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Diversity. A critical approach

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ABSTRACT

In this paper “diversity” is scrutinized under four different angles. The first is to place it in a genealogy of scientific and political concepts which describe and assess urban societies, stressing that this concept denotes a further step away from egalitarian discourses and policies. The second is an examination of the relationship between diversity and inequality, inspired by François Dubet’s (2010) elaboration on the relation between unequal class positions and unequal opportunities. The third discusses the relation between diversity and spatial mobility and, particularly, the constrained mobility of labour legitimated based on individuals’ essentialised otherness. The fourth and last angle, is a comment on the relationship between diversity and democracy, pinpointing that the rise of diversity in political discourse has been increasingly concomitant with the limitation of democracy in terms of effective political alternatives as well as in terms of the limited political rights for many of those who constitute this diversity. Overall, the paper stresses the ambivalent relation of policies and discourses promoting diversity with the egalitarian project when the rights of diverse groups are founded on fixed identities and essentialized differences.

Keywords: *diversity; inequality; mobility; democracy; context*

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ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ

Σε αυτό το κείμενο ο όρος «ετερότητα» εξετάζεται κάτω από τέσσερις διαφορετικές οπτικές γωνίες. Η πρώτη την τοποθετεί σε μια γενεαλογία επιστημονικών και πολιτικών εννοιολογικών εργαλείων τα οποία περιγράφουν και αποτιμούν τις κοινωνίες των σύγχρονων πόλεων και επισημαίνει ότι η χρησιμοποίηση της έννοιας «ετερότητα» σηματοδοτεί ένα ακόμη βήμα απομάκρυνσης από εξισωτικούς λόγους και πολιτικές. Η δεύτερη διερευνά τη σχέση μεταξύ ετερότητας και ανισότητας, εμπνευσμένη από τις επεξεργασίες του *François Dubet (2010)* όσον αφορά τη σχέση μεταξύ άνισων ταξικών θέσεων και άνισων ευκαιριών. Στο πλαίσιο της τρίτης οπτικής συζητείται η σχέση μεταξύ ετερότητας και χωρικής κινητικότητας, με επικέντρωση στην εμποδιζόμενη κινητικότητα της εργασίας, την οποία νομιμοποιεί κυρίως η ουσιοκρατική αντίληψη της ατομικής ετερότητας. Η τέταρτη και τελευταία οπτική γωνία αφορά σε ένα σχόλιο για τη σχέση ετερότητας και δημοκρατίας, το οποίο επικεντρώνεται στο ότι η αυξημένη χρήση του όρου «ετερότητα» στον πολιτικό λόγο συμβαδίζει όλο και περισσότερο με τον περιορισμό της δημοκρατίας όσον αφορά τις ουσιαστικές επιλογές, αλλά και τον περιορισμό εκείνων των πολιτικών δικαιωμάτων που κυρίως ενσαρκώνουν αυτή την ετερότητα. Συνολικά, το κείμενο τονίζει την αμφίσημη σχέση μεταξύ πολιτικών και λόγων που προωθούν την ετερότητα, από τη μια πλευρά, και προγραμμάτων για περιορισμό των κοινωνικών ανισοτήτων, από την άλλη, όταν τα δικαιώματα των ομάδων στις οποίες αναφέρεται η ετερότητα βασίζονται σε παγιωμένες ταυτότητες και σε ουσιοκρατικά αντιληπτές διαφορές.

Λέξεις κλειδιά: ετερότητα; ανισότητα; κινητικότητα; δημοκρατία; συγκείμενο

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INTRODUCTION – DIVERSITY IN CONTEXT*

As a social and political notion, diversity varies widely across different contexts. Vertovec (2010) and many others use this concept interchangeably with multiculturalism, echoing mainly what happens in the English-speaking world. Diversity is a rather good match with the melting pot notion in the New Anglophone World or the tolerated juxtaposition of ethnocultural differences at the core of the post-colonial Commonwealth. In contrast, diversity was deemed irrelevant and ignored in the assimilationist context of French Republicanism (Bertossi, 2016) and the West German Gastarbeiter period, when migrants were kept at a distance because their presence was considered temporary.

Diversity also varies over time. Vertovec (2007) advocated the concept of “super-diversity” as a post-multiculturalist approach to diversity, to grasp the interactions amongst its various dimensions under conditions of increased migrant mobility, multiple legal statuses, transnational living, and the various – and often contradictory – feelings of belonging that these conditions entail. Tasan-Kok et al. (2013), who was involved in the FP7 project DIVERCITIES, proposed the alternative notion of “hyper-diversity” to go beyond migration-based diversity and embrace other possible dimensions of diversity as well, such as class inequality, age differences, gender, lifestyle and sexual orientation, and their interactions, following to some extent the basic idea of intersectionality (Anthias, 2013).

