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Stephen G. Xydis

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the three outstanding features of the global system: an essay in global political sociology

by

Stephen G. Xydis

Professor of Political Science
Hunter College,
City University of New York

The *anarchic polyarchy* of world politics is based primarily on a system of *territorial political communities*. This is no historical novelty. Such systems existed in the past, in early Mesopotamia, in China, Greece, late Mediaeval and Renaissance Italy, then Europe. Students of international politics have studied some of these systems for comparative purposes in order to try to understand our own.¹ However, our system differs from these earlier systems in several important aspects. First, it is global; second, its major components are three-dimensionally permeable at all times; and, third, it is physically destructible. Let us examine each of these features separately in greater detail.

a. globality²

At various historical epochs, prior to the twentieth century, multistate systems that varied greatly in territorial extent developed in contiguous or non-contiguous regions of our globe, and certain empires with pretensions of universality were built. Yet neither these empires, nor these multistate systems ever encompassed the entire globe.

Today, however, even though mankind remains divided into many different peoples and states, a *single* multistate system exists for the first time in the history of spaceship earth. This system, a crazy-quilt on any multicolored political map of the world, spreads out over a closed field, the boundaries of which are those of the great globe itself.

The historical or macropolitical process toward globalization or universality is believed to have begun with an era of Middle East dominance that lasted from the dawn of human civilization in Mesopotamia until about 500 B.C. During the era of the Eurasian cultural balance that followed, the Roman Empire emerged in the West and the Han (Chinese) Empire emerged in the Far East, with the Parthian and Kushan empires in between. Africa and America were peripheral, «fringe» civilizations of this Eurasian ecumene (inhabited world) which arose between 500 B.C.

1. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 27-59. W. Franks, «The Italian City-States as an International System», in M. A. Kaplan, ed., *New Approaches to International Relations*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968, pp. 426-458. P. J. Fliess, *Thucydides and Politics of Bipolarity*, Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1966. The universe of international systems, past, present, future, and hypothetical, is said to be the proper object of the study of international relations. G. Modelski, «Agraria and Industria, Two Models of International Systems», in K. Knorr and S. Verba, *The International System*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 121.

2. The summary that follows is based on W. H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963, pp. IX-XII. (Table of Contents), 249-253, 565-567.

and 200 A.D. After several fluctuations in this ecumene which witnessed the Western Roman Empire's downfall in the fifth century A.D. and a revival of Middle Eastern culture and political power with Islam's rise in the seventh century A.D., a third era opened. It covered the centuries from about 1500 to our own. Up to about 1917, this was the era of Western European dominance. It featured the «closure» of the ecumene since about 1900, with no fringe areas left outside it.

The global political implications of this novel feature in mankind's history are twofold:

First, the closure of the ecumene means that outside the contemporary multistate system no new territories, no *terrae nullius* in legal terms, exist any longer on our globe for discovery, exploration, and conquest. For the major European states this meant that no territories were left outside of Europe for emigration, colonization, and expansion. For the United States and Russia, this was the end of their expansion westward and eastward, respectively, on the north American continent and Eurasia. Any territorial expansion of one of the system's political units would have to be at the expense of another unit of the system. It might lead to intrasystemic war. This partly accounts for the facts that economic and social development and, in certain cases, economic, political and social integration of several adjacent states, have become major internal and external goals of states in our era, rather than territorial expansion; that means other than territorial control are devised by some states in efforts to expand their political influence on other states; that territorial sovereignty has expanded downward, under the oceans, to the continental shelf, and that the extent of traditional *res communes* such as the open seas has been reduced even as new *res communes* are created in Antarctica and outer space.

