


Δελτίο Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών

Τόμ. 4 (1983)

Αφιέρωμα στη Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή



Δuo όψεις της Αμερικάνικης πολιτικής: Ο ναύαρχος Bristol και ο πρόξενος Horton

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doi: [10.12681/deltiokms.38](https://doi.org/10.12681/deltiokms.38)

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Βιβλιογραφική αναφορά:

Housepian, M. (1983). Δuo όψεις της Αμερικάνικης πολιτικής: Ο ναύαρχος Bristol και ο πρόξενος Horton. *Δελτίο Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών*, 4, 131–158. <https://doi.org/10.12681/deltiokms.38>

II
Η ΚΡΙΣΙΜΗ ΤΡΙΕΤΙΑ

GEORGE HORTON AND MARK L. BRISTOL:
OPPOSING FORCES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
1919-1923

In the years 1919-1923 so crucial to the history of Asia Minor and the destiny of Turkey's remaining Christian populations, two American officials stand out as the embodiments of opposing forces in United States foreign policy: the force of conscience on the one hand and of pragmatism on the other. After an uneven struggle it was of course this last, representing short-term interests and opportunities that won the day at Lausanne. Yet the sides were not quite so clearly drawn as one might expect. True, Big Business and its mighty ally the Harding administration* led the pragmatists, untroubled by the force of conscience except for one flickering moment during the burning of Smyrna in 1922. The same could not be said of those peddlars of Christianity, the Protestant missionaries, who in the nineteen-twenties were deeply involved in questions of foreign policy both in the Near and Far East, but could not so easily discard matters of conscience, although some managed to do so more easily than others. Journalists, newspaper editors and the mighty weight of public opinion had also to be pried loose from their earlier stand against injustice. At the end the ranks of those speaking for the force of conscience were reduced to a few solitary figures, among them a lonely government official who was to put the matter in perspective: «The United States has done some things it ought to be ashamed of», he wrote in 1927, «if there were anybody to feel shame. A government, is, unfortunately, constructed in some respects like a corporation, which lawyers inform us has no soul».¹

This man was George Horton, the American Consul General at Smyrna from 1911-1917 and 1919-1922. In contrast, and belligerently pragmatic,

*Oil interests were already helping determine Near Eastern policy in 1919 when Wilson's leadership and his policies were weakening.

1. George Horton, *Recollections Grave and Gay, the Story of a Mediterranean Consul*, 1927, p. 93.

was Admiral Mark L. Bristol, Chief of the U.S. fleet in Turkish waters and American High Commissioner at Constantinople 1919-1923. Both men were born and raised in small towns in the northeastern section of the United States. They were only nine years apart in age, and both came from solidly American middle class backgrounds. And yet the two were worlds apart in character and outlook. A look at these men, their attitudes and careers, may be instructive in appraising the course of American diplomacy during the years in question, and, to an extent since.

George Horton was born in 1859 in Fairville, New York. An ancestor, one "Captain Horton" had reached American shores from Britain in 1635 and built for his bride what was in those days an exceptionally fine house which still stands (it is now a museum) as the oldest frame house on Long Island, in the town of Southold. In 1878 Horton received his A.B. degree from the University of Michigan where as a student he came under the tutelage of a noted classicist of the day, Professor Martin D'Ooge, and became an ardent Hellenist. D'Ooge taught him ancient Greek and the Classics. Horton later learned to speak and write modern Greek fluently: he translated poems of Sappho and other of the ancients, and wrote original poetry in modern Greek. In 1922, when the American consulate at Smyrna was engulfed in flames and Horton had time only to snatch up a treasured possession or two as he fled the building, he grabbed D'Ooge's book, *The Acropolis at Athens*².

Horton made his early living as a journalist in Chicago, a career that thrust him intimately into the first of many brutal and cynical environments which nonetheless failed to contaminate either his sense of justice or his vision. He remained essentially a poet and continued to write prolifically both poetry and prose with a talent rare enough to be recognized by such masters of his day as William Dean Howells and Walt Whitman, the great master poet himself, who has been quoted as saying that he preferred Horton's poetry to that of any living American's³.

Horton's first volume of poetry, *Songs of the Lowly*, was published in 1891 and drew praise for its delicacy, sincerity and honesty of sentiments as well as for his masterly yet unpretentious style⁴ — this last a rarity in a day when stylistic affectations were rampant. He went on to pub-

2. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

3. As quoted in George Horton's obituary in *The New York Times*, June 10, 1942, p. 21.

4. Quoted in *Athene*, VII/2 (summer 1946 dedicated to George Horton and his work), p. 3.

lish a second volume and over his lifetime more than a dozen books, most of them novels set in Greece.

The reviews of Horton's works reveal clearly that while appraising his works the critics were presenting a measure of the man. In 1902 his novel of Chicago life (*The Long Straight Road*) prompted reviewers to note, in the words of one, «the sterling democracy of the writer, his unflinching sympathy for the great struggling mass of humanity»⁵.

It was of course this «unflinching sympathy», this sensitivity that drew Horton the writer to his readers. This trait of character also qualified him as an ideal representative of his government to a land toward which he felt so deeply empathetic. Essentially a romantic, he was, unlike most, neither a dreamer nor an escapist from the harsh realities. Rather, he devoted the better part of his life to helping those who needed his help and in trying to explain to those in power the effect of these realities and, in specific circumstances, to set forth reasons why it was a matter of enlightened self interest for America to combat injustice even if doing so conflicted with immediate profits.

In America it was not at that time customary (nor is it always now) to match a man's qualifications to his assigned diplomatic post. In *Recollections Grave and Gay*, a volume of witty and profound observations and reminiscences which was published in 1927, Horton describes the typical American consul of the 19th century as more often than not an underpaid, untutored, uncouth political hack⁶. This was not surprising considering the casual way in which these men were chosen. Horton himself had been offered the post of Secretary of Legation to Berlin in 1893, an unsought for reward for a series of editorials he had written in the *Chicago Herald* at election time favoring Grover Cleveland. These had pleased the new President enough to prompt an offer after his election. «I could see no connection between such editorials and the ability to fill a diplomatic post intelligently then, nor do I now», Horton noted, «at any rate I did not wish to go to Berlin and declined». He requested, and was given, the post for which he felt thoroughly qualified, and arrived in Athens as Consul in 1893, «freshly escaped from a Chicago news desk»⁷.

At that time a consul held his post so long as his benefactor remained in office; Horton was «turned out» when McKinley succeeded Cleve-

5. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

6. *Recollections*, p. 85.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

land although he remained longer than he had expected «due to a petition from many prominent and learned men, until I became about the sole survivor of the deluge and aroused considerable indignation on the part of patriots anxious to serve their country abroad»⁸.

