


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systems of values in traditional and industrial societies

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Whether we want to write an essay, a book or a lecture we are always faced with having to cope with one great difficulty. It is the difficulty arising from terminology, especially when we are dealing with terms which cannot express unambiguously what we mean by these terms. This difficulty becomes still more acute when we are dealing with terms which have been taken from the field of sociology or which, in fact, have their roots in this field, for such terms do not only have two, three, or many meanings. Because of their being popularised they become strongly loaded with connotations which, as for example in the case of the dual term «community-society», make an objective description of reality by means of such terms, virtually impossible.

In order to clear any misunderstandings right out of the way, I wish, therefore, to suggest that the concepts of «traditional-society» and «industrial society» on the one hand, can convey very little about the society which they purport to delineate, and that they, on the other hand, are only permissible provided special suppositions are established. I would include the following statements in these suppositions. Firstly, that tradition must not be conceived of as contrary to industrialisation, because apart from the fact that industrial societies have their tradition—indeed a very rich one—tradition was and is no absolute hindrance to the industrialisation of a country. Secondly, there exist mixed types of societies in which tradition and industrialisation mutually complement each other. Thirdly, the ideal type of what we here describe as a traditional society is not a society which, in contrast to a society with no tradition—which in fact does not and cannot exist—, possesses a tradition, but a society whose members orientate their thinking and their actions mainly according to tradition, i.e. according to values which have been handed on.

As far as the concept of «industrial society» is concerned, we must beware of using it to indicate a particular form of society. It is enough to reflect that the two greatest world powers—America and Russia—are called industrial countries, although the forms of their societies differ basically. The designation «Industrial Society», therefore, tells us nothing of the main characteristics of a so-called industrial society since in fact the industrialisation is *only one* of these main characteristics. This does not of course mean that those societies which we call «industrial societies» have any common or similar characteristics. Yet, industrialisation, the factor of *labour*, its value, and the attitude of the indi-

vidual and of the group towards him are important characteristics which we meet in all industrialised countries, or more specifically in their forms of society.

Now that we have attempted to demonstrate the various possible interpretations of the concepts «traditional and industrial society» in their limited form, we must now find a definition, and this must of course be neutral in value, which can assist us in obtaining a clear picture of what is to be understood under *values*. In order to achieve both a clear idea of what a value is and neutrality of value itself I think we have to rest content with the simple definition of values as convictions or notions which are important to a person or to a group or a society in so far as they determine the behaviour of the individual, the group or the society, to a certain degree. Closely linked with those values which determine human behaviour there are certain *obvious cultural factors* which are of great significance in understanding certain social phenomena. The forms of social intercourse, customs and conventions, social habit, the law and the like are sanctioned forms of behaviour from which every system of norms is built up, and further, each system is based on conceptions of values which are decisive for the social actions of the individual and for the structure of society. Because types of family, social levels, political, economic, and religious institutions are, for example, nothing other than the results of relationships which derive their particular content and their particular form on the basis of behaviour patterns, which in turn are affected by particular conceptions of values.

II

Every culture is based on a system of values which wishes to preserve those institutions and forms of behaviour which, basically, have arisen from the system, so that a traditional system of values is at least suspicious of innovations, since innovations endanger the existing cultural factors which are taken for granted. We must, therefore, not forget, when we concern ourselves with industrial societies, that there have been systems of values strong enough to bring about the great innovation of industrialisation, by defeating other conceptions of values which were able to inhibit innovations. On the other hand, industrialisation has contributed to the rise of new systems of values and new cultural norms which stand in unambiguous and direct causal relationship to the phenomenon of industrialisation. However, this does not mean that industrialisation should be identified with those systems of values which can

accelerate it, or which arise out of it. We must not lose sight of the fact that differences exist between values that favour, further and accelerate industrialisation, and those which should, in an industrial society, be regarded as its product; while, on the other hand, we must avoid the dangerous simplification which is embodied in the notion that industrialisation implies a *definite* and *unavoidable* system of values. Values which are favourable to, and which further the rise and development of the industrial society have not arrived like bolts out of the blue. They have their roots in a tradition or, to be more precise, within a society which orientates itself according to a tradition, since before becoming industrialised all forms of society approached the type of society which we nowadays call the traditional society. One of the most important problems, therefore, with which we are faced, is the question of which values may be counted amongst those original forces which were in a position to weaken or to neutralise systems of values which stand in the way of innovation. Or, to put the question in another way, which values within a society which is orientated towards tradition, can influence existing institutions and ways of behaving in such a way that they at least do not hinder industrialisation and the kinds of life and ways of thinking that go hand in hand with it.

