


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HARRY J. PSOMIADES

## THRACE AND THE ARMISTICE OF MUDANYA, OCTOBER 3-11, 1922\*

Given its considerable influence on the negotiations for the Near East peace settlement at Lausanne, which replaced the defunct Ottoman peace treaty of Sèvres, the armistice of Mudanya has surprisingly received little attention by scholars. Mudanya was not simply a matter of drawing the military lines between the victor and the vanquished, between Turk and Greek, but primarily a political settlement reflecting the competing interests and objectives of the Great Powers and Turkey. It was also arguably more of an Anglo-Turkish armistice than a Greek-Turkish one. It was as much about British determination to prevent the Turkish military from crossing over into Europe and refusal to vacate Constantinople [Istanbul] until after peace had been signed as it was about Greek military dispositions in Thrace.

Mudanya was of crucial importance to Greece. Its acceptance by Athens would inevitably exact a heavy toll—the extirpation of the three millennia presence of Hellenism in Asia Minor and Thrace and the acceptance of the staggering burden of absorbing over one million destitute refugees into a society ill—prepared to care for them. Indeed, Mudanya was perhaps the last opportunity available to Greece to halt or modify the movement toward a massive population exchange.<sup>1</sup> A firm stand on the Eastern Thrace question by Greece during the Mudanya armistice talks or, at the least, a refusal to evacuate the region until after the Lausanne peace conference, would have undoubtedly strengthened the Greek position during the peace negotiations. It may have prevented the mass exodus of 300,000 Greeks from the region, whether or not it

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1. Michael L. Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922*, London, Allen Lane, 1973, p. 334.

remained under Greek or Turkish sovereignty. At the very least, it would have allowed for a more orderly and humane transfer of the province's Christian population to Greece. Why this did not happen is a primary focus of this study.

### *The Road to Mudanya*

The sudden and unexpected rout of the Greek army in Anatolia in August 1922 led to the joint intervention of Britain, France and Italy whose own interests were also at risk. Ostensibly their mediation was based on a September 2 note of the Greek Government asking London to arrange for it an armistice on the basis of an immediate evacuation of Asia Minor, its army no longer being capable of coping with the enemy offensive.<sup>2</sup> But the Greek request was silent on the question of Eastern Thrace;<sup>3</sup> and after much discussion in London, on the folly of a

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2. Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, First Series, Vol. XVII: *Greece and Turkey*, January 1, 1921 – September 2, 1922. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglass Dakin and M. E. Lambert, London, HMSO, 1970, Doc. 754-756. Bentinck (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 2, 1922. Hereafter cited as *DBFP*. The long awaited Turkish offensive began on August 26, 1922 southwest of Afyonkarahisar, on the most vulnerable point of the Greek front. Hopelessly outnumbered, the Greeks were easily overcome and within a few days the Turks succeeded in cutting the rail link to Smyrna, occupying Afyonkarahisar and totally disrupting the principle Greek line of Communications and supplies. The Greek forces were cut in two and in full retreat. While those in the northern sector skillfully retreated to the sea of Marmara and embarked for Greece, leaving much of their equipment behind, the larger concentration of forces, in the southern sector, were completely routed. Disoriented and in disarray they fled to Smyrna and the coast, accompanied or followed by thousands of civilian refugees. On September 8, they evacuated Smyrna for Greece. See Alexander Mazarakis-Ainian, *Mémoires*, Thessaloniki 1979, pp. 273-275; and X. Stratigos, *Ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐν Μικρῇ Ἀσίᾳ [Greece in Asia Minor]*, Athens 1922.

3. While prepared to evacuate Asia Minor, Greece was not prepared to give up Eastern Thrace which had a Greek majority or near majority population and where militarily it enjoyed a strategic advantage. Greek forces had occupied much of Eastern Thrace in 1919. The Allies awarded the region to Greece, along with the Smyrna district, on August 10, 1920 (Treaty of Sèvres). See Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase*, Thessaloniki 1968, pp. 39-41, 45-46. The three Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs had met in Paris in March 1920 with the view of ending the Greek Turkish war in Anatolia and to revise the Sèvres treaty in Turkey's favor. They proposed that Greece evacuate Anatolia, restoring it to complete Turkish sovereignty; that the navigation of the Straits be placed under the control of an international commission under a Turkish president; that all of Eastern Thrace be demilitarized; and that a portion of Eastern Thrace be returned by Greece to Turkey to provide a sufficient distance from Constantinople to assuage Turkish fears for the security of the city. Adrianople [Edirne] was to remain Greek. The Greek Government signified its acceptance of the proposal pending clarification of minority guarantees. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1922), *Pronouncement by Three Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs respecting the Near Eastern*

premature armistice request and on the possibility of the Greek army halting the Turkish army on the frontier of the Smyrna zone, telegrams were finally dispatched setting in motion a joint Allied appeal to Angora [Ankara] to negotiate an end of the fighting in Anatolia or Asia Minor.<sup>4</sup> However, the Turkish Nationalists and their leader, Mustapha Kemal [Atatürk], had no intentions of slowing down the momentum of their offensive and would not consent to an armistice as long as the Greek army remained in Anatolia and as long as the armistice conditions did not provide for a clause establishing a line behind which the Greek troops in Thrace must retire.<sup>5</sup>

Turkish military success had shifted the focus of an armistice arrangement from Anatolia to Thrace, Constantinople and the Straits. On September 5, Kemal informed the Allies that Thrace should be restored unconditionally to its frontier of 1914, within two weeks of the armistice; that the Turkish prisoners of war should be returned at once; and that Greece should pay war damages to repair the devastation committed by its army in Anatolia. Thus, with little optimism, the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople sent a message off to Kemal to open negotiations for an armistice on September 9, on the basis of the Greek request; however, the meeting did not materialize.<sup>6</sup> On that day, the Turkish army

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*Situation*, Paris, March 27, 1922. [Cmd. 1641] (London, HMSO, 1922). At this juncture, the Turkish Nationalists were not interested, the proposals were unacceptable, and employed delaying tactics to give sufficient time for military preparations to overcome the increasingly vulnerable Greek forces. Kemal sent his trusted friend Fethi Okyar on a mission to London in August 1922 whose objective, in part, was «to deceive the British and Greeks into thinking that we are still trying to reach an agreement with them». On August 16 Kemal told him to stay in London and continue to gain time for the counter-offensive. Osman Okyar, «Turco-British Relations in the Inter-War Period: Fethi Okyar's Mission to London» in William Hale and Ali Ihsan Bağış (editors), *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations. Studies in Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Affairs*, North Humberside 1984, pp. 62-79.

4. *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII: *Greece and Turkey*, September 3, 1922 – July 24, 1923. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert (London, HMSO, 1972). Doc. 4. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 4, 1922; Doc. 5. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Bentick (Athens), September 4, 1922; Doc. 6 and 7. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 4 and 5, 1922; Doc. 9. Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 5, 1922; and Doc. 19. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 9, 1922. Also Briton Cooper Busch. *Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923*, Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 1976, pp. 341-342.

5. *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 16. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 8, 1922 and Doc. 20. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 10, 1922.

6. Kemal Atatürk, *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, October 1927*, Leipzig 1929, p. 567. Hereafter cited as *The Speech*. Rumbold had reported that the Allied Generals in Constantinople believed that the Nationalists would not agree to an armistice which did not call for the withdrawal of Greek troops from Eastern Thrace. *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 16. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 8, 1922.

occupied Smyrna [Izmir],<sup>7</sup> from which the battered remnants of the Greek army were earlier evacuated by waiting ships. And by mid-September, the withdrawal of the Greek army from Anatolia was complete when the Greek Third Corps in the north, retreating in an orderly fashion to the port of Panderma on the Sea of Marmara, found ships for evacuation, after abandoning its guns and heavy equipment.

The sudden change in the state of affairs created an entirely new situation for the Allies. With the shield of the Greek army smashed, nothing but a few battalions of disunited British, French and Italian troops stood between a victorious Turkish army and its return to Europe. Flushed with victory, Kemal moved his forces north toward the Straits, with the objective of taking Thrace, including Constantinople and Adrianople [Edirne], the frontiers demanded by the National Pact, by force of arms if necessary.<sup>8</sup> He also claimed British-held Mosul, but renounced any designs on Mesopotamia and declared his willingness to guarantee the security of the Straits.<sup>9</sup> Military victory at once placed the Turks in an advantageous if not dominant bargaining position, not only with Greece but with the Allies as well, whose share of the spoils of the Ottoman peace treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920, had been assured by the presence of the Greek army in Anatolia.<sup>10</sup>

Shocked by the magnitude of the Turkish victory and alarmed by the vulnera-

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7. As more and more Turkish troops entered the undefended city, terror spread among its Greek and Armenian population. For days the streets were hideous with screams, murder, rape and pillage. The situation worsened when on September 13 fire broke out, within days two-thirds of the city, primarily its Christian quarters, lay blackened and smoldering. This tragic story has been told many times. See Marjorie Housepian, *Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a City*, London 1972; George Horton, *The Blight of Asia... with the True Story of the Burning of Smyrna*, Indianapolis 1926; Melville Chater, «History's Greatest Trek», *The National Geographic Magazine*, 48/5 (November 1925); Smith, *op.cit.*, Ch. XIII; Lord Kinross, *Atatürk*, London, Ch. Forty, 1966; and Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Foreign Office memorandum on Smyrna Events*, October 10, 1922, FO 371/7955/E11040.

8. FO/7887/E9154 Report of a conversation between the British Ambassador in Rome and Osman Nizami Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador designate, October 9, 1922, quoted in Salah Ramsden Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923*, London 1975, p. 173; and H. C. Armstrong, *Grey Wolf*, New York 1961, pp. 169-170. The Turkish National Pact or *Misak-i Milli* was the Turkish «Declaration of Independence» declared on January 28, 1920. It called for *inter alia* the retrocession of Eastern Thrace to Turkey and for a plebiscite in Western Thrace, which would determine the region's political future. For the events leading to the Turkish National Pact see Roderic H. Davison, «Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne» in Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (ed.) *The Diplomats, 1919-1939*, Princeton 1953, pp. 172-181. For the complete text see Eliot Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey*, New York 1924, Doc. 18. See also *The New York Times*, October 1, 1922.

9. Kinross, *op.cit.*, p. 331.

10. Psomiades, *op.cit.*, pp. 29-31.

bility of their own interests, the Allies drew together. On September 10, at a meeting of the Allied High Commissioners, the British G.O.C., General Sir Charles Harington, warned that the Turks were thinking of occupying the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles and that it was urgent to demonstrate Allied solidarity on the question of the Neutral Zone. Without permission from London, Harington asked his French and Italian colleagues if they would send token detachments to reinforce the slender British forces making a front in the Ismir [Ismid] peninsula and at Chanak [Çanakkale] on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles. They willingly agreed to do so; and on the following day the three Allies notified Kemal's representative in Constantinople that Turkish forces must not transgress the Neutral Zone.<sup>11</sup> Earlier, Harington had sent confusing if not contradictory messages to London stating that British force alone would be inadequate to hold either side of the Dardanelles, although he had previously proposed that it should hold the Chanak or Asiatic side. Finally, he proposed to ask the French and Italians to join in defending Chanak though he appeared to express doubts that they would agree; and suggested that if they should reject his proposal Britain should undertake the defense of Chanak alone.<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile, in view of this confusion of opinions, and unaware of Harington's success with the Allied Generals, London decided to withdraw its forces from the Asiatic side of the Straits. It informed Harington that while Chanak was valuable, it was not indispensable to hold the Straits, and authorized him to evacuate Chanak at his discretion, it being highly unlikely that the French and Italians would join in its defense. On the other hand, any attempt by the Turks to cross over to the European shore would be met by force, with or without Allied support.<sup>13</sup> Upon receiving these instructions and fearful that London might undermine his credibility, Harington pleaded that Chanak was critical as an advance base for the defense of the Gallipoli peninsula. And suggested that to withdraw from Chanak and from the Neutral Zone in the Ismir peninsula after the communication made to the Turks by the Allied High Commissioners would be fatal and would have a deplorable effect on the prestige of the Allied Powers.<sup>14</sup> In the end, as a result of his plea and his assessment that as long as the Allies presented a united front in the Neutral Zone that Kemal was not likely to attack,

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11. Busch, *op.cit.*, p. 343; Sir Neville Henderson, *Waters under the Bridges*, London 1945, p. 109; Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis: The Aftermath*, Vol. 5, London 1929, p. 422; *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 20. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 10, 1922; and *The Times* (London), September 12, 1922. The Neutral Zone was the Allied ring around Constantinople from the lines of Chataldja in the west to the Ismir peninsula in the east, from the Black Sea in the north to the Straits of the Dardanelles in the south.

12. Busch, *op.cit.*, pp. 343-344; *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 21, note 1. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 11, 1922.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Doc. 23. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 13, 1922.

