


## Public Realm. Postgraduate and Early Career Journal of Political Philosophy

Tόμ. 2 (2025)

Public Realm





# PUBLIC REALM

POSTGRADUATE AND EARLY CAREER JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

WAR IN QUESTION / LA GUERRE EN QUESTIONS





# Public Realm

*Postgraduate and Early Career Journal of Philosophy*

**Volume 2**

**2025**

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# Articles



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# Ideas in trenches: Power and Polemics in Panagiotis Kondylis

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Panagiotis Lathyris

*University of Athens*

## **Abstract**

The author of the article attempts to examine the positions of Panagiotis Kondylis on the intellectual history and ideas' polemical nature that is the basic feature for understanding the configuration and development of an idea-theory in history. In order to achieve a full understanding of the specific concept of the intellectual history, first of all we have to analyze the Greek thinker's positions on the power and the way in which the search for power as a basic and irrevocable anthropological condition leads to a polemic condition within the social field. This polemic condition is also evident in the field of ideas, as ideas can be seen as the attempt to form worldviews by the respective subject or group of subjects that have the purpose of self-preservation and expanding their power. Therefore, in this article the emphasis is placed on two different areas of Kondylis' thought, the philosophy of man and then on the description of the ideas' formulation.

## **Keywords**

*Panagiotis Kondylis, Carl von Clausewitz, intellectual history, ideas, power, decision*

## The "genealogy" of the power of Panagiotis Kondylis

Extensive observation of Panagiotis Kondylis' life and writings very often leads the scholar to the conclusion that Kondylis has a fairly secure position regarding the philosophical, and in general the research interests of the Greek thinker. Kondylis had developed a considerable interest in power and war from the early phase of his writing activity. By "war" is meant not only violent conflict, or to put it in Clausewitz's terms, any act of violence aimed at forcing our opponent to follow our will<sup>1</sup>, but the more general warlike elements that are evident in the socio-political field. His systematic engagement with Niccolò Machiavelli indicates from the beginning of his career, the direction that Kondylis' thinking would take in the years to come around power, war and the correlation between morality and politics. This becomes apparent if we carefully observe his main theoretical influences throughout his career. Machiavelli, as already mentioned, Thucydides, Carl Schmitt and Carl von Clausewitz are some of the names which the Greek thinker was theoretically associated with. In particular, his preoccupation with the latter writer, who could not fit into the narrow framework of the typical status of a philosopher -as most people have him in mind-, as well as his late study and presentation of geopolitical issues, clearly shows Kondylis' immediate interest in the conflict.

The decision of the Greek historian to deal with geopolitical issues however, is not some kind of inexplicable preference. Despite his initial association with Marxism, Kondylis is led to formulate a philosophy of man that breaks directly with the moral-normative approaches that prevailed, especially in political thought after the writing of John Rawls' Theory of Justice. The Greek thinker understood, after his break with Marxism, that rejecting the moral-normative approaches of contemporary political thought and dealing with power would be a rather strange project for the world of philosophers, as power has always been a complex issue. In particular, since the Greek thinker rejected the moral-normative character of the socio-political field, he supported the idea that power plays a much more essential role in the formation of values and normative principles. These positions lead to the rejection of ethics as an "objective" investigation of the issues of the axiological problem and the rejection of reason as a tool for finding "objective" truth. In conclusion, for many readers of him, Kondylis can be described as a modern skeptic. An initial view of the subject leads to this conclusion, but the Greek thinker does not emphasize so much on issues of the possibility of knowledge, but denies the objectivity of values. This observation, possibly, cannot support the characterization of Kondylis as a skeptic.

According to Kondylis, the problem of power was posed very early in the early stages of philosophical thought about man and society. The philosophical conflict between the Sophists and Plato is perhaps the most characteristic example in the intellectual history where the problem of power is posed as a polemic between two rival positions. The sophistical inquiry into the antithetical relationship between Nature and Law is essentially the first systematic investigation of the opposition between force and morality from

<sup>1</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *War and politics-war, economy and society; war and revolution- the hot war after the cold war- the Greek-Turkish war*, (Athens: Theme Lio, 1997), p. 22.

which an anti-metaphysical and relativistic philosophy is formed<sup>2</sup>. The Sophists represented in a fairly early form in antiquity what Kondylis tries to establish in more detail in the field of socio-political thought in the 20th century. The Sophists, contrary to the popular view of their work, did not simply teach techniques for the acquisition of power, but provided the philosophical discourse of the time with a radical view of the understanding of human affairs<sup>3</sup>. According to Kondylis, Thucydides - a key influence - was the most brilliant representative of sophistry. The main achievement that the ancient historian achieved through his work is that he described the driving forces of people and history in general. According to Thucydides, war is not an exceptional event, but a frequent occurrence that can reveal the forces that drive human action. This possibly led Kondylis to his engagement with the Clausewitz's anthropology and philosophy of culture, as through the German military man's thought, Kondylis sees another tool to affirm the existential tension for the acquisition of power, which is at the core of the war phenomenon<sup>4</sup>.

Returning to the controversy between the Sophists and Plato, the basic positions of Kondylis on the axiological and moral-normative problem can be discerned. The modern Greek thinker stands on the theoretical dichotomy that Plato makes between Good and Pleasure, i.e., between Reason and Power. At this point, Kondylis observes the hidden polemical dimensions of the issue from the perspective of Plato's conception, and his critique of the ancient philosopher leads Kondylis' readers to understand why he rejects Reason as a tool for investigating "objective" morality. Plato thinks that a will is motivated by force is not a true will, because a true will must be oriented by the Idea of the Good<sup>5</sup>. The Greek historian of ideas points out that the Good in Plato is defined axiomatically by moral-normative criteria, as is the case with its speculated, according to Kondylis, objective character, but also with the rejection of all other reasonable conceptions of the definition of the Good<sup>6</sup>. These axiomatic judgments clearly contain claims of power, as do all axiological judgments in general. Plato entrusts the definition of the Good to an expert, which it is readily understood that this expert is himself. The invocation of the Reason and the theoretical separation from power is another trick of the pursuit of power, since the subject who then invokes the Reason can posit himself as free from the suspicion of pursuing power<sup>7</sup>. Kondylis considers Plato's greatest contribution to be the formulation of an impeccable strategy for gaining power, rejecting the pursuit of power and the use of force<sup>8</sup>.

The contemporary Greek thinker observes that the problem of power within the socio-political field is an issue that pervades the entire history of political thought. Typical, according to Kondylis, is the attempt by Christians, such as Augustine of Hippo, to critique the ideals of pagan culture and sophistical notions of the unsatisfying pursuit of power. According to the

<sup>2</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Power, Pleasure, Utopia*, (Athens: Stigmi, 2000), p. 55.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 57.

<sup>4</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *War and politics-war, economy and society; war and revolution- the hot war after the cold war- the Greek-Turkish war*, Ibid, p. 26.

<sup>5</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Power, Pleasure, Utopia*, Ibid, p. 61.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 62.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

Greek historian of ideas, however, even this attempt to demolish theories of the pursuit of power as a basic anthropological condition in defense of an ascetic conception embodies within it clear pursuits of power that lead to the combating of pagan concepts<sup>9</sup>. Thus, the Christian of the Middle Ages denies that he desires the acquisition of power and presents God as the sole source of power and authority, and subsequently God and power become a purely political affair when he undertakes to distribute power and authority to people. For Kondylis, even the medieval worship of God concealed issues of power in political terms.

In modern times the question of power acquires an anti-metaphysical dimension with the center of the philosophical search shifting from theology to anthropology. Hobbes is the most prominent example of a thinker who reconstructs questions about power and places them on a mechanistic basis. Power can be understood as the natural movement of human beings and its limitation can only be achieved by a more intense power, which is what is presented in the Leviathan state. Spinoza, who is influenced by similar positions, refers to the effort of everything to adhere to its Being<sup>10</sup>. This effort is referred to as *Conatus* and is a force inherent in the being, without having received external intervention<sup>11</sup>. According to Kondylis, Spinoza is led to similar political conclusions as Hobbes<sup>12</sup> and they are one trend in the debate on power in modern times. The other direction is that of Rousseau, which is the main attitude of the Enlightenment, as Hobbes' anthropological 'pessimism' and the idea that the human subject is motivated by the pursuit of power, clearly led to morally relativist positions, which is the main attitude of the Enlightenment opposed, according to Kondylis,<sup>13</sup> Rousseau questions the native and biological origin of the will to pursue power and traces it to causes arising from social symbiosis<sup>14</sup>.

The debate on power was of great interest in the 20th century as well, since Kondylis belongs to the circle of philosophers of the previous century who not only extensively analyzed the issue of power in the socio-political field, but also this issue became the core of his own original thinking. His critique of two great thinkers of the 20th century on their positions on power indirectly reveals part of his own theoretical positions. The Greek thinker, first of all, attacks Arendt's notion of the separation between power and violence. Power, for the German-Jewish political scientist, has to do with prestige, and for this reason she generally reproaches the tradition of political thought for its arbitrary identification of power and violence. According to Kondylis, Arendt wrongly assumes that this identification in modern thought comes from Weber and at the same time does not accept that historically the

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 67.

<sup>10</sup> Vasiliki Grigoropoulou, *Knowledge, passions and politics in Spinoza's philosophy*, (Athens: Alexandria 1999), p. 90.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> This thesis of Kondylis is possibly a very simplistic statement, as the development of Spinoza's thinking on politics and the social contract is not the same as that of Hobbes

<sup>13</sup> Kondylis does not directly explain why the Enlightenment rejected moral relativism, but it is understood that moral relativism is characterised by two features that Enlightenment thought abhorred. The first is the denial of the universality and universality of values and the second is the suspicion of nihilism with which relativism is associated. Nihilism is the other great opponent of the Enlightenment along with ascetic ethics and theological metaphysics [Panagiotis Kondylis, *The European Enlightenment (Volume A)*, (Athens: Themelio 1987), pp. 33-34)].

<sup>14</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Power, Pleasure, Utopia*, Ibid, p. 74.

identification of power and violence has a Platonic origin<sup>15</sup>. In addition, the contemporary Greek thinker notes that Arendt is wrong when she fails to see the necessary condition for the existence of the political community, which is the threat of the use of violence<sup>16</sup>. Kondylis, secondly, reproaches Michel Foucault on his way of approaching power and authority. Foucault is right when he observes the diffusion of power throughout the micro-points of society and that it is also formatted by a complex network of relations. However, this Foucauldian approach may indeed lead to reliable anthropological and psychological concepts, but it fails to give scientific interest to the historical and political philosopher. Power should take form and be institutionally established<sup>17</sup>. The above critique reveals Kondylis' ambition to construct a social ontology.

### **The power through the decision: The formation of world images**

From the very first pages of *Power and Decision*, i.e., his basic philosophical work, the Greek thinker sets out the definition of decision (de-cisio). Decision is a process of detachment through which a world image suitable for ensuring the capacity of orientation for self-preservation emerges<sup>18</sup>. It is a withdrawal of the subject of the decision from the preliminary anarchic world to a world that is meaningful and contains a direction. The subject of decision, according to Kondylis, is unable to grasp the Whole and form a complete worldview because of its finite character<sup>19</sup>. The subject of decision, therefore, relies on a known and elaborated part of the existing world. These subjects have the feature to know that there are other possible decisions and world images, however, these world images constructs are considered to be fictitious and part of the constituents of the preliminary heterogeneous world<sup>20</sup>.

These positions of Kondylis are not only parts of a philosophy of man, but are a reflection on the formation of the subject as identity and developed more generally into a philosophy of existence, as the Greek thinker often clarifies the strong existential tension that characterizes the whole process of de-cisio. The subject's decision shapes an ordered world and at the same time its identity is formed. Without the insert of the subject into an ordered world the identity of the subject cannot exist<sup>21</sup>. This process reveals the importance of decision and the necessary fusion of the subject with it. The bond between decision and subject is strengthened as long as the subject of the decision has practical successes within its ordered world. To summarize, the subject is initially confronted with an anarchic, disparate and chaotic world with no inherent meaning<sup>22</sup> or direction. At this stage, there can be no reference to a subject with an identity, but to a bare existence. Then, the subject through the decision can act in an ordered world having acquired its

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 95.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 97

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Power and Decision: The Formation of World Images and the Question of Values*, (Athens: Stigmi 2001), p. 23

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 25.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, pp. 26-27.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 29.

<sup>22</sup> The absence of inherent meaning is so important for understanding Kondylis' philosophy of man.

identity. The decision is the inaugural event of the subject with identity and the description of its complex and complicated 'prehistory' cannot be accurately described because the subject understands this 'prehistory' in terms of the decision, its worldview and its present identity<sup>23</sup>. This subject's 'prehistory' has to do with his biopsychological traits and the various inclinations of existence and the justification of his decision, in fact, cannot be rationally justified and, as Kondylis points out, is ultra rationem. This is a point that emphasizes existential tension and clarifies the unbreakable relation between existence and decision. The Greek thinker believes that decision shows the primacy of the existential element and is a universal phenomenon that has to do with every subject regardless of historical and cultural conditions.

It is apparent in the Greek thinker's thought that the existential element cannot be approached logically and at the same time motivates the subject of the decision to turn to an ultra rationem withdrawal from the preliminary world, to a distinction between interest and of no interest. As Kondylis points out, it is obvious that the subject's exploration of the world and all its constituent elements is not done with any rational approach and thorough investigation, because this would go against the subject's everyday demands of achieving self-preservation. From all of the above, the importance of the decision for existence itself becomes clear.

However, the correlation between the decision and the pursuit of power has not been explained. This correlation does not seem to be taken axiomatically by Kondylis, but is derived through his analyses of the necessity of the decision for self-preservation. As noted, decision is the way for a subject to be able to live in the world. For the Greek thinker, self-preservation inherently cannot be static, but must have a dynamic character<sup>24</sup>. By necessity, self-preservation in order to be achieved must have as its long-term consequence the increase of power<sup>25</sup>, as the subject is in an environment and faces physical deficiencies that endanger his self-preservation. The deprivation, i.e. the physical lack is directly linked to the struggle for self-preservation and reveals that it can only be dealt with when the available equipment, i.e. the means the subject has to cope with the deprivation, grows and expands<sup>26</sup>. This is essentially an increase in the power of the subject. Man, therefore, in order to cope with the constant crises of unsatisfied needs, have to seek to increase his power. On the basis of above positions, Kondylis justifies the relationship between decision and the pursuit of power and thinks that the latter is a basic anthropological fact. From Kondylis' philosophy of man, the relation of man with power becomes evident, which can manifest itself as violence, but also as warfare in the political sphere.

Kondylis' criticism of Hannah Arendt on the relation of power to violence and therefore of politics to violence reveals the Greek philosopher's basic thoughts on the political. In particular, in his work on the theory of war, the presentation of Clausewitz's anthropology, philosophy of culture and

<sup>23</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Power and Decision: The Formation of World Images and the Question of Values*, Ibid, pp. 38-39.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, pp. 59-60.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 60.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, pp. 60-61.

theory of war further clarifies his positions on the relationship between politics and violence and, more specifically, politics and war. These points in his thought are directly related to his conception of power. Clausewitz's positions on the nature of war and its relation to politics are very much in line with those of the Greek thinker, so any reference to Clausewitz's positions also highlights Kondylis's positions on the question of the relationship between political power and violent war.

Clausewitz, according to Kondylis, observes in the phenomenon of war an existential core that is located at the level of the individual human subject<sup>27</sup>. The existential core of war is revealed through Clausewitz's ideotypical abstraction who tries to isolate pure war from real war, and he achieves that by leaving out of the definition of its defining features those characteristics that prevent the full perpetuation of enmity and violence<sup>28</sup>. Human nature remains constant regardless of circumstances and the course of war has to do with the ambivalent nature of the human subject who on the one hand is a carrier of pure enmity and on the other hand is possessed by emotions, for example, ambition for the future, which mitigate his aggressive tendencies<sup>29</sup>. At this point, the connection with Kondylis' thought on man becomes evident, who believes that man by nature seeks self-preservation and the acquisition of power.

Power and violence, politics and war are directly related and this is because man cannot break away from his relation to violence. He cannot remove himself from it, but at the same time, he cannot live with it all the time. His intellect and the mitigation of the violence that results from these mental processes, always in the context of the pursuit of power, lead him to a mitigation of violent practices. It could be stated that war is the opposite of politics, that is a product of civilization and civilization is a product of the recession of savage pre-political instincts. This objection, however, cannot be convincing, because the role of the intellect and reason in the phenomenon of war is not understood. Any war that takes place in the context of civilization is necessarily political, precisely because it veers away from the direction of pure war and blind violence and takes place in the context of the calculation and study of the means and ends, but also of the particular traits and situations that characterize each state<sup>30</sup>.

The answer as to whether politics and war, and therefore power and violence, are related creates another question, which has to do with identifying this relationship. It has to do with the content of the relationship between them. According to Clausewitz and Kondylis, war is born through politics and is essentially the continuation of 'political communication' by other means. Politics is about conflict and the separation of friend and enemy and war essentially continues this conflict (of interests) simply by bloody means<sup>31</sup>. Conflict, however, is not the cause of the initiation of bloody violence within the context of culture and politics, as violence and war are a possible development within conflict situations, but not necessary. The

<sup>27</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, War and politics-war, economy and society; war and revolution- the hot war after the cold war- the Greek-Turkish war, Ibid, p. 24.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p. 31.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, pp. 41-42.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. 44.

general concept of conflict in the political realm and violent war should have a common cause and that is the pursuit of power<sup>32</sup>. The above theses highlight the wide gap between Kondylis and Arendt and the reason why he radically disagrees with her thinking about power. Arendt emphasizes in her work "On revolution" the profoundly anti-political character of violence<sup>33</sup> and the fact that violence is a marginal phenomenon in the political sphere for the human subject as a political being who possesses the capacity of discourse<sup>34</sup>.

In his study of Clausewitz, the Greek thinker shows from the first pages that the development of civilization in no way means the minimization of the existential source of war<sup>35</sup>. The development of the intellect, in fact, does not reduce the chances of war conflict, but on the contrary can make war violence more effective, since it is put in the service of the pursuit of power and functions in such a way as to make violence in a war conflict more effective. This «exhibition» of the intellect of its pacifist masks is also clearly evident in *Power and Decision*, where Kondylis analyses the relationship between 'spirit' and the pursuit of power. These positions form the basis for understanding the polemical nature of ideas.

The Greek thinker dealt with the question of 'spirit' in his introductory remarks in his work about European Enlightenment. There, he claims that there is an ambiguity that characterizes the concept of "spirit", since, although the main meaning concerns the mental functions as opposed to the organs and bodily needs, there is also the meaning that identifies the spirit with the mental functions that are in opposition to the body<sup>36</sup>. On the issue of the "spirit"<sup>37</sup> that he develops in the last part of *Power and Decision*, Kondylis seems to accept the first interpretation of the identification of spirit with intellect. As the Greek philosopher points out, 'spirit' is associated with the pursuit of power to the extent that it elevates man from the purely animal condition<sup>38</sup>. The "spirit" is that mechanism which is not limited to the achievement of self-preservation, but is able to detect the state of deprivation and motivates the subject in the pursuit of power. As the philosopher says in his text:

*This causes a chain reaction of power claims, never to stop. Precisely because the "spirit" is that human element, which eminently thirsts for power...<sup>39</sup>*

The instinct of the purely animal element is subordinated to the superiority of the "spirit", not because the spirit is something superior from a moral and normative point of view, i.e., that the intellect is a more value mechanism than psychological urges, but because the "spirit" is better suited

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 48.

<sup>33</sup> Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*, trans. Angeliki Stoupaki, (Athens: Alexandria 2006), p. 24.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, pp. 23-24.

<sup>35</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *War and politics-war, economy and society; war and revolution- the hot war after the cold war- the Greek-Turkish war*, Ibid, pp. 35-36.

<sup>36</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *The European Enlightenment (Volume A)*, (Athens: Themelio 1987), Ibid, p. 23.

<sup>37</sup> With this term Kondylis means «the intellect».

<sup>38</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Power and Decision: The Formation of World Images and the Question of Values*, Ibid, p. 144.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p. 145.

to act to obtain power in many cases where the instinct is unable to do so<sup>40</sup>. Under Kondylis's concept of the pursuit of self-preservation as a basic anthropological element leading successively to the pursuit of power, it essentially follows that the "spirit" is born as a product of the functional failures of the instinct to resolve those problems that affected its self-preservation and the acquisition of power<sup>41</sup>. The conclusion of the above considerations leads Kondylis to a central position for understanding the intellectual history. 'Intellectual' life, that is, the process by which ideas are formed and distributed, affected by the same laws<sup>42</sup> as all other phenomena of social life and is directly linked to the effort for self-preservation and the acquisition of power<sup>43</sup>.

The role of ideas and people in the historical process, for Kondylis, is obvious and, perhaps, should be obvious to all scholars of the intellectual history, if they understood the way they themselves operate when they study ideas as political subjects and thoroughly engaged with the details of various theories. The intellectual history cannot be understood if ideas are understood as sterile sets of beliefs applied to the world directly and precisely as they are found in written texts. The application of ideas takes place through struggling individuals engaged in a struggle, which has its own logic that must transcend the logic<sup>44</sup> of texts if it is indeed to play a significant role in a specific historical period<sup>45</sup>. Ideas are tools and means to achieve an end for a plurality of subjects in a situation of existential tension<sup>46</sup>. Kondylis in *Power and Decision* points out the same lightness and insignificance of ideas as such in the field of history. Ideas "do not exist", there are only human entities that are confronted with specific situations and act with a view to self-preservation and enhancement of its power in various ways, one of which is the production and embodiment of ideas<sup>47</sup>. People act in the name of various ideas<sup>48</sup>.

The importance of the ideas as such, according to Kondylis, is underestimated and this results from his basic positions. The insignificance of ideas detached from the subject of the decision made is observed, equally, for the Greek philosopher, in the gap between the ideology of the subject and his behavior. The statement of support for an idea in no way means a

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, p. 146.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 147.

<sup>42</sup> Kondylis uses the term law without quotation marks in this passage. The author's assessment, however, is that the use of this word without quotation marks may create misunderstandings about Kondylis' understanding of the historical act.

<sup>43</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Power and Decision: The Formation of World Images and the Question of Values*, Ibid, p. 149.

<sup>44</sup> This transgression also concerns the "ethics" developed in a text, or rather the "moralistic" positions, to be more compatible with Kondylis' language.

<sup>45</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *The European Enlightenment (Volume A)*, (Athens: Themelio 1987), Ibid, pp. 42-43.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 43.

<sup>47</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Power and Decision: The Formation of World Images and the Question of Values*, Ibid, p. 153.

<sup>48</sup> The astute reader might ask the question why subjects would embrace ideas and not create their own, since this would make it easier for them to tailor their own ideas perfectly to their biopsychological traits and it has everything to do with self-preservation and the pursuit of power. The answer is simple, since the acceptance of an admitted idea may be free from theoretical errors which in the observation of opponents could be a blow to the subject who adopts an idea which he himself formulates, without, however, having the intellectual capacity and theoretical training for such an undertaking.

determination of the behavior of the bearer of the idea<sup>49</sup>. Ideology determines behavior only indirectly and symbolically. This situation, in essence, reveals the importance of polemic consistency over logic and that the support of an idea is simply the public statement, from the subject's point of view, of his identity, his friends and his enemies<sup>50</sup>. In this case the ideas as tools fulfill their role and as symbols used for some future activity in which a partial or total recruitment will be necessary<sup>51</sup>.

The polemical nature of ideas is a clear fact for the Greek thinker, and this nature of ideas is observed in a variety of ideas that initially seem quite different from each other, but all of them are characterized by the polemical spirit that possesses their bearers and the fact that they are means, tools and public declarations of enemy and friend. For example, the dispute between rationalists and irrationalists, which has preoccupied intellectuals throughout modern times, is a classic example of this. The identification of rationalism with a specific content of ideas was from the outset one of the main instruments of polemic of the Enlightenment philosophers against their enemies and especially against medieval scholasticism, as Kondylis points out in his treatise on the European Enlightenment<sup>52</sup>. The war project of the rationalists, then, since the rise of the Enlightenment, has been to monopolize thought and proper argumentation as a whole<sup>53</sup>. This is clearly an arbitrary identification of form and content, at a time when, for the Greek philosopher, rationalism as the correct use of the tools of formal logic can only be formal. On the other side of the ideological war, irrationalists (in the logical sense of the term)<sup>54</sup> act in an equally polemic manner, as they "pretend" to oppose the Reason since they already use arguments to support their positions. Reason is demeaned on their part because their fundamental positions are called into question when they are subjected to acute criticism through Reason. In particular, this polemic between rationalists and irrationalists and the way in which it takes place reveals that deliberation in search of 'objective truth' is nothing more than a covert pursuit of power on the part of a collective subject.

## Conclusion

If one conclusion can be drawn that is not explicitly stated in the main body of the article, but is implied throughout, it is that Kondylis was a philosopher who did not recognize the formative role of ideas as such. The Greek thinker, in essence, underestimated ideas, and particularly in the way most philosophers understood and treated them. His turn in the later years of

<sup>49</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Power and Decision: The Formation of World Images and the Question of Values*, Ibid, p. 159.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p. 163,

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, p. 162.

<sup>52</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *The European Enlightenment (Volume A)*, (Athens: Themelio 1987), Ibid, p. 59.

<sup>53</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Power and Decision: The Formation of World Images and the Question of Values*, Ibid, p. 167.

<sup>54</sup> Kondylis refers to two kinds of "irrationalism", irrationalism in the mystical sense of the term and irrationalism in the logical sense of the term. The first kind refers to the acceptance of a fundamental position which is made without the use of reason, but which arises through a decision and is itself ultra rationem. The second kind is that attitude in which irrationalists refuse to argue by logical means because they consider that some of their fundamental positions are in danger of being undermined through the use of reason. This results in the denial of reason in the name of will or the complexity and movement of life that cannot be determined by reason.

his writing career to geopolitical and planetary thought, perhaps reveals to some extent his opposition to the philosophers' 'abstractions' on issues concerning the international socio-political realm. Even in this field of engagement, however, Kondylis did not cease to address phenomena through the prism of self-preservation, the pursuit of power, and the polemical nature of ideas. International politics is a great example of the polemical texture of politics and ideas. This is an excellent way of explaining why, for example, the 'anti-Western' states<sup>55</sup> have not ceased to make extensive use of technological innovations in the military and political spheres, which are the result of the 'Western spirit'<sup>56</sup>. At the same time, Kondylis raises the issue of human rights on an international scale. Even on this issue, the Greek philosopher perceives the rhetoric around human rights as a tool of war and a means of pressure<sup>57</sup>. As he himself mentions, the universalism of "human rights" was a theoretical "weapon" of the West against the communism of the Cold War period<sup>58</sup>.

