


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The impact of traditional cultural patterns on Greek politics

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the impact of traditional cultural patterns on Greek politics

by
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Ph. D.

Greece is viewed by the West as the cradle of democracy harking to the era of the glory of Ancient Athens. Both Greeks and western Greco-philosophers overlook the fact that the philosophic roots of modern western democracy with its emphasis on individual rights and individual self-interest within a state constituted to enhance the pursuit of individual happiness with minimal governmental interference stems from the modern political philosophers, while an evolving free market structure overthrew the bonds of feudalism thus providing the requisite institutional framework. The underpinnings of the bourgeois state do not rest either on the philosophic premises of Plato and Aristotle or on the social conditions prevalent in Ancient Greece. Aristotle feared mobocracy and lauded submission of the individual to the group, be it the clan or «polis»; in fact, an individual had no existence qua individual. Plato, on the other hand, justified the ultimate right of the state to suppress dissidents since the individual owes his existence to and was a product of the state.¹ For the Ancients, to exile an individual from his «polis» was the ultimate sanction since he was bereft of family and home. It is Plato and Aristotle² with a later admixture of the mysticism, and the fatalism of Byzantium—that is the legacy of the modern Greeks—a far cry from the cradle of western democracy.

Greece never experienced the Renaissance and the Enlightenment which engulfed western Europe. The revival of learning, the intellectual and artistic ferment of the 15th-18th centuries, the French «philosophes» of the 17th century had no counterpart in Greece. Most of what is geographically Greece today was a neglected province of the Ottoman Empire during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Not only did Greece remain untouched by the intellectual currents of western Europe but it failed to undergo the revolutionary socio-economic changes which transformed western Europe from feudalism to a multiplicity of bourgeois nation-states. The legacy which the Renaissance presented modern Greece was a ready-made Greek nationalist ideology. The Renaissance's revival and mythologizing of the Ancients and their philosophy, provided the Greek nationalist leaders of the early 19th century with an ideology proclaiming their descent from

1. In fact students of Socrates would have executed poets for their views and their possible disruption of the «good» society.

2. Greek schools of philosophy that rejected Platonic and Aristotelian notions, such as the Sophists and Epicureans, nevertheless did not develop the concept of «individualism» of relevance to the civil or political society.

the Ancients and their inherent superiority.¹

In marked contrast to those who view Greece as the fountain-head of democracy, some analysts have characterized the modern Greek political system as one dominated by political clientelism whose roots are deep in traditional Greek society. As such, Greek politics are viewed as non-ideological and issueless, operative both within the framework of a parliamentary system and of military rule.² However, to the extent that clientelism is descriptive of the modern Greek political system, patron-client relations must be scrutinized within the context of Greece's philosophic and ideological foundations and its economic realities. On a descriptive level, patron-client relations are manifest in societies as disparate as India, Nigeria, Japan and Greece, but in each case the cultural context varies. Cultural patterns in turn are rooted in the philosophic premises of a particular society which are embodied in its prevailing ideology, norms and values. This complex constitutes part of a society's givens which are often ignored and hence excluded from analytic inquiry. In order to gain greater insight into political clientelism therefore it is essential to investigate the values, norms and belief systems which condition the functioning of the clientelist networks in particular societies.

the Greek view of self

Traditionally in Greece, the Greek view of self and of his relations with others and with the world around him, have precluded the notion of the existence of an individual *qua* individual. He is an integral part of a greater whole and has no existence as a separate person. The primary reference group for Greeks which has determined his values, norms and behavior, has been the extended family. An individual's worth has been measured in terms of his adherence to the highest moral value, «*philotimo*», which literally means love of honor, honor being defined in a particularly «Greek» fashion. «*Philotimo*» is the Greek term for the experiencing of oneself as part of a system of group relatedness: «...it is the dominant Greek value which has integrated all other values and norms, defines appropriate behavior

towards other group members and towards foreigners.»³

Essential to *philotimo* is what to a westerner would appear as different ethical standards applicable to the members of an extended family and to those in the remainder of the environment. Lying, cheating, dishonesty are immoral actions vis-a-vis family members, but moral vis-a-vis foreigners. Within the traditional Greek framework, however, this is not a double standard, it is a unified ethical system stemming from the Greek conceptual framework whereby social reality is structured differently and hence experienced differently than in the West.⁴ *Philotimo*, for which there is no English equivalent, measures a man's worth in terms of his success in fulfilling kinship obligations and in protecting the extended family from real or imaginary threats emanating from a hostile physical and human environment.⁵ Defense of the interests and honor of the family include efforts to enhance its status and economic position. Since «goods» have been perceived as fixed or limited in quantity, a benefit accruing to one particular family is perceived by others as diminishing their prospects for gain.

Significantly, despite recent socio-economic changes, «*philotimo*» has tended to persist among large sections of the population. Rapid urbanization particularly since the end of World War II, for example, although it has resulted in a breakdown in some intra-family obligations such as living arrangements, has left untouched the basic psychological bonds. Living quarters restricted to the nuclear family have become common, in contrast to traditional arrangements whereby several generations lived under the same roof. But reciprocal familial obligations have not been altered nor has the notion that a code of behavior moral within the family can be immoral vis-a-vis foreigners. The experiencing of shame rather than guilt persists, guilt being a mechanism regulating behavior when individuals relate intra-individually and shame when individuals relate inter-individually. A failure to behave in accordance with the requirements of *philotimo*, whatever the socio-economic context, does not engender feel-

3. Adamantia Pollis, «Political Implications of the Modern Greek Concept of Self», *British Journal of Sociology*, March 1965, p. 34.

4. A traditional Greek would not experience the value contradictions discussed in Aaron Esterson, *The Leaves of Spring*, England: Penguin Books, 1972, for what appears as contradictory in one cultural context may not be so in another.

5. It should not be inferred that the extended family lives in harmony. When latent hostility and distrust become overt, a not infrequent event, family unity disintegrates; enemy camps are formed and conflict becomes intense and vituperative.

1. William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 13-22, discusses the discrepancy between the perception of Greece by western Europeans and the realities of Greece at the time of the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821.

2. Keith Legg, *Politics of Modern Greece*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1969.

ings of guilt but feelings of shame since others view him as a failure.

