


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«The Sons of Hagar» in Archbishop Eustathios' The Capture of Thessaloniki: Some Evidence Concerning Late Twelfth Century Byzantine-Turkish Relations

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«THE SONS OF HAGAR» IN ARCHBISHOP EUSTATHIOS' *THE CAPTURE OF THESSALONIKI*: SOME EVIDENCE CONCERNING LATE TWELFTH CENTURY
BYZANTINE-TURKISH RELATIONS*

The Capture of Thessaloniki (Εὐσταθίου τοῦ Θεσσαλονίκης συγγραφὴ τῆς εἴθε ὑστέρως κατ' αὐτὴν ἀλώσεως...)¹, Eustathios' account of the conquest of his archbishopric² by the Normans of Sicily (1185), constitutes a significant historical source for the period 1180–1185, which supplements the corresponding chapters from Niketas Choniates' *History* (Χρονικὴ Διήγησις)³. In this work Eustathios depicts not only the capture and occupation of his see, but he also offers valuable information about the events prior to the disaster.

Therefore, it is not surprising that in *The Capture of Thessaloniki* there are some references concerning the Seljuk Turks, which illustrate certain aspects of the later

* Special thanks are due to Taxiarchis Kolias (Professor, University of Athens, and Director of the Institute for Byzantine Research [IBR] / National Hellenic Research Foundation [NHRF]) and to Nikolaos Moschonas (Research Professor, IBR / NHRF) for their useful comments and suggestions.

1. EUSTATHIOS OF THESSALONIKI, *Ἀλώσις*, ed. St. KYRIAKIDIS (with an Italian transl. by V. ROTOLO) *Eustazio di Tessalonica, La espugnazione di Tessalonica* [Testi e Monumenti, Testi, 5], Palermo 1961. Due to the absence of a shorter title, a conventional one for this work is usually employed; the complete and very extensive heading constitutes probably a short presentation of the contents (H. HUNGER, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, vol. 1, Munich 1978, 427). Generally on this work, see *ibid.*, 426–429.

2. On Byzantine Thessaloniki, see Angeliki KONSTANTAKOPOULOU, *Βυζαντινὴ Θεσσαλονίκη. Χώρος και ιδεολογία*, Ioannina 1996; Eleni KALTSOGIANNI – Sophia KOTZABASSI – Eliana PARASKEVOPOULOU, *Ἡ Θεσσαλονίκη στη βυζαντινὴ λογοτεχνία. Πητορικά και ἀγιολογικά κείμενα* [Βυζαντινὰ Κείμενα και Μελέται, 32], Thessaloniki 2002; Vassiliki NERANTZI-VARMAZI, *Βυζαντινὴ Θεσσαλονίκη. Εγκώμια τῆς πόλης*, Thessaloniki 2005.

3. NIKETAS CHONIATES, *Χρονικὴ Διήγησις*, ed. J.-L. VAN DIETEN, *Nicetae Choniatae Historia* [CFHB, 11/1], Berlin – New York 1975.

twelfth century Byzantine-Turkish relations. Eustathios' remarks are valuable, as he outlines to some extent the new balance of power that emerged after two catalytic events: the military defeat of Manuel I Komnenos (1143-1180) by the Seljuk Turks at the battle of Myriokephalon (1176), which diminished Byzantium's military prestige⁴; and Manuel I's death (1180), which signalled a period of political instability for the Byzantine Empire. In order to be precise, it must be stressed that Eustathios' allusions to Seljuk Turks are meagre; in fact, there are only three relating to them throughout the text⁵, not all being of equal importance for our purpose⁶. However, this key text,

4. On the battle of Myriokephalon, see R.-J. LILIE, Die Schlacht von Myriokephalon (1176): Auswirkungen auf das byzantinische Reich im ausgehenden 12. Jahrhundert, *REB* 35, 1977, 257-275; Sp. VRYONIS, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1971, 123-126; IDEM, The Battles of Manzikert (1071) and Myriocephalum (1176). Notes on Food, Water, Archery, Ethnic Identity of Foe and Ally, *Mésogeios* 25-26, 2005, 49-69; J. HALDON, *The Byzantine Wars: Battles and Campaigns of the Byzantine Era*, Gloucestershire 2001, 139-144.