In this paper, the main argument is that approaches and policies that prioritize the management of diversity¹ tend to dissimulate issues of inequality and discrimination. The fundamental starting point here is examining the relationship between diversity and inequality. Capitalist globalisation and the advance of neoliberal policies in the last 45 years considerably transformed the *rapport des*

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¹ An advertisement by SAP suggests that technology-based management is the answer: ‘How can you put 3 million people on a planning committee? It is easy. SAP Hana’. SAP (Systems Analysis and Program Development) is a transnational global leader in IT corporate management applications founded in Germany in the early 1970s.

forces between capital and labour, and eventually curtailed the part of the social product appropriated by the latter, clearly depicted in Piketty's elaboration (2014) on the trends of inequality since the early 20th century. As capital appropriates the lion's share, it also becomes increasingly invisible as a social relation and is distanced from the political game. This transforms the stakes in the political arena and promotes new criteria for shaping social policies. Under these conditions, the diverse features of those who sell their labour power often become the main criteria for gaining advantages or suffering disadvantages in the increasingly antagonistic redistribution of resources amongst those who work for a living.

In the following, we consider diversity from four angles: a genealogy of political and scientific concepts assessing urban societies, the relation of diversity with class inequality, the relation of diversity with spatial mobility and, last, the relation of diversity with democracy.

A GENEALOGY OF DIVERSITY

The first angle is to place diversity in a genealogy of concepts which describe, and assess urban societies. Each of these concepts rises and dominates in different historical periods and national contexts suggesting different social and political agendas.

Social cohesion is a rather vague concept, but one which denotes a significant change since the 1990s in the context of social and political agendas (Maloutas and Pantelidou Maloutas, 2004). The more egalitarian goals of bridging social distances and the rather explicit terms used to express them (e.g. reduction of inequality, narrowing of gaps) were replaced by imprecise goals of social justice, expressed by new terms, such as inclusion and cohesion. The new terms (Lenoir, 1974) signify holding society together and avoiding the exclusion of groups at the lower socioeconomic echelons from the assumingly prosperous mainstream society. The transition from rather explicit to more vague and limited social goals and terms was concomitant with the transition from a period of welfare state growth to the gradual prevalence of neoliberal ideas and policies. Social agendas were demoted and subsumed to economic growth objectives that were henceforth considered of primary societal importance.

Diversity may be considered a further step down this line of concepts and notions that are supposed to designate the main challenges faced by societies and

policy-makers. Describing a city as unequal immediately implies the need for policies to bridge the gaps; a city described as socially fragmented, where exclusion appears to be an imminent danger, implies the need for policies promoting social cohesion; and a city described as diverse implies the need to manage this diversity without specifying the social and political objectives of this management.²

To a large extent, this narrative about diversity is Eurocentric. If we look at the other side of the Atlantic, the genealogy of diversity as a description of urban social milieus would be quite different. It would involve the constant tension between the melting pot aspect of the American dream and the resilient structures of urban segregation which have been studied since the Chicago School and were ardently fought during the Civil Rights Movement. Furthermore, since segregation in US cities is almost synonymous with ethno-racial segregation, the implied social issue is discrimination, and the policy agenda is anti-discrimination, mainly through controlling the negative effects of segregation.³ Thus, when diversity becomes a privileged way of approaching European urban societies – and since diversity is mainly related to ethnocultural differences – there seems to be an indirect corroboration of the claim that European cities are moving towards the American model (Häussermann, 2005; Häussermann and Haila, 2008).

Moreover, diversity has not remained a steady signifier during these changing times. In the period of welfare state-building in Europe, or of Johnson's Great Society and Civil Rights Movement in the US, diversity was much more related to multiculturalism in a positive way that designated plural ethnic and racial identities as untapped social resources. Diversity became much more 'neutral' when neoliberal

² The approach adopted by the European Commission on "societal challenges", prescribed as research missions for Horizon 2020, is characteristic of such a "neutral" stance, which indicates a reluctance to address inequality and discrimination as issues per se, unless the scope is limited to managing their extreme forms and their manifestly negative impact on economic growth. "Societal challenges" comprise issues like ageing and climate change, which seem more susceptible to technocratic solutions, and neglect issues like tax evasion, tax avoidance, and offshoring (Urry, 2014), whose immediate political management is left to national governments (subsidiarity) that have increasing difficulties to promote effective solutions to these issues at the national level. For a detailed description of these challenges, see the Horizon 2020 webpage (<https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/societal-challenges>). However, since things are never black or white, Horizon 2020 comprises fields and calls where inequality and discrimination are prominent issues (e.g. calls on migration). The question then is the specific content of these calls, the object of successful proposals and, eventually, their impact.

³ Brute opponents of diversity in the United States mainly criticise the relevant policies (i.e. positive discrimination), claiming that they represent an unconstitutional offense to equal rights and individual liberty and that tolerance of otherness is breeding danger, especially since 9/11 (Wood, 2003).

discourses and policies became dominant and together with multiculturalism acquired negative connotations in political discourses.

