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
THE INTERMEDIATE SPACE


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THE INTERMEDIATE SPACE

THE GARDEN, THE ARCHITECTURE, THE ART OF “NON FINITO”

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“A real work of art never ends”

P. Valery

ABSTRACT

Starting from the question of why things have a form, we develop the concept of the “Intermediate Space” as a procedure during which the “thing” assumes its form as a word or as a picture. However, this intermediate space can constitute itself its final form.

Looking, firstly, into the concept of the “Intermediate Space” as a basic structural function of psychopathology, we then focus on three examples which we base our outlook on, namely

1. the Garden as the “Intermediate Space” of the divisions between countryside-city/nature-civilisation and unconscious-conscious

2. Architecture as the “Intermediate Space” between matter and spirit as for its agony to be art.

Following our initial observations, we examine the concepts of “rurbain” and the “ladder”, as well as “non finito” in art where the route of the “thing” to its form as art crystallizes before its final shaping. Towards this account, we look into different appearances of art and expand on relevant philosophical comments.

In the final part of our study we attempt, through a series of questions, an elevation of the human's life to a “Non finito” work.

The “thing”, as far as this study is concerned, has to be heard in the concept of the lacanian topology and the freudian “Das Ding”

Keywords:

Intermediate space, “thing”, symbolic, form, garden, architecture, spirit, art, ladder, rurbain, “Non finito”, “Ars moriendi”

1. INTRODUCTION "PROLEGOMENA"

Why do the things have a form? Because it is not enough to wonder, like Leibniz, "why is there Something (the World) and not Nothing?" but why this Something, since it exists, has a form.

Things have a form because otherwise they would not exist. Things exist through their form. The content of a thing is nothing but the unfolding and the emergence of its form. The essence of a thing—if there is something like that, so that Nietzsche (2009) doesn't laugh with us—is the form without which it wouldn't exist.

Let's imagine for a moment, things without a form, essentially without a limit. They would be a vast undefined soup. Whether this concerns the universe and the stellar world or the human's psyche or the Logos.

God in Genesis essentially creates the world, giving form through words ("and he said...") to the pre-existent undefined.

The human is a "subject of Logos" of the signifier, exactly because the diffused state of the drive that inhabits him is delimited-formed, even if in psyche, as well as in the universe, the "thing", the amorphous, the disastrous, the madness, the "ineffable", the "unimagined", continues to be latent; whereas in form, however, it conveys the world, the meanings within which we inhabit and move. That's why Lacan said that the human is not only a subject of the signifier but also a subject of the "real", of the irrational.

Nonetheless, from the moment that the "thing" comes into the word, into the picture, it stops being the "thing" that it was. It is a "thing" immobilized to death, even though it might be breathing for centuries, just like a work of painting or a temple whose breath we feel when we find ourselves close by. A word is always going to be a word, a picture is forever going to be a picture and the "thing" from now on is going to be the word or the picture that conveys it, while at the same time the word or the picture is going to be its prison. Thus, J. Koons' (1991) tongue over his mistress's body will re-

main forever immobilized, as the tongue of gargoyle (Daemon) in Nôtre Dame will remain eternally petrified. Whatever they had to express they expressed it then, as much as they continue to express it still within a present progressive or a historical present.

The form is the immobilization of the "thing". It is the death of the undefined state of the universe and the psyche albeit, at the same time, the life of the universe and the psyche in form, begins.

The Kantian pure reason, the Lacanian "sinthome" and the Topology could advocate in favour of our view if the extent of this text allowed it.

To conclude, we would say that the form is the beingness of the things whether it is about a rock, a temple, or a text.

The world is the world of forms.

The sign is equivalent to the signifier, the signified being absorbed by the signifier. The subject is led unknowingly by the supremacy of the signifier, it doesn't own the signification, it is possessed by it; it does not speak the language, it is spoken by it. The semantic abyss of the subject's historicity, the ontology of the past, is one of the signifier. An excellent example of the sign's complete formation by the signifier is L. Hjelmslev's and U. Eco's non-signified sign.

So, the nature of the things is their form.

The essence of the things, their hypostasis, their being, their existence, their entity, their content itself—if we suppose that there is such—is their form and their form alone.

Certainly, the form of each "thing" is different, a fact which means that the way of being of each "thing" is different.

Thus, even if it is the form that always exists within language as a word or picture, it is the "thing" that dictates as a sublingual.

2. THE "INTERMEDIATE SPACE"

The "thing", during its course to the decrystallization of its form, occupies what we would call "Intermediate Space".