In addition, the presentation of the philosophy of man and the genealogy of power on the part of Kondylis is intended to highlight a whole methodological attitude towards social phenomena. The Greek thinker's philosophy of man reveals the reason why he himself is a classic example of a Weberian socio-political analyst. German thinker's methodological individualism is clearly revealed in Kondylis' philosophical thought where the causes of the formation of the socio-political field and its various tendencies are located in the field of the biopsychological traits of the subject of decision.

The article emphasized the issue of moral-normative evaluation which conceals power relations. This was the central concern of Kondylis. The Greek thinker as a descriptive thinker did not wish to make moral-normative evaluations, yet he believed that it was possible to know human affairs. According to the Greek thinker, the epistemological and the ethical question have no necessary connection. Therefore, the characterization of Kondylis as a "skeptic" may be unfortunate. Kondylis was an example of a nihilistic philosopher, where his nihilism was a product of his understanding of the polemical nature of ideas and power relations.

Finally, it should be noted that Kondylis' preoccupation with conflict and war and his belief in the inherent polemical element of man is a pattern that can be observed generally in thinkers who refer to the inability of human reason to settle the conflict of absolute values. This is precisely what Leo Strauss mentions in his critique of Max Weber, who based his rejection of natural law on what Strauss refers to as the politics of power<sup>59</sup>. German sociologist, Kondylis and thinkers in general who question the possibility of objective value judgments perceive peace as an impossible social situation and war as an inevitable event.

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<sup>55</sup> Panayiotis Kondylis, *From the 20th century to the 21st century: Intersections in Planetary Politics around the Year 2000*, (Athens, Themelio 1998), p. 90

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 65.

<sup>57</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Planetary politics after the cold war*, (Athens, Themelio 2011), p. 125.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Leo Strauss, *Natural Law and History*, Trans. Stefanos Rozanis, Gerasimos Likiardopoulos, (Athens Gnosis 1988), p. 88.

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# When does morality win in war?

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## Abstract

Morality in war has long been a topic of scholarly and political discussion. Just war theory suggests three dimensions of war that should be morally considered: whether it is justified to wage war, how a war could be fought justly, and how can justice be guaranteed after a war. To this day, there has not been any definitive consensus on what makes a war just or on how morality in war should be approached. The purpose of this essay is to answer the question of when morality prevails in war. According to the argument put forth, morality prevails when the state upholds the right to national defence insofar as it serves as a means for a people to exercise their right to collective self-determination, and that is because this is the most effective way to guarantee that the largest number of people will benefit the most over time.

## Keywords

*Morality, philosophy, just\_war theory, self-determination, utilitarianism*

## Introduction

Morality in war has been studied by scholars and political thinkers for centuries. Some intellectuals deny that morality has a part in war, and others believe that the horrors of war could never be justified morally. According to just war theory, there are three aspects of war that should be taken into account from a moral perspective: 1) the justification for waging war (*jus ad bellum*), 2) how a war may be waged justly (*jus in bello*), and 3) how justice can be secured after the end of war (*jus post bellum*). Although the relevant literature is rich in arguments, there is as yet no conclusive agreement on the question of what constitutes a just war and how we should approach morality in war.

In an effort to provide a more convincing answer, this essay seeks to answer a question posed by Saul Smilansky: in times of war, when does morality win?<sup>1</sup> Smilansky's conclusion is that we should give a nation that defends itself against external attacks more leeway in maintaining the universally applied moral standards of just war. While taking into consideration Smilansky's assumptions and line of reasoning, this essay proceeds in a different direction and arrives at a different conclusion. Firstly, it is suggested that it is more fitting to adopt a utilitarian perspective on the principles of just war theory on the basis of institutional - rather than interpersonal - moral reasoning. It is thus demonstrated why it is more appropriate to regard morality in war as an institutional matter and why, from an institutional standpoint, a utilitarian approach offers the most coherent understanding of the moral principles that comprise the just war theory doctrine.

Subsequently, this essay claims that the most compelling argument for justifying a war is a state's right to national defence and that a utilitarian viewpoint is better suited to bolster this argument. It is specifically argued that peoples should be recognized as entitled to collective self-determination because there is a moral value in people being able to establish laws of justice as members of politically organised communities. Given that the state has proven to be the most effective means for people to exercise their right to collective self-determination, the state ought to be authorized to use right of national defence.

Finally, the concluding argument maintains that collective self-determination guarantees the most beneficial result for the largest amount of people because co-establishing and abiding by rules of justice ensures that most individuals enjoy certain rights and have opportunities to improve their well-being. Thus, the most convincing response to the question of when does morality win in war requires an institutional moral reasoning perspective and holds that a state's right to national defence to the extent that the state serves as a means for the people to exercise their right to self-determination. The reason for this is that collective self-determination, and thus national defence, is the best way to ensure the best long-term outcome for the majority of people.

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<sup>1</sup> Saul Smilansky, "When Does Morality Win?," *Ratio* 23, no. 1 (January 4, 2010): 102-10.

## When does morality win?

In his essay “When does morality win?” Saul Smilansky argues that we need to gain a better understanding of what it takes for morality to win, to acknowledge this as a significant moral issue, and to reconsider how morality can prevail more frequently. To illustrate his point, he presents a hypothetical scenario of two nations at war; Benevolentia and Malevoran. Malevoran engages in unjust aggression and disregards the accepted moral standards of war. Benevolentia’s troops and leadership strictly adhere to those rules, and as a result, Benevolentia loses. This constitutes a “*reductio* of the prevailing morality of warfare”, Smilansky claims, since morality has been undermined by Malevoran’s victory over Benevolentia.<sup>2</sup>

In this scenario, Malevoran has launched an unfair war and is fighting it in an unjust manner (targeting Benevolentia’s civilian population, for example), but that is not the only evil thing about its activities. Malevoran’s strategy is predicated on the notion that it can succeed in doing evil (pursuing an unjust war) because it uses its enemy’s moral rectitude to its advantage. Malevoran cannot be stopped, Smilansky notes, because it has brought about a circumstance wherein, should Benevolentia tries to fight back, it would implicate itself in the unintentional harming of numerous civilians, who Malevoran has deliberately put in harm’s way.

From Smilansky’s point of view, morality has lost. In particular, the moral nation and army are defeated by the immoral ones and good people have lost and ultimately suffered more because of the evil people’s aggression.<sup>3</sup> Needless to say, it does not sound right when people find themselves in a worse predicament the more rigidly they adhere to moral principles, and Benevolentia’s morality proved to be a terrible burden for both the country and its people. We may also acknowledge that Malevoran’s triumph has been attributed in large part to the fact that Malevoran had taken advantage of Benevolentia’s higher moral standards. It would be fair to assume that, as a result of witnessing this turn of events, other nations would now be far more inclined to follow Malevoran’s example in similar circumstances.<sup>4</sup> Thus, not only has immorality prevailed, but it also appears to be the wisest course of action.

According to a different perspective, in Smilansky’s scenario morality has triumphed since Benevolentia’s combatants were strongly tempted to act immorally but resisted the urge. Although the good Benevolentians have ultimately suffered more than the evil Malevorans, this is ethically unimportant because since moral values were upheld by Benevolentia’s leaders and combatants, morality has triumphed.<sup>5</sup> This viewpoint assumes that moral purity is what matters most. Moreover, one might argue that if Benevolentia had adhered to its higher moral standards, morality would still have triumphed because other countries, fearing Malevoran, would have sided with Benevolentia to preserve world peace.<sup>6</sup> However, as Smilansky points

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<sup>2</sup> Smilansky, “When does morality win?”, 102.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 103.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p.104.

out, this response is unlikely to be convincing because it presents an overly optimistic view of international relations.

Smilansky encourages us to approach the problem in “evolutionary” terms. In particular, we should be concerned about ensuring that morality will not allow its opponents to dominate; that the option of morality seems to be the most beneficial to the people, and that immorality will lose the appeal it gains when morally upright people consistently and overwhelmingly suffer because they uphold moral principles in difficult times.<sup>7</sup> However, in order to achieve these goals, we must reject the rigorous absolutism of the conventional morality of war which requires us to uphold the high moral standards regardless of whether an opponent retaliates and regardless of the ramifications of our actions.

According to Smilansky, we will have achieved a moral upgrade if we give Benevolentia more leeway in its attacks on Malevoran and if Malevoran is held accountable for the subsequent Malevoranian casualties.<sup>8</sup> In other words, we have to set lower standards and show tolerance for those who are attempting to protect their defenceless civilians from opponents who have no regard for morality. We uphold morality, Smilansky contends, when we defend ourselves against those who act immorally and deliberately try to prey on the consciences of others. One could claim, though, that Benevolentia would have ended up just as evil as Malevoran by doing evil similar to that of Malevoran. As Hemingway wrote, “Being against evil doesn’t make you good. [...] when you start taking pleasure in it you are awfully close to the thing you’re fighting”.<sup>9</sup> Smilansky counter-argues that this is false comparison: firstly, because Benevolentia would not have acted the way it did if Malevoran had not attacked in the first place and secondly, because Malevoran purposely puts its own non-combatant inhabitants in danger and seeks to injure as many of them as it can because this would signify success, while Benevolentia views the killing of non-combatants as accidental and a moral failure. In other words, Benevolentia’s potential misconduct is restricted to specific actions with calculable consequences, rather than an all-out assault on a nation’s populace or a random onslaught similar to that of terrorists.<sup>10</sup>

While I find Smilansky’s reasoning convincing, I do not believe Benevolentia should have the right to not fully adhere to the moral principles of just war theory because it has the right intentions. When the rules are twisted or relaxed to benefit one actor over another based on preconceived notions of what is morally right, their significance is compromised. The question of how morality might prevail, or more accurately, of how we can ensure that morality does not become ineffective on a global scale and can be discarded, should be approached in a different way. In agreement with Jeffrey P. Whitman, I propose the adoption of a utilitarian approach to just war theory based on institutional moral reasoning. By doing so, we arrive at the conclusion that we need to prioritize a state’s right to national defence as a yardstick for justifying war in order for morality to win, because this leads to the best possible long-term outcome for the greatest number of people.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>9</sup> Hemingway Ernest, *Islands in the Stream* (London: Arrow Books, 2013).

<sup>10</sup> Smilansky, “When does morality win?”.

## A Utilitarian Perspective

In his article “War and Massacre,” Thomas Nagel notes that a person who recognizes the force of constraints in conflict can face significant moral quandaries. He may believe, for example, that bombing a community will put an end to a terrorist campaign. If he believes that the benefits of a particular measure will clearly outweigh the costs, but he still suspects that he should not implement it, he is in a dilemma caused by a conflict between two opposing categories of moral reason: utilitarian and absolutist, in which utilitarianism prioritizes concern with what will happen and absolutism prioritizes concern with what one is doing.<sup>11</sup> However, not all just war theorists adhere to this dichotomy.

In his essay “Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism: A Utilitarian Perspective” Whitman presents his approach to just war theory. According to Whitman, just war theory can provide the conceptual means necessary to address the evolving circumstances of the modern world.<sup>12</sup> It lies halfway between realism and pacifism, he notes. While realists hold that morality usually has no role in conducting war, and that only national interests and military necessity should be prioritized, pacifists generally believe that all forms of violence and war are immoral.<sup>13</sup> His main argument rests on the idea that a re-examination of the tradition’s moral underpinnings in the context of the fight against terrorism shows that, as opposed to the generally accepted rights-based, deontological view of just war theory, a rule-utilitarian perspective is the most relevant one for comprehending the just war tradition. A utilitarian foundation would yield a balanced assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of policy decisions concerning war and suggest more caution and prudence in fighting terrorism and external aggression.

According to just war theorists, morality establishes restrictions on what kinds of wars and tactics can be justified. In order to achieve this, the three main objectives of just war theory are to: (1) reduce the likelihood of war occurring; (2) lessen the severity and suffering of war; and (3) reduce the likelihood that a war will break out after it has been resolved by achieving a just peace. The goal of reducing the incidence of war is primarily guided by what just war theorists refer to as the *jus ad bellum* standards, which must be satisfied in order for a state to wage a just war. As Whitman notes, “most standard interpretations of *jus ad bellum* list six criteria: just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, likelihood of success, proportionality, and last resort”.<sup>14</sup> Secondly, the principles of *jus in bello* regulate the methods of waging war that apply to the second objective of just war theory, namely to lessen the savagery of conflict. The most significant of these regulations deals with how non-combatants - including the sick and wounded and prisoners of war - are treated during armed conflict. Lastly, just war theorists have developed what are known as the *jus post bellum* criteria, which apply

<sup>11</sup> Nagel, Thomas “War and massacre.” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1972, 1 (Winter): 123-144.

<sup>12</sup> Jeffrey Whitman, “Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism: A Utilitarian Perspective,” *Public Integrity* 9, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 23-43.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

to the theory's third aim, which is to preserve the peace following the conclusion of a conflict.

In discussing *jus ad bellum* Whitman contends that "a just war is a defensive war aimed at defeating aggression which in turn is defined as any violation of a state's territorial integrity or political sovereignty".<sup>15</sup> He also argues that the aspect of just cause and the acts done in support of it are inextricably linked with the right intention aspect in the way that, if just cause is an objective norm, then right intention is its subjective equivalent. Furthermore, Whitman notes that the proportionality criterion compares the costs and benefits of using military action for all parties involved, not just the state considering doing so. This is the utilitarian test and it is the most important *jus ad bellum* standard that is applied to the moral justification of war because it asks if the costs of victory will be worth it for all sides involved.<sup>16</sup>

The *jus in bello* rules are based on two primary moral precepts, proportionality and discrimination. The general rule of discrimination states that non-combatants and their property should never be directly attacked. Whitman stresses the word "direct" here since the concept of discrimination does allow for unintentional, or indirect, attacks on people who are protected and their property - also known as "collateral damage". The principle of double effect, which is frequently used in such circumstances, allows harm to be done to protected individuals as long as it is an inevitable and unintentional consequence of operations intended to achieve legitimate military goals, such as demolishing opposing forces or taking control of strategically important territory, and as long as the benefits of those operations outweigh the costs.<sup>17</sup>

Following Whitman's analysis, in the context of *jus in bello*, proportionality demands that the devastation caused by a specific act of war must not be out of proportion to the objective to be achieved. To distinguish this from the *jus ad bellum* principle of proportionality, which requires balancing the costs and benefits of the entire war, Whitman draws attention to specific acts of war. For instance, it would be wrong to use artillery fire to level a whole hamlet, killing civilians in the process, in order to apprehend or neutralize one or two enemy snipers.<sup>18</sup> The methods used must not undermine the prospect of peace or foster disrespect for human life. When using the proportionality criterion, Whitman asserts, soldiers and their superiors are effectively making a utilitarian decision.

The last aspect of the just war theory is the concept of *jus post bellum* and refers to the moral requirements of justification of the end-of-war period, such as reconstruction and establishment of a just peace. A just peace would be achieved if the authorities strive to make up for the wrongs committed by the aggressor without inflaming tensions to the point where a new conflict breaks out. Although public authorities may be sensitive to feelings of retaliation, *jus post bellum* principles require them to use "coldly

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

calculating” reason to overcome the public’s natural impulses in order to achieve the aim of a better condition of peace.<sup>19</sup>

As Whitman notes, unwarranted and excessive use of force in the armed forces tends to sow discontent and the seeds of future terrorism. Therefore, a theory of just war must acknowledge the interconnectedness of *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, and *jus post bellum*, especially with regards to the war on terrorism. This could be achieved precisely by acknowledging the utilitarian foundation of just war theory, which holds that all of the theory’s requirements are justified eventually by weighing benefits against costs and risks.<sup>20</sup>

The definition of a just cause, Whitman points out, has changed over time - moving from employing military action to right a wrong, to protecting a state’s territorial integrity or sovereignty, to include the use of force for humanitarian intervention. Whitman argues that the most fitting moral foundation for comprehending just war standards is provided by Robert Goodin’s version of rule utilitarianism which says that the best strategy to maximize total utility when establishing a framework of rules and regulations is to use the utility calculus.<sup>21</sup> One advantage of rule utilitarianism is that by applying general principles, just war theory can adapt to changing global political conditions without sacrificing the moral goal of these laws, which is to lessen the likelihood of conflict.<sup>22</sup>

There are more advantages that rule utilitarianism offers to just war theory. The adoption of general, utility-maximizing institutional regulations enables individuals and institutions to make rational future plans without having to worry about a lot of rule exceptions.<sup>23</sup> For example, the use of military force is morally justified typically only when a country is defending itself against real, continuous aggression. Permitting one nation to launch a pre-emptive war against another would put nations in a condition of perpetual fear of possible enemy assaults and increase the frequency of warfare globally. This works against the achievement of the greater good of the people that rule utilitarianism advocates. Moreover, the use of force in the battlefield with discrimination and proportionality leads to a net gain in utility because it maximizes the likelihood of a just peace.<sup>24</sup>

A reasonable objection to rule utilitarianism is based on the fact that the protection of human rights seems to be of lesser importance from a utilitarian perspective. Nevertheless, the rights reasoning is intertwined with rule utilitarianism’s version of just war theory. In particular, rule utilitarianism weighs up whether recognizing a particular right will increase long-term expected benefit. As a result, rights are not fundamental in this institutional moral reasoning context, but rather arise from the utility calculus, without, thus, being undermined.<sup>25</sup>

Proponents of rule utilitarianism, according to another critique, face the danger of violating rights if doing so maximizes utility, and thus eventually

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

practice actutilitarianism. For instance, they could decide to publicly endorse the commitment to non-combatant immunity, but in private be prepared to break the law when it deems necessary for the sake of expediency.<sup>26</sup> In response to this criticism, this combination strategy will not be effective if the policies adopted by the rule utilitarian are publicly accessible. When such rights are violated, the public seldom, if at all, benefits in the long run. For instance, several “disutilities” might occur if it is well known that your armed forces has resorted to mistreating and torturing POWs in order to obtain intelligence information: firstly, you expose your own prisoners to the possibility of receiving the same treatment from the enemy, and secondly, as soldiers lose interest in surrendering, you run the risk of escalating the ferocity and brutality of the fighting on both sides.<sup>27</sup> In the end, the animosity created by such a policy will significantly reduce your chances of achieving a just and more stable peace. Ultimately, rule utilitarianism endorses and prohibits many of the same policies and tactics as the human rights approach, but for different reasons.

Whitman argues that there is no rule that applies in all circumstances. This is partly the reason why the kind of rule utilitarianism put forth here prioritizes guiding institutional principles above strict interpersonal guidelines for behaviour. As previously said, enforcing broad standards of conduct offers several utility-maximizing advantages in addition to being important from a practical standpoint. There is a significant benefit of adopting such a perspective in the fight against terrorism, Whitman claims, which is that it resists the urge to transform the conflict into an idealistic crusade against evil.<sup>28</sup>

The professional military ethics as expressed in the moral requirements of just war tradition do not clash, in theory, with the interests of the state, although regrettably, this is not always the case. It is frequently necessary to weigh the state’s interests and ideals against the moral requirements of just war in order to apply the just war theory’s criteria and the rules of war. This kind of value-balancing is precisely what just war theory from a rule utilitarian standpoint offers.<sup>29</sup> Following established, utility-maximizing principles in war is usually the default course of action at the lowest levels of decision-making. Establishing a suitable command environment and practical instructions for implementing utility-maximizing principles becomes one’s moral duty as one rises in rank and responsibilities while the default course of action at the lowest levels of decision-making is to follow the rules that derive from those principles. The challenge for those in the highest leadership positions – including those in government – is to determine whether the current regulations still maximize utility or whether they should be revised and reinterpreted, or even if a new rule should be created.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>30</sup> Regarding the matter of who has the last word and within what limits are the final decisions made, we need to note firstly, that everything is ultimately decided by political leaders and governmental officials, and secondly, that these decisions are subject to the customary institutional safeguards of a well-established rule of law system.; Ibid., 40.

According to Whitman, the existing just war tradition is essentially utility-maximizing. When making changes to the established set of moral standards, it is important to avoid any bias. Any changes that are considered should be universal in scope (i.e., applicable to all situations of the same or similar nature), publicly accessible and utility-maximizing insofar as they are directed toward the just war theory primary objectives: that is, limiting the likelihood, severity, and occurrence of war.<sup>31</sup> The actions and choices that the theory permits or forbids must have a morally sound purpose. Rule utilitarianism best meets the goals of just war because it aims to minimize the major negative effects of war as much as possible.<sup>32</sup>

Whitman emphasizes that extra attention must be paid to *jus post bellum* issues as the war continues.<sup>33</sup> Distinguishing between terrorists and their civilian supporters, who might have legitimate complaints that can be resolved through political means, is crucial while working toward a just peace. All parties involved must have their domestic rights protected, and no side of the conflict should bear an undue financial or political burden. The best source of the *jus post bellum* criteria is the concern with developing utility-maximizing norms for ending conflicts; yet, in order to apply these criteria, it is frequently necessary to see these broad principles through the lens of maximizing benefits over harms.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, in order to effectively combat terrorism, a more equitable global peace must be established, one in which everyone has access to a fair amount of political freedom, economic prosperity, peace and security at home. Without these necessities, people may experience a level of bitterness and hopelessness that terrorist groups might take advantage of to enlist new members and fighters for their cause.

## **The moral value of collective self-determination**

### **The moral standing of states**

The *jus ad bellum* doctrine's central tenet - that only a defensive war is morally justified, and that a state has the right to defend itself against external aggression - is the one requirement for the justification of war that the majority of contemporary just war theorists endorse. In his essay "The Moral Standing of States Revisited" Charles Beitz addresses the issue of the moral standing of states and endeavours to situate Michael Walzer's perspectives on intervention and humanitarian intervention within the framework of global justice, wherein collective self-determination plays a crucial role.<sup>35</sup> Charles Beitz argues that "the rights to life and liberty correspond to the rights of states to territorial integrity and political sovereignty".<sup>36</sup> Violations of these rights constitute crimes, he contends, and people whose rights are violated, as well as those in a position to address these violations, are justified in employing force to defend against the abuses and punish the perpetrators. As Beitz notes, Walzer's perspective permits

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Beitz, Charles R. "The Moral Standing of States Revisited." *Ethics & International Affairs* 23, no. 4 (2009): p. 325-47.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 326.

exceptions to the non-intervention principle in three situations: when it would oppose an earlier and unwarranted intervention by another state; when it would support a secessionist movement that has proven its representative nature; and when it would terminate actions that “shock the moral conscience of mankind”.<sup>37</sup>

According to Walzer, there isn’t a single set of ideas that defines what constitutes a legitimate state. He argues that the “fit” (or historical and cultural resonance) between a state’s government and its people determines the legitimacy of that state; or, as he notes, “a people governed in accordance with its own traditions” is what constitutes a legitimate state.<sup>38</sup> This position could be characterized as an example of “reiterative universalism”: it is “universalistic” in the sense that it maintains that “every government should be legitimate”, but it is “reiterative” in the sense that the standards of legitimacy are contingent upon the unique political culture and historical background of each society.<sup>39</sup> Since community members must choose whether to abide by state laws, they are the ones who must determine whether a state’s institutions are actually legitimate. In contrast to those under the control of an illegitimate state, citizens of a legitimate state are bound by its laws. And, as a matter of fact, the former may have a right to rebel.

Beitz argues that in Walzer’s *Just and Unjust Wars*, a broader understanding of global political justice appears to be implied. It is the perspective of the “society-of-peoples”. He recognizes three key concepts entailed in it. The first concept relates to the makeup of our social environment which, according to Beitz, is actually a community-based world. Every community is the centre of a shared existence where morals, culture, and sometimes even religion are frequent manifestations of human ingenuity. The second point has to do with how this world is organized politically. The territorial national state is its principal form, yet it can also take the form of a multinational state, depending on historical conditions. By setting up its political decision-making procedures and guarding them against outside intervention, the state enables a community to decide its own destiny. Lastly, the global order is the subject of the third concept. As an order predominantly made up of autonomous communities arranged into states, it presents a unique set of challenges. He contends that “the exercise of human creativity simultaneously in many different communities produces a plural world expressed in differing moralities, cultures, religions, and ideas of political legitimacy” and that managing this pluralism is the primary issue for a just global political order.<sup>40</sup>

Ultimately, collective self-determination, Beitz argues, is morally valuable because it upholds or defends specific individual rights and interests. The legal and political autonomy of a state determines “external” self-determination, meaning that the government of an autonomous state has the final say over its citizens and its territory. Consequently, an autocracy can be self-determining from the outside. However, only when there is a certain characteristic in the connection between a nation or people and its state—

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 327.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 332.

namely, that the state should allow the people to rule themselves—can a people be considered internally self-determining.<sup>41</sup> In the end, Beitz concludes that for a state to be characterized as self-governing, its institutions ought to give its citizens the power to shape their own shared future.<sup>42</sup>

### The moral standing of peoples

Following a different path, in her analysis of why a state has moral standing and why national defence is morally justified, Margaret Moore presents a compelling argument for the moral value of collective self-determination. Moore considers it crucial to address the issues of who is entitled to national defence and to appreciate the value of the ideals contained in political community. But before that, Moore wants to get one misconception out of the way: namely, that the common justification of defensive rights is largely based on a false parallel between individual and national self-defence. This is where she departs from Walzer's and Beitz's individual-rights-based perspective.