Philotimo as discussed above essentially relates to the appropriate behavior for men. For women *philotimo* is not as potent a value and has different behavioral consequences. Greek society is heavily male oriented and women have been treated as objects in the males' environment. Women, like men, are integral parts of an extended family, but in addition to the definition of self in terms of this group, her self is further defined in terms of the male members of the family, in relation to whom she is subordinate throughout her life. Man's fulfillment is achieved by activity in the outside political, economic and social world aimed at furthering the interests of the extended family. A woman's fulfillment is achieved in marriage, and the extended family circumscribes the confines within which her life is lived. Within the family the specific role of women has been to provide for the needs of men by assuming responsibility for the household, to be reflective of their views and supportive of their action and by raising children.

Semnotis (modesty) is the highest virtue a woman can possess. It presupposes the absence of individuality and implies submissiveness, deference towards males and the absence of personal drives or desires. Traditionally a young girl who exhibited an independent will, was considered to have a character flaw, of lacking *semnotis* and hence the requisite behavior of obedience and withdrawal, thus diminishing her chances for marriage. Therefore, the demands of *philotimo* for a woman were fulfilled if she behaved with *semnotis*, and was obedient and docile. Although obedience to authority is a general value within the Greek framework, it is of greater psychological potency for women as is evidenced in a recent survey conducted in the urban centers of Greece. Recent decades have witnessed apparently significant changes in the role of women. Increasing numbers are obtaining an education equivalent to males, and increasing numbers are entering the labor market, particularly prior to marriage. Nevertheless obedience was listed by women as the most important behavioral consequence of *philotimo* by contrast to male respondents who considered it less significant.¹

Additional values and norms subsumed under *philotimo* as applied to men include the inadmissibility of personal assumption of responsibility

for failures or the concession of errors. Admission of personal blame for inability to obtain a job, or for one's immorality or for that of a member of one's family, would be psychologically devastating: it would shatter the self. Such actions would indicate the absence of «*philotimo*», it would permit the hostile outside world to treat one with scorn and derision, which in turn would engender painful, unbearable feelings of shame. Concurrently, Greeks believe that they have no control over their environment or their destiny. There is nothing more reflective of the sense of fatalism that permeates the culture than Greek laic (populist) music. The suffering and anguish of man's fate—unrequited love, betrayal, poverty—are the central themes of the lyrics. It is others who have betrayed, it is fate that has made one poor and there is no escape from one's destiny. Just as responsibility for failures in one's personal life, is projected externally, there is a tendency to externalize responsibility for political developments. Given the premises of *philotimo* which preclude admission of error and the simultaneous sense of impotence, Greeks tend not to assume responsibility for political or economic failure but to blame the elements, fate or malicious enemies.

historical experience and authoritarianism

Banfield in his study of Calabria, Italy, describes the origins of a cultural pattern similar to the Greek, of familial amoralism, as he labels it, to the initial scarcity of resources in the region, making intense competition among families a matter of survival.² Without delving into the historical origin of a similar pattern of atomized group competitiveness in Greece, it should be indicated that several factors in the historical experience of Greeks have contributed to the persistence of the extended family as the primary reference group; to the persistence of the perception of the world as hostile; and to man's inability to affect the course of events. Buttressed by the classical legacy which provided a conceptual framework, or cosmology, the empirical reality of economic scarcity over the centuries has reinforced competition among atomized family groups for the available scarce resources. In turn Byzantium superimposed on Greek culture a religiosity permeated with fatalism and other-worldliness. Istanbul (Constantinople) became a glittering capital; a priestly class was established whose upper echelons possessed immense power and status, while

1. Vasso G. Vassiliou and George Vassiliou, «The Implicative Meaning of the Greek Concept of *Philotimo*», *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1973, p. 337.

2. Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959.

the territory of what is now Greece became the neglected and poverty ridden backwaters of an Empire. Subsequent Ottoman rule beginning in 1453 changed little in the life of the ordinary peasant except to add another class of both Muslim and Christian tax gatherers and to further strengthen the power of the Orthodox Church. In fact during the latter years of the Ottoman Empire the exploitation of the peasantry by the tax gatherers increased.¹

The response of the peasantry to the perceived social reality during Ottoman rule was individual family supplications to the authorities—demogerontes and priests—for intervention with the tax gatherers in order to obtain a reduction of their individual tax burden. The millet system, whereby the Orthodox priests were the intermediaries and the liaison between Christian and Ottoman officialdom, defined the institutional framework within which a peasant society functioned, and set the foundations for the subsequent development of political clientelism when a modern state was established. In modern Greece, within the context of a contemporary political institutional framework, be it parliamentary rule, or military dictatorship, the notion of scarcity and the pressure to «survive» either psychologically or economically, has persisted. To be virtuous, to fulfill one's moral obligations to one's family and to behave with «philotimo», men have continued to look to those with status and power as the appropriate channel for furthering their personal (family) goals and interests.

The historical evolution of Greece and the failure of the Greek War of Independence from Ottoman rule in 1821 to modernize or to bring significant changes in social structure, perpetuated the hierarchical structure of society in which power continued to reside in the traditional local elites.² The perceived impotence of the individual to control his environment and to affect his family's destiny persisted. Thus the only path open for survival and possible improvement continued to be dependence on those with power who commanded more resources and were in a position to affect one's well-being. The modern state, formed in 1830, by not altering the pre-existing social structure preserved the dominance

of face to face relations and hence personalized politics, a necessary precondition for clientelism to operate. Abstract concepts such as equality before the law and impartial justice have had little meaning, or rather they have acquired substance and significance only as judgments of individual actions in terms of traditional reciprocal obligations. In turn, the Greek attitude towards the authorities on whom they are dependent has been one of deference and submission.