Harington was given permission to hold at Chanak and the Ismit line except in case of serious military risk.<sup>15</sup> And on the following day, the 14th, at the request of British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, French Premier Poincaré asked Kemal on behalf of the Allies not to violate the zone of the Straits, but softened his request by adding that «such an action would not prejudice the conditions of peace on which our [French pro-Turkish] sentiments are known».<sup>16</sup>

Fortified by this resemblance of Allied cooperation and alerted by reports from Constantinople that if the situation were allowed to drift Kemal was likely to force the issue and attempt to cross the Straits, the British Cabinet met in urgent session on September 15.<sup>17</sup> It decided to adopt military measures necessary to restrain the Turks at the Straits until arrangements could be made for a peace conference. It ordered reinforcements to Chanak; and agreed to send telegrams to the Allies, the Dominions and to Balkan states of Greece, Serbia and Rumania warning them that the freedom of the Straits was now in danger and inviting them to join Britain in resisting the danger by force of arms if necessary.<sup>18</sup> On the next day, having dispatched these telegrams, Curzon left for his country home. In his absence, Churchill, who until then favored the pro-Turkish group in the Cabinet, emerged for combat. He drew up a statement of the Cabinet's policy on the Turkish question of the previous day and with the Prime Minister Lloyd George's approval publicly announced it. Foreshadowing a possible war with Turkey, the communiqué, the so-called manifesto of September 16, was provocative both in tone and content.<sup>19</sup>

The sensational appeal for the defense of the Straits had a devastating effect on Allied unity. While in accord with the necessity of preserving the freedom of the Straits, France differed on the proper means to realize it and accused Britain of undermining its efforts to bring the Turks to the peace table. Moreover, the

15. Doc. 26. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 13, 1922; Churchill, *op.cit.*, p. 430; and Busch, *op.cit.*, p. 345. Thus, upon Harington falls much of the responsibility for staying at Chanak and for the subsequent confrontation with the Kemalists.

16. Jules Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré, 1913-1926*, Paris 1957, p. 162; General Ali Fuad Cebesoy, *Siyasî hatîralarî [Political Memoirs]*, Istanbul 1957, pp. 74-75; *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 41. *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, held at the Quai d'Orsay, September 20, 1922; and Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925*, London 1934, p. 271.

17. Doc. 27. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 15, 1922.

18. Doc. 32. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 16, 1922; Nicolson, *op.cit.*, p. 271; and Stephen W. Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets*, Vol. II, 1919-1931, London 1972, pp. 283-284. Hankey was Secretary of the Cabinet. His diary is extensively used in Roskill's study.

19. For the complete text see Churchill, *op.cit.*, pp. 426-427; Nicolson, *op.cit.*, pp. 271-272; and Roskill, *op.cit.*, pp. 284-285.

French Government was profoundly troubled that London did not confer with it before making its grave initiatives public. The Dominions were also upset that they had not been properly consulted before the policy was publicly announced.<sup>20</sup> Only New Zealand and Newfoundland offered full support. Australia offered to help but only if conflict broke out; but South Africa wholly demurred and Canada declined any help. Serbia and Rumania pulled back from supporting the British request as a result of French pressure.<sup>21</sup>

The rupture with France was almost complete. On September 17, General Pellé, the French High Commissioner, left Constantinople to meet with Kemal, without informing his British and Italian colleagues.<sup>22</sup> On the 18th, in Smyrna, he assured Kemal that France did not associate itself with the British manifesto, but asked him to respect the Neutral Zone, in return for promises of support at the peace conference. Kemal's response was that although he was prepared to attend a peace conference, he could not restrain his troops until Eastern Thrace was liberated; and that he must finish the campaign before the onset of winter, even if it meant war with Britain. Delay would be fatal.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile, on the following day in Paris, France and Italy in a joint communique declared that they would not go to war against Turkey, disassociated themselves from the «war hysteria» in London and announced, contrary to the wishes of Britain, that they were prepared to concede in advance of the peace conference the territorial terms of the Turkish National Pact, including retrocession of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa frontier with Adrianople [Edirne], and Turkish sovereignty over the Straits when neutralized. They also withdrew their token detachments at Ismit and Chanak, leaving the British troops alone to face the Turk's advance.<sup>24</sup>

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20. The telegrams sent to the Dominions were overtaken by the press communiqué which had reached the Canadian and Australian newspapers before the responsible. Ministers had received the official request from London.

21. While Greece welcomed the British manifesto, its support alone would create serious problems for Britain both at home and abroad. There was strong feeling against being tied to Greece and acting against France. See *Roskill, op.cit.*, p. 289.

22. Doc. 36. Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 19, 1922, note 9.

23. *The Speech*, p. 528; and Doc. 41. *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, held at the Quai d'Orsay*, 11 a.m., Wednesday, September 20, 1922. Also on the 18th, the Angora [Ankara] agent in Paris, Dr. Nihad Rechad, had informed the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Kemal would not recognize any neutral zone on the Asiatic side or any place as neutral which had been previously occupied by Greek troops, and mentioned Chanak in particular. (Doc. 35. Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 19, 1922). The Turkish response to the manifesto of September 16 was to reconfirm Russian support in the event of war and to strive for an understanding with Bulgaria for joint action in Thrace. They also sought to encourage the Serbs to make common cause with them and to seize Thessaloniki (Sonyel, *op.cit.*, pp. 174-175).

24. Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, Vol. 3, London, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1929, pp. 302-305; Roderic H. Davison, «Turkish diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne», in *The*

At this critical point, Curzon, having recently returned to London from his country home and having read with consternation the bellicose manifesto issued by Churchill, hurried to Paris on September 19 to repair the damage and to reproach Poincaré for the desertion of French troops at Chanak. After a long and acrimonious dispute at the Quai d'Orsay, due in part to the personal antipathy between Poincaré and Curzon, the conference was resumed, owing largely to the tact of British Ambassador Hardinge and the Italian representative, Count Sforza.<sup>25</sup> The basic disagreement at the conference was, above all, over Eastern Thrace, Poincaré, in support of the Nationalists' demands, wanted to transfer Eastern Thrace immediately to Turkey, including Adrianople. Curzon wished to deal with it in accordance with the Paris, March 1922 proposals<sup>26</sup> at the pending peace conference, while allowing the Allied Generals and Kemal to work out stop lines for the respective military forces. Finally, despite a considerable effort to hold firm in Eastern Thrace, Curzon reluctantly gave way. On September 23, the Allied representatives, in a joint note to the Nationalist Government drafted by Curzon, again called for a peace conference on the affairs of the Near East, mainly at the expense of Greece. At the insistence of the French, the joint note indicated *inter alia* that the Turkish desire for the restitution of Thrace up to the Maritsa [Evros] river including Adrianople, would be taken into consideration at the peace conference; the condition was that the Nationalists would not send troops into the Neutral Zone of the Straits, which would also become Turkish with suitable demilitarization safeguards. The note invited Kemal to attend a meeting at Mudanya, on the Şea of Marmara, to arrange with the Allied Military Chiefs an armistice between Greece and the victorious Turks and lines of demarcation beyond which the Turks should not advance. This was to precede a conference in Venice or elsewhere to decide the conditions of peace between the Allies, Greece and Turkey.<sup>27</sup>

On the same day, to test British resolve, a large detachment of Turkish cavalry entered the Neutral Zone at Erenköy near Chanak. After being warned by the local British commander that his forces would fire if the Turks did not pull back,

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*Diplomats, 1919-1939* edited by Gordon A Craig and Felix Gilbert, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 197-198; Busch, *op.cit.*, pp. 346-348; and Doc. 35. Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 19, 1922.

25. Henderson, *op.cit.*, p. 109; Lord Riddell, *Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After*, London 1933, p. 389; and Lord [Charles] Hardinge, *Old Diplomacy*, London 1947, pp. 272-273.

26. See note 3.

27. *The Speech*, p. 569; Cebesoy, *op.cit.*, pp. 75-76; Busch, *op.cit.*, pp. 350-351; *Times* (London), September 25, 1922; and *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris*, held at the Quai d'Orsay, Doc. 42, September 20, 1922, Doc. 48, September 22, 1923; and Doc. 50-51, September 23, 1922.

the Turkish force withdrew on September 24. On the following day, however, a much larger Turkish unit with machine guns returned to Erenköy, creating a militarily dangerous and politically delicate situation. By the 27th, Turkish troops had advanced against the British lines at Chanak, with rifles reversed, butts front, as a refutation of hostile intent, and appeared outside the British wired perimeter. Their orders were to dig in but to be friendly and peaceful; although they were clearly in violation of the Neutral Zone. Meanwhile, Kemal's response to the demarche of the Allies to respect the Neutral Zone was to deny knowledge of any such zone and to say that the sole object of his troops was the pursuit of the beaten Greek army.<sup>28</sup> He had not replied to the Allied invitation of September 23 for armistice and peace talks.

It looked as if Britain was drifting into another war. To prevent this, Pioncaré urged London to withdraw from Chanak. Hardinge from Paris advised that to maintain troops on the Asiatic shore was not worth the risk and danger that it entailed for the peace of Europe. Harington even proposed to ease the tension by allowing the Turks into Eastern Thrace. And within the Cabinet it was argued that since it was agreed to give up Constantinople, Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, it made no sense to retain troops at Chanak. In any case, even without Chanak, the Turks could still dominate the Dardanelles and mine the Straits in another war. Nevertheless, the Cabinet remained steadfast. There could be no question of a British retreat and additional reinforcements were ordered into Chanak, whose defense had now become primarily a matter of pride and prestige of a Great Power.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople continued to urge Angora to accept the invitation to attend armistice talks without further delay.<sup>30</sup>

The climax at Chanak was reached on September 28 and 29 when telegrams came in from Harington of an alarming nature, saying that the Turks were collecting in considerable numbers around the British perimeter and that the situation was becoming impossible.<sup>31</sup> On the 29th, the Cabinet reconvened with Curzon and the Chiefs of Staff present. Noting the fact that Kemal had not responded to the Allied invitation to a conference and in view of the disturbing

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28. Doc. 62, Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 27, 1922; Riddle, *op.cit.*, p. 387; Busch, *op.cit.*, pp. 353-355; Nicolson, *op.cit.*, pp. 273-274; and Churchill, *op.cit.*, p. 431. In terms of legal exactitude, there was a difference of opinion between the British and the Kemalists as to what constituted the Neutral Zone. See Busch, *op.cit.*, p. 353.

29. Doc. 57 and 58, Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 26, 1922; Riddle, *op.cit.*, pp. 387-388; Busch, *op.cit.*, p. 352; and Churchill, *op.cit.*, pp. 431-432. For a detailed account of the Chanak crisis see D. Walker, *The Chanak Affair*, London 1969, pp. 198-280.

30. Doc. 64 and 65, Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 27, 1922.

31. Churchill, *op.cit.*, p. 435; Roskill, *op.cit.*, p. 290; and Nicolson, *op.cit.*, p. 275.

reports from Harington, the Cabinet decided that the time had come to take a stand at Chanak. It authorized Harington to issue an ultimatum to the Turks, «if you do not withdraw from the Neutral Zone around Chanak, you will be fired upon».<sup>32</sup> Curzon opposed the decision and begged for a 24 hour suspension of the ultimatum. He said that the danger was exaggerated<sup>33</sup> and that he needed the time to once again enlist the cooperation of Pioncaré to bring the Turks to the peace table. And that he had encouraging talks with the Nationalist representative in London. His proposal was ignored even though, at the moment, the ultimatum was premature and unessential.<sup>34</sup> And for the next two days, the Cabinet «waited breathless to know whether the guns had gone off or whether the Turks had withdrawn».<sup>35</sup>

Meanwhile, on September 27, Pioncaré decided to use his personal influence to restrain Kemal by sending to him an «unofficial emissary» in the person of Franklin-Bouillon.<sup>36</sup> Upon hearing the news, the French High Commissioner in Constantinople, who had been urging the Kemalists to go to the conference table, sent a strong telegram to his government saying that either Franklin-Bouillon was going to assure Kemal of the goodwill of the French Government, in which case his mission was superfluous, or else that he was bringing with him the promise of further concessions, beyond those of the Allied note of September 23. If

32. Doc. 78. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Hardinge (Paris), September 30, 1922. According to Hankey, the militants in the Cabinet, including Lloyd George and Churchill, dreaded that Kemal would accept the September 23 invitation to an armistice conference because it would compel Britain to implement the condition of handing over Eastern Thrace to the Turks. Thus, Britain would lose its credit with the Greeks without gaining that of the Turks as France and Italy will claim that they forced Britain to it (Roskill, *op.cit.*, p. 290).

33. Harington had also reported that the British position at Chanak was «strong, well-wired and well sited» and even Churchill acknowledged that by September 28 Chanak had been well reinforced and that it enjoyed superior fire power, air supremacy and total command of the sea. «There was never any danger to British forces at Chanak» (Churchill, *op.cit.*, p. 433, 435).

34. Roskill, *op.cit.*, p. 290; Nicolson, *op.cit.*, p. 275; and Churchill, *op.cit.*, pp. 435-436. Curzon was also undoubtedly encouraged by the moderate tone of an interview with Kemal reprinted in the *Daily Telegraph*, September 27, 1922. The only unacceptable point to the British was his claim to oil rich Mosul in Iraq.

