The Greek Review of Social Research

Vol 21 (1974)

21-22

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doi: [10.12681/grsr.223](https://doi.org/10.12681/grsr.223)

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To cite this article:

Thermos, E. (1974). Ta prolegomena of Alexander's homonoia. *The Greek Review of Social Research*, 21, 163–172.
<https://doi.org/10.12681/grsr.223>

ta prolegomena of Alexander's homonoia

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The concept of *Homonoia* was introduced formally by Alexander at Opis in 324 B.C. It seems to reflect his desire and aim to reconcile and to unite the peoples of East and West into a gigantic oecumenical state. Through the method of cultural fusion the Hellenic-speaking people and the peoples of the Orient were to become of one mind, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, and body, and to live permanently in peace, harmony and $\acute{o}\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$.

In my effort to support this particular interpretation of *Homonoia*, I propose to consider certain important factors such as (1) the Pan-Hellenic political crisis, (2) the class struggle and social revolutions of the fifth and fourth centuries in the Hellenic world, (3) the attitude of the Greek thinkers towards unity and *Homonoia*, (4) Philip's drive for Pan-Hellenic unity under Macedonian leadership, and (5) Alexander's «ideology», his foreign policy and role in history. As such, I believe that these factors have to be studied and analysed rather carefully if a meaningful interpretation is to be assigned to *Homonoia*.

It is the subject of this paper to consider extensively the first four of the above listed factors in an effort to examine closely some vital elements composing the background of the Hellenic world during the Pre-Alexandrian era, hoping to shed some light on Alexander's relationship to *Homonoia*. The factor concerning Alexander's relationship to *Homonoia* is reserved for a full examination in a separate paper.

the Hellenic political crisis

With the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C., a crisis of large proportions became visibly evident in the Greek world. The real roots of the crisis seem to go far back to a time before the year 431 B.C., and they are mainly associated with the states of Athens, Corinth and Sparta. These states had established themselves after the Persian Wars of 490 and 480-479 B.C. as the dominant forces in the Hellenic world and they associated themselves, to a differing degree, with imperial interests. The ultimate clash of those interests came about in 431 B.C. when the armed struggle took place between the state of Athens and that of Sparta. In these states almost the entire Hellenic world participated.

In the decisive head-on collision between the two, Athens was totally crushed in 404 B.C.; eventually the victors suffered the same fate as that of the vanquished. The state of Sparta unwilling and unable to maintain a position of total supremacy over the Hellenic world was also defeated militarily by Thebes in Leuctra in 371 B.C.

The civil conflict which began with the Pelopon-

nesian War continued after the War for more than sixty years. Thus the Hellenic world for almost one hundred years was in a deep political crisis which destroyed and dissolved important political institutions and signaled the end of the city-state as an independent political entity. The long, destructive wars had unleashed certain powerful social forces and intensified class conflict.

Because some of these forces were seriously threatening the existing socio-economic structures of the Greek city-states, several members of the Greek intelligentsia began to question seriously the validity of the systems in the city-states and proposed certain alternatives or remedies to the situation. Plato talked of the problem of the plutocrat and the beggar and devised an Ideal State, which could do away with economic, political and social conflict and bring about *εἰρήνη*, which is the highest good.¹ Isocrates warned that since the loss of Sicily to the Barbarians, *τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μέρη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις ἔστιν*.²

Almost all the city-states began to exhibit certain desires for limited unity during the early part of the fourth century. However, the strategy and shape through which this association was to be attained became a crucial obstacle. The methodology was so diverse as to make any serious attempt obsolete from the start. The particular emphasis by the various Leagues underlines the issue of the time. There were six Amphictionic Leagues in Greece during the fourth century:

1. The Amphictionic League which was centered around the temple of Poseidon Ogchisto of Veotia.
2. The Amphictionic League centered around the temple of Poseidon at Kalavria (today's Poros).
3. The Amphictionic League of Apollo at Delos, otherwise known as the Delian Amphictionic League.
4. The Amphictionic League of Poseidon at Trifilia meeting annually on the grounds of the Temple of Poseidon.
5. The Amphictionic League of Apollo in Asia Minor, made up mainly of the Doric city-states there.
6. The Delphic Amphictionic League having the following members: Thessaloi, Veotoi, Doriis, Jones, Perraivoi, Magnetes, Locroi, Oitaioi, Achaoi, Phokis, Dolopes, Maliis.

The Amphictionic Leagues originated as religious unions of different neighboring people (*Ἀμφικτυονία*-dwellers around) and their functions were limited mainly to religious festivals and sacrifices. However, the scope, purpose and function of all the Amphictionic Leagues in general and of the Delphic in

particular changed drastically during the fourth century.

The twelve tribes in the Delphic League included almost all of the Hellenic people south of Macedonia with the exception of the people of southwest Peloponnesos and those of Aetolea and Acarnania. The Delphic Amphictionic League underwent a rapid transformation during the 5th century B.C. becoming a foremost institution in Greece striving for a political role and symbolizing an eventual federation of the city-states.