Moore argues that the aforementioned comparison falls short because innocent people will unavoidably be killed in war on both sides - rather than just troops on the attacking side - and because the aggressor state does not always present a deadly threat to civilians, especially since no one would be harmed if the defending state merely concedes the lost area of its territory.<sup>43</sup> Thus, Moore claims, the question of why killing innocent people is justified when defending political objectives must be addressed in some other way in order to support defensive war. In particular, she contends that it would be more fitting to treat this issue as one of institutional as opposed to interpersonal morality.<sup>44</sup>

The best way to approach the justification of defensive war, Moore claims, is not from a human rights point of view. Considering the innocent people who are killed during a conflict, an emphasis on individual rights as a foundation for reasoning is more likely to lead to pacifist conclusions than to a justification of war in self-defence.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, attacks on sovereign territory are seen as acts of war and do not seem to be reducible to individual rights, particularly when no lives are lost. Therefore, an argument for both territorial and individual rights is required, one that is grounded in the importance of collective self-determination and may be practiced on land that a group legitimately occupies. We need to keep in mind, though, that it is the people who have a right on the territory they occupy and the ones who own the right to collective self-determination, not the state.<sup>46</sup> Thus she

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 336.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 345.

<sup>43</sup> Moore, Margaret. "Collective Self-Determination, Institutions of Justice, and Wars of National Defence." In *The Morality of Defensive War*, edited by Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar, 1st ed., 185-202. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014, 185.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 186.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Moore, Margaret. "Territory, Self-Determination, and Defensive Rights." In *Walzer and War: Reading Just and Unjust Wars Today*, edited by Graham Parsons and Mark A. Wilson, 1st ed., 31-50. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, 44.

argues that a balance between individual and collective rights and duties must be found.

Moore is not the only one who does not consider the human rights perspective not to be most appropriate way to understand just war theory. Apart from her, and Whitman's rule-utilitarian perspective, Michael Ignatieff also presents a strong argument against the human rights moral reasoning in just war theory. The concept of non-combatant immunity exemplifies the distinction between the "particularistic" framework of the laws of war and the "universalistic" framework of human rights.<sup>47</sup> From the perspective of the laws of war, there is a clear distinction between the moral standing of actors with different status, such as combatants, non-combatants, military personnel, detainees, and medical personnel. On the other hand, Ignatieff argues, human rights principles oppose moral discrimination by status.

Following this line of reasoning, from human rights perspective, civilian immunity is a contradictory concept running counter to the idea that all people deserve the same respect. For instance, when viewed through the prism of human rights, national liberation struggles ought to be constrained by the laws upholding those rights, which will most likely result in their defeat.<sup>48</sup> Thus, Ignatieff emphasizes that there are limitations to human rights as a moral framework. One restriction inherent in human rights, Ignatieff argues, is its pacifism, which condemns the oppressed to defeat and submission. Because of that, he maintains that if nonviolent protest has failed to address a problem that affects a fundamental human right, then the question of whether violent action is warranted rests on whether all other peaceful, deliberate avenues have been truly exhausted.<sup>49</sup>

As mentioned earlier, Moore reaches the conclusion that there needs to be a balance struck between individual and collective rights. The balance Moore seeks for, she finds in institutional moral reasoning. In her own words, "the rights and duties that attach to political communities, and individuals as members of those communities, should be based on institutional moral reasoning, which assesses institutional design, practices, and principles on the basis of whether they contribute to moral progress in international and/or national governance".<sup>50</sup> In line with Allen Buchanan,<sup>51</sup> she defines institutional moral reasoning as the process by which institutions, policies, and practices are collectively justified, as opposed to an individual defending the morality of their own conduct. She also presents a normative account of "moral progress" which conveys that in order to guarantee that people live by rules of justice, political communities should be granted a fundamental right to collective self-determination; in particular, in the context of the interstate system, national defensive rights are "justified in terms of their consequences in achieving a just result".<sup>52</sup>

In more detail, Moore argues that "institutional moral reasoning [...] justifies policies and practices as a set" in terms of that set's content and

<sup>47</sup> Ignatieff, Michael. "Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Terrorism." *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 69, no. 4 (December 2002): 1143-64.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 1153.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 1156.

<sup>50</sup> Moore, "Collective Self-Determination", p. 187.

<sup>51</sup> Buchanan, Allen E. "Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination moral foundations for international law". Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

<sup>52</sup> Moore, "Collective Self-Determination", p. 187.

function in the system, as well as the “criteria for determining what counts as morally progressive”.<sup>53</sup> With regard to the “function in the system” aspect, Moore argues that, in order to constitute morally progressive institutional responses to aggressive war, policies, practices, and rights must be evaluated in light of their intended purpose.<sup>54</sup> Concerning the content of that set of policies and practices, as well as the criteria for determining moral progress, Moore notes that we should follow a consequentialist reasoning for their justification in the sense that, the institution should have the fewest possible drawbacks and prevent negative outcomes.

Adding to this last point, what Moore says is that the respective institution “should aim at the overall achievement of the values of justice and self-determination and non-domination, where non-domination is conceived of as a feature of just relations, and where collective self-determination is conceptualized, not in terms of non-interference, but in terms of non-domination”.<sup>55</sup> She also notes that, in order to prevent situations in which the political community aids and abets in the continuation of injustice, institutional rules of war should help individuals collaborate to establish rules of justice to guide their lives within those communities.

In order for a political community to fulfil its purpose as a justice-establishing entity, it needs to occupy some space. Therefore, an argument in support of territorial rights is required. The justice-based argument for territory, which is founded on Kant’s ideas, is arguably the most widely accepted explanation for why territorial rights are justified. Political communities, according to this argument, have territorial rights because they uphold justice. According to Kant, people who live close to one another and hence inevitably interact with one another have a moral need to acknowledge a political authority that possesses the capacity to defend their property rights by coercive legislation, establishing thus a just state - that is, a politically organized community governed by laws.<sup>56</sup>

Moore believes in the significance of political communities arguing that their members co-create and abide by standards of justice. In particular, political communities “realize justice in their own way, thus realizing collective autonomy as well”, and consequently “they realize the fundamental principle of non-domination”.<sup>57</sup> Moore contends that political communities also matter because they crystallize “feelings of co-membership and co-participation in a common political project” and as such they constitute a morally significant relationship that is difficult to replace by another set of justice-establishing institutions.<sup>58</sup> Political communities’ moral value, Moore argues, derives from the community’s process of establishing and upholding justice as well as creating the norms that guide its shared life. People who engage in collective self-government enjoy a sort of autonomy that is different from individual autonomy because they have the institutional capacity to shape the conditions of their common life and destiny.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Kant, Immanuel and Gregory, Mary J., “Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1797].

<sup>57</sup> Moore, “Collective Self-Determination”, p. 193.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Moore, “Territory”, p. 42.

It is evident that, diverging from traditional arguments, Moore does not come up with a national defence argument based on the supposed inherent value of the state or the nation. She contends that the value of collective self-determination cannot be reduced to the “self-determination” of the state. She does not make a justice-based argument, which interprets defensive rights only in terms of the protection of individual human rights, nor a conventional justification for self-determination under international law, which concentrates on state rights. Furthermore, she views the people as a collective agent but does not make reference to any shared ancestral culture or form of cultural community. Rather, she argues that the people can be defined as a collective agent firstly, if a significant portion of the population is connected to each other with ties that entail a common political engagement to live under shared rules as an attempt to realize their self-determination; secondly, if they are capable of establishing and maintaining political institutions of self-determination; and thirdly, if they have a demonstrable history of political cooperation, such as “participating in state or sub-state institutions, or even through mobilizing and participating in a resistance movement”.<sup>60</sup>

National defensive rights, Moore holds, are the reflection of collective self-determination rights but, as such, are second-order rights, “grounded in the people’s right to be collectively self-governing, and operating against foreign aggression to maintain the entitlement of the people to be collectively autonomous and live in a political order organized according to the principle of non-domination”.<sup>61</sup> The conclusion that follows, thus, from Moore’s reasoning is that any state that is subject to an armed invasion by a foreign power that violates its “political sovereignty” or “territorial integrity” has the right to self-defence and it is justified to wage war on the basis of safeguarding “the moral goods that are realized through political self-determination”.<sup>62</sup> In this context, the ability for just political relations to exist at all depends on political communities’ existence and independence as well as on the establishment of an interstate order marked by relations of non-domination.<sup>63</sup>

It may seem to the reader that Moore does not attribute enough value in human rights arguments as a basis for moral reasoning in terms of just war theorizing. But that is not true. She acknowledges that war entails an attack on individual rights but she argues that we can still justify war in the interest of national defence. Moore claims that fighting a war cannot demand a complete commitment to upholding individual rights and so she argues that, while it is acceptable to honour the restrictions on individual rights violations of *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum*, “we should resist implausible attributions of individual liability to the enemy combatants,” whom we must deliberately harm in order to win, and to the non-combatants on both sides, some of whom will inevitably perish in the course of the war.<sup>64</sup>

As was previously mentioned, Moore holds that territorial rights, particularly those pertaining to jurisdiction, belong to the people who are

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>61</sup> Moore, “*Collective Self-Determination*”, p. 198.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 201.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 202.

lawfully residing in a region. In other words, political communities are entitled to their own territory because they establish rules of justice. Moreover, a state's ability to defend itself in a conflict may only exist if it serves as the means of the people's exercise of self-determination. That explains why even states which uphold the rule of law have no right to annex territory from states that do not. That is also why a state may be legitimate in terms of its territorial rights but illegitimate according to justice or democratic standards.<sup>65</sup> And finally, that is why every time the "territorial integrity" of a state is endangered, we cannot merely invoke the significance of that state's territorial integrity as a value.<sup>66</sup>

All peoples are vulnerable, Moore contends, if we do not allow their defence against political aggression. And if we do not allow retaliation against aggression motivated by political aims, every people run the risk of having their collective self-determination threatened and of existing in an institutional order defined by relations of dominance and subordination".<sup>67</sup> The moral justification of national defence as the protection of a people's right to collective self-determination ensures that peoples can avoid that vulnerability. If state institutions and practices reflect the identity and shared goals of individuals as members of communities that seek to actualize collective self-determination, then both peoples as collective agents and states, secondarily, as these peoples' instruments, have the right to protect their territory.

Arriving to this essay's core claim, Moore's argument makes more sense from a rule-utilitarian viewpoint. Rule utilitarianism endorses the establishment of general, guiding institutional principles concerning the justification of war based on a costs and benefits analysis for all parties involved and in the long run. Acknowledging and supporting a state's right to national defence, on the basis of a people's right to self-determination, from a rule utilitarian perspective, as a guiding institutional moral principle for the justification of war, indicates that war will be less likely to occur, will be less savage, and lastly, less likely to re-occur. Put differently, a state's right to defensive war guarantees the most beneficial outcome for the most people and thus it is best understood as a utilitarian argument. And since it does guarantee the most beneficial outcome for the greatest number of people, it answers the question of when morality prevails in war.

## Conclusion

The point of this essay is to provide a more convincing answer to Saul Smilansky's question about morality's triumph in war than his contention that morality wins when we grant a country that defends itself against attack greater latitude in upholding the generally accepted moral principles. The first step is to argue for the adoption of a utilitarian approach in interpreting the principles of just war theory on the basis of institutional moral reasoning - or else, to illustrate why it is more fitting to view morality in war as an

<sup>65</sup> Moore, "Territory", p. 44.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>67</sup> Moore, "Collective Self-Determination", p. 198.

institutional issue and why a utilitarian perspective offers in this institutional context the most coherent interpretation of our established views on moral justification of war.

The second step was to show that the fundamental justification for going to war is a state's right to national defence; something that is best acknowledged and supported by adopting a utilitarian viewpoint. In particular, it was argued that there is moral value in the fact that people, as co-dependent individuals organised in political communities, have the capacity to establish rules of justice, and because of that, peoples should be recognized a right to collective self-determination. Consequently, if we accept that the state has proven to be the best vehicle for people to exercise that right, the state should be granted the right to national defence.

Ultimately, since living under rules of justice guarantees to a large extent that most people enjoy certain rights and have opportunities to advance their well-being, we could argue that collective self-determination offers the most beneficial outcome for the greatest number of people. Therefore, from an institutional moral reasoning perspective, the appropriate response to the question of when does morality win is to support a state's right to national defence to the extent that the state acts as a vehicle for the people to exercise their right to self-determination because this guarantees the most beneficial outcome for most people over time.

I would like to end this essay with a suggestion for future research. A people's right to self-determination presupposes other agents' obligation to not violate that right by aggressive war. The obligation requires the existence of a superior authority to protect these rights and to impose penalties on those who breach their commitments. And since states' rights are second-order rights, there should be no conflict of legitimacy between a state's authority and a supranational authority. In the same spirit, Moore supported the establishment of an interstate order characterized by relations of non-domination in order for just political relations to exist among political communities and Charles Beitz argued that "the ideal of a society of self-determining peoples may be achievable only in conjunction with an increasingly robust internationalism willing to challenge the moral standing of particular states in the name of the wider ideal".<sup>68</sup> These lead me to consider that we need to advocate for the establishment of an international or supranational authority that guarantees the peoples' rights to defend themselves as collective actors against aggressors, in order for morality to prevail. Needless to say, the already existing international set of institutions and organizations that bear corresponding responsibilities, while endorsing the just war principles, have demonstrated their inadequacy in guaranteeing morality's victory in war.

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<sup>68</sup> Beitz, "The Moral Standing of States Revisited", p. 345.

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# War in Marxian and Engelsian Thought: The Crimean War (1853-56) and the “Sixth Power in Europe”

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## **Abstract**

The Crimean War (1853-56) attracted Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' political interest. The two thinkers came up with a long volume of articles and letters written as dispatches for the American newspaper *The New York Tribune*. I tap into the said corpus to glean past perspectives on a modern war as a major geopolitical phenomenon involving three Great Powers —namely England, France and Russia—and the crumbling Ottoman Empire, directly impinging upon the post-Vienna Congress established European socio-political order. I argue, based on Marx and Engels' commentaries, that in the Marxian philosophical constellation, war is conceptualised and projected as a harbinger of a pan-European proletarian revolution. As a “sixth power in Europe” that could hold sway over —foremost by precipitating— the course of events which would usher in a radical social transformation. The under-theorisation of modern war in the Marxian and Marxist intellectual traditions, the reasons behind it, and Étienne Balibar's distinct theoretical approach to the coupling of war and revolution are also presented and discussed.

## **Keywords**

*Marx, Engels, Crimean War, War in Europe, War and Revolution, 19th century*

## Introduction

Russia's gruesome attack on Ukraine, the ongoing bloody war and its harrowing effects have brought the tumult diachronically besetting Eastern Europe into high relief. Pundits and journalists of disparate ideological hues and interests have tried to draw parallels, pointing to continuities and ruptures, with another war of equally resounding geopolitical significance: the Crimean War of 1853-56.<sup>1</sup>

The latter had been the first large-scale war to break out after almost forty years of a propitiously balanced European peace agreed upon at the Vienna Congress (1815) that marked the end of the Napoleonic era. Despite not being canonised a "Great War," the Crimean War held all the typical trappings that could make it unfold into one: Two circumstantially allied Great Powers, namely France and Britain, supported by the disgruntled Ottomans and a contingent of Sardinians (Piedmont), launched a campaign against another, Russia.<sup>2</sup> In light, also, of the implicated violence, its high death toll and the demographic shifts it precipitated, it has rightly been termed "a transformative event."<sup>3</sup> The principal belligerents first came to loggerheads over the vexed question of who could claim the authority to have a say in the religious affairs of the Christian Churches and the protection of their votaries in the Holy Land, which were then part of the Ottoman dominion. The Sultan's swift concession to French demands to cede them control of the Catholic Church, but concomitant denial to bend to the will of Russians, who wished not only to hold sway over the affairs of the Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem but moreover to assume the role of protector of Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, incurred the Tsar's wrath. Russia and the Ottoman Empire initially went to war in October 1853, after the occupation, by the former, of the two Ottoman principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; Great Britain and France entered the war after allying with the Ottomans<sup>4</sup> in March 1854 and attacked Crimea with the object of crushing Russian naval power in the Black Sea.<sup>5</sup> For the French and the British, in effect, this was a war waged to thwart Russia's influence in the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing risks it could pose to their interests, primarily the maintenance of free trade routes to southeast Asia; other smaller European powers, such as Prussia, Austria, Sweden and Denmark dithered over whom they ought to side with and eventually chose the path of active neutrality.<sup>6</sup> The war ended with the seizure of Sevastopol by the allied powers in September 1855 and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Paris in March 1856, which promulgated the Black Sea a neutral sea, and stipulated, among other things,

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Alexander Etkind, "Two Toxic Commodities, Two Crimean Wars, and Other Wrong Historical Analogies," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (March 14), 2023.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89261> (accessed May 27, 2023).

<sup>2</sup> James B. Agnew, "The Great War that Almost Was: Crimea, 1853-1856," *Parameters* 3, no. 1 (1973): 46-48. There exists a vast bibliography on the said war, the review of which goes beyond the scope of this study.

<sup>3</sup> Mara Kozelsky, "The Crimean War, 1853-56," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 4 (2012): p. 905.

<sup>4</sup> Agnew argues, by citing illustrative quotes, that "Turkey was not so much an ally of France and Britain as she was an 'excuse.'" See Agnew, "The Great War," p. 49.

<sup>5</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd ed. (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 19-20.

<sup>6</sup> Maartje Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 69-73.

that Ottoman territorial integrity –by then a crumbling Empire, which had been progressively forfeiting lands it hitherto dominated— should be respected.<sup>7</sup>

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were not indifferent to these developments. The two men dwelt extensively on them in a series of articles and letters published in the *New York Tribune* over the years the war was waged.<sup>8</sup> The latter was reportedly “one of the largest and most influential newspapers worldwide.”<sup>9</sup> It held a good reputation for standing firmly against slavery; besides, it was despised by Prussian authorities, which regarded it as an “organ of the Whig party” that advocated what they derogatorily dubbed “socialist extravagances.”<sup>10</sup> The two thinkers, in their career as correspondents for the said newspaper, which lasted from the early 1850s until 1862, reported on a great variety of themes, maintaining a focus on British socio-political affairs and the fledgling capitalist society of the United States, less so on countries of continental Europe.<sup>11</sup> Jürgen Herres has recently argued that Engels’ contribution remained a “carefully guarded secret for a considerable time,” and only much later was it revealed that numerous reports, especially those dealing with military matters, were penned by him despite them having been credited to Marx.<sup>12</sup>

In this paper, I tap into this little-studied reportorial corpus. First I attempt to reconstruct the Marxian/Marxist and Engelsian theory of war. I then turn to their commentaries on the Crimean War. My goal is to glean their views on modern warfare in Eastern Europe and its socio-political implications for the broader continent.

## Marx and Engels on War

Three, according to Siegfried Kissin,<sup>13</sup> have been the “perennial” quandaries preying on the minds of those adhering to socialism: how to prevent war; how to respond to it; what opportunities there exist(ed) for advancing the socialist cause in wars between capitalist powers. Contemporaries and epigones of Marx and Engels, starting from the International Working Men’s Association (1864-72), to early German Social Democrats, and later authoritative figures of the Marxist tradition such as Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, and the post-First International anarchists and feminists, rigorously addressed such questions.<sup>14</sup> Presumably having grasped that war as an act of collectively exerted violence presupposes the constitution of coherent, consensual and

<sup>7</sup> Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, p. 20.

<sup>8</sup> Karl Marx, *The Eastern Question: A Reprint of Letters Written 1853-1856 Dealing with the Events of the Crimean War*, ed. Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling (1897; rep., Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> Heinz D. Kurz, “Transatlantic Conversations: Observations on Marx and Engels’ Journalism and Beyond,” *Social Research* 81, no. 3 (2014): p. 637.

<sup>10</sup> Kurz, “Transatlantic Conversations,” p. 640.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p. 642, 644-48.

<sup>12</sup> Jürgen Herres, “My Immortal Works: Friedrich Engels as a Journalist and Publicist – An Overview,” in *The Life, Work and Legacy of Friedrich Engels: Emerging from Marx’s Shadow*, eds. Eberhard Illner, Hans A. Frambach and Norbert Koubek, trans. Joseph Swann and Mícheál Úa Séaghdha (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023), p. 18-19.

<sup>13</sup> Siegfried F. Kissin, *War And The Marxists: Socialist Theory and Practice in Capitalist Wars, 1848-1918* (New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2019), p. ix.

<sup>14</sup> Marcello Musto, “War and the Left: Considerations on a Chequered History,” *Critical Sociology* 49, no. 3 (2023): p. 515-20.

unanimously organised political groups and organisations that should be able to secure widespread societal support for a successful large-scale mobilisation,<sup>15</sup> they sought to obstruct this process by appealing, via their writings, addresses and slogans, to the distinct and utterly irreconcilable, internationalist “common interest”<sup>16</sup> of the working class and its revolutionary movement,<sup>17</sup> the primary pool of manpower in every war.

When we turn to the forefathers, however, looking for an operational explanatory theoretical map and tools to navigate through the extant material, scholarly opinions converge in that there exists a gap in the Marxian intellectual legacy when it comes to identifying a coherently formulated, systematic and all-round theory of war. This is so either concerning war as a contemporaneous phenomenon in itself,<sup>18</sup> or in its relation to other phenomena, such as revolution,<sup>19</sup> or as an integral element in the broader constellation of international relations.<sup>20</sup> Nor did Marx and Engels expound any elaborate, clear-cut distinction between “just” and “unjust” wars<sup>21</sup> or a novel theory of unorthodox warfare.<sup>22</sup> Such themes still command marginal research interest. Neumann and Von Hagen blamed it on slanted (mis)representations of the two thinkers, hallowing them as stern anti-militarists and fervent pacifists.<sup>23</sup> For Paul Blackledge, it was the early 20th-century rise of “imperialism” and its prompt

<sup>15</sup> Siniša Malešević and Christian Olsson, “War,” in *The Sage Handbook of Political Sociology*, eds. William Outhwaite and Stephen P. Turner (London: SAGE, 2018), p. 718-19.

<sup>16</sup> Alan Gilbert, “Marx on Internationalism and War,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 7, no. 4 (1978): p. 354.

<sup>17</sup> Musto, “War and the Left,” 515-20. It had been César de Paepe, one of the principal leaders of the International Working Men’s Association (1864-72), who first formulated the classical position of the workers’ movement on the question of war, namely that under capitalism, wars are inevitable, since it is the dominant socio-economic paradigm itself that engenders and proliferates them.

<sup>18</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Η Θεωρία του Πολέμου*, 5η έκδοση [Theory of War, 5th edition] (Athens: Themelio, 2004), 169; Musto, “War and the Left,” 516; Sigmund Neumann and Mark Von Hagen, “Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, eds. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 262; Walter Bryce Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 67, 73-74. The above-cited scholars refer to pronouncements on the subject matter which they view as “fragmentary,” “occasional,” “sometimes contradictory,” “not developed systematically enough, not related clearly enough to the core principles of Marxist social and political theory” and “scattered through their [Marx and Engels’] writings”.

<sup>19</sup> Kissin, *War And The Marxists*, 38-39; Kondylis, *Η Θεωρία του Πολέμου* [Theory of War], 227-39; Karel Kára, “On the Marxist Theory of War and Peace: A Study,” *Journal of Peace Research* 5, no. 1 (1968): 13-14. Kondylis discusses the relation between the two, as derived from Marx and Engels’ fragmentary writings. Their presumed interdependence was important because it brought *foreign policy* to the two thinkers’ centre of attention, as a distinct factor affecting the global spread of the long-awaited proletarian revolution. Kára discusses the qualitative distinction between “violent” and “peaceful” forms of revolution in the Marxist tradition. War, expectedly, falls within the first category.

<sup>20</sup> Benno Teschke, “War and International Relations,” in *The Marx Revival: Key Concepts and New Interpretations*, ed. Marcello Musto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 302-5, 314; Scott Burchill, “Marxism,” in *An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives*, eds. Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke, and Jim George (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 69.

<sup>21</sup> Kondylis, *Η Θεωρία του Πολέμου* [Theory of War], 235-36. As a matter of principle, a “just” war equates to a (civil) revolutionary war. The big question, nevertheless, has been to what extent a “just” war could, from a strategic point of view, remain defensive, or whether it could also evolve into an aggressive one. Having said that, it is interesting that when it came to revolutionary tactics, the two men stressed the importance of attacking first (see 245-47).

<sup>22</sup> Kondylis, p. 249-50.

<sup>23</sup> Neumann and Von Hagen, “Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society,” 262-63. Their reaction to the Allies’ entry into the Crimean War is a glaring refutation of the purported thesis: “*At last* [my emphasis], the long-pending question of Turkey appears to have reached a stage where diplomacy will not much longer be able to monopolise the ground for its ever-shifting, ever-cowardly, and ever-resultless movements. The French and British fleets have entered the Black Sea [...].” See Marx, *The Eastern Question*, 215 [The European War].

incorporation into Marxist thought that consigned the fruits of the two thinkers' military thought into oblivion, as irrelevant and of no intellectual value for contemporary political realities, signalling "a radical transformation of the European and world theatres after Marx and Engels' death."<sup>24</sup>

Benno Teschke, most recently, broached this under-theorisation in great detail. He imputes the lack of a Marxian concept of war to a Marxian "historical materialist" understanding of history, in which the interpretation and theorisation of inter-state war are taken to be an extraneous task since it is the state itself that is foregrounded as the sole unit of analysis. Precedence is therefore given to vertical social conflicts taking place *within* the boundaries of political communities, and phenomena that manifest beyond national boundaries are only appraised in relation to their significance for the "strategic calculations of national and international working-class movements."<sup>25</sup> It was moreover anticipated that the gradual spread and ultimate universalization of capitalism would lead —due to the "universal interdependence of nations"— to the waning of national antagonisms; concomitantly the swollen class struggle would pave the way for "the formation of a world proletariat as a universal class," that would embark on "a single and synchronised world revolution" which, in turn, would signal the eventual elimination of war.<sup>26</sup> Besides, the inner mechanisms of the foreseen trade-mediated expansion of capitalism remained at best vague, making it seem as if it hinges upon "an automaticity to a transnationalising and homogenising process that discount[s] how the expansion of capitalist practices was refracted through a pre-existing interstate system that generated resistance and differences through geopolitics, war and class conflict in the contested and regionally highly differentiated (non-)transitions from pre-capitalist to capitalist state-society complexes."<sup>27</sup> By and large, such inherent determinism, combined with a rigid eschatology, made any theorisation of modern war seem tangential. All in all, Teschke concludes by couching the problem in an erudite manner: "Marx," he argues, "oscillated between foregrounding theoretical abstractions held to impose the deep logics and functional requirements on the course of history —notably, a single-world-historical pattern of sequences of modes-of-production, the mega-structures of a transnationalising, homogenising, and unifying capitalist world market, or the spaceless self-expansion of the concept of capital— and delving into historical concretions —a series of case studies on specific geopolitical junctures. Both modes of inquiry were expressed in the use of different analytical registers: theoretical-logical tracts versus journalistic, political, and historical narratives."<sup>28</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Paul Blackledge, "War and Revolution: Friedrich Engels as a Military and Political Thinker," *War & Society* 38, no. 2 (2019): 2.