35. Roskill, *op.cit.*, p. 290.

36. Franklin-Bouillon was the ranking member of the French Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. The ubiquitous Frenchman and avid Turcophile was instrumental in concluding for France an important agreement with Turkey on October 20, 1921, commonly known as the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. The treaty provided *inter alia* for the evacuation of the French army from Cilicia or southeast Anatolia in return for certain economic concessions. It enabled Kemal to withdraw his forces from the Armenian and Syrian fronts and fling them against the Greeks. The treaty was negotiated in secret without the knowledge of France's ally Britain and created much bitterness between them. It marked a definite line of cleavage in their policies in the Levant. It was the first treaty signed between the provisional Turkish Nationalist Government and a western power. Davison, *op.cit.*, pp. 192-193. For the text of the treaty see *LNOJ* 54 (1926-1927), pp. 177-193.

so, Pellé asked, what are they? He was immediately assured by Paris that Franklin-Bouillon had no authority to offer additional concessions.<sup>37</sup>

Franklin-Bouillon left for Smyrna aboard a French warship on September 28, pathetically eager to be the hero and to stop all chances of war by yielding to the Turks. According to Pioncaré and the French media, it took Franklin-Bouillon two days of hard negotiations to convince Kemal to hold back his troops and send General Ismet [İnönü] to meet with Harington at Mudanya. But they chose to ignore the fact that Franklin-Bouillon had exceeded his authority by assuring Kemal that all of his demands would be met and that Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa would be immediately evacuated by the Greeks and restored to Turkey.<sup>38</sup> In his anxiety to be seen as a peacemaker, Franklin-Bouillon had offered the Turks more than Britain and perhaps even France were prepared to give.<sup>39</sup>

In fact, Kemal did not need to be convinced by Franklin-Bouillon to accept the September 23 invitation to parley. His military posturing and the delay in agreeing to meet with the Allied generals were largely due to the need to placate the extremists in his own camp who, carried away by their victories, were eager to push into Eastern Thrace and even to recover Western Thrace as far as Serres in Eastern Macedonia. He also wanted to test Allied resolve and to improve his military position before going to Mudanya. In the end Kemal overruled the majority of his generals and ministers who wished to push on into the Balkans because there was nothing to be gained by attacking the British, who were clearly determined to fight even without allies. Moreover, Chanak was not of strategic importance to the Turks and a battle there would have been drawn out and wasteful of supplies and men, only a major military operation could possibly dislodge the British. War or a further delay of armistice talks would also give the Greek army time to reorganize and reinforce its defense of Eastern Thrace. If Kemal really wanted a war, he would have attacked much earlier when British defenses at Chanak were negligible. In any case, why fight a war that you could lose if you have already been promised Constantinople, Eastern Thrace and the Straits without firing a shot and if you have the assurance of French and Italian support at Mudanya.<sup>40</sup>

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37. Reported in Doc. 64. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (London), September 27, 1922.

38. The British did not appreciate Pioncaré's bargaining with Kemal behind their backs and came thoroughly to dislike his intrusive emissary who preached that peace was only possible by giving in to the Turks. Henderson, *op.cit.*, p. 109.

39. Doc. 91. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922; Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya'da millî mücadele [The National Struggle in Thrace]*, Vol. I, Ankara 1955, p. 470; *The Speech*, pp. 569-570; Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün söylev ve demeçleri [Collected Speeches]*, Vol. II, Ankara 1945, pp. 466-467; Ali Naci Karacan, *Lozan Konferansı ve Ismet Paşa*, Istanbul 1943, pp. 8-9; Sonyel, *op.cit.*, p. 176; Busch, *op.cit.*, p. 356; and *Oriente Moderno*, II:5 (October 15, 1922), pp. 278-281.

40. Armstrong, *op.cit.*, pp. 171-172; Churchill, *op.cit.*, pp. 431-433; Kinross, *op.cit.*, p. 336;

In a telegram to Pioncaré, dated September 29, Franklin-Bouillon reported that Kemal finally had ordered his troops to stand fast and agreed to meet with the Allied generals at Mudanya on October 3 for armistice talks, but that he continued to insist on the immediate restoration of Eastern Thrace to Turkish sovereignty. On October 1, Pioncaré sent urgent telegrams to the French Ambassadors in London and Rome and to the French High Commissioner in Constantinople informing them of the contents of the Franklin-Bouillon report. Hardinge also telephoned the news to London on the same day.<sup>41</sup>

The Cabinet met on Sunday morning, October 1, still without knowledge of Kemal's agreement to enter into armistice negotiations. However, in the previous 24 hours, it was relieved to learn from Harington and Rumbold, the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, that the situation seemed to be getting better and that the British forces at Chanak were not in danger. Consequently, they had taken it upon themselves to withhold the ultimatum to see if there was a good chance of getting the Turks to Mudanya. The Cabinet was also informed that the Turks had withdrawn from the British barbed-wire at Chanak, allowing General Marden, the local commander, to extend his small defense perimeter. With this news, but without the knowledge of Kemal's agreement to negotiate, the Cabinet approved Harington's forbearance. Thus, a war at Chanak was averted and with the news from Smyrna all attention was now focused on Mudanya.<sup>42</sup>

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Nicolson, *op.cit.*, p. 243; Sonyel, *op.cit.*, p. 175; Doc. 7. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 5, 1922; Doc. 15. Graham (Rome) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 8, 1922; and Doc. 77. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 30, 1922.

41. France, Ministère des Relations Extérieures, Series «E», 1919-1929, *Levant: Turquie*, Vol. 60. Tel. 304. Pioncaré (Paris) to French Ambassadors in London and Rome and to the French High Commissioner in Constantinople, October 1, 1922 and Tel. 1347. Pellé (Constantinople) to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Paris), October 1, 1922. See also FO 3897/E10276, Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 1, 1922.

42. Sir Charles Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back*, London 1941, pp. 113-116; Doc. 77 and 79. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 30, 1922; Busch, *op.cit.*, p. 356; Churchill, *op.cit.*, p. 436; Nicolson, *op.cit.*, pp. 275-275; Ronaldshay, *op.cit.*, pp. 307-309; D. I. Shuttleworth, «Turkey, from the Armistice to Peace», *Journal of the Central Asian Society* 11/1 (1924), pp. 60-62; and Roskill, *op.cit.*, pp. 290-291. It should also be stressed that Harington, while showing much wisdom in withholding the ultimatum, was in fact very much responsible for it. His efforts kept the British at Chanak and his previous reports of the seriousness of the situation activated the ultimatum. It led Hankey to write in his diary that «What the Cabinet, Churchill and others were angry about was that after Harington's telegrams about the seriousness of the situation, we had been spoofed» (Roskill, *op.cit.*, p. 291).

### *Revolt in Athens*

The decision of the Allied Governments in Paris to cede Eastern Thrace to Turkey in their September 23 note to Angora was not solely the result of Greece's defeat in Anatolia and the state of dissolution of much of its army. It was also the consequence of the political vacuum in Athens where military defeat brought about the collapse of the Gounaris/Stratos Government and the inability of King Constantine to find someone to put together an effective ministry. However, the political void in Greece did not last long and the Allies, in their efforts to reach an understanding with Turkey, were soon to encounter a defiant Greece.

On September 24, the remnants of the Greek army which withdrew to the off-shore islands of Chios and Mytilini revolted. And Colonels Nicholas Plastiras and Stylianos Gonatas assumed the leadership of the Revolution which sought to strengthen the Thracian front, to remove and punish those responsible for the defeat in Asia Minor, and to deal with a rapidly deteriorating domestic situation that threatened the very integrity of the Greek state. On September 26, the revolution reached Athens forcing King Constantine on the following day to abdicate, for the second time in five years, in favor of his son George. The government resigned and the *vouli* or parliament was dissolved. On September 27, a new government appointed by the Revolutionary Committee was formed under Sotiris Krokidas and on the following day 12,000 troops belonging to the Revolution marched unopposed in an orderly fashion into Athens. On that day, the Revolutionary Committee had definitely assumed authority in the capital. It was represented by a triumvirate consisting of Colonels Gonatas and Plastiras and Captain Phocas of the Navy, who took a much less active part in affairs than the first two.<sup>43</sup>

Initially, the primary goal of the new Greek regime was to reorganize the army and to reinforce its defense of Eastern Thrace. Indeed, the revolution and the expulsion of King Constantine were, in part, precipitated by the Allied invitation to Kemal to negotiate peace on the basis of receiving Eastern Thrace. The new regime no doubt believed that with King Constantine gone, the Allies would favor their holding all of Thrace.<sup>44</sup> While this was wishful thinking as far as France and Italy were concerned, it was not the case with Britain. In fact, the

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43. The principal ministers were: Alexander Zaïmis (Prime Minister), Sotiris Kokridas (Minister of the Interior and *ad interim* Prime Minister), Nicolas Politis (Minister of National Economy and *ad interim* Minister for Foreign Affairs). Zaïmis had still not accepted the premiership when the government resigned on November 23, 1922. The Revolutionary Committee remained in being and was the real power in the country.

44. Doc. 85. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 1, 1922.

moment Lloyd George read of the news of King Constantine abdication, «he bitterly regretted the [Paris] decision as regards Eastern Thrace».<sup>45</sup> He could not support King Constantine on September 23, but the new Greek Government was another matter. Still, the decision was made and Britain felt bound to it, unless and until it was modified by a further Allied decision, or by the outbreak of hostilities.<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, in its confrontations with Kemal, it was no secret that the new Greek factor was crucial in British military planning and had revived hopes of meaningful support from that quarter, even though there was strong feeling in Britain against being tied to Greece and acting against France.<sup>47</sup> Undoubtedly, it also precipitated Kemal's orders to his troops to advance on Chanak by reviving Turkish fears that Lloyd George and Venizelos might again throw the Greeks into the field or at least press for a settlement favorable to Athens.<sup>48</sup>

However, the revolutionary regime had now to face the extraordinary problems of the previous regime, both internal and external. As a result of almost a decade of war and of the humiliating defeat in Asia Minor, the demoralized Greek army was in a state of dissolution and the economy on the verge of bankruptcy. To make matters worse, the carnage of Smyrna had heralded the mass exodus of the Greek Christian population from Anatolia. In a matter of 2-3 weeks in September over 500,000 destitute refugees were dumped like cattle in Greece, despairing and clamoring for immediate assistance simply to survive.<sup>49</sup>

«The conditions of these people upon their arrival in Greece was pitiable beyond description... If ever the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse rode down upon a nation it was when this appalling host appeared upon the shores of Greece, that was trampled by the flying hoofs of their chargers and scourged by the spectral riders of War, Famine, Pestilence, and Death».

The condition and the state of mind of the returning soldiers and of the incoming refugees clearly had the potential for explosive social conflict. The Revolution was also under much internal pressure, particularly from the army, to try and convict those responsible for the Asia Minor debacle, which would further add to the deep schism in Greek politics between royalists and anti-royalists. One of its first acts was to arrest leaders of the previous regime, Gounaris, Theotoky, Goudas, Photopapadakis and Stratos. Others were soon to follow.

In external affairs, the Revolution had to deal with a victorious Turkey, reach an armistice agreement and prepare for the peace negotiations at Lausanne. Kemal was now not only master of Asia Minor but was also threatening to move

45. Roskill, *op.cit.*, p. 289.

46. Doc. 86. Lindlye (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 2, 1922, note 4.

47. Roskill, *op.cit.*, pp. 289-290.

48. Kinross, *op.cit.*, p. 333; and Nicolson, *op.cit.*, pp. 273-274.

49. Henry Morgenthau, *An International Drama*, London 1929, p. 52.

into Thrace. At this critical juncture in its history, Greece was internationally isolated. Indeed, since December 1920 all Allied help had been withdrawn and official and public opinion in Britain and France had been totally estranged by the restoration of King Constantine, because of his anti-Entente politics during the World War.<sup>50</sup> Its Revolutionary Government was also not recognized and its erstwhile allies, although clearly divided, were united in reaching a peace agreement with Kemal, mainly at Greek expense, to protect their own interests in the Middle East and at the Straits. As far as they were concerned, Greece had no choice but to follow their dictates, «Greece must bow to the decree of the Powers».<sup>51</sup>

Suffocating under the pressure of events and international isolation, the Revolutionary Government saw that its most immediate critical needs and priorities were to attend to the relief of the refugees and to reorganize its demoralized military forces into an effective instrument in order to obtain some leverage in the forthcoming armistice and peace conferences.<sup>52</sup> Recognizing its own inexperience in foreign affairs, one of its first acts was to send a telegram (September 27) to Venizelos<sup>53</sup> in Paris asking him to represent Greece abroad and providing him with full powers to deal with foreign policy questions.<sup>54</sup> Sensing the danger in which Greece found itself, Venizelos immediately accepted the request and entered into contact with the ministers in Paris and London to prepare the best possible position for Greece in the peace negotiations.<sup>55</sup>

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50. For the politics of Greece in 1919-1922 see A.A. Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture — and After*, London 1937 and Michael L. Smith, *Ionian Vision, Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922*, London 1973.