In the midst of the destructive civil wars the Greeks realized that they had exposed themselves to possible conquest by the Persians. Already by the Treaty of Sousa in 383 B.C. the Persians were regulating Greek affairs both east and west of the Aegean Sea. The image of the Great Persian King had become an element in the political life of the Greeks from 404-359 B.C. The year 359 B.C. should be taken as the turning in the Hellenic thought towards cooperation and unity. By 359 B.C. the following outstanding events had taken place:

1. The Peace of Antalcidas was signed between the Spartans and the Persians in 378 B.C. Sparta, frightened by the alliance concluded by the Corinthians, the Athenians and the Thebans in 392 B.C., sent their king, Antalcidas, to Persia in order to obtain a treaty of alliance with the great king. In return for this alliance, the Spartans made two tremendously important concessions to the Persians. First, they handed the control of the Hellenic city-states in Asia Minor over to the Persians, thus giving up any commitment which they had to them for their defense and officially recognized the sovereignty of the Persians over these territories and states for the first time in history. Second, they agreed formally that all the city-states of Greece should be prevented from forming alliances or uniting with each other.³ Each city-state should be completely independent of the other. Thus the over-all power of the Hellenic-speaking people was greatly reduced. No longer could the Greeks resist the ambition and frustrate the plans of the Persian king. He was to be left entirely free in dominating the Middle East.

2. The city-state of Thebes had risen and fallen. Struggling for recognition and a position of dominance in the Hellenic world, Thebes used various means, including cooperation and alliance with the Persian king against the Greeks, in order to increase both her potential strength and her image in the outside world. During the Peloponnesian War Thebes retreated into the background and watched Athens and Sparta destroying each other and along with

1. Plato, *Laws*, Book 1.

2. Isocrates, *To Philip*, 13-17.

3. Albert A. Trever, *History of Ancient Civilization*, Vol. 1 (New York: Brace and Company, 1936), pp. 176, 177.

them a number of other city-states. Finally, her turn had to come. On the ruins of the Peloponnesian War, Thebes rose as the mighty and invincible state of Hellas. Her glory and success depended mainly on the ability of two extremely able political and military leaders, Pelopidas and Epamenondas.

The rise of Thebes was to bring only disasters and war adventures on the suffering peoples of the Greek World. A new civil war erupted in 394 B.C. and continued until 362 B.C. This time the city-states were polarized around Sparta and Thebes. Athens retreated into a secondary role. Thebes drive for power climaxed with the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C., in which the Spartans were crushed, and continued until the Battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. In Mantinea the two mightiest armies of Greece clashed for the second time head-on. The outcome of this deadly clash was a draw, symbolizing and underlining once again the exhaustion of the embattled Hellas.

3. All three city-states, Athens, Sparta and Thebes, had risen and fallen. They were tired and exhausted, and with them all the other major Hellenic city-states save Macedonia.

class conflict and social revolutions

During the fifth century the class struggle took various forms both within and without the city-state. A general mass unrest characterized the century with the masses being class-conscious and awakened to their power.¹ From the years 467 to 457 B.C. Athens embarked upon a policy of expansion and creation of an empire. Persia had been defeated and rolled back in 490, 480, and 479 B.C., and Athens had emerged from the Persian wars as the most powerful state in the Mediterranean.

Soon after the Persian Wars, Sparta chose to retreat back on her own limited sphere of influence, mainly in central, southern, and western Peloponnesos; she embarked at the same time to a program of maximum security recognizing the dangers both from within and without. Her policy was based on the principle of isolation or limited interaction, while maintaining an efficient war machinery for internal and external defense.²

From the end of the Persian Wars to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. the policy of Sparta, apart from being one of isolation, was also a reaction to the Athenian foreign policy. Sparta was aware of the Athenian schemes for expansion and domination and was invariably reacting to such schemes and drives.

In her aim for establishing a powerful empire, Athens realized that the main opposition to such motions was to come from Sparta; Thebes, Corinth and Megara were powers of secondary importance and could not be compared with Sparta in her military and economic power.

Because of the vulnerability in the internal structure of the Spartan system, due primarily on the class antagonism between the Helotes, Perioikoi on one side, and the Spartan citizens on the other, the Spartan leaders refused to embark upon expansionistic policies and international adventures, and thus they rejected Pausanias' plan for the creation of an international empire. Athens, however, aware of this deadly weakness of Sparta, extended her influence in practically all the Aegean, Black and Ionian Seas and controlled places and states all the way from Byzantium to Sicily.

Thriving commercially due to her empire and the individual initiative of her subjects, Athens became both economically and militarily powerful, and her citizens came to enjoy the highest standards of living in the Greek world. Under such conditions, the Athenian democracy received strong popular support and the tensions of class antagonism were by and large diminished.

