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NIKOLAOS G. CHRYSIS, *Crusading in Frankish Greece: A Study of Byzantine-Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204-1282* (Medieval Church Studies 22), Turnhout: Brepols, 2012, pp. xlii + 335, 7 maps, 4 Appendices. ISBN 978-2-503-53423-7

This book is essentially the first monograph on the crusades proclaimed and at times sent to Frankish Greece during the thirteenth century. It begins with the Fourth Crusade of 1204 against Byzantium which resulted in the conquest and partition of most of continental and insular Greece among the participants of this crusade and ends with the failed plans of Charles of Anjou to head a crusade against Byzantium, which had re-captured Constantinople from the Latins in 1261. As the author explains in the introduction, hitherto this subject has been overshadowed by the themes of Church Union between the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox and the establishment of Latin states in the Greek mainland and islands. After reviewing the existing secondary literature and explaining the reasons why this subject is either overlooked or treated scantily in the studies published so far, he gives some background information on aggression against Byzantium in the crusades taking place prior to 1204 followed by a description of the political fragmentation characterizing Latin Greece. He also states, significantly, that 'the main focus of the book ...will be on the development of papal policy towards crusading in Romania (i.e. Latin Greece)'. This decision, which he justifies by observing the centrality of the papacy in initiating, authorizing, organizing and sometimes even conducting the crusades, inevitably determines his choice regarding the main source material of this monograph. As he points out: 'the papal registers provide the core of evidence through which the crusades in Frankish Greece can be reconstructed'. Aware of the limitations and pitfalls involved in using the registers, the author supplements them with other literary and documentary sources such as the Latin chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade, the contemporary Byzantine historical accounts, the Chronicle of the Morea and Sanudo's *Istoria di Romania*, documents on the negotiations for Church Union and other miscellanea.

Throughout this study the author makes it clear that papal policy towards crusading in Greece was evolutionary and that Latin Greece had to compete, more often than not unsuccessfully, with other areas of crusading and especially the Holy Land. One paradox was that the Fourth Crusade itself had never been proclaimed against the Greeks but against the Muslims of Egypt and Syria. Only after its diversion to Greece and the capture of Constantinople itself did Pope Innocent III legitimize the crusader conquests, indeed he did so at the behest of the Latin emperor Baldwin I, whose letters to the pope evoked the prospect of bringing the Greek Church under Roman obedience, asked his assistance in encouraging Latins to settle in the conquered Byzantine lands for temporal and spiritual rewards and promised that the crusaders would continue on to the Holy Land. These three arguments Baldwin raised were to form important considerations for the papacy when sanctioning crusades to Greece throughout the thirteenth century. When in May 1205 Pope Innocent III granted those who would help Emperor Baldwin consolidate the empire and church in Constantinople so that he could eventually go to the Holy Land ‘the same crusader indulgence that the Apostolic See has granted to other crusaders’, the former Byzantine Empire became an officially sanctioned crusade destination for the first time, even if it was still seen as a means to the end of recovering the Holy Land, not a crusader end in itself.

Indeed, reverses in both the Holy Land and the new Latin Empire of Constantinople undermined the papal legitimization of former Byzantine lands as a crusader destination. Following the annihilation of the Latin army by the Bulgarian King Kalojan outside Adrianople and the deaths of King Aimery of Jerusalem and his wife Isabella, Pope Innocent III in July 1205 angrily reminded his papal legates in the East that their mission was ‘not to capture Constantinople but for the defence of the remnants of the Holy Land’, although by the end of 1205 he was calling those who desired to assist the Holy Land to serve the Latin Empire, granting them a full crusading indulgence. In April 1206 the pope granted those crusaders about to set out to help the Latin Empire both remission of sins and absolution from all pilgrimage vows except those for the Holy Land, the first recorded instance of vow commutation for the Latin Empire, although those taking part seem to have suffered defeat in late 1207 after landing at Dyrrachium at the hands of Michael Doukas, the Greek ruler of Epirus. The failure, however, of the crusaders in Romania to proceed on to the Holy Land made them a target for criticism, as the pope knew well, not only among Latin Christians but also among the Byzantines and Bulgarians, who accused them of being false crusaders. The author describes how in response to