51. Doc. 55. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 25, 1922.

52. To supplement the five divisions in Thrace the Revolutionary Government retained four classes of conscripts, 1919-1922, confirmed the summons already given to the 1923 class and recalled two more of classes older than 1919; planned to regroup 2-3 divisions and send them to Thrace with an independent division. This would give them eight to nine divisions in Thrace or approximately 100,000 men. But it would take several weeks for the plan to be fully implemented. This information concerning the military posture of Greece was requested by the British Prime Minister at a Cabinet meeting held on September 27 in the event the outbreak of an Anglo-Turkish war. Doc. 72. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 29, 1922.

53. Eleftherios Venizelos (1864-1936) was Prime Minister of Greece during most of the period 1910-1920. Under the leadership of the great Cretan statesman Greece emerged from the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) doubled in size. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, he acquired for Greece Thrace and the Smyrna district. The cost of his nationalist policy in Asia Minor was war with Kemal's Turkey. He went into exile after disastrous electoral defeat in November 1920.

54. «The Revolution declares its absolute confidence and trust in you to deal with the conduct of foreign matters and asks for your immediate help». Quoted in Yiannis Kordatos, *Μεγάλη Ιστορία της Ελλάδος [The Great History of Greece]*, Vol. 13 (1900-1924), 2nd edition, Athens, 200s Aionas, 1948), p. 600. See also A. Mazarakis-Ainian, *Mémoires*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1979, p. 278. The memoirs first appeared in Greek (Athens, 1948).

55. *Ibid.*

### *The Allied Powers and Turkey at Mudanya*

The armistice talks opened on October 3 at Mudanya, a small, mosquito-ridden, entirely open port on the southern shore of the sea of Marmara which also served as the terminus of the 41 kilometer long railway to Brusa, the administrative capital of the vilayet or province of that name. The talks were held in the former Russian Consulate, a small, shabby house with poor lighting and limited space. There was only room at the conference table for the heads of the four delegations, British, French, Italian and Turkish, with interpreters in between them. Moreover, the only lodgings available in the town were some mosquito-ridden hospices, compelling the Allied generals to sleep on board their warships off shore.

The negotiations at Mudanya are best characterized as ten tense days of hard bargaining, without much optimism for success. Britain was represented by General Harington, France by General Charpy with Franklin-Bouillon fluttering in the background and Italy by General Mombelli. Turkey was represented by General Ismet [İnönü] with several assistants. The Greek delegates, who arrived late, were General Mazarakis and Colonel Sariyannis.<sup>56</sup>

Although the negotiations were complex, the main issue, not surprisingly, was Eastern Thrace. Curzon had made it clear to the Allied generals and High Commissioners that the sole object of the generals at Mudanya was to fix the line of retirement of the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace, in accord with the Greek and Turkish military authorities. In return for this Allied intervention, the Kemalists would undertake not to send troops into the neutral zones and not to cross the Straits before and during the final peace conference. The provisional administration in Eastern Thrace was one to be decided by the Allied Governments and not by the generals at Mudanya who were instructed not to make political decisions. In any case the interim administration for Eastern Thrace would be controlled by Allied officers until after the peace conference. And Greek forces would only withdraw to the agreed upon line of retirement when the Turks withdrew entirely from the neutral zones and satisfactory arrangements had been made for the preservation of order and the protection of minorities of whatever nationality in the evacuated areas.<sup>57</sup>

However, the program presented by the Allied generals on October 4, within the limits of their instructions, was completely unacceptable to the Turks who tried to get them to discuss political questions in anticipation of the final peace

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56. An anomaly of the conference was that the Greek delegation did not participate directly in the negotiations but were informed of the proceedings at meetings held with the Allied generals aboard. Allied warships in the harbor of Mudanya. Their participation will be discussed separately.

57. Doc. 81. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), October 1, 1995.

settlement. Ismet treated any point raised by the Allies which he did not like as being something that had to be referred to Angora.<sup>58</sup> The Nationalists, with evident encouragement of the French, were clearly not in the mood for compromise and their reply to the Allied proposals that all of Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople and Karaağaç, be evacuated within thirty days and restored to complete Turkish sovereignty before the entry into force of the final peace treaty led to a deadlock. Harington reported that the main difficulties were over four points: (1) Turkish claims to Karaağaç, on the grounds that forts across the Maritsa in Greek hands would pose a threat to Turkey; (2) Turkish objections to a limitation on the number of their gendarmerie to enter Eastern Thrace; (3) Turkish objections to the principle that Allied Missions should remain in any area evacuated by the Greeks after it had been taken over by the Turkish administration; and (4) Turkish claims to the right to carry out military operations even after the signature of a military convention until after it was ratified by the Governments concerned.<sup>59</sup> But the main obstacle in the negotiations was point 3 and the Turkish formula; namely, that the stay of Allied control commissions and of Allied troops in Thrace would be limited to the period of the Greek evacuation of no more than fifteen days. As soon as the evacuation takes place, the territory would be progressively consigned to the Kemalist authorities who would, within fifteen days, take possession, with all of the rights of full sovereignty, of the entire administration of the country, without any intervention by the Allies. The Allied control commissions and troops will retire immediately after the installation of the Turkish administration.

On October 5, after heated discussions with Ismet on these essential points, the Allied generals drafted a protocol with significant concessions to Turkey and asked for Ismet's approval. But at the last minute, Ismet abruptly changed course and demanded that all of Eastern Thrace be turned over to the Nationalists immediately and that Allied officers, missions and contingents in Eastern Thrace be withdrawn at once. He threatened that if his demands were not accepted within 24 hours, his troops would resume the advance and attack Chanak.<sup>60</sup>

While Charpy, under orders from Franklin-Bouillon,<sup>61</sup> was prepared to accept

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58. In Harington's own words «They adjourn on every point they don't like and telephone Angora» in Harington's report of October 4 to the War Office found in Doc. 91. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922.

59. *Ibid.*; and Doc. 92. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922.

60. Tel. 14100-1413 [E 304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 8, 1922; Doc. 96. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 6, 1922; and Doc. 106. British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Chargé d' Affaires in Paris held at the Quai d'Orsay on October 6, 1922.

61. Tel. 223-4-4 [E 304-1]. Charpy (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 6, 1922;

Turkish demands for the immediate cession of Eastern Thrace, Harington and Mombelli were not. Harington was particularly disturbed by the haughty attitude and intransigent position of the Turkish delegation that considered «Eastern Thrace as already theirs and that there should be no foreign interference on this matter. The line they take is that they intent to have Eastern Thrace and that if they don't get it peacefully and soon, they will continue military operations at once».<sup>62</sup>

The rupture in the negotiations was largely due to Turkish insistence that the promises made to Kemal by Franklin-Bouillon at Smyrna to get him to stop the advance of his troops and to enter into armistice talks must be honored; whereas Britain and Italy did not consider themselves to be bound by them since they did not authorize him to make such promises.<sup>63</sup> The impasse prompted Kemal to bitterly complain to the French that «I have already lost 15 days because I had confidence in you, what is there left for us to do».<sup>64</sup> The Turkish demands were ostensibly also made as a reaction to the vague promises of the Allies, to the continuous British military build-up at Chanak and to the reorganization and expansion of Greek forces in Thrace. They were also Kemal's response to mounting pressure from his officers and the Grand National Assembly to move immediately into Thrace. He felt a particular burden of a grave responsibility for agreeing to participate in the conference at Mudanya without the consent of the latter.<sup>65</sup> On balance, however, Kemal's belligerent threats were clearly part of a calculated strategy of brinkmanship that was to prove highly successful.

Under the threat of the Turkish ultimatum, Harington suggested to his colleagues that the conference at Mudanya should be adjourned until the afternoon of October 7, to give time for consultations and perhaps new instructions from their Governments. Ismet also announced, after the intervention of the French, that he

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and for Pellé's report on the negotiations at Chanak see Tel. 297-304-1 [E 304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 14, 1922. Throughout the negotiations Franklin-Bouillon flitted between Ismet and Charpy urging the former to resist and the later to surrender.

62. Doc. 91. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922; and Tel. 297-304-1 [E 304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 14, 1922. Charpy accepted the Turkish demands on October 5 and Mombelli on October 7, leaving Britain once again alone.

63. *Ibid.* The British, in particular, complained that Franklin-Bouillon had encouraged the Turkish Nationalists in their pretensions. They resented his efforts to get the anxious Turks and the reluctant Allies to discuss political questions with himself as mediator. Harington described him as a perfect curse and curtly refused his offer to help in the negotiations. Rumbold characterized the French attitude «as a treacherous surrender inspired by Franklin-Bouillon». Doc. 96. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 6, 1922.

64. Conversation of Kemal with Mougín, the French representative in Angora, in Tel. 317 [E 304-1]. Mougín (Angora) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 6, 1922 which was included in Tel. 1422 [E 304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 8, 1922.

65. *Ibid.*

would not move his troops until 2:30 p.m. of the same day. On October 5, the Allied generals returned to Constantinople where the same evening they met with the High Commissioners to discuss the deadlock. Appalled at the prospect of war, the French and Italians favored the immediate return of Eastern Thrace to Turkey, whereas the British stood firmly by the proposals of September 23. At the same time, London ordered Harington to make no further concessions, to prepare for the worst, and not to return to Mudanya without prior approval. Yet, all three generals agreed that without some kind of gesture to the Turks on the question of Eastern Thrace, such as securing the immediate evacuation of the Greeks from the region and their replacement by Allied troops, Kemal would not agree to a further delay and would order his troops to advance.<sup>66</sup> Even Rumbold was moved by the threat that Turkey might start a war if it did not get what it wanted. While opposed to Turkish blackmail, he advised Curzon that «we have no alternative but to turn over the administration [but not military occupation] of Eastern Thrace to the Nationalists».<sup>67</sup>

Meanwhile, having been apprised of the threatening situation and of the division in the Allied camp, Curzon once more crossed the Channel to confront Pioncaré. From 11 p.m. on October 6 until the early hours of the morning on October 7, he remained closeted with the French Premier. With little ground to stand on, the most Curzon could secure from Pioncaré was a face saving concession by which the Greeks would withdraw to the line west of the Maritsa river within fifteen days and Eastern Thrace would be occupied by Allied detachments for thirty days after the Greek withdrawal, instead of the fifteen days Generals Charpy and Mombelli had conceded to Ismet. And this only after Curzon threatened not to send Harington back to Mudanya and to defend the Straits from Turkish incursions, with or without French support.<sup>68</sup> It was also agreed that the number of Turkish gendarmes in Eastern Thrace would be limited and that the validity of the military convention would depend upon Turkish respect for the Neutral Zone as defined by a successful Anglo-Turkish agreement. On October 7, a general formula for a final military convention was approved and Curzon instructed Harington to resume negotiations but there were to be no further concessions. On this understanding, Pioncaré telegraphed Charpy ordering him to support Harington in insisting on the terms of the agreement.<sup>69</sup>

On the same day, the conference at Mudanya reconvened, although the instructions to the Allied delegates did not arrive until the following day. At last,

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66. *Ibid.*; Harington, *op.cit.*, pp. 116-117; Doc. 97 and 99. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 6, 1922; and Churchill, *op.cit.*, pp. 436-437.

67. Doc. 93. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922.

68. Doc. 106-108. British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting..., October 6, 1922, October 7, 1922 and October 7, 1922 respectively. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 318.

69. Nicolson, *op.cit.*, pp. 275-276.

on the evening of October 9, the Allied generals submitted a final draft of their proposals to Ismet, in conformity with the general formula sent to them from Paris. The four page document provided that hostilities between Greece and Turkey cease; Greek troops were to withdraw to the west bank of the Maritsa river within 15 days; Greek civil authority was to be turned over to a Turkish administration within thirty days after the Greek military withdrawal, with an inter-Allied mission to supervise in the interim; and no more than 8,000 Turkish gendarmes were to be stationed in Eastern Thrace before the treaty of peace was signed. Turkish troops were to keep out of the neutral zones, including Constantinople and Eastern Thrace until the conclusion of a treaty of peace.<sup>70</sup>

Ismet asked for an adjournment until 5 p.m. October 10 to study the draft convention. Thus, on the morning of the tenth, the generals returned to Constantinople to discuss along with the High Commissioners what action to take if Ismet refused to sign the protocol. However, during the adjournment of the conference, Turkish forces unexpectedly began advancing into the Ismit zone toward Thrace.<sup>71</sup> As a result, Harington felt compelled to prepare an ultimatum of his own.<sup>72</sup> Time appeared to be running out and a collision course seemed inevitable. But both Pellé and Marquis Garroni, the Italian High Commissioner, while agreeing on behalf of their Governments to support Harington on the draft convention, announced that their Governments could not accept the presentation of an ultimatum to the Turks. Pioncaré's orders, said Pellé, were that under no circumstances were French troops to fire on the Turks. Nevertheless, the ultimatum stood and the meeting broke up on that note.<sup>73</sup>

Just before the generals returned to the conference at Mudanya that after-

70. *Military Convention between the Allied Powers, the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Greece* in E 320-1. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 10, 1922; and Turkey, No. 1 (1922), Cmd. 1570.