Second, the closure of the ecumene brought about the disappearance of any political environment of the multistate system. As a result, no outside barbarians, the «external proletariat» in Toynbee's terms, exist any longer, to take over the system, as happened with the Roman empire. Violent changes can be brought about only from within the system, by the «internal proletariat». Wars tend toward civil strife, just as civil strife tends to be, or to become, an international war of sorts. In different terms, the border line between the civic and the military arenas has become blurred.¹

Moreover, no possibility exists for a peripheral state to take over the multistate system and fuse its

component political units into a single empire, as Babylon had done with the warring Mesopotamian temple states; Macedonia with the system of ancient Greek city-states; the Ch'in, with the warring states in ancient China; and Rome with the Hellenistic kingdoms in the eastern Mediterranean.

If a universal empire or world government is to be set up, it must be either by voluntary amalgamation of existing political units within the multistate system or by universal conquest by one of the political units within that system or a group of them, or by a worldwide revolution. In our closed global system, it is not surprising that the United States and the USSR, with their respective nuclear capabilities appeared to the eminent nuclear physicist, Robert Oppenheimer, as two scorpions *inside* a bottle (emphasis added). Would American and Soviet efforts to explore outer space be due to claustrophobic efforts of these two deadly scorpions to escape from their closed bottle? No one can tell. Outer space, according to one scientist, represents a new frontier.²

That Western Europeans, not Chinese, Indians, Incas, or Ewes, achieved the closure of the ecumene thanks to their technical superiority in transport and communications which enabled them to control the oceans and extend the range of their military force to other continents, has had other far-reaching consequences for world politics.

First, the new political units set up in the former European colonies followed the European model of the territorial state as this developed after the Peace of Westphalia (1648). As a glance at any collection of constitutions will show, all these new states have such organic laws. Like the pioneering US Constitution, these written documents establish a framework of government that directly or indirectly is of Western European provenance. At the same time, utopias and ideologies born in Western Europe together with the industrial revolution, such as socialism in various forms, have spread throughout the world, even in the absence of industrialization.

Second, the Law of Nations, which until the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 had been applied only to the Christian nations of Europe, has tended to become the common universal law of nations.³

Third, political structures that originated in European international politics, such as international organizations, have become a feature of the entire global multistate system, as witness the United Nations, with its universality of membership.

Fourth, anti-European, perhaps anti-White racial

1. H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950, p. 252, make this distinction. They defined a military arena as one where the expectation of violence is low.

2. F. Dyson, «Human Consequences of the Exploration of Space», *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, vol. XXV, no. 7, September 1968, 8-13.

3. W. Jenks, *The Common Universality of the International Law of Mankind*, New York: Praeger, 1958.

attitudes have developed among the non-European people of the new states—with various effects on the texture of global politics. Thus, at the Bandung Conference (April 18-24, 1955), which was the first international gathering limited to 29 Asian and African states representing 1.4 billion people (Communist China included but not the USSR, which is partly Asiatic, not Nationalist China or Israel), most representatives expressed grievances against the West and its colonialist record; expressed fear of a possible resurgence of Western imperialism; blamed the West for their underdevelopment; and felt that aid from the West, the United States included, was a matter of justice and right, even a sort of compensation due to them for previously practiced colonial exploitation by people of European stock.¹

Fifth, people in these new, non-European states have questioned the suitability of European institutions, and, occasionally, the appropriateness of existing international law and international organization for the conduct of their international relations. Some of their leaders have clamored for a new international law that would presumably be a synthesis of their own conceptions of this law and of the traditional European conceptions. Indonesia, under Sukarno, withdrew for a while from membership in the United Nations and sought to set up a new international organization for Southeast Asia, perhaps together with Communist China.