Senator Spooner of Wisconsin had a candidate for Horton's job who was the owner of a lumber mill in the Senator's home State. The man finally arrived in Smyrna (though rather abruptly) to take over. As Horton describes it:

«One day without previous warning, a tall, fierce-looking man with a peg leg walked into my parlor and asked 'Are you the counsel?'

"I am the Consul", I replied.

"I'm the new counsel", announced this fearful wedding guest, "I've come to take over the archeeves. When can you git out?"

I told him it would take about a week.

"Can't ye git out quicker'n that?" he insisted, "My things are down on the ship, rottin' in the boxes".

Horton tried to explain that he should stay a bit to show the new "counsel" what was what.

"I won't need yer help; it's different now from what it was when you was appointed. I had to be examined".

A farcical examination had been put into effect, Horton explains, and, having "passed", the new man felt thoroughly qualified for the job⁹.

In fairness, Horton explains that some old-time consuls, though untutored, had sterling virtues. He offers as an example one Colonel Maden, an old consul in Smyrna who demanded the release from prison of an Armenian who was an American citizen. When the authorities refused, he took an axe, chopped down the prison door and let the man out. "The American government had prestige in those days and such an act was possible", Horton remarks sadly, and adds that "when this good man's term ended he hadn't enough money to get his family back to the U.S. Friends rescued him and he sailed away in a crazy little cargo boat. I heard that he had found employment as a floorwalker in a department store in Philadelphia. . ." ¹⁰

Horton was reappointed to his Athens post by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905, and until 1910 served as Consul General. (In 1909

8. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

he married Catherine Sacopoulo of Athens.) In 1910 he became Consul at Salonika and a year later was made Consul General at Smyrna, where he remained until diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey were suspended in 1917. In May 1919 he returned to Smyrna and resumed his post at about the same time that Mark L. Bristol was being appointed American High Commissioner to Constantinople.

Born in Glassboro, New Jersey in 1868 Bristol graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy at Annapolis at the age of 19, the same age at which Horton had received his A. B. from Michigan. In the eighteen - eighties a Navy education dwelled hardly at all on the humanities but stressed naval engineering and similar technical subjects, so that Bristol, never strong in the refinements and complexities of history, language or literature had, by virtue of his training as well as inclinations, a thoroughly parochial view of the world in general and America in particular. This view he retained throughout his life.

He rose through the ranks from Ensign and, by 1913, thanks to the impetus of the Spanish-American War, had been made Captain, having served aboard the battleship Texas at the famous Battle of Santiago. From 1913, when he was promoted to Rear Admiral, until the end of 1916, he was in charge of the Aeronautical Division of the Navy, then in its infancy and staffed with men intensely interested in this new technological development. Bristol did not believe naval aviation had a future, and his more enthusiastic colleagues were not sorry to see him leave to take charge of a troop convoy to Europe when the United States entered the War in 1917»¹¹.

After several more shifts in assignment Bristol was moved to the U.S. Naval Detachment in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1919 and, in August of that year, was appointed U.S. High Commissioner to Turkey. (The Chief of Staff assigned to him here was Allen Dulles, who early in 1921 would become the head of the Near East desk at the Department of State under the Harding administration.) It was of course in Turkey that Bristol's path converged with Horton's.

When the two first met, Bristol had been in Turkey for a few months, most of this time in charge of the fleet, while Horton had served as Consul through the area for a total of nearly a quarter of a century. The two men could not have been more different in character and outlook. Bri-

11. This information was revealed to me by a member of the staff at the Library of Congress who was sorting the papers of the United States Navy's Aeronautical division while I was engaged in studying the Bristol papers.

stol was insular, ruthlessly ambitious, affable and charming toward those he considered socially deserving or for some reason worthy of his attentions, arrogant to those he considered inferior and could be of no use to him or who stood in his way. He was none too bright, indeed dense to complexities, but shrewd, single-minded and persistent. He had several mottos which run like a refrain through his correspondence (his ineptitude for writing did not prevent him from carrying on a prodigious letter-writing campaign) which shows that he was in the habit of writing the same letter with only minor variations to a good many recipients.

«I believe there is only one correct road to follow and that is the right road», was a remark he evidently thought profound enough to repeat, «I am for the U.S. first, last and always». This last usually was followed by: «Of course I believe in a square deal for everyone concerned». On at least one occasion (after a meeting with Lord Beaverbrook in Constantinople?) as he confessed in his diary, he had hastily changed the subject in order to avoid specifying what «a square deal for everyone» would be¹².

Bristol detested Greeks, Armenians, Jews and only slightly less, the British, all of whom interfered with his interests. He often referred to «my interests» although these were, of course, those of the Department of State under the secretaryship of Charles Evans Hughes. Fresh from a top executive position at the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Hughes was giving his highest priority to the interests of big business (especially Standard Oil) and to the establishment, in Turkey, of a most favored position for the United States as regarded the exploitation of the Mosul oil fields (then belonging to Turkey) and what were thought of as vast resources and opportunities.

By now Horton had outlasted countless changes in administration. During the War and before the United States entered against Germany, he had taken charge of the interests in Asia Minor of Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania. During this period he had protected Greeks and Armenians in Smyrna and distributed relief among needy civilians and prisoners of war. For his services during the War he received the thanks of the British and French governments, was decorated with the Papal order of Gregory the Great for the protection he had afforded the Christians, and was made a Com-

12. See chapter IX, Marjorie Housepian, *Smyrna, 1922. The Destruction of a City*, London 1972.

mander of the Order of the Savior by the Greek government. The United States government had bestowed no honors upon him but had returned him to his post. By now sixty years old, Horton was undoubtedly content to stay there until retirement, and the government for its part must have seen the need for a man who could get along well with all sides in a sensitive area he knew so thoroughly. Bristol, after studying Horton's reports and talking with him had declared the man to be «plainly fair and square»¹³. In Bristol's terms this meant that he found Horton free from pro-Greek prejudice, a fact that surprised him considerably when he discovered that Horton was married to a Greek.

It was Bristol's object to prove to the Turkish élite, whom he courted diligently, and through them to the emerging government led by Mustapha Kemal (who no one doubted would rule the new Turkey) that he, Bristol, and the government he represented were not the neutrals they publicly professed to be, but were warmly pro-Turkish. Italy and France may have beat America to the side of the Kemalists, but Bristol would prove that America's devotion would outdo the others.

