

**The conflict between the Angevins and the Byzantines in Morea in 1267-1289: A Late Byzantine endemic war**

*Juho WILSKMAN*

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JUHO WILSKMAN

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ANGEVINS AND THE BYZANTINES IN MOREA  
IN 1267-1289: A LATE BYZANTINE ENDEMIC WAR<sup>1</sup>

A common dictum in modern research is that, in medieval warfare, pitched battles were unusual and instead the armies concentrated on ravaging enemy territories. Especially the Byzantines are traditionally believed to have been inclined to avoid open battles<sup>2</sup>. As a result, medieval wars are

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1. This article is largely based on my MA thesis “*Bysanttilaisten ja Akhaian ruhtinaskunnan väliset sotatoimet 1259-83: Tapaustutkimus myöhäis-bysanttilaisesta sodankäynnistä*” (The War between the Byzantines and the Principality of Achaia 1259-83: A Case Study in Late Byzantine Warfare) for the University of Helsinki (2007). The thesis in Finnish is published on the Internet with an English abstract at the address <http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe20072054>. I have, however, made several revisions, especially thanks to the scholarships for my PhD work, which enabled me to stay for several months in Athens and Rome, and study such material that is poorly accessible in Scandinavia. Other articles based on my MA thesis are: J. WILSKMAN, The Campaign and Battle of Pelagonia 1259, *Βυζαντινός Δόμος* 17-18 (2009-2010), 131-174 and ID., A conflict (and some co-habitation) in Crusader Greece – Morea 1264 and the Battle of Makry-Plagi, which is intended to be a part of forthcoming monograph by Central European University about the Crusades, and the battle of Prinitza in 1263, which is planned to be published in *BZ*. I wish thank Jon van Leuven, Marina Koumanoudi, and Stephen Bennett for comments and correcting my English. All the errors are my own.

2. See for example J. GILLINGHAM, “Up with Orthodoxy!”, In Defence of Vegetian Warfare, *Journal of Medieval Military History* 2 (2004), 149–158; J. FRANCE, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000-1300*, London 1999, 2-15; S. MORILLO, Battle Seeking: The Contexts and Limits of Vegetian Strategy, *Journal of Medieval Military History* 1 (2002), 21-29; M. BARTUSIS, *The Late Byzantine Army, Arms and Society. 1204-1453*, Philadelphia 1992, 354-357; J. HALDON, *Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World. 565-1204*, London 1999, 35–36, 278. It has been suggested (for example by Haldon and Bartusis) that

often considered to have been fought at a low level. Notwithstanding this “current orthodoxy”, actual research has concentrated on “big events”. This is understandable, because low-level warfare seldom leaves many traces in the sources.

In this article I attempt to reconstruct one medieval and late Byzantine low-level war, namely the conflict between the Angevins and their vassal, the Principality of Achaia, on the one side and the Byzantines on the other, in the Morea during 1267-1289. This conflict offers a case of relatively well-documented late Byzantine low-level warfare. Several modern historians have treated the events<sup>3</sup>, but analysis from the point of view of military history has been missing. In addition I give special attention to the economic and demographic consequences of war in Morea, for the building of fortresses, and for the idea put forward by Bartusis that war in Morea needlessly took resources from the defense of Anatolia, thus contributing to the loss of the

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a lack of resources was the reason to avoid battles. I have however shown that this idea is problematical (WILSKMAN, Pelagonia, 146-147, 162).

3. The most comprehensive ones about events in Morea during the period under discussion are A. BON, *La Morée franque: Recherches historiques, topographiques et archeologiques sur la principauté d'Achaïe (1205-1430)*, Paris 1969, 136-66; D. ZAKYTHINOS, *Le Despotat Grec de Morée*, rev.ed. CH. MALTÉZOU, London 1975, 48-62; K. HOPF, Griechenland. B. Griechenland im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit: Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf unsere Zeit, in *Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste in alphabetischer Folge* [Erste Section 85 Teil], Leipzig 1867, 261-264, 290-329; J. LONGNON, *L'Empire Latin du Constantinople et la principauté de Morée*, Paris 1949, 234-267 *passim*; W. MILLER, *The Latins in the Levant: A History of Frankish Greece. 1204-1566*, London 1908, 125-175 *passim*; F. CERONE, La sovranità napoletana sulla Morea e sulle isole vicine, *Archivio Storico per le Provincie Napoletane* 41 (nuova serie 2) (1916) and 42 (nuova serie 3) (1917); P. LOCK, *The Franks in the Aegean. 1204-1500*, London-New York 1995, 84-95; A. ΜΡΟΥΤΣΙΚΑΣ, *Η Φραγκοκρατία στην Ηλεία (1205-1428). Η κυριαρχία των ξένων και η πολιτική τους*, Athens 1985, 77-100; M. ΔΟΥΡΟΥ-ΕΛΙΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Η ανδραγαυική κυριαρχία στη Ρωμανία επί Καρόλου Α΄ (1266-1285)*, Athens 1987, 55-58, 79-88, 170-188 *passim*; EAD., *Το φραγκικό προγκιπάτο της Αχαΐας (1204-1432)*, Thessaloniki 2005, 35-37. Recently two new studies about late Byzantine warfare have emerged. Both, however, treat the events in Morea 1267-1289 only cursory and concentrating on the campaigns of 1270 and 1272 [S. ΚΥΡΙΑΚΙΔΗΣ, *Warfare in Late Byzantium. 1204-1453* [History of Warfare 67], Leiden 2011, 203; N. ΚΑΝΕΛΛΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, *Η οργάνωση και η τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού στην ύστερη περίοδο (1204-1461)*, unpublished PhD thesis for the University of Thessaly, Volos 2010, 101-102. I thank Kanellopoulos for giving me access to this study].

area to the Turks<sup>4</sup>. Especially older studies have been ready to claim that the war caused significant depopulation in the peninsula, but some modern ones are more doubtful and have declared that mainly the geographical distribution of the population changed<sup>5</sup>. There is plenty of literature about the castles of the Peloponnese, which are usually considered to have been built mainly by the Latins of the principality. However, the claim of the Venetian historian Marino Sanudo that during the war the Byzantines built “strong castles over the mountains and made most fortified passes”<sup>6</sup> has been left almost unnoticed. I also give attention to the treatment of prisoners.

### The Background

The conflict between the Byzantines and the Principality of Achaia had began in 1259, when the Prince of Achaia supported his father-in-law, Michael II of Epeiros, against the “Emperor of Nicaea” Michael VIII Palaiologos. The coalition was defeated in the battle of Pelagonia, and Guillaume II, the Prince of Achaia, fell into the hands of the Nicaeans with most of his nobles. Prince Guillaume made peace after the “Nicaeans” had conquered Constantinople and “re-founded” Byzantium in 1261. In exchange for freedom Prince Guillaume gave the Byzantines fortified places in south-east Morea<sup>7</sup>.

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4. BARTUSIS, *The Late Byzantine Army*, 347-350.

5. For the traditional point of view, see for example ZAKYTHINOS, *Le Despotat Grec de Morée*, 44, 48-51; LOCK, *The Franks in the Aegean*, 84; D. GEANAKOPOLOS, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West. 1258-1282: A Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations*, Cambridge Massachusetts 1959, 175; MILLER, *A History of Frankish Greece*, 119, 125. For the more modern ones E. SAKELLARIOU, *Latin Morea in the Late Middle Ages: Observations on its Demography and Economy*, in *Porphyrogenita. Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides*, ed. CH. DENDRINOS et al., Aldershot 2003, 301-308; B. PANAGIOTOPOULOS, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Πελοποννήσου. 13ος - 18ος αιώνας*, Athens 1985, 27-44.

6. “Fece castelli forti sopra montagne e passi fortissimi” (*Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο. Ιστορία της Ρωμανίας* [Institute for Byzantine Research, Sources 4], introduction, edition-translation, commentary by E. ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, Athens 2000, 125. 15).

7. For the campaign of Pelagonia, see especially WILSKMAN, *Pelagonia*, and D. GEANAKOPOLOS, *Greco-Latin Relations on the Eve of the Byzantine Restoration: The Battle of Pelagonia*, *DOP* 7 (1953), 99-141. In addition there is S. ASONITES, *Πελαγονία 1259: Μια νέα θεώρηση*, *Βυζαντικά* 11 (1991), 129-165.

The peace did not last long and the war broke out almost as soon as Prince Guillaume and his men had returned to Morea. Things began well for the Byzantines and Prince Guillaume had problems in getting support from his vassals outside Morea<sup>8</sup>. The men of the Principality, however, defeated the Byzantines in the battle of Prinitsa (most likely in late autumn 1263). In the next year, after an unsuccessful attempt to conquer the “capital” of the Principality, Andravida, the Turkish mercenaries in Byzantine service went over to the Latins, because they had not received their pay for several months and had served longer than intended. Together the Franks and the Turks defeated the Byzantines at the battle of Makry-Plagi and took a number of prisoners, but soon after the battle the Turks returned home to Anatolia. Prince Guillaume apparently felt unable to push the Byzantines out of Morea himself. This led to the end of the intensive phase of the war in Morea<sup>9</sup>.

At this point there seem to have been serious peace efforts. A prisoner exchange took place, and according to Sanudo, the Byzantines suggested that the son of Emperor Michael should marry the daughter of Prince Guillaume. The prince had no sons and thus after his death his territories would fall under the control of the Palaiologos dynasty. The Frankish barons

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8. Prince Guillaume was also the overlord of the Lord of Athens, the marquis of Boudonitza, the triarchs of Euboea, the duke of Naxos and the count of Kephallenia (*Livre de la conquête de la princée de l'Amorée. Chronique de Morée (1204-1305)*, ed. J. LONGNON, Paris 1911, §§ 221–253; *The Chronicle of Morea (Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως): A History in Political Verse Relating the Establishment of Feudalism in Greece by the Franks in the Thirteenth Century*, edited by J. SCHMITT, London 1904 (English translation H. LURIER, *Crusaders as Conquerors: The Chronicle of Morea*, New York 1964), 3173–3364; *Libro de los Fechos e conquistas del principado de la Morea, compilado por comandamiento de don Fray Johan Fernández de Heredia. Chronique de Morée aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles*, ed. A. MOREL-FATIO, Genève 1885, §§ 236–240; G. RECOURA (ed.), *Les Assises de Romanie*, Paris 1930, III; C. MINIERI-RICCIO, Il Regno di Carlo I D'Angiò dal 2 gennaio 1274 al 31 dicembre 1283, *Archivio Storico Italiano* serie 3 XXII – serie 4 V (1875–1880), 26 August 1278; Μαρίνος Σανούδος *Τορσέλλο*, [as in n. 6], 103–105, 109–113, 125).

9. Closer analyses of events, sources and previous scholarship can be found in my forthcoming articles about the battles of Makry-Plagi and Prinitsa. For the earlier wars of the Principality of Achaia, see especially M. KORDOSES, Η κατάκτηση της νότιας Ελλάδας από τους Φράγκους. Ιστορικά και τοπογραφικά προβλήματα, *Ιστοριογεωγραφικά* 1 (1986), 53–194.

of Morea refused to accept the settlement<sup>10</sup>. Prince Guillaume together with his overlord, the expelled Latin emperor of Constantinople Baldwin II, now sought support from Charles of Anjou, the count of Provence and brother of King Louis IX of France. Charles, who was crowned king of Sicily, was the leading figure of the supporters of the Pope in Italy (the *guelphs*) and had conquered southern Italy from Manfred, the natural son of Emperor Frederick II.

At Viterbo in 1267, Charles made treaties with the Latins of *Romania*. In exchange for support in re-conquering Constantinople, Baldwin gave Charles the overlordship of several territories in *Romania*, including the Principality of Achaia. On his part Prince Guillaume gave his daughter to the son of Charles of Anjou, thus the Angevin dynasty would also inherit the direct control of the Principality. The heritage would belong to the Angevins even if the son of Charles were to die before his father, as it happened. For the next fifteen years after the treaty, until the Sicilian Vespers, the diplomacy in the Mediterranean region was largely dictated by Charles' attempts to organize a large scale campaign against the Byzantines, and by Michael VIII's efforts to prevent it. Morea was only one front in the conflict between these two rulers<sup>11</sup>.

The most important archive documents dealing with the events under discussion were the Angevin registers in Napoli, which were destroyed by the Germans in 1943. The content of the registers has been partly reconstructed under the leadership of Ricardo Filangieri and his followers in *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina* from the old editions, microfilms, and some surviving pieces. From the point of view of the events in Morea the most

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10. Μαρίνος Σανούδος *Τορσέλλο*, 129; Γεώργιος Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικὰ Ἱστοροῖαι*, III.17, ed. A. FAILLER [CFHB v. XXIV/1], Paris 1984.