In Sparta the situation was quite different. Economically Sparta was not very much better off after the Persian Wars than she had been before them. The standards of living remained almost the same and no new revenues came into the state, since the methods of production did not alter and since Pausanias' plan for expansion was voted down.³

In 469 B.C., a violent earthquake shook Sparta and the towns around, killing about 20,000 people and leaving only five houses standing. During this profound natural disaster, the Messenian Helotes and Perioikoi found an opportunity for revolution. The revolt was finally crushed with the help of the troops of Mantinea and Sparta survived the challenge.⁴

In 464 B.C., the Thasians revolted against the Athenian exploitation of Mount Pangaeon which yielded gold and silver. However, the Athenians imposed their rule over the Thasians again, and secured the mines.⁵ By this time, the Athenians had advanced greatly as a first rate power and began to treat their allies as subjects (*βιαιώς και υπερηφάνως ήρχον*).⁶

The Peloponnesian Wars in 431-404 B.C. unleashed a number of social forces which brought the class struggle out in the open in Athens and intensified

1. Charles A. Robinson, Jr., *Ancient History from Prehistoric Times to the Death of Justinian* (New York: Macmillan, 1951).

2. Trever, pp. 410, 420.

3. Margaret O. Wason, *Class Struggle in Ancient Greece*, (London: Victor Collanez, Ltd., 1947, p. 38).

4. Diodorus XI, 63. 1-6.

5. Diodorus XI, 69.4-70.2.

6. *Ibid.*, XI, 70.2-71.2.

it in the other Greek states. In 412 B.C. the Athenian democracy was changed to the Oligarchy of Four Hundred.¹ A year later a revolution broke out in Athens in which the extremely conservative group of the Four Hundred was replaced by the government of Five Thousand. Only 5,000 of the wealthiest citizens were allowed freely and actively to participate in the decision-making process and in the new power structure of the government. By 410 B.C. the old democracy was restored. In the meantime revolutions broke out in other parts of Greece. In Kerkyra for example, the masses favored democracy while the rich fought to maintain the oligarchy. A serious civil strife and massacre culminated in the greatest bloodshed yet.² In Samos the sailors revolted and replaced the oligarchy with democracy.³ Encouraged by this revolution, the people of Athens revolted against their oligarchs in order to bring back democracy.

In the fourth century the states of Athens, Sparta, Thebes and Macedonia continuously tried to secure areas of dominance. The wars which resulted from such schemes and struggles, unleashed a new breed of social forces and intensified further the class war. Some of the highlights of class conflict and social revolutions in the fourth century were the following:

The Social Revolutions in Peloponnesos, 371 B.C. Following the defeat of the armed forces of Sparta at Leuctra by the rising might of Thebes in 371 B.C., a series of social revolutions broke up in these states of Peloponnesos which were under the Spartan sphere of influence. In Argos, according to Diodorus, στάσις ἐγένετο called σκυταλισμός which was accompanied by the largest slaughter ever to have occurred in Greece.⁴ In Arcadia about the same time, large scale civil war broke out involving pro and anti-Spartan factions. The anti-Spartan party came to power for a while but the pro-Spartan elements prevailed upon the Lacedaemonians to invade Arcadia and to suppress the popular uprising.⁵

The Social War of 358-357 B. C. In 358 B.C. a crisis of very large proportions shook the foundations of the empire which Athens had managed to put back together after her defeat in the Peloponnesian Wars. The competition between Thebes and Athens for the establishment of spheres of influence in the Aegean and in central and northern Greece brought about an increasing degree of exploitation for the peoples

in these areas and whose destinies and lots were in dispute by Thebes and Athens.

Both Athens and Thebes managed to organize their own favored parties in the various states of Greece; such was the case in Peloponnesos and in other parts of the country where one could find pro-Spartan governments and parties during the second half of the fifth and fourth century, and so it was the case with the Athenians and Thebans during this time. As a matter of fact, the leading Greek city-states always associated their own immediate security with the spread of their own forms of government and systems throughout Greece; or if this was not possible, they tended to support certain functions and parties in the various states which were indentifying at least partially with their interests.

In Euboea, an island which traditionally was regarded as an Athenian sphere of influence, the Thebans organized their own party and challenged the interests of Athens there. The clash of the Theban and Athenian interests in Euboea not only intensified exploitation and stimulated class struggle there, but brought about an armed conflict between the pro-Athenian and the pro-Theban parties. The civil war which began in Euboea was to become the spark for revolutions in the entire Athenian empire.

The inhabitants of Euboea were involved in a civil war. When the parties of the conflict invited foreign support, the war spread over the entire island. Soon after the Euboean civil war, the Athenians became involved in the Social War against the revolutionaries of Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium.⁶

The city-states of Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium joined forces immediately and on the land operations they defeated the Athenian forces which were sent to crush the revolutions in Chios led by the generals Chares and Chabrias. On the sea operations the allied city-states had put together a fleet of one hundred ships in contrast to the sixty ships in the Athenian fleet. The allied fleet conquered most of the Athenian positions in the Aegean and placed Athens in a very difficult situation. Under these conditions, Athens was forced to negotiate with the revolutionaries of Chios, Cos, Byzantium and Rhodes. The outcome of the negotiations was a settlement according to which the rebellious city-states not only retained their independence but they also were allowed to withdraw from the Athenian League. The independence of Byzantium was officially recognized.⁷

Aggression in Peloponnesos, 352-351 B.C. The defeats of Sparta at Leuctra in 371 B.C. and in Man-

1. Diodorus XIII, 38, 1-6.

2. Diodorus XIII, 47.5-48.3.

3. Thucydides VIII, LXXIII, 3-LXXIV.1.

4. Diodorus Book XV, 57.2-58.3.

5. *Ibid.*, Book XV, 59.3-60.3.