The motion of the “thing” towards the symbolic field, its expression where it is expected to assume a form through successive but not necessarily straight crossing points, does not yet belong to the symbolic field, although it is that which will shape its form. It is about an intermediate motion that concerns the before-the-final-form space and time, independent of the final form. As an example, we could refer to cinema where the movement of succession of the 24 images per second to accomplish the required result, namely, the motion picture, is not a movement of the pictures themselves, although this movement comes from their own “Intermediate Space” as time constitutes the relation among them.

The “Intermediate Space” is visualized by successive intermediate spaces, starting from the “real” (the space and the dynamics of the “thing”) towards the symbolic field, the form. The movement “from-to” means successive spaces of specification, successive moments.

Exactly like how Zeno's arrow moves.

We would compare the “Intermediate Space” to the concept of Derridean “difference” (Derrida: 2003): a perpetual abeyance of the signifier which is a signifier just because it soars inconceivably within reading. The signifier denotes because it denies its definition, its final place. It is found within an intermediate state, between no-read and read, between the ‘thing’ and the symbolic; it is defined by what does not define.

An absolute case of “Intermediate Space” is Marx, as the entirely dissociated subject of Modernity. Although Marx is the creation of Enlightenment and Right Reason, he draws from Romanticism (the Hegelian “thing”) to express his philosophy.

The “Intermediate Space” is what is defined by its non-limits, such as the wetland, the beach, Tiresias, Persephone, Artemis, the etymology of a word, the ornitorinc.

Frequently, the “Intermediate Space”

is defined by the ambiguity of limits between neighboring countries, the Purgatory or even the form in the Baroque, as noted by Wölfflin (2007). Vernant, as well, has given us excellent examples of intermediate spaces-borderline states from mythology meeting Spinoza when he had already said: “Omnis determinatio est negatio / every definition is a negation”.

“Intermediate space” is also the space that intervenes, or is introduced, or is established, in people's relationships; the space that obstructs people from knowing the Other, except as a projection of their own self, a relation of narcissistic projection, or hatred.

The suspended step of the stork is a complete step.

3. THE EQUIVALENT IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

The “Intermediate Space” found cordial welcome in psychopathology as “Borderline”, “États limites”. This was mainly manifest in Bergeret's monumental study: neither neurosis nor psychosis, there is a fluid dynamic that moves in the “Intermediate Space”, and it is exactly this space that gives the possibility of a nosological entity. Clinically, we could also include “crepuscular” and “dreamy” states as well as phenomena of depersonalization and accompanying syndromes. In a broader sense, we would also include space-time continuum within the poles of bipolar disorder as the respective one between schizophrenic recrudescence, as well as the mourning process time in reactive depression. In the Lacanian clinic, which is a clinic of structure, this space does not exist: the subject is either neurotic, psychotic, perverse or not. However, lately, the discussions about ordinary psychosis and “sinthome psychosis” and their possible relation to “as if” states (Deutsch, 1934), “Cold Psychosis” (E. Kestenberg, 2001) or “White Psychosis” (A. Green, 1973), probably tend to a reconsideration of the concept of structure. We would say that

nothing stops the signifier from moving to an “Intermediate Space” in the form of a delusional metaphor, or in the form of obsessive defenses, or a psychosis with perforated neurotic engravings of depersonalised elements, such as elements of hysteria with oral origin (i.e. eating disorders), as well as in the form of perversion with obsessive references or psychoformed regression (Apollinaire: “Eleven thousand rods”, 1907, de Sade: “Justine”, 1791, etc.).

But doesn't every failed “sinthome psychosis” reflect a “Borderline” state? Or, to put it differently, isn't a “Borderline” symptomatology the emergence of an incomplete or failed “sinthome”, just like a delirious idea that never formed into an organized delirium or like a psyche that never dared to be happy nor surrender to repetition, reminding us N. Christianopoulos' (2007) verse “I want neither to die / nor to heal. / I just want to settle within my destruction”?

4. THE “INTERMEDIATE SPACE” AS GARDEN, ARCHITECTURE, “NON FINITO”

Let's highlight three distinctive paradigms.

The first and the second paradigm concern the Garden and Architecture respectively examined as an “Intermediate Space” between nature and civilisation, nature-countryside, unconscious-conscious.

The third paradigm, the one of the Art of “Non finito” where the “thing” freezes during its emergence towards its final form, before its final form.

An excellent case of “Intermediate Space” is the sanctuary of the Temple, seen as an “Intermediate Space” between invisible-“thing” and visible-form.

In this part of the text, we will briefly focus on the paradigm of the Garden and of Architecture as art and extensively on the example of “Non finito”.