11. For the treaty of Viterbo see C. PERRAT – J. LONGNON (eds.), *Actes Relatifs à la Principauté de Morée*, Paris 1967, *Appendice*, 1267, 24 Mai – Viterbe; J. BUCHON, *Recherches et matériaux pour servir à une histoire de la domination française aux XIIIe, XIve et XVe siècles dans les provinces démembrées de l'empire Grec à la suite de la quatrième croisade*, Paris 1840, registre du trésor des chartes no. 49, 232; *Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 6265–6492; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 441–56. For the political struggle between Michael Palaiologos and Charles I Anjou the classic is: GEANAKOPOLOS, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West 1258–1282*. See also G. L. BORGHESE, *Carlo I d'Angiò e il Mediterraneo. Politica, diplomazia e commercio internazionale prima dei Vespri* [Collection de l'École Française de Rome 411], Rome 2008.

important sources about the content of the registers are the two-part article “La sovranità napoletana sulla Morea e sulle insole vicine” by Fr. Cerone and C. Minieri-Riccio’s “Il Regno di Carlo I.° D’Angiò dal 2. Gennaio 1273 al 31 dicembre 1283”. Cerone’s article is a study which includes several long direct quotations from the registers; Minieri-Riccio’s work consists of *regesta*; and the *Actes Relatifs à la Principauté de Morée* of Perrat and Longnon begin only at the end of the war discussed here. Karl Hopf’s classic study should also be mentioned here, since it used several documents from the archives of Anjou, which disappeared before other researchers could study them<sup>12</sup>.

A very important source is the list of the Venetian claims commission of the year 1278 on cases where the Byzantines had broken the truce they made with Venice in 1268. This list names 257 separate incidents (339 claims), mainly “piratical” actions. Several of them have something to do with the war in Morea<sup>13</sup>. In addition, the notarial documents from Dubrovnik (Ragusa) offer some interesting information.

The most important narrative source is the *Chronicle of Morea*. It was apparently written in the 1320s and has survived in several versions

12. Because Filangieri’s work is a reconstruction, I quote it only when the original edition has not been at my disposal. If Cerone’s article has an edition of the quoted part of document, I consider this edition as a primary source and give the archival note. Otherwise I treat Cerone as a secondary source. Hopf’s study does not include editions. For the analysis of the Angevin archives from the point of view of the Principality of Achaia, see F. SAMPSONIS, *L’administration de la Morée par Charles Ier d’Anjou (1267-1285). L’apport majeur d’une source delicate: les registres angevins, Mélanges de l’École française de Rome: Moyen Âge* 120, 1 (2008), 140-145. See also the studies of M. DOUROU-ELIOPOULOU, *Η ανδεγαυική κυριαρχία*, 34-36, 56-58, 79-88; EAD., *Les “Etrangers latins” en Romanie angevine sous Charles Ier (1266-85)*, *BSI* 59 (1998), 65-70; EAD., *The Oriental Policy of Charles I and Angevin Settlement in Romania. A Model of Medieval Colonialism, Βυζαντινά* 21 (2000), 279-286.

13. TAFEL – THOMAS, v. 3, 159-281 no. CCCLXX. For commentary on this document see G. MORGAN, *The Venetian Claims Commission of 1278*, *BZ* 69 (1976), 411-438. For piracy of the time in general see P. CHARANIS, *Piracy in the Aegean during the Reign of Michael VIII Paleologus*, *ALPHOS* 10 (1950), 127-136; I. KATELE, *Captains and Corsairs: Venice and Piracy. 1261 – 1381*, PhD Thesis for the University of Illinois, Urbana 1986, 2-131; E. ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Πειρατές και κουρσάροι στο Αιγαίο τον 13ο αιώνα, Δίπτυχα* 6 (1994-1995), 89-107. For piracy in Angevin sources, see M. DOUROU-ELIOPOULOU, *Η πειρατεία στις ανδεγαυικές κτήσεις της Ρωμανίας το δεύτερο μισό του 13ου αι.*, in *Πειρατές και κουρσάροι: Μονεμβασιώτικος Όμιλος, I συμπόσιο ιστορία και τέχνης, 20-22 Ιουλίου 1997*, eds. CH. KALLIGAS – A. MALLIARIS, Athens 2004, 56-65.

in various different languages. The French and vernacular Greek versions are closest to the original *Chronicle*. The Aragonese *Libro de los Fechos et conquistas del Principado de la Morea* was written at the end of the fourteenth century and is considered as an independent work that has used the *Chronicle of Morea* as its main source<sup>14</sup>. I quote both the Greek *Chronicle of Morea* and the French *Livre de la conquête*, if both works provide the information in question, and the *Libro de los Fechos*, when its version of the events differs from the other two.

The *Chronicle of Morea*, regardless of the version, is a very problematic source. Often the information that the *Chronicle* gives is simply false and the work is far from being impartial. Some mistakes may result from the fact that the *Chronicle of Morea* probably relied heavily on oral sources, whose information easily becomes distorted. The author's familiarity with the topography of the Peloponnese suggests that the information he gives about the events in the peninsula might be more reliable than his reports about the events outside the region. Besides, the *Chronicle* pays attention to military matters, more than, for example, the aforementioned Sanudo, who wrote at about the same time and is often considered more reliable. A major problem is that the chronology of the events in *Chronicle* does not quite agree with that deduced from the other sources<sup>15</sup>. Unfortunately the Constantinople-centered Byzantine historians do not have anything to say about this phase of the war in Morea.

Historians should also try to use the non-written sources. Among these, the remnants of the fortifications and the archaeological field surveys have particular importance from the point of view of my study. The main method of these surveys is to collect ceramics from a relatively large area and reconstruct the settlement history. Unfortunately the chronology of late medieval ceramics in Greece is still quite inexact. With the research on the fortifications, the major problem is that there were usually no great differences in masonry between the different fortification builders

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14. Several studies have been written about the *Chronicle of Morea*, but the current knowledge and debates are fairly well summarized in the monograph by T. SHAWCROSS, *The Chronicle of Morea: Historiography in Crusader Greece*, Oxford 2009.

15. BON, *La Morée franque*, 29–30, 140–144; GEANAKOPOLOS, The Battle of Pelagonia, 130–131. About Sanudo see E. PAPADOPOULOU, *Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο. Ιστορία της Ρωμανίας* [as in n. 6 above], 3–17, 53–95; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 204–205.

in *Romania*, and several sites have also been used as fortresses before and after medieval times. Therefore it is difficult to define the exact builder or building period simply from the remnants. Even the textual references can be misleading. Perhaps archaeological investigations will shed more light in the future, but so far relatively few medieval fortification sites in Morea have been excavated<sup>16</sup>.

### The War

The Peloponnese peninsula has five major coastal plains. The plain of Achaia in the north-west was the core area of the principality. Here were located Andravida, the capital of the principality, and its harbor town Clarenza. The Byzantines practically ruled the south-eastern part of the peninsula and the plain of Lakonia, which is located there. Apparently in 1264 the Latins controlled here only the town of Lakedaimon (Sparta), which had to be repopulated by Prince Guillaume because the Greek inhabitants had fled and moved to Mistra<sup>17</sup>.

The interior of the Peloponnese peninsula is mountainous, but there are numerous valleys and plains. Along the Alpheios River these form a natural corridor through the Peninsula, from the plain of Achaia to the plain of Lakonia. The highest mountains are found in the Taygetos range between Lakonia and the south-western plain of Messenia. Autonomous and apparently warlike Slavs, who were allied with the Byzantines, lived in these mountains. Apart from the Slavs, another distinctive ethnic group were the Tsakones, who lived in the mountainous south-eastern tip of the Peninsula. Although the Tsakones spoke Greek, because of their peculiar dialect and customs, they were frequently considered as a separate ethnic group<sup>18</sup>.

16. For the difficulties in dating fortifications, see for example K. MOLIN, *Unknown Crusader Castles*, Hambledon and London 2001, 203-204, 222-223; M. BREUILLOT, *Châteaux Oubliés de la Messénie Médiévale*, Paris 2005, 261-263; BON, *La Morée franque*, 645-646, 680-684.

17. *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 5584-5635; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 385-9. I treat these events further in my forthcoming article about the battle of Makry-Plagi.

18. For the historical geography of thirteenth century Peloponnese, in general, see A. ILIEVA, The mountain in the geographical and cultural space of the Peloponnese during the Middle Ages (before the Tourkokratia), *Ιστορικογεωγραφικά* 3 (1991), 11-24. The monograph of A. ILIEVA, *Frankish Morea (1205-1262). Socio-cultural interaction between the Franks and the local populations* [Historical Monographs 9], Athens 1991, provides a

In addition the Byzantines plausibly controlled the Mani peninsula also west of the Taygetos range and south of Kalamata. The castle of Kalavryta in the northern Peloponnese c. 100 km away from the rest of the Byzantine territories might also have been in their hands. The Byzantines possessed these places in the 1270s, and we do not have concrete information about the date they were taken over. I have argued, however, that Kalavryta would have been captured in 1263 and I believe that about the same time the Byzantines also occupied the west side of the Mani peninsula<sup>19</sup>.

The *Chronicle of Morea* claims that, when Prince Guillaume was still in Italy making treaties with Charles, a Byzantine army commanded by the nephew of the Emperor came to Morea. His troops were composed of Cumans, Turks, and Greeks from the region of Nicaea. According to the *Chronicle* the Prince went immediately to Brindisi and sailed from there to Clarentza in two days. In Andravida he started to organize the defense and supply of the castles. The *Chronicle* claims that King Charles sent Galeran d'Ivry to help the Prince and describes the campaign which followed. Most scholars believe, however, that the *Chronicle* has confused Galeran d'Ivry and his campaign with one that Dreux de Beaumont carried out with the Prince in 1272. The nephew of the emperor would have arrived in 1270. In earlier research he is identified with Alexios Philanthropenos, who had apparently commanded the Byzantine navy on the coast of the Peninsula in 1262-3<sup>20</sup>.

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useful introduction to the society and culture of the Principality of Achaia. On the Tsakones, see S. CARATZAS, *Les Tzacones*, New York 1976.

19. More detailed commentary about the Byzantine conquests during the early phase of the war is in my forthcoming article about the battle of Prinitsa. For indications about the Byzantine holding of Kalavryta and several places west of Taygetos in the 1270s, see TAFEL – THOMAS, nos. CCCLXX [A]38, 53, [H]16, 17, 19, [J]7; Catalogue A. Dedicatory Inscriptions, in *Dedicatory Inscriptions and Donor Portraits in Thirteenth-Century Churches of Greece*, ed. S. KALOPISSI-VERTI [VTIB, Bd. 5], Wien 1992, 66-67, 71-75; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 662-92. See also J. VAN LEUVEN, The Phantom Baronies of the Western Mani, in *Studies in the Archaeology of the Medieval Mediterranean*, ed. J. SCHRYVER [The Medieval Mediterranean 86], Leiden 2010, 45-67.

20. *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 6484-6771; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 456-473; CERONE, *La sovranità napoletana*, (1916), 18 (reg. v. 4, f. 39 t.); *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, eds. R. FILANGIERI – J. MAZZOLENI – J. DONSI GENTILE – R. OREFICE DE ANGELIS – B. MAZZOLENI – S. PALMIERI – M. L. STORCHI, v. I-XXX, XXXVIII, XLIV, Napoli 1950-1998, v. I, no. II, 157; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 292-293; BON, *La Morée franque*, 140-2. About Alexios

Anyway, in 1268 Charles was attacked by Conradin von Hohenstaufen. Prince Guillaume made a one-year truce with the Emperor's *kephale*, i.e. representative or governor in Morea, and he went to help Charles with 400 heavy cavalrymen. A papal document attests him in Italy in March 1268. In August, Charles achieved his great victory over Conradin in the battle of Tagliacozzo. According to the *Chronicle of Morea* Guillaume heard soon after the battle that the Byzantines had broken the treaty and attacked. He returned to the Peloponnese and King Charles gave with him 50 heavy cavalrymen and 200 infantrymen. According to the Greek version of the *Chronicle* the latter were crossbowmen, and Charles also gave money for six months' wages<sup>21</sup>.

Most of the researchers believe that Guillaume returned to his Principality not earlier than February or March 1269 and thus the idea that the Byzantines had broken the truce is only propaganda<sup>22</sup>. In my opinion it might also be worth taking into account the possibility that the Byzantine *kephale* had made the truce only on his own behalf and now a new *kephale*, who did not recognize the truce, had arrived in the autumn. During the peace negotiations in 1289 the *kephale* directly informed the Latins that he could make a truce only for one year, because his period in office was

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Philanthropenos on the coast of the Peloponnese see Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικά Ιστορικά*, III.15-16.

21. *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 6772-7165; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 474-93; *Registres de Clement IV (1265-1268) recueil des bulles de ce Pape*, ed. M. ÉDOUARD JORDAN, Paris 1894, no. 1336; S. BORSARI, La Politica bizantina di Carlo I d'Angiò dal 1266 al 1271, *Archivio Storico per le Provincie Napoletane*, nuova serie 35 (74 dell' intera collezione), (1956), 341-342. The Aragonese *Libro de los Fechos* differs in details from the other versions of the *Chronicle* concerning the battle of Tagliacozzo (*Libro de los Fechos*, §§ 400-14). See also N. ΚΑΝΕΛΛΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ – Ι. ΛΕΚΕΑ, Η βυζαντινή πολεμική τακτική εναντίον των Φράγκων κατά τον 13ο αιώνα και η μάχη του Tagliacozzo, *ByzSym* 19 (2009), 63-81; G. VILLANI, *Nuova Cronica*, ed. G. PORTA, v. 1 (libri I-VIII), Parma 1990, § VIII, XXIII-VIII, XXIX. Joachim Göbbels has concluded in his studies that in the army of Charles I the cavalrymen were divided into units of 25 men and the infantry into units of 50 men [J. GÖBBELS, *Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien zur Zeit Karls I. Anjou (1265-1285)*, Stuttgart 1984, 82-83]. These numbers correspond neatly with figures that the *Chronicle* gives about the contingents sent by the king.

22. HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 290; CERONE, *La sovranità napoletana*, (1916), 36; ΖΑΚΥΘΙΝΟΣ, *Le Despotat Grec de Morée*, 47-48; BORGHESE, *Carlo I d'Angiò*, 22-23.

not longer<sup>23</sup>. The short terms of office would have made it difficult for the Byzantines to follow a coherent strategy in the Peninsula, but the Emperor might have wanted to avoid a situation where a Byzantine aristocrat would have gained a powerful position in a province distant from Constantinople.

The Angevin registers indicate that something was indeed going on in Morea. In 1269 Charles ordered his captain in Kerkyra to obey Prince Guillaume. There are also several orders relating transports of victuals to Morea from southern Italy in the spring and summer of 1269. In 1270 Charles ordered that a navy of 25 galleys and *terides*, and some *vaccettas*<sup>24</sup>, should be prepared for Morea. Among other things it would have transported hundreds of horses. From the same year we also have several references, which reveal that fief holders in southern Italy were required to fulfill their service obligation by participating the campaign in Morea. For some reasons the preparation of the navy met serious difficulties, and the ships were still in harbor in the late autumn. Angevin naval resources were apparently over-extended, because of the Crusade against Tunis. Probably this navy to Achaia never sailed forth<sup>25</sup>.

23. *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 8687–8706; *Livre de la conquête*, § 599; ZAKYTHINOS, *Le Despotat Grec de Morée*, 63–65. It should be noted Bartusis has claimed that this may have been simply a ploy of the governor, if he for some reason hesitated to make a peace (BARTUSIS, *The Late Byzantine Army*, 70–72).

24. Galleys were powered both by sails and oars. A typical galley of Charles I of Anjou in the 1270s had 108 oars, each with its own rower. There were 27 benches on each side of the galley and two rowers on each bench. The full crew of this kind of galley was normally about 150 men and included about 35 *supersalientes* (more or less equivalent to marines, most likely they were crossbowmen). The *teride* was a galley specially designed for horse-transportation; the *terides* built for Charles I Anjou could for example transport 30 horses. The *vaccetta* was more or less a large boat [*I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XII, nos. LXVI, 11, 12; no. LXVII, 292; no. LXIII, 486; J. PRYOR, *The Galleys of Charles I of Anjou, King of Sicily: ca. 1269–84*, *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* 14 (Old Series, Volume 24) (1993), 33–103; GÖBBELS, *Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien*, 251–254].

25. CERONE, *La sovranità napoletana*, (1916), 29–38 (reg. 3, f. 1; reg. 3, f. 3; reg. 4, f. 16), 50–62 (reg. 11, f. 7; reg. 11, f. 1 t; reg. 5, f. 80; reg. 5, f. 94; reg. 6, f. 164 t.; reg., 6, f. 133; reg. 11, f. 80 et); *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. I, no. V, 320; v. II, nos. VIII, 334, 622; v. IV, nos. XIV, 51, 135, 222, 229, 304, 316, 377, 385, 398, 405, 423, 432, 441, 447; v. IV, extravagantes infra regnum nos. XIV, 1029, 1030; v. V, no. XVII, 32; v. V, nos. XV, 111, 290, 353, 387; v. VI, no. XXII, 949; v. VII, no. XXVII, 74; no. XXXI, 65; v. IX, no. XLII, 58; v. XLIV, additiones reg. no. XX, 29; W. COHN, *Storia della flotta siciliana sotto il governo di Carlo I d'Angiò*, *Archivio storico per la Sicilia Orientale*, seconda serie, anno

Additional evidence about the military activity in Morea is found in the Venetian claims document from 1278, according to which Byzantine soldiers robbed and killed Latin churchmen, who were heading from Methone to Clarenza. The event probably took place in 1270. The commander of the Byzantines is referred to as *σεβαστοκράτωρ*. He is also mentioned elsewhere, in connection with several other “robberies” in Morea, as Emperor’s brother<sup>26</sup>. Apparently it refers to Constantine Palaiologos, the step-brother of the Emperor, who had commanded the Byzantines early in the war, but left before the defeat at Makry-Plagi<sup>27</sup>. I also believe that he could be the “nephew” of the emperor, who according to the *Chronicle* arrived with the army of Cumans, Turks, and Greeks from the region of Nicaea.

It has been suggested that the Byzantines exploited the Crusade campaign of Charles and his brother to Tunis in 1270, which ended with the destruction of a large part of the fleet in a storm<sup>28</sup>. It is, however, worth noting that the destination of the Crusader fleet was kept secret until the last moment, and there were fears that it would sail against the Byzantines<sup>29</sup>. It would have been impossible for the Byzantines to make a plan of exploiting the Crusade for expansion in Morea. At most they might have planned a diversionary attack in case the Crusaders headed towards Constantinople or, as seems most likely, the Byzantine commander simply exploited the

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V; 25 dell’intera collezione (1929), 366-381, 386-387; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 290-292; ZAKYTHINOS, *Le Despotat Grec de Morée*, 48-50; BON, *La Morée franque*, 138-41; BORGHESE, *Carlo I d’Angiò*, 24-29, 51-55; J. PRYOR, *Soldiers of Fortune in the Fleets of Charles I of Anjou, King of Sicily ca 1265-1285*, in *Mercenaries and Paid men. The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. FRANCE [History of Warfare 47], Leiden 2008, 126-128; GEANAKOPOLOS, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West*, 222-223.

26. TAFEL – THOMAS, nos. CCCLXX [A] 28, [H] 14, 17, [L] 12–13. *Σεβαστοκράτωρ* was title in the imperial hierarchy immediately after the emperor and *δεσπότης* (PSEUDO-KODINOS, *Traité des offices*, introduction, texte et traduction par J. VERPEAUX, Paris 1967, 300). The Venetian claims document refers to the alleged victims of the incidents as “robbed” (*derobato*). Thus I mostly refer the incidents as “robberies” unless the context allows more specific judgment about the nature of the event.

27. Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικὰ Ἱστορικά*, III.16-17. See also my forthcoming article about the battle of Makry-Plagi.

28. GEANAKOPOLOS, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West*, 227-230.

29. BORGHESE, *Carlo I d’Angiò*, 55-71; Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικὰ Ἱστορικά*, V.8-10; J. STRAYER, *The Crusades of Louis IX*, in *A History of the Crusades*, vol. II: *Later Crusades (1189-1311)*, eds. R. E. WOLF – H. W. HAZARD, Philadelphia 1962, 509-516.

situation when he found out that there were less enemy troops in the peninsula than expected.

Anyway, the Byzantine attacks might have been quite successful. The route from Methone to Clarenza was some distance away. Lakedaimon perhaps fell to the Byzantines at this time; at least the description of the campaign of Prince Guillaume and Dreux de Beaumont/Galeran d'Ivry (see below) seems to indicate that the Franks had lost all their territories in Lakonia. It is also possible that some of the fortifications which were found in Byzantine hands in 1270s, such as Beaufort and Kalavryta, were not conquered in 1262-4, but later, and in that case the campaign of the *σεβαστοκράτωρ* would be another good alternative<sup>30</sup>.

At least in 1271 Byzantine vessels were already active in the Ionian Sea. On 7 July, a ship which had come from Monemvasia in south-eastern Morea, robbed a Venetian, who was traveling from Lepanto (Naupaktos) to Clarenza. This Byzantine ship was apparently an imperial corsair, its captain's name was "Zuraz" and the *nauclearius* was "Rolandinus"<sup>31</sup>. The Venetian claim document of 1278 applies relatively seldom the term *cursarius* (it usually refers simply *homines domini Imperatoris*). I, however, find the term corsair proper for "Zuraz" and similar captains, who prayed on merchant fleets without being a part of a major fleet, but, at least judging from the Venetian claim document, were under the authority of the Emperor and thus cannot be considered as out-law pirates<sup>32</sup>.

On 12 January 1272 the harbor of Nauplion was attacked by a fleet of 17 imperial galleys and five other vessels commanded by "Caleoiani Apriano prothouestiaria". The Venetians claimed that they had lost property worth

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30. A *terminus ante quem* for the loss of Lakedaimon is August 1278; *Les registres de Nicolas III (1277-1293)* [BEFAR 2<sup>e</sup> serie t. 14], ed. J. GAY, Paris 1898, no. 123; BON, *La Morée franque*, 144-145. The Venetian claims document, which is the first source about Beaufort in the hands of the Byzantines, refers to the *σεβαστοκράτωρ*, TAFEL - THOMAS, no. CCCLXX [H]17.

31. TAFEL - THOMAS, no. CCCLXX [L]4. Morgan identifies Zuraz with Gyraakis, who is mentioned in connection with some other "robberies" and had his base in the eastern part of the Aegean Sea (MORGAN, *The Venetian Claims Commission*, 428-429). At the time the term *nauclearius* was roughly equivalent to "helmsman" (PRYOR, *The Galleys of Charles I of Anjou*, 81-83).

32. For the definitions of pirates and corsairs see especially KATELE, *Captains and Corsairs*, 2-37, 47-56; PAPAPOULOU, *Πειρατές και κουρσάροι*, 89-90, 96-100, 106-7.

4000 *hyperpyra*<sup>33</sup>. It was probably a surprise attack which took advantage of the unlikely sailing season<sup>34</sup>. The risk seems to have been worth taking, at least if plunder was the only aim.

In February 1272 an Angevin army commanded by the marshal Dreux de Beaumont finally reached Clarenza. Apparently there were already some fief holders from southern Italy serving in the region. This campaign is usually identified with the campaign of Galeran d'Ivry described in the *Chronicle of Morea*<sup>35</sup>. According to the *Chronicle*, d'Ivry had 100 paid cavalymen and 200 infantrymen –half of the later being crossbowmen and the other half shield-bearers. In addition to this, the king had promised to cover the expeditionary corps' wages for six months. The Prince was in the upper Alpheios valley, but he travelled immediately to d'Ivry and brought pack-animals to his troops. It was decided to travel to the town of Nikli in central Morea and seek battle against the Byzantines. The army marched along the river Alpheios. At the castle of Karytaina the barons of Karytaina and Akova joined them with 150 cavalymen and 200 armed infantrymen. The troops were divided into units (*ἀλλάγια*), and the lighter troops were sent to plunder the regions of Tsakonia and Gardalevos. The raid took five days and after that the troops returned to Nikli<sup>36</sup>.

The *Chronicle* claims that the Franks now heard that the Byzantine army was in Lakedaimon and did not move. They were told that after the defeats in Prinitsa and Makry-Plagi the emperor had given orders not to engage in battle with the Franks in the open, so that the whole Morea would

33. TAFEL – THOMAS, no. CCCLXX [O]2. I believe that the commander can be identified with *πρωτοβεστιάριτης* Aprenos, whose army of 5000 men was defeated by the Bulgarians in 1279 and Aprenos himself died [Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι*, VI.19, for dating the death of Aprenos see A. FAILLER, Chronologie et composition dans l'histoire de Georges Pachymère, *REB* 38 (1980), 234–242].

34. Sailing was usually avoided between November and the end of February; after c. 1300 the situation changed and the sea was “closed” only from December to the beginning of February (J. PRYOR, *Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the maritime history of the Mediterranean. 649–1571*, Cambridge 1988, 87–89).

35. CERONE, *La sovranità napoletana*, (1916), 205–209 (reg. v. 13 f. 208; fascic. Ang., XVIII, n. 10); *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. VII, no. XXI, 172; nos. XXVII, 20, 83, 180; v. VIII, nos. XXXIII, 12–63, 79–85, 88, 96; v. VIII, nos. XXXV, 84, 104; BORGHESE, *Carlo I d'Angiò*, 106–108.

36. *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 461–6; *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 6525–6657; BON, *La Morée franque*, 331.

not be lost. Instead the Emperor wanted the Byzantines to use generalship and stratagems, and to benefit from mountainous terrain and archers. Some Franks wanted to march against the Byzantines, but according to the *Chronicle* the wisest men advised the Prince not to do so. In the rough and wooded terrain the bowmen could shoot the unarmored horses of Franks without fear of punishment. The Prince was advised to stay in Nikli and use it as a base in order to prevent Byzantine raids towards central and north-east Morea. The Prince thought, however, that there was not enough food and fodder there, especially for the mercenaries. Thus he left only 100 cavalrymen, 100 crossbowmen, 100 shield-bearers, and 300 archers at Nikli. They were ordered to patrol up to Veligoste and Chelmos (c. 20 km journey) and to prevent Byzantine raids<sup>37</sup>.