6. Diodorus XVI, 7, 1-3.

7. *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, Book XVI, pp. 255, 256, 257.

timeia in 363 B.C. by the Thebans had exposed the fact that Sparta was declining in power and status in the Hellenic world, and that perhaps her days as a dominant force were over. Fighting hard against this seemingly inevitable doom and collapse, Sparta decided to bring under her grip all the areas in Peloponnesos which had traditionally been within her sphere of dominance. Some cities in central and southern Peloponnesos had managed to take advantage of the weakness of Sparta and to escape from her control and even influence. The Arcadians, the Tegeans and others even maintained close ties with states outside of Peloponnesos, like Thebes and Athens.

The aggression of Sparta began first against the Megalopolitans. The Lacedaemonians sent their army under the command of Archidamus in 352 B.C. and overran the country of the Megalopolitans. To meet this threat, the leaders of Megalopolis asked their allies—Argives, Sicyonians and Messenians—for military aid. In addition to the aid which Megalopolis received from her allies, Thebes sent also four and a half thousand troops under the leadership of Cephisian.¹

It is important to note here the kind of support which the Spartans received from the Greek states. Indeed, most of the conservative elements came to her aid. Lycophron and Peitholaus, the exiled tyrants of Pherae along with the Phokians came to aid the aggression with a force of about three and a half thousand men.

The firm opposition and determination of the Megalopolitans and their allies to resist, forced, the Spartans to make an armistice with them and to give up their schemes of conquests, realizing fully the willingness and determination of the masses to fight for their freedom. The forces of reaction which began to retreat with the decline of the Spartan might were now ready to turn their hopes and allegiances to the rising new power of the north.

The Role of Macedonia. The rise of Macedonia is closely associated with the personal rule of Philip II. Philip's main objective was to create an empire and to bring all the Greek cities under his control. However, he preferred to control Greece through governments favorable to him rather than by military force. For this reason the cardinal principle of his foreign policy was to create pro-Macedonian parties

in the various city-states, supporting often unpopular and conservative elements.²

Philip's policy was most successful in the northern and eastern Greek city-states where the influence of Macedonia was great and the «foreign aid» of Philip was utilized by the leaders of the pro-Macedonian parties efficiently. Many cities were treacherously handed over to Philip's control against the wish of their peoples by pro-Macedonian tyrants and their mercenaries.³

The struggles of Athens, Sparta, Thebes and Macedonia to create empires in the fourth century coupled with the effects of these struggles, greatly strengthened and stimulated the class consciousness of the masses in Greece; they made them aware of the existing socio-economic conditions and exposed class struggle as a primary social force of the fourth century, which was expressed mainly in terms of the clash of democracy against oligarchy, monarchy or tyranny.

the philosophical attitudes towards Homonoia

From the description of the nature and extent of the Pan-Hellenic political crisis and social revolutions, certain forces can be readily identified as being dominant in shaping the historical trends of the time, such as the drive for expansion and creation of empires, class struggle, trends towards regional unity or regionalism, decline of the City-State along with its ideology and institutions.

By the middle of the fourth century the city-states were nearly exhausted from their armed struggles and some leaders recognized that the only way out of this crisis was a friendly reconciliation and cooperation between them. To be sure, they did not think in concrete terms of a Pan-Hellenic union but they did feel the need for a closer and more meaningful cooperation and pacific settlement of disputes. The turning point that brought this new attitude among the city-states, came immediately after the exhaustive battle which they fought in Mantinea in 363 B.C.⁴

It looked as if the only logical way out of this crisis was the emergence of a power outside the structure with an enlightened monarch as the center of unity. Such a person could set up an enlightened strong personal rule and arrest the forces of decay and disintegration. Already the concept of an enlightened monarch as the ultimate savior of the Hellenic world in part and the *Oikoumene* in general was an attractive idea among the highest Greek intelligentsia and

1. *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, pp. 297, 298, 299. Marcus N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, Vol. II: From 403 to 323 B.C. (Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 157, 158, 159, 165, 166.

E.L. Hicks and G. F. Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Revised Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), pp. 249, 254, 261.

2. Wason, p. 145.

3. Diodorus, Vol. VII, Book XVI. 37.3-38.2.

4. Diodorus, Vol. VII, Book XV. 98.2-90.2.

specifically among some philosophers, whose positions towards the concept of enlightened monarchy will be presented here.