This required getting the missionaries and business interests together and convincing them, first, that engaging in business of any kind with Turkey was a respectable thing to do. The missionaries, especially (who were the single most powerful force in shaping public opinion toward countries where large numbers of American protestant missionaries had moved in), were now needed to help reverse American opinion. After the Armenian «exterminations» of 1915-1916 (as the genocide was then called) the returning missionaries, as eyewitnesses, had so thoroughly publicized the atrocities that Americans looked upon Turks as more savage than the hordes of Ghengiz Khan.

Bristol's sense of public relations left nothing to be desired; he knew he had first to convince the key missionaries, who also administered the Near East Relief which not only had publicized the genocide but sent aid to those Armenian orphans gathered in the deserts who had somehow survived their parents' deaths, and to Armenians who had fled over the border adjacent to Russia and were dying of starvation by the tens of thousands. Missionary and Near East Relief officials (often one and the

13. Bristol to Secretary of the Navy, 18 March 1924, Naval Records Collection, The National Archives, Washington, D. C. Also U. S. National Archives 767.68/624. (Bristol did not depart from this position either during Horton's tenure in Smyrna or after.)

same) had close ties with the newspapers. Bristol's job entailed convincing these officials that the only hope the missions had of salvaging their investments of millions of dollars in properties (homes, schools, dispensaries all of which literally numbered in the thousands, there being over 350 mission schools alone in Turkey) and over a hundred years of effort (exclusively among Armenians and Greeks) and of working directly to convert Moslems now that Kemal was ready to dissolve the Caliphate and secularize the nation, lay in changing their attitude. This, the policymakers reasoned, would jolt the press, and the American public, into shifting their views as well¹⁴.

The reasoning was correct: they had simply underestimated the time it would take to accomplish a reversal of public opinion, given the extent of the public's awareness of past events, and a total lack of cooperation from the Turks who continued to commit atrocities against the remaining Christian populations. Fortunately for Admiral Bristol, the Greeks and Armenians retaliated in kind just often enough for him and now the reconverted missionaries and businessmen to seize on *these* atrocities as proof that «these people are no better than the Turks». They were in fact far worse than the Turks, Bristol kept insisting, though just why he did not specify.

Bristol's first opportunity to show the extent of his friendship toward Turkey came in connection with the landing in Smyrna of Greek forces on May 15, 1919, following authorization given Venizelos at the Peace Conference in Paris. Incidents of murder, rape and pillage against Turk and retaliatory acts of the same kind against Greeks, accompanied the landings. George Horton later summed up the situation as follows:

I arrived in Smyrna immediately after the Greek landing and found perfect order reigning. From careful investigation I substantiated that 76 Turks had been killed, partly by Greek soldiers and partly by the mob.

The ringleaders were immediately punished by the Greek authorities. Three, including a Greek soldier, were executed. I was present and saw the execution. Seventy-four sentences in all were passed and carried out.¹⁵

14. See *Smyrna, 1922*, Chapter V.

15. The personal papers of George Horton (undated draft of letter addressed to *The Washington Star*).

Bristol expressed *his* conclusions three days after the Greek landings. He wrote to a friend, Admiral Sims, (on May 18, 1919):

Everything is going very well out here except the most recent occurrence which was the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks assisted by the "Associated Powers". To me it is a calamity to let the Greeks have anything in this part of the world. Of course all of us were brought up to believe that the Greeks or the modern Greeks are simply the representatives of all the ancient Greeks meant to the world. This is so far wrong that probably everyone out here will agree that the Greek is about the worst race in the Near East. This may seem radical but it is pretty close to the truth. I am holding no brief for any race in the Near East because I believe that the Turk, the Greek, the Armenian, the Syrian etc., if shaken up in a bag you would not know which one would come up first but probably the Turk is the best one of the lot especially if he is given a chance to develop under normal conditions.

*I have not so much hope for these other races. If they intend to split this country up we may look for troubles in these parts for a good many years to come. It will be a second Balkan situation only a great deal worse for there are no Serbs or Bulgars or anything like their qualities to build on.*¹⁶

Again, in his Report of May 25, 1919:

There is an old saying «where there is so much smoke there must be some fire» therefore when the opinion of people who know the Greeks is so universal in regard to their inability to govern other races in the Near East, it seems eminently proper that some heed should be taken. . . The Greeks should not be granted territory in Asia Minor or in Thrace. The occurrences in Smyrna bear out the statements that have often been made regarding what would happen if the Greeks were allowed to occupy parts of Turkey.

Two months later Bristol was chosen to be the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry on the Smyrna Landings. His final Report on the subject, written with the assistance of his chief Intelligence officer, gave an enormous boost to the Turkish nationalist cause

16. This and other quotations from Bristol's correspondence, diaries or Reports, unless otherwise noted are from the Bristol papers at the Library of Congress.

by officially legitimizing all offensive actions taken by the Turks subsequent to the landings, and condemning all actions taken by the Greeks during and after the landings regardless of provocation. The punishment inflicted on the Greeks by their own administration, the Report Stated, was proof of their guilt.

Horton, by now aware of the new policy and Bristol's attitude, could do little but continue to send out his observations and Intelligence information, and hope that someone would take notice. As an example, on January 27th, 1920 Horton cabled in code :

I have just had a long talk with British officer detailed for duty of observation along the lines of Greek occupation. Reference to Turkish allegations that Greeks are attacking and bombing Turkish villages, he says that it was his duty to inform Turkish irregulars that now Greek line had been decided upon by the Council at Paris, and that. . . [the Greeks] could have 14 days delay to evacuate certain villages. Turks refused to obey instructions and when the Greeks advanced, Turks fired upon Greeks. As a result fighting developed along the entire line and Turkish regular troops came to the aid of irregulars. Turks have also refused to recognize neutral zone 3,000 yards wide established by General Milne and are firing with artillery on the Greeks from villages in this zone.

Moslem population heartily sick of irregulars who levy large sums of money on cities such as Akhissar, Panderma, Soma, Baliassar, etc., and seize cattle and cereals from smaller towns. Turks do not like Greeks but they prefer the latter to Moslem bands and many Turks are crossing the border into Greek occupied territory. Turks are not being maltreated by the Greeks as the Hellenic officers have strict orders to control their troops in this respect.

This officer. . . believes that if a definite decision were made as to the Smyrna villayet at least half [of the 20,000 irregulars] scattered through the villages would disband and go home. He says he has talked with many Turks and knows these believe that they have only the Greeks opposed to them and that the great Powers are not supporting the Greeks. . . This officer is a native born Englishman without any Greek affiliations. I can substantiate the truth of his statements from personal observation in the country and from other sources. . .¹⁷

17. Found in the Bristol papers.

All of Horton's reports now had to go to the State Department via Bristol, who added his own lengthy opinions, heavily coated with what «most people out here think. . . » and insisting that «pitiless publicity» he given «the true facts» (insinuating that Horton's were «false facts»). His own Reports had no relationship to Horton's.