Judging by the Angevin registers and Sanudo the main concern of Prince Guillaume and Dreux de Beaumont in 1272 might not have been Morea, but Euboa, where the Latin adventurer Licario, who had joined the Byzantine side and received help from them, caused troubles for the local Latin lords. These were vassals of the Prince. Guillaume and Dreux went to Euboa. According to Sanudo Prince Guillaume, who knew the ways of the enemy and kept his troops together, achieved success, but Dreux, who was ignorant of them, was defeated with his 700 cavalrymen, and he had to escape to the mountains after losing men, horses, and pack-animals. It is very likely that he was lured in ambush. Dreux was replaced by a new commander already on 8 July 1272. Prince Guillaume probably left Euboa also at this time<sup>38</sup>.

37. *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 6658–6720; for place identifications see BON, *La Morée franque*, 364. The account in the French version differs slightly. For example it claims that above all the Turkish horse-archers were considered a threat, and it does not mention the infantry archers among the troops left in Nikli (*Livre de la conquête*, §§ 466–70). The horse-archers were not the most natural type of soldiers for the rough terrain, and plausibly the author simply had the Frankish defeat at Pelagonia in mind (*Livre de la conquête*, §§ 297–305; *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 4030–4091; WILSKMAN, Pelagonia, 156–157). The archers in Frankish service would most probably have been local Greeks or Saracens from southern Italy (GÖBBELS, *Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien*, 100–33; WILSKMAN, Pelagonia, 141) and perhaps the author was unwilling to mention their role.

38. Μαρίνος Σανούδος *Τορσέλλο*, 129–131, 135–145; *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. VIII, no. XXXVII, 750; v. XI, no. LIV, 118; Νικηφόρος Γρηγοράς, *Ρωμαϊκή Ἱστορία*, IV.5 (*Nichephori Gregorae, Byzantina Historia*), cura LUDOVICI SCHOPENI, v. 1, Bonnae 1829, 144; ΚΑΝΕΛΛΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ – ΛΕΚΕΑ, *Η βυζαντινή πολεμική τακτική*, 79. It has also

The situation in Euboea might have been the reason to abandon the attack on south-east Morea, if it was ever even intended. This does not, however, mean that the description of the *Chronicle* is worthless. Actually it seems to describe accurately the strategic stalemate which followed the Byzantine conquest of the whole south-east and lasted almost to the time of writing of the *Chronicle*<sup>39</sup>. The terrain between Lakonia and the rest of Morea is difficult and the fortifications, both those already existing in Frankish times and the ones the Byzantines may have built, presented additional problems<sup>40</sup>. At least the Slavs and Tsakones seem to have been skilful light infantrymen (the main weapons apparently were bows and spears) and they knew the terrain.<sup>41</sup> They would have been quite dangerous in the mountains. Kalavryta and the fortresses on the west side of Taygetos would have been more exposed to the Frankish attacks, but perhaps the Latins were afraid of committing troops to siege operations, which might leave some of their territories exposed to raids. Besides, at least in the area west of Taygetos the Byzantines might have been able to launch an attack directly on the Frankish flank.

The order of the Emperor to avoid open battles with the Franks, and instead use harassment, rough terrain, and missile weapons, corresponds been suggested that the campaign in Euboea actually took place in 1276 (PAPADOPOULOU, *Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο*, 276-277), but I find that the arguments are not strong enough. The account in the history book of Sanudo refers to 700 armed men who went together with Guillaume and Dreux to Euboea, and thus differs slightly from the version above, in which I have relied on one of Sanudo's letters (it is published in F. KUNSTMANN, *Studien über Marino Sanudo den Älteren mit einem Anhang seiner ungedruckten Briefe*, in *Königliche Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Abhandlungen der Phil.-Histor. Klasse* 7, München 1855, no. II). Sanudo's history book has only survived in translation and small distortions are likely.

39. For the geographical and political contexts of the writing of the *Chronicle* see especially SHAWCROSS, *The Chronicle of Morea*, 42-44.

40. On the fortification building, see below pp. 50 ff.

41. For military experience, equipment, and quality of the Slavs and Tsakones see Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι*, III.9, 17; IV.26; *Livre de la conquête*, § 206, 261, 696, 823; *Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 1715-1725, 2985-3031, 3512-3514; Γεώργιος Ἀκροπολίτης *Χρονικὴ Συγγραφή: Georgii Acropolitae Opera I*, recensuit A. HEISENBERG, Lipsiae 1903, § 81; *Documents sur le régime des terres dans la Principauté de Morée au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle* [Documents et recherches sur l'économie des pays byzantins, islamiques et slaves et leurs relations commerciales au moyen âge], eds. J. LONGNON - P. TOPPING, Paris 1969, 88-89, 99-100; WILSKMAN, *Pelagonia*, 141; CARATZAS, *Les Tzakones*, 78-83.

with the instructions which, according to the Byzantine sources, Emperor Michael VIII gave to the Byzantine armies facing the Latins at Pelagonia in 1259 and Berat in 1281<sup>42</sup>. This might have been Michael's "official doctrine" in wars with the Franks, and even the composition of the army sent to Morea might have reflected the chosen strategy<sup>43</sup>. The Turks and Cumans were usually horse-archers, and the Greeks of the region of Nicaea were famous as bowmen<sup>44</sup>. With harassment tactics it was, however, impossible

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42. See Γεώργιος Ἀκροπολίτης *Χρονική Συγγραφή*, 168-169. Μ. Ὀλόβωλος, *Manuelis Holoboli orationes*, v. I, ed. M. TREU [Programm des Königlichen Victoria Gymnasiums zu Potsdam], Potsdam 1906, 40; L. PREVIALE (ed.), *Un Panegirigo inedito per Michele VIII Paleologo*, *BZ* 42 (1942), 35-6; Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικὰ Ἱστορικά*, VI.32; *Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο*, 145-147; WILSKMAN, Pelagonia, 145-6. Actually both in Pelagonia and Berat the favorable circumstances seem to have caused the Byzantine to change their plans and attack achieving significant victories (for my opinions about the events in Pelagonia see WILSKMAN, Pelagonia, 148-158. Unfortunately the PhD thesis of N. LAPPAS, *Πολιτική ιστορία του κράτους της Ηπείρου κατά τον 13ο αι.* (University of Thessaloniki 2007) has not been available for me. For studies about the battle of Berat see especially E. SYGKELLOU, *Ο πόλεμος στον δυτικό ελλαδικό χώρο κατά τον ύστερο Μεσαίωνα (13ος-15ος αι.)* [Institute for Byzantine Research, Monographs 8], Athens 2008, 220-222; KANELLOPOULOS, *Η οργάνωση και η τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού*, 112-118).

43. Compare WILSKMAN, Pelagonia, 146. See also KANELLOPOULOS – LEKEA, *Η βυζαντινή πολεμική τακτική*, 75-79. As stated in the beginning of the article the traditional image of Byzantine warfare is that the Byzantines tried to avoid open battles. Recent research has, however, diversified this image by pointing out that in some periods during their long history the Byzantines seem to have been quite willing to engage in pitched battles and that different adversaries were countered with different methods [see for example I. SYVÄNNE, *The Age of Hippotoxotai: Art of War in Roman Military Revival and Disaster (491-636)*, Tampere 2004, 113-117; J. BIRKENMEIER, *The Development of the Komnenian Army. 1081-1180* [History of Warfare 5], Leiden 2002, 45-46, 66-74, 82; KANELLOPOULOS, *Η οργάνωση και η τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού*, 283-324]. Thus one cannot consider it as self-evident that the Byzantines always wanted to rely on the strategy of avoiding battles. I dealt with the issue more closely in my paper "Avoiding pitched battles in Byzantine warfare against the Latins during the thirteenth century: Benefits and drawbacks" held during the *22nd International Congress of Byzantine Studies* in Sofia (25 August 2011) and I intend to discuss this issue further in my PhD.

44. Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικὰ Ἱστορικά*, II.20; III.12. I find it plausible that many of the bow men from the frontier of Byzantine Anatolia were horse-archers (WILSKMAN, Pelagonia, 149).

to achieve decisive victory<sup>45</sup>, if some lucky change did not favor as happened at Pelagonia and Berat. Even conducting sieges was difficult for the armies, which wanted to avoid battles, because if the enemy relief army came to help, the siege had to be abandoned. The exceptions were the situations, when the enemy main forces were committed elsewhere (as it might have been at the time of Tagliacozzo and after). Of course we do not know whether the Byzantines still wanted to take the whole Peninsula.

Light troops could, however, make fast raids and cause destruction. This kind of activities the Franks probably tried to stop with their bases and patrols. Apart from Nikli, Grand-Arachova seems to have served as a Frankish base. But keeping the men ready in one place was not without problems. Apparently in 1275 a “stomach disease” broke out in Grand-Arachova and killed several men including the famous baron of Karytaina, one of the main heroes in the *Chronicle of Morea*. The *Chronicle* credits its hero with the last chance to make a raid against the Byzantines and defeat them before dying<sup>46</sup>. Several war-related diseases are especially prone to break out if the army has to stay in the same place for a long time. Diseases in general were a major cause of death in pre-industrial wars, and probably killed more people than major battles did<sup>47</sup>.

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45. For the importance of battles in order to get strategic gains in offensive warfare during the middle ages see C. J. ROGERS, The Vegetian “Science of Warfare” in the Middle Ages, *Journal of Medieval Military History* 1 (2002), 1-19.

46. *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 7189–7219, 8334–8336; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 494–7, 576; BON, *La Morée franque*, 143; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 294. The location of Grand-Arachova is controversial (see for example BON, *La Morée franque*, 377-389). Romaios, however, claims that near Arachova of Lacedaimon, which is one of the candidates, there is a river, whose waters are said cause typhoid fever (Κ. ΡΟΜΑΙΟΣ, *Τοπογραφικά της Φραγκοκρατίας, Πελοποννησιακά* 2 (1957), 6).

47. For example the casualty rate of non-combatant clergy during the Crusade campaigns, which lasted for 2-4 years was 15-20%, while for the knights it was about twice as much. The mortality rate of poorer people from hunger and diseases would most probably have been higher and for example in the eighteenth century the armies on campaign lost almost regularly 20% of their men to diseases, hunger and desertion. For the casualty rates during the Crusades see P. MITCHELL, *Medicine in the Crusades: Warfare, Wounds and the Medieval Surgeon*, Cambridge 2004, 143–145, 177. In 18th century warfare C. DUFFY, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason*, London 1987, 173. See also J. BRADBURY, *The Medieval Siege*, Woodbridge 1992, 82-84.

Having troops in readiness also caused financial strains. The fief holders of south-Italy were obligated to serve three months in a year in the army, and the fief holders of the Principality of Achaia four months in the field army and four months in the garrisons (the ecclesiastical fiefs were free from garrison duty)<sup>48</sup>. The paid troops however required wages and in 1273 the Angevine commander had to take loans to support them. At this time Charles seems to have had French, Provençal, and *Latini* (evidently Italian) paid troops in Morea. Charles also sent rowers to the galleys of the Prince, and 1273 Saracen bowmen from Lucera were shipped to Morea. Göbbels has estimated (on the basis of 232 gold ounces for one and half months' wages) that there were 450 of them. It is possible that the Byzantines also had troubles with financing their troops. In his letters from the years 1280 and 1283 Charles refers to Turkish and Cuman (or Bulgarian) troops, who had apparently deserted from the Byzantine side at the time of Prince Guillaume. Most of the Turks might have been part of the group, which chose to stay in Morea in 1264 and received baptism. The Cumans (or Bulgarians) must have switched sides later. Naturally it is also possible that the Angevin chancellery might have confused different distant nations<sup>49</sup>.

Indeed, the Latins seem to have enjoyed some success. From the years 1273-1274 we have orders from King Charles related to a group of prisoners –some of them Greeks from Morea–, who were transferred to the castle of Trani in south-Italy. This case is interesting insofar as it reveals how prisoners were treated in warfare between the Latins and the Byzantines.

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48. *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 129–131; *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 1990–2016; G. RECOURA (ed.), *Les Assises de Romanie*, Paris 1930, § 70; GÖBBELS, *Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien*, 95–97. Almost all historians, who have studied the Principality of Achaia, have commented its fief-system and “feudalism”. I would, however, especially like to mention P. TOPPING, *Feudal Institutions as revealed in the Assizes of Romania the Law code of Frankish Greece* [Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of History vol. 3.], Philadelphia 1949.

49. CERONE, *La sovranità napoletana* (1916), 201–202 (reg., v. 3, f. 53), 212–225 (reg., v. 19, f. 157 t.; reg., v. 3, f. 13 t.), 231; *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. IX, nos. XLVII, 20, 23, 42, 44, 51, 72; v. X, nos. XLVIII, 101, 104, 159, 174, 185, 256–7, 292; v. XI, no. LIV, 191; no. LVII, 73; v. XII, no. LXVI, 26; v. XII, nos. LXVIII, 518–521, 543–4; v. XXIII, no. XCV, 128; nos. XCVII, 199, 200; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 296; C. MINIERI-RICCIO, *Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò*, 17 April 1273, 24 April 1273, 8 May 1283; GÖBBELS, *Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien*, 121–2; BORGHESE, *Carlo I d’Angiò*, 110, 114–115.