4.1 THE PARADIGM OF THE GARDEN

In the critical question that concerns the garden entity, namely the submission of the “thing”-nature to form-civilization (as showcased in the work of F.L. Wright and Tadao Andō) or vice versa, we can see that the Garden, as much as it wants to be in contact with the “thing”, the nature, subordinates the natural element to civilization through the form that nature takes by the human hand, as it happens with the allegedly unruly liberal English garden in juxtaposition to its conveniently crafted ‘ha-ha’ features, or the perfectly ordained Zen garden — or the French baroque garden, being the total expression of this submission.

In terms of psychology, there is a superiority of the conscious even though it is the unconscious that dictates its submission by the conscious as the only possible way for its appearance.

A garden ought to anticipate utopia, immateriality, the complete liberalization of desire as a synonym of nature; fact, yet impossible and inconceivable.

Adorno has expressed that, in saying that this state constitutes art's utopian imperative (the garden as landscape architecture is art, q.v. Bacon, Kant, Hegel, Thoreau...) the work tends to be immaterial, mere spirit. The work moves within the negativity of its matter. Similarly, Kandinsky, Malevich and others assert that the object damages art. Nevertheless, in Architecture as well, we meet Gaudi's and Hudertwasser's analogous opinions or the one of the exceptional gardener and theoretician Kent on the straight line: nature despises straight lines. We could also, detect here Foucault's opinion on heterotopia: the garden belongs nowhere, it moves like a ship in the “Intermediate Space”.

In that sense, the garden is a movement towards utopia, not towards one of the future, but towards one of the past, a prelinguistic state, towards the ineffable, the absolute, a return to the immaterial desire which is the lack of reality, that is the mother's hug in which the human

resorts to, so as to avoid the civilization's noise, dystopia—in spite of the fact that, as we said before, the garden is definitely itself part of the civilization; it owes its existence to civilisation. It is in this hug, however, that the Heideggerian “dasein” turns to for reflection, relaxation, a kiss at a random bench: out of/within the civilisation, without the awe of a complete regression, even though it regresses in this, ever green, maternal hug.

The garden specifies the “Intermediate Space” of nature-civilisation, city-country, dystopia-utopia, being a heterotopia.

4.2 THE PARADIGM OF ARCHITECTURE

Is it possible that the main problem of architecture is connected to the relation between the “thing”/form and the “Intermediate Space”?

What does architecture seek? To become spirit. As, for instance, a temple or a tomb. But, in order to become spirit, it will have to surmount what it is. And, what is it? Matter, land, water, building materials, materials of the exemplary axis which in the syntactic axis will have to stop being what they are: they will have to transform into spirit so as to express what they want to say. Nonetheless, if they become spirit, don't they then distance themselves from the nature of architecture which is to remain rooted and motionless on earth, so as to be architecture? Doesn't the motion that architecture desires so as to be integrated within the hegelian self-actualisation of the spirit, cancel what it is and, as a result, cancels its desire since just from the position where it is, it can desire what it is not?

What is the essence of a temple, or generally, what problem is form called to resolve in architecture so as to be what it wants to be, that is, architecture? Because, before the solution of the problem we mentioned, it wants to be, but it isn't yet, architecture. A construction site is not yet architecture. In order to achieve that, it resorts to the other arts, it borrows elements from

sculpture, painting, music, dancing, from arts that do not touch the earth steadily, and express more actively the spirit's course to its self-realisation.

Thus, the problem of architecture is that, in order for it to be what it is, it has to negate its being, its matter. Its matter must transform into a non-matter, into spirit, immateriality, absoluteness, into utopia. The “thing” has to negate its nature so as to take a form, to meet its negativity, Adorno would say. And, indeed, it negates it from the moment it enters meaning, from the moment it is meaning. From the moment it negates its burden (not the symbolic burden, like the one of a Bank or of the hitlerian architecture, but its ontological burden) and its immobility.

So, here is the paradox: to be firmly rooted to the earth (even if in present-day Clément (1991) tends to negate the recourse to the earth by constructing flying gardens), its materials to be earthly, destructible and finite while the architecture itself is called through these materials to their exceedance, so as to surpass its burden and its immobility; so as to become spirit. Simply put, matter must contribute to its immateriality, the brick to transform into spirit, mud into word of the immaterial text God, in the case of the Temple. In other words, from architecture as a building site, through the “Intermediate Space”, it turns into the “miracle”, architecture as art.

That is what made Hegel place architecture in the last grade of arts as forever rooted to the earth, as unable to follow the course of the spirit to its self-realisation. But, it is what made Tadao Andô say that the building should be a Zen meditation and A. Isozaki (2011) say that architecture is invisible.

