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Signing dissent in the name of “woman ”: Reflections on female activist coalitions in Istanbul, Turkey

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**SIGNING DISSENT IN THE NAME OF “WOMAN”:
REFLECTIONS ON FEMALE ACTIVIST COALITIONS
IN ISTANBUL, TURKEY**

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the unexpected female coalition created in 2008 between feminist, LBT (lesbian, bisexual, transsexual) and religious activists in Turkey, and asks how women come to signify –and possibly challenge– the pre-established demarcations of politics framing gendered precariousness. How do women claim to sign differently the contract of the political? By referring to the neoliberal and conservative values of the current government’s agenda and underlying the importance of newly formed alliances between activist women, it explores the complex ways in which these three groups struggle to be heard within public debate in Turkish society and how they try to form alliances despite their differences.

Keywords: *gender, activism, coalitions, precarity*

Fewer than twenty religious activist women had gathered beneath Cumhuriyet Anıtı, the Republic Monument, which stands at the centre of Taksim Square in Istanbul. In a soft and thin voice, one of them was reading a press release. There was a calm tension in the air. With serious and sad faces, the protesters were holding A4 papers featuring the names of women who had been subjected to discrimination because they bore religious symbols upon their bodies. The emblematic statue of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the background was a stark contrast to the protesters’ claims to be remembered as citizens with rights and as women who have suffered in a secular polity.

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However, if this scene were to be viewed only as the claim of religious women to safeguard their right to be re-emplaced in the secular polity, this would devalue the political message of that day. In light of growing tensions between the government and the oppositional party over the use of headscarves in public institutions, the religious activists declared in their press release that decisions were being taken in their name without giving them space to be heard, without considering them as equal interlocutors regarding matters that affect their underprivileged and vulnerable position in society. More significantly, however, the poster laid out on the street, featuring the slogan “Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz” (“we keep an eye on each other”, or “we look after each other”), was representing a women’s activist platform formed in 2008. “A public sphere where we cannot walk arm in arm is not our public sphere”, read the headline of the petition signed by women of different ideological and political aspirations, such as feminists and LBT activists, to inaugurate this activist women’s coalition. The feminists and lesbians who were present on that day were supporting the religious activists’ claims for rights by declaring that they were aware of how hostile “home” can be for them as well.

My aim in this paper is to explain how the common political struggle of different activist women reverberated that day as a call to challenge common sense. In other words, this protest not only invites us to think again what is at stake in a demonstration organised by religious activist women who protest their position in Turkish society. Rather, it also brings forth the complexity of the issues raised when different female activists attempt to challenge the entrenchment of inner national borders set between them, by supporting each other despite their differences. In what follows, I will focus first on the government’s attempt to amend the constitution in order to secure religious women’s rights, and explain the reasons why this led to strong reactions by some religious activists, while also igniting an interest in creating unexpected alliances, bringing them for the first time together to sign the name of ‘woman’ as a means of defining a common act of dissidence. Veena Das insightfully argues that a signature can be seen as a “writing technology of the state” to assign citizenship status to its members while also defining who is to be seen as vulnerable (2007:163). However, in this case, as I will argue: “the iterability of utterances and actions in which the signature of the state can detach itself from its origin and be crafted onto other structures and other chains of significations” (Das, 2007:177) becomes part of a gendered struggle to claim the name of ‘woman’ as a politically intelligible signature of dissent.

1. HOSTING POLITICS IN THE NAME OF “WOMAN”

In 2008, the so-called “headscarf controversy” was once again over-determining the polarisation of public affects and debates in Turkey. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), following an unexpected decision taken by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, attempted to pass a constitutional amendment in order to secure the lifting of the headscarf ban in higher education and the public sector.¹ The secular/Kemalist political establishment, despite having lost governmental power in 2002, had preserved its hegemony over several milieus of the state, especially high judiciary and administrative boards like the Constitutional Court and the Higher Education Council (YÖK).² It was not unexpected, then, that the major opposition party, CHP (Republican People’s Party), while performing its role as the doorkeeper of Republican values and acting in the name of a secular state imbued with a militarist/Kemalist ideology, demanded the intervention of the Constitutional Court, which annulled the amendments by nine votes to two in June 2008. The Court further opened a case in which, for the first time, a governing party with a large parliamentary majority came under threat of closure, as 71 party officials, among them the President and the Prime Minister, could have been banned for five years from political activities.