The «realistic» restraints on challenging authority have been further reinforced by a socializing process transmitted through the family and schools, whereby deference to authority is internalized and an open face to face confrontation becomes psychologically well nigh impossible. Authority figures have been manifold: male heads of families, clergy, military officers, bureaucrats and politicians. While defining reality in terms of hierarchical reciprocal personal obligations has persisted, the object to whom deference has been accorded has shifted and altered depending upon the prevailing social and political order. Deference is not necessarily accorded to traditional authorities but to whomever possesses status and power, who in turn is «legitimately» entitled to privileges not accessible to the many. Egalitarianism, therefore, at least as understood in the West, has not been a traditional Greek value. The meaning of equality in Greece has not been equality of opportunity, nor equality in terms of human rights, nor equality as a natural endowment; it is equality in terms of a man's worth and the criteria of worth is that of a virtuous man, a man who behaves with «philotimo». In this sense the rich and the poor, the lowly and the mighty can be equal. For women the concept of equality is irrelevant in any set of terms since they are viewed as inferior.

Societies possess an underlying cognitive structure and a central core of norms and values for the psychological functioning of individuals, for the structuring of social relations and for defining social reality,³ which are resistant to change while other values, peripheral to the core concepts, are far more amenable to change. Faced with a similar set of physical or environmental «realities» different peoples can evolve differing understandings of these «realities» and formulate varying concepts and norms governing their relations with each other and with physical objects.

1. For a discussion of increased provincial exploitation which led at a later time to the Tanzimat Reforms, see Roderick H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962, in particular the early chapters.

2. Nikiforos Diamandouros, *Political Modernization, Social Conflict and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State, 1821-1827*, unpublished dissertation, Columbia University, 1972.

3. For an excellent discussion of the creation of «reality» by man through the institutionalization of roles, patterns of social interaction, etc., and the objectivization of this reality, see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966, in particular pp. 50-63.

This basic cognitive structure is resistant to change: new phenomena, new events and developments are assimilated and comprehended within this framework.¹ The islanders of Greece, for example, have been seafarers for centuries, absenting themselves, in the past, for years at a time. Despite this, the definition of self in terms of family and village and its attendant responsibilities and obligations remained intact. Concurrently, however, seamen have viewed themselves as sophisticated in the ways of the world, accumulating cultural artifacts and often adopting alien consumer goods. In the post World War II era, with rapid urbanization, the values of consumerism have been assimilated with alacrity without this leading, however, to a breakdown of core concepts such as the psychological bonds of the family network and the dependence and deference towards authority.² Even the rapid entry of women into the labor in recent years is within the context of enhancing the family's well-being and is frequently subject to control by the male members of the family.

The image of the Greeks, as Zorbas, as free spirits, is an illusion fostered by 'the readiness with which they criticize and demean authority, by their argumentativeness and by the multiplicity of views expressed on any subject. As already indicated, overt defiance of authority in Greece is psychologically out of bounds; verbal attacks are not harbingers of potential action. This very argumentativeness serves as psychological outlet for the frustrations that develop in working out «one's fate», but they are «full of sound and fury, signifying nothing».³ Complaining does not aim at changing one's condition, but rather at venting its curse. An open challenge to authority is both psychologically traumatic and jeopardizes one's prospects for gain. Any such action, therefore, would constitute failure to fulfill one's obligations. Paralysis in action coterminous with verbal criticism reinforces the sense of powerlessness, the belief that «nothing can be done».⁴ The

argumentativeness and the panoply of views expressed by Greeks is «couvenda», a form of verbal game playing. It is frequently the peaceful alternative to physical combat—an arena in which the combatants engage in a war of words. Frequently, little attention is paid to the substance of the arguments. Rather, the object of «couvenda» is to outmaneuver, to outwit one's opponent and emerge victorious.⁵ Given the Hobbesian view of the universe held by the Greeks, «couvenda», argumentativeness, is a mechanism of social control which restrains the potential violence inherent in a world of a man against man.

Among the Greek values addressing themselves to the fear of potential violence by imposing behavioral restraints is «isihia» (tranquility, quiet). «Isihia» should be striven for in the family, and in the political and social realm. The state of «isihia» implies that nothing disruptive has occurred in the established order of things and hence all is well. Psychologically, the disturbance of tranquility precipitates free floating anxiety of impending doom and chaos.⁶ Children are admonished not to question and to be quiet.⁷ Adults are censured and shunned if they disrupt established routinized patterns and relationships in the family and in society. Striving for «isihia» clearly diminishes the prospects of violence. Yet it is not violence alone that is threatening and frightening, but any manifestation of disorder, conflict or dissidence; they all lead to anarchy. A significant consequence of the high priority ascribed to «isihia», over and above other values such as equity and justice, is that manifestation of dissidence from an established order, challenge the existing authority, and are perceived as opening the door to chaos necessitating suppression and re-

havior in particular cultures. For example, Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe, New York, 1958, in which the author concludes, in the pilot study conducted in Greece, that the Greeks were modernized since they could empathize with political leaders, discuss politics and read newspapers extensively. From this he inferred that Greeks are participating citizens, ignoring the empirical fact that such behavior is not necessarily related to action, nor necessarily indicative of a belief in the ability to act.

5. Pollis, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

6. The psychological fear of internal chaos as a determinant of political attitudes particularly in the acceptance of the order provided by dictatorships are among the findings of a recent survey. Alexander T. Simos and R. Eugene Cash, *Greek-American Attitudes toward the Greek Dictatorship in Progress*, 1974 (unpublished manuscript).

7. An excellent poetic expression of Greek attitudes challenging authority and towards limiting one's concerns to self interest is «To one who Doesn't Resist», in a compilation of poetry on the Greek resistance during the Papadopoulos dictatorship by Norman Weinstein, *Let Us Be Greek*, Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1975, pp. 65-66.

1. For a discussion of assimilation and contrast see the experimental work by Muzaffer Sherif, *Social Interaction: Process and Products*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967, pp. 347-352. Sherif argues that the less ego-involved an individual is in a particular item the more easily it is assimilated and seen as consistent with one's existing values whereas on ego-involved items slightly deviant positions are seen as markedly different from one's views.

2. Ernestine Freidl, «The Role of Kinship in the Transmission of National Culture to Rural Villages in Mainland Greece», *The American Anthropologist*, 61, No. 1, February 1959.