Within this changing landscape, objections to multiculturalism were being raised from all political sides, either as a breeder of national disintegration and insecurity or as a way to avoid addressing class-based inequality and welfare withdrawal (Vertovek, 2010). The unanimous declaration by Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and David Cameron a few years ago, of the failure of multiculturalist policies,⁴ was an attempt by conservative parties in Europe to legitimate austerity policies by attributing them, at least in part, to the cost of migrants. The immigrant “other” came to re-embody the non-deserving poor in the new neoliberal discourse and policy; and, although multiculturalist measures and policies have not been seriously curtailed in many countries, especially in those with a strong welfare state tradition, the political conditions for their preservation and development have been considerably undermined.

At this point, the electorates in the two countries that pioneered unfettered globalisation have turned against it, by Brexit and the Trump election, in a way that some label as populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). A similar wave has been growing in most continental European countries, where many conservative, and some socialist, parties have tried to mitigate the pro-diversity positions which some of them had expressed in the past. The countries where the dominant political forces still explicitly promote diversity as a feature of social and economic strength, such as Canada and Australia, are rather few. However, being pro-diversity does not necessarily mean adopting an egalitarian agenda of universal citizenship rights, unobstructed mobility, and complete anti-discrimination. The promotion of diversity is often harmoniously combined with neoliberal ideas and policies (Benn Michaels 2008)⁵.

⁴ For Merkel’s declarations about the failure of multiculturalism see Weaver (2010) and Noack (2015); similar declarations from Cameron and Sarkozy were published respectively by BBC Online on February 5, 2011 (<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12371994>) and CBN News on February 11, 2011 (<http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/february/frances-sarkozy-multiculturalism-has-failed/?mobile=false>).

⁵ See also Tissot (2015) on how the endorsement of diversity may not work against inequality but as a gentrifying culture.

DIVERSITY AND INEQUALITY

To consider subjects as unequal, there must be some degree of similarity amongst them that permits comparison in the first place. Diversity is by definition the negation of similarity; this makes any reference to equality/inequality dependent on the system of differences it pinpoints. For a rather homogeneous population of economically active white males, class differences may be easily understood in terms of inequality in income or occupational status. However, if gender and ethnicity are also considered, the observed differences become more complex, as they involve multiple systems of inequality, hierarchy, and discrimination.

Inequality and discrimination are usually addressed in tandem as social problems that erode social justice and that are, therefore, harmful to social cohesion. Hence, it is often assumed that policies promoting social justice are combatting both discrimination and inequality, and that a more equal society will also be one where minority rights gain greater recognition and where diverse identities do not lead to different living and working conditions and considerably unequal chances of social mobility.

Yet this is only partly correct since inequality and discrimination refer to different facets of equity – the former refers to the range of distances between places occupied by actors within a specific system, while the latter refers to actors' opportunities to access positions within such systems. Equality concerning both places and opportunities is important for the egalitarian project, but different political projects prioritise one over the other, and capitalist globalisation treats them very differently.

François Dubet (2010) stressed the difference between the two major forms of social inequality – unequal positions and unequal opportunities – and discussed their relation to social justice. He argued that claiming equal opportunities for social justice reflects liberal ideological principles while defending the minimisation of distances between social positions represents socialist principles. Both forms of equality are essential for social justice, and exclusive attention to one or the other creates injustice. Focusing only on distances between class positions usually leaves out those who are not securely positioned in the class system, while focusing exclusively on opportunities underestimates the fact that equal opportunities for unequal individuals lead to unequal outcomes systematically. Nevertheless, although both forms of equality rely on one another, equal positions are a priority for a solid egalitarian

project and, are a prerequisite for opportunities to become effectively equal. Diversity is first and foremost a way of perceiving and describing (urban) societies, which focuses on unequal opportunities rather than unequal positions.

If diversity is considered a crucial social feature of urban societies, and social justice issues are addressed mainly in respect of diversity, then we come closer to the agenda of equal opportunity principles than to that of positional equality. Consequently, dissimilarities among individuals and groups appear to be the major element affecting the just redistribution of resources, rather than the distances between their positions within some hierarchical system. The dissimilarities that constitute what we usually understand as diversity have become increasingly prominent in recent decades and overshadow positional inequality. Indeed, the transition from inequality to diversity as the main focus of social and political attention follows the economic and political changes of the last four decades, from Fordist to neoliberal (de)regulation.

Capitalist globalisation and the domination of neoliberal policies have weakened considerably the position of labour in the capital-labour relationship and curtailed the resources that labour receives through redistribution. This weakening process has certainly been supported by the diversification of identities in the labour camp, which cause a specific commodity (the labour force) to be treated differently and traded unequally following the particular characteristics of its holders (e.g. gender or ethnicity), which are usually irrelevant to its quality but are closely related to entitlements associated with such characteristics. Entitlements may be legally bound (like those related to nationality and citizenship) or related to established practices, such as gendered practices in the labour market that form glass ceilings and gender gaps in remuneration for the same jobs. The long-term reproduction of discrimination according to such different characteristics contributes to their essentialisation, and hence to reinforcing sexism and racism and to consolidating their effect on inequality.