The staging of an almost theatrical moment, in which those representing the Islamic political establishment were positioned before the law of the Constitutional Court and the polity’s secular values, was not something new.³ However, this time, this political gesture became even more signifi-

1. The suggested amendment was targeting constitutional Articles 10 and 42. Article 10, which guarantees equality before the law, would change to secure equal access for all citizens to all public services, and Article 42, which certifies the right to education, would include a phrase aiming to prevent the denial of access to education. In addition to these amendments the AKP government, following the suggestion of the minor opposition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), proposed the amendment of Article 17 of the Higher Education Council regulations, which governs the style of clothing in universities. Regarding these changes see also Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008.

2. The Higher Education Council is a body made up of members selected by the president of Turkey, the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Education, the Inter-University Council and even the military. In the 1980s when it was founded, it was used as a mechanism to implement the regulations introduced by the Ministry of Education against veiling practices and therefore enacted orders banning students, firing university staff and safeguarding by all means the official state ideology.

3. The role of the Constitutional Court is of great interest because since 1982 it has shut down more than 18 parties, most of them pro-Islamic or pro-Kurdish, on accusations of breach-

cant than in the past, as AKP had since attained unprecedented popularity across various strata of Turkish society⁴ and this underpinned Erdoğan's assertive tone in defending his attempt to amend the constitution.

During that period an executive member of an Islamic NGO called AK-DER (Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği – Organisation for Women's Rights Against Discrimination) noted in one of our discussions:

The parties are creating a bigger problem for us. It is a dead end. If the Constitutional Court decides to reject the legislative changes, it will be a problem. If they don't reject it, it is still a problem. The articles that AKP tried to amend were not a problem for us. In Turkey, there is no law that explicitly prohibits the use of the headscarf. The problem is created because the ban on the headscarf can be enforced if perceived as a threat to laws protecting secularism. It is a matter of interpretation. And what the parties managed to do once again is to turn people against us.

This statement was highlighting the reasons why AK-DER had decided to oppose AKP's decision to amend the constitution and had launched a signature campaign that was later warmly embraced by feminist and LBT activists, leading to the formation of the women's activist platform "Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz". How can we interpret the political stance of these religious activist women?

Ayşe Kadioğlu has argued that, through the accommodation of an 'anti-political' discourse that refuses to be related to particular political groups and is more concerned with influencing public consciousness, Islamic organisations, like AK-DER, manage to decipher the relation between civil society, Islam and democracy through the use of a rights language which foregrounds "the conception of an alternative view of politics that is more

ing democracy's principles as defined by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. During the 1990s the Constitutional Court had reached the decision to dissolve the Refah Party (Welfare Party) on the grounds of representing political Islam, after the party's unsuccessful proposal to the Parliament to amend the principle of secularism (for an analysis of the Refah Party's politics see Arat, 2005). Additionally, in 1998 when Erdoğan was mayor of Istanbul and considered a prominent candidate to be the next leader of the banned Refah Party, he was convicted with a 10-month prison sentence for inciting religious and ethnic hatred, after reading a poem with strong religious connotations during a meeting in Siirt. For an insightful analysis of the role of the Constitutional Court see Kogacioglu, 2004.

4. For example, Cihan Tuğal's (2009) ethnographic research on Sultanbeyli in the early 2000s demonstrates how AKP managed to moderate the revolutionary potential of Islamist politics because the language of neoliberal economic policies started to make more sense both to the religious working class and to some secularist elites.

radical since it is above and beyond political society” (2005:37). Therefore, what the author defines as anti-politics is an anti-state rhetoric, a strategically incorporated depoliticisation of identities, which nevertheless remains, above all, a politicised discourse. However, in this case, when AK-DER prepared a signature campaign as a means of answering back both to the political parties and to those who constantly perceived veiled women’s politics with suspicion, their aim was to make explicit that as women wearing the headscarf they were similarly aware of other political problems. In their press release, they contested the state’s authority over their bodies; they asked for freedom in universities for everybody who had been expelled on the basis of their religious, political, ethnic or other beliefs, and they condemned the implementation of Article 301 of the Constitution restricting freedom of speech. Within one day, immediately after this petition was circulated on the web, it had gained more than 650 signatures of religious women. This also ignited the warm embrace of feminist and LBT activists who then decided to collectively sign a different statement in support of the veiled activists’ initiative.