<sup>25</sup> Teschke, "War and International Relations," 304-6.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 307-8; Burchill, "Marxism," 69; Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*, 68; Kondylis, *Η Θεωρία του Πολέμου* [Theory of War], 171, 177.

<sup>27</sup> Teschke, 308; see also 309, p. 312-14.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 314-15. Such may be the case for Marx. As for Engels, it can expressly be said that he lived up to his nickname: "the General." He was enlisted early as a bombardier in the 12th company of the Guards Artillery Brigade in Berlin and got actively engaged in the failed revolutions of 1848. It was then that he first developed an interest in a variety of military affairs, as he "understood the importance of a good military force for any revolutionary movement, and the need for decisive action at the opportune moment." Further, he had been a pedantic observer of naval battles and came up with perceptive, often prophetic remarks on naval warfare affairs. Gallie dubs him "the most perceptive military critic of the nineteenth century." See: Roland Boer, "Friedrich Engels (1820-95)," in *Routledge Handbook of Marxism*

We can, however, still talk of a “general Marxist position on war.”<sup>29</sup> This boils down to three Marxian premises, namely that: war is not ipso facto evil or irrational; war can be seen in a favourable light when advancing social progress and multiplying the possibilities of production;<sup>30</sup> political-diplomatic criteria ought to override military ones when war is regarded as a policy.<sup>31</sup> Marx and Engels, argues Kondylis, in conceptualising “war,” referring to the highest level of escalation of an armed conflict, regardless of whether this is taking place within or among states: it is an “act of collectively exerted, armed violence aimed at attaining collective goals, where collective agents can be either classes, nations or states.”<sup>32</sup> What is confounding, nevertheless, is that the two men, in trying to draw a connection between military conquest and the transformation of prevailing social structures, recurred to much earlier stages of mankind, repudiating, in effect, the central historical materialist thesis that war is endemic solely to class-organised societies.<sup>33</sup> Therein, they found war to have been “a permanent inter-societal possibility,”<sup>34</sup> an ever-present “relatively independent variable in the ever-changing human scene.”<sup>35</sup>

Let me begin with Engels.<sup>36</sup> For Engels, wars waged between small, classless tribes are to be differentiated in two ways from those waged between class-organised societies: In the former, it is the duty of the whole tribe, at whose hands power lies entirely, to conduct war; not exclusively of a specialised group, as would be the case in a society with a fully-fledged division of labour and relevant class distinctions. It does not, then, reflect a clash of antagonistic class interests, but instead transcends them. Besides, such wars were (initially) not conducted in order for tribes to gain access to exploitable resources, be they people or goods, since classless societies were largely based on autarchy.<sup>37</sup> Their goals were of a rather insular *economic* nature, be it the protection of the land which the tribe settled on and cultivated or its small-scale expansion.<sup>38</sup> “But it is precisely the impossibility of such a circumstance [...] in the future [communist] society, which would preclude the scarcity of goods and be based on a capitalism-induced global market. The causes of war in the primordial classless society would wither away within the classless society of the future.”<sup>39</sup>

Marx, respectively, traced war’s corrosive effects upon ancient societies by focusing on the Greco-Roman organisational model.<sup>40</sup> There, aggregations of people settled in cities and subsisted by cultivating the countryside, which

and Post-Marxism, eds. Alex Callinicos, Stathis Kouvelakis and Lucia Pradella (New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2021), 42; Kurt Möser, “‘The General’ as Admiral: Friedrich Engels and the Naval Warfare Debate,” in *The Life, Work and Legacy of Friedrich Engels: Emerging from Marx’s Shadow*, eds. Eberhard Illner, Hans A. Frambach and Norbert Koubek, trans. Joseph Swann and Mícheál Úa Séaghdha (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023), 90-91, 93, 95; Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*, 68-69; Neumann and Von Hagen, “Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society,” 264-66, 272-75; Blackledge, “War and Revolution: Friedrich Engels,” 5-8.

<sup>29</sup> Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*, p. 74.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 74; Kondylis, *Η Θεωρία του Πολέμου* [Theory of War], p. 171-72.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. 174-75.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 176-77.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, p. 177.

<sup>34</sup> Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*, p. 76.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, p. 79.

<sup>36</sup> The theoretical views of Engels, elaborated on here, were put forward in his *Anti-Dühring* (1878) and in *The Origin of the Family* (1884); those of Marx in his *Grundrisse* (written 1857-61).

<sup>37</sup> Kondylis, *Η Θεωρία του Πολέμου* [Theory of War], 177-8.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. 178-79.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p. 179.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, p. 181.

formed part of the broader dominion. The biggest challenge for this societal paradigm came from rival groups that could occupy or lay claim to the said lands.<sup>41</sup> War, in this instance, had been a means of securing the group's existence. It formed the "sublime collective duty" of the community.<sup>42</sup> Marx, nevertheless, did not fall short of noticing the ensuing paradox, namely that even though war serves as the sole "guarantor" of the continuance of a community's social life, it, at the same time, undermines the cardinal foundational principle of its economic preconditions, that is the suspension of the individuality of its members for the sake of the community. War and conquest, to put it short, alienate the social subject by introducing the conditions for him to develop an assertive attitude which subsequently translates into an ever-increasing lust for authority.<sup>43</sup> Both thinkers, importantly, recognised that unremitting warfare would naturally alter the internal structures of early-day societies, creating "lords" and "slaves." Such an unequal power structure, it was argued, would arise as a corollary, on the one hand, of the genesis of slavery and, on the other hand, of the progressive autonomisation and institutionalisation of those subjects who managed to distinguish themselves as skillful warriors, enhancing thereby, in an epoch of frequent wars, their status within the community. An analogical correlation between combatant services viewed as vital-for-the-community and the desire for further claims to authority was thus established.<sup>44</sup>

At this time, slavery as a nascent institution stood as a catalyst for the transmutation of the socio-economic functions of war. Developments in the field of the economy, such as the division of labour, rise in volumes of production and dispossession of the common ownership of land,<sup>45</sup> amplified the need for more labour. Naturally, it was only through war that this need could be met.<sup>46</sup> Captured men of defeated tribes, who once would have been killed, were now transformed into slaves and subjected, significantly, not to the community as a whole but to a ruling class of warlords. Slave ownership thus emerges as a new paradigm of class rule. "[W]ithout war labour could not be found, hence it had been impossible for slave ownership to become established as a form of class domination," notes Kondylis.<sup>47</sup> As a result, war, formerly a means of defence and conquest, is now re-introduced as "a response to the [still inchoate, though existing as a consequence of uneven warfare skills] internal differentiation of the community,"<sup>48</sup> with the quest of warlords seeking accumulation of power being its driving force. The growing number of such slave-owning warlords and their ardour for conquest led, in turn, to the proliferation and consolidation of slave-owning economies, ergo of slavery as an institution.<sup>49</sup>

The disillusionment suffered due to the failed revolutions of 1848<sup>50</sup> drove Marx and Engels to enquire into the connection between foreign policy,

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 181.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 181-82.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 182.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. 180-1.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 180.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 182-83.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 183.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, p. 183.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 183-85; Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*, 77-78. The emergence of Roman latifundiae as self-contained units of production is a paradigmatic case in point.

<sup>50</sup> Neumann and Von Hagen, "Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society," 266-68.

war and internal affairs, as well as the broader interdependence between socialism, military policy and foreign affairs “because without an understanding of these relationships, a realistic revolutionary strategy could not be possible.”<sup>51</sup> It had been then that they conceived war as a harbinger of revolution,<sup>52</sup> began to regard the peasantry as “a possible ally or driving force in the coming social revolution,”<sup>53</sup> put forward the view that dormant domestic class struggles could be brought into the spotlight when war among national ruling classes breaks out<sup>54</sup> and understood that “the future success of the workers’ movement demanded socialists [to] develop a workable strategy for confronting and overcoming the military power of states.”<sup>55</sup>

The said engraftment of the concept of “revolution,” and of the implied “class struggles,” in post-Marx theoretical debates around war was problematised by Étienne Balibar.<sup>56</sup> Balibar has argued that the two concepts brought to the fore the “unpolitical” character of war since they spell “‘the end of the political state,’ or suppress the autonomy of the political sphere.”<sup>57</sup> Tracing “class struggle” back to an appropriation of the Saint-Simonian conception of “antagonism,” he contends that Marx came to posit “the Industrial Revolution and the process of proletarianisation” as “just another form of war” after reversing the thesis of Saint-Simonians that industrialisation, commerce and production will supersede war.<sup>58</sup> Through the introduction of the “war model” for the class struggle, a new concept of the “political” emerged: “*Politics* in the essential sense would [now] precisely concern the transition from one phase, [that of ‘low-intensity’ civil war], to the other, the ‘becoming visible’ of latent struggle [...]” allowing for a scope of decision-making that would either lead to “victory” or “defeat.”<sup>59</sup> Classes would figure as “camps” or “armies,” forming “radically exclusive antagonistic groups external to one another,” pushing themselves towards a fatal confrontation in a teleological fashion.<sup>60</sup>

The link between world capitalism and war, “the *historicity* of war from the point of view of ‘historical materialism,’”<sup>61</sup> to couch it in Marxian terms, is also touched upon. Balibar argues that the introduction of war in Marx’s theory of history is inherently problematic since it comes to deconstruct the body it meant to build.<sup>62</sup> This is due to two contradictions encountered in the dialectic of war and militarism: First, the evolution of military technology and strategies,

<sup>51</sup> Neumann and Von Hagen, 263-64. Teschke also argues that “the nexus between capitalist development, foreign policy, revolutions, and war” became, for the first time, an object of Marx’s interest in reaction to the Crimean War. This interest was sparked by the events that fell under the rubric of the “Eastern Question”, which “could not [be] resolve[d] in line with his own theoretical premise of world-historical progress driven by the most advanced capitalist nations. For it proved impossible to derive from the ‘objective’ interests of the British (and French) bourgeoisie a definitive and unambiguously liberal-progressive foreign policy, either in intentions or outcomes. It also proved impossible to identify a transnational bourgeois class interest [...] that somehow dispensed with interstate conflicts.” See Teschke, “War and International Relations,” 309-11.

<sup>52</sup> Neumann and Von Hagen, p. 269.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, p. 268.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, p. 269.

<sup>55</sup> Blackledge, “War and Revolution: Friedrich Engels,” 3.

<sup>56</sup> Étienne Balibar, “Marxism and War,” *Radical Philosophy* 160 (2010): 9.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, “Marxism and War,” p. 9.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 10.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 10-11.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, p. 11.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

along with the incorporation of masses into conscription armies,<sup>63</sup> which in no way lead to the eventual elimination of “arms races”; these are “virtually as unlimited as the process of capitalist accumulation itself.”<sup>64</sup> Second, it seems that the rising importance of the nation-state does not entail the repositioning of state apparatus as the chief enemy in the eyes of the global working class, but –to the disenchantment of socialists– it is the (un)successful espousing either of nationalism or internationalism by workers that ultimately determines their opposition to a general war among rival capitalist states.<sup>65</sup>

Hence we reach the crux of the “problem” of revolution. Herein lies the question: “How did the Marxists make and think of the revolutions they were involved in, and what was their essential objective?”<sup>66</sup> Balibar identifies two “tendencies.” He finds these to have been expressed in the historical cases of Vladimir Lenin and Mao Zedong: the revolutionary war of the masses and the mass resistance to war.<sup>67</sup> It had been Lenin’s “transformation of the imperialist war into a revolutionary civil war,” that through its “re-creat[ion] of class politics at the expense of the state,” ushered in the transition “from the state monopoly of legitimate violence to the class monopoly of historical decisive violence.”<sup>68</sup> Respectively, Mao’s propounding of a “protracted war of partisans,” through a recalibration of the Clausewitzian axiom that regards war as “the continuation of politics by other [extra-state] means” and a new conception of the political that renders the communist party the chief organ of historical development,<sup>69</sup> gave rise to a new articulation of the relation between war and politics. The latter’s linchpin had been “a new historical unity of class, people and revolutionary party.”<sup>70</sup> “So, in a sense, we have come full circle, and it is not by chance, probably, that the closure of this circle consists in the reversal of the hierarchical relationship between institutional warfare waged by the state and popular guerrilla warfare.”<sup>71</sup>

Marx and Engels’ theses on war massively moulded the character of modern revolutions. What ought to stand out as their most seminal contribution is that through their theorisation of global politics and conflicts “they raised the question of social change in their time [...] to the plane of world politics.”<sup>72</sup> The passages reproduced below reveal a spectacularly knowledgeable account of 19th-century geopolitical rivalries and capture the two men’s sincere angst for the course of the revolutionary cause.

<sup>63</sup> Both Marx and Engels placed great emphasis on the establishment of a modern mass army through conscription. This, they thought, “could serve as the major channel through which a democratic society might emerge.” The doctrine of a “democratic army,” a “nation in arms,” was first advocated and further expounded on by Engels. See Neumann and Von Hagen, “Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society,” 277, 279-80. For a more wide-ranging discussion on the social functions the army performs, see Kondylis, *Η Θεωρία του Πολέμου* [Theory of War], 207-27, especially 209-11, 223-25.

<sup>64</sup> Balibar, “Marxism and War,” p. 12-13.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, p. 13.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 14.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p. 14.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p. 14-15.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p. 15-16.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, p. 14.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, p. 15.

<sup>72</sup> Neumann and Von Hagen, “Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society,” p. 264.

## The Crimean War and the “sixth power in Europe”

Marx and Engels had been no strangers to journalism before they started working in the *Tribune*. In the early 1840s, after he discarded any hopes of finding employment in academia as a radical, Marx became chief editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, a reputedly liberal paper which was based in Cologne and was subtly critical of the provincial government and the seated-in-Berlin monarchical authority. It was then that he was first brought up against the tangible economic hardships faced at the grassroots level of society and felt impelled to study political economy.<sup>73</sup> Engels, from early on an eloquent thinker and a vocal social critic,<sup>74</sup> maintained a lifelong relationship with journalism, using the numerous newspapers he wrote for as an outlet platform for his ideas to be disseminated.<sup>75</sup> He also published pamphlets, essays and commentaries of military-strategic interest and on uprisings and wars.<sup>76</sup>

At this point, a methodological caveat should be added. This is necessary for the sake of the clarity and scholarly solidity of the present study’s normative underpinnings. When visiting the works of past thinkers, it is suggested as methodologically apt to proceed by exploring two avenues: one of authorial intention, and that of authorial and textual reception.<sup>77</sup> Authorial intention “attempt[s] to recover the original intention that the author[s] had in writing the relevant text, and particularly [their] intention in making one or more conceptual moves within that text.”<sup>78</sup> Sensitivity to historical context is indispensable in this respect. Authorial and textual reception, on the other hand, “seeks to understand the impact of th[ese] author[s’] move by tracing the reception of [their] text[s] over time.”<sup>79</sup> Here I do not focus on “the serial contexts [...] in which the author[s] [are] explicitly drawn on, reinterpreted, and reused;”<sup>80</sup> what chiefly concerns me is the reception of my work by a potential readership.

For Karl Marx, at the core of the Eastern Question, the “ever-recurring question” reignited “whenever the revolutionary hurricane has subsided for a moment,”<sup>81</sup> laid a geopolitical stalemate, encapsulated in the following

<sup>73</sup> Terrell Carver, “Reading Marx: Life and Works,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Marx*, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 7-8; Paul Prew et al., “The Enduring Relevance of Karl Marx,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx*, ed. Matt Vidal, Tony Smith, Tomás Rotta and Paul Prew (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 8.

<sup>74</sup> Terrell Carver, *Engels: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3-5.

<sup>75</sup> Herres, “‘My Immortal Works’: Friedrich Engels,” 10-11, 14, 16, 17, 18-19, 20.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 18, p. 22-23.

<sup>77</sup> Claire Vergerio, “Context, Reception, and the Study of Great Thinkers in International Relations,” in *War, States, and International Order: Alberico Gentili and the Foundational Myth of the Laws of War*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 28.

<sup>78</sup> Vergerio, “Context, Reception, and the Study of Great Thinkers,” p. 28.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, p. 28.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, p. 28. A work that revisits the 1853-56 corpus in a revisionist fashion, aiming to flesh out and refine the analytical lenses of International Relations scholarship “by reintegrating class [interests],” is that of Cemal Burak Tansel, “Geopolitics, Social Forces, and the International: Revisiting the ‘Eastern Question,’” *Review of International Studies* 42, no. 3 (2016): 492-512.

<sup>81</sup> Marx, *The Eastern Question*, 2 [Turkey]. The excerpts cited henceforward (but also the one in footnote 23) have been formatted in the following way: besides page number, the full title of the respective article/letter is cited within brackets. Since in the original corpus the articles/letters are not signed, I have consulted the work of Kondylis (*H Ελλάδα, η Τουρκία και το Ανατολικό Ζήτημα* [Greece, Turkey and the Eastern Question]), in which some of them are cited, to attribute each piece either to Marx or Engels. When the author is not identified, I use “Marx/Engels.”

question: “What shall we do with Turkey?”<sup>82</sup> He considers “the present crisis of the Ottoman Empire” as “produced by the same conflict between the Latin and Greek Churches which once gave rise to the foundations of the Empire,”<sup>83</sup> and imputes “the true origin of the present Eastern complication,” to Napoleon III’s “anxi[ety] to cajole and win over the Pope, and to be crowned by him.”<sup>84</sup> “Bonaparte,” he writes, “had reasons to accept the challenge [of, allegedly, protecting the interests of the Latin Church in the East], and make himself appear the ‘most Catholic’ Emperor of France.”<sup>85</sup>

Pervasive throughout his and Engels’ dispatches is a feeling of deep suspicion and antipathy towards all Western political actors and organs. The Vienna Conference, a joint body of England, France, Prussia and Austria, periodically convening in Vienna to come up with a solution that would avert war –in fact, that would put pressure on the Sultan to yield and unconditionally concede to the Tsar’s preposterous demands– is scathingly labelled a “retrospective Pythia”<sup>86</sup> and a “juggle.”<sup>87</sup> Marx refers to Napoleon III as “the oppressor of the French people” and dubs him the “Western [Ts]ar.”<sup>88</sup> Lord Palmerston, “that unscrupulous and consummate tactician,”<sup>89</sup> is also targeted for his suspected oblique service to Russian interests.<sup>90</sup> As for the cumbersomeness he sees defining the English Parliament and the futile debates taking place there throughout the time Russia kept menacing the Sultan, but, most markedly, on the eve of war, he remarks: “After all, the most curious feature of these agitated debates is that the House completely failed in wresting from the Ministers either a formal declaration of war with Russia or a description of the objects for which they are to plunge into war [...].”<sup>91</sup> “Can there exist a greater delusion than believing this Ministry [...] to have been all at once transformed [...] into a Ministry that could undertake any war against Russia, except a simulated one, or one carried out in the very interest of the enemy against whom it is ostensibly directed?”<sup>92</sup> Following, some time thereafter, the exposure of a secret memorandum agreed upon between England and Russia back in 1844, he comes raging against the Ministry, labelling them “criminals [...] convicted of having permanently conspired [with Russia]”<sup>93</sup>; while in another instance, when secret documents were disclosed, highlighting a humiliating position on the part of English political agents against the Tsar, he exclaims: “So much must be clear to whoever peruses these documents that, if

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, p. 2 [Turkey].

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, p. 248 [Russian Diplomacy—The Shrines—Montenegro]. The origins and particulars of the conflict in the Holy Land are also further discussed by Marx in 317-23 [War Declared—Mussulman and Christian].

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, p. 248 [Russian Diplomacy—The Shrines—Montenegro].

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, p. 248 [Russian Diplomacy—The Shrines—Montenegro].

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, p. 172 [The Quadruple Convention—England and the War].

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, p. 339 [Russia and the German Powers].

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p. 98 [Urquhart—Bem—The Turkish Question in the House of Lords]. Marx/Engels mention[s] that it had been “circumstances [my emphasis] [that] have almost constituted [Napoleon III] the arbiter of Europe.” For it would be his success or failure to think and act strategically that would eventually determine developments in the European continent: “The prospect of a European war, dragging along with it insurrectionary movements in Italy, Hungary and Poland [...] these eventualities seem to allow the man of the 2nd December [1851] to lead the dance of the peoples, if he should fail to play the pacifier with the kings.” See Marx, 182 [The Russian Victory—Position of England and France].

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, p. 190 [Palmerstone’s Resignation].

<sup>90</sup> See, for example, Marx, p. 330-32 [War with Russia].

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, p. 260 [Debates in Parliament].

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, p. 265 [Kossuth—Disraeli and Hume—United States—France and England—Greece].

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, p. 329 [War with Russia].

this scandalous Ministry remain in office, the English people may be driven, by the mere influence of external complications, into a terrible revolution, sweeping away at once Throne, Parliament and the governing classes, who have lost the faculty and the will to maintain England's position in the world.”<sup>94</sup>

To decipher the intellectual routes the two men follow, interpret their stance and trace the connection they draw between phenomena, I should further explore authorial intention. Why, to put it in mundane terms, did they seek to occupy themselves with the Eastern Question? Besides the formal need to meet the contemporary American press readership’s demand to remain updated on European events that affected American domestic affairs and interests in relations with Britain in several contending issues,<sup>95</sup> I should focus on the two men’s wider philosophical viewpoints and aspirations, as these could be conceptualised in a spectrum of eventualities intertwined with the prospective resolution of the Eastern Question. “Marx and Engels,” writes Kondylis, “viewed the Eastern Question [...] through the, for them, crucial prospect —the prospect of the tactics and the strategy of the European revolution.”<sup>96</sup> It is a well-known fact that following the failed revolutions of 1848-49, the two men remained steadfastly<sup>97</sup> sanguine —consecutive disillusionments notwithstanding— over the prospects for a pan-European proletarian revolution which would be sparked off by some minor, potentially expanding European war;<sup>98</sup> or after a major, long-time simmering, financial crisis that would have had a spillover effect.<sup>99</sup>

The chief bastion, however, of anti-revolutionary activity at that time —from 1815 and on— as the quelled revolution in Hungary (1848-49) had demonstrated,<sup>100</sup> was one of the Crimea belligerents: Tsarist Russia. The two thinkers’ abhorrence of Tsarist Russia is profuse and evinced throughout their reports. For Engels, Russia was the foremost obstructor of any reform and reorganisation of Europe; he talks of the “Empire of the Tsar” as the “mainstay of European reaction,” which “threatened the progress of Europe with its expansive foreign policy and therefore had to be fought with every available means.”<sup>101</sup> Since 1789, the year of “the European Revolution, the explosive force of democratic ideas and man’s native thirst for freedom,” he writes, “there have been in reality but two powers on the continent of Europe —Russia and Absolutism, the Revolution and Democracy. For the moment the Revolution

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, p. 313 [The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence].

<sup>95</sup> David Riazanov, *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: An Introduction to Their Lives and Work* (London: Martin Lawrence, 1927), p. 105; Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals*, p. 78, 81; Frank A. Golder, “Russian-American Relations During the Crimean War,” *The American Historical Review* 31, no. 3 (1926): p. 463-64, 467.

<sup>96</sup> Panagiotis Kondylis, *Η Ελλάδα, η Τουρκία και το Ανατολικό Ζήτημα* [Greece, Turkey and the Eastern Question] (Athens: Gnosti, 1985), p. 13.

<sup>97</sup> It was only in the period between the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 and Marx’s death in 1883, that the two men started to regard war as “a retarding and regressive phenomenon rather than a promoter of revolution and progress” and declared that “peace would be more likely than external war to enhance the prospects of revolution in Russia, and in capitalist Europe generally.” The reason behind this perspectival shift was that it was now thought that “war would unleash a chauvinistic wave and would mean widespread exhaustion of energies.” See Kissin, *War And The Marxists*, p. 87-90.

<sup>98</sup> The entertained pattern of an anticipated pan-European proletarian revolution is recurrent and can be traced in the commentaries of Marx and Engels whenever war broke out. See Kissin, p. 3-4, 12-13, 16, 18, 19, 22-24, 38-39, 59-60, 67, 86.

<sup>99</sup> Marcello Musto, *Another Marx: Early Manuscripts to the International* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 76-80.

<sup>100</sup> Kissin, *War And The Marxists*, p. 11.