Thus, the visibility of discrimination based on the essentialised characteristics of all individuals currently takes precedence over inequality amongst positions held by some of these individuals within the class system. On the contrary, positional inequality is downgraded as the capital-labour relationship is getting more invisible. Therefore, diversity may be considered a notion that conveys primarily the incommensurability of individuals; it downplays class positions and the issue of inequality amongst them by bringing to the fore attributes whose social importance is

largely tautological, since it derives from the discriminating impact of their essentialised nature. A man and a woman undertaking the same work are treated differently because of the essentialised differences of their historically constituted social roles. The stereotyped and immanent identities assumed in multiculturalist approaches also essentialise the long and discriminating impact of colonial history and neo-colonial practice. Thus, diversity may be either a descriptive inventory of stereotyped differences that reinforces the essentialisation of identities or – when openly addressing and challenging discrimination against the composite identities of real people – may lead to raising issues of social justice. In this sense, diversity does not have an inherent ideological/political predilection and meaning; rather, it follows what the dominant wave assigns as its content.

Neoliberalism's relationship with diversity developed ambivalently across different varieties of capitalist regulation. The social and political complexities of addressing discrimination and social inequality have been a major issue for the survival of the European model, for instance. The crucial point is that the European model has been more attentive to positional equality than to discrimination since it was usually built within homogeneous ethnic settings with one dominant ethnic component. In contrast to the US model, and to the rest of the New Anglophone World, the European model has faced greater difficulties in addressing discrimination issues partly due to the resistance of those already integrated within labour markets and social security systems – that is, in national citizenship systems, where access rights are more easily legitimated based on essentialised mono-ethnic identities. European societies – except for the UK – have had much less ethnic diversity (for historical reasons) and have, therefore, been more introverted than those of the New English-speaking World, which have based their growth and elite formation on absorbing and integrating diversity.

The partial breaking of this “introversion” of the European model coincided with new trends in inequality on a global scale. Growing inequality in post-industrial societies since the 1970s is leading, as Piketty (2014) stated, to extreme disparities in terms of both incomes and fortunes (i.e. accumulated wealth) and is gradually approaching the peak range of inequalities observed before World War I. The main trend is the growing gap between high and low incomes with the highest decile and, especially, the highest centile getting richer at an exponential rate. The New English-speaking World integrated ethnic diversity during a long period of unprecedented

decline of social inequality and middle-class growth in the 20th century (from World War I to the 1970s), whereas Europe faced massive ethnic diversification when this trend was reversed.

Discrimination and inequality issues did not evolve along the same timeline. Ethnoracial discrimination decreased constantly since the beginning of the post-war period; gender inequality – even though it remains important – has substantially decreased during the last few decades. According to Benn Michaels (2008), (positional) inequality is always an issue for capitalism, while diversity – and therefore discrimination – is not necessarily one. Neoliberalism is sometimes fervently against discrimination, for it may hinder the options of capital to use the human resources it considers to be best qualified for its tasks. It is quite characteristic that major global corporations, like Apple, Microsoft, and Google – in fact, almost 100 US technology companies – “filed a legal brief opposing Trump’s ban on migration from seven Muslim-majority countries, arguing that it imposes significant burdens on the industry by preventing it from hiring talented migrants” (Hern, 2017). On the contrary, the new Mayor of London has tried to challenge unfair visa rules so that London-based businesses can attract the world’s best talent, and thus create future opportunities for Londoners (Raco and Kesten, 2016).

Capitalism in the New English-speaking World has conventionally reproduced and expanded the middle class from new migrant labour. Through the years, access was increasingly restricted for those with less potential for upward mobility but remained open to attracting ‘talent’ from all over the world. Yet Europe remained much more closed to upwardly mobile migrants, even regarding intra-European migration (Recchi, 2015).

Moreover, on a global scale and during the period 1988–2008, the trend of inequality – apart from the significant growth in income amongst the richest – according to Branco Milanovic (2016), shows that the highest income growth occurred around the middle of the global income hierarchy, which coincides with the broad middle classes of countries like China and India. At the same time, the lowest increase – almost no increase at all – occurred for incomes around the 80th to 90th percentiles, belonging to the lower-to-middle middle classes, in post-industrial economies. This may provide a revealing insight into the impact of globalisation on socio-economic hierarchies across the world and on the broad canvas on which resistance to globalisation is painted in these countries. As a result, the more

introverted urban middle classes have much less empathy for newcomers aspiring to reach middle-class status, as they feel that their reproduction is already a heavier load than the local labour markets can carry.