In the meantime, on 30 July 2008, the Constitutional Court announced its decision not to close down AKP, with six of eleven votes nonetheless supporting closure: seven would have been enough to disband it. Ten of eleven judges found the party guilty of supporting anti-secular activities and issued a serious warning along with a penalty of state funding cuts. The decision satisfied the European Union and Erdoğan made declarations of triumph. What was apparently celebrated, though, was not the success in securing religious women’s rights since the ban was not lifted. Moreover, the “headscarf controversy”, without being resolved, once again ended in a “deadlock”, dividing society into two separate camps and awakening uncertainty, fear and suspicion (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008: 515-6).

The name of “woman” here, or acting in the name of women’s rights, appeared more to stand as a *metaphor* for sustaining a persistent fight between the supposedly incommensurable secular and religious worldviews, marking them as a constant threat to each other’s limits (cf. Mahmood, 2009:64).⁵ The political language used in such “patriarchal bargains”, to quote Deniz Kandiyoti’s (1988) insightful term, renders sexual difference affirmed and legitimised as a bargain over the stability and the unity of the city while the division between “Kemalist” and “Islamic” worldviews

5. For a critical analysis of the limits set by secular and religious affects and symbols see Navaro-Yashin, 2002; Asad, 2003; Mahmood 2005; Asad, Brown et al., 2009.

aims to become commonsensical in a polity consuming the politics of such aesthetics, lifestyles and visions. Ultimately, the possibility of women voicing their demands in their own terms is foreclosed because, under such demarcations of the political field, female religious precariousness is turned into a frame able to produce either vulnerable subjects in need of protection or dangerous subjectivities threatening the polity's limits (cf. Spivak, 1988; Abu-Lughod, 2002). For this reason, I suggest, one needs to push further the possible connotations of the anti-political politics of the female religious activists in order to understand the (im)possibility of articulating a different political voice "through the 'ocean of discourses', which are exclusively male discourses" (Varikas, 2010: 240). Consequently, when Kadioğlu argues that the female religious activists' politics are anti-political, this is clearly not Loraux's "antipolitical" that I perceive to haunt the field of answerability, that is, the ability to answer back in a voice that will not reaffirm the language one tries to contest. For Eleni Varikas, who follows Nicole Loraux, tracing women's voices amongst this "ocean of discourses" is an "impossible task" (ibid.). Or, in Loraux's words, the antipolitical that is against politics becomes "the other of politics, but also another politics, no longer based on consensus and living together, but on what I call the 'bond of division'" (2002:23, cited in Athanasiou and Tzelapis, 2010:111). Ultimately, the female religious activists are ensnared in this "impossible task", as I will argue.

Following Giorgio Agamben's insight that it is not only people who are assigned with a signature, but also concepts that have signatures (2009:76), what would it mean if 'woman' was to be seen as a concept that bears its own signature? How can we understand what a signature signifies when it bears the name of (real) women, or when for the female activists "woman" appears as a signature, namely, as a testimony of a common act of dissent?

2. SIGNING THE NAME OF "WOMAN"

The press release inaugurating this activist women's platform read:

We, women, both believers and non-believers, veiled or not-veiled, women who act within the frame of women's rights and liberties, we are against those saying that 'if you exist, then I do not.'

We oppose the racist subjection of veiled women, via being considered as "Islamic robots" by such adjectives as ignorant, bigoted, mischievous, disingenuous, opportunist. We oppose the sexist consideration of not-

veiled women as if they are sexual commodities, exhibitionists, seducers. We know that the oppression and exploitation of women are facilitated by the gaps created among them. And we think that the suppression of women can be overcome only in an environment of peace and by the practice of rights and liberties. We, women, who are against all kinds of discrimination and injustice, reject all types of prohibitions and oppressions by the state as a “field of contest for brave men”, which ignores our existence by relying on the understanding that “the place of woman is by her husband’s foot”, which makes discrimination through the regulations on “public morality”, which aims to delimit women’s liberties. We, the women, reject the control over our bodies in the name of modernism, secularism, the republic, religion, tradition, custom, morality, honour or freedom.