71. When news reached him that the Turks were again violating the Neutral Zone, Lloyd George thought and perhaps hoped that the Mudanya conference would break down. He talked constantly of the possible occupation by the Greeks of the Chataldja lines—the fortified lines in Eastern Thrace guarding the approaches to Constantinople from the west (Roskill, *op.cit.*, p. 295). Pellé reported that the Turkish advance in Ismit exasperated the British who viewed it as treachery. He wrote that «the supporters of the Turks will excuse them without doubt by saying the advance was in response to the reinforcement of British forces; There is a great difference. The English, unlike the Turks, had not made or undertaken an engagement not to reinforce their positions, whereas the Turks had formally promised to maintain their troops in place until the end of the Conference. They are playing a game of brinkmanship». Tel. 1465-1468, E 304-1. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 10, 1922.

72. Busch. *op.cit.*, p. 351; Tel. 459-50. Rumbold (Constantinople) telegram to the Foreign Office, October 10, 1922; and No. 297, E 304-1. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 14, 1922. See also his earlier telegrams 1437, E 320-1, October 9 and telegram 1473, E 320-1, October 10.

73. Walder, *op.cit.*, Ch. XVII; and Henderson, *op.cit.*, pp. 110-111.

noon, Harington was issued his final instructions and, at the same time, a text of a counter-ultimatum which he was to present to the Turks if there were no agreement. He was ordered to employ all the forces at his command to resist the Turks if they attempted to encroach on British positions on the Asiatic side of the Straits. Needless to say, the news that he was prepared to issue an ultimatum, if necessary, became known to the Turks from French and Italian sources. Nevertheless, when the conference reassembled, Ismet refused to sign the protocol, objecting to most of its provisions. He was particularly opposed to the provision that, until the ratification of peace, the Nationalists would be required to keep out of or pull back their forces from certain areas of the neutral zones (Constantinople, Ismet and Gallipoli but not all of the Chanak region), and to limit the number of their gendarmes in Eastern Thrace.<sup>74</sup>

Ismet was instructed by Kemal to give maximum effort to obtain changes in the text with specific counter proposals; however, when he was convinced that the British would concede no more, he was not to risk a rupture and to sign the armistice document. Try as he may, through out the evening, Ismet could not get Harington to budge and vented his anger at Charpy and Mombelli, accusing them of going back on their promise to restore Karaagaç to Turkey and to limit the turn over period in Eastern Thrace to thirty days. Finally, in the early hours of October 11, Ismet, after pacing up and down in that awfully dark room, relented. Mindful of his instructions and on orders from Kemal, he suddenly agreed to sign the convention, taking effect as from midnight October 14/15, 1922.<sup>75</sup> Harington was clearly surprised and grateful that the ultimatum in his pocket need not be delivered. But he was taking no chances and, despite the objections of his weary colleagues, insisted on signature that very night. And so the conference sat for several more hours, while the convention, with the aid of inexperienced typists, was recorded in five languages. Finally it was completed and signed. The distinct likelihood of a new war, which might have involved most of the protagonists in the previous world struggle, was averted. In the morning the text was handed to the press.<sup>76</sup> And Harington and Ismet were correctly praised for the success of the

74. *Ibid.*; and Busch, *op.cit.*, p. 357.

75. Doc. 119. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 11, 1922; Bıyıklıoğlu, *op.cit.*, pp. 450-454; *The Speech*, pp. 568-570; Harington, *op.cit.*, pp. 117-118; Henderson, *op.cit.*, p. 111; Cebesoy, *op.cit.*, pp. 83-101; Yusuf Hikmet Bayer, *Türkiye devletinin dış siyasi [The Foreign Policy of the Turkish State]* Istanbul 1942, pp. 117-118; Amedeo Giannini, *I documenti diplomatici della pace orientale*, Rome 1922, pp. 251-253; Sonyel, *op.cit.*, pp. 180-182; *Oriente Moderno*, II:6 (November 15, 1922), pp. 338-339; No. 297 [304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 14, 1922; Eliot G. Mears, *op.cit.*, pp. 658-659; and Turkey, No. 1 (1922), Cmd 1570.

76. Harington, *op.cit.*, p. 118; and Kinross, *op.cit.*, p. 338. For a copy of the original and official French text with signatures see Appendix A.

conference and for the restraint they showed during critical moments of the negotiations, although it is also true that they helped to create the crises which they were credited with averting.

### *The Greek Reaction*

The September 23 invitation to Kemal for armistice talks at Mudanya was prepared and delivered without consultations with the Greek Government. Yet it was apparent that whatever agreements were reached at Mudanya would require the consent of the new Revolutionary Government in Athens whose leadership had declared that «the Turks had won in Asia Minor but not in Thrace. If they want it let them come and fight for it».<sup>77</sup> With good reason the Turks insisted upon the Greek approval of the armistice results and the Allies agreed. On October 1, just four days after the new government was installed in Athens, Curzon telegraphed Lindley, his minister in Athens, that the armistice would take place on October 3 and that «it is desirable to get the Greek Government to send a representative there, since it is not in their interest that the matter should be discussed in their absence».<sup>78</sup> On the morning of the following day, Colonel Plastiras visited Lindley in his office and asked if it was true that on the next day the Allied generals would be meeting with the Turks at Mudanya. He also informed the British minister that he was going to Thrace to try to reform the army there and that he hoped to field an effective force of 60,000 men in its defense if necessary. In the course of their conversation Lindley, who had not yet received official confirmation of the armistice talks, advised Plastiras that if Kemal accepted the Allied invitation to a conference, it would be madness for the Greeks to refuse to attend. Greece, he explained, would have need of the Allies after the long war and could not hope for their assistance to put its house in order unless it accepted the decision of the Powers. He added that the lessons of the last two years were that Greece could do nothing in the long run if isolated and that if Greece refused to attend the conference and continued the war with Turkey against the wishes of the Powers, the result could be a real catastrophe. At this point Plastiras admitted the force of Lindley's counsel and declared that Venizelos was the best judge of the situation. «He would do what Venizelos advised in this matter but he must lose no time in getting the army in Thrace in shape». Lindley responded that a disciplined and efficient military force on the Maritsa was indispensable for Greece

77. Gregory Daphnis, *Ἡ Ἑλλάς μεταξὺ δύο πολέμων, 1923-1940 [Greece Between Two World Wars, 1923-1940]*, Vol. 1, Athens 1955, p. 26; A.I. Peponis, *Νικόλαος Πλαστήρας, 1909-1945*, Vol. 1, Athens 1947, p. 275; and Stylianos Gonatas, *Ἀπομνημονεύματα, 1897-1957 [Memoires, 1897-1957]*, Athens 1958, p. 250.

78. Doc. 80. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Lindley (Athens), October 1, 1922.

because one never knew how far Kemal's successes might have gone to his head.<sup>79</sup>

Also on October 2, Venizelos met with Curzon at the Foreign Office and was told that the purpose of Mudanya was to draw a line behind which the Greek army would be asked to withdraw in Thrace and to prepare a plan for an inter-Allied occupation in Eastern Thrace pending the peace conference. Venizelos replied that he realized Eastern Thrace was lost for Greece but declined to consider the possibility of the Greek army being withdrawn until the peace conference had given its final judgement. He argued passionately for the necessity of the Greek military to remain in occupation of Eastern Thrace, in order to secure the protection of its Greek inhabitants and to give Greece leverage to defend its remaining interests when the peace conference assembled. How otherwise, he asked, would his Government be in a position to retain Western Thrace and to resist Turkish demands for indemnity, which it cannot afford, and thus be forced to surrender to them the Greek fleet. Curzon's response was that Britain would work hard for the retention of Western Thrace by Greece and that indeed by staying in Eastern Thrace, Greece would jeopardize its position in Western Thrace and elsewhere. It would lead to immediate Turkish military action for which Greece was not prepared. He reasoned that by agreeing to withdraw from Eastern Thrace, Greece would have time, before and during the peace conference, to develop its military posture in Western Thrace. Venizelos replied that he was returning to Paris and would then decide the Greek position.<sup>80</sup> Two days later, he returned to London and informed Curzon that he had advised the Greek Government to accept the withdrawal of Greek troops from Eastern Thrace, provided that there were guarantees for the Christian population in the form of an Allied occupation pending the peace conference.<sup>81</sup>

Meanwhile, late in the evening of October 2, General Mazarakis was appointed Greek representative to the Mudanya conference, with instructions to seek a simple rectification of the line currently held by Greek troops in Thrace. If demands were made for a major pullback, he was to declare a lack of authority on the matter and ask Athens for further instructions. He was to absolutely reject demands that Greece not reinforce its military forces in Thrace or that Greece undertake a complete evacuation of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa river.<sup>82</sup>

On the morning of October 4, just as Mazarakis prepared to sail for Mudanya, the Greek Government received the following dispatch from Venizelos:<sup>83</sup>

79. Doc. 86. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 2, 1922.

80. Doc. 89. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Lindley (Athens), October 3, 1922.

81. Doc. 106. British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting..., October 6, 1922.

82. He was told that «the goal of the conference will be that indicated in the last paragraph of the note addressed by the Allies to the Angora Government, on September 23, 1922, that is to say the designation of the line behind which Greek troops would eventually withdraw until the conclusion of a definite peace». Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, p. 279.

83. *Ibid.*, pp. 282-283; and Giannis Kordatos, *op.cit.*, 2nd edition, Athens 1948, pp. 600-601.

«The new government ought to know that the catastrophe we have been subjected to is irreparable. We have not only lost Northern Epiros, but even Western Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, from the moment that the three Great Powers, once or formally our allies, have decided to yield themselves to Turkey... We find ourselves in complete military and diplomatic isolation. These losses are not unfortunately the end of a series of misfortunes which threaten us. The Turks will do all they can to expel us from Western Thrace, to obtain from us indemnity for the damage caused by the Greek army in Asia Minor, and that we surrender our fleet to them, which would make it impossible for us to defend the Islands... There remains one crucial question: to save the hundreds of thousands of Greeks, threatened with extermination by the return of the Turks to Europe. For these reasons Greece should be in a prepared state. To defend its vital interests at the peace conference, it is necessary that she occupy [Eastern] Thrace.

If we abandon Thrace, before the conference meets, it would be superfluous to send representatives there... This is why, if the Government is invited to send a representative at Mudanya, it should at all costs refuse to evacuate Thrace before the signature of peace. If the Powers allow Turkish troops to move into Thrace, we should take every measure on land and sea to defend and secure Thrace effectively. We might still be able to hold on to it... The second eventuality that may permit us to save Thrace is if Kemal goes to war against the British Empire. We should be ready to assist the British. It is urgent that the Government take a political position. However, if its policy includes a resolution to hold on to Thrace, even against the decision taken by our former allies, I am afraid that I would have to decline the offer of representing my country abroad. If, on the other hand, the Government accepts my views, it will be necessary that you let me know as soon as possible so that I can give the Powers assurances that we will give up or support their decision concerning Eastern Thrace. We can be almost certain that at least Britain will not authorize the Turks a free hand in the Straits and to carry the war into Europe. If it means war we will support Britain as our ally, and in this case the return of the Turks to Europe will be impossible».

Mazarakis left that morning in a Greek torpedo boat for Mudanya, in the company of the leader of the Revolution, General Plastiras. On the way, they stopped at the Thracian port of Rodosto to pick up Colonel Sariyannis. Since the Turks would not allow a Greek warship in Mudanya harbor, they were compelled to transfer to a British destroyer in the sea of Marmara for the remainder of the journey to Mudanya. They arrived there late on the evening of October 4, the conference had started without them. It was not until the morning of the next day that they had their first meeting with the Allied generals.<sup>84</sup> The meeting took place aboard the

84. The Greek delegation did not participate directly in the talks at Mudanya and conse-

British cruiser, the Iron Duke, where they were told of the decision for the evacuation of Eastern Thrace. Not surprisingly, Mazarakis, in accordance with his instructions, refused to accept the decision of the Allies. He explained that he came to Mudanya to discuss an armistice and not to surrender Eastern Thrace to the Turks, which was a political matter to be taken up at the forthcoming peace conference. Needless to say, the Allied generals were deeply disturbed by the Greek position. They feared, not without reason, that the Turks would refuse to accept the validity of the conference, if the Athens Government did not immediately adhere to its decisions. Charpy, in particular, strongly condemned the Greek position and asserted that Eastern Thrace will be given to Turkey and that this cession was definite and irrevocable. The Greeks, he declared, «better understand the situation and accept it because they lost the war and had to pay».<sup>85</sup> Harington and Mombelli were more moderate in the tone of their remarks but in principle agreed with their French colleague and urged their Governments to seek assurances from the Greeks of their acceptance of the conditions set for the evacuation of Eastern Thrace.<sup>86</sup> On the following day, October 6, Mazarakis presented a formal letter or first declaration to the Allied generals rejecting their proposals for Thrace. Meanwhile, General Plastiras left for Thrace where he declared that the area would never again know Turkish dominion.<sup>87</sup>

In the meantime, the conference had reach a dangerous impasse over Kemalists' demands for a full and immediate possession of Eastern Thrace by Turkey, obliging the Allied generals to return to Constantinople for discussions with their High Commissioners. The crisis also hastened a meeting of the Allied foreign ministers in Paris, where they were reassured by Venizelos that Greece would withdraw from Eastern Thrace. Thus, the primary task of the foreign ministers was to come to an agreement on what arrangements to make for a provisional administration of the evacuated areas.

