How is "AI testimony" possible? A "Non-Anthropocentric" Attempt to Defend "Technological Testimony"

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Published: Jun 7, 2026
DOI: https://doi.org/10.12681/dia.45790
Keywords:
Social epistemology Technological epistemology technological testimony testimony Artificial intelligence
Weng Hong, Yue
Nanjing Normal University, China
Abstract

In contemporary society, where artificial intelligence technology is highly developed, Generative AI and its generated content permeate daily practices, shaking the anthropocentric concept of "testimony." Therefore, whether "AI testimony," generated and provided by AI, can be accepted has become an unavoidable frontier issue in contemporary philosophical research. Canadian scholar Freiman, after analyzing related debates, argues that "AI testimony" lies in the middle ground between humans and technological objects, between everyday language and mechanical scales, thus proposing the concept of "quasi-testimony" to describe it. This paper, while supporting the viewpoint of "AI testimony," adopts a more concise "deceptive argument" to demonstrate that Freiman's "quasi-testimony" is unnecessary. Simultaneously, this paper attempts to delve into the anthropocentric perspective and address the potential problems arising from accepting "AI testimony," striving to supplement the discussion of "AI testimony" with possible ideas and necessary normative frameworks.

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