these charges Baldwin's successor, the Latin emperor Henry, presented the Latins of Romania as crusaders in written appeals to the pope for more men and in the dispatch of sacred relics from Constantinople to the West. By 1212 this presentation was experiencing success, for Arnaud Amaury, the archbishop of Citeaux, spoke of a three-part crusade against 'schismatics of the east, heretics of the west and Saracens of the south', while Alberic of Trois-Fontaines included Greece among the crusading fronts in which reverses had occurred. While the establishment of the Latin Empire did little to promote Church Union, the fact that the Orthodox patriarch Michael Autoreianos around 1208-1210 offered indulgences to those willing to fight the Latins vividly illustrates how crusading incentives were understood and utilised by the papacy's opponents in Greece and the Aegean area. By 1214, however, in the wake of the generally disappointing response to appeals in the West for assistance to the Latin Empire and the danger of such appeals detracting from help for the Holy Land, the pope sent his bull *Quia major* for the organization of a crusade to the Holy Land to all parts of Europe except Spain and Greece, an implicit admission that crusaders in Latin Greece were now expected to defend their conquests on the spot, not proceed to the Holy Land.

Under Pope Honorius (1216-1227) Latin Greece was further dissociated from the Holy Land in crusading appeals. He proclaimed two crusades preached mainly in France, Venice and Hungary, one in November 1217 for the liberation of the Latin emperor Peter of Courtenay and his legate Cardinal John Colonna, both captured by the ruler of Epiros Theodore Doukas, and the second in May 1223 for the relief of the embattled Latin kingdom of Salonica. Both were failures. The first was employed more as a threat to secure the liberation of the papal legate, for the pope could ill afford a crusade venture in Greece at a time when the army he had prepared for the Fifth Crusade was poised to strike at Egypt, and became a dead letter on the legate's release. The second crusade expedition led by William the marquis of Montferrat, despite taking place after the conclusion of the Fifth Crusade, likewise failed, but presents interest on account of the broadening in the use of crusading mechanisms in a Greek context. For the first time plenary indulgences were granted to persons taking part in the expedition without an obligation to go on to the Holy Land and vows regarding the Holy Land were commuted for those taking part in the crusade in Romania. Another new development was the partial financing of the crusade through papal taxation. Also for the first time, Greeks were explicitly identified as enemies of the Roman Catholic faith, something satirized by crusade critics in the West, such as the troubadour Guilhem Figueira who satirized the papacy as being

ineffectual against the Muslims but eager to massacre Greeks and Albigensian Latins.

The author stresses how under Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241) crusading in Latin Greece reached the apogee of its development. This pope had assisted in the organization of the Fifth Crusade and during his pontificate crusading embraced various fronts, the Holy Land, the Baltic and Latin Greece. Innovations he introduced to crusading included the employment of mendicant friars in preaching, fundraising and combating heresy and schism. Initial calls to the Hungarians in 1232 to go on crusade against the Byzantine Greeks, with a commutation of the vows they had taken to help the Holy Land, failed to generate enthusiasm. The pope now deferred the use of the crusade while negotiations for Church Union were in progress with the Byzantines, and for the first time Church Union was envisaged as an alternative to sustaining the Latin Empire. On their collapse in 1234, however, the pope deployed the crusade against the Byzantine Greeks to assist the beleaguered Latin Empire. A crusade summons in December 1235 was directed mainly to France and Hungary. It included requests to some nobles to commute their crusade vows from the Holy Land to the Latin Empire, and even the justification that a Greek re-capture of Constantinople would lead to the fall of the Holy Land on account of Greek collaboration with the infidels.