<sup>101</sup> Herres, “‘My Immortal Works’: Friedrich Engels,” p. 21.

seems to be suppressed, but it lives and is feared as deeply as ever.”<sup>102</sup> Marx was no less condemnatory; according to Bruno Naarden, “[t]o him Russia was an extremely dangerous and uncivilised power with a constant lust for expansion that could only be blocked by military force.”<sup>103</sup> He finds “Continental retrogression [to have, ever since,] been identical with Russian progress in the East.”<sup>104</sup> The success of her covetous, expansive policy, which is seen not “as a mere casual and temporary occurrence, but as part and parcel of a great scheme of policy,”<sup>105</sup> Engels imputes “to the ignorance, dullness, and consequent inconsistency and cowardice of Western Governments;”<sup>106</sup> Marx, specifically, “on England’s connivance.”<sup>107</sup> “It will prove,” nevertheless, “utterly powerless with the revolutionised peoples” the latter asserts with confidence.<sup>108</sup>

Analysing the note of Count Nesselrode, Russia’s foreign minister, following the occupation of Danubian principalities and the entrance of the joint fleets of English and French in Ottoman waters, they can not help but express their fury towards the contemptuousness with which the Tsar treats Western Powers: “It is a document, indeed of Europe’s degradation under the rod of counter-revolution. Revolutionists may congratulate the [Ts]ar on this masterpiece. If Europe withdraws, she withdraws not with a simple defeat, but passes, as it were, under *furcile Caudine*.”<sup>109</sup> Instead they call for treating “a Power like Russia, [...] *the fearless way* [my emphasis].”<sup>110</sup> At last, despite a purported Russian imperviousness to “the more pernicious invasions of the revolutionary spirit,”<sup>111</sup> she is presented as anything but complacent: “Russia herself is more afraid of the revolution that must follow any general war on the Continent [...]. Does [she] act on her own free impulse, or is she but the unconscious and reluctant slave of the modern *fatum* –revolution? I believe the latter alternative,” writes Marx.<sup>112</sup> It is with consideration, therefore, to the revolution that the Western Powers ought to address the Eastern Question: “The Sultan holds Constantinople only in trust for the Revolution, and the present nominal dignitaries of Western Europe, themselves finding the last stronghold of their ‘order’ on the shores of Neva, can do nothing but keep the [Eastern]

<sup>102</sup> Marx, *The Eastern Question*, 18 [The Real Issue in Turkey]. Engels had been a vitriolic critic of Russia from the late 1840s, since he considered that her “intermarriage” with Prussia and Austria in the so-called “Holy Alliance” and their common exploitation of partitioned Poland, stalled the democratisation of Germany. See Blackledge, “War and Revolution: Friedrich Engels,” p. 5-6.

<sup>103</sup> Illustrative, in this regard, is Marx’s first address in the International (1864). His hostility was also amplified by his rift with Mikhail Bakunin. Marx’s image of Russia, nevertheless, is a nuanced one. Insights of a more positive tint are also included: After the Paris Commune was brutally suppressed in 1871, Marx started counting more on a revolution that would take place in Russia and developed a research interest in the Russian village communes and the distinct collectivism that defined agrarian relationships there, which he regarded –qualifiedly though– as an alternative path to socialism. See Bruno Naarden, “Marx and Russia,” *History of European Ideas* 12, no. 6 (1990): p. 783, 789-90, 790-93.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, *The Eastern Question*, 29 [Turkey and Russia].

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, p. 107 [The Turkish Question in the Commons].

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, p. 22 [The Turkish Question].

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, p. 46 [Aberdeen–Clarendon–Brunnow–Connivance of the Aberdeen Ministry with Russia].

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, p. 80 [Traditional Policy of Russia].

<sup>109</sup> Marx, p. 62 [The Russo-Turkish Difficulty–Ducking and Dodging of the British Cabinet–Nesselrode’s Latest Note].

<sup>110</sup> Marx, 188 [Russian Policy]. Marx and Engels abetted every war that would enmesh and could potentially weaken –let alone thrash!– Russia. Their unwavering anti-Russianism was in consonance, it should be noted, with a perennial tradition of Russophobia that kept shaping contemporary prevalent views on this country and her political regime after 1789. See Naarden, “Marx and Russia,” p. 785-87, 789; Kissin, *War And The Marxists*, p. 4, 19-21, 26, 37-38, 41-43, 45, 59-61, 63, 82-84.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, p. 336 [Russia and the German Powers].

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, p. 29 [Turkey and Russia].

question in suspense until Russia had to meet her real antagonist, the Revolution. The Revolution which will break the Rome of the West will also overpower the demoniac influences of the Rome of the East.”<sup>113</sup>

Commenting on the reasons behind Western European Powers’ vacillation to resolutely confront Russia, they draw a socio-politically tinted contradistinction between the two camps. “There is an energy and vigour,” argues Marx, “in that despotic Government and that barbarous race which we seek in vain among the monarchies of the older States. [...] Western Europe is feeble and timid because her Governments feel that they are outgrown and no longer believed in by their people. The nations are beyond their rulers, and trust in them no more. It is not that they are really imbecile, but that there is new wine working in the old bottles. With a worthier and more equal social state, with the abolition of caste and privilege, with free political constitutions, unfettered industry and emancipated thought, the people of the West will rise again to power and unity of purpose, while the Russian Colossus itself will be shattered by the progress of the masses and the explosive force of ideas.”<sup>114</sup> Besides politicians holding high offices, the blame for this condition is particularly to be put on “the stockjobbers, and the peace-mongering bourgeoisie, represented in the Government by the oligarchy, who surrender Europe to Russia”;<sup>115</sup> —“in order to resist the encroachments of the Tsar, we must, above all, overthrow the inglorious Empire of those mean, cringing, and infamous adorers of the golden calf.”<sup>116</sup>

A telling excerpt, in the same vein, of the connection the two thinkers draw between war, rising popular grievances and domestic civil unrest —the latter regarded as uniquely fertile soil for revolution— is encountered among remarks they make when the war breaks out: “While the first cannon bullets have been exchanged in the war of the Russian against Europe, the first blood has been split in the war now raging in the manufacturing districts, of capital against labour. [...] While the hypocritical [...] humbugs spoke peace to the [Ts]ar at Edinburgh, they acted war with their own countrymen at Manchester. While they preached *arbitration* between Russia and Europe, they were rejecting scornfully all appeals to arbitration from their own fellow-citizens. [...] [T]he masters do not want arbitration. What they aim at is dictation. While at the very moment of a European struggle, these Russian propagandists cry for a reduction of the army, they are at the same time augmenting the army of civil war, the police force [...].”<sup>117</sup>

Such anticipations, nevertheless, may have reverberated as plain wishful thinking since, for the time being, “counting on the cowardice and apprehensions of the Western Powers, [the Tsar] bullies Europe, and pushes his demands as far as possible [...] [while] [t]he Western Powers [...] inconsistent, pusillanimous, suspecting each other, commence by encouraging the Sultan to resist [him], from fear of the encroachments of Russia, and terminate by compelling the former to yield, *from fear of a general war giving rise to general revolution* [my emphasis].”<sup>118</sup> In a patently jaundiced and defeatist tone, Marx

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, p. 81 [Traditional Policy of Russia].

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, p. 189 [Russian Policy].

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, p. 133 [The Vienna Note (Continued)].

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, p. 133 [The Vienna Note (Continued)].

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p. 151 [War].

<sup>118</sup> Ibid, p. 74-75 [Russia and the Western Powers].

remarks: “The revolutionary party can only congratulate itself on this state of things. The humiliation of the reactionary Western Governments, and their manifest impotency to guard the interests of European civilisation against Russian encroachment, cannot fail to work out a wholesome indignation in the people who have suffered themselves, since 1849, to be subjected to the rule of counter-revolution.”<sup>119</sup>

But how is the interrelation between the breakout of a general war and radical social transformation ushered in by revolution conceptualised in Marxian and Engelsian terms? The answer is to be found in the following excerpt; it is worth quoting in full: “But we must not forget that there is *a sixth power in Europe* [my emphasis], which at given moments asserts its supremacy over the whole of the five so-called ‘great’ Powers, and makes them tremble, every one of them. That power is the Revolution. Long silent and retired, it is now again called to action [...]. From Manchester to Rome, from Paris to Warsaw and Pesth, it is omnipresent, lifting up its head and awakening from its slumbers. Manifold are the symptoms of its returning life, everywhere visible in the agitation and disquietude which have seized the proletarian class. A signal only is wanted, and the sixth and greatest European power will come forward, in shining armour and sword in hand, like Minerva from the head of the Olympian. This signal the impending European war will give, and then all calculations as to the balance of power will be upset by the addition of a new element which, ever buoyant and youthful, will as much baffle the plans of the old European Powers, and their generals, as it did from 1792 to 1800.”<sup>120</sup>

### In lieu of a Conclusion

In this paper, I analysed Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ dispatches on the events of the Crimean War in the *New York Tribune*. After indicating and discussing the gap in the theorisation of modern war as a distinct element in the Marxian philosophical constellation, I turned to their reports to unearth their perspectives on the particular events. I tilted my emphasis towards the two thinkers’ approach to war as a contingent precipitant of a pan-European revolution, which was meant to overthrow the post-Vienna Congress die-hard reactionary Powers of the continent and the social order they had peremptorily devised and largely entrenched.

Given that the time during which I was working on this paper has been rife with developments on the war front, and beyond, which can hardly leave one dispassionate, I should also broach the matter of textual reception.

It is not uncommon for receivers of a text, be them researchers or readers, “to ‘decontextualise’ the author[s] they are engaging with in order to make [them] fit their own context and aspirations,”<sup>121</sup> “to claim them for their own camp,”<sup>122</sup> often deploying them as “sources of transhistorical wisdom.”<sup>123</sup> “When great thinkers are used as weapons to defend particular projects or

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, p. 75 [Russia and the Western Powers].

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, p. 220-21 [The European Power].

<sup>121</sup> Vergerio, “Context, Reception, and the Study of Great Thinkers,” 42.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, p. 41.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid, p. 21.

ideologies over others,” underscores Claire Vergerio, “the *agency* [my emphasis] lies with those who wield their name, and the intellectual force [...] comes to be mediated through the minds of those who claim these authors’ legacy for themselves.”<sup>124</sup> “Marx,” as such –to echo Terrell Carver— “as he was, is not the arbiter of current research on himself or anything else.”<sup>125</sup> The utility of his and Engels’ insightful accounts rests on us entirely.

Having thus by now argued, citing relevant snippets, that Marx and Engels held no sympathies for Tsarist Russia, it would not be a paradox for one to come to extrapolate that the two men would have been unequivocally supportive of the Allied camp. Historical realities are way more intricate though. And rendering the two men as what we could anachronistically dub “pro-Western” is hardly a thesis that withstands historical scrutiny. For it is the same Russophobic Marx who writes:

“It was equally a mistake to describe the war against Russia as a war between liberty and despotism. [...] liberty would be for the nonce represented by a Bonaparte, the whole avowed object of the war is the maintenance of the balance of power of the Vienna Treaties –those very treaties which annul the liberty and independence of nations.”<sup>126</sup>

Indicative of their double-mindedness is also their ambiguous stance concerning the maintenance of the status quo.<sup>127</sup> They knew that following its overturn there existed two potential outcomes: the one they were hankering after, i.e. the outbreak of a pan-European proletarian revolution that would shatter the European capitalist order; the other outcome they despised, i.e. the further Russian aggrandisement that would come as a result of the devouring of Ottoman lands. In a continuum of two extremes, they had, therefore, to mindfully strike a balance between two inimical poles, namely European capitalism and Tsarist Russia;<sup>128</sup> and on this occasion they saw their revolutionary interests, which were conditioned on the defeat of Russia, aligning better with those of the Allied powers. Their siding with them though was neither wholehearted nor uncritical, but rather pragmatic and opportunistic.<sup>129</sup> “[They] hailed the war,” notes Riazanov, “[f]or after all the war did mean that the three major powers which had been the mainstay of counter-revolution, had fallen

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid, p. 48.

<sup>125</sup> Carver, “Reading Marx,” p. 3.

<sup>126</sup> Marx, *The Eastern Question*, 373 [Speeches –St. Arnaud]. With regards to justifying the methodological remarks I made above, it is useful to cite the comment made on this snippet by Marcello Musto, a scholar critical of the role of the US in the war in Ukraine: “If we replace Bonaparte with the United States of America and the Vienna treaties with NATO, the observations seem as if written for today.” See Musto, “War and the Left,” p. 523.

<sup>127</sup> On the one hand, the maintenance of the status quo was decried as a dishonourable and humiliating pretext to the irresoluteness of the Allied powers to take action against Russia. On the other hand, it was considered the best possible solution to the Eastern Question at that time.

See Kondylis, *Η Ελλάδα, η Τουρκία και το Ανατολικό Ζήτημα* [Greece, Turkey and the Eastern Question], 17, 20-21.

<sup>128</sup> Kondylis, p. 15-19.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, p. 19; Riazanov, *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels*, p. 107-8; Kissin, *War And The Marxists*, p. 19. Engels writes: “Russia is decidedly a conquering nation [...] But let Russia get possession of Turkey, and her strength is increased nearly half, and she becomes superior to all the rest of Europe put together. Such an event would be an unspeakable calamity for the revolutionary cause. [...] In this instance [my emphasis] the interests of revolutionary democracy and England go hand in hand.” See Marx, *The Eastern Question*, p. 18-19 [The Real Issue in Turkey].

out, and when thieves fall out, honest folks are likely to benefit by it.”<sup>130</sup> Based on these remarks, I would argue that, in the instance of the Crimean War, it would have been historically accurate to take Marx and Engels as “defeatists,”<sup>131</sup> in the sense that they drew an explicit connection and placed the focus on the interaction between defeat in war and revolution. “The upshot, in plain terms, is that they felt total antipathy towards both belligerents, they would have welcomed any result which offered better chances for an early proletarian revolution,” to put it the way Kissin does.<sup>132</sup>

I wrap up by citing an allegorical story that Marx, in all likelihood, did not employ randomly but rather constitutes a distillation of his perception of the particular political parameters that could hold sway over the course of events in the above-discussed phase of the Eastern Question. I presume that some readers may find it of contemporary relevance: “There is a facetious story,” he writes, “told of two Persian naturalists who were examining a bear; the one who had never seen such an animal before enquired whether that animal dropped its cubs alive or laid eggs; to which the other, who was better informed, replied: ‘That animal is capable of anything.’ The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, *so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing* [my emphasis].”<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Riazanov, p. 107.

<sup>131</sup> Kissin, *War And The Marxists*, p. 68. The attribution of the said characterisation, however, is strictly ad hoc and based on one’s reading and interpretation of primary sources. It should therefore not be accepted without any qualification. Henze (“Marx on Russians and Muslims,” *Central Asian Survey* 6, no. 4 [1987]: p. 35), for example, writes of Marx that “he was sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire, seeing it as threatened and pressured by Russia and deserving of Western backing.” This view is at variance with those of Kondylis (*Η Ελλάδα, η Τουρκία και το Ανατολικό Ζήτημα* [Greece, Turkey and the Eastern Question], p. 21-23, 40-53) and Riazanov (*Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels*, p. 108). Even Kissin himself employs variegated adjectives to describe the stance of the two men on a range of conflicts: In the Prussian-Danish War of 1848-49, Marx and Engels were seen as “patriots,” who “[i]n conflicts involving the Germans did not back the German side ‘right or wrong’; their support went to the party they regarded as more progressive” – such “patriotism” is paradigmatically reflected in their stance on the Franco-German War of 1870-71; in the Italian revolt against the Habsburgs, he identifies them as advocates of “revolutionary defencism,” i.e. “determined resistance to the external enemy combined with internal struggle to replace a reactionary monarchy with a progressive radical republic”; in the case of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-59 by the British, he argues that their “defeatism” “was limited to the domestic weakening of the colonial power and did not extend to total British defeat in the colonial war”; while in the case of a potential Russo-British war in the 1870s, he argues, “the two friends would have supported the British war effort wholeheartedly; [...] Their policy in such a contingency would have been without a trace of defeatism, revolutionary or otherwise.” See Kissin, *War And The Marxists*, p. 5, 9, 35, 69-81, 83-84.

<sup>132</sup> Kissin, p. 69.

<sup>133</sup> Marx, p. 53 [Russian policy against Turkey].

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# Does the Melian Dialogue serve as an emphatic continuation of Pericles' imperialist policy?"

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## Abstract

This article<sup>1</sup> is divided into two parts: in the first part, I undertake the weighty task of interpreting the Melian Dialogue – the widely known conversation between the Athenians and the Melians, which took place in 416 B.C. – and then I shed light on the immorality that characterizes the views expressed by the Athenians. Athens seeks to conquer Melos by force, basing its decision on the necessity for Athenian hegemony to constantly expand its territorial borders. The second part of the paper examines the three speeches of Pericles – propounded by Thucydides – and attempts to prove that the Melian Dialogue acts as a faithful continuation of Pericles' imperialistic orations. In this way, it becomes evident that the Melian Dialogue is not just a circumstantial event, caused by the pain and suffering of the Peloponnesian War, but also represents a carefully considered expansionist policy put into practice by the Athenians over the years.

## Keywords

*Thucydides, Melian Dialogue, Pericles, Athenian Democracy, Athenian Imperialism, Peloponnesian War*

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<sup>1</sup> I am most grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback. Furthermore, my profound gratitude extends to Professor Dimitris Karadimas for his instrumental assistance.

## Introductory Remarks

In March 416 B.C., the Athenians decided to invade and conquer Melos, a Greek island located in the Aegean Sea.<sup>2</sup> A similar military operation had been carried out by the Athenians ten years earlier, in 426 B.C., under the generalship of Nicias<sup>3</sup> - the famous leader of the moderate faction - but Melos had shown great resistance, which proves that the Athenians did not always succeed when trying to impose their will on other cities. This time, the Athenians - known for their dogged determination, which often rescued them from various dangers or, on the contrary, got them into trouble - have once again decided to impose their leadership on Melos. Thucydides presents the dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians in a way that is largely reminiscent of the technique - namely, dialectic conversation - used by Plato in his works.<sup>4</sup> Conversely, it could be argued that Thucydides represents the earliest example of this phenomenon. Therefore, if the historian was influenced by any literary genre, it would be tragedy, rather than the Platonic dialogues. In this paper I will attempt to prove that the Melos campaign is

<sup>2</sup> See Michael G. Seaman, "The Athenian Expedition to Melos in 416 B.C.", *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 4th Qtr. 46, 1997, p. 386.

<sup>3</sup> See Thuc. 3.91.1-3: *Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους οἱ Αθηναῖοι τριάκοντα μὲν ναῦς ἔστειλαν περὶ Πελοπόννησον, ὃν ἐστρατήγει Δημοσθένης τε ὁ Ἀλκισθένους καὶ Προκλῆς ὁ Θεοδώρου, ἔξηκοντα δὲ ἐς Μῆλον καὶ δισκιλίους ὀπλίτας· ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου. τοὺς γὰρ Μηλίους ὄντας νησιώτας καὶ οὐκ ἔθέλοντας ὑπακούειν οὐδὲ ἐς τὸ αὐτῶν ξυμμαχικὸν ιέναι ἐβούλοντο προσαγαγέσθαι. ὡς δὲ αὐτοῖς δησουμένης τῆς γῆς οὐ προσεχώρουν, ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Μήλου αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπλευσαν ἐς Ωρωπὸν τῆς Γραικῆς, ὑπὸ νύκτα δὲ σχόντες εύθυνς ἐπορεύοντο οἱ ὀπλῖται ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζῇ ἐς Τάναγραν τῆς Βοιωτίας. οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανδημεὶ Αθηναῖοι, Ἰππονίκου τε τοῦ Καλλίου στρατηγοῦντος καὶ Εύρυμέδοντος τοῦ Θουκλέους, ἀπὸ σημείου ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ γῆν ἀπήντων.*

<sup>4</sup> See Colin W. Macleod, "Form and Meaning in the Melian Dialogue", *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 4th Qtr. 23, 1974, p. 389: "The Melian Dialogue is an ideal form of deliberation. It combines the practicality of the public speech with the precision of dialectic. It clearly defines its subject, it is based on the facts of the case, not on idle speculation, and it aims to do no more than what those facts allow off, to discover what is possible or expedient". For another feature of this dialogue that resembles Plato's form of writing see indicatively Daniel Boyarin, "Deadly Dialogue: Thucydides with Plato", *Representations* 117, 2012, p. 66-67: "The dialogue begins with a metacomment that is immediately reminiscent (to us) of the *incipets* of various Platonic dialogues, namely an explicit thematization of the form of the discourse. Just as in the *Symposium*, the *Gorgias*, the *Protagoras*, and the *Republic*, where Socrates insists on dialogue and not debate, refusing that the decision of right and wrong in the discussion be made by anyone else (the form of democracy), so too in the beginning of the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians refuse the Melians the opportunity to carry on a debate, in which each party would be able to express their own position at length, freely, and with full opportunity to express themselves". Furthermore, see Felix Martin Wassermann, "The Melian Dialogue", *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 78, 1947, p. 19: "Like a scene in a tragedy, the Melian Dialogue belongs to the Thucydidean passages which, as Plutarch says (*Mor.* 347A), turn the reader into a spectator. It makes him witness history in action. Rationalistic scepticism and keen analysis have not impaired Thucydides' dramatic abilities". For the opposite view, see Panos Christodoulou, "Thucydides' Pericles. Between Historical Reality and Literary Representation", in A. Tsakmakis and M. Tamiolaki (ed.), *Thucydides Between History and Literature*, Berlin: De Gruyter 2013, p. 226: "The tendency, however, to underestimate the historical dimension of Thucydides' thought and to promote first and foremost the literary dimension of his work seems to disrespect the limits that the author himself poses in his venture". Cf. Simon Hornblower, *Θουκυδίδης. Ο Ιστορικός καὶ τὸ Ἐργό του*, trans. A. Maniati (Athens: Tipothito, G. Dardanos 2003), p. 113. On Plato's dialogue form, see C. Emlyn-Jones, "Dramatic Structure and Cultural Context in Plato's Laches", *The Classical Quarterly* 49, 1999, p. 132.

nothing less than an emphatic continuation of the imperialist policy exerted by the great Pericles.

The reason for the Athenians' intense desire to subjugate Melos is more than obvious: the island was asserting its right to remain neutral during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>5</sup> The Athenians, in turn, could not afford to allow other cities to remain uninvolved during the catastrophic war, and, thus, demanded from them an alliance (this is the positive scenario) or a declaration of submission (this is the worst scenario).<sup>6</sup> In any case, the reader is expected to experience discomfiture due to the fact that Thucydides makes a very abrupt and "cold" introduction to this historical episode by using the neutral phrase *καὶ ἐπὶ Μῆλον τὴν νῆσον Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν*. In other words, the historian, by offering this statement, wishes to create an evocative representation of the Athenians' arrogance;<sup>7</sup> the city of Athens was known for making spontaneous decisions (their attitude is perfectly described by the use of the prosthetic conjunction *καὶ*), something that resembles the way immature children usually act. The actions implemented by the Athenians, however, could potentially negatively affect the lives of thousands of people.<sup>8</sup> War, of course, is cruel and relentless and Thucydides acknowledged this better than anyone else, thanks to his exceptional ability to observe and describe human nature from both a sociological and philosophical perspective.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, while the conquest of Melos is, seemingly, an

<sup>5</sup> Moreover, Thucydides informs us that Melos was a colony of the Lacedaemonians and the inhabitants of the island did not wish to become subjects of the Athenians. See Thuc. 5.84.2. See also Seaman, "The Athenian Expedition to Melos in 416 B.C.", *ibid.*, p. 390 and George Bornstein, "Reading Thucydides in America Today", *The Sewanee Review* 123, 2015, p. 664-665. We should also keep in mind that in the Platonic *Apology* (31e-32a) Socrates points out that whoever takes action for the common good will not only fail but his life will also be put in danger.

<sup>6</sup> Martha Elena Venier, "De Pericles A Sicilia", *Foro Internacional* 51, 2011, p. 361: "Pero en lo que se conoce como el diálogo de Melos -párrafos 85-113 del libro quinto- hay un ejemplo no despreciable de lo que se podía ganar o perder cuando en nombre de la democracia se buscaba colonizar. Los atenienses procuraban alianza o vasallaje en esa isla al sur del Peloponeso, partidaria de los lacedemonios, pero neutral. El argumento básico de los atenienses se sustentaba en que si los melios aceptaban el vasallaje, que en esencia significaba pagar tributo, no habría necesidad de dominarlos por otros medios y de esa manera les evitaban el trabajo de destruirlos. Las alternativas no eran favorables para los melios, que descartaron cualquier trato. En el último asedio de los atenienses, a quienes favoreció la traición, los melios capitularon y, cuenta Tucídides, "los atenienses ejecutaron a todos los melios en edad viril que cayeron en sus manos, redujeron a esclavitud a niños y mujeres, y enviaron luego quinientos de sus colonos para poblar la ciudad"".

<sup>7</sup> A similar view to mine is expressed by Connor, who notes that the narrative begins almost randomly, but its subsequent development demonstrates the importance of this historical episode, which Thucydides wants to emphasize. See Robert Connor, *Θουκυδίδης*, trans. P. Daouti (Athens: Gutenberg 2022), p. 251-252.

<sup>8</sup> The Athenians' hasty decision in 427 B.C. to slaughter all adult Mytilenaeans and turn women and children into slaves serves as an indicative example of the Athenians' reckless actions (Cleon, of course, contributed significantly to this outcome, since at that time he exerted a major influence on the Athenian Assembly thanks to his grandiloquence). The next day, though, the Athenians, having apparently felt remorse, revoke their decision, proving in fact that they are not heartless and can, at times, behave with leniency. This incident proves that war kindles passions in the hearts of men, corrupts their souls and forces them to behave recklessly and under the destructive influence of panic. W. Liebeschuetz, "The Structure and Function of the Melian Dialogue", *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 88, 1968, p. 73-74 discovers a hermeneutic link between the Melian Dialogue and Cleon's harsh attitude towards Mytilene.