Curzon reminded his colleagues at the Paris meeting that Venizelos had agreed to the evacuation of the Greek army and administration from Eastern Thrace provided that the area remain under Allied administration, for the protection of the Greek population, until the conclusion of the peace conference. Without such protection, Curzon argued, the Greek population, mindful of the Turkish atrocities in Asia Minor, would leave under difficult conditions. And in this case, he asked,

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quently did not confront the Turkish delegation. Mudanya was perhaps the first or an early example of «proximity talks», except that the Greek delegation had essentially no say in the talks. All decisions were made by the Allied generals, who expected Greek acquiescence.

85. Kordatos, *op.cit.*, p. 602; Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, pp. 283-284; and Doc. 91. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922.

86. Tel. 1382 [E 304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 5, 1922.

87. Kordatos, *op.cit.* p. 602; and Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, p. 284. For the First Declaration see Appendix B.

who would feed and care for them? Pioncaré declared that the protection of minorities was of small relative importance and if the Turks advance into Thrace he would do nothing. In any case, while the Turks might get excited in Asia, they would behave in Europe.<sup>88</sup> He refused to even contemplate an Allied occupation of Eastern Thrace until the end of the peace conference but finally gave in to Curzon's demand to extend from 15 to 30 days Allied control of Eastern Thrace, in which the evacuation of the population that wished to leave for Greece might be peaceably effected. Curzon had argued that if Greece were not given the thirty days, Venizelos might be relieved of his promise and Greece may refuse to withdraw from Eastern Thrace. Finally, Curzon got his thirty days, although he and Venizelos warned that it was not enough to perform the task of making orderly arrangements for the anticipated departure of the Greek civilian population and the installation of the Turkish authorities. Nevertheless, Venizelos made it known to the Allied foreign ministers in Paris that he would recommend their verdict to the Greek Government.<sup>89</sup>

Meanwhile, on October 7, Mazarakis received new instructions, suggested to Athens by Venizelos, «allowing for the evacuation of the Greek army from Eastern Thrace on the condition that the Greek administration and gendarmerie may stay to assure the security of the inhabitants until the peace conference, and that the Allies co-occupy the region with us, or they occupy it alone».<sup>90</sup> Clearly these instructions were based on Venizelos' advice prior to the Paris meeting of October 6. However, on October 8, Mazarakis' instructions were modified to reflect the results of the Paris conference; and they directed him «to assist in the deliberations of the Allied generals and to accept the decisions which are taken, as long as the representative of Britain is present and agrees».<sup>91</sup> But shortly thereafter, the Government sent him a copy of a dispatch by Venizelos which warned that Mazarakis should only accept the line fixed by Bulgaria and Turkey in 1915 for the withdrawal of Greek troops. The 1915 line extended two kilometers east of the Maritsa river into Eastern Thrace and not down the medial line of the river itself. Whereas, the Allies and Turkey had agreed that the Greek forces would withdraw to the west of the Maritsa river which would also serve as a natural border or barrier guaranteeing a neutral zone between the forces of Greece and Turkey.

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88. Doc. 106. British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting...., October 6, 1922.

89. Doc. 107-108. British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting...., October 7, 1922. See also Venizelos' message to the Greek legation in London in Doc. 109. Crowe (Foreign Office) to Hardinge (Paris), October 7, 1922. While in Paris, Venizelos informed Athens that his entire effort was directed at providing some kind of security for the Greek population of the lost province of Eastern Thrace. «You know [he wrote] that all of the guarantees which the armistice may provide and which the Turks would accept provide no real security for the Christians». *Venizelos Papers*, 29, Venizelos (Paris) to the Greek Foreign Office, October 7, 1922.

90. Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, p. 287.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 288.

Consequently, on October 9, the Greek delegates presented a second declaration which formulated some observations on the new Allied text which had been given to them but its main objection was the withdrawal of Greek troops to the west of the Maritsa river. Their note declared that the maximum line of retreat of the Greek troops in Eastern Thrace was the boundary between Bulgaria and Turkey fixed in 1915. The region included between that line and that which was proposed in the armistice convention was a part of Bulgaria in 1915 and ceded to Greece by the Great Powers by virtue of the 1919 Treaty of Neuilly. Thus, the Greek delegation could not accept the evacuation, up to the conclusion of the peace treaty, of the forts, railway and city of Karaagaç, situated on the west bank of the Maritsa.<sup>92</sup>

Surprised by the Greek declaration, the Allies tried to assure Mazarakis that the withdrawal of the Greek forces to the Maritsa would in no way prejudice the final Thracian frontier between Greece and Turkey. They had no knowledge of the 1915 line and, once it was explained to them, refused to recognize it as an appropriate line of demarcation for a troop withdrawal. They noted that they had refused Turkish demands for a Greek withdrawal from the forts, railway and the town of Karaagaç, on the west bank of the Maritsa which would be occupied by Allied troops without a Greek evacuation. They urged the Greek delegation to accept the Allied armistice plan and promised that the questions of amnesty, security and minority rights for the Greek population remaining in Eastern Thrace would be considered. They expressed their confidence that the Greek delegation would receive new instructions authorizing it to accept the Allied plan.<sup>93</sup>

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92. *Ibid.*, pp. 290-292; and Tel. 1483-84 [E 320-1] Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 11, 1922. The Turkish note to the Allies of September 29 and October 4 had called for a Greek withdrawal to the west bank of the Maritsa and the Allies agreed. They referred to it as the 1914 line. But there were only two officially recognized boundaries: that of 1913 whereby Turkey regained from Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War much of Thrace extending several kilometers into the region on the west bank of the Maritsa; and that of 1915 when Turkey in order to entice the Bulgarians to enter WW I on the side of the Central Powers ceded to Bulgaria a strip of territory on both side of the Maritsa, thus providing Bulgaria with a potential port and outlet to the Aegean. The Greeks insisted, in part, on the official 1915 line for fear that if they did not do so, they would be pushed back to the 1913 line which included all of the region of Didimotocho, on the right bank of the Maritsa. They also, on principle, did not want to give up territory which was theirs by virtue of the Treaty of Neuilly, an internationally recognized instrument. Several weeks later, during the Lausanne conference, the Turks expressed their regrets that they did not demand the 1913 line during the Mudanya talks. By being on the west bank of the Maritsa they believed that they could have exerted greater pressure to force a plebiscite in Western Thrace and deprive Greece of a military advantage by denying it the high ground on the west bank of the Maritsa. Indeed, at Lausanne the Turks claimed the Thracian frontier of the 1913 treaty of Constantinople but the Allies only offered a small enclave between the 1915 boundary and the Maritsa. In part, this had been Greece's reward for accepting the terms of Mudanya. For the Second Declaration see Appendix C.

93. Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, pp. 293-295.

On October 10, Mazarakis informed Athens of the tense situation at Mudanya and asked for new instructions. He recommended that Greece reject the terms of the armistice, complaining that none of the core Greek proposals had been inserted in the convention; neither those concerning the withdrawal of the Greek troops to the former Bulgarian frontier of 1915, nor those for amnesty and the prolongation of the Allied administration to insure the orderly and safe withdrawal of an apprehensive civilian population.<sup>94</sup>

After Ismet had accepted the Armistice terms in the early hours of October 11, all eyes turned toward the Greeks. Would they sign? Harington had received word from London that they would and so informed his colleagues.<sup>95</sup> Thus, at noon, Mazarakis was invited aboard a British warship for a signing ceremony, but to the dismay and consternation of the Allies he refused to sign the armistice convention in the absence of full instructions from his Government and repeated his objections of the previous day.<sup>96</sup> He then left Mudanya and arrived in Athens on October 13 to explain his reasons for not signing before the Government and the leaders of the Revolution. However, Mazarakis had, in fact, received instructions from Athens just before the meeting with the Allied generals. In spite of not knowing the final text of the armistice agreement, the Greek Government instructed Mazarakis to sign, with reservation; but he chose to ignore his instructions because he found them contradictory. They read: «You are authorized to sign the Convention in accordance with previous instructions». He concluded from these instructions that the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs was confused and believed that the frontier of 1915 and the course of the Maritsa river coincided.<sup>97</sup>

Meanwhile, on October 12 Venizelos received an urgent telegram from Athens, informing him that Greece had not signed the convention, and asking him to advise the Government whether it should do so. He immediately went to the British Foreign Office to learn of the substance of the convention; and after

94. *Ibid.*, p. 296.

95. Tel. 1483-884 [E 320-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 11, 1922.

96. Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, pp. 296-297; and Doc. 119. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 11, 1922. As a result of Mazarakis' refusal to sign, there is no Greek signature on the official armistice convention signed at Mudanya, although it does contain a Greek signature block and, of course, the signatures of the other participants. See also A. Türkgeldi, *Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekeleri Tarihi* [*History of the Mudros and Mudanya Armistice*], Ankara 1948, pp. 158-192. For the Third Declarations see Appendix D.

97. Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, pp. 298-299. Mazarakis' explanation may have been an excuse not to affix his name to a document which he considered humiliating and grossly unfair to Greece. When he was first asked to accept the assignment to Mudanya, he had refused on the grounds that «It was very difficult for me to present myself as a defeated party at a place where I had been a victorious party. In my opinion, it was more just to have a royalist officer go there». (*Ibid.*, p. 278).

lengthy discussions with Curzon and Crowe, it was apparent that he was chiefly alarmed at the provision that, contrary to his understanding with Curzon in Paris, Turkish authority was to be restored immediately after the withdrawal of the Greek troops and not 30 days after the completion of the withdrawal. He expressed his misgivings that the Allies had not inserted contingency plans in the convention if it were found impossible to complete the withdrawal of the civil population, or that part of it which wished to withdraw, within the stipulated thirty days. He was fearful that without a contingency plan for the extension of the period of Allied occupation and control, the civil population would be exposed to the danger of either complete annihilation, if it stayed, or of a sudden rout, as was the case in the Smyrna region, where the refugees took to flight, leaving every possession behind them in order to save their lives.<sup>98</sup> On the following day, having finally received an official copy of the text signed at Mudanya from the Foreign Office, Venizelos dispatched a letter to Curzon expressing his misgivings of the armistice convention and his fears for the safety of the Christian population of Eastern Thrace. Their tragic situation, he wrote, was further increased by the failure of the Allies to compel the Turks to give amnesty to those who, thinking themselves to be Greek subjects for the past two years, either served in the Greek army or collaborated with the Greek administration. They will now be prosecuted for high treason, as has already happened in Smyrna, and will be hanged.<sup>99</sup> Nevertheless, following the advise of his British mentors, who sought to assure him that one way or another the civil population would be protected, Venizelos cabled Athens that it was in the interest of Greece to sign the convention.<sup>100</sup>

On October 13, a reluctant Greek leadership officially accepted the terms of the armistice. Following the advise of the British for a speedy passage of all measures of its execution, the armistice was to be implemented on October 15, the Greek Government instructed Simopoulos, the High Commissioner of Greece in Constantinople to address a declaration to the Allied High Commissioners and to the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly signifying Greece's acceptance of the Mudanya convention. The text of the declaration read as follows: «The Greek Government considers that its declarations made by the Greek

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98. Doc. 122. *Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos*. Foreign Office, October 12, 1922; See also *Venizelos Archives*, 29, Kanellopoulos (Athens) to Venizelos (London), October 12, 1922. It should be noted that both Pioncaré and Curzon claimed that Venizelos had accepted the 30 day limit in Paris, although Venizelos denied it. Lord Curzon minuted on October 12: «As it was M. Venizelos himself who suggested the month to the French he must have been either very rash or very shortsighted» in note 6 to Doc. 122. Also the discussions of October 12 were based on newspaper reports of the armistice convention. The official text, for some inexplicable reason, had been delayed in reaching the Foreign Office.

99. Doc. 122. note 7.

100. *Venizelos Archives*, 29, Venizelos (London) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 13, 1922.

delegates at Mudanya should have been taken into consideration, especially regarding guarantees and formulas strictly necessary for the safety of the lives and property of the Christian population of Eastern Thrace. The Greek Government makes a final appeal to the sentiments of humanity of the Allied powers in favor of these populations. Desiring, nevertheless, to conform to the decisions of the Powers, the Greek Government sees itself obliged to submit and declare its adherence to the armistice protocol signed at Mudanya».<sup>101</sup>

### *The Mudanya Armistice in Perspective*

Although the Turkish Nationalists did not achieve their maximum demands, they were, by far, the chief beneficiaries of the armistice. They compelled the Allies to meet on Nationalist-held territory and to treat with them as the only official government of Turkey, signaling the end of the Ottoman Government in Allied-controlled Constantinople. Without war, they pressed the Allies to abandon their hold on Turkey, obtained Eastern Thrace, deemed essential for their return to Constantinople, and secured the eventual orderly Allied withdrawal from that city upon the conclusion of a Near East peace. Moreover, the agreement to vacate Constantinople emboldened the Nationalist within a few days after Mudanya and before the opening of the Lausanne peace conference to undermine the Allied occupation machinery and to force a dual de facto regime in Constantinople — an Allied military regime and a Turkish civil one.<sup>102</sup> In addition, at Turkish insistence, the questions of minorities and amnesty were left outside of the scope of the armistice, thus provoking the welcomed mass exodus of the Greek population of Eastern Thrace and a sizable portion of the Greek population of Constantinople, who were viewed as a grave source danger to the Turkish state.