Plato, in his *Republic*, creates a world which is based upon a system of ideocracy. Ideocracy consists of aristocracy and monarchy.¹ He tells us that the Greek cities and τῶ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, will never rest from their evils until οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἢ οἱ βασιλεῖς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταυτὸν ἔμπροσθεν, δύναμει τε πολιτικῇ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ, τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ' ἑκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα... οὐδὲ αὖτε ἡ πολιτεία μὴ ποτε πρότερον φῦη τε εἰς τὸ δυνάτον καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ἴδῃ, ἣν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεν.²

Plato tells us in *Politicus* that there is a need for an ideal and absolute monarch. Monarchy when bound by good written laws, Plato says, is the best of all six forms of government. However, without law χαλεπὴ καὶ βαρὺν ἔξουσίαν.³ The philosopher also draws the portrait of the statesman. He defines the monarch as being the true statesman and defends monarchy as being the best government because in monarchy the king rules like a scientific ruler⁴ and possesses perfect knowledge of political science.⁵

Plato argues that monarchy offers two great advantages over all other political systems either in theory or in practice. The first is that monarchy brings harmony which he substitutes for equality. The second advantage is that monarchy creates a flexible government. Plato believes that monarchy is preferable to any other form of government, because only in monarchy can one find free play of reason.⁶ The rule of a monarch is guided by his reason which is personal and thereby flexible. Therefore monarchy possessing a strong personal element and flexibility becomes a humane system.

The *Republic* was written by Plato around 383 B.C. It accounts for the existent political systems but finds none of them attractive or suitable for a natural, just and flexible form of government.

He proposed that the family institution be changed and liberalized. Women should share power and be treated as equals, while the society as a whole be guarded from internal diseases such as drinking and promiscuity. Poets were to be forbidden to circulate

verses unless censored by Curators to reflect accurately as the real essence of things, while exportation of internal money was forbidden. Private property was severely limited. The Monarch in Plato's thought is the necessary social force which can bring ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν among the men of courage and restraint, and thus provide for a happy state without conflict.⁷

Plato substitutes harmony for equality because he begins with the assumption that most people are not equal by nature and that justice is the freedom of individuals to discover the harmony of their nature with the world around them and thus to perform the function for which they are best fitted by nature. So if harmony is the keynote of the platonic system, then once it is established it should always be preserved. There can not be a productive social system in Plato's mind unless it is an accurate model of the real harmonious order of things that exists in the universe and which includes the relationship between Man and his environment.

Since the mission of the monarch is to bring *Homonoia* and harmony in the society and to preserve wisely the guidance of the laws, the monarch must possess certain outstanding moral, intellectual, and physical qualities, in order to fulfill such a delicate and difficult task. The wise monarch thus must be a *charismatic* hero, whose outstanding leadership should constitute an important social element in the ideal state.

In such a state, Harmony, *Homonoia* and social love are the main bonds which hold the society together and make the system operational. From the harmonious nature of the system, the concept of justice emerges. Justice, according to Plato, aims to bring happiness to every individual in the society, because it demands the expression and fulfillment of the personality of every individual, which is a duplicate of his real nature. This individual nature is in total harmony with the harmony that constitutes the fabric in the structure of Cosmos. Thus justice can be defined as the harmony of the parts in a whole.

Since justice depends entirely on harmony, then there can be no justice in the ideal state unless the political system of the state is one of harmony, and the leaders of that state direct their rule in such a way as to promote *Homonoia* among the citizens, thereby eliminating permanently seeds of decay that might disturb the harmonious order of things. Plato's aim was to make all men good, as he conceived goodness.⁸

Homonoia becomes the connecting tissue in the *Republic*, a vital element in creating the psychological and ideological substructure of the system.

7. Plato, *Politicus*, 311 C.

8. Freeman, Eugene and David Appel, *The Wisdom and Ideas of Plato*, p. 118.

1. Sir Ernest Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), p. 164.

2. Plato, *Republic*, Book V, 472 D-E.

3. Plato, *Politicus*, 302 E.

4. Plato, *Politicus*, 301 Z.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

It is this so important substructure, dangerously ignored by critics of Plato and neo-platonists, that completes the system by bringing spontaneous harmony between the rational and irrational natures of Man. The human being in the Republic is the universal Hellene who represents the finest synthesis of the best in the human nature. He is a product of the liberating and humanizing process that evolved from Achilles to Dionysos.

Perhaps more concerned than Plato over the future of the Hellenes was the philosopher Isocrates (436-338 B.C.). A few years after Plato wrote his *Republic*, Isocrates wrote his *Panegyricus* in 380 B.C. Through this important work we can analyse and visualize the old order of Greece. On the full realization of the nature and magnitude of the Pan-Hellenic crisis, Isocrates sees as salvation a national union through 'Ομόνοια.¹ His program was to be primarily Pan-Hellenic. He wanted to see a real unity among the various Hellenic city-states and to use this unity for a common cause against the traditional enemies of the Hellenes, the Persians.²

Isocrates was close to being ninety years old when Philip was securing his position in Thessaly and was getting ready to wage war against the Greeks south of Thessaly. The old man sent a number of letters to Philip advising him to bring about ὁμόνοια among the Greek city-states and to pay no attention to the various orators who were primarily supporting their own immediate interests. Isocrates also advised Philip to display moderation and persuasion in dealing with the Hellenes. μέλλω γάρ σοι συμβουλεύειν προστῆναι τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμονομίας καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους στρατείας.³

However, Isocrates limited his ideas only to Greeks, without much consideration for the peoples of the East whom he called Barbarians, and the people of the West who were, according to the Greek thinking, even less civilized than the Barbarians.