<sup>9</sup> See Williamson Murray, "Thucydides: Theorist of War", *Naval War College Review* 66, 2013, p. 30.

insignificant episode included in a destructive war that lasted approximately twenty-seven years, nevertheless in reality it shows vividly the new mores prevailing in Athens at that time: the Athenians conquering other cities by force, and validating the views expressed by Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*<sup>10</sup> or those of Callicles presented in Plato's *Gorgias*.<sup>11</sup> Above all, however, the Athenians put into practice (whether they realize it or not) the proclamations of Pericles. Thirteen years after the death of the renowned politician - who had fallen ill but failed to recover due to the disastrous plague<sup>12</sup> that struck Athens - Pericles' words were still deeply engraved in the hearts of the Athenians. This even led to the comic poet Eupolis making use of an extremely apt simile, according to which Pericles was such a talented and eloquent orator, that he was able to enchant his listeners and seduce

<sup>10</sup> See P. P. Nicholson, "Unravelling Thrasymachus' Arguments in 'The Republic'", *Phronesis* 19, 1974, p. 210-232; George F. Hourani, "Thrasymachus' Definition of Justice in Plato's 'Republic'", *Phronesis* 7, 1962, p. 110-120; Joseph P. Maguire, "Thrasymachus - or Plato?", *Phronesis* 16, 1971, p. 142-163; A. G. N. Flew, "Responding to Plato's Thrasymachus", *Philosophy* 70, 1995, p. 436-447; Demetrios, J. Hadgopoulos, "Thrasymachus and Legalism", *Phronesis* 18, 1973, p. 204-208; I. H. Jang, "Socrates' Refutation of Thrasymachus", *History of Political Thought* 18, 1997, p. 189-206; Shmuel Harlap, "Thrasymachus's Justice", *Political Theory* 7, 1979, p. 347-370; E. L. Harrison, "Plato's Manipulation of Thrasymachus", *Phoenix* 21, 1967, p. 27-39; F. E. Sparshott, "Socrates and Thrasymachus", *The Monist* 50, 1966, p. 421-459; G. J. Boter, "Thrasymachus and Πλεονεξία", *Mnemosyne*<sup>Fourth Series</sup> 39, 1986, p. 261-281; J. R. S. Wilson, "Thrasymachus and the Thumos: A Further Case of Prolepsis in Republic I", *The Classical Quarterly* 45, 1995, p. 58-67; Georgios N. Bebedelis, *Monism and dualism in Plato and the platonic tradition*, diss. (Athens: National and Kapodistrian University of Athens 2023), p. 25 and W. A. Welton, "Thrasymachus Vs Socrates: What Counts as a Good Answer to the Question "What is Justice?", *Apeiron* 39, 2006, p. 293-318.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, George Klosko, "The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's 'Gorgias'", *Greece & Rome* 31, 1984, p. 126-139; Rod Jenks, "The Sounds of Silence: Rhetoric and Dialectic in the Refutation of Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias*", *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 40, 2007, p. 201-215; Scott Berman, "Socrates and Callicles on Pleasure", *Phronesis* 36, 1991, p. 117-140; George B. Kerferd, "Plato's Treatment of Callicles in the 'Gorgias'", *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*<sup>New Series</sup> 20, 1974, p. 48-52; Joseph Patrick Archie, "Callicles' Redoubtable Critique of the Polus Argument in Plato's 'Gorgias'", *Hermes* 112, 1984, p. 167-176; Devin Stauffer, "Socrates and Callicles: A Reading of Plato's 'Gorgias'", *The Review of Politics* 64, 2002, p. 627-657; and Kyriakos Katsimanis, "Ο πλατωνικός Καλλικλῆς υπό το φως του Θουκυδίδη", in M. Skortsis (ed.), *Γ' Διεθνές Συμπόσιο για τον Θουκυδίδη: Δημηγορίες*, Athens: Sideris I. 2006, p. 80-101.

<sup>12</sup> The deadly plague that struck Athens not only had a negative impact on the well-being of the Athenian citizens, but also proved that human psychology is inextricably linked to health. The Athenians lost their minds, behaved unreasonably and went literally mad, since they were dying one after another. The phrase ἄποροι καθεστηκότες (Thucydides means that the Athenians did not know how to react) used by the historian at 2.59.2 vividly describes the Athenians' despair. After experiencing the devastating pandemic of COVID-19 in modern times, we can now, at least to some extent, share the despair felt by the Athenians. But let us not forget that at that time medicine was not at the high scientific level it is today. For the Athenian plague in general, see W. P. MacArthur, "The Athenian Plague: A Medical Note", *The Classical Quarterly* 4, 1954, p. 171-174; Donald A. Nielsen, "Pericles and the Plague: Civil Religion, Anomie, and Injustice in Thucydides", *Sociology of Religion* 57, 1996, p. 400-403; Dennis L. Page, "Thucydides' Description of the Great Plague at Athens", *The Classical Quarterly* 3, 1953, p. 97-119; Herbert Newell Couch, "Some Political Implications of the Athenian Plague", *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 66, 1935, p. 92-103; E. M. Craik, "Thucydides on the Plague: Physiology of Flux and Fixation", *The Classical Quarterly* 51, 2001, p. 102-108 and Lisa Kallet, "Thucydides, Apollo, The Plague, And The War", *The American Journal of Philology* 134, 2013, p. 355-359.

them with his tongue, in a way reminiscent of bees that use their sting as a weapon.<sup>13</sup>

### The Arguments Posed by the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue

First of all, it is necessary to point out that the dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians takes place in a private context and not before the people, i. e. the inhabitants of Melos. In short, the Athenians send ambassadors to represent them in the diplomatic debate, while the Melians invite these ambassadors to present the official positions of Athens in front of their rulers. The Athenians, in their turn, who have vast experience in handling diplomatic affairs, immediately recognize the dishonest motives of the Melians, pointing out that the latter present the Athenians before a few elite figures of authority, because they are well aware of the Athenian tradition in rhetoric. Therefore, the Melians assume that if the Athenians are given the opportunity to speak before a crowd, then victory in the matter under discussion will be theirs, since they will easily impose their views on the audience thanks to their ability to persuade whomever they wish to.<sup>14</sup> It is widely known that the Athenians were extremely articulate thanks to the ceaseless exposure to the art of rhetoric afforded them by their firmly grounded direct democracy. The Melians respond without hesitation (thus proving that they are aware of the predicament they are facing) that the outcome of the dialogue seems to be predetermined: if they refuse to succumb to the wishes of the Athenians, then this will undeniably be a *casus belli*, whereas if they finally give in, they will become slaves of Athens. The Athenians, outraged by the temporary turn of events, threaten to withdraw from the debate and claim that what the Melians suppose is merely speculation about the future. In fact, we can clearly observe a rhetorical trick that aims to present the Athenians as supposedly benevolent and impartial (if I have a flair for rhetoric, it means that I am capable of deceiving my interlocutor). The Melians inevitably fall into the trap and agree to conduct the dialogue in the way the Athenians have just proposed.

The Athenians begin the development of their arguments with a famous and shockingly immoral notion, according to which justice becomes a matter of discussion when the two interlocutors are equal in power; by contrast, when one of the two cities possesses greater military (or naval) force, then the dominant one must prevail and the weaker one must obey without question.<sup>15</sup> For most scholars, this phrase serves as a “paradigm of

<sup>13</sup> See Eup. Fr. 102 K.-A. = 94 K.: (A.) κράτιστος οὗτος ἔγένετ' ἀνθρώπων λέγειν· / ὅπότε παρέλθοι <δ'>, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοὶ δρομῆς/ ἐκ δέκα ποδῶν ἥιρει λέγων τοὺς ρήτορας. / (B.) ταχὺν λέγεις γε. (A.) πρὸς δέ <γ'> αὐτοῦ τῷ τάχει/ πειθώ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χείλεσιν, / οὗτος ἐκήλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ρήτορων/ τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις.

<sup>14</sup> See Thuc. 5.85.

<sup>15</sup> See Thuc. 5.89.1: τὰ δυνατὰ δ' ἔξ ὡν ἐκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι, ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἰδότας ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείω λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν. The reader comes to grips with the idea that Thucydides is not accidentally considered by political scientists as the founder of the realism that prevails in international relations. Do modern states operate in a different way? See Jonathan Monten, “Thucydides and Modern Realism”, *International Studies Quarterly* 50, 2006, p. 3: “Captivated by the methodological and substantive nature of Thucydides’ initial contention of a “truest cause” based on “the facts themselves,”

imperial brutality".<sup>16</sup> As I will reveal below, this tactic of the Athenians is not a revolutionary method, but part of a wider rhetorical tradition that goes back in time and is directly linked to Pericles. The Melians, however, take care to set the necessary limits to the dialogue from the beginning and warn the Athenians that it is imprudent to behave in this way, because, should they ever be defeated in battle, their opponent will show no mercy at all and will punish them with the same severity with which they tend to impose their views on the rest of the Greek cities.<sup>17</sup> The scholar of Thucydides immediately notices here that this warning acts as a foreshadowing of the disastrous defeat that the Athenians will soon experience in Sicily. The historian alerts the reader accordingly by implicitly telling him that the Athenians will soon suffer the same injustices they have committed in the past.<sup>18</sup> The universe tends to bring everyone back to order when they overstep their boundaries. In short, life is no different from philosophy: every argument (or every situation) is overturned by a new one (or a new reality), and this process goes on forever.<sup>19</sup>

Nevertheless, the Athenians, undeterred by the warnings of the Melians, respond with greater arrogance,<sup>20</sup> pointing out clearly that they are not worried about the possible destruction of their hegemony;<sup>21</sup> the

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modern realists and their critics have debated the appropriation of Thucydides as the founder of a continuous line of realist thought, with nothing less at stake than the historical credibility such a patron scholar entails. As Stephen Walt (2002) writes in a recent review of realist research, "the realist tradition has a distinguished lineage, including the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Friedrich Meinecke, Carr, and Morgenthau." Robert Gilpin (1986:306) writes that "in my judgment, there have been three great realist writers; it is difficult for me to conceive that anyone would deny them inclusion in the tradition. They are Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Carr"".

<sup>16</sup> I am borrowing the phrase from A. B. Bosworth, "The Humanitarian Aspect of the Melian Dialogue", *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 113, 1993, p. 30.

<sup>17</sup> See Thuc. 5.90. See also Emily Greenwood, *O Θουκυδίδης και η Διαμόρφωση της Ιστορίας*, trans. P. Chiotellis (Athens: Kardamitsa 2011), p. 55-56.

<sup>18</sup> As Donald Lateiner, "Nicias' Inadequate Encouragement (Thucydides 7.69.2)", *Classical Philology* 80, 1985, p. 206 puts it: "The nature of the Athenian's encouragement illustrates the enemy's assertion: Nicias and his troops are in a state of ἀπόνοια, desperate disregard of calculation, resulting from their circumstances (7.67.4). Gone is the πρόνοια of Pericles or Themistocles' ability to improvise as needed (αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα). Nicias appeals to the specious terms that the Athenians at Melos had recently declared to be irrelevant to power and conducive to avoidable disasters (5.89, 111.3). He embodies the rhetoric of conventional values and nostalgia for the code of the heroic defender - although, ironically, he is the aggressor. Such arguments in Thucydides always signify impending disaster for the pleader, as here. His explicit criticism of Nicias here suggests disapproval of other speakers in his work who employ similar, traditional arguments. Men apply noble concepts *in extremis*, when no alternative is evident. The strategy of the fair-sounding phrase reveals desperation in Thucydides' *History*, as consideration of the similarly desperate plights of the Plataeans and the Melians makes clear. All lean on Hellenic custom and law, ancestors and their accomplishments, the gods, hope and fortune, and, finally, the possibility of deliverance, simple survival. These men perish miserably. Their histories exemplify that suffering and disturbance to which Thucydides alerted the reader from the beginning (1.1.2, 23.1-3). Moralistic rhetoric in war is futile".

<sup>19</sup> For a philosophical elaboration of this argument, see Stavros Chr. Anastopoulos, *Φιλοσοφικές Καταθέσεις* (Athens: Pyrinos Kosmos Publications 2021), p. 43. Cf. Jean Sykouris, *Έκλογή Έργων* (Athens: Kaktos Publications 1997), p. 539.

<sup>20</sup> See Alker R. Hayward, Jr., "The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue", *The American Political Science Review* 82, 1988, p. 806, who uses the phrase "moral cynicism" to describe the Athenians' behavior.

<sup>21</sup> See Cornelius Castoriadis, *Η Ελληνική Ιδιαιτερότητα, τόμ. Γ'. Θουκυδίδης, η Ισχύς και το Δίκαιο*, trans. Z. Castoriadi (Athens: Kritiki 2011), p. 61-62.

Lacedaemonians, being rulers themselves, are lenient towards the defeated. More dangerous, on the contrary, are the Athenians' subjects, who thirst for revenge and want to completely destroy their oppressors. The Athenian ambassadors add that they have come to Melos in order to act in the interests of the Athenian hegemony and wish to rule Melos without causing any collateral damage.<sup>22</sup> In essence, what the Athenians are saying is: "Surrender and we will not harm you". Indeed, it is evident that war turns powerful cities into voracious beasts. This means that the virtuous are often led to their demise, while the unscrupulous tend to survive. The Athenians, then, conclude that any mercifulness will be perceived as a sign of weakness by the other cities, which will rebel against Athens when the first opportunity arises.<sup>23</sup> Of course, we have every compelling reason to completely disavow the Athenian arguments on a human level, but these evaluations are extremely applicable in the military field, while simultaneously they interpret, in a philosophical way, the state of human psychology during a war.

Moreover, the Athenians argue that the conquest of Melos will enhance the security of the Athenian hegemony, which draws its advantages from the domination of the sea. The Athenians, being *θαλασσοκράτορες*,<sup>24</sup> are obliged to conquer the other islands in order to increase their naval power.<sup>25</sup> The Melians, however, are willing to risk everything and we cannot help but acknowledge their bravery. The Athenians, in contrast, try to put them in their place, presenting the view that the struggle is unequal, and those who trust in hope usually lunge towards their own disaster.<sup>26</sup> At this point, we can discern once again a foreshadowing of future events, as the Athenians underestimate those who resort to uncertain estimations and oracles; nevertheless, they are not in a position to predict that later on the general Nicias will not avoid falling into the same psychological trap during the Sicilian campaign.<sup>27</sup> Thucydides emerges as an extraordinary writer, since these pensive remarks are reminiscent of the artistic ingenuity under the influence of which the great poets of Athens, such as Aeschylus and Sophocles,

<sup>22</sup> See Thuc. 5.91.1-2.

<sup>23</sup> See Thuc. 5.95.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, John Nash, "Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War", *Naval War College Review* 71, 2018, p. 123: "The strategy of Pericles was an evolution of the strategy developed by those who had come before him, back to Themistocles and the Persian Wars. Thucydides sees Themistocles as the one who spurred Athens into becoming a sea power, thereby laying the foundations of the Athenian empire. This was because Themistocles in 478 had the Athenians rebuild their city walls, as well as the long walls connecting the city to the town and port of Piraeus. He allegedly advised the Athenians that if they were ever to find themselves hard pressed by land, they should go down to Piraeus and defy the world with their fleet. Before the battle of Salamis in 480, a Corinthian delegate attacked Themistocles's counsel, dismissing him because Athens had been evacuated and thus he did not even have a city to his name. Themistocles replied that not only did he have a city, but he had one even greater than the Corinthians—so long as the Athenians had 250 ships fully manned. Athens's decision to rebuild the city's walls caused anxiety in Sparta, although it was Sparta's allies that allegedly instigated the Spartans to confront Athens, because they feared the Athenian navy and the valor the Athenians had displayed against Persia. It is noteworthy that Thucydides maintains that it was Sparta's allies who were most concerned, for these allies were nearer to the coast than Sparta itself, and therefore more vulnerable to Athenian sea power. Plutarch put it bluntly in his biography of Themistocles, writing that he "fastened the city to the Piraeus and the land to the sea"".

<sup>25</sup> See Thuc. 5.97-99.

<sup>26</sup> See Thuc. 5.100-103.

<sup>27</sup> See Thuc. 7.50.4.

composed their tragedies. Every distinguished thinker tends to be able to vividly depict in their work the tragedy of human existence itself.

The Athenians conclude their argument by emphatically stating that what they proclaim to be universally verified is closely intertwined with a natural law inherited from their ancestors, according to which the strong have a duty to rule the weak. At the same time, they imply that the Melians are acting with hypocrisy, since, if Melos possessed the hegemony, it would treat its allies with similar brutality.<sup>28</sup> Thucydides implies that humans tend to kill each other in the same way and for much the same reasons that lions maul zebras: due to the irresistible power of natural instinct. On the other hand, one might contend that natural instinct is an anachronistic notion and a lion's killing for food does not seem to be the same as human imperialism and the will to unlimited hegemony. Finally, a little further on, the Athenians fall unintentionally into an apparent contradiction, as they believe that the strong should not yield to the mighty, whereas the weak are under obligation to submit to the claims of the strong.<sup>29</sup> The Athenians forget, of course, that when they were called upon to face the Persians,<sup>30</sup> despite being powerless, they did not surrender but fought to the death for their freedom. The fact that the Athenians are now calling on the Melians to do the opposite of what they themselves did in the past proves that Athens is drunk with its excessive power and will soon lose everything.<sup>31</sup> Consequently, the fate of Melos is now sealed: the Athenians will kill all the adults and enslave the women and children.<sup>32</sup> This time someone like the conservative orator Diodotus, who could possibly prevent them from killing innocent people, is unfortunately absent.

## Pericles as the “New Founder” of Athenian Imperialism

I shall begin the development of this chapter by explaining why I place the phrase “new founder” in quotation marks: in fact, Pericles does not invent the idea of controlling the sea, but rediscovers it, since Athens’ tradition in naval warfare is immense and stretches all the way back to Themistocles<sup>33</sup> and even further back to Agamemnon or the king of Crete Minos.<sup>34</sup> Scholars

<sup>28</sup> See Thuc. 5.105.1-3.

<sup>29</sup> See Thuc. 5.111.4.

<sup>30</sup> See Ioannis M. Konstantakos, “La campagna di Serse contro la Grecia: mito poetico e pensiero storico, da Eschilo a Erodoto”, in G. E. Manzoni (ed.), *Il mito, il sacro, la patria dei poeti. Le radici identitarie dell’Europa a 2500 anni dalle guerre persiane*, Milano: Edizioni Studium 2021, p. 62-94.

<sup>31</sup> See Dion. Hal. *On Thuc.* 39: Βασιλεῦσι γὰρ Βαρβάροις ταῦτα πρὸς Ἑλληνας ἥρμοττε λέγειν. Αθηναίοις δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας, οὓς ἡλευθέρωσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων, οὐκ ἦν προσήκοντα εἰρῆσθαι, ὅτι τὰ δίκαια τοῖς Ἰσοις ἔστι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τὰ δὲ Βίαια τοῖς ἰσχυροῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς.

<sup>32</sup> See Thuc. 5.116.4.

<sup>33</sup> See Timothy W. Burns, “The Problematic Character of Periclean Athens”, in G. C. Kellow and N. Leddy (ed.), *On Civic Republicanism. Ancient Lessons for Global Politics*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2016, p. 16. For Themistocles as an architect of the Athenian Empire, see S. N. Jaffe, “Walls of Wood and Walls of Stone: Themistocles as Architect of Empire”, in N. Marinatos and R. K. Pitt (ed.), *Thucydides the Athenian*, Athens: Alexandria Publications 2022, p. 19-46.

<sup>34</sup> See Herodot. 3.122.2: Πολυκράτης γὰρ ἔστι πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Ἑλλήνων ὃς θαλασσοκρατέει ἐπενοήθη, πάρεξ Μίνωός τε τοῦ Κνωσσίου καὶ εἰ δή τις ἄλλος πρότερος τούτου ἤρξε τῆς θαλάσσης· τῆς δὲ ἀνθρωπηίης λεγομένης γενεῆς Πολυκράτης πρῶτος, ἐπίδιας πολλὰς ἔχων Ἰωνίης τε καὶ νήσων ἄρξειν.

rightly give Pericles credit for establishing a truly radical democracy that increased the political rights of the Athenian citizens and drastically improved their quality of life.<sup>35</sup> However, Xanthippus' son also made a significant contribution to Athens' foreign policy. In this chapter I will analyze elements of Pericles' three rhetorical speeches - these orations survive through Thucydides - which prove that the Melian Dialogue stands as a precise continuation of Pericles' war policy. Of course, this by no means implies that the politicians of the period during which the Melian Dialogue takes place are consciously copying Pericles' tactics; what is in fact happening is that the Athenians of 416 B.C. continue to apply unconsciously - although with great dedication - Pericles' proclamations. Besides, De Romilly<sup>36</sup> has proven in her doctoral thesis that Athenian imperialism was not a temporary event, but a policy that was faithfully put into practice over a long period of time. In short, domestic politics caused intense disagreements among the Athenians, but foreign policy was an occasion for common action. One need only recall Nicias' unsuccessful campaign against Melos in 426 B.C. (Nicias was the leader of the conservative party) and then expound the views expressed by Pericles in his speeches (Pericles was the leader of the democratic party). When circumstances called for it, the Athenians were as united as a fist. In short, the leaders of radical democracy (Pericles, Cleon, Alcibiades etc.) often disagreed with the conservative politicians (Nicias, Laches etc.), and each party promoted different ways of governing Athens, but on the contrary when foreign policy was the main item on the agenda, these ideological factions used to act in solidarity with each other, in order for them to be able to protect their precious *áρχή*.

Pericles' first speech (Thuc. 1.139.4-1.145) was delivered in 431 B.C. The Lacedaemonians and their allies have already decided to declare war against the Athenians and, thus, during this period of time they send many embassies to Athens making various claims, which, if realized, will supposedly prevent the outbreak of war. Pericles' speech represents a dynamic response to the demands of Sparta. At the beginning of his speech, the son of Agariste points out that the Athenians must not in any way preserve their territorial acquisitions under the influence of fear. The great politician adds that the Lacedaemonians are trying to impose their views on the Athenians in an authoritarian way: therefore, the Athenians should shout "no" and prepare for battle.<sup>37</sup> Pericles' dynamic attitude - the Athenians are rulers and cannot take orders from others - may have led Thucydides<sup>38</sup> and Aristophanes<sup>39</sup> to believe that the son of Xanthippus was pushing the Athenians towards war. Moreover, Pericles expresses the opinion that sea dominant cities enjoy huge

<sup>35</sup> Edward M. Harris, "Pericles' Praise of Athenian Democracy Thucydides 2.37.1", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 94, 1992, p. 164.

<sup>36</sup> See Jacqueline de Romilly, *Ο Θουκυδίδης και ο Αθηναϊκός Ιμπεριαλισμός. Η Σκέψη του Ιστορικού και η Γένεση του Έργου*, trans. L. Stefanou (Athens: Papadimas 2000<sup>2</sup>), p. 147-322.

<sup>37</sup> See Thuc. 1.141.1: αὐτόθεν δὴ διανοήθητε ἡ ὑπακούειν πρίν τι Βλαβῆναι, ἡ εἰ πολεμήσομεν, ὡσπερ ἔμοιγε ἄμεινον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μεγάλῃ καὶ ἐπὶ βραχείᾳ ὄμοιώς προφάσει μὴ εἰζοντες μηδὲ ξὺν φόβῳ εἴσοντες ἀ κεκτήμεθα· τὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν δύναται δούλωσιν ἡ τε μεγίστη καὶ ἐλαχίστη δικαίωσις ἀπὸ τῶν ὄμοιών πρὸ δίκης τοῖς πέλας ἐπιτασσομένη.

<sup>38</sup> See Thuc. 1.127.3: ὃν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν ἴναντιοῦτο πάντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ οὐκ εἴα ὑπείκειν, ἀλλ' ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὄρμα τοὺς Αθηναίους.

<sup>39</sup> See Ar. *Acharn.* 531: ἥστραπτ' ἐβρόντα ξυνεκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

military advantages, and maintains that if Athens were an island then no nation in the world would have been able to conquer it.<sup>40</sup> For this reason, the well reputed politician urges his fellow citizens to evacuate their homes and gather behind the city walls; this is Pericles' famous defensive strategy,<sup>41</sup> according to which the Athenians ought to leave the countryside exposed to the Lacedaemonians in order to be able to hit the enemy with their naval power (a similar plan was conceived by Themistocles when he proposed that the naval battle should be carried out at Salamis; again, Pericles is re-inventing the Athenian tradition). Pericles stresses that it is not the lifeless stones that matter, but people and their capacity for action. However, Pericles' obsession with war may have led to the outbreak of the plague (the crowding of citizens within confining walls, one could argue, may lead to the spread of viruses, which lead to serious or even fatal health problems).

Pericles' second speech - the famous Funeral Oration, Thuc. 2.34.8-2.46.2 - is usually praised for its democratic virtues and is considered by scholars as an eternal hymn to democracy,<sup>42</sup> written at a time when most thinkers and literati espouse moderate or even anti-democratic views. However, if we study the text carefully, we will discover that the idea of Athenian imperialism is still evident.<sup>43</sup> Pericles argues that the Athenians inherited their hegemony from their ancestors and then took care to strengthen and broaden its scope, thus ensuring self-sufficiency for the Athenian citizens. The reader is, of course, in awe of the fact that Pericles

<sup>40</sup> See Thuc. 1.143.5: μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος. σκέψασθε δέ· εἰ γὰρ ἡμεν νησιῶται, τίνες ἀνάληπτότεροι ἔσονται;

<sup>41</sup> See Gustav Adolf Lehmann, *Perikles. Staatsmann und Strategie im klassischen Athen* (München: Verlag C. H. Beck 2008), p. 224: "Für Perikles, der als Jugendlicher die zweimalige Evakuierung von ganz Attika vor dem Angriff der persischen Armee miterlebt hatte und danach an dem Wiederaufbau Athens und dem raschen Aufstieg der Polis zu ungeahnter Größe aktiv beteiligt gewesen war, mochte diese sehr rationale und distanzierte Sicht unproblematisch erscheinen. Dabei konnten freilich dem ersten Mann über seiner in militärischer wie politischer Hinsicht folgerichtigen Konzeption die emotionalen und massenpsychologischen Komponenten innerhalb eines so elementar in alle Lebensverhältnisse einschneidenden Kriegsgeschehens leicht aus dem Blick geraten. Auf die Mehrheit der attischen Bürger, die bis dahin auf dem Lande lebte, und insbesondere auf die Jugend, die noch keine Kriegs- und Notzeiten gesehen hatte, sollte jedenfalls von der Zerstörung der heimischen Wohnstätten und der Verwüstung der Felder und Baumpflanzungen in Attika durch die peloponnesischen Invasoren, allen großen Schockwirkung ausgehen, der sich zunächst viele mental nicht gewachsen zeigten".