Bristol wrote to Colonel William Haskell, Allied Commissioner to Armenia in 1919 in acknowledgement of one of Haskell's Reports «Now, as regards information obtained from Azerbaijan, Armenia, or from Turkey, I never take stock on it on its face value and only use this information as a line of investigation to find out the truth*. . . this is a very plain accusation, I know, but it is the experience of a good many months and the experience of most people who have lived for years in this country. From some of the confidential information forwarded in Rhea's letter I would say it came from a British source. . . »

«Most people who have lived in this country», referred, in Bristol's parlance, to anyone who happened to agree with him, most often the Turkish élite with whom he spent many pleasant afternoons and evenings in their palatial villas and on board his flagship *Scorpion* which served as his yacht. In his book, *The Blight of Asia*, Horton discreetly but clearly called attention to the effectiveness of Bristol's social life.

The shrewd, Europeanized group of Turks who inhabit Constantinople overdid themselves in the courtesies and hospitality which they lavished on foreign diplomats. This sort of oriental is the most plausible and fascinating man in the world. The educated hanum, also, is extremely charming and has a seductive grace that is hardly granted to her alien sisters. If a few of them take off their veils and show their faces in Constantinople they have little difficulty in persuading diplomats that they are emancipated, that polygamy is a thing of the past among Mohammedans, that the Greeks burned Smyrna, that a million and a half Christians practically committed suicide and were not actually massacred, or anything else they wish.

What can one do but believe, when he is taken back to the days of Haroun-al-Raschid, and floats off to a palace perfumed with roses of Cashmere on an enchanted carpet?

*There is no indication in the Bristol papers or in the Naval or State Department archives of Bristol's having made any attempt to «use the information as a line of investigation to find out the truth».

*Our representative at Constantinople, Admiral Mark L. Bristol, is an extremely attractive personality: honest, brave, generous with frank and winning manners. By the sheer magnetism of his genial and engaging character he gathers about himself, wherever he is, a school of admirers and disciples who ardently defend the Admiral and everything he thinks and does.*¹⁸

As a skilled professional writer, Horton was able to convey, by flattery and juxtaposition, the information he intended without subjecting himself to the possibility of a suit for libel.)

While Admiral Bristol's reports on the respective virtues and failings of Turks and Greeks were lacking in detail, he was ready to pass along pertinent facts about business concessions as they supported his prognoses:

Greece's efforts to check Italy's expansion is probably not displeasing to France with that [sic] Greece has been selected for the base for Britain's trade drive is indicated by the fact that Athens was selected as the place for holding Britain's Industrial Exhibition in the Near East and that the Near Eastern Commissioner of the Federation of British Industries is located there.

Especially ominous is the possibility that virtual British control will be instituted over the extremely important port of Piraeus. A plan for port improvements to the value of \$ 24,000,000 is almost certain to be awarded to a British firm, as Venizelos is now the Greek government and he is openly pro-British. . . With harbor dues under the control of the British it is easy to anticipate the difficulties that commercial competitors would encounter. If Britain should also gain control of Constantinople, her monopoly of the trade of the Near East could be made complete. . .

Horton, later, had this to say about British backing of Greece:

Though Britain was largely responsible for the landing of Greeks in Asia Minor, and the latter were defending her interests, she afforded them no aid but gave them fallacious encouragement which led them

18. George Horton, *The Blight of Asia*, 1927, p. 203-4.

to their doom. As far as England was concerned, Greece was the victim of British internal politics which seized upon the government's policy in the Near East as an object for attack. If Lloyd George was pro-Greek his political opponents became, ipso-facto, rabid pro-Turk. If the Hellenic soldiers were mere tools of the British, as both the Italians and the French believed, then it certainly was not «playing the game» to desert them in their extremity; and this desertion carries a graver responsibility with it, inasmuch as it made possible the fearful catastrophe of Smyrna and its hinterland.

On July 2, 1920, the Secretary of State conveyed to Bristol the news that the Greek Minister had formally objected to the Admiral's «alleged» favoritism to the Turks and hostility to Greeks. The Department «feels confident that the reported attitude. . . has been unintentional on your part. You are nevertheless requested to make no expression whatever which might be construed as unfriendly towards the Greeks or to show favoritism to the Turks. The Admiral's straightforward reply follows:

I deny most emphatically and categorically that I have shown favoritism to the Turks and hostility to the Greeks, but on the contrary since coming here 18 months ago I have endeavored to consistently maintain a neutral and just attitude toward all races and factions.

That done, and with a more or less free hand given by “the full confidence” of the State Department, Bristol continued as before, presumably with somewhat more inhibition in public. During the years 1920-1921 he was especially careful to stop any news of the renewed massacres (of Greeks, and the relatively few returning Armenians) from reaching the newspapers; the Near East Relief officials cooperated by insisting that all workers in the areas of the massacres sign statements that they would not reveal what they had witnessed. Bristol also pressed the State Department to resist, strenuously, any moves by the Allies to conduct an investigation, after two missionaries, Ward and Yowell, disclosed the renewed atrocities on their return to England. Bristol called these heartrending accounts “Yowell's yowell”. He wrote to Allen Dulles on May 24, 1922.

England, evidently for the time being, achieved a strong diplomatic position by utilizing the reports of Dr. Ward and Mr. Yowell. . . By this maneuver America has been drawn into a false position on the

side of England and our prestige has been lowered and England has been able to make it appear that the Turks are not worthy of any consideration. . . thus the only solution will be to back the Greeks. . . The general impression is here that this action of England is political and not humanitarian. . . I realize that a great deal of pressure will be brought to bear upon the Department by American public opinion to favor our taking part in the proposed investigation. Yet I hope the Department will stand out and not be drawn into this mixup. I am sure you will agree with me that if we remain on the outside we will be able to do a great deal more to bring about a solution of this Near Eastern problem than if we get mixed up with the European countries.

I am sure we cannot fully realize out here the strength of agitation in America on behalf of the Greeks and Armenians. Yet I have always had this in mind and thus handled affairs out here so as to make allowance for the position the Department was bound to be placed in by this agitation. . .

Dulles replied (July 25, 1922):

The proposed investigation in Turkey has gone very much the course we foresaw and which you predicted. . . I wish we could state that the stories of the Turkish atrocities were unfounded or even grossly exaggerated, it would make our position easier, but unfortunately the evidence, even if it comes from prejudiced witnesses, has not been refuted and I am afraid it cannot be. It is not a satisfactory answer to the Christians in this country [to say] that the Greeks and Armenians have also been guilty. They ask whether the Christians can be blamed after what they have suffered at the hands of the Turk. I write this so that you can fully appreciate our position here.