The competitiveness sought after in a neoliberal, globalising, open society spirit is gradually undoing welfare arrangements based on national and relatively closed systems. In Europe and elsewhere, defensive, extreme right reflexes and separatist or new protectionist tendencies are the main political response supported by broad strata ranging from working to established middle classes, who feel that globalisation is not serving their interests but exists to benefit the more privileged and outsiders, whom they perceive as their rivals in a zero-sum game.

Overall, the “postmodern” condition eventually weakened the foundation of social justice on the equality of positions within inclusive class systems – which it tended to disintegrate – and favoured turning to selective equality of opportunities, thereby undermining the egalitarian social project. To a large extent, this happened within a general increase of spatial mobility, and it is the unequal role and participation of capital and labour in this increased mobility that enhanced the tension between diversity and equality.

DIVERSITY AND MOBILITY

Movement and mobility have been closely associated with urban diversity for more than a century. Tönnies, Simmel, and later the Chicago School elaborated on contrasting the traditional, “immobile”, small, and closed village communities to the open communities of the modern metropolis, which facilitated mobility and bred individualism (Grefmeyer and Joseph, 1984; Maloutas, 2004; Bassand, Kaufmann, and Joye, 2007). The increased division of labour created a much higher level of social diversity throughout the fast-growing cities, which, in turn, produced new waves of intertwined social and spatial mobility. These two types of mobility seem to have moved in parallel courses throughout the long years of the old industrial development model, expressed through multiple varieties of capitalism across the globe. These parallel courses led to the massive growth of urban populations and of the middle classes that eventually reduced the pyramidal social structure and the very high level of income inequality in advanced capitalist countries up to the last quarter of the 20th century (Piketty, 2014).

Capitalist globalisation and the new economic model brought about important changes in the relationship between mobility and diversity, mainly by establishing completely asymmetrical mobility conditions for capital and labour. Capital used to be less concentrated, more personalised and locally bounded, mainly in the 19th century and until WWII. Its increased movement in the form of accelerated investment/disinvestment, greatly enabled by its financialization, made the presence of capital much more volatile in terms of both time and space. Volatility, in terms of space, is the ability to choose the locations for the investment of capital and the spatial scale at which to negotiate its interests. Volatility, in terms of time, results from the increasingly shorter intervals between the consecutive moves of capital. With the leverage of investment promise and the threat of disinvestment, capital tends increasingly to avoid confrontation at the national level, where the political power of labour has historically been consolidated (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).

By becoming a kind of external factor at the national level, capital is transformed into an invisible and uncontrollable force, out of reach of other actors, who are restrained in national social and political arenas. The political burden is no longer to equilibrate opposite social interests in the distribution of national resources but to devise local and national strategies to attract global investment in a fierce bidding competition between local and national entities. Capital must be lured by the highest bidders. The perception created as a result, that markets are an intangible force, is, transforming a social relation (i.e. capital) into a “natural” force that stands out and above social and political relations. Thus, at the national level – and the level of supranational coalitions like the EU – labour faces government(s) much more than it can face capital, and governments usually choose to act as if the power of markets is out of reach, explaining this choice as political realism on which the dominant political rationalism is built.⁶

At the same time, the enhanced mobility of capital has affected its role in the process of growth by systematically reducing its contribution through innovation. According to Mazzucato (2013), the parts of capital liberated from the traditional

⁶ The mobility of capital—or its strategic and/or constrained spatial and temporal fixes—are a much more complex and contradictory process (Harvey, 2003) than this simplistic account aiming at stressing the increasingly unequal mobilities of capital and labour. Furthermore, the assessment of these spatial and temporal fixes of capital should equally combine economic and political parameters, accounting for the logic of capital as well as that of the state, according to Jessop’s critical reading of Harvey’s work (2004).

spatial confines and temporal restrictions of its investment has completely changed its contribution to producing innovation and, hence, to producing growth. Being practically and feeling politically free to focus on the short term and the most profitable part of the long process of innovation, capital increasingly avoids investment in the uncertain phases of research and early-stage innovation, while it has become very active in devising ways to maximise gains at the end of the innovation process through the stock market and the minimisation of tax for capital gains. In the new economy, this very mobile capital minimises its contribution and maximises its gains from innovation by becoming increasingly parasitic at the expense of both the workers in innovative industries and the taxpayers, whose increasing contribution to producing innovation is socialising the risks, while capital focuses its investment on privatising profits. At the same time, austerity policies and public funding cuts reduce the broader investment in research and innovation, thus curtailing their prospective impact on growth. This increasingly parasitic focus of capital makes claims for economic democracy (Crouch, 2004; Malleson, 2014; Hahnel and Wright, 2016) ever more crucial and delegitimises opposite claims based on the assumption that giving capital freehand is advantageous for growth.

The unleashed mobility of capital has been concomitant with the growing mobility of people. People, however, are moving much more as bearers of purchasing power or agents of capital (i.e. as tourists or as business travellers) than as bearers of the commodity they inherently carry (labour-power) and that they can sell in different places.⁷ Compared to capital, labour is much more constrained in its movement, since the labour force commodity, unlike capital, cannot be easily equitised and physically separated from its holders.