Finally, because of the contribution of Europeans to the closure of the ecumene, it was they who first viewed the physical world as it actually was and in terms of political geography, geopolitics, and world politics.

b. three-dimensional permeability

The author of a book published in 1959 maintained that the political components of the multistate system that emerged in Europe slightly over three centuries ago had been impermeable, «hard-shell units», because of the then prevailing technology of warfare. Hence, the principle of territorial sovereignty adopted at the time by European sovereigns as the basis of their mutual relations coincided, supposedly, with their capability of defending their territory. By contrast, the component units of our own multistate system had become permeable, because of revolutionary developments in peace and war technology. It followed that since the concept of territorial sovereignty no longer reflected impermeability, it was

obsolete. With it so was the «hard-shell power unit», the territorial state, which therefore was destined to wither away, together with the multistate system.²

More than a decade has passed since this prediction was made. Yet far from withering away, the units of our multistate system have been thriving. Since 1959, forty-eight new states were added to the system. The membership of the United Nations rose from 51 in 1946 to 132 in 1971. In 1968 the book's author himself was obliged to acknowledge that his prognosis had been incorrect.³

The fact is that both territoriality and permeability have been basic features of all political communities since the dawn of civilization. Students of animal behavior observe that territoriality is also a feature of certain animal societies. They define territory as the area of space, whether of water, earth, or air, that an animal will guard as its exclusive possession and defend against all members of its kind.⁴

As for permeability, it is a necessary condition for interpolity relations in a multistate system. It always has been a feature of polities in such a system, not only in wartime when soldiers of one polity penetrate the territory of another, but also in times of peaceful symbiosis among governments and peoples of different polities in that system. Permeability has been evident not only in the migrations of peoples from one part of the world to another but also in the extraordinarily free travel of tradesmen, craftsmen, artists, and thinkers in the «worlds» of China of the «Warring States», of ancient Hellas, of Mediaeval Europe, of the Renaissance and of the «Enlightenment».

If territoriality is, as some writers maintain, ultimately rooted in animal behavior, the permeability of human communities would have to be a cultural, not a biological phenomenon. Civilized man, in contrast to brown rats, has learned to tolerate under certain circumstances the intruder from another polity, the diplomat, the trader, the traveler, despite ethnocentrism, xenophobia, nationalism. The presence of an intruder in a polity does not automati-

2. J.H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 42.

3. J.H. Herz, «The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State», *Polity*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1968, pp. 12-34.

4. R. Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative*, New York: Atheneum Press, 1966, p. 3. He considers territoriality a key factor in any animal behavior. His ethnologist critics reject this single-factor approach but emphasize that territorial behaviour is not an intrinsic aspect of an individual's motivation, but constitutes a «group characteristic» that stems from the cohabitation of a group of individuals in a particular locality and from their interaction. J.H. Crook, «The Nature of Territorial Aggression», in M.F. Ashley Montagu, ed., *Man and Aggression*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 48.

1. I. W. Meister, «The Bandung Conference: An Appraisal», in R. Strauss-Hupe and H. W. Hazard, eds., *The Idea of Colonialism*, New York: Praeger, 1958, p. 236.

cally arouse intraspecific aggression, in peacetime at least, as it does among rats.¹

The principles of *cujus regio ejus religio*—that the ruling prince in each state has the right to set up his religion as the exclusive faith²—as well as of territorial sovereignty and exclusive territorial jurisdiction, of inviolability and nonintervention that European sovereigns after the Peace of Westphalia adopted as norms that should govern their mutual relations emerged exactly at a time when the permeability of the units of the European multistate system had greatly increased. For the firearms and artillery, which had enabled kings to destroy the mediaeval moats and walls of feudal castles and create empire-sized territorial units administered in a centralized way, had also increased the vulnerability of these larger territorial units and threatened their security. And the widespread transpolity circulation of printed tracts and books, such as the *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* or the pamphlets advocating regicide to Protestant or Roman Catholics in these emerging polities,³ endangered the lives of the sovereigns themselves, if not the very foundations of their rule. Thus, these principles were not legal expressions of some actual physical impermeability of the emerging European states, which, despite efforts of military engineers as De Vauban (1633-1707) in France,⁴ were hardly «hard-shell power units», as the wars of Louis XIV, Frederick the Great, Charles XII of Sweden, or Napoleon demonstrated. They were politicojuridical, cultural replacements of the walls and castles rendered obsolete by gunpowder-propelled cannonballs. Their purpose was to establish a legal fiction of impermeability for each state, to regulate the increased peacetime permeability symbolized by institutionalized resident diplomacy, and to mitigate, through rules of warfare, the potentially harmful effects of wartime permeability.

