The Self of No-Self: Yogacara, Consciousness-Transformation, and the Analysis of Selfhood in Generative AI
Published:
Σεπ 18, 2026
Keywords:
Yogacara No-self Large language models Artificial intelligence Philosophy of mind Consciousness Selfhood
Abstract
Large language models produce first-person expressions, simulate hesitation, and generate apparently self-referential judgments. These behaviors have reopened philosophical debates about machine selfhood, yet existing positions share an unexamined assumption: that genuine selfhood requires a persistent, unified substantial subject. This paper names that assumption substantial-self priority and argues it is philosophically unmotivated. Drawing on Yogacara Buddhist philosophy of mind and its doctrines of consciousness-transformation and no-self, I argue that generative AI instantiates what I call the self of no-self a system producing sophisticated self-representations without any substantial subjective core. The paper maps the Yogacara storehouse consciousness model onto large language model architecture, engages directly with embodied-cognition critiques of disembodied selfhood, examines what AI genuinely lacks through the criterion of transformative substrate-revolution, and draws implications for both AI philosophy and Buddhist thought.
Article Details
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Yiwen, Z. (2026). The Self of No-Self:: Yogacara, Consciousness-Transformation, and the Analysis of Selfhood in Generative AI. Dia-Noesis: A Journal of Philosophy, 20, 447–474. https://doi.org/10.12681/dia.46986
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