In my opinion this question can only be correctly answered if the position of the individual is first clarified, in the first place the position within a traditional society and secondly within the framework of an industrial society. However, in order to comprehend the situation of the individual in the industrial society as a special situation, we require an explanation that can give us some information on how the individual can overcome his traditional situation which binds him to existing institutions and ways of behaving, so that he may achieve a special position relative to the group and to society, which can assure him of *freedom* of thought and action. With this we can approach the solution of two more important problems, that of *dependence* and *self-sufficiency*, the significance of which in the handing on, the renewing and the origination of systems of values can hardly be over-estimated.

It will, however, hardly be possible to conceive of the liberation of the individual from those kinds of thought and action which have been handed on to him, unless we can clearly see this liberation, as well as the earlier situation of total dependence of the individual on the group, in their causal relationship with religious notions, which can decisively influence and have decisively influenced both dependence and self-sufficiency.

It is just here that we must not lose sight of one of the sociologically most important functions of religion, for religious convictions bestow on values, norms and the ways of behaving and the institutions linked to them, a certain legitimacy and, at the same time, a special stability. One can hardly overlook the fact that religious convictions and concepts, their affirmation, negation or neutralisation have a very important, if not the most important, part to play in the handing on of norms and values. Of course, religious conviction can encourage not only stability but also mobility so that phenomena such as social change, pluralism, democracy, revolution, etc. can be understood just as little when the factor of religion is not taken into consideration, as perhaps phenomena like conservatism, stabilisation of the existing state of society, or any form of monism, etc.

In view of the important part that the individual plays as a supporter and an instiller of values, and considering the fact that the various concepts of the significance and the value of values are conditioned strongly by religion, the entire problem of dependence and self-sufficiency which is so important to us in discussing this question comes sharply to the fore, and it at once compels us to make clear what the position of the individual is, firstly within the framework of the folk religion, secondly in the universal religions, and especially in Christianity.

III

As far as the ideas of *folk religion*, *universal religion* and *folk faith*—as expounded by *Gustav Mensching*—are concerned, one may take it that the main characteristic of the folk religion is that the *collective group* is, in fact, the bearer of the religion, and, therefore, salvation¹ is a collective business. As regards the sociological situation of the individual in the folk religion, this means that, from the outset, the individual is relegated to a secondary position. The feelings and thoughts of the individual as well as his actions are exclusively directed collectively since the group does not recognise the individual's own separate existence. For the group, life is equated with adaptation and subordination, and the individual himself does not attain consciousness of himself because the concepts of an independent existence and

personal responsibility are alien to him. If a human being develops a sense of personal responsibility so that he must under certain circumstances leave his group, he will cease to exist in the «folk-religious» state. As his existence was only meaningful within his group, he can never attain salvation as an individual but only as a member of his group, which, in the folk religion, as it has been stated, is always the bearer of the religion.

On the one hand, the group, in practice, extinguishes the individual, but, on the other hand, it gives him everything. It gives him the possibility of life and a share in all its possessions. It embraces him, and he is able to live within the ancient collective ties. He can open relations with the religious sphere, and his salvation flows from this towards him. As a member of the clan or tribe he has access to the divine being, or rather the works of the divine being include him as soon as he has become a member of his group. I would mention here, as an example, the *Germanic religion* in which *allegiance* of the members of the clan towards one another is present to an outstanding degree and in which «life» as a mysterious concept binds all together. In connection with this it must not be overlooked that by the word «life» we do not here mean the individual's own existence but the existence of the whole clan. For this reason the clan can only act as a unit; any act of the individual does not place responsibility on himself but on the clan. Both the individual's happiness and unhappiness are withdrawn from his own person, and the whole clan must bear them. If the actions of an individual are recognised as evil, the whole clan is harmed and its life is poisoned. The bad limb is thrust out, and it is certain that for him no existence of his own can begin outside the group, which means nothing other than his eventual death, having been excluded from life. And so the notion of death is not bound to actual dying, since in this case death must be equated with removal from clan life.

In the further development of folk religion individual persons are gradually released from collective allegiance and they develop a sense of their own consciousness. An exception is provided in the case of kings or prophets, since, being bearers of a charisma, which is bound only to their own person, they stand above the others. One must, however, not speak here of a general isolation of the individual. In this case, these are individuals who are not separate from the group, but who stand out in their group and for the group in their capacity as individuals. It is here, however, that the first characteristics appear of a develop-

1. The German words «Heil» and «Unheil» present some difficulty. «Heil» may be taken to mean «prosperity», «happiness», «welfare» or «salvation». We have decided to use «salvation» and «damnation» even although these words in English carry greater religious overtones than the original German.

ment that led to the general awakening of the individual, as a pre-condition of the break-through of individuality, by which human beings were matured for the new religions, i.e. the world religions. Examples of the release of individuals, and their new dealings in conditions of sole personal responsibility as individual people can be found everywhere in considerable numbers. We find such examples in, for example, Greece in the person of *Antigone* who withstands the collectivism of the people, or in *Socrates*. The prevalence of the consciousness of self was more clearly evident in the Israelite religion where—in Psalm 118,6—the singer clearly sets himself apart from the group as an individual when he says, «If God is for me, I fear nothing, what person can prevail against me?».