The king's orders were to treat the above mentioned group of prisoners well, but they were to be held in chains, and not in the upper parts of the castle but in the subterranean chambers. In February 1274 the king ordered the Greek prisoners to be transferred to the castle of Canossa, the prisoners were not allowed to speak with anyone, and iron chains needed to be provided. In June the prisoners sent an application to Charles begging permission that they could send a message to their relatives through a middleman and request money for necessary expenses. Charles gave his permission and issued an order to ease the imprisonment and make the conditions healthier. There are also other sources which confirm that it was common for the Latins and Byzantines to keep their prisoners in chains, and that Charles had a practice that the prisoners should at least partly cover their own expenses<sup>50</sup>.

#### The lull and the fortification building

Apparently the Angevins made preparations for sending a fleet from south-Italy to Achaia in the late winter and early spring of 1274, but it is not clear whether the ships left the ports. There seem to have been difficulties in gathering ship crews, and Charles threatened those who did not go into service with loss of property and destruction of houses<sup>51</sup>. Actually a more quiet period at the front seems to have begun around April, when Prince Guillaume received the commandship of the Angevin troops in Morea in addition to the troops of the Principality. We also have information about the founding of a new Cistercian hospital in Frankish territory. Plausibly, the negotiations concerning the union of churches, which officially took place in July 1274, made both warring sides cautious about doing something which would upset the pope. Besides, Charles had financial troubles. There might have been a truce agreement for one year after the council of Lyon. Possibly at this time the noble Frankish ladies who were given to the Byzantines

50. CERONE, *La sovranità napoletana*, (1916), 228–231 (reg. v. 3, f. 57; reg. v. 18, f. 31); MINIERI-RICCIO, *Il Regno di Carlo I D'Angiò*, 8 April 1273, 28 February 1274, 14 March 1274, 26 June 1274, 6 October 1274, 3 August 1277, 9 September 1282; *Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 5513–5517; *Livre de la conquête*, § 693; Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικὰ Ἱστορία*, I.11; III.28; V.1, 2; TAFEL – THOMAS, no. CCCLXX [A]38; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 299–300.

51. MINIERI-RICCIO, *Il Regno di Carlo I D'Angiò*, 6 February 1274, 24 March 1274, 27 March 1274; CERONE, *La sovranità napoletana*, (1916), 233; J. DUNBABIN, *Charles I of Anjou. Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe*, London and New York 1998, 176; BORGHESE, *Carlo I d'Angiò*, 111.

as hostages as part of the peace agreement in 1262 also got back home apparently unharmed<sup>52</sup>.

Sanudo is not explicit about precisely when the Byzantines built their strong castles and fortified the passes. South-East Morea (like the rest of the Peninsula) is dotted with medieval fortifications, whose constructors and building dates are uncertain<sup>53</sup>. Some of these might have been built by the Byzantines during this war or immediately afterwards, a possibility often overlooked by previous scholars. The mainstream of current researchers mainly credit the Byzantines for the thirteenth century city walls of Mistra, which surround the city and divide it into upper and lower parts. The castle of Mistra had been built by Prince Guillaume, but apparently it became a city only in Byzantine times, when the Greek people of Lakedaimon moved there. The exact time when the walls were built is uncertain, but for example the frescoes from the Metropolitan church just inside the outer curtain were made in 1270-1300, and the most likely *terminus ante quem* is 1282<sup>54</sup>.

52. CERONE, *La sovranità napoletana*, (1916), 226, 231-232; *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XI, no. LIX, 101; *Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 4343-4562, 7301-7335; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 501-504; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 294-296; BORGHESE, *Carlo I d'Angiò*, 111, 124-130, 206-208; ΓΕΑΝΑΚΟΠΛΟΣ, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West*, 237-245; BON, *La Morée franque*, 143-144; K. SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1271). Part 1: The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries*, Philadelphia 1976, 112-120. It is also possible, and perhaps more sensible, that the hostages were liberated already during the prisoner exchange following the battle of Makry-Plagi (*Libro de los Fechos*, §§ 381-399; Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικὰ Ἱστοροῖα*, III.17; B. HENDRICKX, *Οἱ θεσμοὶ τῆς Φραγκοκρατίας. Ἡ Λατινικὴ Αυτοκρατορία τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως καὶ τὸ Λατινικὸ Βασίλειο τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης*, Thessaloniki 2007, 367-369).

53. The most comprehensive and accessible list is probably found in G. SHIPLEY, *Archaeological Sites in Laconia and the Thyreatis*, in *Continuity and Change in a Greek Rural Landscape: The Laconia Survey, Volume 2, Archaeological data*, eds. W. CAVANAUGH - J. CROUWEL - R. CATLING - G. SHIPLEY, London 1996, 263-313. Also useful are J. CHAPMAN, *Mani: A Guide and History, 2001-2006*, [www/zorbas.de/maniguide.de](http://www/zorbas.de/maniguide.de) and VAN LEUVEN, *The Phantom Baronies of the Western Mani (op. cit.)*.

54. For the walls of Mistra see K. ANDREWS, *Castles of the Morea*, Princeton New Jersey 1953, 159-182, 225-227; A. PARADISSIS, *Fortresses and Castles of Greece*, v. 2, Athens 1982, 180-184. I have also visited the site in person. For the dating of the frescoes in the Metropolitan church see S. KALOPISSI-VERTI, *The Impact of the Fourth Crusade on Monumental Painting in the Peloponnese and Eastern Central Greece up to the End of the Thirteenth Century*, in *Byzantine Art in the Aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, International Congress, March 9-12, 2004*, Athens 2007,

I believe that one very strong candidate as a Byzantine built fortress is the castle of Chelmos. It is situated on a mountain between Lakonia and the Alpheios-valley, i.e. precisely in the region where the frontier between the Franks and the Byzantines stabilized. The *Chronicle of Morea* refers to Chelmos as a place-name during the events which apparently took place in 1263 and 1272, but as a castle it is mentioned for the first time in the 1290s. At that time it was in Byzantine hands<sup>55</sup>.

Another likely candidate as a Byzantine-built castle, referred to by Sanudo, is Zarnata in north-west Mani. It dominates the plain of Kampos and the coastal route to south. The place has been fortified in ancient, medieval, and modern times, although not continuously, and when the medieval fortress was built is uncertain. The *Chronicle of Morea* does not mention the place, although it has been connected with the Frankish barony in the area of Gritsena and the Lakkoi<sup>56</sup>. The Venetian claims document of 1278, however, refers to Zarnata as a place which was in Byzantine hands and evidently had an imperial captain in charge. Zarnata is only 20 km from Kalamata, which had a Frankish castle, and I doubt that the Byzantines would have placed an official there if it was not fortified<sup>57</sup>.

Furthermore it is possible that medieval fortifications at Pellana (between Chelmos and Mistra) and Kyparissi (on the east-coast) were built by the Byzantines; both are hill-fortresses, while Kyparissi watched over a good anchorage<sup>58</sup>. These castles are also located in the area where the frontier

83-84. It has been suggested that Mistra was a fortified town already before the Franks came (C. FOSS – D. WINFIELD, *Byzantine Fortifications: An Introduction*, Pretoria 1986, 30-31, 143), but I find this hardly convincing.

55. *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 4664, 6718; *Livre de la conquête*, § 814. For description of the site see BON, *La Morée franque*, 516-518, 662-663; W. LORING, Some Ancient Routes in the Peloponnese, *JHS* 15 (1895), 71-74.

56. *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 1944-1945; A. KRISIS, On the Castles of Zarnáta and Kelefá, *BZ* 56 (1963), 309-313.

57. TAFEL – THOMAS, nos. CCCLXX [H]16, [J]7. For descriptions of the site see BON, *La Morée franque*, 507-508; KRISIS, On the Castles of Zarnáta and Kelefá, 308-313; ANDREWS, *Castles of the Morea*, 24-27; CHAPMAN, Mani: A Guide and History; *Venetians and Knights Hospitallers: Military Architecture Networks*, eds. A. TRIPOSKOUFI, A. TSITOURI, Athens 2002, 62-63.

58. SHIPLEY, Archaeological Sites in Laconia, 282-283, 288; LORING, Some Ancient Routes in the Peloponnese, 44-46; *RE*, v. II, 3 Silencenis-Stluppi, entry Sparta, C. Geographie (F. BÖLTE); A. J. B. WACE, F. W. HASLUCK, East Central Laconia, *British School of Archaeology*

was stabilized. Most of the other undated, possibly, medieval fortifications in south-east Morea are further away. If the fortresses were constructed during the war and close to the enemy, this was probably at a time when the Franks were engaged elsewhere, in Euboea for example, or when there was some sort of temporary truce.

The “robberies” and military actions did not cease totally. Especially at sea the ships of the men of Emperor made their raids even in the area of the Ionian Sea. Perhaps the Byzantine naval victory over the Latin lords of Greek islands in 1273 made the naval actions easier. Besides at some point before 1275 (possibly already 1262-3) the Byzantines had taken over the island of Kythera in a strategic place near the south coast of Morea. It was evidently ruled by a governor from Monemvasia. The inhabitants of Monemvasia were active participants in sea robberies. From the Venetian claims document we know that the imperial naval vessels and corsairs captured shiploads worth of hundreds of gold pieces in the waters of Morea<sup>59</sup>.

15 (1908-1909), 173-174. Fortifications in Gardiki and Pedema might also be built by Byzantines, but probably after the period discussed in this study (BREUILLOT, *Châteaux Oubliés de la Messénie Médiévale*, 202-220, 230-241).

59. A. DANDULO, *Chronica per extensum descripta (aa. 46-1280 d. C.)*, ed. E. PASTORELLO, [Rerum Italicarum Scriptores XII] Milan 1728 (Bologna 1938), 323, 5-7; TAFEL - THOMAS, nos. CCCLXX [G]10-[H]11, [J]8, [K]2, 8, [M]10. For the sea-“robberies” in the waters of Morea or made by Monemvasiotes see TAFEL - THOMAS, nos. CCCLXX [A]10-11, 25-27, 38, 40, 53, [C]5-7, [D]11, [F]3, 17-18, [G]9, [J]2-6, 8- 9, 15, [K]1, 9-10, [L]2-4, 7-9, 12-3, 18, [M]8, [O]12. About the naval battle Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικαὶ Ἱστορίαι*, IV.31-32; *Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο*, 133-135; FAILLER, Chronologie et composition dans l'histoire de Georges Pachymère, 189-202. Kythera had not been a part of the principality, but under Venier-family, who were Venetian patricians settled in Crete. We do not know how it ended up in the hands of the Byzantines [about Kythera see *Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο*, 143; TAFEL - THOMAS, no. CCCLXX [A]53; J. HERRIN, Byzantine Kythera, in *Kythera. Excavations and Studies Conducted by The University of Pennsylvania Museum and The British School at Athens*, eds. J. N. COLDSTREAM - G. L. HUXLEY, London 1972, 48-50; PΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο*, 275-276; M. ΚΟΥΜΑΝΟΥΔΙ, Illi de Ca' Venier; The First Venetian Lords of Kythera, in *Venezia e Cerigo, Atti del Simposio Internazionale, Venezia 6-7 Dicembre 2002*, eds. CH. MALTEZOU and M. ΚΟΥΜΑΝΟΥΔΙ, Venezia 2003, 88-93; CH. GASPARIS, Cerigo sotto il Dominio Veneto. Problemi Economici di un'isola di importanza strategica, in *Venezia e Cerigo*, op.cit., 107-9; CH. MALTEZOU, Le famiglie degli Eudaimonoianis e Venier a Cerigo dal XII al XIV secolo. Problemi di cronologia e prosopografia, *RSBS* 2 (1982), 208-217 (reprinted in CH. MALTEZOU, *Βενετική παρουσία στα Κύθηρα, Αρχαιακές μαρτυρίες*, Athens 1991, H)].

Monemvasia was a maritime city, and like its traders, its corsairs could also sail far. In addition the Slavs and other inhabitants of the Mani peninsula made “robberies” at sea and in harbors, although they needed to restrict their activities to coastal sailing, where the booty’s worth was usually less than 100 *hyperpyra*. A typical case is the one of “Alberto Marangono” and “Johannes Conte”. They were sailing from Korone to a harbor in Mani with a ship carrying olives and salt. When they were at Beaufort a group of men from Lakonia came to the ship and robbed it. The Venetian commission claimed 60 *hyperpyra* for this incident<sup>60</sup>.

An interesting case took place in 1277 when 13 “men of the Emperor” from Kalavryta robbed a Venetian, who was travelling from Patras to Naupaktos. Kalavryta is inland, but the incident probably occurred at sea. Perhaps the attackers had taken a boat from the coast. According to the claims document they gained booty worth 75 *hyperpyra*. If the information was right, the attackers were Byzantine soldiers, and if the Byzantines’ customary practice about the division of the spoils, was followed<sup>61</sup>, then every men would have received 2.3 *hyperpyra*. This was equivalent to approximately one month’s wage. Sanudo tells that at this time for every two *denari* a corsair captain invested he got back three, and if he fought against other pirates four<sup>62</sup>.