In architecture, just like in the other arts, sometimes the “thing” prevails—that is the archaic expression of the “thing”—while other times we have the prevailing of the covering of the “thing” with the form-meaning.

Architecture, thus, becomes a way of expression, a “figure of speech” since

the “thing”, though out of speech, must be found inside speech in order to be expressed, to such an extent that we could wonder whether the “thing” is, or said. Hence the “thing”, despite escaping its definition (every time we try to define the “thing” we find ourselves in front of a word or a picture or the void), produces the definition, the meaning, the world, the signifier, in form.

When the human got tired by the “thing's” subordination, namely civilization, rules, convention, he wanted to allow the “thing” to have space. The revolutionary movement of Romanticism in the 19th century owes its existence to exactly that: “No more truth. More magic.”

It is then that the human gave space to the “thing” in arts and, of course, architecture through the introduction of nature, since nature without a limit and a form is the “thing”.

As a characteristic example we observe gardens as part of the architecture of modern mental hospitals: the mental hospital, a primary place for the “thing” to be as well as its subordination to take place, makes provision during its construction to give plenty of space to the garden as a sterilised blessed bread to the castration of wild desire, human's nature, madness (e.g., mental hospitals of Nuuk Greenland, Vejle Denmark, Friedrichshafen Switzerland, ...)

Otherwise stated, civilization in its narcissistic certainty allows a regression to its starting point, the “thing”, which in architecture is identified with nature and its materials.

However, in each case, this regression is controlled in favour of civilisation, in favour of cogito.

Hence, while F. L. Wright's Fallingwater house (1935) seemingly puts civilization to coexist harmoniously with the river — the “thing”—the stakes ultimately are not about a harmony of civilisation-nature but about the river's subordination to architecture's plans, to human's plans. What we admire is civilization's force to subordinate nature, instead of the supposed harmony between them.

It is about nature's humiliation and the emergence of human's dominance, not as part of nature himself but as part of civilization: a fountain is water's humiliation, being forced to do acrobatics like a trained animal so that the subordination and the excellence of the civilisation can emerge, like a surfer who dominates over Pacific's waves. F. L. Wright captivates the water from the river in the same way that medieval architects captivated the sun and vitraux makers captivated the light. This lies in contrast to Tadao Andô who, following a different philosophy, subordinates, where possible, construction to nature.

We would therefore say that architecture's essence moves in this “Intermediate Space”; it is the “Intermediate Space” of soil and water, from the passions of materials to the transcendence in “rosette” form.

4.3 “RURBAIN”

A characteristic example of “Intermediate Space” concerning the meaning of space itself are the suburbs of inner cities, which although organically belonging to the city, they consider themselves nature. “Intermediate Space” are cottages and slums, a residence between a house and a tent.

“Intermediate Space” is the provincial population that inhabits the city. Also, the village itself, as lying between symbolic-nature, city-countryside, rural-urban which Lefebvre calls with the neologism “rurbain”. Nature, Lefebvre says, becomes a ghetto of recreational areas, the urban loots the country; a possible intermediate space. Which is why for E. Dühring, permanent social structure would be the permanent separation between countryside and city.

In a city, “Intermediate Space” is the one between the districts of rich and poor economic classes.

The whole of “New Urbanism” movement (1980) could belong to the “Intermediate Space”.

A characteristic example of “Intermediate Space” were the famous Galleries of Paris

in the 19th century, that Baudelaire and Benjamin (2020) adored.

“Intermediate Space” are corridors in apartments, shafts of blocks of flats, or, as Benjamin says, the living room as an in-between the public and the private. He also notes that only in Luis-Philippe's time (1773-1850), the “private citizen” was born as a result of the intermediate space between the living and the working space. Such a case of our encounter with the “Intermediate Space” is the doorstep, seen as a place where the “inside” meets the “outside”; a Freudian “proego” where architecture stands as the embodiment of this meeting.

“Intermediate Space” are the streets, the cathedral's “Via Sacra”, “Transway Kalahari”, the sand in Noyaxot's or Honiara's roads where municipal street cleaners, like Sisyphus, sweep the sand from the rudimentary pavement when the whole town is an intermediate space within the beach, the undetermined boundary of the city of Timbuktu in relation to the desert, the whole of the country of N. Somalia in relation to nature, Bujumbura trying desperately to imitate a capital, the jungle between Orinoco and the Amazon, the whole of the Amazon as an intermediate space between Iquitos and Macapa, the airports, the highways close to the city centers and the gas stations on motorways, lit with vivid neon colors all through the night.