5. The reference to a group serving on the Norman side generally named «the Saracens» (EUSTATHIOS, Ἰλωσης, 136.26: τῶν Σαρακηνῶν) is beyond the purpose of this paper, since the name 'Saracens' is used very broadly and, therefore, provides us with no evidence for their exact origin. Of course, they could have been Arabs from Sicily. On the term «Saracens», see G. MORAVCSIK, *Byzantinoturcica*, II: *Sprachreste der Türkvolker in den byzantinischen Quellen*, Berlin 1958, 268, 359-360; D. F. GRAF - M. O'CONNOR, The Origin of the Term Saracen and the Rawwāfā Inscriptions, *Byzantine Studies / Études Byzantines* 4, 1977, 52-66; P. THORAU, Sarazenen, *Lexikon des Mittelalters* 7, 1995, 1376-1377; A. G. C. SAVVIDES, Η γνώση των Βυζαντινῶν για τον τουρκόφωνο κόσμο της Ασίας, των Βαλκανίων και της Κεντρικής Ευρώπης μέσα από την ονοματοδοσία, in N. G. MOSCHONAS (ed.), *Ἡ ἐπικοινωνία στὸ Βυζάντιο*, Athens 1993, 711-727, esp. 721; IDEM, Some Notes on the Terms *Agarenoī*, *Ismaelītai* and *Sarakenoī* in Byzantine Sources, *Byzantion* 67, 1997, 89-96, esp. 94-96.

6. The first reference to the Turks occurs when Eustathios mentions the conspiracy, encouraged by the late Emperor Manuel I's daughter Maria and her husband Renier-John of Montferrat, against Alexios Komnenos the *protosebastos* (πρωτοσέβαστος). Alexios the *protosebastos* was the favourite of Maria-Xene of Antioch, Manuel I's spouse and head of young Emperor Alexios II's regency council. The conspiracy was revealed and many of Alexios the *protosebastos*' enemies escaped, preferring exile (EUSTATHIOS, Ἰλωσης, 18.28-22.5. Cf. NIKETAS CHONIATES, *Χρονική Διήγησις*, 230.93ff.; See C. M. BRAND, *Byzantium confronts the West, 1180-1204*, Cambridge, Mass. 1968, 34). Among Alexios the *protosebastos*' enemies was ... ὁ καλὸς Λαπαρδάς, ὁ πάνσοφος τὰ στρατηγικά, ὃν ἱέρακα διὰ τὸ τῆς φρονήσεως καὶ τὸ κατὰ πράξιν ὀξυπετές ὁ τῶν Τούρκων σουλτάν ὀνομάζειν ἐπέκρινεν (EUSTATHIOS, Ἰλωσης, 22.5-7). Obviously, Eustathios refers to the Seljuks indirectly here, in connection with the Seljuk Sultan of Ikonion Kilic Arslan II's praise of the Byzantine general Andronikos Lapardas. This allusion, however, has some significance, since Eustathios chooses to exalt the worthy general's abilities with the nickname that a non-Byzantine gave him, may be because the praise of the foe is more valuable than that of the friend. It is worth mentioning that Andronikos Lapardas had fought against the sultan in the disastrous, for the Byzantines, battle of Myriokephalon as one

even though sparsely, proffers the chance to take a glance at late twelfth century Byzantine-Turkish relations and assemble the additional information from it.

Two passages in particular are quite enlightening about the Turkish meddling in Byzantine political life during the reign of Andronikos I Komnenos (1183-1185). In the first of them, the Turks are mentioned among those who suffered from the «inhuman» (*ἀπάνθρωπος*)⁷ Andronikos I. He was a cousin of Manuel I, who was brought to the limelight by the opposition against the regency of the Empress Maria-Xene of Antioch, Manuel I's second wife and mother of the underage Emperor Alexios II (1180-1183). In 1182, Andronikos overthrew the empress, but his successful uprising was marked by the massacre of the Latins in Constantinople, led by his inciting. He became regent for Alexios II, and soon after his coronation as co-emperor (1183), he had young Alexios strangled, remaining thus, the sole sovereign ruler⁸. Eustathios states that Andronikos desired to be the only survivor, an obsession instigated by his suspicious nature, which made him assume that all men coveted becoming emperors in opposition to him⁹:

Καὶ οὕτω μὲν κατὰ πάντων αὐτός· ἦσαν δὲ οὐδ' οἱ πάντες ἀπεικόνιες ἐκείνου πρὸς γε τὸ μῖσος. Μισοῦμενοι γὰρ ἐφιλοτιμοῦντο ἀντιμισεῖν, οὐκ εὐαγγελικῶς [cf. Matt. 5,44] μὲν, κατὰ βασιλικὸν δὲ ἐκεῖνο παράδειγμα. Καὶ συλλεγέντες τῇ ἀμύνῃ πρὸς τι ἔν δρᾶν ἤθελον καὶ ἀντιλυπεῖν τὸν κατάρξαντα. Ἦσαν δὲ ἐν τοῖς δρῶσι πρὸς ἄμυναν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθοῦσι, καὶ οἱ τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Τὰ γὰρ κατὰ Νικαέων πάθη καὶ ὅσα οἱ Προουσαεῖς ἔτλησαν ἦσαν καὶ ἐκείνης καὶ εἰς πολὺ ἐχθίστην ἡμῖν ἐνέγραψαν. Πολλοὺς γὰρ καὶ τῶν αὐτῆς ἐπιλέγδην ἡ Νίκαια, καὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ Προῦσα, μετὰ πολὺποννον ἄλλωσιν μετεωρισθέντας εἶδον, ὅθεν ἔστι καταβῆναι εἰς Ἑλλάδα καὶ ταχὺ καὶ οἰκτιστὰ¹⁰.

of Emperor Manuel's generals (NIKETAS CHONIATES, *Χρονικὴ Διήγησις*, 180.81-84). This reference expresses to an extent the «chivalric» attitude of the twelfth century Byzantine «ruling class» –the military elite– which Eustathios illustrates: the admiration of military virtues, which even the enemy appreciates (see A. KAZHDAN - S. FRANKLIN, *Studies on Byzantine Literature of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*, Cambridge-Paris 1984, 146-147; A. P. KAZHDAN - Ann WHARTON EPSTEIN, *Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1985, 105ff.). For a study of Andronikos Lapardas' career, see L. STIERNON, Notes de titulature et de prosopographie byzantines. Théodora Comnène et Andronic Lapardas, sébastes, *REB* 24, 1966, 89-96.

7. EUSTATHIOS, *Ἑλλάδος*, 54.16.

8. Ibid., 28.30-52.23; NIKETAS CHONIATES, *Χρονικὴ Διήγησις*, 243.32-274.29. Cf. BRAND, *Byzantium Confronts the West*, 38-50; M. ANGOLD, *The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204. A Political History*, London-New York 1984, 264-265. On Andronikos I, see O. JUREWICZ, *Andronikos I. Komnenos*, Amsterdam 1970.

9. EUSTATHIOS, *Ἑλλάδος*, 54.21-23.

10. Ibid., 54.29-56.3.

Therefore, the Turks, «the Sons of Hagar» (οἱ τῆς Ἄγαρ) in Eustathios' own words, were active in the resistance against Andronikos I, because they had been harmed by him and they had also been touched by the sufferings of the people of Nikaia and Prousa. It can be observed here that Eustathios names the Turks as «the Sons of Hagar», or «Hagarenes» (τῶν Ἀγαρνῶν)¹¹, something common, given that Christian writers employed the term 'Hagarenes' to denote the Arabs and therefore the Turks¹².