On September 9, 1922, the day Kemal's troops entered Smyrna and even as they were beginning, systematically, to surround the Armenian quarter and rob, rape and kill the inhabitants, house by house, Bristol's naval representative on the scene, Captain Hepburn, reported to Bristol that Horton was «almost a total wreck from loss of sleep and worry from being continually besieged not only by civilians of all nationalities but by his official colleagues as well».

In his reply, dated September 11, Bristol refers to a telegram sent him from the Department of State:

With regard to the status of Horton: It will be very desirable for Horton to remain at Smyrna as a delegate of this High Commission. If you can do anything unofficially with the Kemalists authorities to further this I will leave it to you to do what you think best. I will approach the Kemalists authorities at this end with regard to Horton remaining there. I think the line of attack would be to get the Kemalists local authorities to realize that Horton remaining in Smyrna would create a good impression with our government and with our people, also that he would be of much assistance in connection with any relief work that we undertook there. Of course we don't want to raise any issue. . . and above all it should never come to a point of their ordering Horton out. We should insist on their simply indicating that they would prefer not to have a Delegate and we would accede to their desire. In case Horton had to leave, a destroyer could be utilized to bring him away. If he has to leave I think it would be better for him to come here first and not to go to Greece direct.

This message is interesting for its revelation that Horton had become essential as a symbol of the administration's concern and that the forces of public opinion were still agitating—much to the Department's dismay—on behalf of the Armenians and Greeks. That these forces were strong is evident in the statement, as is the intimation that even the Turks had become aware of Horton's position on behalf of the victims, whoever they happened to be.* The Department, and Bristol, at this point needed Horton's presence to head off, or at the very least to reduce the pressures they were certain to receive after the Turks seized Smyrna. There appears to have been no question that (along with everyone except the Armenians and Greeks, who felt secure because of the allied fleet standing in the harbor), the Americans expected trouble.

Horton at this time (Sept. 11) had become not simply exhausted but frustrated to the limits of his endurance by the ignominious behavior of the Allies, and especially of his fellow Americans who were giving the Turks all the licence possible to renew their age-old pattern of atrocities against native Christians. He was taking a brief rest on board the U.S. destroyer Litchfield (having had virtually not a night's sleep in a week) while, nearby, two correspondents, Constantine Brown and John Clayton, typed their stories. Bristol had given these men permission to go

*Horton's personal papers reveal as many letters from grateful Turks, written over the course of his service in Turkey, as from grateful Greeks and «others».

to Smyrna on one of his destroyers on condition that they would submit to his censorship and provide what he called «balanced coverage». This meant that atrocities committed against Greeks and Armenians had to be «balanced» by similar acts committed by Greeks and Armenians against Turks. Horton had closed his eyes for a moment when he heard one of the men stop typing, pull his sheet out of the machine and say, «I can't send this stuff, it'll queer me in Constantinople. We'd better get busy and look for some Greek atrocities.»²⁰

That evening Horton went to Brown's hotel and tried to make as strong a case as he could for reporting the truth. He had heard that war was about to break out between England and Turkey, he told the newsman, and England planned to offer the Turkish atrocities as a part of the *causis belli*. (Horton was in fact revealing nothing that had not been openly rumored for days). Exhibiting his devotion to Bristol's orders, Brown rushed to report this «strange conversation» to Captain Hepburn, who immediately sent word of it, via destroyer, to Bristol in Constantinople²¹. By the time the destroyer returned to Smyrna the city was already in flames. On Hepburn's orders, confirmed by Bristol, George Horton left Smyrna with the first boatload of American dependents. He was not to return.

Consul Horton's final report to the State Department on the burning of Smyrna titled «The Near Eastern Question» and dated from Athens, September 27, 1922, is a poignant historical document of seven legal sized single-spaced pages in which he sums up the history of the Christian minorities in Asia Minor as he observed their treatment by the Turks during his 25 years of service in the area. His testament is prophetic: «The real progressive workers are gone», he writes, «and any development of the land is halted forever». As for the outrages the Greeks had committed during the retreat of their armies:

*I see a difference between the excesses of a furious and betrayed army. . . and the conduct of the victorious Turkish army which, instead of protecting the helpless people which it had in its power, deliberately set about massacring and outraging it.*²²

20. *Blight*, p. 205-6.

21. See *Smyrna, 1922*, p. 144.

22. This report was still listed as «classified» in the National Archives in 1969. It was released on my request but a copy reached me shortly after my book on the burning of Smyrna (U. S. edition *The Smyrna Affair*, 1971) had gone to press.

After a leave, Horton was sent on his last assignment as Consul to Budapest for the remaining few years of his career. It was considered a low grade post and showed the extent to which the Department overlooked his long and valuable service, but more especially how much they deplored his failure to «play the game». Unable to afford, financially, to resign from government service, he remained the few years to his retirement, when at last the lid was off.

In *The Blight of Asia* he wrote, as he said, «strictly in my capacity as a private citizen, and without reference to official documents» to tell the world — specifically the Christian world of America which was made up of millions of citizens who financially supported the foreign missions «the grim tale of the extermination of Christians and Christianity in the Near East». For the contemporary reader the book is weakened by the excessively religious overtones which portray the Turks not only as destructive, but as the forces of anti-Christ. This may be explained to an extent by the years of enforced restraint to which Horton had been subjected, and in large part to the readership to whom he was addressing the book: those Christians and missionaries who, even after Lausanne, could be made to feel some pangs of conscience at the betrayal of their brethren in Asia Minor. The papers of the Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions housed in the Houghton Library at Harvard University, testify to the struggle within the missionary movement in the years that led to the Treaty of Lausanne, and to the bitterness some of the individual missionaries felt as they witnessed the victory of pragmatism operating no less in the business of religion, than in the business of oil.

The Blight of Asia is said to have disappeared so rapidly from circulation that there were rumors of the State Department buying it up. There is no question that it troubled those in power and brought on a tumult of protest. It stands as a testimony to the greed of nations and as a testament to a man who after nearly three decades in Asia Minor did not harden himself to the sights and sounds of suffering. In his book he characteristically went to the heart of the matter concerning the holocaust at Smyrna:

Certainly at Smyrna nothing was lacking in the way of atrocity, lust, cruelty and all that fury of human passion which, given their full play, degrade the human race to a level lower than the vilest and

23. *Blight*, p. 153.

cruelest of beasts. . . One of the keenest impressions which I brought away with me from Smyrna was a feeling of shame that I belonged to the human race. . .