The “Intermediate Space” in every one of these cases is so intense and complete, that only utopian philosophers like Owen or Fourier would come to request the elimination of the boundaries between countryside and the city. The same applies to sociologists like Lefebvre, who imagines the ideal city as the meeting point of utopianism's maximum with realism's excellence. And, architecturally, only El Lissitzky (“Proun”: plan of affirmation of the new, 1919-1927), came to develop a completely utopian model of creative formations of space for a better world, through the transcendence of painting and engineering. For El Lissitzky, space and materials constitute a metaphor for the visual attribute of the world's radical transformations, we

would say, equivalent, to the one which started the erection of the “Tower of Babel” hubris.

Foucault's “heterotopias” are also exquisite examples of the “Intermediate Space”.

Another characteristic case, as Winckelmann captures it, are ruins, the beauty of which is attributed to the fact that the structure can match effortlessly with the free forms of the surrounding nature, convincing the spectator that he belongs to the visual set. Something which is inconceivable for the complete picture of a building not destroyed. This constitutes, in a way, Piano's philosophy for the Centre Beaubourg (1977): “We wanted the museum to be open to the city”.

An absolute “Intermediate Space” that could belong to either the place of heterotopia or utopia equally is the island of Rurutu in the S. Pacific, territory of the French Polynesia: a whale that was stranded and gradually decomposed in the shore so that its skeleton could live in eternity, carving a non-border between the elements of nature and the marriages of French soldiers to Gauguin's women.

4.4 THE STAIRCASE/ LADDER

An exceptional instance of procedure with regards to the concept of “Intermediate Space” is the staircase.

No staircase ends in the final step whether of ascent or descent. The final step is a conventional ending. Every staircase continues indefinitely, we would say, towards the sky and beyond, or towards the bowels of the earth. For example, Saint John Sinaites' (Saint John Climacus') “The Ladder of Divine Ascent” (5th to 6th century A.D.) does not terminate in God. It is halted by God just like a work of art is halted by the conventional finishing touch, note, or movement. The 30 steps of the Ladder begin from “About withdrawal” only conventionally, as they do not end at “About love, hope and faith”: the

Ladder continues to the ineffable, to the unimagined. The same applies to Jacob's "The Road to Heaven Ladder" "through which" divinity descends and worldliness ascends.

The same applies as well to the materialized dimension of the staircase. In "Battleship Potemkin" (Eisenstein: 1925), the Odessa steps, though referring to the events of 1905, they definitely "escalate" towards the events of 1917. When the "Joker" (Philips: 2019) goes down the 132 steps in Bronx, we don't know how many steps he has already climbed down before the moment we actually see him starting to do so. Similarly, do we know when the visitor is lost when he ascends or descends the granite baroque steps with the eight symbolical fountains in "Bon Jesus do Monte" (Braga, Portugal, 1373, 1627, 1725, M. P. Vilalobos)? —or, where the kings and the priests of Maya were lost when they ascended the steps in the Yucatan pyramids, or the respective officials in the Copán pyramids? Doesn't the ladder in a dream symbolise sexual intercourse (Scala Paradisi), Freud tells us, so as for the lover to ascend to the seventh heaven and to find himself when he wakes up descended on earth? And let us also remember "The sleeping beauty in the wood" (Perrault C., 1697), when she ascends the staircase to enter the forbidden room.

No one knows where one goes when they ascend or descend a subway staircase.

And the interior pine wooden staircase in the two-floor house at 90 Pipinou street in Athens consisted of 26 stairs up to the first floor and 21 stairs from the first to the second floor (S. Zervos, 1927) is certain to end conventionally in the mosaics at the top of the stairs. It continues even after the second floor, exceeding the roof, indefinitely, as, besides, do the 8 steps of the staircase which lead to the basement and continue beyond underground space, I would say, beyond the foundations, beyond whichever conventional principle.

Every ladder is the materialisation of an invisible ladder which ascends or

descends indefinitely.

Every ladder is a "Non finito" of the history of the world, that is, the human's world.

5. THE PARADIGM OF "NON FINITO"

5.1 "SFOUMATO"

A characteristic case of "Intermediate Space" that develops chronologically (Heidegger: "Temporality regulates from within every ontology") through the flux of the "thing" towards an expression over the symbolic is found in art's "Non finito", which is, however, already a form of expression "finito" as a form of art; as it happens, for instance, in Rembrandt's final self-portrait "Self-portrait with beret and turned-up collar" (1659).