“Ignoring anyone directs him/her to be suspicious about his/her own existence.” Hannah Arendt.

We, women, are not suspicious of each other, but we look after each other! Because we, women, stay together with those whom we recognise!

By appropriating the connotations of the verb *sahip çıkmak* (to step forth as the owner of), the activists were performatively re-inscribing within the national political economy the meaning of ‘stepping forth as women’ in order to take care of each other (Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz). They were positioning themselves as the hosts of the home’s rules while objecting, refusing and opposing the sexist representations of women in society by the state or by their reiteration in ideologies aiming to control women’s bodies.

At the same time, the invocation of Hannah Arendt in the context of the text works to make “woman” echo in the name of humanity, a humanity that for Arendt welcomes the public sphere as a space of rights grounded upon “the ungrounded right to have rights” (cf. Arendt, 2004). The human as plural to which Arendt refers is “a catachrestic use of oneness”, according to Judith Butler, who argues that for Arendt universalisation “seeks to establish inclusiveness for all human society, but one that posits no single defining principle for the humanity it assembles” (2011: 84). We are thus guided to understand plurality as a process and not as a boundary set by limits posed through inner differentiations (Butler, 2011: 84-5).

Similarly then, “woman” in this declaration assumed a catachrestic meaning aiming to unsettle inner differences in order to address such a unique interdependence traced within a plurality. As the activists declared, they oppose those advocating “if I exist, then you do not”. Coexisting in “woman” becomes signified, in Arendt’s words, as: “Ignoring anyone di-

rects him/her to be suspicious about his/her own existence". Their reference to rights, liberties and peace may as well have sounded in a Kantian cosmopolitanism of universal hospitality, which then resonates to a Habermasian public sphere of discursive democracy. However, they quote Arendt. Indeed, there is strong link between Arendt and Kant in their perception of plurality as "a regulative ideal, that everyone has such rights, regardless of the cultural and linguistic differences by which anyone is characterised" (Butler, 2011: 85). But, for Butler, the important difference in the Arendtian pluralisation (as opposed to the Kantian universalisation) is the recognition that "political rights universalise, but always in the context of a differentiate (and continually differentiating) population" (2011: 85-6).

Although the humanity claimed in the name of 'the human' was analysed by Arendt in relation to stateless populations, refugees and migrants, for the female activists precariousness is re-signified in the name of woman and in relation to women's position in a public sphere dominated by men. By claiming that the rights of Woman have been cast as Other to the rights of Man, they expose Woman as the Other of a hu/man citizen who has been granted citizenship rights. It is upon this claim that they build a *precarious political subjectivity* which aims to expose modes of governance, by sustaining their vulnerable status as subjects deprived of rights. As they premise their demands upon the ungrounded right to have rights "as women", they find a common way to exceed their inner differences by exposing 'woman' in historicity and in a future promise of a different co-existence.

Therefore, asking for political rights in the name of woman renders woman as a process ensured in the context of a differentiated and continually differentiating womanhood. However, as Jacques Rancière points out, "Man and citizen [or Woman] are political subjects and as such as are not definite collectivities, but *surplus names* that set out a question or a dispute (litige) about who is included in their count" (2010: 68, my emphasis). Indeed, the surplus value carried in the name of woman, returned as a question posed back to them while each had to account again for the process of their continuous differentiations. Soon after the creation of this platform, they had to rethink what it meant to sign "plurality" in the name of woman as they had to account anew for "differentiation".

3. "WOMAN" AS A SIGNATURE OF DISSENSUS

Almost two years after this coalition was formed, on March 5 2010, the Turkish magazine KAOS GL published a series of letters exchanged between

Yasemin Öz (a human rights lawyer and LGBT rights activist) and Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal (a religious activist, feminist and writer). The exchange had been occasioned by a signature campaign supporting the right of women to wear headscarves in the universities. Once again a great number of people, both as individuals and as organisations, signed this petition: KAOS GL, an LGBT organisation based in Ankara, was amongst them. This time, however, the fact that an LGBT organisation had signed a petition to support religious activist women did not appear to be a simple matter. Although the signature of KAOS GL initially appeared on the list, it soon disappeared.