The Turks freely glutted their lust for slaughter, rape and plunder because they had been systematically led to believe they would not be interfered with. And this, the presence of battleships in Smyrna harbor impotently watching the last great scene in the tragedy of the Christians of Turkey, was the saddest and most significant feature of the whole picture.²³

In letters to his many friends Bristol summed up his own version of the Smyrna «incident»:

The Greek debacle of Anatolia has been put in our press in such a way as to tell one side of the story as has been the case so often. You hear nothing about the outrages committed by the Greek army and Greek civilians as they evacuated Western Anatolia. . . Smyrna was undoubtedly burned by all hands and not especially by the Turks. A very remarkable thing is that under the circumstances the Turkish army did not commit wholesale massacre in Smyrna. . .*

And in Bristol's diaries of which the following passages of October 17, 1922 provide an example, we see in microcosm the summation and direction of American diplomacy:

Suad Bey and his wife, who was formerly Mrs. John P. Spreckles, an American woman, called on board the Scorpion. He has recently been to Smyrna where he stated he had seen all of the Turkish high officials and they were all anxious for peace and desired to get to work as soon as possible in reconstructing the country. . .

He said that the Turks especially wanted Americans to come in and do business. This gave me my opening to point out to him very forcibly the necessity for the Nationalist Government to make laws that would not interfere with the proper development of commerce and trade. . .

*In his official Report, which he did not send until March 27, 1924, Bristol absolves the Turks entirely for the burning of Smyrna.

I then went on to point out very plainly to Suad Bey that the Turks had made a grave mistake in Smyrna. . . Suad admitted that Nouredin Pasha had not pleased the Turks and stated that Mustapha Kemal in his address to the Grand National Assembly mentioned all the Turkish commanders who had distinguished themselves and rendered great service but omitted to mention Nouredin Pasha. . .

Mrs. Suad Bey remarked that the press in America was changing its tone to a favorable attitude towards Turkey. . .

In the afternoon Ensign and Mrs. D. L. Jones and Lieutenant and Mrs. Mackey called.

In the afternoon Mrs. Bristol and I attended a tea given by the Spanish Minister at the Pera Palace Hotel. . .

In 1927 Admiral Bristol was made Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic fleet. George Horton, after publishing *The Blight of Asia*, modestly lived out his days on a meager pension, but continued bravely to speak his mind.

MARJORIE HOUSEPIAN

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Athens, Greece, September 27, 1922

SUBJECT: The Near Eastern Question

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to submit to the Department a statement of what has been and is going on in the Near East, with a brief discourse on the events and causes which have led up to the appalling tragedy that is now being enacted at Smyrna.

I have the honor to call the attention of the Department to the fact that immediately after the Greeks landed in Smyrna, I telegraphed that this would prove a second «Syracusan Expedition», referring to the war against Syracuse in 413 B.C. which led to the complete depletion of the Athenian treasury and the effacement of Athens as the leading power of the ancient world.

In another dispatch, whose date I cannot refer to here as the archives are in Smyrna, I predicted that if the Greek army retreated from Asia Minor it would be followed by the entire Christian population and said that anyone who could not foresee this was not familiar with the situation of the Near East and the mentality of its peoples. A copy of this was forwarded to Constantinople, and I remember receiving an explanation to the effect that the new Turkish administration which would be established would be a «kindly and benevolent administration.»

Of course in some circles, the hideous and outrageous conduct of the Turks in Smyrna will be explained by the rage created among the Turks by the devastation caused by the Greek army in its retreat upon this city. I have been in the Consular service in the Near East for nearly thirty years and there are some things which all men who have had long residence in this country absolutely know. After the atrocious and frightful massacre of Armenians in 1915, of which I reported to the Department full accounts given me by the native-born American eye witnesses, representatives of American firms who came to Smyrna, I did not see how anyone could longer have faith in the kindly intentions of the Turks towards the Christian populations of the empire. About one million and a quarter Armenians per-

ished in that awful affair, done to death by slow torture under circumstances of the most dreadful cruelty. This methodical extermination of the Christian population has been going on steadily since. The fear inspired in the Christian population is such that the non-Mussulman inhabitants of Smyrna would in any case have run away at the first definite announcement that the Turks were coming back. This is so plain that anybody ought to be able to see it.

The last great Sultan of the old Ottoman empire was Abdul Hamid, the last great ruler who knew what the Ottoman empire was, namely the remains of the old Byzantine empire, composed of various industrial and progressive races whom the Turk lived upon as a parasite by taxing them. Abdul Hamid knew that the safety of the so-called Ottoman empire lay in keeping the Christians in dissension, a not very difficult task, — and as far as Macedonia was concerned, he kept a special expert at Salonica whose duty it was to provoke rows between the Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbians. When he was deposed and the so-called new Turk came into power, they commenced, as, my dispatches and those of all my colleagues at the post at that time will show, to persecute and exterminate Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbians indiscriminately and a general reign of terror was started. The prisons overflowed and Salonica began to fill with women reporting their husbands had been killed or spirited away. No general massacre took place but sporadic killings almost amounting to a massacre, besides brutal tortures, prevailed all over Macedonia. The situation became so intolerable that the Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbians were obliged to get together for long enough to drive out the Turk, a thing which they could have done at any time for many years past but for the dissensions mentioned above. It is true that they fell at each other's throats as soon as their task was finished but they stayed together long enough to accomplish this.

What has been at the back of the minds of the Turks ever since the fall of Abdul Hamid is well represented in their slogan, «Turkey for the Turks». Themselves unprogressive, except in the arts of war, incapable of commerce on a large scale or manufacturing, inventions or modern industry, they are jealous of the Christians whom they regard as thriving at their expense. I have heard Turkish politicians make speeches at Salonica in which they affirm that if the Christians were exterminated and driven out, the Turks would of sheer necessity progress and develop schools, commerce and industry. Then followed the great massacre mentioned above and other great massacres on a smaller scale.

The landing of the Greeks in Asia Minor as actually carried out was the great mistake of Venizelos. Though undoubtedly asked by the represen-

tatives of all the allies to go to Smyrna, he should not have done so without an actual treaty, with a written statement of what support they would give. To avoid the horrible catastrophe which has followed, which is exciting the fanaticism and daring of the entire Mussulman world, involving both France and Italy, in untold dangers, only two plans were possible (1st) never to have sent the Greeks to Asia Minor, (2nd) once having sent them there to support them in a loyal manner. What really happened was immediate dissension among the allies as always in history among all Christians. Italy, which had practically been promised Smyrna, started a port at New Ephesus to draw the trade if possible away from the former city and began to sell arms to the Turks and to flatter them. The French, to undermine Great Britain in the Near East, took up an attitude towards the Turks which finally resulted in the Treaty of Angora and the recognition by the French of the government.