As examples of "Non finito" could be considered Schubert's "Unfinished Symphony", No. 8, D759 (1822), Musil's "The man without qualities" (1930) or Büchner's "Woyzeck" (1913) as well as Rubens' hyperbole as the possibility of imperfection, of "Non finito", as Delacroix points out. Delacroix, notes that only the mediocre is perfect since he is never out of self. Degas is exceptionally cutting concerning a complete work of art, extremely detailed, yet considering it as nonexistent: "it may have finished, but it definitely hasn't begun".

Rubens continued to work on his "Adoration of the Magi" 20 years after its beginning, first with small corrections. Later on, he added new details. At the non-end of his work, Rubens has added two big frames to the initial work. He adds himself in a prominent position among the pilgrims in the manger. But, although the work as a whole has changed a lot over the twenty years that it traversed along with him, he pictures himself as not having changed at all. Obviously, he himself is "Non finito", unfinished and eternal as the One he kneels before.

An exquisite example of academic "Non finito" art can be found in Rodin's works "Eternal idol" (1893), "The tempest" (1898)

and most prominently “The fallen angel” (1890) and “The thought” (1895) in which C. Claudel's face can be recognised: a complete amalgam of “thing” (stone and madness) and symbolic (art). Here, “the statue is not liberated from the stone”, as Plotinus proclaimed a statue must do in order to be. But it is for this reason that the statue demonstrates the captured “Non finito” motion, same as a photograph petrifies motion in posture, as L. Mulvey (2005) notes. This applies the same with Caravaggio's “Basket of fruit” (1599): the rotting of the apple will stay unfinished forever, the time is frozen and incomplete. Like every photograph, every “Still Life” is a “Non finito” work, a magical moment of immobility of the time flux, before the theme of the painting dies, before the end of time.

Characteristic cases of these “Non finito” works of art are the ones of Donatello and Michelangelo, who, out of all his works, only signs his Pietà (1498). An exceptional work of “Non finito” art, though with a different perspective, is A. Canova's “Endymion sleeping” (1822). In this work the spectator can wait forever for Ekati's presence, since the myth is inextricably linked to her relationship with Endymion. Ekati is announced through the rays that bathe Endymion's body, with Ekati herself never appearing. The spectator is found in a futile standby. We can better see the “Non finito” impression of this work by contrasting it with A. L. Coronet's counterpart in which the goddess is present.

“Non finito” is also found in children's art, graffiti, and “Street art”. We often meet a version of “Non finito” in folk art, in which the artist has given a final form to half of his material while the rest, rock, wood, etc. remains unprocessed material. Indian “mandala” are equally found in a “Non finito” procedure since the sand that reflects the image is poured straight onto the eternal volatility of the water.

As “Non finito” we could equally consider Gauguin's incomplete drawings, Christo's work “Pontneuf Wrapped” (1975) or the recently exhibited “Arcdetriomphe Wrapped” (2019), every performance visual or not. Definitely, “Land art”.

Of course, the same applies to the techniques of “Sfumato” and “Tenebrismo”, especially the one of “Tenebrismo barroco” as a capture of shapes without contour.

And certainly, the forms of “Outsider art” and “Art brut”, places principally of the “thing” but dressed in the carnival costumes of the symbolic. Every “Art brut” work is a metaphor of Rabelais' “Gargantua and Pantagruel” as Bakhtin (1984) introduces it to us, as a work desperate and at the same time festively liberating, of a fiery “thing” that burns the symbolic's official suit. “Art brut” is essentially nothing but the materials' liberation from the form, always within a form, the “thing's” desperate attempt for autonomy or at least for a not complete submission to the symbolic. “Art brut” obviously integrates itself in the dimension of “Non finito” since it will never accept its final surrender to the symbolic field.

In architecture, apart from the same fact of Architecture as we saw it previously, an excellent example of “Non finito” is “Saint John of the rock” constructed by the Czech Kilian Ignaz (1730). It reminds us exactly of the micro-sculptures of Buddhist monks in southern Sri Lanka of which the form seems to exit and to continue to exit the wood without a pause, even though the work has finished. The shape is prefigured based on the material, which, as “thing”, dominates the form that it gradually allows for to emerge. It also refers to the incomplete Moai on Easter Island.

And if we agree with Duchamp (Cabanne: 2008) that the work of art is co-created with the spectator, that it is created within the spectator's gaze, (“two people are required for a work of art”), then from the moment that the spectator leaves and takes it with him and reflects on it indefinitely, doesn't the work of art cease to end without ending, since the spectator and the era continually reconsider it, they review it, they add emotion or thought? If a work of art ended definitively, then there wouldn't be any new essay on art or on new aesthetic theories. Let's not be

mistaken by the material part of the work of art, the marble or the colour which, indeed, however not always, seems to be completed, because the work of art is not its material equivalent. Whoever sees just that, Gombrich (2011) said, then he does not see it at all. Accordingly, Benjamin (2013) would talk about the “aura” of the work of art and Weber about the removal of magogery from the world.