3. William Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, Act V, Scene 5, Line 11.

4. Erroneous conclusions are frequently derived from lack of familiarity with the interrelationships between specific be-

pression in order to forestall reforms and social change. Both the competition among conflicting interest groups advocated by the pluralists¹ and the possible functionality of conflict as defined by Cosser² are repudiated by the notion of «*isihia*» and the fear of disorder. Inevitably, strikes, demonstrations, rallies and marches organized by voluntary associations are perceived as disrupting the prevailing «peaceful» social order. By contrast, conflict among atomized groups operating within the framework of clientelism are not perceived as disintegrative but as consistent with «*isihia*».

The valuing of «*isihia*», the commitment to stability and harmony is rooted in part in the Greek's modern historical experience, an experience of periodic intense cleavage and internal violence; the Greek War of Independence of 1821-29 accompanied by civil war; the overthrow of King Otto in 1863; the deep schism between Venizelists and Royalists during and after World War I; the civil war following World War II and the brutality accompanying the student uprising at the Polytechnic Institute in 1973 during the Papadopoulos dictatorship. Divisiveness and violence in modern Greece has been no more or less than that in many other societies, but in Greece these experiences have been interpreted and understood in terms of the Hobbesian nature of the world and the loss of morality, psychologically reinforcing the preexisting values of «*isihia*» and harmony. Hence the elimination of conflict, disorder and violence necessitates a reaffirmation of traditional values. In other societies, France in the 18th century for example, with a comparable historical experience of divisiveness and unrest resulted in the French Revolution. But this conflict was understood within an entirely different cognitive framework whereby the revolution was viewed in part as a result of class conflict.

Historically, religion, particularly as represented by the Greek Orthodox Church, has reinforced the psychological fear of disintegration leading to chaos, and has strengthened the cultural traits of obedience and deference towards authority. Eastern Orthodox differentiates sharply between the life of the soul and that of the state and society. Social and political issues, therefore, ostensibly are of little concern to the Church. By contrast with the Catholic Church which periodically con-

venes synods which address themselves to contemporary social issues resulting in Papal encyclicals and other pronouncements interpreting and applying Catholic dogma to a wide range of social and economic issues, the Eastern Orthodox Church has not convened a synod in eleven centuries, since 787 A.D.³ The realm of the Church is spiritual and distinct from the lay concerns of the state. The Greek Church consequently, by maintaining a position of neutrality on non-spiritual matters, has survived with its power intact in all political regimes to date. Religion provides no guidelines on such matters as social justice and no body of ethics derived from its religious precepts. For the Greeks, religion is synonymous with the Church as an institution and the Church conducts liturgies and performs the sacraments and rituals around birth, baptism, marriage and death which are essential for insuring an individual's salvation.⁴

Despite the official neutrality of the Church on matters pertaining to the political realm, it is a significant socializing structure which transmits traditional values and cultural patterns while its very neutrality lends the weight of religious support for the prevailing social and political system.⁵ The preachings of the Church intermesh with traditional attitudes of obedience and deference to established authority, while reinforcing the belief in man's impotence. The equivalent to the secular notion of *philotimo* as a measure of equality is the Christian concept of equality before God which deflects from the psychological salience of political, economic and social inequality. In accord with Orthodox precepts, whatever is, whatever happens, is God's will, and obedience and respect is due to the civil authorities; leaders of the social system which God has ordained. Just as the definition of self in traditional Greek culture is in terms of the extended family and not as an autonomous individual, thus man has no existence outside the Church. In turn, his existence as part of society is contingent on

3. In 1975 discussions were initiated by the Patriarchate in Constantinople to consider the convening of just such a synod. In November 1976 a pre-synodal meeting was held in Chambesey, Switzerland with representatives of 13 patriarchates and churches which agreed on an agenda for the forthcoming Great Synodal meeting. No date was set for the meeting.

4. There is little in the way of sociological analyses of the Greek Orthodox Church, see Anastase Tzanimis, «La Sociologie de la religion en Grèce», *Social Compass*, XXII, 1975, 1, pp. 7-17.

5. *Ibid.*, p.9. «...aujourd'hui encore elle soit considérée comme le centre autour duquel c'est organisée la société grecque. L'Eglise est devenue la cible des forces conservatrices, autant que réformatrices que la jugent incapable de jouer un rôle dans la formation de la nouvelle société grecque».

1. As examples see Robert Dahl, *Who Governs*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961; *Modern Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970; David Easton, *A Framework of Political Analysis*, New York: Prentice-Hall 1965.

2. Lewis A. Coser, *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict*, New York: The Free Press, 1967.

adherence to the sacraments, and disobedience leads to excommunication; the religious counterpart to the political exile imposed by political authorities against political dissidents.¹ A challenge to the authority of the Church,² like a challenge to civil authority, is perceived as disrupting the social order, creating dissidence and conflict, disturbing tranquility and leading to chaos. Thus, many Greeks who purport to have no religious convictions are nevertheless reluctant to challenge or attack the priesthood or the Church for fear of its social and political consequences.

The complex of values, attitudes and behavior discussed above—traditional group relatedness, deference towards authority, fatalism, patron-client relations—describe component elements of a political culture at variance with that which ostensibly characterizes democratic politics. None of the Almond and Verba categories³ from which they attempt to derive the characteristics of a democratic political culture are applicable to Greece; it is not participant since its citizens do not articulate common interests in voluntary associations and it is not subject since its citizens are not concerned with the policy output of the system. Nor, however, are its citizens parochial, unconcerned or inactive within the political system; they are highly politicized but the activity and the evaluation is in terms of personalized goals which they expect to achieve by «participating» individually.

The political regimes of modern Greece have alternated between parliamentarianism and dictatorship — military or civilian — in varying combinations with a monarchical or republican form of government. However, even when the political system is formally a parliamentary one, the substance of representative democratic government is frequently subverted in part because the cultural foundations upon which its implementation is dependent are lacking. The absence of the concept of an individual qua individual, the perceived powerlessness of the individual to affect change, the deference accorded authority and the psychological fear of disorder and conflict, all mil-

itate against the development or sustenance of a democratic polity.

democratic precepts and Greek politics

The difficulties encountered in the functioning of a democratic political system given traditional cultural patterns are manifold. The absence of a well grounded conception of individual human rights has given to constitutional provisions or statutes providing for such rights a legal and political connotation; they are seen as rights granted by the authorities or the state, rather than as inherent or natural rights to be protected from encroachment by the state.⁴ Significantly the Greek language does not have a term for «privacy» or the «right to privacy». The Greek equivalent «aporito» (secret) has a different connotation and is rooted in a different conceptualization. Since language, as Sapir has argued,⁵ provides the cognitive framework for structuring reality, privacy has no reality in traditional Greek culture. The political implications of the absence of the concept «privacy» and the legalistic conception of human rights, are clearly detrimental to sustaining a democratic system.