Later summonses in January and December 1236, offering the same indulgences as for the Holy Land and extending the area of crusade preaching to England, introduced the novel argument of heresy as a reason for prosecuting the crusade in Latin Greece and the use of mendicant friars, especially Dominicans, in promoting it. The possessions of those participating would, moreover, be placed under papal protection. To fund the expedition the pope resorted to highly unpopular measures such as clerical taxation, including the Latin clergy in Greece, the use of legacies and donations meant for the Holy Land for Latin Greece instead and an organised system for the redemption of crusading vows on a grand scale. The fact that this crusade was being organized in parallel with one to the Holy Land only harmed it. An attempt to enlist the support of John Asen the king of Bulgaria ultimately failed, and attempts to recruit the Hungarian King Bela IV and the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick IV, previously under a sentence of excommunication, likewise failed, with crusades against Asen and Frederick being proclaimed in 1238 and 1239. The crusade, headed by the new Latin emperor Baldwin II following the withdrawal of Peter of Dreux the count of Brittany who had decided to go on the Holy Land Crusade instead, went forth in the summer of 1239 but with very limited success.

By November 1239 the English recruits under Richard of Cornwall solemnly swore to proceed exclusively to the Holy Land, rejecting the idea of crusading in Greece, and all that Baldwin could do was to besiege and storm the city of Tzurulum in Eastern Thrace. By 1240 it was clear that assisting the Latin Empire was an unpopular crusading objective in the West, and the only ones going there were the southern French heretics obliged to do so as a penance.

Following the pope's death in 1241, and under his successors Innocent IV (1243-1254) and Alexander IV (1254-1261), crusading to Latin Greece was downscaled and finally abandoned. The author argues clearly that the conflict with the emperor Frederick II in Italy resulted in assistance to Latin Greece taking the form of fundraising, especially after the first Council of Lyon in 1245, and assigning its defence to Prince Geoffrey II of Achaia and local Latin prelates. The Mongol invasion of Hungary prevented any aid to Latin Greece arriving from that quarter and King Bela's letter to the pope in around 1247 forcefully criticised the pope for diverting crusading resources urgently needed to defend Hungary from the Mongols to the Latin Empire and the Holy Land. Frederick II, in alliance with the Byzantine emperor John Vatazes at the time promised help in 1245 for the Latin Empire, the Holy Land and against the Mongols if the pope made peace with him, but nothing came of this. The catastrophic defeat the Muslims inflicted on the Latins in the Holy Land at La Forbie in 1244, causing King Louis IX to take the cross, were another diversion. All these crises in theatres other than Latin Greece impelled the pope to resume negotiations for Church Union with the Byzantines of Nicaea and in effect abandon crusading ventures for Latin Greece, a policy continued to a point of almost complete success, but cut short in late 1254 by the deaths of Pope Innocent IV, Patriarch Manuel II and Emperor John III Vatatzes. Pope Alexander IV exhibited minimal interest in the Latin Empire and even in Church Union, concentrating his efforts against combating Manfred, the heir of Emperor Frederick II who had died in 1250, in Italy and Sicily. Alexander's death in May 1261 was followed by the Byzantine re-capture of Constantinople in July 1261, which ended the Latin Empire's very existence.

Pope Urban IV (1261-1264) responded to this event in 1262 by proclaiming a crusade throughout Europe, both for re-conquering Constantinople and for protecting the remaining Latin possessions in Greece. As previously, the mendicants were actively involved, with the Franciscans preaching the crusade in France and the Dominicans in Poland and Aragon, while as on former occasions assisting the Latin Empire was presented as furthering the liberation of the Holy Land. Those taking part

were to obtain the same indulgences, privileges and immunities as for the Holy Land and papal agents were sent to collect subsidies over the next three years for helping the Latin Empire in France, Castile, Hungary, England and Wales. This, however, was the last crusade summons for Latin Greece proclaimed on traditional lines, and Latin clergy in Spain, France and England all protested vehemently against giving subsidies. The author astutely observes, moreover, that it was only proclaimed after a long period of papal indifference because with Constantinople lost the papacy had been deprived of a major incentive for inducing the Greeks to accept Church Union and papal primacy. The papal struggle against Manfred was intensifying at this time, with crusades proclaimed against him in Italy and Sardinia in 1263-1264, while Hungary was a prey to Mongol incursions and internal unrest. The overtures the exiled Latin emperor Baldwin towards him only alienated Pope Urban IV, ultimately pushing him into an alliance with Charles of Anjou, the brother of King Louis IX of France. The ensuing diplomatic and military struggle between Charles of Anjou and the Byzantine emperor Michael Paleologus (1258-1282) during the years 1267 to 1282 provided the papacy with a new albeit inducement to pressure the Greeks into accepting Church Union, that of keeping in check Charles' designs to conquer the revived Byzantine Empire. The author makes it clear that following Charles of Anjou's defeat and destruction of Manfred and his heir Conradin between the years 1266-1268 and the signing of the Viterbo treaties in 1267 the remnant of continental Latin Greece came under Angevin control, influencing papal policy accordingly.