5.2 COMMENTS

Merleau-Ponty's (2016) agony is obvious when he wonders: How can something be truly presented to us since its composition is never completed? “How could I know the world, since none of the representations of the sensory perception I have of this cannot deplete it and the horizons always remain open?” This ambiguity does not express an imperfection in nature, in existence, in conscience. It is its definition itself. “The world”, Merleau-Ponty says, “is an incomplete work”. As Bakhtin said, the final word of the world for the world has still not been said. Klee pointed out that “the world is dynamism without a beginning or an end”.

We would say that the human seeks to create art, build or occupy space, because he considers his previous work as incomplete and, therefore, seeks to complete its insufficiencies so as to mirror himself complete in it—a characteristic example being the three religions that developed successively in the Mediterranean basin.

Laclau (1997) says that the self-determination of the subject is carried out through procedures of identification, since there is a lack of being. This self-determination does not express a fixed essence of the subject, it is always under formation.

The same “ego” is unsound and incomplete, since it cannot define itself. The subject is not found in its name. Guattari said that: “the unity and autonomy of ego represent the subject's imagined substitution of the symbolic dissociation”. They represent

the subject's lack.

Bourriaud (2015) said that contemporary art does not present the result of a work. It is constituted by the work in process itself, or the promise of a work; a fact that C. Bishop notes, when she says that what is observed in curators like Lind, namely the pursuit of a continuous flux of the work of art and not a closedness, is nothing but the emphasis of the work of art's goal of a non-end.

It is what U. Eco called “open work” while Bourdelle, some centuries earlier, said: “in order to be able to judge a work, some years from its ending must have passed”.

Art as a whole could be considered as an “Intermediate Space” in the sense of specification from what is left in the pure fields of science; essentially, what is not told. The artist and the poet, as Heidegger says, remain in the intermediate / “das Zwischen”, between the world and the earth, between presence and present, between being and existence.

A fact that Baumgarten had already pointed out, when he said that there is an osmosis between art and science.

Generally, we could consider every century of art as “Non finito”, since the coming of the one following doesn't allow the one previous its possible development, even though the one previous has to have ended evidently, because of the coming of the next one. However, even if we consider the emergence of the next one as a consecutive development of the previous one, then we find ourselves still in front of a continuous “Non finito”.

If Plato had already noted that the work of art never resembles the idea, meaning that it is perpetually under representation in the concept of expectancy for identification, then we deserve to wonder whether we can embrace Hegel's and Marx's thoughts, from a different origin (Hegel: when the spirit will have self-actualised, it will not need art, philosophy, religion; Marx: in socialism, the human will not need art because he will be happy), resulting, nonetheless, in the same conclusion about the end of art. On the same

note, we could disagree with Lukács' similar reasoning ("art will not have a reason to exist because life itself will have become a work of art") or Debord's concern ("art will be eliminated from the social celebration"). Similarly, we would disagree with Adorno's pessimism ("does art have a meaning after Auschwitz?"), as well as with Heidegger's ("art's character as an unfolding of the world is threatened by the spirit of technique of

the contemporary world").

We would thus offer as conclusion to the present section Schelling's (2015) perfectly suited remark about the incomplete border of art, of "Non finito": "As classic art we mean the dimension of the infinite within the finite, while as a christian one we mean the dimension of the finite within the infinite".

6. CONCLUSION

"ARS MORIENDI" - IS THERE A PROPER TIME TO DIE?

Could what we say about the incomplete in art also be said for words, relationships, life, science, or knowledge?

But what is this, that does not finish? What else but the "thing" and the threat it poses, against which no mound is enough. Scientific achievements are proven wrong one after the other, new knowledge is needed, new mounds, new excavations, new walls.

The "thing", undeterred, obliges the human to consider from the beginning its life as "Non finito", even if there isn't a convention of a new desire, since death becomes another way of managing the unknown, a place that must be covered with explanations, knowledge or religion, namely words.

Is life endless, like Leibniz's folds of the gothic cathedral or the folds in the "Pietà's" gown (1497-1499) as Arnheim emphasizes, although it's already finite within the gaze? Spengler claims similarly that the gothic style symbolizes "Faust's" spirit to the infinity (1828).

Enhrenberg characterizes the fact of madness itself as a "Non finito" fact, in the sense of a work of creation that didn't work out.