According to Isocrates, Philip's mission was to bring Homonoia to the Greek lands and to follow the steps of the national hero of Hellas. Heracles was not only a great warrior but also a man of virtue and kindness, essential qualities that must be displayed by a king if he is to become a great leader and to win immortality.⁴

The Pan-Hellenic war against the Persians in the mind of Isocrates was a historical necessity which was imposed upon the Hellenes by the deadly political and economic weakness and limitations of the city-state. οὕτε γὰρ εἰρήνην οἷόν τε βεβαίαν ἀγαγεῖν, ἢν μὴ κοινῇ τοῖς βαρβάροις πολεμήσωμεν,

οὐθ' ὁμονοῖσαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας, πρὶν ἂν καὶ τὰς ὀφειλίας ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιησώμεθα.⁵

Isocrates seems to have realized the limitations and realities of the classical civilization. The lack of other feasible alternatives such as technology, communications, political modernization, etc., limited the choice of the Hellenes to the goals of national unity and a materially motivated war against Persia. Τούτων δὲ γενομένων καὶ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀφαιρεθείσης, ... οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐχ ὁμονοήσωμεν καὶ τὰς εὐνοίας ἀληθινὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἔξομεν.⁶

Aristotle's position on unity and instruments of unity is considerably different from those of Plato and the other Greek contemporary philosophers. He is an ardent supporter of the city-state system on the grounds that the state is natural and necessary because man is not able to meet his desires and protect his interests by himself.⁷

Unity in Aristotle's view should be centered around the State which is an end in itself and the best government for a state would be a synthesis between democracy and oligarchy. The uniting factor in a society of property classes should be the middle class.⁸

Aristotle sees the middle class as a uniting and balancing force in the system. The mission of the middle class is to fill the gap between the rich and the poor, to avoid and nullify a polosis of the two extremes of the system and as such to arrest and harmonize all the diverse factions and social forces.⁹ Concerning the role and mission of the monarch, Aristotle's position is similar to that of Plato.

Although Plato, like Aristotle, sees the mission of the monarch as one of harmonizing and arresting the contradictions and conflicts of the forces within the system in order to preserve the harmonious order of things, he differs from Plato in his belief that the King need not be a philosopher king in the platonic sense, but rather the king should come from the better classes in order to protect them from the people.¹⁰

In summation, Aristotle believes that the missionary role of the middle class is to be a buffer zone between the two antagonistic classes of that of very rich and that of very poor and to eliminate or arrest social discontent. The missionary role of the monarch is to project himself as a powerful social force of arbitration and harmony in the system. Although Aristotle associates this principle of supreme virtue

5. Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, 173-174.

6. Isocrates, *Ibid.*

7. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, Vol II, p. 403.

8. Barker, p. 268.

9. Aristotle, *Politics*, IV, IX, 6-8.

10. *Ibid.*, IV, X-36.

1. Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, 173-175.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Isocrates, *To Philip*, 13-17.

4. *Ibid.*

with monarchy, his favored political system was one which could be based upon the rule of law.

At the same time there was a group of intellectuals critical of the existing order and known as Cynics. The original meaning of the word Cynic is «doggishness.» Used as a metaphor, it means shameless or unabashed, and suggests a negative approach to issues, and from this metaphor cynicism takes its meaning.

Cynicism was not a philosophy and did not constitute a separate school of thought as the other four Hellenic schools had done with a body of doctrine (Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic). Cynicism was rather a mode of thought, a way of life, and its approach was completely negative.¹ ἀπάθειαν γὰρ ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δὲ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι.²

Cynicism was highly critical of the cultural behavior and structure of the establishments and it was highly individualistic. The Cynics thought always of themselves as having no bonds with their immediate society but rather belonging to the world community. They were not, in their hearts, citizens of any city-state, but citizens of the world.

When Diogenes (400-325 B.C.), the founder of the Cynics, was asked to what city he belonged, he answered that he was a cosmopolite, meaning citizen of the world, and thus he had rejected the basis and nature of the Greek city-state.³

The Cynics had rejected the current systems and institutions. They displayed hostility and contempt for such things as lineage and fame because they were parts of the system and were mere smokescreens to conceal the weakness and often bankruptcy of the system. The end result and aim of the Cynicism was to be natural happiness. τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας.⁴

Diogenes, Crates and other cynics said much against the declining city-state system and exposed its hypocrisy and lack of justice by their negative approach. However, Cynicism suggests something more than just an approach of a group of people expressing their dissatisfaction and disagreement with the system. This trend exposes the dimensions of the alienation in the Hellenic world during the fifth, fourth, and third centuries. It expresses also the symptoms of decay of the old order. Cynicism was not a formalized movement or a centralized institution with heritage and concrete aims and plans. It represented clearly a mounting dissatisfaction and discontent

of many intellectuals with the existing socio-economic and political institutions.