The concept of the «balance of power» represented another aspect of the concerted effort of the major European states to ensure their continued existence,

despite their increased vulnerability and permeability. Until World War I, international jurists regarded it either as a fundamental legal principle or legal right in international law derived from the right of self-preservation, or as a political condition of international law.

What has happened to the permeability of states in our times is that it has acquired altogether and unprecedented a character—a third dimension—because of revolutionary developments in transport and communications. Since Kitty Hawk in 1911, it has become possible to overfly the territory of other states, with implications for warfare first realized on Christmas eve 1914, when a single German plane dropped a single bomb on London. Governments today are able to apply massive violence on the foe's noncombatant population, which in the past was either out of reach because it lay behind the military front or because rules of ground warfare exempted it from violence that could be followed. And since the early twentieth century again, governments and other organizations of one state are able to communicate to people of another state both in peacetime and wartime in order to manipulate their attitudes through information, propaganda, and psychological warfare, without any physical intrusion into the air space of the other state, except through wireless waves. In the near future, indeed, they will be able to do so by means of television. And since the sixth decade of our century, governments are able to engage in surveillance operations unprecedented in history thanks to unmanned artificial satellites orbiting the earth or suspended in outer space, without any violation of the air space of other states.

The response of governments to such developments consisted in intense efforts to regulate their peacetime permeability by international agreements that would enable them to maintain their separate identity as units of the multistate system. Thus, in the Paris Convention of 1919 for regulating aerial navigation they agreed that their sovereignty extended to the air space above each state's territory and territorial waters.⁵ In the multipartite treaty of the UN Charter they reaffirmed their respect for each other's sovereignty, and through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1945, they sought to regulate the flight of civilian aircraft over their territory. And since 1957, they have been engaged in trying to establish the limits between air space and outer space, tacitly recognizing that the law of air space does not necessarily extend to outer space.

These efforts of governments to maintain their

1. K. Lorenz, *On Aggression*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 1963, p. 161.

2. The European princes agreed on this in the religious peace of Augsburg of 1555. Under this treaty, the Lutheran princes secured full equality with the Roman Catholic princes, including the right to determine within their respective territories, the religion of the inhabitants. A. Nussbaum, *A Concise History of the Law of Nations*, rev. ed., New York: Macmillan, 1954, p. 61.

3. George Buchanan was Protestant, Francisco Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, Roman Catholics, and all advocated regicide.

4. In 1914, the German armies sweeping through Belgium, demolished with enormously heavy artillery the great Belgian fortress of Liège and Namur, D.C. Watt, F. Spencer, and N. Brown, *A History of the World in the Twentieth Century*, New York: William Morrow, 1968, pp. 217-219.

5. H. Lauterpacht, ed., *Oppenheim's International Law*, New York: David Mackay, vol. 1, 8th ed., 1955, p. 519.

political autonomy in decision-making over persons, things, and events in a particular piece of territory, have led to the proliferation of tacit and explicit international agreements, to the remarkable growth in the number of international organizations of general or limited competence,¹ to the endeavors to produce a new body of international law. And the subject matter dealt with in international agreements, international organizations, and international law, has enormously expanded. A glance at the UN Charter and at the activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies confirms these points.

It remains to be seen whether these collective efforts to regulate state permeability portend the end of the extraordinarily free travel of traders, artists and thinkers that featured in earlier multistate systems well up to the beginning of our century. In our times, not only trade but cultural activities and sports have come within the ambit of international politics. If present trends continue, tourism (already rigidly controlled in communist party-states) may suffer the same fate. And the sphere of world politics may become coextensive with that of international relations.

c. destructibility

Destructibility became a distinctive feature of our multistate system since the first atomic bomb was detonated atop a steel tower at Alamogordo, in the New Mexican desert on July 16, 1955. This event, which was the outcome of man's struggle not against nature but against man, is a vivid reminder of his capacity to change his milieu not as a healer but as a destroyer.