Moreover, policy frames promoted under conditions of capitalist globalisation treat the mobility of capital and labour very unequally, following the assumption that capital is politically beyond reach. The different policy frames for the mobility of capital and labour are materialised in, and reproduced by, the globally dominant pro-growth, pro-competitiveness policies and by the subsidiarity of social policies, which illustrate, on one hand, the ability of capital to move across the deregulated scape of locations and spatial scales, and on the other hand, the regulated confinement of

⁷ Compare the much greater increase during the 2000s in the mobility of individuals as carriers of solvent demand for tourist services (consumers) than as carriers of the labour force commodity (migrants) (Recchi, 2015).

labour to national boundaries.⁸ In such a context, the main asset for labour force bearers in motion is the usefulness of the commodity they carry (i.e. skills in demand), which legitimates their mobility and acts as a passport for their movement. At the same time, however, this legitimates the impediments to the movement of those with no skills in demand.

It is within this radical reshaping of the relationship between capital and labour that labour force mobility is enhanced today through voluntary migration, but also increasingly through coerced migration. Labour force mobility – once again, unlike capital mobility – is often forced owing to war, poverty, or natural disasters, and is constrained at the receiving end through complex legal frames and enforced control, which eventually leads to an amalgam of promoted, tolerated, or restricted mobility. This is why Glick-Schiller and Çağlar (2016) expressed a preference for the term “displacement”, instead of “mobility”, to stress the constraints that frame migrant movement, even though they acknowledged the importance of agency despite these constraints.

Migrant labour becomes a flow, mainly visible through its otherness, and the term “visible minorities” clearly denotes the essentialised identity of those who are visibly different. The stereotyped identities of immigrant others are accentuated by what is usually attributed as their negative collective features (delinquency, a burden on welfare services, etc.). At the same time, they become invisible as holders of social and political rights because these rights are enmeshed in complex practical and administrative arrangements related to national sovereignty, which are much more effective in regulating the mobility of labour than capital. Migrants also become invisible through processes that affect the broad lower social categories to which they usually belong. Within these categories, there is often a reluctance to assert one’s class identity in classifications that relegate this identity to the bottom of the hierarchy and, as such, stigmatise and demote this identity.⁹

⁸ The EU offers a good example: social policies –and migration policies amongst them– are subsidiary, while competitiveness constitutes a heavily subsidized central EU policy objective. The great difficulty in devising –let alone in implementing– a common policy on the refugee crisis, illustrates the reluctance of the EU to face social issues as common problems even when they represent a humanitarian crisis.

⁹ Savage (2015) witnessed this reluctance in the implementation of the Great Class Survey in the United Kingdom. The sample, obtained from massive voluntary participation in an online questionnaire promoted by the BBC, led eventually to an over-representation of upper categories and an even more

The diversity produced at the level of migration-receiving cities must ultimately face the depletion of resources left for labour, following the massive tax evasion and avoidance that have led to the growth of austerity regimes. As capital is increasingly exempted from redistributive mechanisms, social justice appears to be related to fairness in the distribution of depleted resources amongst the middle and lower class groups contributing to this increased urban diversity. Thus, an arena of competition over the available resources is usually created, where groups that are better positioned in established social and political arrangements and power structures claim their rights based on their official “rights” and privileges. In doing so, they contribute to essentialising their features as positive assets (e.g. nationality and citizenship) versus others’ features as negative (e.g. absence of legal documents, ‘dangerous’ religious beliefs). Drawing from a colonial past and centuries of nationalism, rich in the essentialisation of difference, the antagonistic urban settings of globalisation’s diversity contribute to ethnicising, racializing, or otherwise stereotyping and discriminating against labour force carriers – and hence the whole population – in a process that eventually tends to strip them of their human property as the source of their rights. Such antagonism over the appropriation of available resources eventually becomes a major component in the workings of local and national political systems that often overshadows class divisions and contributes to making traditional ideological and political divides seem outdated.

The identities of labour force carriers become increasingly diversified not only because of the presence of more cultural backgrounds but also because the lived experience and expectations of people with transnational lives are increasingly oppressed within the confines of nationalism that marginalise them as eternal outsiders (Çaglar, 2016).¹⁰ National(ist) borders remain real and effective in dividing labour force carriers, while capital enjoys much freer circulation, even if this is achieved also at the expense of many smaller or weaker capitalists. In these increasingly diversified settings, there is a growing difficulty in finding common ground for the struggle against the asphyxiating domination of neoliberal policies.

accentuated under-representation of lower ones – especially of members of the broader precariat, which contains an over-representation of migrants and minorities.

¹⁰ Nina Glick-Schiller (2014) showed this very clearly in a paper on the experience and the sense of belonging of young, second generation migrants in different European cities.

The only hope, according to Glick-Schiller (2014), is the shared experiences of the outcast migrants and the increasingly growing memberships of local precariats.