<sup>42</sup> James A. Andrews, "Pericles on the Athenian Constitution (Thuc. 2.37)", *The American Journal of Philology* 125, 2004, p. 542. See, also, Venier, "De Pericles A Sicilia", *ibid.*, p. 359: "En los dos primeros discursos (i, 140 y ii, 13), directo el primero, el segundo indirecto, Pericles alude a la situación en que se encontrarían los atenienses si entraran en guerra: no faltan hombres de mar y tierra, dinero ni experiencia, y hay razones para suponer que con esas ventajas saldrán vencedores, en especial porque los espartanos están en situación inversa. El tercer discurso (ii, 35), más conocido porque en él se honra a los primeros caídos en batalla (según cuenta Diódoro de Sicilia, xi, 33, 3, la tradición de escoger a un orador dotado para esta ceremonia se remontaba a las guerras médicas), comienza con un largo exordio que encomia la situación política de la Hélade, en especial su δημοκρατία, ejemplo para todos, porque se respeta lo individual y se cumple con lo público, "más que nada por un temor respetuoso, ya que obedecemos a los que en cada ocasión desempeñan las magistraturas y las leyes, sobre todo las que están legisladas en beneficio de los que sufren la injusticia, y en cuanto a las no escritas [las leyes naturales], si no se cumplen, traen vergüenza manifiesta a los que no las cumplen".

<sup>43</sup> Rachel Templer, "From Democracy to Empire: Transgression and Substitution in Thucydides' Periclean Narrative", *Polity* 47, 2015, p. 147: "In Thucydides' recounting of Pericles' funeral oration, the Athenian invites his audience to consider the connection between their city's democracy and its empire, and suggests that the latter was made possible by the former".

speaks directly about the *ἀρχή*, that is, he does not avoid talking about the Athenian Empire.<sup>44</sup> Closely related to the above is Pericles' remark, according to which the enemies of the Athenians claim to have defeated the whole army of Athens if they happen to win a battle against even a small group of well-trained Athenian soldiers. Therefore, the accomplished statesman notes that all Greek cities feel the highest honor every time they have to face Athens in battle.<sup>45</sup> However, the presence of Athenian imperialism becomes more conspicuous when Pericles avows that the enemies of Athens do not complain when the Athenians mistreat them, while the subjects of Athens do not consider themselves to be ruled by an unworthy city. In other words, Xanthippus' son believes that it is not immoral for one famous and powerful city to impose itself on another, vulnerable city, while the weak ought to feel honored when they are to be ruled by a high-powered empire. The Funeral Oration reaches its highest political climax when Pericles claims that Athens' achievements speak for themselves and therefore the Athenians do not need someone like Homer to praise their brave deeds.<sup>46</sup> Besides, Pericles adds that the Athenians have forced every state by land and by sea to submit to their fearlessness.<sup>47</sup> At this point we must turn our attention to the fact that the widely known politician deliberately offers exaggerating statements in order to boost the morale of the relatives of the deceased. However, Pericles' sayings reflect reality, place emphasis on the foundational principles of radical democracy and accurately describe the way in which Athenian imperialism was established.<sup>48</sup> Finally, the phrase *ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς* (Thuc. 2.43.1), which calls the Athenians to love their city with passion,<sup>49</sup> reminds the scholar that in ancient Greek literature love (*ἔρως*) is often

<sup>44</sup> See Thuc. 2.36.1-3.

<sup>45</sup> See Thuc. 2.39.3.

<sup>46</sup> See Tobias Joho, "The Revival of the Funeral Oration and the Plague in Thucydides Books 6-7", *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 57, 2017, p. 33: «In contradistinction to the Athenians' eager imitation of epic models on the eve of the expedition, Pericles in the Funeral Oration had rejected the need of a Homeric singer, preferring the truth of the Athenians' actual achievement to the momentary delight of an epic poem (2.41.4). This emphasis on the priority of the factual over the fancies of the imagination is one of Pericles' central concerns».

<sup>47</sup> See Thuc. 2.41.2-4.

<sup>48</sup> For Pericles' justification of Athenian Imperialism see Ronald C. Lee, Jr., "Justifying Empire: Pericles, Polk, and a Dilemma of Democratic Leadership", *Polity* 34, 2002, p. 505-514.

<sup>49</sup> See Ryan Balot, "Pericles' Anatomy of Democratic Courage", *The American Journal of Philology* 122, 2001, p. 512. See also Mateo Duque, "Two Passions in Plato's Symposium: Diotima's to Kalon as a Reorientation of Imperialistic *Erōs*", in H. L. Reid and T. Leyh (ed.), *Looking at Beauty to Kalon in Western Greece. Selected Essays from the 2018 Symposium on the Heritage of Western Greece*, Iowa, USA: Parnassos Press 2019, p. 96-97: "We should remember the perilous context Pericles is in. He has been elected to speak in honor of those who have died in the war, but at the same time he needs to motivate the surviving Athenians—many forced to come inside the walls of a cramped city—to stay the course. Pericles is deftly combining a factual description of Athens with a normative prescription. On the one hand, Pericles is using figurative language to describe Athens's existing practice of pederasty, which helped to constitute its socio-political order. Social networks and connections were formed by the relationships between *erastai* and *erōmenoi*, they functioned as a process of political acculturation and socialization. On the other hand, Pericles also exhorts his audience; he holds out an ideal to them. He inspires the citizens to behold and love the city as one would a beloved. Pericles wants to harness the ambition, and drive in *erōs* that lives in every citizen, and to channel that collective energy toward a shared love object, Athens. All of it is in service to the war effort".

associated with tyranny.<sup>50</sup> In short, Pericles invites his fellow citizens to become lovers of Athens, so that the prestige of the city can be enhanced through the loyalty of its citizens. If we take into consideration that the Athenians are ready to die willingly for Athens' pride, then we suddenly come to grips with Pericles' view according to which Athens is unbeatable.

Pericles' third and final oration (Thuc. 2.59.2-2.64.6) was delivered in 430 B.C. The Peloponnesians have already invaded Attica twice and have destroyed the property of the Athenians, while the plague has left a heavy imprint on the health of the general population. Shortly afterwards, the Athenians remove Pericles from his office and decide to impose a fine on him; they are obviously angry due to the failure of his defensive strategy. This speech of Pericles was delivered before his political deposition, when he was still a general (*στρατηγός*). This oration highlights all of Pericles' rare rhetorical and intellectual gifts, since the acclaimed statesman knows how to calm his fellow citizens and give them courage. Indeed, the situation is extremely difficult for Pericles, since the Athenians have been forced to gather behind the city walls and watch the Spartans destroy their land while at the same time the plague rapidly devastates the Athenian population. The son of Xanthippus, being extremely eloquent and dispassionate, manages to convince his fellow citizens to make the right choices in every situation, without forcing them to act in a way that does not suit their temperament. The Athenians, in turn, are likely to disobey and may prefer to punish Pericles. Indeed, this is the case, but Pericles willingly obeys and pays the fine so that he is not deprived of his civil rights. The Athenian democracy is operating at the peak of its powers at this time, since those in office are recalled by the Athenian *demos* without protesting or feeling violated by the majority.

The idea of Athenian imperialism emerges when Pericles expresses the view that the Athenians are undoubtedly the absolute rulers of the sea<sup>51</sup> on the entire earth and neither the Persians nor any other nation can resist their power. Pericles explicitly states that if the Athenians wish to conquer other nations in the future, they will do so with ease.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the famous politician points out that the Athenians ought to feel superior to the rest and this assumption is based on their military strength and not on hope which only leads to reckless behavior.<sup>53</sup> This phrase is very reminiscent of the warning that the Athenians addressed to the Melians, urging them not to rely on hope, which always misleads people towards disaster. Pericles explains here that the Athenians have no need for hope, because they possess robust knowledge. I take Pericles' statement to be somehow related to the intellectual ideal that the philosopher Anaxagoras had taught him, which was how to transcend superstition and interpret reality with the aid of science.<sup>54</sup> The great Athenian

<sup>50</sup> See, for example, Connor, *Θουκυδίδης*, *ibid.*, p. 299, n. 53.

<sup>51</sup> See Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, Vol. I, (New York: Oxford University Press 1991), p. 335-336.

<sup>52</sup> See Thuc. 2.62.2.

<sup>53</sup> See Thuc. 2.62.4-5.

<sup>54</sup> See Plut. *Pericl.* 6.1: οὐ μόνον δὲ ταῦτα τῆς Αναξαγόρου συνουσίας ἀπέλαυσε Περικλῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας δοκεῖ γενέσθαι καθυπέρτερος, ὅσην τὸ πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα θάμβος ἐνεργάζεται τοῖς αὐτῶν τε τούτων τὰς αἰτίας ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ περὶ τὰ θεῖα δαιμονῶσι καὶ ταραττομένοις δι' ἀπειρίαν αὐτῶν, ἥν ὁ φυσικὸς λόγος ἀπαλλάττων ἀντὶ τῆς φοβερᾶς καὶ φλεγμανούσης δεισιδαιμονίας τὴν ἀσφαλῆ μετ' ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν εὔσέβειαν ἐργάζεται.

politician adds that currently the Athenians are not only fighting to defend their freedom, but also to protect and maintain their empire. At the same time, he admits that Athens can no longer afford to renounce the obligations that come with the possession of a hegemony:<sup>55</sup> the Athenian *άρχη* is exercised by the Athenians as a tyranny,<sup>56</sup> something which is, of course, unfair, but any indifference to it is extremely dangerous.<sup>57</sup> Pericles faithfully reflects here the famous philosophical doctrine of *πολυπραγμοσύνη* ("vigor" or "assertiveness", as Finley points out<sup>58</sup>), according to which it is necessary for the Athenians to be in continuous motion. If the phrase is interpreted philosophically, then it means that the Athenians are like man himself, for whom it is crucial to constantly move in order to be able to prove that he is alive. Anything that remains still is dead. In short, if the Athenians are not constantly vigilant or become tolerant towards others, then their hegemony will soon be shattered by other powerful cities.

Pericles' line of argument is fully compatible with his past political mentality, especially if we take into consideration that the great statesman commanded his fellow citizens to destroy Aegina in 431 B.C.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, the

<sup>55</sup> See Thuc. 6.18.2-3. Alcibiades seems to adopt Pericles' views concerning the Athenian hegemony.

<sup>56</sup> We should note here that several comic poets accuse Pericles of ruling as a tyrant. See, for instance, Plut. *Pericl.* 3.3: *τῶν δὲ κωμικῶν ὁ μὲν Κρατῖνος ἐν Χείρωσι, “στάσις δὲ”* (φησί) *“καὶ πρεσβυενής Κρόνος ἀλλήλοισι μιγέντε μέγιστον τίκτετον τύραννον, ὃν δὴ κεφαληγερέταν θεοὶ καλέουσι,”* καὶ πάλιν ἐν *Νεμέσει*: *“μόλ’ ὡς Ζεῦ ξένιε καὶ καραΐε.”* For a relevant commentary see Philip A. Stadter, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press 1989) p. 66: "Cratinus (F240 K. = 258 K.A., F111 K. = 118 K.A.): see the introduction, 3.1.e. Both the *Chirons* and the *Nemesis* concerned Pericles and contemporary politics under mythological guise. In both cases Pericles is Zeus (cf. also 13.10): in the *Chirons* he is the son of Cronus by Faction (instead of Rea) and a tyrant. Tyranny became a standard political slogan against Pericles' influence in Athens: see 16.1". Cf. Plut. *Pericl.* 7.1-4: *ό δὲ Περικλῆς νέος μὲν ὃν σφόδρα τὸν δῆμον εὐλαβεῖτο. καὶ γὰρ ἐδόκει Πεισιστράτῳ τῷ τυράννῳ τὸ εἶδος ἐμφερῆς εἶναι, τὴν τε φωνὴν ἡδεῖαν οὖσαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν γλώτταν εὔτροχον ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ταχεῖαν οἱ σφόδρα γέροντες ἔξεπλήττοντο πρὸς τὴν ὄμοιότητα. πλούτου δὲ καὶ γένους προσόντος αὐτῷ λαμπροῦ καὶ φίλων οἱ πλεῖστον ἡδύναντο, φοβούμενος ἔξοστρακισθῆναι, τῶν μὲν πολιτικῶν οὐδὲν ἐπραττεν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς στρατείαις ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς ἦν καὶ φιλοκίνδυνος. ἐπεὶ δ' Ἀριστείδης μὲν ἀποτεθνήκει καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔξεπεπτώκει, Κίμωνα δ' αἱ στρατεῖαι τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔξω κατεῖχον, οὕτω δὴ φέρων ὁ Περικλῆς τῷ δῆμῳ προσένεμεν ἑαυτόν, ἀντὶ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ὀλίγων τὰ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πενήτων ἐλόμενος παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἥκιστα δημοτικὴν οὖσαν. ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικε, δεδιώς μὲν ὑποψίᾳ περιπεσεῖν τυραννίδος, ὄρων δ' ἀριστοκρατικὸν τὸν Κίμωνα καὶ διαφερόντως ὑπὸ τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαπώμενον, ὑπῆλθε τοὺς πολλούς, ἀσφάλειαν μὲν ἑαυτῷ, δύναμιν δὲ κατ' ἔκεινον παρασκευαζόμενος. εύθὺς δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν δίαιταν ἐτέραν τάξιν ἐπέθηκεν.* Cf. Fr. 348 K.-A. = 355 K.: *ἀνελκταῖς ὄφρύσι σεμνόν.* In antiquity the raised eyebrow was linked to anti-democratic sentiments. Even today, when we raise an eyebrow we usually want to express our disapproval of something.

<sup>57</sup> See Thuc. 2.63.2-3. Cleon also highlights that Athens rules as a tyrant, see Thuc. 3.37.2. This proves that all of Athens' great politicians just represent stages of Athenian imperialism. See, for example, A. G. Woodhead, "Thucydides' Portrait of Cleon", *Mnemosyne*<sup>Fourth Series</sup> 13, 1960, p. 300: "Like the Melian Dialogue, Cleon's speech represents a direct and sensible, and in the circumstances properly drastic, implementation of accepted doctrine".

<sup>58</sup> See John H. Finley, *Thucydides*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1942) p. 127.

<sup>59</sup> Plut. *Pericl.* 8.7: *οἷον τὸ τὴν Αἴγιναν ὡς λήμνην τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἀφελεῖν κελεῦσαι.* See Stadter, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, ibid., p. 108: *“‘to remove Aegina, the pus in the eye of the Piraeus’*. Aegina probably did not join the Delian League at its foundation but in ca. 459 was made tributary after being defeated by Athens in a major sea battle and losing seventy ships (Thuc. 1.105.2, 108.4; cf. ML 33). After the peace treaty of 446 she remained in the empire, but her continuing complaints to Sparta supplied one of the motives for the war (Thuc. 1.67.2, 139.1). In 431, after the Spartan invasion, the Athenians removed the Aeginetans from the island and settled their own citizens

Athenians - following the military instructions of Pericles - occupied Hestiae in 446 B.C. and expelled all the inhabitants from their homes.<sup>60</sup> The previous examples vividly demonstrate the callous attitude that Athens usually adopted towards the other Greek cities.<sup>61</sup> Finally, directly intertwined with Athenian imperialism is the phrase *τὸ δὲ μισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηροὺς εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι πᾶσι μὲν ὑπῆρξε δὴ ὅσοι ἔτεροι ἔτέρων ἡξίωσαν ἄρχειν* (Thuc. 2.64.5). Those who aspire to exercise restraining authority over others are obliged to come to terms with the hatred that the weak cities will show towards them.<sup>62</sup> In other words, Pericles implies that the Athenians ought to bravely accept their fate and continue to be the rulers of the other Greek cities.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, it is necessary to stress that Athenian imperialism was not a political stage of democracy but was closely related to the highly innovative Athenian constitution. The Athenians pursued their foreign policy with unanimity and all agreed on the necessity of maintaining their hegemony at all costs. The Melian Dialogue, which stands as a representative example of the arrogance to which excessive power can lead, is not far from the views expressed by Pericles in his three speeches, which are preserved by Thucydides. Moreover, a connection between the Melian Dialogue and Athenian imperialism can also be made through Alcibiades, Pericles' nephew who had a significant influence on the Athenians in 416 B.C. and the years that followed. Alcibiades expressed the view that the strong ought to rule the weak and not set limits to their ambitions - beliefs which are obviously related to influences during his upbringing, namely Pericles. Of course, every text-

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there (Per. 34.2; Thuc. 2.27.1). These words probably belong to the latter occasion, as they seem similar to Thucydides' explanation: *τὴν Αἴγιναν ἀσφαλέστερον ἐφαίνετο τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐπικειμένην αὐτῶν πέμψαντας ἐποίκους ἔχειν*. The phrase was recalled for its forceful image: conjunctivitis was a common ancient disease, marked by a purulent discharge of the eye, sticking the eyelids together and impairing or blocking vision. The offending matter needed to be cleaned out (cf. *Non posse 1101C*, *δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀμέλει τῆς περὶ θεῶν δόξης ὥσπερ ὄψεως λήμην ἀφαιρεῖν τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν*). Aegina similarly inhibited the use of Piraeus. Plutarch quotes the phrase also at *Dem. 1.2*, and *Reg. et imp. apophtheg. 186C* and *Praec. ger. rep. 803A*, perhaps from *Arist. Rhet. 3.10.7.1411a15-16*. Our 'eyesore' is now trite, and in any case has a different meaning, referring to an obvious blight external to the viewer. The expression is attributed to Demades in *Athen. 3.99D*; Strabo (9.1.14 [395]) says some applied it to the island of Psyttalia".

<sup>60</sup> See Thuc. 1.114.3: *καὶ Αθηναῖοι πάλιν ἐς Εὔβοιαν διαβάντες Περικλέους στρατηγοῦντος κατεστρέψαντο πᾶσαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὄμολογία κατεστήσαντο, Ἐστιαιᾶς δὲ ἐξοικίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἔσχον. Cf. Plut. *Pericl. 23.4*, Ar. *Vesp. 715-716* and Ar. *Nub. 211-213*.*

<sup>61</sup> See also Plut. *Pericl. 28.2*: *Δοῦρις δ' ὁ Σάμιος τούτοις ἐπιτραγωδεῖ, πολλὴν ὡμότητα τῶν Αθηναίων καὶ τοῦ Περικλέους κατηγορῶν, ἣν οὔτε Θουκυδίδης ιστόρηκεν οὔτ' Ἐφορος οὔτ' Αριστοτέλης· ἀλλ' ούδ' ἀληθεύει ἐοικεν, ὡς ἄρα τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας τῶν Σαμίων εἰς τὴν Μιλησίων ἀγορὰν καταγαγόν καὶ σανίσι προσδήσας ἐφ' ἡμέρας δέκα κακῶς ἡδη διακειμένους προσέταξεν ἀνελεῖν, ξύλοις τὰς κεφαλὰς συγκόψαντας, εἴτα προβαλεῖν ἀκήδευτα τὰ σώματα. We do not know for certain whether Pericles ordered the Athenians to tie the captives of Samos to boards for ten days and then break their heads with clubs, leaving their bodies lying around. In any case, no possible scenario can be ruled out. See Joshua P. Nudell, "Accustomed to Obedience? Classical Ionia and the Aegean World, 480-294 BCE" (Michigan: University of Michigan Press 2023), p. 50-53.*

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Alcibiades' views, Thuc. 6.16.5.

based disagreement is acceptable; some scholars could argue (citing Thucydides, especially 2.65) that Pericles exercised power wisely. A counterargument of this kind, however, is not compatible with the expansionist policy of Pericles, who, for example, treated the Samians with obvious cruelty during the Samian War. We should also remember that several comic poets accused Pericles of ruling as a tyrant. As much as these phrases are also related to the poets' habit of producing dynamic political opposition, we cannot in any way ignore them. This does not imply that Pericles was a tyrant, but that he was simply faithfully applying the doctrine of Athenian imperialism which he had inherited from his Athenian ancestors. In this way, the Melian Dialogue does not produce a "dissonant sound" in the ears of the well-informed reader, in the sense of not being incompatible with the liberal (and in many instances radical) tendencies of Athenian democracy; it simply confirms that the Athenians had invented a highly innovative constitution, which they were also putting into practice when they had to conduct their foreign policy. Pericles, then, was a democratic leader and simultaneously the mastermind behind Athenian hegemony. In this way, the preconception that a democratic state should universally and globally behave in a democratic way is refuted by the example of the Athenians. To sum up, behind the city walls the Athenian democracy resembled a garden full of fragrant flowers, but beyond the boundaries of their walls the Athenians were suddenly transformed into ruthless warriors. Perhaps this is the price of setting up and maintaining a hegemony and a direct democracy.

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# Elizabeth Anscombe on Just War, Legitimate Killing, and Double Effect

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## **Abstract**

This paper examines Elizabeth Anscombe's just war theory and argues that her central thesis is that nothing can justify the deliberate killing of innocents in wartime. I first outline Anscombe's seven conditions for just war theory and demonstrate how she employs these conditions to a specific conflict. I then analyze Anscombe's distinction between the innocent and the non-innocent in warfare, leading to a discussion on the justification and limitations surrounding legitimate killing. At last, I present Anscombe's examination of the principle of double effect within her action theory, particularly her distinction between intentional, foreseen, and accidental consequences, highlighting the misuse of this principle as a justification for civilian casualties in war. My aim is to demonstrate how Anscombe's action theory addresses controversial issues in war and provides new perspectives on just war theory.

## **Keywords**

*Anscombe, Just War, Legitimate Killing, Innocence, Double Effect, Intention*

## Introduction

Elizabeth Anscombe, one of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth century, is renowned for her contributions to action theory and ethics. Her influential monograph, *Intention* (1957), has been described by Donald Davidson as “the most important treatment of action since Aristotle”. In ethics, her article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) is recognized as the revival of contemporary virtue ethics. Despite her significance, Anscombe is often regarded as challenging to understand—some prefer to use the word “notorious”. I believe this negative reputation stems from a misunderstanding of her work, largely due to a failure to appreciate the historical context in which she wrote.

In recent years, there has been a growing number of studies focusing on the historical context of Anscombe’s writing. These studies often use this context as a starting point for examining her action theory and ethics, providing a valuable framework for clarifying common misunderstandings about her work.<sup>1</sup> These studies unveil a crucial historical context for Anscombe’s writing of both *Intention* and “Modern Moral Philosophy”. Specifically, she vehemently opposed Oxford University’s decision to award Harry S. Truman an honorary degree in 1956. Truman, the former president of the United States, was infamous for ordering the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Anscombe argued that an honorary degree represents “a reward for being a very distinguished person”. By nominating Truman, she contended, Oxford was effectively endorsing a distorted notion of “distinguished person” by recognizing someone she described as “a notorious criminal responsible for two massacres”.

Anscombe published a pamphlet called “Mr Truman’s Degree”<sup>2</sup> in 1957 to clarify her views. This was not her first public stance on the war. In 1939, she co-authored “The Justice of the Present War Examined”<sup>3</sup> with Norman Daniel, responding to Britain’s entry into the war against Germany to restore Poland’s frontiers and independence. Later, in 1961, she wrote an essay titled “War and Murder”<sup>4</sup> for the collection *Nuclear Weapons: A Catholic Response*, where she reiterated similar moral arguments but clearly with Catholic audience in mind.<sup>5</sup> As a result of Anscombe’s engagement with these issues, the just war theory, which had fallen into obscurity during World War II, gradually regained acceptance across various segments of society. Anthony Kenny contends that the revival of just war theory “is due

<sup>1</sup> See Duncan Richter, *Anscombe’s Moral Philosophy* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011), 3; Rachael Wiseman, *Anscombe’s Intention* (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 28–36; John Berkman, “Justice and Murder: The Backstory to Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe*, ed. Roger Teichmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 225–231.

<sup>2</sup> Elizabeth Anscombe, “Mr Truman’s Degree” (henceforth TD), reprinted in *Ethics, Religion and Politics Collected Philosophical Papers Volume III* (henceforth CCP3), (Oxford: Blackwell, and Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 62–71.

<sup>3</sup> Elizabeth Anscombe, “The Justice of the Present War Examined” (henceforth JPW), reprinted in CCP3, 72–81.

<sup>4</sup> Elizabeth Anscombe, “War and Murder” (henceforth WM), reprinted in CCP3, 51–61.

<sup>5</sup> See the introduction of CCP3, vii; Lucy Brown, “Intentions in the Conduct of the Just War”, in *Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe*, ed. Cora Diamond and Jenny Teichman (Sussex: The Harvester Press Limited, 1979), 133–145; David Goodill OP, “Elizabeth Anscombe on Just War”, in *The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe*, ed. Luke Gormally, David Albert Jones, and Roger Teichmann (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2016), 154–171.

more to Elizabeth Anscombe than to any other individual".<sup>6</sup> Despite being written in different historical contexts, Anscombe's three papers on war present a continuous and coherent line of thought. For example, they all address the topics of "the attack on civilians as a means of warfare" and "the applicability of the principle of double effect in relation to attacks on civilians". Not only were these issues significant during her time, but they also remain crucial questions that we must confront in today's conflicts.

In this paper, I will explore Anscombe's theory of war and argue her central thesis that nothing can justify the deliberate killing of innocents in wartime. In Section 2, I will outline Anscombe's seven conditions for just war theory, grounded in natural moral law, and demonstrate how she employs these conditions to evaluate the conflict of 1939. In Section 3, I will analyze Anscombe's distinction between the innocent and the non-innocent in warfare, leading to a discussion on the justification and limitations surrounding legitimate killing. In Section 4, I will first present Anscombe's examination of the principle of double effect within her action theory, highlighting its misuse as a justification for civilian casualties in war. What delved into then is her concept of intention, aimed at addressing challenges regarding the applicability of this principle to the context of civilian killings in warfare.

## Just War

In both pamphlets, Anscombe takes a stand against the war of her time and the specific means used in that conflict, but she is not a pacifist. Instead, she argues that pacifism is a false doctrine<sup>7</sup> that is not only wrong but also extraordinarily harmful. Normally, a wrong idea might not lead to particularly bad consequences, and a false doctrine would not typically encourage people to do anything harmful. However, pacifism is an exception. It arises in situations where evil is occurring, and good outcomes cannot be achieved without resorting to some evil means. Anscombe thus contends that war can be necessary in certain circumstances and can be just under specific conditions. Her objections to certain wars and the means employed in them are not a rejection of war itself, but rather a critique of those wars that do not meet her criteria.

Anscombe gives seven conditions that must all be fulfilled for a war to be just:

- (1) There must be a just occasion: that is, there must be violation of, or attack upon, strict rights.
- (2) The war must be made by a lawful authority: that is, when there is no higher authority, a sovereign state.
- (3) The warring state must have an upright intention in making war: it must not declare war in order to obtain, or inflict anything unjust.
- (4) Only right means must be used in the conduct of the war.
- (5) War must be the only possible means of righting the wrong done.