Turkish diplomacy was driven by the deeply-held belief that if the Allies did not yield to Turkish demands at Mudanya, they were less likely to do so at the peace conference. The Kemalists were clearly distrustful of the vagueness of Allied promises and wary of Britain's decision to refuse them Constantinople until the final conclusion of peace. They were convinced that even after Mudanya, Britain would strive to maintain its position at the Straits at their expense.<sup>103</sup> Indeed, two days after the signing of the armistice, in an interview with the Turkish press, Ismet declared: «It is only when they respect all the engagements

101. Doc. 124. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office). October 13, 1922; See also Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, p. 299 and Tel. 1499 [E 340-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 12, 1922.

102. Alexis Alexandris, *op.cit.*, p. 79.

103. Biyıklıoğlu, I, *op.cit.*, pp. 438, 440-441; Gonatas, *op.cit.*, pp. 250-251; and Cebesoy, *op.cit.*, 89ff.

and promises made that we can say that we have been successful. We do not consider our mission as complete. Our armies are ready in case we do not obtain our rights». <sup>104</sup>

The success of the Nationalists at Mudanya was largely due to their measured but firm diplomatic stance and their willingness, if necessary, to employ their advantageous military position for the achievement of their goals. Success at Mudanya also insured for them the promise of a similar triumph in the forthcoming peace conference at Lausanne. The one major disappointment for them at Mudanya was their inability to extract an Allied pledge to hold a plebiscite in Western Thrace as outlined in the National Pact. This failure was attributed to the absence of a Turkish army in Eastern Thrace, due to British resolve, and to the growing power of a reorganized Greek army along the western bank of the Maritsa. <sup>105</sup>

France and Italy also considered their participation at Mudanya a success; and in terms of Great Power rivalry took some satisfaction in Britain's put-down by the Kemalists. Their support of the Nationalists and indifference, if not outright hostility, to Britain's client, Greece, came as no surprise. Long before Mudanya, in 1921, the French and the Italians acknowledged the realities of Turkish nationalism and decided to cut their losses in Cilicia and Antalya [Adalia] respectively; provided weapons and aid to the Kemalists in the 1919-1922 Greek-Turkish war and, in return, secured promises of economic concessions. France's pro-Turkish policy, however, was chiefly inspired by the urgency to acquire a satisfactory demarcation of the Turkish border with French mandated Syria and to be at liberty to deal with the unruly Arabs in Damascus. On the other hand, their experience at Mudanya convinced the French that the Turks «will cease to be our friends the day when the last concession is refused to them» <sup>106</sup> and thus contributed to the mending of fences with Britain at the peace conference.

Unlike France and Italy, Britain was late in realizing that, in spite of the threat to its prestige, abandoning the pawn constituted by Eastern Thrace was preferable to open hostilities. This was remarkable given the severe restraints on British diplomacy: France and Italy had categorically refused to join in a more forceful policy with regard to Turkey and indeed were prepared to allow the Turks to cross over into Europe; its coalition government was on the verge of collapse and British public opinion was clearly opposed to the renewal of hostilities; and the reconstitution of the Greek army in Thrace was an uncertain factor.

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104. Interview in Tewhid-I-Efkiar, October 13, 1922, reported in No. 297 [304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 14, 1922.

105. Büyükhöğlü, *op.cit.*, pp. 470, 472. According to the author the Turks made one big mistake in not demanding the 1913 frontier in their notes to the Allies of September 29 and October 4, 1922. See *Ibid.*, pp. 485-486.

106. No. 297 [304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 14, 1922.

Moreover, Britain found itself with only 16 battalions facing 200,000 Turks. Nevertheless, Britain's achievements at Mudanya were not inconsiderable. By its determined stand at Mudanya, Britain gained a few critical weeks of breathing space before the opening of the peace conference, which allowed it to secure Allied unity and to shape the direction of negotiations at Lausanne. Moreover, its success in maintaining the Allied military presence in Constantinople and in keeping the Turkish army out of Eastern Thrace strengthened the Allied position at Lausanne and prevented the renewal of a Greek-Turkish war. The military struggle for Thrace would have probably initiated a Third Balkan War with all of its deleterious consequences. Also, Britain's refusal to vacate Constantinople until after the peace conference undoubtedly prevented the mass exodus of its substantial Greek community of some 400,000 in 1922, including Greeks who had recently fled from Anatolia, although in fact many did leave during and particularly after Mudanya.<sup>107</sup> But in Eastern Thrace it was another story. In spite of British efforts, the Allies at Mudanya failed to guarantee the life and property of the region's Christian population and to extend the period of the Allied control commissions beyond thirty days. The result of this failure was over 300,000 additional refugees for Greece. Mudanya was thus probably the catalyst which obliged the Allies, and particularly Britain, to seek a solution to the awesome refugee problem of Greece, for which they felt partly responsible.<sup>108</sup>

For Greece, Mudanya simply confirmed its status as a defeated nation. Given its precarious internal situation and the military posture of the Kemalists, the country seemed to have little choice but to accept the sacrifices demanded of it by the Allies. Although its military leadership was prone to take a stand in Eastern Thrace and renew the war with Turkey, Venizelos had at once accepted the burden of defeat to gain the diplomatic support of the Allies at the forthcoming peace conference and their economic assistance in the task of national reconstruction and refugee settlement. The situation naturally would have been different if Greece had a significant military force in Eastern Thrace capable of holding its own against the Turk or if Britain and Turkey in their acts of brinkmanship fell over the brink.<sup>109</sup> Even Venizelos would have accepted a war with Turkey in Europe which involved the Allies, especially Britain, but not without their support. Yet, a rational calculation might have led Greece to refuse to evacuate Eastern

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107. Alexis Alexandris, *op.cit.*, p. 82. From October to December some 50,000 Christians fled the city. Some 15,000 alone during October, 1922.

108. Doc. 126. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 16, 1922; and Doc. 122. *Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos*, Foreign Office, October 12, 1922.

109. British brinkmanship just before and during Mudanya was largely responsible for the downfall of Lloyd George's wartime coalition government on October 19, 1922; whereas Turkish brinkmanship contributed to the consolidation of power of the Kemal [Atatürk] regime.

Thrace, at least until after the peace conference in order to ensure the rights and welfare of its Christian population.

Venizelos, who unwisely got Greece into Asia Minor in 1919, performed perhaps one of his finest and most difficult acts by refusing to represent the interests of the Greek Revolutionary Government abroad unless it consented to surrender Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa river. «In so doing, he deliberately forbore to embarrass the Allies at a moment when any Greek had a right to feel bitter against each and all of them. And resisted the temptation of precipitating... a new Turco-British war, in which Greece might have had a gambler's chance of retrieving... all or a portion of Eastern Thrace».<sup>110</sup> While his policy to surrender Eastern Thrace was ultimately to Greece's interest, it also clearly served the immediate interests of Britain. Yet, one wonders whether or not the welfare of the Greeks of Eastern Thrace would have been better served by Venizelos had he refused to support the armistice convention without a clause for the retention of the Allied control commissions in the area until a peace had been signed or a clause for amnesty.

The real victims of Mudanya were the tens of thousands of panic-stricken Christians, who upon hearing that the Turks were coming, abandoned their homes and fields and fled to a refugee burdened Greece. As soon as they saw the Greek troops striking camp, within hours hundreds of villages and towns were deserted. To the first wave of 800,000 pitiful refugees from Anatolia was added a new torrent of wretched, numbed Greeks from Eastern Thrace, «where the shadow of the disaster in Asia Minor fell over the Greek communities».<sup>111</sup> Ernest Hemingway, then a young reporter for the *Toronto Daily Star*, described the abject misery of the scene: «...the Christian population... is jamming the roads... The main column crossing the Maritza at Adrianople is twenty miles long. Twenty miles of carts drawn by cows, bullock and muddy-flanked water buffaloe, with exhausted, staggering men, women and children... walking blindly along the rain beside their worldly goods... they can only keep their places in the ghastly procession... It is a silent procession. Nobody even grunts. It is all they can do to keep moving».<sup>112</sup> Under the circumstances, the loss of Eastern Thrace was probably inescapable, but the sudden flight of its Christian population was not. If the Allies had insisted that the period of Allied control and occupation be prolonged until the conclusion of the peace conference, as they had for Constantinople, a good portion of the Christian population would have remained. Or, at the very least, if the period of Allied control for all of Eastern Thrace had been extended

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110. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, 2nd edition, New York 1970, pp. xix-xx. Venizelos' acceptance of the Mudanya terms also gained Allied support for Greece in Western Thrace at Lausanne.

111. M. L. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 319.

112. Ernest Hemingway, *Toronto Daily Star*, October 22, 1922.

for one month, and not progressively consigned to the Kemalist authorities, the departure of the civilian population would have taken place under more hospitable circumstances. In any case, the failure of the Allies to respond to this humanitarian concern at Mudanya would lead them, on the day the armistice convention took effect, to formally invite the League of Nations to take all possible steps to reach an agreement as soon as possible regarding an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey.<sup>113</sup>

Mazarakis was opposed to the Mudanya convention precisely because it did not provide adequate security for the civilian population of Eastern Thrace. It can be argued that Greece should have held out for appropriate protection of the Christians of Eastern Thrace before committing itself to the convention. One, of course does not know what the outcome of such an action would have been. Would the Turks risk their gains at Mudanya and continue the war because of an Allied occupation of Eastern Thrace until the forthcoming peace conference? After all they accepted these conditions for the continued Allied occupation and administration of Constantinople. It is ironic that by insisting on the immediate take over of Eastern Thrace as the Greek army withdrew and thus pushing the Christian population of the region into Western Thrace, the Kemalists lost any chance of getting the Allies to agree on a plebiscite in Western Thrace with its substantial Muslim population. Both Curzon and Venizelos were in agreement that by encouraging the Greek population of Eastern Thrace to resettle in Western Thrace, with its substantial Muslim population, Greece would be assured of demographic dominance in the region, which would serve as a bulwark against Turkish demands and Bulgarian irredentism.<sup>114</sup>

Thus, Mudanya was the decisive factor which prompted Venizelos to seek a population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, on the very day he pleaded with Curzon for the safety of the Greek population of Eastern Thrace and advised Athens to accept the verdict of Mudanya, he sent a telegram to Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations High Commissioner for refugees, requesting him to endeavor to arrange an exchange of population between Greece and Turkey before the signature of peace, foreseeing the long diplomatic negotiations at Lausanne.<sup>115</sup>

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113. *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922), 48/24318/24318. League of Nations, Report of Dr. Nansen, Part 1, *Reciprocal Exchange of Racial Minorities between Greece and Turkey* (Geneva), November 15, 1922.

114. Doc. 122. *Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos*, Foreign Office, October 12, 1922.

115. *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922), 48/24318/24318. Venizelos (London) to Nansen (Constantinople), October 13, 1922. Interestingly, Venizelos' telegram was dispatched before the arrival of Nansen's letter of October 10 which independently recommended the settlement of the refugees on vacant lands in Greek Macedonia and Thrace with the help of foreign loans and international relief organizations and vaguely suggested a Greek-Turkish population exchange.

And two days later in response to a note from E. Kanellopoulos, the Greek Foreign Minister asking him «should the Government discourage the Greeks of Eastern Thrace from abandoning their homes and fleeing to Greece?»,<sup>116</sup> he replied:<sup>117</sup>

«I think that the Government would be committing a grave crime if it did not help the population of Eastern Thrace that wished to emigrate. Of course, if it were possible to secure their life and property until the conclusion of peace, we would be in a better position at the peace conference. But it is absolutely certain that after 30 days, with the removal of all Allied controls on the Turkish administration in Thrace, the Turks will plunder the movable property of our fellow countrymen and will expel them naked and miserable. Remember what happened on the eve of the Great War. Today, this will be repeated on a much wider scale because of the contempt the Turks have of the Great Powers. For this reason, it is necessary to facilitate in every way the departure of our fellow countrymen, taking with them their movable property before the [Turkish] army comes... Do not be deceived. Eastern Thrace is lost forever for Hellenism. The Turks will not tolerate a compact foreign population at the very gates of their capital».

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116. *Venizelos Archives*, 30, Kanellopoulos (Athens) to Venizelos (London), October 15, 1922.

117. *Venizelos Archives*, 30, Venizelos (London) to the Greek Foreign Office, October 16, 1922.

APPENDIX A

*Signal*

*Bosnia 1900*

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**CONVENTION MILITAIRE ENTRE LES PUISSANCES ALLIEES,  
LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA GRANDE ASSEMBLEE  
NATIONALE DE TURQUIE et LA GRECE.**

*E 320-1*

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*E 304-1*

Conformement aux termes de la Note adressée au Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie par les Puissances Alliées le 23 Septembre 1922, et de la note adressée au Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie le 29 Septembre 1922, des réunions entre les Généraux Alliés :

- le Général HARRINGTON, pour le Grande Bretagne,
- le Général LOMBELLI, pour l'Italie,
- le Général CHARPY, pour la France,
- et le General ISMET PACHA, pour le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie,
- et le General MAZARAKIS, pour la Grèce,

ont été tenues à Moudania le 3 Octobre 1922 et jours suivants.