Previous to this there had been no such thing as patriotism among the Turks, an ignorant, nomadic people, but the landing of the Greeks gave Mustapha Kemal the very argument he desired for uniting the Turks and the forming of an army. He could not incite the Mussulman peasant to leave his plough or his camels or his herd of goats by an appeal to his patriotism, but an appeal to his fanaticism to drive out the hated Greeks and plunder their rich towns and capture their women found a ready response. Throughout the whole Mussulman world, since the fall of Constantinople, there has been a legend that the Turk was the Mussulman race which could make Europe tremble. The flattering of the Turk, and the wooing of him by the great Christian nations, has again revived in India and Egypt and among Mussulmans generally this ancient tradition.

The regime of the Greeks in Asia Minor was the only civilized and beneficent regime which that country has seen since historic times. I was in close touch with Mr. Sterghiades through it all, I have travelled widely through the country, I have talked with scores of native-born Americans who have travelled over the region and I absolutely know of what I am talking. Greeks were more severely punished for aggressions against Turks than Turks for aggressions against Greeks. Brigandage was practically suppressed, security very generally reigned and insofar as the means of the Greek government permitted, Mr. Sterghiades supported and originated civilized institutions and progress and promoted agriculture, and industry. The Greek farmers, who had but a few years before been driven out from their homes and their villages destroyed, had largely returned and had begun again the cultivation of the famous Sultana grape on a large scale, of tobacco and other agricultural products. I am sending the Department, in

another dispatch, a list of the various benevolent acts towards American educational institutions by Mr. Sterghiades together with another list of the opposite kind of treatment which they have suffered from the Turks. Those institutions are forever lost in Smyrna and vicinity — the large college and agricultural school of Dr. MacLachlan, which has been growing for thirty years, with its expensive buildings constructed with American money, has no longer a reason for existing. The end of that admirable institution was significantly brought to a full stop by the attack upon Dr. MacLachlan himself by Turkish soldiers, in which he nearly lost his life. The Greeks and Armenians who largely supported it are gone, not to return for many years. The Turks will not attend it. Mrs. Caldwell, wife of one of the professors, told me yesterday that their Turkish students whom they regarded as fine young men, with well molded characters, slumped all their civilization and became savages when the Turks arrived in Smyrna. The Girls School, one of the most admirable institutions in the Near East, the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A. and two institutions for working among the Turks, both of which had been liberally supported by Mr. Sterghiades, are all hopelessly gone. There will doubtless be some business with Smyrna in the near future, some figs will be raised and possibly some raisins and tobacco, but the whole territory is devastated, the real progressive workers are gone and any large development along progressive lines is over perhaps forever.

The Greeks in Smyrna district contended with many difficulties: — (1st) the apathy of the native population which did not support them as it should, (2nd) the impossibility to really placate the Turk, (3rd) the big Levantine British, French and other merchants who had made fortunes under the old Turk of the capitulations and knew that it was impossible to exploit the Greek, (4) the hostility of the large Catholic element which is just as bitter against the Greeks as it was in the days fo the Byzantine empire.

Another thing that has greatly handicapped the Greeks is their pernicious and corrupt politics. The amount to which politics is played in Greece and the extent to which the Greek politician will go, even to the sacrifice of his country and of many lives in order to keep his party in power for a few weeks can hardly be believed. The overthrow of Velizelos, Greece's great advocate in Europe and America, and the bringing back of its discredited king, was the beginning of the end. Politics is played to such an extent that even now, in the face of this tremendous tragedy to Greece, it is not lost sight of, and the Royalist party will not even allow Venizelists to distribute money which they are receiving from Europe or to establish soup kitchens.

I firmly believe from my observations in Smyrna and from information which I have received from various sources, that the terrible disaster which

has happened to the inhabitants of Asia Minor was the result of a contemptible political move. The party in power believed they could not get the help of Europe without turning out Constantine and bringing back Venizelos. Without that help, they could not stay in Smyrna, they could not announce that they were willing to withdraw their armies from the Smyrna district, and they therefore deliberately provoked the debacle which the world has seen. For months there has been a steady withdrawing of Venizelist officers and their replacing by trusted Royalists, many of whom have been deserting their troops, leaving whole regiments without officers. I am credibly informed that the Greek army, even at the last moment, could have made a stand and retrieved the situation as the Turkish forces which entered Smyrna were insignificant. But even the Greek officers who desired to make a stand and expressed their ability to do so were ordered to retire. The whole pitiful tragedy, resulting in the most poignant human suffering on a great scale, must provoke general disgust, and discouragement, with reference to Greeks, Turks and Europe. Mustapha Kemal had an opportunity to justify the praises of his European and American propagandists and to put the Christians to shame by entering Smyrna peacefully and affording protection to all its inhabitants. Instead a revolting massacre was perpetrated, which I have already described but which I shall refer to again. Looting and pillaging and rape and massacre went on on a large scale immediately after the entry of the Turks, their vengeance first breaking upon the Armenian population, who were accused of having thrown bombs. The truth is that very few bombs were thrown, possibly half a dozen at the utmost and those in a quarter of the city where Armenians are seldom seen. This was no excuse for a hunting, night and day for three days, of Armenians by squads of regular soldiers and their killing in the most revolting manner by being shot, stabbed, hacked to death or having their throats cut publicly in the streets. Armenians were systematically hunted and killed throughout the entire city and their houses methodically broken into, street by street, pillaged, and the men taken out and killed. No pro-Turk propaganda can obscure what actually occurred in Smyrna;—there were too many reliable witnesses—the truth is sure to come out.

After the great fire, as a result of which the whole Christian population was forced upon the quay where it remained for days stretching its hands to the battleships in the harbor, screaming and pleading for help and dying of hunger and thirst, the conduct of the Turks was abominable. Miss Emily MacCallum, director of the Girls School in Smyrna, who returned from that city this morning, says that there are still great throngs of these miserable creatures on the quay and along the seashore, without water and without

food and dying, and that the stench of these dead bodies is terrible. There are still two hundred thousand waiting on the quay to be taken off. It has been announced that all of the men from eighteen to forty-five years of age, are to be taken as prisoners of war and marched into the interior, and she saw, corroborating statements by others recently from Smyrna, large bands of men being marched away by Turkish guards. The heart of the whole world has been calloused by the European war but there are still people living who can appreciate, the fearful suffering caused by this forcible separation of these fathers and brothers and relatives from their loved ones. Anyone who has ever lived in the Orient will know that the fate of these people is certain death. During the Great War, while I was in Smyrna, the rayahs, or Greek Ottoman subjects, were forcibly taken for military service and set to digging trenches and other work in the rain, without blankets or tents or food, and three out of four of them died. The families will be brought away, wives and sisters and children will be without natural protectors, and must perish unless indefinitely cared for.