The corsairs could also make raids against the coastal inhabitants. The claims document informs us that in April 1277 “Lanfrancus Chavallari of Thessaloniki” attacked southern Messenia with a ship from Ania in

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60. TAFEL – THOMAS, nos. CCCLXX [A]41, [H]14, 18–24, [J]1; one could also add [H]15, which took place near Mistra (i.e. in inland), but otherwise similar. About Monemvasia see H. KALLIGAS, Monemvasia, Seventh–Fifteenth Centuries, in *The Economic History of Byzantium: From the Seventh through the Fifteenth Century*, v. 2, Editor-in-Chief A. LAIOU, Washington D. C. 2002, 884–895; D. A. ZAKYTHINOS, *Le despotat grec de Morée*, 254–263.

61. **The Emperor should have got 1/5, the grand-domestikos** (the official leader of the army) 1/5, the other commanders 1/5, and the men were entitled to the rest (see PSEUDO-KODINOS, 251; Ioannes Kantakuzenus, *Ἱστορίαι* II.32: *Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris Historiarum libri IV*, v. 1, cura LUDOVICI SCHOPENI, Bonnae 1828, 495–501; S. KYRIAKIDIS, The Division of booty in late Byzantium (1204–1453), *JÖB* 59 (2009), 165–166, 167–169, 175).

62. TAFEL – THOMAS, no. CCCLXX [A]38; *Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο*, 173–175; CHARANIS, Piracy in the Aegean, 131–132. The estimate of the wages is based on a contract between the Emperor Michael VIII and the Genoese in 1261 (*Regesten der Kaiserurkunden der Oströmischen Reiches*, v. III, eds. F. DÖLGER, P. WIRTH, München 1977, no. 1890).

Byzantine Anatolia. This town was a base for several corsairs. He took both men and women as prisoners and also harmed the Venetians. It has been inferred that Lanfrancus enslaved these locals<sup>63</sup>. This is, however, problematic if Lanfrancus really operated under the Emperor as the document claims. Evidently the Byzantines did not enslave Orthodox, their brothers in religion. One would also assume that the Catholic men of the Emperor would have been required to respect the practice. Naturally they might have ignored it, and there are cases where even Orthodox slaved Orthodox. Perhaps it was a question of forced migration, a practice common to the Byzantines and somehow in a gray zone in relation to slavery<sup>64</sup>.

Latins could enslave Orthodox Christians (and theoretically vice versa) who were captured in war. Especially in the fourteenth century there was a large-scale slave trade of Greeks, mainly women<sup>65</sup>. Actually among the notarial papers of Ragusa there is a document concerning the manumission of a slave girl, Maria of Clarenza, on 17 May 1281. There is no information on how, why, and when Maria was enslaved. She might have been captured in the war of Morea, but from the Ragusan archives we also know a case dated 5 May 1268 where a Moreote woman, who had unable to pay the loan she had taken because of hunger, promised to spend 10 years in servitude<sup>66</sup>.

Enslaving even “schismatic Christians” was, however, always considered somehow problematic. For example on 6 December 1274, King Charles gave to two south-Italian provinces an order to free all Greek and Albanian slaves and let them go where they wanted. This order was probably related to the

63. TAFEL – THOMAS, no. CCCLXX [J]4; MORGAN, *The Venetian Claims Commission*, 421-425.

64. For the Byzantine enslavement practices and forced migration, see for example H. KÖPSTEIN, *Zur Sklaverei im ausgehenden Byzanz: Philologisch-historische Untersuchung*, Berlin 1966, 56-69; KYRIAKIDIS, *The Division of booty*, 169-170.

65. For slavery in Latin Christendom see especially C. VERLINDEN, *L'esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale*, v. 2, Gent 1977; N. MOSCHONAS, *Der Sklavenmarkt im östlichen Mittelmeerraum in der Palaiologenzeit*, *SüdostF* 65/66 (2006/7), 28-49.

66. *Les Régestes des Documents des Archives de Raguse concernant le Levant, in Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Âge*, ed. B. KREKIĆ, Paris 1963, nos. 9, 17. From 1291-1292 we have information about the slaves (both men and women) in the Venetian colony of Methone in Morea, who judging by names were Greeks (*Pasquale Longo, notaio in Corone 1289-1293*, ed. A. LOMBARDO, Venezia 1951, nos. 71, 94; VERLINDEN, *L'esclavage*, 801-802). We have, however, no information on where they came from and why they had been enslaved.

church union and Charles' close contacts with the Greek rulers of Epeiros and Thessaly at this time<sup>67</sup>. I doubt that Charles would have freed soldiers of Michael Palaiologos without conditions, and these would probably not have been enslaved. Anyway, the number of Greek slaves in the Latin slave markets does not seem to have been significant in the period under discussion. None is, for example, among the 206 sales of a slave mentioned in the surviving notary registers of Ragusa from 1281-1283. It might also be worth noting that, although according to the Venetian claims document of 1278 several Venetians were held prisoners, there is no indication of enslavement. The Venetians captured in connection with the war in Morea, and whose fate we know, were released after a few weeks and, far as we can tell, without conditions<sup>68</sup>.

The episode of Geoffroy de Bruyères the Younger, which is described in the *Chronicle of Morea*, possibly took place in the mid-1270s. He came from France with eight *sergeants*<sup>69</sup> to claim the heritage of the baron of Karytaina. The plea was refused. The angry Geoffroy de Bruyères now took the castle of Araklovon (French Bucelet) from the men of the Principality by a clever stratagem. He pretended to be sick and got inside the castle, and when its small garrison was in the tavern below his men closed them in and took the castle. They freed the twelve prisoners there (Byzantines and local peasants) and sent two of them to the Byzantines to ask for help, promising to hand over them the castle<sup>70</sup>.

The men of the Principality and Angevin troops reacted quickly. Simon de Vidoigne, who was defending the central Morea with Arachova as his

67. MINIERI-RICCIO, *Il Regno di Carlo I D'Angiò*, 6 December 1274. For the contacts between Charles and Epeiros, and Thessaly, see GEANAKOPOLOS, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West*, 275; BORGHESE, *Carlo I d'Angiò*, 130-133.

68. TAFEL - THOMAS, no. CCCLXX [A]38, 40, [D]2, [H]15, 18, 19, 21. Köpstein has made the same observation concerning the lack of enslavement of Venetians in the claims document of 1278 (KÖPSTEIN, *Zur Sklaverei*, 80-84). For Ragusa see VERLINDEN, *L'esclavage*, 743-765.

69. *Sergeant* was a foot-soldier or cavalryman without the status of knight (C. MARSHALL, *Warfare in the Latin East. 1192-1292*, Cambridge 1992, 48-50; J. FRANCE, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades. 1000-1300*, London 1999, 58-63; BON, *La Morée franque*, 85-89).

70. *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 8110-8330; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 557-72; *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XIII, no. LXX, 479; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 321; BON, *La Morée franque*, 148. The version of *Libro de los Fechos* (§§ 428-46) differs slightly in details.

base, blockaded Araklovon and closed the roads and passes leading there. The representative of King Charles arrived from Clarenza with his troops and heard that the Byzantine *κεφαλή* had already arrived at the ford of Alpheios. De Vidoigne was sent to block his way (according to the French *Chronicle*) with 100 cavalymen and 200 infantrymen. Geoffroy de Bruyères and his men were threatened with the claim that a bigger army was coming, and men were sent to call Venetian siege-engineers to build a *trebuchet*. At the same time the besiegers expressed understanding towards the actions of Geoffroy and told him that a diplomatic solution was possible. Geoffroy married the widow of a Moreot noble and received a sizeable fief<sup>71</sup>.

The contingent sent against the Byzantines seems to have been quite small indicating that the Byzantine forces were not sizeable either. Most of the “robberies” mentioned in the Venetian claims document and which had something to do with the war in Morea were also made by the local inhabitants or corsairs, which might indicate that there were not many imperial troops left in the Peninsula and mainly the locals were responsible for the defense. On the other hand the Venetian claim document only list incidents, which were considered to be against the treaty made by the Emperor, and it is likely that irregulars and corsairs were more prone to those than the proper imperial troops. It might be worth of noting that the Venetian siege-engineers were supposed to build the *trebuchets*, and this is not the only reference about the men of the Principality relying on the Venetian engineers for siege-engines<sup>72</sup>.

### The period of “baillis”

Prince Guillaume died on 1 May 1278 and King Charles became the direct ruler of the Principality. He was represented by a “*bailli*”; the first

71. Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως, 8331-8473; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 573-85. The Greek version does not reveal the number of troops de Vidoigne sent against the *κεφαλή*, but tells about the men of Skorta, Kalamata, Perigardios, Vostitza, and Chalandritza indicating the troops composed of local men of the Principality.

72. See *Livre de la conquête*, § 820. Kanellopoulos has made the same notion about the role of Venetians as siege-engineers for the Principality of Achaia (KANELLOPOULOS, *Η οργάνωση και η τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού*, 329-330). About the Venetian traditions for building siege-engines see A. SETTIA, *L'apparto militare*, in *Storia di Venezia dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima*, v. II, *l'età del commune*, eds. G. CRACCO – GH. ORTALLI, Roma 1995, 472-474.

was Galeran d'Ivry<sup>73</sup>. The Italian historian Saba Malaspina mentions that in the same year the Franks commanded by Gautier de Sumoroso attacked to the lands of Greeks in Morea, trusting only to their courage. The Greeks had superior numbers, and they defeated the Franks totally, capturing Gautier and several other important men. Otherwise Saba Malaspina writes about this war only that fortune favored sometimes the Byzantines and sometimes the Franks, and that Charles often sent new troops and commanders to Morea<sup>74</sup>. Perhaps new men, unaccustomed to the Byzantine ways of war, allowed themselves to fall into ambush prepared by the locals.

D'Ivry did not get along well with the local strong men, and apparently there were problems relating to the payments for mercenaries. When a new *bailli* came in August 1280 it is reported that castles lacked provisions and the garrisons had not received wages for three to twelve months. In order to support themselves, the mercenaries plundered villages in central Morea which had only temporarily been in the enemy hands, causing in this way great harm to the local fief holders. A document from the year 1283 refers to mercenaries who had gone to the Byzantine side because of the lack of pay<sup>75</sup>. Perhaps this happened during the period of d'Ivry. It is notable that since the Franks relied more on fief-holding troops, the problems of paying the

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73. MINIERI-RICCIO, *Il Regno di Carlo I D'Angiò*, 26 August 1278; *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 7753-7939; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 532-544; BON, *La Morée franque*, 150-154; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 315-316. According to the *Chronicle of Morea* the first *bailli*, who is wrongly identified, brought with him 50 cavalymen and 200 infantrymen, apparently crossbowmen. These soldiers were elite mercenaries. In addition, the documents from Naples reveal sending of victuals, textiles, one mason, and two carpenters to the Principality. In May, already before the news about the death of the Prince arrived, Charles had ordered troops sent to Achaia. This contingent included at least 50 crossbowmen [CERONE, *La sovranità napoletana* (1917), 59-67 (reg. 1, f. 152; reg. 32, f. 226; reg. 32, f. 222 t; reg. 26, f. 106; reg. 32, f. 32; reg. 32, f. 233; reg. 32, f. 222 t)]; MINIERI-RICCIO, *Il Regno di Carlo I D'Angiò*, 2-19 May 1278, 1-2 September 1278].

74. SABA MALASPINA, *Chronica*, ed. W. KOLLER – A. NITSCHKE, [MGH *Scriptores* XXXV] Hannover 1999, 260-262; *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XLIV, additiones ad reg. LXXXII, 701.

75. HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 316-318; MINIERI-RICCIO, *Il Regno di Carlo I D'Angiò*, 18 May 1279, 8 May 1283; *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XXIII, no. XCV, 48; v. XXV, no. CIV, 5; *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 8523-8529; GÖBBELS, *Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien*, 29-30.

mercenaries did not mark a turning point in the war similar to the desertion of the Turks from the Byzantine army in 1264.

When the next *bailli*, Philippe de Lagonesse, came in August 1280<sup>76</sup> he brought with him money for three months' wages for the paid troops of the king in Morea. The document also provides the numbers of these: there were 16 knights, 160 paid cavalrymen, 22 mounted crossbowmen, and 82 normal crossbowmen. This kind of contingent should have had 230 squires and *garziones*, if the regulations concerning the ratio of followers per man on horse were followed<sup>77</sup>. The troops of the Principality itself (perhaps 500 heavy cavalrymen plus infantry)<sup>78</sup> were not included in these figures, but anyhow the modest numbers<sup>79</sup> indicate that there was not a large Byzantine army against them in Morea.

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76. Two years seem to have been the normal period in office for *baillis* (HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 316; SAMPSONIS, *L'administration de la Morée*, 146, 149-150).