..

Les Gouvernements alliés ayant décidé de remettre au Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie la Thrace Orientale y compris Andrinople, le but de cette conférence était :

- 1°. De préciser la ligne au delà de laquelle les forces grecques seront invitées à se retirer de la Thrace Orientale.
- 2°. d'établir les modalités d'évacuation des troupes et de l'administration helléniques et de l'installation de l'administration et de la gendarmerie du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie dans ce territoire.
- 3°. d'assurer le contrôle de cette région pendant la période transitoire en vue de maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité publique.

..

Les Délégués se sont mis d'accord sur les points suivants:

- 1°. Les hostilités cesseront entre les forces turques et helléniques à la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention.

2°. La ligne derrière laquelle les troupes helléniques de Thrace seront invitées à se retirer dès la mise en vigueur de la présente convention est constituée par la rive gauche de la Maritza, de son embouchure dans la Mer Egée jusqu'au point où elle traverse la frontière de Thrace avec la Bulgarie.

3°. Afin d'éviter toutes complications possibles jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, la rive droite de la Maritza (Kara Agatch inclus) sera occupée par des contingents alliés qui seront installés en des points à déterminer par les Alliés.

4°. La portion de voie ferrée longeant la rive droite de la Maritza de Swilengrad (Jisr Mustapha Pacha) à Kuléli-Bourgas sera l'objet d'une surveillance (à régler par une convention spéciale) par une Commission militaire mixte comprenant un Délégué de chacune des trois Puissances alliées, un Délégué de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie et un Délégué de la Grèce, en vue de maintenir intégralement le libre parcours de cette section de voie qui permet l'accès de la région d'Andrinople.

5°. L'évacuation de la Thrace Orientale par les troupes grecques commencera dès la mise en vigueur de cette convention. Elle comprendra les troupes elles-mêmes, les services et formations militaires et leurs moyens de transport divers, ainsi que les approvisionnements stockés en matériel de guerre, munitions, dépôts de vivres.

Cette évacuation sera effectuée dans le délai d'environ 15 jours.

6°. Les autorités civiles helléniques y compris la Gendarmerie, seront retirées aussitôt que possible. Au fur et à mesure que les Autorités helléniques se retireront de chaque région administrative, les pouvoirs civils seront remis aux autorités alliées qui les transmettront autant que possible le jour même aux autorités turques. Pour l'ensemble de la région de Thrace cette remise devra être terminée dans un délai maximum de 30 jours, après la fin de l'évacuation par les troupes grecques.

7°. Les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie seront accompagnés de forces de gendarmerie du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie, d'effectif strictement nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité locale, à la surveillance de la frontière et des chemins de fer.

L'effectif total de ces forces ne dépassera pas : 8.000 (Officiers compris).

8°. Les opérations de retrait des troupes grecques et la transmission de l'administration civile s'effectueront sous la direction de missions interalliées qui seront installées dans les principaux centres. Le rôle de ces missions est de s'entretenir pour faciliter les opérations ci-dessus de retrait et de transmission. Elles s'efforceront d'empêcher les excès de toute nature.

9°. En outre de ces missions, des contingents alliés occuperont la Thrace Orientale.

10°. Le retrait des missions et des contingents alliés aura lieu 30 jours après que l'évacuation des troupes grecques aura été terminée.

Ce retrait pourra avoir lieu à une date plus rapprochée pourvu que les Gouvernements alliés soient d'accord pour considérer que des mesures suffisantes ont été prises pour le maintien de l'ordre et la protection des populations non turques. C'est ainsi que lorsque l'administration et la gendarmerie du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie fonctionneront régulièrement dans une division administrative, les missions et contingents alliés pourront être retirés de cette division administrative avant l'expiration du délai de 30 jours prévu.

11°. En Asie, les troupes du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie s'arrêteront sur les lignes suivantes qui ne devront pas être dépassées jusqu'à l'ouverture et pendant la conférence de la paix : -

Région de Chanak :

Une ligne à une distance d'environ 15 kil. de la côte asiatique des Dardanelles ayant pour origine Koum Bournou au Sud et rejoignant Boz Bournou (Nord de Lampeaki) au Nord.

Péninsule d'Ismid :

Une ligne allant de Daridjé sur le Golfe d'Ismid, à Chilé sur la Mer Noire en passant par Guebzé. Ces localités incluses au Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie.

La route allant de Daridjé à Chilé pourra être utilisée en commun par les troupes alliées et celles du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie.

Les lignes ci-dessus seront délimitées par des commissions mixtes composées d'un Officier de chacune des armées alliées et d'un Officier de l'armée du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie.

Les Gouvernements alliés et le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie, tout en prenant les précautions nécessaires pour prévenir tout incident, s'engage à ne pas augmenter les effectifs de leurs troupes et à ne pas entreprendre de fortifications ou travaux militaires dans les régions ci-dessous :

Région de Chanak : à partir des Dardanelles jusqu'à une distance de 15 kil. à l'Est de la ligne Boz Bournou - Koum Bournou.

Péninsule d'Ismid : à partir du mérophore jusqu'à une distance de 40 kil. à l'Est de la ligne Daridjé - Chilé.

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie s'engage à ne pas placer d'Artillerie à moins de 15 kil. de la côte entre Boz Bournou (Nord de Lampeaki) et Kara Bournou (Nord de Kara Bigha) inclus.

quatrième page.  
et dernière.

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12°. La présence des troupes alliées sera maintenue sur les territoires où elles sont stationnées actuellement, territoires que le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie s'engage à respecter jusqu'à décision de la conférence de la paix :

Savoir :

Péninsule de Constantinople :

Toute la partie de la Péninsule située à l'Est de la ligne marquée par un point de la Mer Noire à 7 kil. nord Ouest de Podima, Istrandja, Kichtaghi, Sinekli, Kara-Sinan-Tchiflik, Kadi-Keuy, Yémidjé, Fladina-Tchiflik, Gallieratia, tous ces points inclus.

Péninsule de Gallipoli :

Toute la partie de la Péninsule de Gallipoli au Sud de la ligne : Sakla - Bournou (Cap Xeros), Boulaïr, embouchure du Soghluok, tous ces points inclus.

13°. Le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie s'engage à ne pas transporter de troupes ni à lever ou entretenir une armée en Thrace Orientale jusqu'à ratification du traité de paix.

14°. La présente convention entrera en vigueur 3 jours après sa signature, c'est-à-dire à minuit le 14/15 (quatorze/quinze) Octobre 1922. (N.S.)

Faite en quatre feuillets à LOUJAN (en français),  
ce onze Octobre , mil neuf cent vingt deux. (N.S.)

Pour la Grande Bretagne : - *J. H. Harcourt* *Le General*  
Pour l'Italie : - *M. Mussolini*  
Pour la France : - *Ch. Charpy*  
Pour le Gouvernement de  
la Grande Assemblée : - *K. T. Inönü*  
Nationale de Turquie.  
Pour la Grèce : -

## APPENDIX B

## PREMIERE DECLARATION

DES DELEGUES MILITAIRES HELLENES DEVANT LA REUNION  
DES GENERAUX ALLIES.

La délégation hellénique a déjà exposé devant la réunion des Généraux Alliés qu'elle considère la proposition qui lui a été faite concernant le retrait des troupes grecques à l'Quest de la Maritza, comme une solution politique et non comme une mesure d'ordre purement militaire.

Cette proposition, en effet, préjuge les décisions de la future conférence de la Paix et leur acceptation par le Gouvernement hellénique, les pouvoirs et les attributions des délégués militaires grecs ne leur permettant pas d'envisager des décisions politiques et de les discuter.

C'est sous ces réserves que les délégués ont pris connaissance du projet qui leur a été remis. Ils ne peuvent pas en discuter les détails étant donné que pour les raisons précitées, il leur est impossible d'en accepter le fond.

Moudania.

6 Octobre 1922

## APPENDIX C

## DEUXIEME DECLARATION

DE LA DELEGATION HELLENIQUE DEVANT LA REUNION DES  
GENERAUX ALLIES A MOUDANIA

Les délégués hellènes invités à prendre part à la réunion des Généraux Alliés prévue par la Note du 10/23 Septembre, se sont trouvés à leur arrivée à Moudania devant des décisions radicales déjà prises qui leur ont été communiquées et à l'élaboration desquelles leur avis n'avait pas été demandé.

Ils ont déclaré qu'ils n'étaient pas autorisés à accepter des décisions tellement importantes et à en discuter les détails de l'exécution.

Se trouvant aujourd'hui devant des décisions définitives des Grandes Puissances Alliées, décisions qui en réalité sont imposées au Gouvernement hellénique, ils se voient obligés, malgré leur profonde douleur, de s'incliner, et, autorisés par leur Gouvernement de déclarer en son nom:

1. Ils n'acceptent comme ligne maxima de retrait des troupes helléniques de

la Thrace Orientale (Art. 2 du projet) que la ligne frontière entre la Turquie et la Bulgarie fixée en 1915, étant donné que la région comprise entre cette ligne et celle proposée dans le projet de convention appartenait à la Bulgarie à partir de 1915, qu'elle fut cédée par celle-ci aux Grandes Puissances Alliées en vertu de Traité de Neuilly, et qu'à leur tour elles en firent cession à la Grèce. Les délégués hellènes ne peuvent, par conséquent, pas accepter l'évacuation jusqu'à la conclusion du Traité de Paix de la partie de la forteresse d'Andrinople sise sur le rive droite de la Maritza et comprenant les forts, la gare et la ville de Karaagatch, comme située dans la région précitée.

Ils acceptant la surveillance du tronçon de la voie ferrée entre Kuleli-Bourgas et Svilengrad par une commission mixte interalliée, turque et hellénique.

2. Ils acceptent la clause (Art. 1 du projet) d'après laquelle les hostilités cesseront entre les forces turques et helléniques à la date de l'entrée en vigueur de la convention.

3. Ils acceptent (Art. 5 du projet) l'évacuation de la Thrace orientale par les troupes helléniques avec leurs services, formations, dépôts, etc. Mais, considérant que toutes les opérations qui d'ailleurs coïncideraient avec le départ des populations chrétiennes indigènes, exigent un délai plus long pour être effectuées en ordre et sans confusion, les délégués insistent pour que le délai de quinze jours soit porté au moins à un mois.

4. Quant à la transmission des pouvoirs civils (Art. 6 du projet) ils doivent attirer toute l'attention des Généraux Alliés sur les conséquences graves que pourrait avoir en remise trop hâte de l'administration et de la gendarmerie aux mains des Turcs. Si l'on pense aux certaines de milliers d'habitants qui voudront quitter le pays avec tout ce qu'ils peuvent emporter de leur fortune, on comprendra que c'est un minimum d'humanité à accorder à ces populations malheureuses, déracinées pour la deuxième fois de leurs pays natal dans l'espace de quelques années, que de leur fournir tout le temps et toutes les facilités nécessaires.

Les délégués hellènes estiment que le seul moyen efficace serait la remise de l'administration aux troupes alliées qui la maintiendraient au moins pendant un mois jusqu'à ce que ces populations soient évacuées en ordre et des autorités alliées.

5. Les délégués hellènes estiment que pour effectuer l'évacuation sans désordre et pour la sécurité des populations les missions et les contingents alliés prévus par la projet (Art. 8 et 9) sont insuffisants. Il faudrait prévoir non seulement des excès possibles de la part de l'élément ou des autorités turques contre les populations chrétiennes mais aussi l'irruption de bandes d'irréguliers, turque et bulgares, qui pourraient profiter de l'occasion pour se livrer au brigandage et à des sévices contre ces populations.

Sur les questions essentielles indiquées dans les paragraphes 2 et 5 les délégués hellènes insistent non seulement au nom de leur Gouvernement, mais au nom de la conscience de tout homme vraiment civilisé.

Dans le même ordre d'idées les délégués demandent qu'avant l'installation des

autorités turques une amnistie générale soit accordée aux populations afin qu'elles soient mises à l'abri de toute poursuite motivée par leurs actes ou opinions de caractère politique.

Moudania.

26/9 Octobre 1922.

## APPENDIX D

### TROISIEME DECLARATION

#### DES DELEGUES HELLENES DEVANT LA REUNION DES GENERAUX ALLIES A MOUDANIA

La délégation hellénique constate qu'aucune des remarques qu'elle a formulées dans ses déclarations précédentes n'a été prise en considération dans la rédaction du texte définitif de la convention militaire.


Notamment sur la question primordiale de la ligne de retrait des troupes grecques, qu'elle a déjà déclaré ne pas pouvoir accepter, elle n'a reçu aucune satisfaction.

Dans ces conditions la délégation hellénique ne se croit pas autorisée à signer le texte de la convention militaire.

Moudania.

le 28/11 Octobre 1922.

Map 3. The Greek Turkish Frontier in Thrace



Map 2. The Aegean Islands