It will be the theory of some that no relief work should be done in Greece and that the brunt of feeding all the refugees brought there should be borne by that country as she was responsible for the great debacle, but the funds of Greece are exhausted and she is unequal to this task, and I do not know why innocent third parties should be made to suffer for the faults of others.

I wish to repeat that the consistent policy of the Turk, since the fall of Abdul Hamid, has been the expulsion, killing and elimination of the Christian races. I have made several successful prophecies and I now make another: If the Kemalists are allowed to enter Constantinople, the awful scenes which we have witnessed in Smyrna will be repeated in that city. In view of all that I have said and of all that has happened, I see no reason why the Turk should massacre Armenians and Greeks in the Pontus, in Armenia and Asia Minor, and give them a «kindly and beneficent regime» in Constantinople.

I wish now to point out the difference between the Greek and the Turk. The Greek has undoubtedly massacred Turks but no nation has such a consistent history of massacres on a great scale or ever had in the world's history as the Turk. Greek politics are corrupt and vicious but the Greek is capable of civilization along modern lines; he builds hospitals, universities, founds steamship lines, introduces modern agriculture and, given liberty, he develops. I see a difference between the excesses of a furious and betrayed army retreating through a country which it had held for several years and without its officers, and the conduct of the victorious Turkish army which, instead

of protecting the helpless people which it had in its power, deliberately set about massacring and outraging it.

No one who has not lived in the Near East can understand how utterly incapable of progress the Turk is. No one, who has not traveled through the Turkish villages or through the back region of the Turkish empire, can understand how hopelessly unprogressive a people is who, holding for nearly five hundred years the fairest and richest part of the earth's surface, has never made a sewing machine nor a plough, nor a steam engine, nor a battleship, nor a cotton gin, nor a pin, nor a match. Anyone who hopes for the progress of Turkey inhabited only by Turks is hoping for the leopard to change its spots. The Mussulman religion, which is now having a great renaissance throughout the world, with its polygamy, its attitude toward women, and to all non-Mussulman races, and the example and teachings of Mohamed as opposed to the teachings and life of Christ, is one of the dark forces at work in the world which are combining to destroy modern civilization. The killing off and extermination of progressive Christian populations and its substitution by Mohamedanism, is a slump in those regions in the world's progress back to the days of Abraham.

I have the honor also to point out to the Department that all massacres on a large scale perpetrated by Turks, and the history of the Turkish empire is largely a history of massacres, are always ordered by higher authorities. Anyone who believes that the forces of Mustapha Kemal got out of hand at Smyrna and that he controlled them as soon as he could, knows nothing about the history of Turkey or events in the Near East. I believe also if the Allied fleets in Smyrna harbor, the French, Italians, British and Americans, had emphatically told Mustapha Kemal that there must be no massacring, none would have taken place. If they told him today that he must cease carrying off the men between eighteen and forty-five into the interior, he would stop, but when he sees the great powers of the world sitting by in security on their battleships watching his fearful procedures, he is emboldened to greater and still greater excesses. The sight of a massacre going on under the eyes of the great powers of Europe and with their seemingly tacit consent, is one that I hope never to see again.

I believe that when the real truth is known of what happened in Smyrna and what has been happening in the Near East, all decent people in Europe and the United States will feel as I do.

September 26, 1922

Since writing the above, I have been informed that the three Entente powers have sent a note to Mustapha Kemal announcing that, with their con-

sent, his armies will be allowed to occupy Constantinople and Thrace. The panic, which this announcement must necessarily cause among the native Christians and even European inhabitants of Constantinople, has, I am sure, commenced. The Department is better qualified to know what is going on in Constantinople than I am here but I hazard this assertion as certainty without definite information. The native Christians do well to leave, such of them as can get away, for even if measures are taken to prevent a savage massacre on the arrival of the Kemalist troops, the life of the Christian will be intolerable and unsafe and massacres will surely be perpetrated from time to time in the future. Long observation has convinced me that the Turk is incapable of governing Christian populations. Such may have thrived under the old Turk in a general way, despite the numberless massacres which are a blot upon Turkish history, but the policy of the New Turk will render the life of the Christian element impossible.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

1) *Turkish massacres are always carried out by order of superior authorities. This is a well-known principle and the way in which various historic massacres have been conducted abundantly proves it. Such was the case at Smyrna, and Mustapha Kemal's statement that he could not control his troops is false. It is a curious fact that the Turk is still able to deceive Europeans, despite long observation of his tactics. It is probable that one emphatic word to the Turkish commander by the French Admiral would have stopped the massacre and all the horrors that followed.*

2) *It should be borne in mind that it has been for some time the policy of the Turkish nationalists to exterminate and eliminate the native Christian element in Turkey. Any one forming plans for future business or diplomatic relations with Turkey should bear this in mind and be fully of the changed conditions in the country.*

3) *Kemalism has been built up by the Allies by their weakness and dissension. The conduct of France has been one of faithlessness to the Allies, with the purpose of obtaining concessions, and undermining British influence in the Near East. Great Britain, on account of labor opposition and Mussulman unrest in India, is obliged to swallow this bitter pill, with the hope that concessions to Kemal will quiet the Mussulmans of India. This is a mistake and has been a mistaken policy from the beginning. The entry of the Kemalists into Constantinople will arouse the Mussulmans of India beyond control.*

4) *Constantinople is today as it was at the time of its fall the outer bulwark of Europe against the hordes of Asia, and once it is given over to the*

Turk, he will commence a war of conquest upon the Balkan States — if not today, tomorrow, and if not this year, next year, and the peace of Europe will be perpetually in danger. The Turk is a race who has no interests in the arts of peace and who knows nothing but war and conquest. It is impossible for him to refrain from warlike operations. Any plans made on his promises or on any different suppositions are doomed to disappointment and statesmen who form any schemes for the future on any different basis are building on a false foundation.

I am unfortunately but a simple official, not occupying an exalted position, and my words will perhaps not bear great weight, but I know whereof I am speaking and some who read these lines will live to see them verified.

OBSERVATION:

The men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, who are today being torn from their wives, sisters, mothers and children, amid pitiful scenes that only a DeQuincey could describe, and being driven away by the Turks to perish by slow starvation and exposure, are the peaceful farmers of Asia Minor and the citizens of Smyrna who were never in sympathy with the government of Constantine and who are in no wise responsible for the fearful fate which has befallen them. This unrighteous act is being carried out without even a word of protest by any civilized government.

*I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
American Consul General,
Smyrna.*