A complex of attitudes, values and beliefs impeded the functioning of democracy or even of a modern participant nation-state in Greece. The traditional belief in man's impotence results in public policy being considered as beyond the scope of competence of the ordinary citizen; it is within the domain of affairs of state, while the individual restricts his concerns to jobs, licenses, etc., which may be obtained through a patron's support. In turn, the submission and deference traditionally due authority reinforces a non-participatory culture, by contrast to authority in «modern» societies which is vested in institutional roles defined in terms of functional specificity. In representative governments, the authority of Presidents, Premiers, deputies to legislative bodies, rests on the position they occupy and the functions they perform. In principle at least, they are accountable to the electorate and subject to recall since sovereignty resides with the people. The authoritarian tradition of Greek culture, buttressed

1. The most recent instance of excommunication by the Church was that of the renowned writer Nikos Kazantzakis—the Church also refused to bury him when he died in 1957—while the most recent internal exiles were those imposed by the military dictatorship between 1967 and 1974.

2. The financial and moral scandals that have periodically plagued the Church have been «explained» as indicative of the sinfulness of man which in no way detracts from the Truth of the priest's teachings. On the other hand, institutional criticism is practically non-existent and is considered a taboo.

3. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1965 (paperback), see in particular chapter I, pp. 1-44.

4. It is a myth to claim, as some Soviet specialists do, that it is a particular feature of communist constitutions such as the Soviet one, for the state to grant individual rights. Such a notion seems inherent in all societies, such as Greece, which lack any doctrine of the natural rights of man.

5. See Edward Sapir, «Language» in David G. Mandelbaum (ed.), *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir*, 1947, pp. 324-386, for a discussion of the relationship between language and culture.

by religious precepts, is alien to the concept of popular sovereignty and alien to the notion of protection of minority rights. The basis of authority in Greece is neither traditional, institutional nor charismatic.¹ Those in whom authority is vested shifts in accordance with changes in socio-political systems. Authority remains diffuse, and is the recognition accorded those with power.

Supplementing the underlying conceptual and attitudinal dimensions of a democratic political culture are informal structures rooted in a social structure characterized by extensive differentiation of roles precipitating the articulation of diverse interests. Dahl, extolling pluralism as the essence of a democratic polity, defines it as a condition in which competing elites, representing organized minorities articulate and aggregate their interests within established rules of the game, albeit each elite may constitute the principal decision maker in those spheres of major concern to it.² Although pluralism is hardly an accurate theoretical or philosophic formulation of the American political system, since it ignores the issue of how and by whom «relevant» and «significant» decisions are made and who exercises power, it nevertheless is descriptive of the underlying precept of functionality as the organizing principle of industrial states.

In Greece, functional interest groups, with the exception of a financial and economic oligarchy, have not been significant political actors. Dominant are clientelist networks organized vertically from the local to the national level, while at the national level frequently shifting coalitions have formed political parties. In rural areas, patrons (deputies in the legislature) satisfy the personalized demands of their clients, while the clients remain loyal and insure the patron's reelection. Patron-client relations are face to face relations and engender a host of psychological bonds. In urban centers patron-client relations persist, albeit the networks are more complex and, given the impossibility of face to face relations between voter and representative,³ involve more intermediaries. The greater impersonality of urban centers in conjunction with socio-economic changes nevertheless seem to be producing a tendency, particularly in Athens, to vote in terms of «national» party leader, party label, or principles.

By contrast to a society characterized by political clientelism, modern societies, regardless of ideological foundations, tend to be organized horizontally in associational interest groups representing the concerns and shared goals of their socio-economic interests. In representative governments, reelection is in part contingent on positions taken on issues and/or party platforms. In Greece, deputies to the «Vouli» are concerned with building clientelist networks independent of issues or politics, in order to insure their reelection. Bureaucrats on the other hand have been concerned with extending or withholding favors, impeding or facilitating requests for favors, depending on who is and is not a «client», rather than applying laws and regulations efficiently and impartially.⁴ Thus, the parliamentary system of Greece, from the end of World War II until 1967, and after a period of dictatorial rule, again beginning in 1974, has remained a formal institutional framework subverted in part by traditional cultural patterns. Indicative of the anti-pluralist orientation towards democracy is Premier Karamanlis' statement to the Greek Vouli on June 12, 1976 that organized minorities are antidemocratic.⁵

Some analysts attribute functionality to clientelist politics in developing societies, in that they integrate states characterized by significant cleavages, be they cultural, ethnic, tribal or religious.⁶ Greece has been free of these divisions, but historically village and provincial identity and loyalty has predominated over national relatedness and loyalty. Thus, a Greek identified himself first as a member of a particular extended family and secondly as a member of a particular village. Traditionally, neighboring villages were viewed as «kseni» who were negatively stereotyped. Clientelist politics in Greece, rather than serving as an integrative factor has tended to further fragment society. It has pitted extended family against extended family, village against village and province against province. The reinforcement of provincial loyalties which clientelism fosters and personalized politics, in addition, is dysfunctional vis-a-vis the emergence of national level leadership. Governance by the leaders of any coalition of political clientelist networks is by definition

1. This typology was developed by Max Weber in *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, New York: The Free Press, 1947, pp. 329-63.

2. Dahl, *Who Governs*.

3. The only article in Greek discussing political clientelism this writer has seen is A. G. Kosmopoulos, «Skhesis Prostatias», *Epitheorisis Koinonikon Erevnon*, pp. 413-424, Athens: National Center of Social Research, No. 25, 1975.

4. This is not to question the validity of analyses of the bureaucratic state in industrial societies. Rather it is contended that the norms governing bureaucratic behavior in Greece, are at variance with those industrialized societies.