Lukács already said that art gives form to the founding tragedy of human existence, as it presents the constant, diachronic drama of someone who realizes that life is an anarchy of chiaroscuro, that nothing completes to the full. That's why, there is never a proper time to die, since nothing ever comes to its end.

We are amphibians, Ferry (2011) adds, we belong to the earth and the light. One part of ourselves dreams of the house, the other travels to the unknown. One seeks "the beautiful", the other "the sublime".

The parts of ourselves as "Non finito" turn, possibly in vain, to what promises completion.

"The incomplete knows something that the perfect ignores. The perfect is closed, sometimes it is so perfect that it cannot be seen. As a result, the crack is needed for things to be brought to view, as well as for the possibility—or the necessity—of the mistake to exist". With this sentence, film director V. Papavasileiou meets Gadamer when he asserts that human's nature is not the answer but the question.

Besides, isn't the human's labor on earth what distinguishes life from death, one's labor to wonder, just because imperfection is the human's nature?

In conclusion, we could wonder whether what is happening in architecture, arts, in the garden, but also in nature or the universe, is nothing else but the manifestation of the subject's dissociation as a subject of Logos and as a subject of the "thing". That is, a projection of the human's world on to the world itself. Still, we could ask ourselves whether nature's dissociation to an uncontrollable "thing", on one hand, and to a deeply rooted form on the other, concerns the human psyche so as to exist as the dissociated subject we mention above. That is to say, the "Intermediate Space" as a "B 2 IN": Between, a double "in", within which the human lives. Is it nature, within its own dissociation, that inhabits the human and dissociates him so as for his work to have this imprint? Or is it the opposite, that it is the human who transfers his

dissociation into the creations of his thought, art, philosophy, religion, considering accordingly the forces of nature?

In any case, pay attention to the conclusions, the full stops, the punctuation marks, the realisation of desires, the silence.

Especially punctuation: it constitutes a mound to the "thing's" domain, like a shortened Lacanian session, but also a manipulation, at times suffocating, of the "thing" with the consequences that this might have.

Won't the whole of human's history ever cease to be written and rewritten like a "Non finito" work which is completed by the next generation? Doesn't the whole of a human's life undergo a continuous reconsideration based on a last thought, isn't it defined by the-each-time final point from which we gaze at the past ("How come I hadn't thought of that?"), of a final incident, last night's dream? The "point de capiton" (Lacan: 2013) always lurks in the end. "Is the end, a time before the beginning?", P. Brooks asks himself.

And, if the meaning of life is the whole of our desires through which we won and, at the same time, lost our lifetime, through which we were led towards that which we wanted to avoid (how else to live but chronologically approaching your death?), then isn't the meaning defined by the fulfillment or the cancellation of the chronologically, yet not necessarily significantly, defined final desire?

Pay attention to the full stops. That's why I wonder: Could "Non finito" be a way of not accepting the end, the death; and isn't just the modern human who is indebted to death, since "Non finito" is exactly the negation of the end, a negation disappearing in the depth of present time?

Could we possibly say that "Non finito" is equivalent to the ephemeral, just like life? And, is it possible that we cannot see the "Non finito" dimension as a general view of the world so as to avoid seeing the ephemeral dimension of our life? So as to avoid seeing a place that will remain vacant, empty or, rather, incomplete, however many answers it will receive? A signifier in a structural hole that remains abysmal, regardless of what is thrown inside to fulfill it, however much money, knowledge, sex, fame or however much misery.

A place that the subject never reaches.

Is 'eternity' a synonym of the ending, since only when something dies it enters the dimension of eternity, where it dies no longer? And if the one who dies knows that, then won't he ever die since he knows that he will have to die so as to be immortal?

Is there an intentional tendency towards "Non finito" since, possibly, no moment is withstood unless there is a moment next? Is the expectation of the 'next time', the desire for the 'next trip', what makes the present time bearable? What is the meaning of "Quartet for the end of time" (O. Messiaen, 1941) if the continuous noise from the "Helicopter string quartet" (K. Stockhausen, 1995) is not heard? What meaning could Gioconda have if Beuys' coyote doesn't exist?

Could Zeno's paradox, where the arrow never reaches its target, be in effect? Don't we ever get anywhere?

Is "Non finito" the fact of life itself, seen as an acceptance of a lack that no one ever accepted?

Is existence defined by the fact that it waits? Like Zama in Benedetto's narrative?

Is the human being defined as "a being who waits" regardless of whether Godot (Becket:1994) exists or not?

The human, a finite no-end, a perpetual "Non finito"?

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