Especially since 1953, when the first hydrogen, fusion device was exploded at Eniwetok, man is capable of achieving holocausts that used to be ascribed only to God's will or to the unpredictable whims of Nature. With missiles of intercontinental range traveling at supersonic speeds, he can deliver to any spot on our globe thermonuclear devices based on Einstein's lethal equation about the conversion of mass into energy. A single such device produces explosive energy expressed in thousands or millions

of tons of TNT (kilotons or megatons); generates quasiosolar heat; emits lethal gamma rays; and is therefore capable of inflicting several millions of deaths. With the push of a button, man now can extinguish, in a single instantaneous blow, a whole people, a whole state, just as he has been able in the past, since Cain's time, to kill one man with a single glow at the right spot of his skull. And, if he wished, he could even achieve his own doomsday, if not by blowing up our entire globe, at least by wiping out mankind from the face of the earth.

The production of the nuclear bomb was but another manifestation of the technological revolution and specifically of the tremendous acceleration in man's capacity to kill, as the following statistics indicate:

Between 1,000,000 B.C. and about 1453 A.D. the maximum range of missiles (projectiles) rose only from the 0.01 miles of the hurled rock or club or spear, with a killing area of 0.003 square miles, to the maximum range of 0.35 miles of the catapult or ballista, with their killing area of 0.8 square miles.

Then, in the approximate five and a half centuries from 1453, when the Ottoman Turks battered with cannonballs the stout double walls of Constantinople and took the city, until 1912, i.e. two years before the outbreak of World War I, the maximum range of missiles rose from 1.0 miles with a killing area of 3 square miles, to 11.4 miles, with a killing area of 408 square miles.

Finally, in the brief period of forty-two years from 1912 to 1954, the maximum range of missiles and their killing area rose phenomenally from the aforementioned figures of 1912 to 12,500 miles and 197,000,000 square miles, respectively—by means of the strategic air command plane armed with atomic bombs and refueled in flight.² The time required for delivering interhemispherically weapons of mass destruction has shrunk from 20 hours for the 300-mile per hour B-29 to the 30-minute flight of the ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile).³

These data starkly underline the truth of the observation that, if in the political theory that deals with the state, the focus is on «the good life», speculation about global politics centers primarily on «the theory of survival».⁴ Survival, it should be noted, involves not merely the nation or the state,

1. During 1815-1967, the number of international organizations surpassed the number of states in the multistate system around 1910 and rose thereafter at a discernibly faster pace. M. Wallace and J. D. Singer, «Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System 1815-1967», *International Organization*, vol. XXIV, no. 2, Spring 1970, 282-284. In 1968-1969, 229 international political, economic, social or other intergovernmental associations of various kinds were in existence, the UN and its fifteen specialized agencies included. This represented an increase of 97 such organizations since 1956-1957. Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organizations 1968-1969*, Belgium, 1969, p. 15.

2. H. Sprout and M. Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics*, Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1962, p. 253.

3. J. B. Wiesner and H. F. York, «National Security and the Nuclear-Test Ban», *Scientific American*, vol. 211, no. 4, October 1964, p. 27. With a fractional orbital bomb, the time is even shorter.

4. M. Wight, «Why is There No International Theory?» in H. Butterfield, M. Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations*, Cambridge, Mas.: Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 33.

as was occasionally the case in the prenuclear past, but perhaps each individual in the whole of mankind.

The implications of destructibility on global politics are:

First, in contrast to the situation in past multistate systems, no component political unit of the global system exists that is unconditionally viable, i.e., that cannot be physically destroyed as an independent source of political decisions. Conversely, all the system's political units, without exception, are now only conditionally viable. The continued existence of all states, of the main subjects of international law, depends on the restraint of other states from exercising their capacity for destruction.¹ The dominant nuclear superpowers can destroy not only the non-nuclear and protonuclear states (Britain, France, China). They can also destroy each other.