Thus, the increased urban sociocultural diversity produced within capitalist globalisation seems, ironically, to complement both the restriction of political options and the total or partial exclusion of large numbers of people who constitute this diversity from political rights. Diversity seems, therefore, to develop in parallel with the limitation of democracy, and this limitation occurs when democracy needs, rather, to become more comprehensive by including more directly and effectively the realm of economic decisions.

DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY

Diversity is the opposite of homogeneity or similarity, and this opposition may be understood in different ways. In societies largely organised as nation-states, homogeneity is usually considered an asset and understood as the basis of cohesion in terms of attributes related to a common national origin, like language and culture. This creates a clear “US” and “THEM”, and otherness is dealt with by assimilation, exclusion, or domination. Tensions appear between individual social and political rights and collective minority rights, as well as between individual identities and feelings of belonging and minority communities’ representation.

The same dipole of diversity/homogeneity may alternatively be understood in a different, pluralist way, where diversity is portrayed as an asset. The “US” and “THEM” continue to be reinforced on the same separating foundation of equally immanent/stereotyped identities, but otherness is dealt with as the tolerated juxtaposition – or even the celebrated juxtaposition in more optimistic visions (e.g. Walzer, 1997) – because it is presumed to lead to a mutually beneficial and synergistic cohabitation.

Within, and cutting across, such homogeneous groups, other important differences – mainly class positions – (re)emerge and (re)create different types of “US” and “THEM”. These differences are founded on inequality among similar subjects rather than on other forms of dissimilarity. However, since we are dealing

with unequal and inequality-yielding capitalist societies, all forms of diversity eventually become the subject of some kind of social ranking.¹¹

This systematic social ranking of diversity is a problem for democracy unless democracy is understood simply as a set of political procedures and management policies. In that case, diversity is perceived as growing complexity that has to be effectively managed, and multidimensional urban diversity – as in super or hyper-diversity – may be easily reduced to a growing complexity that begs for ways to accommodate different social, cultural, generational, and otherwise diverse needs and resources in close spatial proximity. This eventually leads to the framing of diversity as a complex problem that requires a technocratic solution based on rational analysis and choice. However, if the democratic theory is involved, the tension between democracy and socially ranked diversity becomes clear.

Democracy, perceived broadly, is a watchword for a variety of notions and aspirations that go far beyond the issues raised by liberal democracy and the mere possession of political rights. However, diversity, as a hierarchy of particularities that negates universality, raises problems even for the narrowest notion of democracy. At the level of attribution of rights, democracy, and especially contemporary theories of participatory democracy, presupposes the perception and management of diversity that leads not only to equality in the possession of rights but also to the possibility of their equal exercise. Questions of social equality and non-discrimination re-emerge thus since they are intrinsically linked to the effective implementation of democracy and promotion of the democratic project. Indeed, democracy is a theory of society (Macpherson, 1973) and is, thus, an ongoing project, which refers to a critical concept (Arblaster, 1991), by which reality is measured and always found to be lacking. It is a process and a way of life (Barber, 1998; Benhabib, 1996), and not some kind of positive state. According to Pierre Bourdieu, it is a “historical process of active negation (...) a never-ending effort to make social relations less arbitrary, institutions less unjust, distributions of resources and options less imbalanced” (as quoted in Wacquant 2005, 21). In conditions where all types of inequality, including those

¹¹ The conversion of diversity to hierarchy may sometimes have a cultural touch and Savage (2015, 232) mentions the exceptional power of the British to create hierarchy out of diversity.

covered under “diversity”, are not a central target for “less inequality” policies, democracy is negated.¹²

Given the internal contradictions of liberal democracy, democracy can't deliver what it promises (Hall 2002), because it tries to produce equal political subjects out of unequal social subjects. The co-existence of political equality and social inequality is the basic weakness of democracy, which commonly leads to a ‘mockery of the ideals and values that democracy is held to embody’ (Pateman, 1989, 223, referring to gender inequality). The key issue is universal citizenship. According to I. M. Young (1990), universal citizenship in general, in the sense of what citizens have in common – namely, their human property. Universal citizenship is defined as receiving the same treatment by law and rules, which should be blind to individual and group differences. Inequality and essentialised or otherwise socially ranked diversity, therefore, curtail universality and make it incompatible with democracy when they obstruct the effective exercise of political rights by everyone.

This means that democracy requires not only political rights but social rights as well. Free and equal citizens are a prerequisite for democracy to function. Since they do not exist, democracy has to create them. In this sense, diversity in a general climate of welfare provisions, optimism, and belief in a better future for all can co-exist with democracy as expected plurality, and can even be seen as the reason for which democracy is needed. On the contrary, in conditions of increasingly antagonistic relations within the labour camp produced by neoliberal policies, the promotion of fixed identities that exclude each other and the idea of boundaries that are insurmountable and fixed once and for all are, by definition, contradictory to democracy. Furthermore, how a notion like diversity is conceptualised is significant for social reality, since it determines the framing of policies that affect it.