77. *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XXIII, no. XCV, 205-211, 216; no. XCVIII, 225; no. XCVII, 236; MINIERI-RICCIO, *Il Regno di Carlo I D'Angiò*, 3 August 1280, 8 August 1280; GÖBBELS, *Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien*, 34-36; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 317-318. Lagonessa brought with him 50 horses to replace the ones lost in battle. From the documents concerning his appointment to office we also learn that every knight received four gold ounces per month, the other cavalrymen and mounted crossbowmen two, and that the wage of an infantryman was 12 *tari* per month (30 *tari* = 1 gold ounce = 27g, see BORGHESE, *Carlo I d'Angiò*, 22).

78. For the military potential of the Principality of Achaia, see WILSKMAN, *Pelagonia*, 139-141.

79. We have for example a similar document from March 1281 for the troops besieging Berat. There are 82 knights, 681 other cavalrymen, 78 mounted crossbowmen, 227 infantrymen from the north side of the Alps, 410 archers, 150 crossbowmen, and numbers of craftsmen. Every knight had to have one squire and two *garziones*, other mounted men had to have one *garzionem*. Sanudo claims that there were 2000 *uomini d'arme* and 6000 infantrymen in the Angevin army at Berat (*I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XXV, no. CIV, 16; Μαρίνος Σανούδος *Τορσέλλο*, 145). At Viterbo Charles had promised 2000 heavy cavalrymen for the Latin Emperor; in 1281 he made a contract with the Venetians for transporting 8000 horses, and men in the usual ratio to horses, against Constantinople (BUCHON, *Recherches et matériaux*, nos. 49, 232; TAFEL - THOMAS, no. CCCLXXIII). It should be noted that usually only one horse per cavalryman was transported by sea (see for example TAFEL - THOMAS, no. XCII). For further discussion about the size of the armies during this era see especially my forthcoming article about the battle of Prinitza and, for example, BARTUSIS, *The Late Byzantine Army*, 258-269; T. KOLLIAS, *Military aspects of the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders*, in *Urbs capta. The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences (La IVe Croisade*

After 1278 we no longer have the Venetian claims document for help, but the Emperor's ships were clearly still causing troubles, and there were preparations against them even on the coast of Sicily. On the coast of Morea were 10 galleys commanded by Gérard de Marseille, which had been sent there in May 1280. Five *terides*, two galleys, and one *galeone*, which formed the convoy transporting Lagonessa, were ordered to join them. De Marseille's navy was ordered to stay on the coast of Morea until November, and one of the *terides* in Lagonessa's convoy brought victuals for it<sup>80</sup>.

The Sicilian Vespers and war against Aragon broke out in 1282; this was the main concern of the Angevins for the next 20 years. In December 1283 the crown prince, who represented his absentee father in South-Italy, gave several orders which could be described as almost symbolic for the diminishing scale and significance of the conflict in Morea. The supplies intended for Achaia were to be given to ships going to Sicily; the *bailli*, Duke of Athens, and the "Despotes of Epiros", who asked for help, received the answer that not numbers, but military skills, bring victory in war. Four Byzantine prisoners kept in Italy were exchanged for de Sumoroso and three men captured with him. Erard, the lord of Arkadia, was not among those liberated, and apparently he had died during the five-year captivity<sup>81</sup>.

The Angevin court did not totally forget the war in Morea. In May 1283 the *bailli* was ordered to ensure the payment of wages, including the ones for the Turks and Bulgarians, so that the troops would not desert to the Byzantine side anymore, but on the contrary there would be deserters from

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*et ses consequences*), ed. A. LAIOU [Réalités Byzantines 10], Paris 2005, 127-131; WILSKMAN, Pelagonia, 139-145; KANELLOPOULOS, *Η οργάνωση και η τακτική του βυζαντινού στρατού*, 261-264. For the potential problems relating the figures in medieval narrative sources see, for example, J. FLORI, La valeur des nombres chez les chroniqueurs du Moyen Age. A propos des effectifs de la première Croisade, *Le Moyen-Age, Revue d'histoire et de Philologie* XCIX, 3-4 (1993), 399-422.

80. *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XXIII, no. XCIV, 274; nos. XCV, 200, 206, 209, 211; no. XCVII, 129, 131, 235; nos. XCVIII, 229; GÖBBELS, *Militärwesen im Königreich Sizilien*, 34-35; GEANAKOPOLOS, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West*, 335-340. See also PRYOR, Soldiers of Fortune in the Fleets of Charles I of Anjou, 130-131. The upkeep of a galley seems to have cost 50 gold ounces per month (*I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XXIII, no. XCV, 206). A *galeone* was a smaller version of a galley, perhaps with 40-72 oars (GÖBBELS, *op. cit.*, 253).

81. MINIERI-RICCIO, Il Regno di Carlo I D'Angiò, 3 December 1283, 5 December 1283, 22 December 1283.

the Byzantine side to the Franks. The *bailli* also received an order that the people from the Principality or persons who owned a fief there should not serve in the castle garrisons, but instead men from the northern side of the Alps should<sup>82</sup>. Probably the king had other use for the locals.

In 1284 the Angevins sent 100 horses as a replacement for the lost mounts, and also in 1288 we hear about transport of horses and victuals<sup>83</sup>. The Franks of *Romania* took also defensive measures of their own in the 1280s. The Duke of Athens, Guillaume de la Roche, is credited with building the castle of Demetra in south central Morea during the time he served as *bailli*. Demetra was probably built for defense against the Byzantines and according to the *Chronicle of Morea* it was destroyed by them. Unfortunately the *Chronicle* does not tell us when this happened. The successor of Guillaume was Nicholas II de Saint Omer, lord of half of Thebes and husband of the widow of Guillaume de Villehardouin. He is said to have built the castle of Old Navarino in the south-western corner of the Peninsula. The castle of Navarino watched over an important harbor. It was more distant from the Byzantine territories, but Byzantine ships had committed “robberies” there<sup>84</sup>.

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82. MINIERI-RICCIO, *Il Regno di Carlo I D'Angiò*, 8 May 1283. This has been seen as a mark of distrust towards the local Franks (for example by MILLER, *A History of Frankish Greece*, 163-164), but the *bailli* at that time, Guy de Dramelay belonged to the nobility of the Principality, as did the new castellan of Clarenza (*I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XXVI, no. CX, 176; no. CXI, 84; no. CXII, 174). About Guy de Dramelay see for example HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 326-327; BON, *La Morée franque*, 158-159; SAMPSONIS, *L'administration de la Morée*, 152-153.

83. *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XXVII, no. CXX, 477; v. XXIX, nos. V, 70, 86-89, 96.

84. **About the castles**, see *Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 7993-8000, 8096-8099; *Livre de la conquête*, § 547, 554; S. DRAGOMES, *Χρονικὸν Μορέως Τοπωνυμικά - Τοπογραφικά - Ἱστορικά*, Athens 1921, 199-204; BON, *La Morée franque*, 158-159, 414-7; ANDREWS, *Castles of the Morea*, 40-48; *Venetians and Knights Hospitallers: Military Architecture Networks*, 76-79; MOLIN, *Unknown Crusader Castles*, 228; BREUILLOT, *Châteaux Oubliés de la Messénie Médiévale*, 39-40, 179-89; LONGNON, *L'Empire Latin du Constantinople*, 262-263; N. D. KONTOGIANNIS, *Settlements and countryside of Messenia during the late Middle Ages: the testimony of the fortifications*, *BMGS* 34, 1 (2010), 15-16. The Aragonese version of the *Chronicle* dates the building of Old Navarino in the 1290s and claims that the brothers of the Teutonic order were responsible for its maintenance (*Libro de los Fechos*, §§ 470-1). For the “robberies” in harbour TAFEL - THOMAS, nos. CCCLXX [J]2, 8.

The new Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II does not seem to have taken advantage of the troubles of the Angevins. Some persons seem nonetheless to have considered the Byzantine conquest of the whole Peninsula as an option. In 1288 Emperor Andronikos confirmed on request a property in Argolis, in a region which never returned to Byzantine control<sup>85</sup>.

Notwithstanding the ambivalence of the central governments the war continued until 1289, when the Principality of Achaia acquired a new Prince, Florent of Hainaut, who had married the daughter of Prince Guillaume. Here again was a sovereign who could concentrate on the matters of Morea, and he made peace with Byzantium. At the same time there were negotiations about the marriage alliance between the heiress of the Latin Emperor and the son of Emperor Andronikos. In peace between the Principality of Achaia and Byzantium apparently both sides kept the territories they held. The peace lasted only seven years and was broken by armed conflicts<sup>86</sup>.

#### Demographic consequences

The idea of the devastating effects of the war on the demography of Morea is mainly based on Sanudo's story about a woman who lost seven husbands in war, on one quite rhetorical letter, and on the *Chronicle of Morea*. In addition, the transportations of food supplies from southern Italy, especially during 1269-1273, has been seen as an indication of famine and resulting depopulation<sup>87</sup>.

85. F. DÖLGER, Ein Chrysobull des Kaisers Andronikos II. für Theodoros Nomikopulos aus dem Jahre 1288, *OCP* 21 (1955), 58-62. Dölger suggests that the document is evidence that the Byzantines had temporary control over the region where the property lay. This possibility cannot be denied, but there is no other information indicating a campaign in this region and/or period.

86. *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 587-827; *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 8474-9335; *Actes Relatifs à la Principauté de Morée*, nos. V, VII, IX, XXVIII-XXIX, XLIV; *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XXXVIII, no. XXX, 376; A. E. LAIOU, *Constantinople and the Latins. The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II. 1282-1328*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1972, 39-41, 48-54.

87. *Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο*, 129; *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 597-606; *To Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 8475-8685; N. FESTA (ed.), Lettera inedita dell' imperatore Michele VIII Paleologo al Pontefice Clemente IV, *Bessarione* 6 (1899), 46-47. Curiously the Ragusan document concerning the Moreote woman who gave herself in servitude due to hunger has been left unnoted in previous research about the effects of the war for the demography of Morea.

Scholars who want to deny the significant effects of the war on the demography have refuted the significance of these claims, at least as indications of long lasting trends. The problems of narrative sources are well known, and there are also several documents concerning transportation of food supplies to the Principality in the 1290s, during a time of peace and, according to the *Chronicle*, of great prosperity. Even the self-sufficiency of Morea is questioned<sup>88</sup>.

Modern demographic history considers that the effects of sudden catastrophes such as wars are short-lived. The survivors have more resources at their disposal and can have several children. The researchers who are skeptical about the devastating effects of the war believe that the demographic development of Morea corresponded to that of Eastern Macedonia, where the archives of Mount Athos provide plenty of information. Here the population seems to have been growing in the thirteenth century. In the early fourteenth century there were temporary problems and stagnation; the amount of children per family decreased. Probably this was due to wars and economic problems, but the real population decline took place only at the time of the Black Death, which kept coming back and thus held the population levels down for a long time<sup>89</sup>.

Definitive answers are difficult to give. We do not know, for example, the relation of the grain shipments from South Italy to *Romania* to the real local need. The same applies to the 2000 gold ounces that King Charles ordered to be given for the Prince in 1269 for reparation of the war damages and/or for travel expenses<sup>90</sup>. The continuity, or resumption, of trade is,

88. *Actes Relatifs à la Principauté de Morée*, 16-17, nos. XLVIII, CXV, CLXVI, CXCIII-CXCV; LOCK, *The Franks in the Aegean*, 247-51; SAKELLARIOU, Latin Morea in the Late Middle Ages, 308-311.

89. SAKELLARIOU, Latin Morea in the Late Middle Ages, 304-8; PANAGIOTOPOULOS, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Πελοποννήσου*, 27-44. About the demographic information from the archives of Mount Athos, see J. LEFORT, Population et peuplement en Macédoine orientale IXe-XVe siècle, in *Hommes et richesses dans l'Empire byzantin*, v. 2, VIIIe-XVe siècle [Réalités byzantines 3], eds. V. KRAVARI – J. LEFORT – C. MORRISON, Paris 1991, 69-82; A. LAIOU, The Agrarian Economy: Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries, in *The Economic History of Byzantium: From the Seventh through the Fifteenth Century*, editor-in-Chief A. LAIOU, Washington D. C. 2002, 316-317. For modern demographic theories see for example M. LIVI-BACCI, *A Concise History of World Population*, translated by C. IPSEN, Malden 1997.

90. CERONE, La sovranità napoletana (1916), 32 (reg. v. 3, f. 3); *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. II, no. VIII, 21; v. IV, no. XIV, 370; v. V, no. XVII, 32; BON, *La*

however, proved, for example, by disputes over custom duties for raw silk brought from the Principality to South-Italy in 1277, by the grant from customs duties of Clarenza in the testament of Prince Guillaume, and by the “robberies” in the document of 1278<sup>91</sup>.

Archaeological surveys indicate, that in late medieval times several smaller settlements were abandoned and the people concentrated on more defensible places such as fortified villages on elevated positions. When this process began, however, is more difficult to say<sup>92</sup>. One should also mention that several churches were built or decorated in Byzantine Morea during the war or immediately afterward. This could be a sign of prosperity. On the other hand it could also indicate that people in trouble sought divine help. Building a church seems to have been surprisingly cheap, and a list of donors for a small church in Mani built in 1265 indicates that the erection and decoration cost only 14 ½ *hyperpyra*. In addition, building projects could also have been used to strengthen the Orthodox and Byzantine identity<sup>93</sup>.