Second, after World Wars I and II demonstrated a clear trend toward the globalization of warfare and its increasingly total character, because of man's ability to penetrate from the air the belligerent component units of the system and his tremendously expanded techniques of destruction, statesmen of the superpowers, despite their fierce antagonism, have avoided any direct violent confrontation that could lead to World War III. As a result, as soon as it became clear that the collective security system of the League of Nations successor could not effectively function, they set up collective self-defence organizations (NATO, OAS, Warsaw Pact, SEATO, CENTO). And, whenever war broke out in the multistate system since 1945, they sought in various ways to keep hostilities limited both in geographic extent and in weaponry used. Moreover, they not only have engaged in ceaseless disarmament talks since 1946, but have managed to conclude various nuclear arms control agreements, despite the mutual distrust, for ending the pollution of the atmosphere through radiation; for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, or their emplacement in outer space and celestial bodies, such as the moon or on the seabed or ocean floor; and for averting the outbreak of a nuclear war because of an accident, misunderstanding or miscalculation.²

1. K. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense*, New York: Harper Torchbooks 1962, pp. 58-59, develops the concept of viability. He defines it as the ability and willingness of parties to destroy each other. A party that can be absorbed or destroyed by another, he writes, is conditionally viable, if the party that has the power to destroy it refrains from exercising this power. A party, on the other hand, that cannot be destroyed as an independent source of decisions is said to be unconditionally viable.

2. The following are the relevant treaties: the partial nuclear test ban of 1963; the «Hot Line» agreement, likewise of 1963, with its supplementary agreements of 1972; the treaty of 1966 banning bombs in orbit, in outer space and on celestial bodies; the agreement of 1967 on a nuclear-weapons-

All these instances of international behavior are signs of awareness of our multistate system's destructibility among the decision-makers of the superpowers and of the emergence of a consciousness of a community interest among them in taking steps to prevent the use of nuclear weapons or at least their unrestrained use among the society of states, and to lessen the chances of any outbreak of nuclear war through accident, misunderstanding or miscalculation.

It is natural that the decision-makers, if they are motivated by a desire for self-preservation and not by a Freudian death wish, should become quite vividly aware of the need of cooperation in order to preserve the conditional viability of the units they govern. For, in contrast to weapons of the past, nuclear bombs discriminate neither between decision-making élite and masses nor between capitalist and proletarian. That in the quarter-century that elapsed since Alamogordo, the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers should have managed to avoid any resort to such weapons despite a number of quite grave confrontations, is thus no accident.³ Nor has it been fortuitous that the superpowers have acquiesced in UN preventive diplomacy; and that in 1956, at the Twentieth Party Congress, Nikita S. Khrushchev proclaimed that the Marxist-Leninist precept that as long as imperialism existed wars were inevitable, was no longer applicable.⁴

freeze zone in Latin America; the nonproliferation treaty of 1968; the treaty of 1971 prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and the subsoil; and the US-Soviet treaty of 1972 on Anti-Ballistic Missiles together with the interim agreement on offensive missiles.

3. Truman, in his memoirs, wants to be remembered primarily as a statesman who managed to avoid a third world war. *Truman Memoirs*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955, vol. 1, p. X.

4. F. S. Burin, «The Communist Doctrine About the Inevitability of War», *American Political Science Review*, vol. LVII, No. 2, 1963, 334-354, analysed this matter in detail. He concluded that the main revision made at this congress pertained to Lenin's theory about the inevitability of wars between the capitalist states. Emphasis on the possibility of peaceful competitive coexistence between the «socialist» and «capitalist» camps, on the other hand, had already been made under Stalin at the CPSU's Nineteenth Congress in 1952. This was a revision to communist views expressed at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935 and an implicit rejection of Lenin's tenet about the inevitability of war between the two camps at the CPSU's Eighth Party Congress in 1919, which Western publicists ceaselessly underlined when wishing to emphasize the Soviet communist threat to peace. On the other hand, no responsible Soviet or American leader has considered world government to be the only alternative to annihilation, as advocated by E. E. Harris, *Annihilation and Utopia*, New York: Humanities Press, 1966. In the view of Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm 1956-1959*, London, Macmillan, 1971, p. 297: «As the years have passed we seem to have learnt like the villagers on the slopes of Vesuvius, to live with danger; or perhaps the scale of destructiveness involved in a nuclear war has somehow seemed a guarantee against its outbreak».