It is noteworthy that Eustathios presents the resistance against Andronikos I, the Byzantine emperor, as almost justified, even by the infidel Turks. This should not be astonishing, since Eustathios supported the previous regime of Manuel I both ideologically and politically, and condemned Andronikos' reforms, which were against the nobility¹³. Therefore, although those who had been harmed by Andronikos had also the ability to hate, it was after all his own behaviour that had prompted this situation of hatred, according to Eustathios. He disapproves of Andronikos so evidently that he does not hesitate to admit that the Turks did not attack urged by rapacity or instigated by other stereotypic barbaric attitude, but on account of suffering because of him. On many occasions Eustathios had praised the military campaigns of Manuel I against the Turks¹⁴, which were above all justified, but in the case of the usurper Andronikos even the enemy had the right to defend himself. Nevertheless, the fact that Eustathios composed his account of the sack of Thessaloniki before February 1186, shortly after the liberation of the city¹⁵, must be taken into consideration. In the meantime, Andronikos I Komnenos had been overthrown by Isaac II Angelos (1185–1195, 1203–1204), and undoubtedly Eustathios felt the urgent need to disrupt the

11. Ibid, 56.21.

12. On the term 'Hagarenes', see Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*, II, 55, 359–360; I. SHAHID, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fifth Century*, Washington, D.C. 1989, 174, 345ff.; SAVVIDES, Η γνώση των Βυζαντινών για τον τουρκόφωνο κόσμο, 721; IDEM, *Agarenoī, Ismaelītai and Sarakenoī*, 90–92.

13. KAZHDAN - FRANKLIN, *Studies*, 156; BRAND, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 53ff.; A. G. C. SAVVIDES, *Θερμουργός Ἀντιχριστοφορίας, ἀνὴρ αἱμάτων: Η τύχη του Στεφάνου Ἀγιοχριστοφορίτη, κυρίου οργάνου του Ἀνδρονίκου Α' Κομνηνού*, in Sp. N. TROIANOS (ed.), *Ἐγκλημα και τιμωρία στο Βυζάντιο*, Athens 1997, 67–95, esp. 72–73.

14. For the mood in Eustathios' orations concerning Manuel I's offensives against the Turks during the later part of his reign, see P. MAGDALINO, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143–1180*, Cambridge 1993, 458, 463–464. The value of Eustathios' panegyrics as a historical source, concerning the wars of the first three Komnenoi emperors against the Seljuk Turks, is demonstrated in A. F. STONE, *Stemming the Turkish Tide: Eustathios of Thessaloniki on the Seljuk Turks*, *Bsl* 62, 2004, 125–142.

15. KAZHDAN - FRANKLIN, *Studies*, 136.

bonds with the previous regime¹⁶. This fact partly explicates Eustathios' hostile stance towards Andronikos I throughout *The Capture of Thessaloniki*.

Undoubtedly, a meticulous interpretation of the afore-mentioned passage reveals a situation closer to reality. Subsequent to the death of Manuel I, the Byzantine throne suffered from violent and frequent changes, offering the opportunity to the Turks to occupy parts of the borderlands in Asia Minor, taking advantage of this state of strife; soon after Manuel's decease, the Seljuk Sultan of Ikonion Kilic Arslan II's (1155-1192) troops captured Sozopolis, sacked Kotyaion and besieged Attaleia¹⁷. Apart from this, rebellions were spreading out in Asia Minor, often backed by Turkoman (Turkish nomadic tribesmen) troops that always sought the opportunity to loot, a situation which deteriorated during the reign of Isaac II Angelos¹⁸.

More specifically, Andronikos' measures against the aristocracy caused a rebellion in Asia Minor (1184), which was formed around the cities of Lopadion, Nikaia and Prousa. The rebels were so determined in their resistance that they asked the Turks to assist them. Finally, Andronikos managed to suppress the revolt, but he retaliated against these insubordinate cities savagely¹⁹. Seen in this perspective, Eustathios' passage is very eloquent about the situation in Asia Minor during the reign of Andronikos I.

The next reference concerning the Seljuk Turks is strongly related to the one formerly mentioned. According to Eustathios, «those who had been harmed» (οἱ βλαβέντες ἐκεῖνοι) by Andronikos were «numerous» (πολλοί), «various» (ποικίλοι), and «spoke many languages» (πολύγλωσσοι), counting amongst them members of the aristocracy²⁰:

...οὗτοι δὲ καὶ ὅσοι δὲ ἄλλοι ἐν ὁμοίοις κακοῖς ἦσαν ἐπρέσβευσαν παρὰ πολλοὺς τῶν μέγιστα δυναμένων περὶ τε τὰ τῆς ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν λήξεως καὶ τὰ ἐσπέρια. Καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸν σουλτάν ἠρέθισαν τὰ πλείω, προϊσχύμενοι εἰς δυσωπίαν τὸν τοῦ βραχυβίου βασιλέως Ἀλεξίου θάνατον, ὥπερ ὄφειλε πιστὰ διὰ τὸν πατέρα Μανουὴλ ὁ τῶν Ἀγα-

16. M. ANGOLD, *Church and Society in Byzantium under the Comneni, 1081-1261*, Cambridge 1995, 181.

17. NIKETAS CHONIATES, *Χρονικὴ Διήγησις*, 262.9-14. Cf. VRYONIS, *The Decline*, 127; BRAND, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 48.

18. VRYONIS, *The Decline*, 127-129.

19. NIKETAS CHONIATES, *Χρονικὴ Διήγησις*, 280,40-289,89; Fr. DÖLGER, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches*, von 565-1453, Bd. 2, *Regesten von 1025-1204*, 2nd ed. P. WIRTH Munich 1995 (στο εξής: DÖLGER - WIRTH, *Regesten*), nos. 1558, 1559. Cf. VRYONIS, *The Decline*, 127; BRAND, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 52-53.

20. EUSTATHIOS, *᾽Αλώσις*, 56.11-16.

ρηνῶν ἔθναρχος, ἕτεροι δὲ τὸν ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ προκαθήμενον, τὸν τε κατὰ κόσμον [Bohemund III, Prince of Antioch (1163–1201)] καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικῶς [Aimery of Limoges, Latin Patriarch of Antioch (1140–1193)], ἄλλοι δὲ τὸν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ζηλοῦντα βασιλικῶς [Baldwin IV, King of Jerusalem (1174–1185)] ὑπὲρ τοῦ καλοῦ. Ὁφειλέτην δὲ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτω τῷ ἄρχοντι ὀρθὴν ἀγάπην καὶ ἐπικουρίαν μετὰ τὸν Μανουὴλ ἀδικουμένῳ τῷ υἱῷ Ἀλεξίῳ²¹.

He notes that these refugees had visited Ikonion –as well as Antioch, Jerusalem, and several other Western courts²²– and had attempted to rouse Sultan Kilic Arslan II to action, reminding him that he owed loyalty to Manuel I and to his short-lived son Alexios II.

C. M. Brand states that this passage brings to light the fact that Manuel I, at the end of his life, had asked the sultan –along with the rulers of Antioch and Jerusalem– to guarantee support for his son²³. First of all, he bases his interpretation of the passage on the fact that Manuel and Kilic Arslan preserved their old friendship despite the events before and after Myriokephalon. According to Brand, even the Turkish attack on the city of Klaudiopolis in Asia Minor, which Manuel saved from almost certain capture (1179)²⁴, must have been launched by Turkomans, and not by the Sultanate of Ikonion; this opinion alludes both to the facts that the Turkomans were responsible for many raids in the Byzantine soil and that the Sultan of Ikonion, as he exercised little control over them, was guiltless²⁵.

Manuel, being aware of the decline of his health, and hence his imminent death, attempted as a last resort to obtain support for his son from these foreign powers in particular. It is not known what Manuel had proffered the sultan and the crusading rulers in return for their assurances, but Brand deems that he may have made proposals which would suit their interests. That is, in the sultan's case, either reciprocal guarantees about the Turkish succession, or an agreement concerning frontiers or territory²⁶. Furthermore, Niketas Choniates, according to Brand²⁷, partly confirms the

21. Ibid., 56,17–24.

22. Ibid., 56,25–58,4.

23. BRAND, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 27: Byzantine refugees believed that they had the right to appeal to Turkish and Latin lords against Alexius' murderer, an assumption which suggests that during his final months Manuel had requested these foreign rulers to guarantee his son's throne.