5. Speech by Constantine Karamanlis, 12 June 1976, *Minutes of the Vouli*, pp. 5443 in which he appealed to the majority to mobilize against minority demands.

6. Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, «Political Clientelism and Political Development», *Comparative Politics*, January 1971, Vol. 4, No. 2.

perceived as excluding members of the defeated clientelist networks from the rewards and benefits derived from the exercise of power. Such a perception is further strengthened given the failure to differentiate between institutional roles and the persons occupying these posts on the part of both citizens and the leaders. It should be noted that the system of reciprocal obligations, albeit between individuals possessed of unequal resources, underpinning an effective patron-client system, is in turn rooted in Greek ethics which has a different standard of ethical behavior towards strangers and towards those with whom one personally «relates».

Despite the disintegrative forces of Greek society several factors at the individual, social, psychological, cultural and ideological levels, historically have coalesced to avert disintegration. In the first place Greek nationalist ideology—an amalgam of the intellectual superiority of ancient Greece and the power and geographic expanse of the Byzantine Empire—was a significant unifying force for nearly a century. Efforts to recreate Byzantium, to fulfill the Megali Idea, dominated Greek policy for nearly a century until its collapse with the defeat of Greek troops in Asia Minor by Kemal Ataturk's forces in 1922. Until then, irredentism served as a superordinate goal unifying the Greeks while deflecting from domestic issues and forestalling the fragmentation of society.¹ Subsequent efforts to redefine nationalist ideology, however, failed to create a unifying symbol. The shift of focus from the external goals embodied in the Megali Idea to internal criteria defining the specifics of the uniqueness and superiority of Greeks—Metaxas' fascism, the «ethnikofrones» of the Civil War and post Civil War period, and Papadopoulos' Greece of Christian Greeks—all used political criteria, and by pitting Greek against Greek, failed as an integrative force.

Components of Greek nationalist ideology and the goals derived from it, have been frequently articulated. Less clearly evident, however, are the cosmological underpinnings of Greek society—the frequently inarticulated givens. The converse of Greek divisiveness and the fear of chaos, and closely intertwined with them, is an ideology of harmony that transcends cleavages and forestalls disintegration. From this perspective unity based on nationalist ideology is only one element, which itself emanates in part from a basic world view.

Thus, although on one level the relations of man to man are Hobbesian, the brutality that such a state of nature prescribes is averted by the principles of harmony which govern the universe and contain potential violence. This principle of harmony is ordained by God and in the secular is manifest in the prevailing social order. It is man's duty to uphold this order and to avoid actions to the contrary which risk social disorganization and chaos. Thus, the citizen's responsibility is obedience and acquiescence to the political authorities while the responsibility of the authorities is to preserve the social order, provide tranquility and prevent dissidence and disorder.

The conjunction of the ideological, normative and behavioral aspects of Greek society thus provides a tenuous cohesion, but one fraught with tensions and stresses; they bespeak of an authoritarian society resistant to social change. The empirical realities, however, are that Greece, like all societies, is not static and it is unlikely that the status quo and the paradigm on which it is based can continue indefinitely to incorporate and vitiate change without an eventual destruction of the paradigm itself. In order to deter social change, it becomes necessary to deny the existence of pressing social and economic issues, to repress expressions of discontent, and to dismiss pressures for reform as the acts of a few malicious men intent on destroying the harmony which governs society. The relevance of social stratification is denied while the possibility of class conflict is repudiated. The organic unity implicit in the identity of Church and religion, of the nation and the people, and of the ideology of harmony, precludes the legitimate recognition of conflicting functional interests. Only interests expressed within patron-client networks are legitimate and non-threatening to the prevailing social order. In western Europe and the United States, the philosophy of pluralism is contingent on recognition of the necessity to reconcile conflicting socio-economic interests, while in the east European socialist states, rule by the working class is the official ideology. In Greece, neither ideological model is operative, but rather a non-modern conception of society which repudiates the very existence of contemporary socio-economic realities.

The dominant Greek ideology of harmony and unity, the authoritarian foundations of Greek society and the anti-modern orientation of the Greek elites have either thwarted social, economic and political change or have deflected their potential for radical transformation by channeling them into traditional cultural patterns and thus vitiating their impact. Striking is a comparison with

1. See Adamantia Pollis, *The Megali Idea: A Study of Greek Nationalism* (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation), The Johns Hopkins University, 1958, for a discussion of the role of the Megali Idea as an integrative force.

Greece's northern neighbor Bulgaria which Greeks have viewed as a «barbaric» underdeveloped country and which, measured by any index of economic development, lagged significantly behind Greece prior to World War II. Bulgaria today, outstrips Greece in terms of industrialization and rate of economic growth.¹ Modernization and development in Bulgaria, however, was accompanied by radical changes in social structure, power distribution and an altered ideology. In Greece, the dominant ideology and its implementors, the ruling elites, are resistant to social change, perceiving it as destructive of the values of civilization and a threat to their power. Nationalist ideology harkens back to a mythical golden past as the ideal which contemporary Greeks should strive to emulate. The ideology of change and progress, so prevalent in the United States has had no roots in Greece.

pressures for social change

The traditionalism of Greek culture, society and politics, described in the previous pages is partial however, and does not deal with contradictory empirical phenomena indicative of significant social change. The static quality of the underpinnings of Greek society have been subjected to pressures emanating from socio-economic developments, changing values and the dissemination of alternative ideologies. Some changes that have taken place have been incorporated within the prevailing ideology, some have not been perceived as threatening to the prevailing social order, whereas others have posed and continue to pose a significant threat. The divisiveness, for example, engendered by the nationalist ideologies of recent decades has in part been compensated for by attitudinal changes whereby the Greek nation, rather than the village has become a significant reference group. Gradually, socialization via the educational system, controlled from the center, Athens, and intensely nationalistic, has had an impact. Of greater import perhaps has been rapid urbanization in the post World War II era, concomitant with retention of familial ties which link rural to urban inhabitants, thus transmitting urban values and concepts, including Greekness, to the provinces.² Greek emigration, in recent years as

workers to western Europe, has further contributed to the shift towards the Greek nation as a primary reference group. The societies in which émigrés live identify them as Greek; the primacy of village loyalties diminishes. The émigrés in turn have contributed to the dissemination of the notion of Greekness among their kin in the villages. This shift in reference group to the nation clearly does not threaten the philosophic underpinning of Greek society. If anything, it strengthens the notion of the organic unity of the Greek nation.³