*Morée franque*, 139. For grain shipments and grain trade from south-Italy to *Romania* see especially DOUROU-ELIOPOULOU, *H ανδεγαυική κυριαρχία στη Ρωμανία επί Καρόλου Α΄*, 143-151, 170-171, 182-184; A. TZAVARA, *Attività Economiche nelle città del Principato di Morea nel corso del XIII sec.*, *Studi Veneziani* 54 (2007), 226-231.

91. CERONE, *La sovranità napoletana* (1916), 252-256 (reg. v. 28, 13 t.; reg. v. 28, f. 14); MINIERI-RICCIO, *Il Regno di Carlo I D’Angiò*, 10 May 1277; *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, v. XXIII, no. IC, 2; v. XXV, no. CIV, 5; v. XXIII, no. XCV, 48; HOPF, *Griechenland im Mittelalter*, 317; TZAVARA, *Attività Economiche* 222-6, 231-7. A. TZAVARA’s *Clarentza, une ville de la Morée latine XIIIe - Xve siècle*, Venice 2008 has unfortunately not been on my disposal.

92. E. ATHANASSOPOULOS, *Landscape Archeology of Medieval and Pre-Modern Greece: The Case of Nemea*, in *Aegean Strategies: Studies of Culture and Environment on the European Fringe*, eds. P. KARDULIAS, M. SHUTES, Lanham Md. 1997, 88-94; PANAGIOTOPOULOS, *Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Πελοποννήσου*, 45-49; *A Rough and Rocky Place: Landscape and Settlement History of the Methana Peninsula*, eds. CH. MEE – H. FORBES, Liverpool 1997, 94-99; 120-173 *passim.*; *The Asea Valley Survey: An Arcadian Mountain Valley from the Palaeolithic Period until Modern times*, eds. J. FORSÉN – B. FORSÉN, Stockholm 2003, 79-121 *passim.*, 317-321; M. H. JAMESON, C. N. RUNNELS – T. H. VAN ANDEL, *A Greek Countryside: The Southern Argolid from Prehistory to the Present Day*, Stanford California 1994, 246-257; P. ARMSTRONG, *The Survey area in the Byzantine and Ottoman Periods*, in *Continuity and Change in a Greek Rural Landscape: The Laconia Survey*, v. 1, *Methodology and Interpretation*, eds. W. CAVANAUGH – J. CROUWEL – R. CATLING – G. SHIPLEY, London 2002, 369-372, 390-402.

93. KALOPISSI-VERTI, *Dedicatory Inscriptions*, 65-82; EAD., *The Impact of the Fourth Crusade on Monumental Painting*, 83-84.

What kind of damage could the war have caused? Medieval raids seem to have been often short in duration (only a couple of days, the major ones a week or two). If the raiding forces kept themselves together, they could cover only a small area; if they divided into smaller groups, they became less able to cope with resistance. The actual plundering seems to have been often carried out with patrols of about 10 men<sup>94</sup>. The reader might remember that the group from Kalavryta in 1277 consisted of 13 men.

As it has been mentioned already, there were only a few major military actions after the initial phase of the war. The Byzantine raiders were probably small and fast-moving groups, trying to get as much booty as possible before the defenders could respond, for example the Frankish cavalry from their bases. Thus the distances covered were also probably small and the possibilities of light infantry, such as Slavs and Tsakones, to do damage were limited. Naval forces could operate at longer distances from their base areas, but if the men –while on shore–went inland, they risked being cut off from their ships. Then, of course, there were the cases of the unpaid troops of the Franks who plundered for a living.

There was probably no time for the attackers to destroy the crops completely during these short raids<sup>95</sup>. The raiders could plunder, but pillaging would have been more difficult. Most likely the cattle formed the main part of their booty. The population could probably seek shelter fairly well in the rough terrain and fortifications.

As we have seen, the distribution of the settlements might have changed. In the area that was covered by the Laconia survey, the regions closest to Lakedaimon had suffered most depopulation. In my opinion this might have been partly result of war discussed in this article. There is also information that many Greeks from the Frankish-controlled area moved to Byzantine territory<sup>96</sup>. This also means that most of the people in the depopulated areas did not necessarily die, but may have moved away.

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94. For the conduct of raids in medieval times see for example MARSHALL, *Warfare in the Latin East*, 183–209; ΚΕΚΑΥΜΕΝΟΣ, *Στρατηγικόν*, εισαγωγή - μετάφραση - σχόλια D. ΤΣΟΥΓΚΑΡΑΚΗΣ, Athens 1996, § 9; SYVÄNNE, *The Age of Hippotoxotai*, 109–110, 289–290.

95. V. HANSON, *Warfare and agriculture in classical Greece*, Pisa 1983, 8–62, 146–147.

96. ARMSTRONG, *The Survey area in the Byzantine and Ottoman Periods*, 347–350, 361–372, 398–402; G. MILLET (ed.), *Inscriptions Byzantines de Mistra*, BCH 23 (1899), 111; *Το Χρονικόν του Μορέως*, 5598–5641; *Livre de la conquête*, § 387; ΖΑΚΥΘΙΝΟΣ, *Le*

Less attention has been given to the possibility that the concentration of population, if it began at this time, might have had a negative effect on population growth. Dispersed settlements facilitate intensive agriculture and greater surpluses. They are also less prone to epidemic diseases<sup>97</sup>. This could have been important when the Black Death struck. The acts of war did not destroy trade, but certainly increased the risks, and Sanudo had nostalgic memories of times when merchants could travel safely<sup>98</sup>.

## Conclusions

The phase of war in Morea under discussion was mainly characterized by a stalemate. The Byzantines did not want to fight in the open field, and the Franks did not dare to venture into the mountains for fear of ambushes. When de Sumoroso apparently did so, he was indeed defeated. It is, however, notable that the Latins did not attack the strong but isolated castle of Kalavryta in the north. Perhaps they were afraid to commit troops in a siege and leave the south open. In addition the general political situation, such as the union negotiations, might have discouraged major military campaigns.

The defense of the Byzantines was actually quite effective, and they were perhaps more successful at harassing the Latins than the other way around, although the nature of the sources may distort our image. Yet the Byzantines could gain new ground only if the Franks were committed elsewhere or suddenly found themselves in very disadvantageous situation, as had happened at Pelagonia and Berat. Apparently the men of the Principality had by now learned the ways of the Byzantines. At any rate, it is difficult to say at which point the Byzantines abandoned the attempt to conquer the whole Peninsula in the near future. The fortifications which

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*Despotat Grec de Morée. v.2, Vie et Institutions*, 205. For other cases during thirteenth-fifteenth centuries when the Greek peasants have escaped over the frontiers between of the Franks, Byzantines, and Venetians (mainly in order to avoid heavy taxation or enemy attacks) see D. JACOBY, Peasant Mobility across the Venetian, Frankish and Byzantine Borders in Latin Romania, Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries, in *I Greci durante la Venetocrazia: Uomini, spazio, idee (XIII - XVIII sec.): Atti del convegno internazionale di studi, Venezia 3 - 7 dicembre 2007*, eds. CH. MALTEZOU - A. TZAVARA - D. VLASSI, Venezia 2009, 525-539.

97. **Settlement pattern influencing the intensity of agriculture**, see ATHANASSOPOULOS, *Landscape Archeology of Medieval and Pre-Modern Greece*, 86-87, 90-98.

98. *Μαρίνος Σανούδος Τορσέλλο*, 105-107.

the Byzantines evidently built probably also contributed to the stalemate. In my opinion the strongest candidates as Byzantine built-fortifications are Chelmos, Zarnata, and the city-walls of Mistra. The fortification buildings in Morea might be compared with the fortification project that Michael VIII undertook along the Sangarios river against the Turks, although this later project was naturally more important for the Empire<sup>99</sup>. If the basic purpose of fortifications is to discourage the enemy from even initiating the attack, the Byzantine efforts in Morea can be judged successful. In the 1280s the Latins, too, strengthened their defense with new fortifications.

There is little evidence that the Emperor held a significant army in Morea, and the relatively modest numbers of troops the Angevins sent to the Peninsula indicate that the numbers of troops on the imperial payrolls were small. Thus I consider it unjustified to claim that it was war in Morea that needlessly drained the resources from the defense of Anatolia<sup>100</sup>. One should also remember that the Angevin troops in Morea could have been used against the Byzantines in Albania, and the Principality would have been happy to contribute to attempts to re-conquer Constantinople<sup>101</sup>. Besides, keeping troops at readiness in frontier regions caused financial strains, and holding the men together for long times in one place made them vulnerable to diseases.

The defense of the Byzantine Morea probably relied to a great extent on the local inhabitants, from whom at least the Slavs had some kind of military obligations, but also autonomy. Moreover, one should not forget the role of the Latin corsairs<sup>102</sup> from Monemvasia and elsewhere in the Empire, who

99. For the fortifications along Sangarios see Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικὰ Ἱστορία*, VI.29; C. Foss, Byzantine Malagina and the Lower Sangarius, *Anatolian Studies* 40 (1990), 173–176.

100. Bartusis may have had in mind that the Byzantine army in Morea c. 1262-1264 included men from the frontier region of Magedon, which at the same time fell victim to serious attacks by the Turks. The Byzantines could, however, stabilize the situation at this time (Παχυμέρης, *Συγγραφικὰ Ἱστορία*, III.16, 21).

101. Earlier, Borsari has claimed that the troops sent to Morea diminished the number of men who could be sent against Constantinople (BORSARI, *La Politica bizantina di Carlo I d'Angiò*, 334).

102. Papadopoulou estimates that judging from names  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the corsairs mentioned in the Venetian claims document of 1278 are Italians (ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Πειρατές και κουρσάροι*, 98). Although some of the name forms are hard to identify, the figure is probably close to truth.

could harass sea lanes and coasts. Modern research usually emphasizes that in Byzantium the imperial army was responsible for warfare<sup>103</sup>. Perhaps it was so in theory and during the major campaigns, but in low-level warfare the “private sector” formed by non-regular locals and corsairs might in practice carry the main burden.

Use of the “private sector” could be cheap, but the problem with such irregular groups was that their aims might differ from the goals of central government. Their main –or sole–concern was probably to get booty, regardless of the consequences: the attacks on Venetians, for instance, created trouble for the Empire; in fact, the Emperor had to compensate most of the “robberies” mentioned in the claims document of 1278, albeit several years later, and the sum was considerably smaller than the initial one requested by claimants. During the peace in the 1290s, the locals also caused conflicts with the Franks. The Greek inhabitants of the Frankish territories were probably the main victims of the Byzantine raids, and this may have begun to turn opinions against the Empire. It seems that the relationship between the Franks and the Greeks in Principality became closer as time went by and the Franks put more trust in the Greeks<sup>104</sup>.

Destroying the agricultural production base during the apparently small and short term incursions was difficult, and it is unlikely that the war caused substantial or long-term demographic decline in the Peninsula. Some areas might have lost people, but some areas gained, especially the Byzantine ones which seem to have benefitted from refugees. Constant military actions, however, were probably a strong motive for people to concentrate in easily

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103. See for example BARTUSIS, *The Late Byzantine Army*, 213–214, 217–221, 307–311; T. KOLBABA, *Fighting for Christianity: Holy War in the Byzantine Empire*, *Byz* 68 (1998), 209–211.

104. For the reparations to the Venetians see *I trattati con Bizanzio. 1265-1285*, eds. M. POZZA, G. RAVEGNANI [Pacta Veneta 10], Venezia 1996, no. 10; MORGAN, *The Venetian Claims Commission*, 426–427; LAIOU, *The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II*, 57–66. About the conflicts in the 1290s, see *Livre de la conquête*, §§ 662–830; *Libro de los Fechos*, §§ 473–85. On the integration of the Franks and their Greek subjects, see for example D. JACOBY, *Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in Peloponnesus after the Fourth Crusade*, *AHR* 78, 4 (1973), 892–903; BREUILLOT, *Châteaux Oubliés de la Messénie Médiévale*, 273–274.

defendable settlements<sup>105</sup>. This could have hampered intensive agriculture and made the society more vulnerable to epidemic diseases. There does not seem to have been wide spread enslavement of prisoners. The prisoners whose fate we do know were evidently kept in chains for exchange and perhaps for ransom.

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105. Sygkellou has reached similar conclusions concerning Epeiros in her study about wars and the consequences of wars in Late Medieval north-western Greece (SYGKELLOU, *Ο πόλεμος στον δυτικό ελλαδικό χώρο*, 106-112, 126-148).

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ANGEVINS AND THE BYZANTINES IN MOREA  
IN 1267-1289: A LATE BYZANTINE ENDEMIC WAR

This article attempts to reconstruct a late Byzantine low-level war, namely the conflict in the Morea during 1267-1289, which took place between the Angevins and their vassal, the Principality of Achaia, on the one side, and the Byzantines on the other side. This conflict offers a case of relatively well-documented late Byzantine low-level warfare. Special attention is given to the economic and demographic consequences of war for Morea, for the building of fortresses, and to the idea put forward in previous research that the war in Morea needlessly took resources away from the defense of Anatolia – thus contributing to the loss of the area to the Turks.