24. NIKETAS CHONIATES, *Χρονικὴ Διήγησις*, 197.7–198.40.

25. BRAND, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 26. Cf. ANGOLD, *Byzantine Empire*, 190.

26. BRAND, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 27.

27. Ibid.

sultan's obligations to support Alexios, as he mentions that one of the several false Alexios IIs visited Ikonion in 1192 to request Kilic Arslan's assistance and support. The usurpation of Andronikos proffered an excuse for Turkish aggression, as a number of pseudo-Alexios IIs emerged along the borders claiming the Byzantine throne and they were endowed with unofficial Turkish support²⁸. This particular pretender accused the sultan of being ungrateful to his father and reminded him of the benefits that his father had bestowed upon him; the sultan, in the beginning, treated him with great honour²⁹. Brand interprets this incident to the extent that the certain pseudo-Alexios «... demanded Turkish support as due him under the terms of the old agreement»³⁰.

Brand, plausibly, underlines the fact that Eustathios records requests of aid from the Byzantine refugees to several Western rulers, but none of them is said to owe support to Alexios, like the lords of Ikonion, Antioch and Jerusalem owed³¹. Moreover, it is apparent that not only Manuel was aware of the precarious reign that he was bequeathing to his son; as P. Magdalino comments on an Eustathios' oration delivered in 1179-1180³²: «The whole tone of this text is one of anxiety at the fact that the empire was held together by one man and its future rested on the survival of one tender lad»³³. From this point of view, his son's marriage to Agnes-Anna, the daughter of King Louis VII of France (1137-1180), his daughter Maria's marriage to Renier-John of the House of Montferrat, and the gesture of reconciliation with his cousin and enemy Andronikos, denote Manuel's measures to secure young Alexios' throne³⁴. Thus, an additional diplomatic effort to obtain the sultan's support for his successor would not be improbable.

Although Brand's interpretation of Eustathios' passage gives the impression of being reasonable enough, one is not able to confirm the existence of an agreement between Manuel and the rulers of Antioch, Jerusalem and Ikonion concerning the

28. ANGOLD, *Byzantine Empire*, 275. On pseudo-Alexios IIs, see K. VARZOS, *Ἡ γενεαλογία τῶν Κομνηνῶν*, vol. 2 [Βυζαντινὰ Κείμενα καὶ Μελέται, 20B], Thessaloniki 1984, 471-481.

29. NIKETAS CHONIATES, *Χρονικὴ Διήγησις*, 420.13-34.

30. BRAND, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 27.

31. Ibid.

32. EUSTATHIOS OF THESSALONIKI, *Λόγοι*, ed. P. WIRTH, *Eustathii Thessalonicensis opera minora. Magnam partem inedita* [CFHB, 32], Berlin-New York 2000, 182-194 [= W. REGEL (ed.), *Fontes rerum byzantinorum. Rhetorum saeculi XII orationes politicae*, vol. I/1, St. Petersburg 1892 (repr. Leipzig 1982), 1-16]: *Λόγος εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κύρ Μανουὴλ τὸν Κομνηνόν*.

33. MAGDALINO, *Manuel I*, 464.

34. ANGOLD, *Byzantine Empire*, 263; MAGDALINO, *Manuel I*, 100ff.

support of Alexios II³⁵. Furthermore, certain points of his analysis, such as the suggestion that Manuel's diplomatic efforts must have been influenced by the fact that he and Kilic Arslan preserved ties of friendship despite Myriokephalon, appear unrealistic; and so seems the argument that because the Turkomans were behind the attack on Klaudiopolis, «... Manuel may have held Kilidj Arslan guiltless of their deed»³⁶. The friendship between two medieval rulers does not necessarily dictate their policy, nor can one believe that the Seljuks of Ikonion, even in the case that their control over the Turkomans was loose, did not have any interest in the pressure that the nomads were exerting on the Byzantines. The Turkish tribes were keeping the Byzantines occupied and were also pushing their ravages deeper into Byzantine soil, contributing to a form of inevitable conquest³⁷.