Without knowing the reasons why KAOS GL had removed their signature, Hidayet published an article, in which she expressed her gratitude to the feminist groups that might oppose religion and the use of the headscarf but nevertheless supported religious women’s fight against discrimination and injustice. In her letter, she also explains that she understands those who decided to silently withdraw their endorsement without creating a problem and concluded: “We need to get mature together for a more democratic country.”

Yasemin, representing KAOS GL, responded immediately by circulating an e-mail to various web groups and to Hidayet personally, in order to explain that they had decided to withdraw their signature after learning that the religious activists had been subjected to severe pressure by conservative circles for their alliance with an LGBT organisation. In a long response, Yasemin explained, firstly, the affective atmosphere mediating the personal discussions between the two groups, which she defined as full of compassion and empathy. Secondly, she stated that the withdrawal of KAOS GL’s signature was a gesture of reinforcing their support as they felt obliged to respond to the pressure that their friends (as she called them) were subjected to, without however reducing the significance of both of their struggles. Finally, she recounted their positions as LGBT activists in relation to the use of the headscarf while emphasising that KAOS GL considered that a petition supporting the religious activists’ fight for their rights should not be turned into a platform to host discussions regarding the relation between homosexuality and religion.

Actually, both Hidayet and Yasemin were members of the activist women’s platform *Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz*. After two years of almost daily negotiations over the limits of the support they could offer to each other, they had reached a position that would entail a paradoxical solidarity. As Hidayet mentioned in her letter, some feminist organisations signed the religious women’s petition, while their signature meant that they still opposed religion and veiling practices but supported the fight of religious women

against discrimination and oppression. If KAOS GL had not been forced to withdraw their endorsement, their signature would have also been signified similarly. This time, though, the pressure exercised by conservative circles on the female religious activists for accepting the signature of an LGBT organisation, exposed that even this kind of almost paradoxical support was to be hindered. It was almost impossible to make such a supportive act attain public visibility as a political statement made by women who have agreed to become allies while still keeping a distance between them.

Comments made around this time by the Turkish state minister for Women and Family Affairs, Aliye Selma Kavaf, who declared gay people to be “sick” and homosexuality a biological disorder that requires treatment, complicated even further the possibility of sustaining such a coalition.⁶ While some female religious activists, as well as AK-DER, tried to take a distance from Kavaf’s comments, 21 different organisations welcomed these declarations and signed a press release in which they denounced homosexuality as a threat and as corruption, as a perverse, immoral, sinful and unnatural act while identifying LGBT activists as part of a conspiratorial lobby scheming to embed homosexuality as a natural choice in the public consciousness. Among these was MAZLUM-DER (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği - Organisation for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed People), one of the first human rights organisations to relate rights’ violations to suffering and oppression (*zulüm*, *zalim*, *mazlum* as its name indicates).⁷ Ironically, MAZLUM-DER’s president, Ahmet Faruk Ünsal, while attempting to justify the aims ascribed to the name of this organisation and also to explain the decision to sign this petition, argued publicly that: “We deem homosexuality abnormal, but we oppose any form of discrimination and violence against homosexual people”.⁸

This comment resonated with the position taken by the female religious activists of AK-DER when they were asked to position themselves vis-à-vis homosexuality after the women’s alliance had been formed. As a member from AK-DER explained to me:

6. Aliye Selma Kavaf’s Interview in *Hürriyet*, March 7, 2010 (<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/pazar/14031207.asp?gid=59>).

7. *Radikal*, March 22, 2010 (<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=Radikal DetayV3&ArticleID=987114&Date=12.06.2010&CategoryID=77>).

8. *Bianet*, March 25, 2010 (<http://bianet.org/bianet/toplumsal-cinsiyet/120894-mazlumperde-insan-haklari-escinsel-deyince-bitiyor>).