It is a fact that although democracy presupposes the rejection of strictly defined and opposed identities, so that it may function for all with no exclusions, in aiming at the maximisation of participation by all and effective social inclusion, it is necessary to promote the assertion of specific identities for the institutionalisation of measures for equality (Nash, 1998). This contradiction creates an additional difficulty for the substantial democratic transformation of political and social relations, while the way it is handled determines the kind of social co-existence promoted. However, this

¹² For a more comprehensive similar approach to democracy, see Pantelidou Maloutas (2006).

contradiction makes it obvious that, especially in policy formation, it seems unfeasible for the time being not to view the subjects of democracy as agents of pre-existing and given unequal identities and interests.¹³

As a way out of the impossibility of democracy in unequal societies, diversity may be given content that promotes the democratic project if it is conceived as the (accepted) possibility of real alternatives. Following Mouffe's (2013) conceptualisation of agonistic politics, diversity can be related to the possibility of political space, which is strangled when the socio-politically dominant "WE" translates its hegemony into rationality and evicts choice from political decisions. Neoliberal policies are associated with the eviction of choice, which makes democracy redundant and impossible, and Margaret Thatcher's "There Is No Alternative" could not express this eviction of choice any better. Diversity related to agonistic politics would, therefore, recognise adverse socio-political projects and the continuously reformed "WE" and "THEM" related to these projects, which struggle for hegemony in the democratic arena, rather than try to translate their transient hegemony to overarching rationalities that hollow out the democratic process by producing rational "WES" that leave no space for the redundant "THEMS".

CONCLUSION

As a concluding remark, democracy may be seen as an inconvenience in the way that it is treated by neoliberal policies, which try to hollow it out as much as possible and label as populist any option that does not comply with the neoliberal rationale. However, this does not make democracy a magic solution for the egalitarian project either, since notions of diversity and inequality are enmeshed in intricate, and often contradictory, ways in different politico-ideological beliefs and discourses.

A paper by Maloutas and Pantelidou Malouta (2012) pinpointed the complex and contradictory relation between supporting egalitarian ideas and accepting diversity as the foundation of particularistic rights. It used data from the *European Social Survey*¹⁴ (especially from the module on welfare attitudes that was part of Round 4 in 2008). In short, it was claimed that the largely majoritarian support for

¹³ See Mouffe (1993, p. 86) criticizing Young (1987 and 1990) for perceiving groups "with their interests and identities already given".

¹⁴ For detailed information about the ESS and for access to data and metadata, see the project's webpage (<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>).

social equality (based on the positive answers given by almost 75% of respondents to the questions “Governments should reduce differences in income levels” and “For a fair society, differences in standards of living should be small”) is seriously undermined in two ways:

- The first is the parallel support for traditional liberal or neoliberal interpretations of social justice. A considerable proportion of respondents supporting egalitarian views in terms of income differences also considered large differences in standards of living acceptable if they were rewards for talent and effort; considered social benefits to cause too big a strain on the economy and business; believed that social benefits breed laziness and an unwillingness to take responsibility, and considered that social order is more effectively maintained through a punitive state rather than a welfare state.
- The second way (and most important here) that support for egalitarian views and policies is undermined relates to the mode and degree of accepting diversity as a parameter defining those who should and should not benefit from egalitarian policies. The profile of those entitled to equality is restricted and the participation, for example, of immigrants or women, becomes conditional. According to a very substantial percentage of respondents, immigrants receive more than they contribute, make the host country a worse place to live in, and should acquire social rights under very strict conditions, if ever. A smaller, but still considerable, proportion of respondents within the majority of those expressing broad egalitarian views perceived the rights of men and women differently, making egalitarian claims conditional for the latter (e.g. limited right to employment when ‘there are not enough jobs for men’) on the grounds of their stereotypical and subordinate social roles.

The notion of diversity is interesting, therefore, not only for the intricate ways it is used to understand the socioeconomic structures of urban societies but also for the ambivalent ways its constitutive features are perceived and integrated into different political discourses. These constitutive features are perceived in ways that either do not affect the human property of their holders, as the source of equal social and political rights or become essentialised and classify their holders in different categories of access to such rights. The considerable extent to which diversity is essentialised even for supporters of egalitarian social projects is indicative of the

complex and ambiguous social realities that cannot be easily translated to ideologically and politically homogeneous understandings, opinions, and projects at the equally complex and ambiguous level of individual situations. The ambivalence of personal ideological and political views – reflecting the experience of equally ambivalent social situations – depicts the open outcome of the fight for hegemony between opposed political projects. At the same time, the “contamination” of egalitarian views by the perception of diversity as essentialized difference provides the basis for displacing the traditional political choice between left and right as the major political stake for the choice between neoliberal rationalism and the new wave of xenophobic nationalist protectionism.

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