Then what is the true meaning of the envoys' visit to Ikonion that Eustathios records? Even though Brand's analysis has certain merits, it seems more feasible that there existed no special agreement to support Alexios II, and these Byzantine representatives just sought to obtain the sultan's aid against Andronikos I. Eustathios most likely declares that the three states of Ikonion, Antioch and Jerusalem owed loyalty to Manuel I and his son, because all three of them had accepted Byzantine suzerainty in the past: Ikonion particularly, in 1161-1162³⁸, although, after the defeat of the Byzantine army in Myriokephalon, these bonds of loyalty would have been theoretical³⁹. Furthermore, Turkish troops served in the Byzantine army⁴⁰, an

35. Cf. R.-J. LILIE, *Byzantium and the Crusader States, 1096-1204*, English transl. by J. C. MORRIS - J. E. RIDINGS, Oxford 1993, 228-229.

36. BRAND, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 26.

37. VRYONIS, *The Decline*, 194; IDEM, Nomadization and Islamization in Asia Minor, *DOP* 29, 1975, 41-71, esp. 46; IDEM, The Decline of Byzantine Civilization in Asia Minor, Eleventh-Fifteenth Century. Remarks on the Dumbarton Oaks Symposium of 1974, *DOP* 29, 1975, 351-356, esp. 354.

38. JOHN KINNAMOS, *Ἐπιτομή*, ed. A. MEINEKE, *Ioannis Cinnami Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gestarum* [CSHB], Bonn 1836, 204.22-208.16; NIKETAS CHONIATES, *Χρονική Διήγησις*, 118.29-121.22; *Chronique de Michel le Syrien, patriarche jacobite d'Antioche (1166-1199)*, ed. and French transl. J.-B. CHABOT, vol. III, Paris 1905, 319; DÖLGER - WIRTH, *Regesten*, nos. 1444, 1446. Cf. MAGDALINO, *Manuel I*, 76-78; VRYONIS, *The Decline*, 122.

39. LILIE, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, 229. Antioch had recognised Byzantine suzerainty in 1159 (JOHN KINNAMOS, *Ἐπιτομή*, 181.6-183.6, 185.20-186.10, 199.6-8; DÖLGER - WIRTH, *Regesten*, no. 1430) and Jerusalem probably in 1171 (JOHN KINNAMOS, *Ἐπιτομή*, 280.11-13; Eustathios, *Λόγοι*, 213.82-215.23 [= REGEL, *Fontes*, 39.9-40.20]; DÖLGER - WIRTH, *Regesten*, no. 1502). See LILIE, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, 177-178, 206-209, 229; MAGDALINO, *Manuel I*, 67ff.

40. ANGOLD, *Byzantine Empire*, 190; KAZHDAN - EPSTEIN, *Change*, 173; W. E. KAEGLI, Jr., The Contribution of Archery to the Turkish Conquest of Anatolia, *Speculum* 39/1, Jan. 1964, 96-108, esp. 107-

indication of cultural contact, and the sultan was indeed powerful enough to support the refugees both with military aid and funding in their cause. This would not be unprecedented, since at times the Byzantines involved foreign rulers in their domestic rebellions⁴¹.

In conclusion, the above-mentioned passages, although scanty, suggest the rise of Seljukid power in Asia Minor, subsequent to the battle of Myriokephalon. In *The Capture of Thessaloniki*, Eustathios, as he was not in favour of Andronikos I Komnenos and intended to disassociate himself from the usurper's regime, censures Andronikos' actions alone for the increase of Turkish aggression. However, he is hardly convincing, as the «Sons of Hagar» evidently exploited the political unrest within the Byzantine Empire after Manuel I's decease, meddling in uprisings, and backing aspiring usurpers. Hence, the examined references of Eustathios to the Turks supplement other primary historical sources and adduce information about a decisive development: the growing Turkish interference in Byzantium's internal affairs. The Sultanate of Ikonion was not regarded any more as a «vassal» state; it was treated as a potential ally in order to prevail within the Byzantine Empire.

108. On the Byzantine army of the Komnenian period, see J. W. BIRKENMEIER, *The Development of the Komnenian Army: 1081-1180*, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002.

41. Among many examples, see the rebellion in Asia Minor (1080-1081) of Nikephoros Melissenos (Alexios I Komnenos' [1081-1118] brother-in-law) against Emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078-1081), in which Melissenos used Turkish assistance (ANGOLD, *Byzantine Empire*, 96-97, 105; W. TREADGOLD, *A History of the Byzantine State and Society*, Stanford-California 1997, 610).