In other areas, however, the traditional ideology and efforts to incorporate change into the status quo has been inadequate and incapable of coping with contemporary social and economic issues. Thus, periodically in modern Greek history, pressures for economic, social and political reforms have erupted which have threatened the foundations of the social and political system grounded in the notion of harmony and organic unity. The informal institutional framework of the Greek polity, traditionally political clientelism, itself has been modified, so that organized interest groups, for example, disavowed as incompatible with the underlying precepts of the unity of the Greek nation, have been formed many sectors of Greek society. Thus, paralleling the vertically organized patron-client networks representing atomized interests, are horizontally organized functional interests. Voluntary associations representing a complex of functional interests or single issues, by their claim to autonomy and independent action and their articulation of demands in competition or conflict with those of other groups, «legitimize» conflict and repudiate harmony as the guiding principle of society. The survival of voluntary associations as autonomous organizations in Greece however, has often encountered nearly insurmountable obstacles, given the proclivity of the state and its spokesmen, consistent with traditional ideology, to convert them into state organs which further enhance and reinforce the conception of organic unity.⁴ Established institutional interests by contrast, such as the Church and the armed forces, are viewed

1. The average rate of growth for Bulgaria from 1960 to 1970 was 8.2% while for Greece it was 7.6%. *Statistical Yearbook*, United Nations, 1973.

2. Friedl, *op. cit.*; see also Adamantia Pollis, «Social Change and Nationhood», *The Massachusetts Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1968, pp. 126-127.

3. For a discussion of the prospects for the emergence of the organic notion leading to a dictatorship, see Pollis, «Political Implications of the Modern Greek Concept of Self», p. 44.

4. Illustrative is the history of the Greek Confederation of Labor which has been largely controlled and dominated by the Ministry of Labor and which is the only officially recognized Greek labor union. Little has been written on the Greek labor movement. For some discussion of manipulation and control of trade unions by the Greek state and the United States in the post World War II period, see Christos Jecchinis, *Trade Unionism in Greece*, Chicago, Roosevelt University, 1967.

as an integral part of the existing social order and are not conceptualized as interests in actual or potential conflict with the welfare and integration of society.

An analysis of the Greek political system using political clientelism as the explanatory variable even when adapted to the particularities of Greek political culture and ideology, thus leaves unexplained many aspects of Greek politics. A more fundamental limitation of an analysis based on political clientelism than the issue of voluntary associations, however, is its inability to account for the repeated emergence of alternative ideological formations which have challenged the official ideology upon which the existing social order has been premised. Political clubs, espousing a variety of Marxist and non-Marxist views, and mass based ideological political parties have been a recurring phenomenon in modern Greece. By ignoring such developments and the responses to them by the existent elites, clientelist analysis is incapable of accounting for severe conflicts such as the civil war during 1946-49 or the military dictatorship from 1967-74.

The most dramatic explosion of violence in recent history was the civil war¹ following World War II, which although made possible by the social disorganization accompanying World War II and the Nazi occupation, nevertheless was rooted in decades of pressures for reform and/or revolution. Decades prior to World War II, towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, incipient changes in Greek social structure occurred with the rise of a small indigenous bourgeoisie. Simultaneously, all varieties of Marxist, anarchist and syndicalist thought appeared among Greek intellectuals, while workers' organizations appeared in Patras, Pireaus and Salonica.² In 1908 a reform socialist group was advocating reorganization and reform of the educational system, the electoral system, agriculture and local and national administration, while proposing workers' benefits and the introduction of a merit system.³ Strikes, demonstrations and

rallies among workers, even farmers, erupted demanding either redress of specific grievances or basic reforms. The military coup of 1909 which brought Eleftherios Venizelos to power was in part a repudiation of the old politics, and a move on the part of an incipient middle class to gain power. But the ferment for reform, modernization and development, a consequence of a degree of economic development in Greece comparable to the early stages of industrialization manifested by western European countries a century earlier, and a commitment of intellectuals to change, was stillborn. Agitation and dissidence in the 1930s ended with the Metaxas dictatorship, a dictatorship parroting the fascist ideological doctrines of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

In the late 1950s and 60s and again in the middle 70s, pressures for essentially the same reforms have been and are still voiced; the indigenous middle class has remained embryonic; the labor movement has remained weak and largely state controlled; politics have remained personalized; the bureaucracy inefficient and clientelist; the educational system archaic. If anything, social and economic issues by the second half of the 20th century have become more intense and more extensive. The rapid urbanization, particularly in Athens and the consequent depletion of rural areas, the emigration of workers to Europe, particularly West Germany, the rapid expansion of tourism and the privileged investments of multinational corporations have further dramatized Greece's position on the periphery of industrialized western Europe, and her dependence on the West, further exacerbating social dislocation. These recent socio-economic changes, while accompanied by the widespread assimilation of the values of consumerism have also been accompanied by a worsened maldistribution of income.⁴ Clearly such conditions at a minimum portend continued pressures for reform.

The periodic dissidence expressed in Greece by various sectors of society, are evidence of potentiality for the repudiation of the issueless politics of clientelism, and of an erosion of the ideology

1. At present the Greek conservatives themselves admit that it was a civil war and not an «antartopolemos». See, for example, statements by the former leader of the conservative party, ERE, Panayotis Canellopoulos, *Istorika Dokimia* (Historical Essays), Athens, 1975, p. 22. Nor do they any longer contend in the face of massive evidence to the contrary that the civil war was Soviet inspired and supplied. See D. George Kousoulos, *Revolution and Defeat*, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 191 ff, which was probably the first reluctant admission by a Greek that the civil war was not Soviet inspired given the British-Soviet agreement on the Balkans.

2. Yannis Kordatos, *I Istorika tou Ellinikou Ergatikou Kinimatou* (History of the Greek Labor Movement), 3rd edition, Athens: Boukoumanis, 1972.