Charles of Anjou's efforts to lead a crusade against the Byzantines were frustrated by a prolonged papal vacancy between the years 1268 when Pope Clement IV died and 1271 when Gregory X became pope. Pope Gregory, moreover, placed his hopes in Church Union, considering that campaigns against the Byzantines were likelier to harm than to help it, and accordingly contained Charles' ambitions while pursuing negotiations for Church Union. This was officially celebrated at the Second Council of Lyon on 6 July 1274, and the author rightly sees that now for the first time since its loss in 1261 the papacy questioned the legitimacy of restoring the Latin Empire. He argues clearly that despite fierce internal opposition good relations with Rome were essential to Michael Paleologus as the only way of preventing an Angevin attack on his empire, and so had to be maintained at any cost. Michael even offered to assist the pope in a crusade to the Holy Land and encouraged him to use the crusade as a means of recovering Byzantine territory lost to the Turks in Asia Minor, a remarkable about-face whereby the Byzantines, hitherto threatened by crusades, now sought to utilise them to recover lost lands.

From 1276 to 1280 the three short-lived successors to Pope Gregory X continued his policy of negotiations, albeit with less enthusiasm and trust in the Byzantine Greeks, and a greater willingness to invoke the threat of an Angevin attack on Byzantium. Once the ruler of Epirus Nicephorus had become his vassal, Charles' designs became more dangerous, and in 1280 a large army under Hugh le Rousseau de Sully besieged Berat in Albania, only to be defeated by a Byzantine force in 1281 which then proceeded to occupy much of Epirus. In February 1281 a new pro-Angevin pope, Martin IV, was elected, and in November he excommunicated Emperor Michael Paleologus, declared him and the Greeks to be schismatics and heretics and prohibited the export of strategic materials from the West to Byzantium, an interesting prohibition as this was normally applied to Muslim states in the eastern Mediterranean. The pope did not attempt to justify this sudden condemnation, which provoked criticism even in the West, but he did not explicitly proclaim a crusade against Byzantium. There is no conclusive evidence for this, at any rate none that survives, while cardinal Hugo Atratus told King Edward I of England that the alliance between Charles and Venice had been concluded without papal consultation. What crusading funds Pope Martin IV did grant Charles in March 1282 were for an expedition to the Holy Land, not against Byzantium. By pointing this out the author convincingly refutes the viewpoints to the contrary previously expressed by Sylvia Schein, Deno Geanakoplos and Kenneth Setton.

Nonetheless, Charles, whose kingdom lacked a strong fleet, was strengthened considerably when in July 1281 he and Philip of Courtenay, the titular Latin emperor of Constantinople who had succeeded Baldwin II in 1273, concluded an alliance with Venice to recover Romania, with Venice undertaking to provide 40 ships. Charles also concluded alliances with the Balkan powers of Bulgaria, Serbia and Epirus against Michael Paleologus, but this well planned assault against Byzantium was stymied in the execution by a massive uprising against Angevin rule on the island of Sicily, famous in history as the Sicilian Vespers. The revolt put an end to both the planned Angevin attack on Byzantium and to Angevin rule in Sicily. Invaded and conquered by King Peter of Aragon, who set up a cadet dynasty that was to rule the island for centuries, Sicily was lost to the Angevins for good. Indeed, it was after these untoward developments that Pope Martin IV, by granting tithes in 1284 for a crusade against Peter of Aragon, implicitly but clearly legitimized anew Latin Greece as a crusade destination and target, stating that Peter's invasion had harmed the cause of recovering both the Holy Land and the empire of Romania.