This platform opened the possibility to talk about issues that we had never discussed before, like as a Muslim, how do I see a homosexual, a feminist, or a Christian? We said that every identity has its Other, I mean, a founding Other (*kurucu öteki*), so as Muslims our other is not a non-Muslim but *zulüm* (oppression, cruelty). All Muslims should be against *zulüm*, whoever enacts *zulüm* is our other. When someone is using violence against a homosexual, then, we are against this violence. This is our religious responsibility.

She continued:

According to Islam, homosexuality is illicit (*eşcinsellik haramdır*), it is a sin (*günah*), it is neither abnormal nor a sickness.

The apparent difference between the two Islamic organisations was that MAZLUM-DER signed a petition legitimising ‘hate crime’ in a period when the long fight for legal recognition of the LGBT organisation Lambda Istanbul was pending, and when murders of transsexual and gay people were being frequently reported on the news. Furthermore, amongst these signatories were those who had exercised pressure on the female religious activists not to accept the support given by KAOS GL, leading the latter to withdraw their endorsement and hence impeding almost two years of efforts to sustain the women’s activist platform. On the other hand, AK-DER’s stance regarding homosexuality could not satisfy the LGBT activists.

The dialogues already taking place between the activists in street demonstrations, in personal encounters, or over the listserv where they engaged, daily, in an intensive exchange of opinions regarding their differences, had already made it clear that they needed to rethink what it means to sign “plurality” in the name of difference. This is why Yasemin writes in her letter:

The endorsement [by KAOS GL] of the petition against the ban on the headscarf was an endorsement against unfairness and discrimination. In this sense the wearing of the headscarf by women is not something we advocate. When we stood side by side we did so with an awareness of our own frameworks, but united in our opposition to violence and discrimination.

Even if this alliance had its own limits, which were at times transgressed or more entrenched, it was nevertheless commonly understood that the allies were not seeking to reach consensus on the conditions that have separately deprived them of certain citizenship rights. Their alliance was built on dissensus and not on consensus. As Rancière suggests, “a political subject is a capacity for staging scenes of dissensus” (2010: 69). In other

words, Rancière emphasises that the relation between bare life and political life is never clear and that human rights mark the paradox of political life, since, as he mentions, “the rights of Man are the rights of those who have not the rights that they have and have the rights that they have not” (2010: 67). According to Rancière, then, this is the paradox upon which Arendt builds a lock (2010: 66). The process of making sense out of this paradox is not to agree, it is not to reach a consensus that becomes either a void (the rights of man are the rights of those who have no rights), or a tautology (they are the rights of those who have rights) (2010: 67). For him, rights are inscriptions which textualise visibility and mobilise the right to dispute on who is included (2010: 69). Thus, “a dissensus is not a conflict of interests, opinions or values; it is a division inserted in ‘common sense’: a dispute over what is given, about the frame within which we see something as given” (ibid.).

Even if the recognition of the religious and feminist and LGBT activists’ common suffering, of being commonly oppressed by the loss of the right to have rights, made them appear as unexpected allies, this recognition was a signature of political dissensus because its aim was to unsettle the common sense upon which the activists are positioned in opposition. Then the surplus value that the name “woman” carried was negotiated between them in order to open the possibility of their ability to be in dialogue, intimacy, and affection. Hence, the differences between them were agonistic, rather than static, subsumed, or commensurable in the name of woman. They emerged as an aporetic question mediating how women’s precarity is framed in society and how it becomes for them (between them) a claim of re-appropriating a precarious subjectivity in order to inscribe their own disputes over rights, injuries and traumas. In other words, what they commonly signed was a claim to be considered as political subjects, especially when they have been expelled from their right to sign their own disputes over rights. This was made even more evident in the way that they then had decided to support each other in their oppositions. In this sense, the name of ‘woman’ was employed not only as a signature of resistance against the state, but, more importantly, as a *metonymy* to address the forms of liberal governance sustaining women’s oppression in society, and to claim the possibility of raising a different political voice vis-à-vis pre-established demarcations of racist, homophobic, sexist and nationalist political frontiers employed to frame gendered precariousness. Additionally, the paradoxical support that the allies decided to give each other would not have assumed the political significance it was meant to carry, had the missing signature of KAOS

remained unnoticed. However, both religious and LGBT activists decided to make it public and hence to publicise the historicity of the impossible task in which they are ensnared, namely, to support each other in their differences against discrimination and oppression.

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