3. For a compilation of the speeches, documents and

proposals of Alexandros Papanastasiou, see *Meletai (Studies)*, Athens, 1969.

4. The first study including material on distribution of income in Greece is Dionysios Karageorgas, «The Distribution of the Tax Burden by Income Groups in Greece» in *The Economic Journal*, June 1973, Vol. 83, pp. 436-448. This article deals with data as of 1964. For indications that the distribution of income has worsened since then, see Dionysios Karageorgas, «I Ikonomikes Sinepies Tis Stratiotikis Diktatorias» (The Economic Consequences of Military Dictatorship) in *Anti*, Athens, Period II, 1, September 7, 1974, pp. 41-46.

of harmony and organic unity. Although the revolutionary attempt to institute radical change during the civil war failed for a multiplicity of reasons, leftist ideology has retained a stronghold on a significant segment of the Greek citizenry.¹ In 1958, EDA, the legal leftist political party, eight years after the end of the civil war, polled over 24% of the vote, while in the first elections in November 1974 after the collapse of the Ioannides dictatorship, the combined vote of all leftist political parties exceeded 20%.² In addition to those who express their discontent with the prevailing social order and its ideological foundations through the ballot, there are pressures of modernizing reforms (organizational and programmatic) within the very political parties whose traditional strength has depended upon the functioning of political clientelism. Comparable pressures are being exerted for reform and restructuring within the educational system, the bureaucracy and the labor unions.

Thus, there is empirical evidence of underlying discontent in Greece which periodically erupts, concurrent with evidence of the gradual development of a set of attitudes, values and belief systems at variance with traditional cultural patterns and with the ideology of organic unity. Class and associational interests have been attempting to assert themselves; there is a growing awareness that common action by a class or functional group can further its interests as a whole, rather than efforts at individual action geared towards individual (family) advancement at the expense of others similarly situated. Some workers; some students, some intellectuals, some professionals, some small scale businessmen, some women, are demanding participation in the decision-making processes, and are assimilating and espousing a range of alternative frameworks for the understanding of reality and hence are propounding new answers for unsolved issues and problems.

The military dictatorship that governed Greece from 1967-1974 can be viewed from one perspective as an attempt to preserve and protect tradition against the onslaught of change. The Papadopoulos-Ioannides dictatorship with its slogan of «Greece of Cristian Greeks» was an attempt to forcibly impose and strengthen the past

and its ostensible virtues. Its ideology, if the regime could be said to have had an ideology,³ was a revival and reaffirmation of the values of discipline, order, obedience, family virtue and moral purity; its mission was to preserve «civilization», which was embodied in the Greek nation, form the onslaught of communism and the decadent democracies of the west. Whatever else military rule represented and whatever economic interests it furthered, its rationale was rooted in values and beliefs indigenous to traditional Greek culture.

Following the return to parliamentary rule with the collapse of the Ioannides regime in 1974 as a result of the fiasco of the Cyprus coup, the goal of the new rulers of Greece became one of restoration—not reform, not change, not modernization—but a return to the status quo ante; a reaffirmation of the traditional official ideology, a perpetuation of the traditional social structure and of the existing socio-economic system, but now within a constitutional framework. Within two years, popular expectations that Greece had entered an era of renovation and progress were shattered as the country returned to «normalcy», to politics as usual. But the stresses on the political system remain, the tensions and the discontent are as great as ever and the cleavage between those who wield power and the mass of people is widening. Accommodation and reconciliation is not feasible when the official ideology and the policies of the government deny the very existence of opposition and withhold «legitimacy» from dissident groups representing the forces of change.

In summary, to contend that political clientelism is the determining variable explanatory of Greek politics is simplistic, ignores empirical evidence that does not fit the framework, and is incapable of accounting for pressures for change, reform and modernization or for such developments as civil war and military coups. Patron-client relations is a way of life for a large segment of the Greek citizenry, but at some level, policy decisions are made in both the foreign and domestic spheres, for which clientelism can not provide an analysis or an explanation. Since the citizenry is excluded from participation in the processes of decision making, an analysis of elite behavior and the relationship between the Greek

1. Jean Meynaud, *Les Forces Politiques en Grèce*, Lausanne, Etudes de Science Politique, 1965, p. 44, «...en principe, aussi dans l'ordre des fait, patronage et idéologie ne sont pas incompatibles».

2. This is not to say that some voters who voted for leftist parties, particularly PASOK, were not voting in terms of traditional patron-client relationships independent of ideological issues. In part this is compensated for by voters in the other political parties who voted in terms of issues.

3. «To attempt to define a coherent ideology underlying the actions of the Greek military regime is a somewhat futile exercise for the very good reason that such an ideology simply does not exist». Richard Clogg, «The Ideology of the 'Revolution of 21 April 1967'» in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos, *Greece under Military Rule*, New York: Basic Books, 1972, p. 36.

elites and foreign actors becomes crucial for a fuller understanding of the Greek political system.¹ The persistence of traditional cultural patterns and political clientelism in the face of pressures for change, in large measure has been a consequence of control of the state apparatus, of the structures of socialization, of the levers of powers, by an anti-modern elite dependent on foreign interests and resistant to reform. It appears, by contrast to much of the modernization literature,

1. A study of Greek elites, and their internal policies for maintaining themselves in power largely by reinforcing traditionalism, and their relationship as clients to foreign powers is discussed in Adamantia Pollis, «Deterrents to Modernization in Greece: Limits of Political Clientelism», paper presented to the symposium on «Forces Shaping Modern Greece» sponsored by the Modern Greek Studies Association, November 11, 1973, Columbia University.

that Greece is characterized by a «modern» elite that is not modernizing.

An analysis of the Greek elites—the armed forces, the church hierarchy, the financial and economic oligarchy and the political elite—the interrelationship among them and the mechanisms employed for perpetuating their rule is essential for an understanding of the deterrents to change in Greece and hence of the dynamics of Greek politics. In turn, efforts to scrutinize Greek politics and the tension between stagnation and change, by contrast to much of the theoretical formulations in comparative politics, must be placed within an international context. Greece, like all small dependent states, is not an autonomous political entity, regardless of its legal status, and any analysis of its political system must incorporate as an integral part of such an analysis the economic and political inputs from outside its borders.