In his conclusion the author, while acknowledging that there was a revival of crusading activity in Greece under the Angevins from 1302 to 1331, is somewhat dismissive of its impact and result, arguing that ‘nothing came of these plans’. Even if this is true, one should not overlook the fact that papal commitment to crusades in Greece in the early fourteenth century was just as strong as during the fourteenth century. After the treaty of Caltabellota of 1302 ending the war between the kingdoms of Aragon and Angevin Naples Charles of Valois, the brother of King Philip IV of France who had married the titular Latin empress of Constantinople Catherine of Courtenay in 1301, renewed the treaties of Viterbo and thereby legitimized his claim to the former Latin Empire of Constantinople. In 1304 Pope Benedict XI (1303-1304) issued two crusading bulls for the recovery of Constantinople, whereby all legacies, redemptions of vows and other revenues allocated in the kingdom of France for assisting the Holy Land were made available to Charles, while those joining his crusade would obtain the same indulgences as for the Holy Land. In addition, the pope granted full remission of penance, with the exception of the heavenly reward, to all persons paying for a third party to travel at their own expense because they could not go overseas themselves. An original element of his bulls was the invocation of the Turkish threat to the Byzantine Empire in order to justify a crusade against the Byzantines, seen in this context as a way of defending Byzantine lands from the Turks, once they had been conquered, more effectively than the Byzantines could do themselves.

This pope's successor Benedict V (1305-1314) continued this policy, issuing crusade bulls in 1306 granting tithes, indulgences and other privileges, encouraging the rulers of Sicily and Naples to support Charles' projected expedition and excommunicating the Byzantine emperor Andronikos II as a schismatic. Although the planned crusade eventually failed to depart due to Catherine's death in October 1307 and the war in Flanders that impeded French participation, the papacy was committed to crusading in Greece no less than in the thirteenth century. In November 1322, moreover, Pope John XXII issued a bull granting indulgences for three years to those taking part in the campaigns of Philip of Taranto, who had married the titular Latin empress Catherine of Valois in 1313 and campaigned in the Peloponnese with his brother between the years 1323-1325. Nonetheless, the general nature of this indulgence for those dying in action against ‘the schismatics Greeks, the Bulgars, the Alans and the Turks and other diverse nations of infidels’ does indicate that the crusade in Latin Greece was not longer directed specifically against Byzantine Greeks, and with the increasing urgent need to tackle the growing

threat of Turkish and more specifically Ottoman expansion from the 1330s onwards crusades against the Byzantines came to an end.

In sum this monograph on crusading in Frankish Greece is a significant advance on previous studies for several reasons. Firstly it shows that Romania was a crusading theatre in its own right throughout the thirteenth century, even though it had to compete, often unsuccessfully with other crusading theatres and especially with the Holy Land, which in the minds of most Latin Christians was not only more significant for crusade expeditions than Latin Greece but was the crusading objective *par excellence*. Secondly it charts not only the history of papal commitment to crusading in Greece but also the development of various crusade mechanisms, ideological, spiritual and financial, under successive popes from the early thirteenth century until 1241, when papal commitment declined in favour of negotiations for Church Union, only to revive briefly and unsuccessfully after the Greek recapture of Constantinople in 1261. By placing events in Greece within a wider European and Mediterranean context the author clearly illustrates the reasons why papal initiatives regarding Greece were so difficult to implement, and were ultimately unsuccessful due to pressing papal commitments elsewhere at the same time. The maps at the end of the book are an invaluable guide in illustrating where and when crusade preaching for expeditions to Greece took place in the course of the thirteenth century. Furthermore, the tables of popes and other rulers, Latin and Greek together with the summaries of crusade proclamations given in chronological order at the end help in clarifying and keeping track of the narrative and thematic threads when reading the history of a region politically and denominationally fragmented as a result of the Fourth Crusade and the ensuing Latin Conquest. This book is an important advance not only on the history of the crusade movement in Latin Greece, the Balkans and the Aegean but also on the history of Frankish Greece *per se*, by placing it in a broader European context through an examination of the genesis and development of crusading there.

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