As the forces of the Pan-Hellenic crisis were gaining constant impetus, and civil wars were intensifying the crisis, the people turned to material objects in the hope of finding a certain amount of security and happiness in them. As the people of Hellas saw their religion and its subsequent value system collapse in ruins, and as they were forced to acknowledge bitterly the reality of the bankruptcy of their political institutions, they turned to other fronts searching for happiness. They became selfish, apathetic, more individualistic, more demanding. The Stoic concept of apathy and the Epicurean concept of anarchy helped to clarify the situation.⁵

Along with the process of alienation, class conflict is exposed and underlined by the existence of Cynicism. The Cynics, along with many Stoics, identified readily with the class struggle and helped to create consciousness among the lower classes of city-states societies. It was the Stoic Spahros of Borysthenes, for example, a disciple of Zeno himself, who seems to have been the directing force behind Cleomenes' social revolution in third-century Sparta; while a century later another Stoic, Blossius of Cumae, seems to have been responsible for the liberal program of the Gracchi.⁶

The fourth century was in some respects for the Hellenic world what the nineteenth century was for the Western world. Both centuries witnessed socio-economic systems collapsing and new ones rising. The political changes were similar also in some respects. A number of different schools of thought such as the Stoic and Epicurean flourished in the Hellenic world during the fourth century. These schools had developed various doctrines ranging from Epicurean anarchy to the highly ordered system of Stoicism. By and large, these new philosophical doctrines were concerned with the task of reconciling man with the realities of the changing world and with suggesting possible paths which he could follow in order to continue surviving and developing further.

Philip's drive for Hellenic unity

Philip of Macedonia was born in 382 B.C. At the age of twenty-three he was appointed regent to the infant son of King Perdiccas who was slain by the Illyrians in a war in the northern Macedonia in 359 B.C. As soon as young Philip was appointed regent, the very existence of the state of Macedonia was se-

1. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, Vol. II, p. 404.

2. Julian, *The Orations of Julian*, VI.

3. Hadas, Moses, *Essential Works of Stoicism* (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. x.

4. Julian, *The Orations of Julian*, VI.

5. Hadas, Moses, *Essential Works of Stoicism* (N. Y.: Bantam Books, 1961), p. ix.

6. *Ibid.*, p. xi.

riously threatened by various tribal groups. At once the young regent dealt with the Peonians and Illyrians with impressive energy and efficiency. Soon the threat was eliminated, thanks to brilliant military victories scored by Philip against the enemies. The success of Philip convinced the leading people of Macedonia that he should become the next king rather than Amyntas, the infant son of Perdiccas. Thus, as soon as Philip returned to Pella, his army and the elite leadership of Macedonia declared him king.

Philip displayed from the very beginning an outstanding character enriched by outstanding qualities in the field of war and politics. He was brave to the point of recklessness and, as Fuller says, «He possessed in marked degree the gift of divining what was in his enemy's mind, and when beaten in the field would accept defeat and prepare for victory. Throughout his life he never lost sight of his aim—to bring the whole of Greece under his dominion.»¹

As soon as Philip secured his northern frontier from the Illyrians and Peonians in 359 B.C., he proceeded to consolidate his positions in the north, thus preparing the way for becoming the master of the Balkan Peninsula in the near future. Having succeeded in bringing unity under Macedonian rule to the various tribes residing along the eastern and northern frontiers, including the Thracians, he proceeded to turn his attention to the Greek world. From his later actions and plans, there is good reason to believe that Philip had from the very beginning of his reign a plan of Hellenic unity under his leadership and that he recognized immediately his number-one enemy which had to be overcome if his plan was to succeed.

The State of Athens, as Philip saw it, was the greatest obstacle to his victory because of her tremendous naval power. She was the great naval power of Greece and she could also become invincible if she could reach an understanding with the Persians.² During this time Athens was again on the rise. It was to be the last ascent of Athens before the eclipse. The Athenian comeback culminated with the Silver Age of Lycurgus.³

Beginning with this assumption, Philip proceeded to neutralize Athens as much as possible from the military standpoint, at the same time he tried to win Athenian cooperation and good will. Thus Philip was

holding weapons in one hand and an olive branch in the other. Power and diplomacy were to be the main two channels followed by Philip in regard to his relations with Athens. A brief account of Philip's drive for the hegemony of Greece is as follows:

In 359 B.C. Philip made a secret treaty with the Athenians agreeing that he should seize Pydna for himself and that he would conquer Amphipolis for them. Soon Philip seized Pydna but Amphipolis was not handed over to Athens and instead it was handed over to Philip by a pro-Macedonian faction. This conquest was to become of paramount importance because the gold mines of Mount Pangaeon produced a revenue of 1,000 talents yearly. These new financial sources were comparable to those of Athens and Sparta during the height of these powers. Philip had secured through the seizure of the mines enough financial support to finance his campaign for the dominion of Macedonia.⁴ He also secured the timber industry of the same region which was extremely valuable for his Fleet.