<sup>6</sup> Anthony Kenny, "Elizabeth Anscombe at Oxford", in *The Life and Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe*, ed. John Haldane (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2019), 12-13.

<sup>7</sup> Anscombe claims that "pacifism is a false doctrine" in both WM and TD. She explains it in a religious way in WM, 55-58; what I discuss here is her argument in TD, 69-70.

(6) There must be a reasonable hope of victory.

(7) The probable good must outweigh the probable evil effects of the war.<sup>8</sup>

These conditions are grounded in the concept of natural moral law.<sup>9</sup>

According to Anscombe, natural law reflects the principles of human nature, guiding individuals on how to act in ways that fulfill their inherent functions, all while respecting their free will. In the context of relationships between individuals, societies, and nations, justice stands as the core principle to uphold. War, being one of these relationships, is also governed by this principle, serving as the only means to achieve the happiness of humanity.

According to some of the seven conditions mentioned above, Anscombe claims that Britain's entry into the war against Germany in 1939 had some justice. Condition (1): The invasion of Poland made it a just occasion, as the rights of Poland had been infringed. Condition (2): The war was declared by a lawful authority, the British government. Condition (5): It is possible that the wrong done could not have been righted by peaceful means. Condition (6): There is a reasonable hope of victory.<sup>10</sup> However, Anscombe argues that the remaining three conditions have not been fulfilled. Given that all the conditions must be met for a just war, this war is not just.

Aside from condition (3), where Anscombe questions the sincerity of the British government—arguing that it never genuinely cared about Poland and merely used it as a pretext to confront Germany<sup>11</sup>—and condition (7), where she sees little hope for a just and lasting peace in Europe<sup>12</sup>, the discussion throughout the pamphlets from 1939 to 1956 primarily focus on the right means required by condition (4). These means are mainly concerned with the issue of civilian casualties, including the distinction between civilians and combatants in modern warfare, the likelihood of civilian attacks, and the differentiation between direct and accidental killings in cases involving civilians.<sup>13</sup> The discussions cover two main topics: first, the justification and limitations of legitimate killing, which will be addressed in section 3; second, the application of the principle of double effect in relation to civilian causalities, which will be examined in section 4.

## Legitimate Killing and Murder

David Goodill OP notes in his article “Elizabeth Anscombe on Just War” that while all three of Anscombe’s essays on the war were written in particular historical contexts, they continue to tackle the same moral questions, one of which is the issue of legitimate killing, including both the justification for such killings and the limitations that should apply.<sup>14</sup> Anscombe argues that legitimate killing in war should be directed only at combatants, and that the distinction between combatants and non-combatants aligns with the concepts of non-innocence and innocence in a moral sense.

<sup>8</sup> Anscombe, JPW, 73. These conditions are not Anscombe’s original idea, she gives sources in the footnote.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* Anscombe also contends that the natural moral law is what modern men have lost, and they cannot live in peace without it. This claim echoes Anscombe’s criticism in “Modern Moral Philosophy”.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> See Anscombe, JPW, 74; Duncan Richter, *Anscombe’s Moral Philosophy*, 28.

<sup>12</sup> See Anscombe, JPW, 80-81; Duncan Richter, *Anscombe’s Moral Philosophy*, 29.

<sup>13</sup> See Anscombe, JPW, 76-79; Anscombe, TD, 66-68.

<sup>14</sup> See David Goodill OP, “Elizabeth Anscombe on Just War”, 169-170.

The first thing that needs to be discussed is whether there are innocent people in war, specifically the definition of combatants and non-combatants. Supporters of the indivisibility of modern warfare argue that civilians and combatants are equally important because a country's military strength is realized through its overall economic and social strength; thus, every member of a society shares a collective responsibility. Therefore, it is senseless to draw any line between combatants and non-combatants, that is, legitimate and illegitimate objects of attack. Anscombe finds this view ridiculous. She mockingly suggests that this theory implies that anyone who bought a taxed article, grew a potato, or cooked a meal has contributed to the war effort, and she finds it hard to believe how children and the elderly fit into this narrative—perhaps because they cheered up the soldiers and munitions workers.<sup>15</sup>

Anscombe admits that the line between combatants and non-combatants might be difficult to draw, but that does not mean we should give up doing so, especially since “wherever the line is, certain things are certainly well to one side or the others of it”<sup>16</sup>. In Anscombe’s view, combatants—those who are non-innocent—are engaged in an objectively unjust proceeding that causes harm; for instance, they wrongfully attack the rights of others or retain what they have wrongfully gained. They can be the target of legitimate killing because killing them stops the harm. Similarly, supply lines and armament factories can also be legitimate targets, as they provide combatants with direct means to cause harm. In this sense, killing combatants is a means of defending or restoring rights. Therefore, the most important condition for legitimate killing is that its purpose must be to stop the harm. That is to say, a surrendered army cannot be killed because they are no longer causing harm; punitive killings are not legitimate either, as their purpose is not to stop harm.<sup>17</sup>

Another important point in Anscombe’s arguments is that the state “has the authority to order deliberate killing in order to protect its people or to put frightful injustice right.”<sup>18</sup> It is also noted in the principles of a just war that the war must be waged by a lawful authority. This means that while specific individuals are fighting on the battlefield, they do so on behalf of their respective states. In war, the identity of the individual tends to disappear, becoming an abstraction that represents the state. Therefore, those who are authorized to conduct legitimate killing and those who can be legitimately killed should be the combatants fighting for their states, rather than individuals acting on their own.

As for the meaning of “the unjust preceding that cause harm”, Anscombe raises a possible question: Does her theory imply that a soldier can only be killed when he is actually attacking? If so, this would mean that it would be impossible to sneak attack a sleeping camp. Anscombe’s answer is that “what someone is doing” can refer either to “what he is doing at the moment” or to “his role in a situation”. Therefore, a soldier under arms is

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<sup>15</sup> See Anscombe, JPW, 76-77; Anscombe, TD, 63.

<sup>16</sup> Anscombe, TD, 67.

<sup>17</sup> See Anscombe, JPW, 77; Anscombe, WM, 53; Anscombe, TD, 67.

<sup>18</sup> Anscombe, TD, 68.

“harming” in the latter sense, even if he is asleep, and a sneak attack also falls under the category of legitimate killing.<sup>19</sup>

Accordingly, civilians do not fulfill the conditions under which a person can be legitimately killed in war, because they are neither carrying out any wrongful actions against those who are defending or restoring rights, nor are they engaged in providing supplies to those who have the means to fight. Therefore, they are non-combatants and innocent. The civilian population that supports the economic and social strength of a nation, in the theory of indivisibility, is not considered combatants. Even though these strengths may eventually be used to support the war unjustly, it is an action of the state and has nothing to do with these civilians. Anscombe gives the example of a farmer growing wheat that may be eaten by the troops; he is not supplying them with the means of fighting, so it is ridiculous to consider this farmer a combatant.<sup>20</sup>

According to these limitations on legitimate killings, particularly the distinction between the innocent and the non-innocent, it is clear that, under condition (4), an attack on civilians is absolutely unjust. In her 1939 pamphlet, Anscombe criticized the British government’s ambiguous stance on aerial and blockage attacks against civilians, as well as its reservations about a promise not to target them. She argued that these ambiguities suggest that, under certain circumstances, the government might indeed attack civilians.<sup>21</sup> The example she provided in her 1956 pamphlet highlights the British government’s true intentions behind this veiled approach. During World War II, the British government bombed the dykes of Zeeland to trap fleeing German military forces. It is a Dutch island where people had nowhere to escape, and eventually, the entire population of the island was drowned—children, women, farmers, and so on.<sup>22</sup> In her 1956 pamphlet, the main target of Anscombe’s criticism is Truman, who ordered the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where most of the local population were not harming anyone and were therefore evidently innocent. Since they do not fulfill the conditions for legitimate killing, attacking them is murder. Anscombe claims that “choos[ing] to kill the innocent as a means to their ends is always murder, and murder is one of the worst of human actions.”<sup>23</sup>

## Double Effect and Intention

### *Double Effect*

One justification for Truman’s actions claims that the deaths of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were accidental.<sup>24</sup> In other words, the purpose of Truman’s order to drop the atomic bombs was to end the war, not to kill innocent people; thus, the deaths of civilians were not intentional but

<sup>19</sup> See Anscombe, TD, 67.

<sup>20</sup> See Anscombe, JPW, 78; Anscombe, WM, 53; Anscombe, TD, 67.

<sup>21</sup> See Anscombe, JPW, 76.

<sup>22</sup> See Anscombe, TD, 66.

<sup>23</sup> Anscombe, TD, 64.

<sup>24</sup> See Anscombe, WM, 59.

merely accidental, meaning Truman does not need to take responsibility for consequences that were not his purpose. Anscombe regards this as a misuse of the principle of double effect, and the reason for this misuse lies in the unclear distinction between “intentional”, “foreseen”, and “accidental” consequences.

The principle of double effect appears in all three of Anscombe’s articles on war, and I argue that it is a crucial element of her just war theory, especially regarding the analysis of “intention”. My analysis will start with her action theory, focusing primarily on her article “Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’”<sup>25</sup>, as I examine how this principle can enhance our understanding of the conditions for a just war.

The principle of double effect is often used to explain when an action that causes serious harm as a side effect is permissible, alongside the intended effect. In other words, a double effect is indeed a result of the action, but this harm should not be the aim or the chosen means. It is neither intentional nor foreseeable, but purely accidental. It would not be permissible to cause such harm as a means to achieve the same good outcome.

Anscombe describes the scenarios that apply to this principle as extreme situations, such as dangerous surgeries or closing doors to contain fire or water. In these situations, “we are helped by thinking of the deaths as either remote or uncertain”. The term “remote” and “uncertain” indicate that the death should be neither intended nor foreseeable.<sup>26</sup>

An example involving a potholer is used by Anscombe to explain the principle of double effect. A potholer is stuck with people behind him, and water is rising to drown them. There are two options: first, the potholer can be blown up, allowing the people behind him to escape; second, a rock can be moved to open another escape route, but this rock will crush the potholer’s head, resulting in his death.<sup>27</sup> Anscombe argues that, in this example, the principle of double effect suggests that people may move the rock, but they must not blow up the potholer. In the first option, the death of the potholer is the means to escape. In the second option, even though the potholer will be killed, his death is neither the end nor the means, but merely a side effect of moving the rock.

However, Anscombe argues that “[we] cannot deduce the permissibility of moving the rock from the principle of side-effects”<sup>28</sup>. She explains that, in the example, the condition states that “moving the rock will crush the potholer’s head,” making the death of the potholer so immediate that the action cannot simply be considered as “taking the risk that [the death] would happen.”<sup>29</sup> In this scenario, there is also an intention behind the potholer’s death; therefore, the effect of death is neither unforeseeable nor accidental.

<sup>25</sup> Elizabeth Anscombe, “Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’” (henceforth AIDE), in *Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe*, ed. Mary Geach & Luke Gormally (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005), 207-226.

<sup>26</sup> See Anscombe, AIDE, 220.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 221.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 222.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 223.

Anscombe draws on McCormick and Bentham's ideas to clarify the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" intentions. Bentham describes a situation where you aim at one target but end up hitting another. He suggests that if you are aware this could happen, it reflects "indirect intention." McCormick echoes this, explaining that "indirectly intended" means "unintended, but the possibility was foreseen"<sup>30</sup>. In this light, neither option in the potholer example can be justified by the principle of double effect, because both involve causing death with either direct intention or indirect intention—essentially, intentionally or foreseeably.

Accordingly, in the context of war, Anscombe refutes the argument that it is justifiable to attack civilians on the grounds of double effect. She argues instead that only "if a military target is being attacked and in the course of attack civilians are also destroyed, then their destruction is not wicked, for it is accidental."<sup>31</sup> She outlines three scenarios: first, accidentally harming a group while targeting another; second, directly attacking a group; and third, attacking a group as a means to eliminate part of that same group, which may be legitimately targeted. The principle of double effect clearly applies to the first scenario, as Anscombe notes, "killing the innocent, even if you know as a matter of statistical certainty that the things you do involve it, is not necessarily murder."<sup>32</sup> For example, when attacking military targets, such as munitions factories and naval dockyards, as carefully as possible, we cannot avoid killing some innocent people, but this is not considered murder. There is little doubt that the second scenario constitutes pure murder. It is in the third scenario that people hold differing opinions. Some argue that attacks can target a whole group of people, including both civilians and combatants. However, according to Anscombe, civilians are not legitimate military targets. If the death of a group of people (including non-military targets) is a means to an end, then this death is foreseeable (indirectly intentional) and not accidental, meaning that the principle of double effect does not apply.<sup>33</sup>

Therefore, Anscombe argues that "it is nonsense to pretend that [Truman does] not intend to do what is the means [he] take[s] to [his] chosen end."<sup>34</sup> It is clearly foreseeable that the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki would result in civilian deaths; no one can claim that these deaths were merely accidental. Thus, Anscombe's objection to awarding Truman an honorary degree is not based on the fact that he caused death (targeting soldiers could be deemed justifiable), nor is it because he harmed the innocent (accidental killings might be forgiven). Rather, it is because he deliberately ordered the dropping of atomic bombs with the explicit aim of killing innocent people to achieve his objectives.

<sup>30</sup> See Anscombe's interpretation of McCormick and Bentham in Anscombe, AIDE, 221-222.

<sup>31</sup> Anscombe, JPWE, 78.

<sup>32</sup> Anscombe, TD, 66.

<sup>33</sup> See Anscombe, JPWE, 78-79.

<sup>34</sup> Anscombe, WM, 59.

### *Intention*

One challenge to Anscombe's analysis is figuring out how we can know people's intentions, since we usually think of intentions as something internal. For instance, how can we really know what Truman intended? Duncan Richter raises a similar point: "if I drop bombs on an enemy tank, for instance, my motive might be anything from sadism to love of justice, the proper effect of my act is damage to the tank, and the completed act is the dropping and exploding of bombs on or near the tank."<sup>35</sup> So, how do we uncover someone's true motive?

Anscombe acknowledges the importance of this challenge, and she reformulates it within her action theory by stating that an action can be intentional under one description and not intentional under another. So, how can we know if a consequence is intentional or not? I will return to Anscombe's action theory and the example of the potholer to clarify her reformulation.

In the example of the potholer, a key element is the description that "moving the rock will crush the potholer's head." This description allows us to see that the death is foreseeable rather than accidental. However, under a different description, the agent might argue that he intends to move the rock but does not intend to crush the head, as he is unaware that moving the rock will lead to that outcome; for him, it is unforeseeable.<sup>36</sup> Anscombe then tweaks the example to make it more thought-provoking. What if the death is not immediate? For instance, if we move the rock, it will follow a path, and during that journey, it will eventually crush the potholer's head. In this case, it becomes harder to judge, as there is room to argue that we did not intend that result, even if we could foresee it. Here, the principle of double effect might come into play.

In light of this new example, multiple possible descriptions arise. In other words, for a given situation, there are actually many ways we can describe what happens. Anscombe has a famous example involving a pumping man that illustrates these various descriptions:

A man is pumping water into the cistern which supplies the drinking water of a house. Someone has found a way of systematically contaminating the source with a deadly cumulative poison whose effects are unnoticeable until they can be cured. The house is regularly inhabited by a small group of party chiefs, with their immediate families, who are in control of a great state; they are engaged in exterminating the Jews and perhaps plan a world war. — The man who contaminated the source calculated that all if these people are destroyed some good men will get into power who will govern well, or even institute the Kingdom of Heaven on earth and secure a good life for all the people; and he has revealed the calculation, together with the fact about the poison, to the man who is pumping. The death of the inhabitants of the house will, of course, have all sorts of other effects; e.g., that a number of people unknown to these men will receive legacies, about which they know nothing.

The man's arm is going up and down, up and down. Certain muscles, with Latin names which doctors know, are contracting and

<sup>35</sup> Richter, *Anscombe's Moral Philosophy*, 28-29.

<sup>36</sup> See Anscombe, AIDE, 223.

relaxing. Certain substances are getting generated in some nerve fibres - substances whose generation in the course of voluntary movement interests physiologists. The moving arm is casting a shadow on a rockery where at one place and from one position it produces a curious effect as if a face were looking out of the rockery. Further, the pump makes a series of clicking noises, which are in fact beating out a noticeable rhythm.<sup>37</sup>

Anscombe claims that “any description of what is going on, with him as the subject, [...] is in fact true”. This list of descriptions includes what he intends (“operating the pump”), what he knows (“clicking out a rhythm”), and what he does not know (“generating certain substances in some nerve fibres”). If the list is classified by consequences, it includes what is intended (“poisoning the inhabitants”), what is foreseen (“earning some money”), and what is unforeseen (“causing some unknown people to receive legacies”).

Here comes the challenge that one action is intentional under one description, and not intentional under another description, so how could we know a consequence is intentional or foreseeable? If we go back to Truman’s case, as there are multiple descriptions of his order of dropping atomic bombs, which description should be judged? If someone claims that “among all descriptions, his only action is signing a paper”<sup>38</sup>, is it a persuasive defense?

Anscombe introduces a traditional answer to the challenge posed by Cartesian psychology, which claims that people’s intentions are purely within the realm of the mind. She lists three reasons that support this traditional view. First, we are not only interested in a man’s intention of doing what he does, but also in his intention *in* doing it; the latter can often be obscured by merely observing his actions. Second, the question of whether a man intends to do what he does would not typically arise, and if it does, this question can be answered by asking the man himself. Third, a man can form an intention without taking any action to carry it out; in such a case, the intention remains purely an internal phenomenon.<sup>39</sup> These reasons lead us to believe that if we want to know a man’s intention, we must investigate the content of his mind. Only by examining something purely within the realm of the mind, can we understand what intention is. This traditional view maintains that what physically occurs—what a man actually does—is the last thing we need to investigate.

Anscombe claims that this doctrine has repeatedly misused the principle of double effect. She believes that it allows the agent to describe any action as legitimate by making a little speech to oneself, such as “what I mean to be doing is...”. This makes it difficult to see how an action, rather than an intention, could be good or bad, virtuous or vicious. Under this doctrine, everything becomes mysterious.<sup>40</sup>

Even though it seems natural to think that a man’s intentions are ultimately determined by what goes on in his mind rather than by his actions,

<sup>37</sup> Elizabeth Anscombe, *Intention* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 37.

<sup>38</sup> Anscombe mentions a justification for Truman, claiming that “Mr Truman did not make the bombs by himself and decide to drop them without consulting anybody; no, he was only responsible for the decision. Hang it all, you can’t make a man responsible just because ‘his is the signature at the foot of the order’. Or was he not even responsible for the decision? ...” (MTD, 66)

<sup>39</sup> See Anscombe, *Intention*, 9. Italics are Anscombe’s.

<sup>40</sup> See Anscombe, WM, 58-59.

Anscombe argues that “what physically takes place” should be our primary focus. In *Intention* §4, she poses the question of how we can discern someone’s intentions. More specifically, she rephrases this question to ask: what true statements can we confidently make about people’s intentions, and how do we know they are true? Her answer is that “if you want to say at least some true things about a man’s intentions, you will have a strong chance of success if you mention what he actually did or is doing.”<sup>41</sup> Anscombe emphasizes that, no matter “whatever else he may intend” or “whatever may be his intentions in doing what he does”, what we would “say straight off what a man did or was doing” will be what he intends. Rachael Wiseman notes that this perspective is evident in *Intention*, where Anscombe focuses more on “intentional action” than on “intention”.<sup>42</sup>

Anscombe continues explaining that the situation she has in mind is that of a witness in court being asked to describe what he has witnessed, specifically in response to a question such as, “What was the man doing when you saw him?” The fact that the testimony of witnesses is admissible in court indicates that, in the majority of cases, the witness’s description of what a man was doing—derived from a large number of true statements about what physically happened—may coincide with the man’s own account of what he was doing. She gives the example of someone sitting in a chair writing; anyone passing by would know that this person is sitting in a chair and writing. If this passerby is asked, “What is that person doing?”, the typical response would be, “He is sitting in a chair and writing”.

Anscombe concludes that what she is interested in is the fact that we can “look at a man and say what he is doing.” This means we can report what comes to mind directly and use it to inform someone who was not there but is interested in what happened, without needing to ask anyone.

Anscombe also presents the premise on which this example so smoothly progresses: that this passerby has “grown to the age of reason in the same world [as the person who is writing].”<sup>43</sup> This premise indicates that the passerby must have the ability to exercise judgment and be well-informed about the circumstances of the world in which he lives.

Now we can revisit Truman’s case with Anscombe’s answer. Anscombe would suggest that we say straight away what Truman did, but before giving this description, we must be well-informed about the facts and details behind Truman’s decision. Without these historical facts, any justification of Truman is groundless. As Anscombe often says, “You cannot be or do any good where you are stupid.”<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Anscombe, *Intention*, 8. Here, we need to note that Anscombe’s words are “a strong chance of success”. This phrase indicates that Anscombe does not attempt to provide an absolutely right answer that applies in all settings; instead, she describes an answer that is most likely to occur in reality.

<sup>42</sup> Rachael Wiseman, “The Intended and the Unintended Consequences of Intention”, in *The Life and Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe*, ed. John Haldane (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2019), 148-172. Wiseman says: “Anscombe dedicates 19 of the 52 paragraphs of her book (4-12) explicitly to the topic of intentional action, and another 27 (22-49) to the intention with which an action is done. Expressions of intention for the future warrant only five sections of discussion.”

<sup>43</sup> Anscombe, *Intention*, 8.

<sup>44</sup> Anscombe, TD, 65. This is exactly Anscombe’s criticism of the consequentialist justification of Truman. Anscombe thinks that people who support the award of Truman’s honorary degree must believe that Truman’s actions can be justified. While they may not advocate for the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they must consider Truman’s actions acceptable and understandable because “it pretty certainly saved a huge number of lives”, and if not, more serious consequences might

Anscombe introduces the historical context of Truman's case at the beginning of "Mr Truman's Decree". At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Stalin informed the American and British statesmen that he had received two requests from the Japanese to act as a mediator in order to end the war. He had refused. The Allies were seeking the Japanese's unconditional surrender. One military option for achieving this end was a land invasion, but evidence showed that this would lead to catastrophic consequences. A month earlier, at the Battle of Okinawa, 90,000 soldiers and 150,000 civilians were killed. On the expectation that such losses would be repeated, Truman ruled out a land invasion to prevent another Okinawa from occurring. The second means of securing unconditional surrender was to issue an ultimatum to the Japanese government. The Potsdam Declaration outlined this ultimatum: if the Japanese did not surrender unconditionally, the country would face prompt and utter destruction. Anscombe mentions that when issuing this declaration, the Allies agreed on the "general principle" of using the new type of weapon that America now possessed.<sup>45</sup>

In this context, Anscombe claims that "It was the insistence on unconditional surrender that was the root of all evil." Truman's case is therefore never an unavoidable choice between an atomic bomb and a large-scale land invasion. Anscombe believes that aiming for an unlimited objective in war is both stupid and barbarous, and it is this unrealistic goal that led to the seemingly unavoidable choice of dropping atomic bombs. When Truman signed the order to drop the atomic bombs, the deaths of these people became the means to achieve the end of Japan's unconditional surrender. Truman intentionally made this choice, which can be considered murder. Anscombe sees Truman as a notorious criminal for committing murder because, in her own words, "for men to choose to kill the innocent as a means to their ends is always murder, and murder is one of the worst of human action".<sup>46</sup>

## Conclusion

In this introduction and analysis of Anscombe's theory of war, I have attempted to show the consistency and coherence of her attitudes towards war in different historical contexts. I first claimed that Anscombe is not a pacifist; she agrees with the just war that conforms to the conditions of natural moral law. Then I analyzed that under the just war theory, the target of legitimate killing must be combatants, and the justification for legitimate killing is that this action stops harm to the right from occurring. This

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have occurred. For example, they may think that "if those bombs had not been dropped the Allies would have had to invade Japan to achieve their aim [...]. Very many soldiers on both sides would have been killed; the Japanese [...] would have massacred the prisoners of war; and large number of their civilian population would have been killed by 'ordinary' bombing." (TD, 65) Anscombe does not believe that this consequentialist justification, which claims that Truman's order resulted in a relatively good outcome by ending the war and preventing more massive injuries and deaths, takes into account many facts and details behind Truman's decision. Truman's case is never an unavoidable choice between an atomic bomb and a large-scale land invasion. Instead, the real condition is Truman's insistence on unconditional surrender, which led him to take the wrong approach.

<sup>45</sup> See Anscombe, TD, 62-64; Wiseman, "The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Intention", 159-160.

<sup>46</sup> Anscombe, TD, 64.

justification also demonstrates that civilians are innocent because they are not committing any harm; therefore, they cannot be the target of legitimate killing. In the last section, I borrowed Anscombe's analysis of the principle of double effect from her action theory and presented the distinction between intentional, foreseen, and accidental consequences. Especially through the distinction between foreseen consequences and accidental consequences, I demonstrated that it is a misuse of the principle of double effect to justify the deaths of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as merely an accident of Truman's true purpose of ending the war, since it is clearly foreseeable that the bombs would cause civilian deaths. Then I analyzed Anscombe's idea of multiple descriptions to address the question, "How do we know people's intentions?" To this question, Anscombe responds that we should try to describe what people did or what physically took place. Accordingly, I presented Anscombe's description of the historical context leading to Truman's decision to order the dropping of the atomic bombs and pointed out that Truman's true purpose was to use the killing of civilians as a means to achieve unconditional surrender.

Overall, in this paper, I analyzed Anscombe's action theory to delve into the central thesis of her just war theory: the absolute prohibition on the intentional killing of the innocent. In her three articles on war, Anscombe consistently emphasizes that choosing to kill the innocent as a means to an end is always murder, and murder is among the gravest of human actions.

One might wonder how Anscombe would respond to the question, "What if killing some innocent civilians is the only alternative to a Nazi victory?" I believe she would remain steadfast in her position, as she once stated, "If the choice lies between our total destruction and the commission of sin, then we must choose to be destroyed."<sup>47</sup>

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