All in all, the combination of the demographic with the technological revolution in transport, communications, and the production of goods of peace and weapons of war, which are responsible for the unprecedented features of the contemporary multi-state system—globality, three-dimensional permeability of its political units, and destructibility of the entire system—have contributed not to the withering away of states and to the disappearance of the multistate system but to the extension of international law to the entire globe, to the tremendous increase in rules of conventional international law, and to the great rise in the number of universal or regional international organizations of general or special competence.

In consequence, international law in terms of substance consists of the law of peaceful symbiosis and cooperation and of the law of international sur-

vival—the latter constituting the precondition of the former. This law of survival is politically based not on the balance of power on collective security but on the balance of terror, which recently has been somewhat qualified. For under the US-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the two superpowers agreed that it was lawful to set up a network of antiballistic missiles around their respective decision-making centers of Moscow and Washington.

Furthermore, this law begins to include also rules concerning threats to the survival of the human race that emanate from the combination of the demographic explosion of mankind with the environmental effects of his peacetime technology. For, unless this pollution is combatted and controlled, it may eventually lead to results similar to those of an uninhibited nuclear war, i.e. to the extinction of the human race.

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Εἰς τὸ περιοδικόν μας ὑπ' ἀριθ. 15-16, Ἰανουαρίου-Ἰουνίου 1973, σσ. 14-25, ἐδημοσιεύθη τὸ ἄρθρον τοῦ George E. Perry, Διευθυντοῦ τοῦ Σλαβικοῦ Τμήματος καὶ Εἰδικοῦ εἰς τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ Θέματα (Βιβλιοθήκη τοῦ Κογκρέσσου), «The Modern Greek Collection in the Library of Congress» (Ἡ Συλλογὴ Νεοελληνικῶν Βιβλίων εἰς τὴν Βιβλιοθήκην τοῦ Κογκρέσσου). Τοῦτο συνετάγη εἰς τὸ πλαίσιον τῶν ὑπηρεσιακῶν καθηκόντων τοῦ συγγραφέως καὶ ἀποτελεῖ μέρος εὐρυτέρας μελέτης περὶ τῶν εἰς τὰς βιβλιοθήκας τῶν ΗΠΑ βιβλίων καὶ τῶν διαθεσίμων εἰς ΗΠΑ ἐρευνῶν περὶ τῆς Ἀνατολικῆς Κεντρικῆς καὶ Νοτιοανατολικῆς Εὐρώπης. Ἡ μελέτη ἐξεπονήθη ὑπὸ τὴν αἰγίδα τῆς Βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ Κογκρέσσου καὶ τοῦ Ἀμερικανικοῦ Συμβουλίου Ἐπιστημονικῶν Ἑταιρειῶν, ὡς καὶ τῆς Διευθύνσεως Παιδείας τοῦ Ὑπουργείου Ὑγείας, Παιδείας καὶ Προνοίας τῶν ΗΠΑ (ὑπὸ στοιχεῖα PL 85-864, Τίτλος VI, Τμήμα 602, ὡς τοῦτο ἐτροποποιήθη, καὶ PL 480). Διὰ πᾶσαν ἀναδημοσίευσιν τοῦ ἀνωτέρω ἁρθρου πρέπει νὰ ζητηθῇ ἡ ἀδεία ἀπὸ τὴν Βιβλιοθήκην τοῦ Κογκρέσσου, Washington, D.C. 20540, ΗΠΑ.