In 358 B.C. Philip took Potidaea and thus almost totally expelled the Athenians from their colonies and footholds along the Thracian coast. In the same year Philip married Olympias, the daughter of Neoptolemus of Epirus, and thus secured his southwestern frontier. In 355 B.C. the first sacred war broke out. The Phokians led by Philomelus had taken Delphi and occupied the sacred temple of Apollo seizing the treasures and other sacred and extremely valuable objects. The General Assembly of the Delphic Amphictionic League passed a resolution condemning the action of Phokis and ordering a military action against him. War between Phokis and the coalition of Veotia, Locris and Thessaly broke out in 355 B.C. Philip gladly took advantage of the situation and marched against the Thesalians. Defeated twice by the combined strength of the Phokians and Thesalians, he retreated, but in 352 B.C. he came back and managed to win the Thesalians by diplomacy. The Phokian army was defeated; by occupying Pherae the control of the whole of Thessaly was under the Macedonians. In 344 B.C. Philip was appointed the *tagus* or ruler of Thessaly for life.

In 339 B.C. the second sacred war broke out, this time between the Locrians of Amphissa and the members of the Amphictionic League, led by Thebes and Athens. Because both Thebes and Athens failed to fulfill their obligations to the Amphictionic Council by using their might against the Locrians, the Council turned to Philip for support. Philip gladly accepted the responsibility and in 338 he led an

1. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (London 1958).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

3. Fordyce Mitchel, *Athens in the Age of Alexander* (Greece and Rome, October 1965), p. 189. The Silver Age of Lycurgus is named after Lycophron, son of Lycurgus. Lycophron dominated the politics of Athens for twelve years and his accomplishments compare favorably with those of Pericle's Golden Age.

4. G.T. Griffith, *The Macedonian Background* (Greece and Rome, Oct. 1965), p. 127.

army of 30,000 on foot and 2,000 on horse south of the key pass of Thermopylae. The Athenians, alarmed, concluded a military alliance with the Thebans and marched their armies to Chaeronea to stop Philip. The battle of Chaeronea was a decisive one. The Macedonians triumphed over the allies. The Macedonian victory established Macedonia as the supreme power in the Hellenic world with Philip as the undisputed leader.

Master in the technique of winning both war and peace, Philip proceeded to deal with the vanquished. He severely punished the Thebans and generously treated the Athenians. Following the general lines of Isocrates' Pan-Hellenic program, Philip sent his son, Alexander, with a top general Antipater to Athens bearing with them generous peace proposals and the ashes of the Athenian soldiers who had fallen at Chaeronea; the Athenian prisoners of war were also set free. Alexander offered to the Athenians to become an ally of Philip, to join the proposed National Council, to remain internally autonomous and free and to retain possessions in Samos, Delos, Lemnos and Imbros, relinquishing, however, her hegemony over the Aegean Empire.¹

The Athenians were pleased at least on the surface,² with the terms of the treaty offered to them by Philip and in return they granted Attic citizenship to Philip and his son and erected a statue of Philip in their Agora.

Now Philip began to construct the New Order of

Greece on the ruins of the old.³ Invitations were issued to all the Hellenic states to send representatives to Corinth in order to consult with him on the creation of a Synhedrion, or Federal Council. All the Hellenic states responded with the exception of Sparta. The first Pan-Hellenic Congress met at Corinth in 338 B.C. for the purpose of formally organizing a new Empire. Interstate peace and freedom of commerce constituted its basis. The representation of the State of the Synhedrion was established in proportion to their military might.⁴ The terms of agreement for a universal peace reached at the first Pan-Hellenic Synhedrion at Corinth at the end of the year 338 B.C. provided for: permanent peace between Macedonia and the League, collective security for external and internal aggression against the government of any member state, Philip was to be the hegemon over the League forces for life and was charged with the duty to conduct in the immediate future a Pan-Hellenic war against the Persians; the Delphic Amphictionic Council was appointed to be the supreme judicial of the League.

Thus Philip's drive for limited unity had born fruit. For the first time in the entire history of the Hellenic world, real foundations for an effective unity had been laid. Philip must also be accredited for the organization and development of the most advanced and efficient military machine up to his time. Under the remarkable leadership of Alexander and his generals, this formidable manpower weapon became, eventually, a key factor in the submission of the Near and Middle East to the thrust of Macedonia. Philip's great achievements opened Alexander's road towards the *Oikoumene*.

3. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (London, 1958), p. 36.

4. *Ibid.*

Ἔστι δὴ ὁμόνοια ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ αὐτὴ προαίρεσις ᾖ, μὴ τοῦ ἐκάτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία πολιτικὴ.

Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution Eudemean Ethics on Virtues and Vices*. Loeb VII, VII, 7-VIII 5.