While the structure of the folk religion is characterised by the fact that, in the first place, the folk in the broadest sense, e.g. Romans, Germans, etc., and not in the sense of a particular class, is the bearer of religion, and, in the second place, salvation is present; the basic feature of the universal religion is that it is an individual religion, or, in other words, the individual is the bearer of the religion. Further important characteristics of the universal religions are that not salvation, but damnation is present, and that the world becomes an object of rational perception and conscious fashioning. Furthermore, it must not be overlooked—and this is very important to the understanding of our entire theme—that within the framework of the universal religions a new collectivism can arise so that one must speak of a continual process which can reproduce the sequence collectivism - individualism - collectivism and which shows us that man certainly freed himself from the original collectivism of the folk religion, only, however, to fit himself once again into a collective. This latter collective, however, differs from the original collective in that we are now faced with a narrowing of the concept of folk, for, whereas in the case of the primitive collectivism we spoke of folk religion, in the case of the collective which arises within the framework of the universal religions we are concerned with *folk faith*. Whereas in the folk religion the entire folk, such as Greeks, Romans, Germans, etc., is the bearer of the religion, i.e. an organically constructed vital unit with a sacred character, in the case of the folk faith, the folk is the bearer of the faith in the sense of being a particular layer within a higher culture or universal religion. So, in the case of the folk faith we stand before a «mass religiosity», whose bearer is always a non-organically constructed plurality whose main characteristic is the primi-

tive structure of religious feeling and thinking.

The group comfortably encloses the individual in the folk religion and guarantees him salvation. The mass religion can only contemplate the individual as a cipher in the plurality. He is faced by the authority and the values which determine his religion, they do not dwell in him. The individual in the folk religion, although unconscious of his own personal existence, is, through his inclusion in the group, delivered up once and for all to happiness and salvation because, as a member of his religious group, he will also act religiously of his own accord. It is quite different for the individual in the mass religion, for, conscious that he is placed in a situation of condemnation, he is offered no possibility of participating in any salvation conferred on the collective or attaining personal salvation through a direct relationship with the divine. In the folk religion the value of the individual lies in the fact that the group needs him, because its productivity as a unit is only achieved through the individual members. The individual within the framework of mass religiosity does not, however, possess this value and this is precisely because he belongs to an unproductive plurality which often produces destructive and disfunctional effects. The great chance for the individual within the mass religion is that he can easily free himself from the collective. He can leave his traditional milieu, and if the occasion arises he can set in motion, through the force of his personal charisma, a new process in the sense of the sequence collectivism - individualism - collectivism that has already been mentioned.

IV

From this representation of the sociological or rather the religio-sociological situation of the individual within the framework of the folk religion and the universal religion, the following important basic premises arise for the understanding of the systems of values on which a culture is based. Those types of society which are strongly orientated towards the tradition of a folk religion respect the group, i.e. the family and the groupings which enclose and further the family community, i.e. the kith and kin, the clan and the tribe, higher than the individual, but also even higher than the entire society. In other words, in the scale of values, the most valuable is one's own group. Accordingly the individual must fit in with the will of the group, which leaves very little room for independent thought and action. Obedience and dependence count as values which can result in damnation if they are offended against.

Since the group provides the greatest value, the individual who is orientated towards his group, or more specifically its tradition, is not interested in any changes. On the contrary he regards any innovations as providing competition to the existing institutions which guarantee his own group, and that means also himself, a certain degree of security. For this reason he places great value on what he is used to. Tribes, for example, whose social orders are based on the waging of war and on military proficiency are coerced with great difficulty into permanent residence, and they rarely become accustomed to the peaceful life of farmers and breeders of animals. So the possibilities of a dynamic change, which one might have found in the tradition itself, hardly exist for those types of society which are strictly orientated towards the tradition of the folk religions. The behaviour of the individual is here strictly traditional, i.e. a «dull, declining reaction to accustomed delights in the direction of the attitude previously adopted». As far as the leadership is concerned the only possibility is a traditionalistic leader who is obeyed on account of one's feelings; it has always been so and can not be any different.

Those types of society whose tradition is orientated towards a universal religion, in contrast to those who are orientated towards the tradition of a folk religion, carry the seeds of dynamic change within themselves, which, of course, does not mean that these seeds always develop or that they cause changes which must necessarily be positive or constructive. The important thing is that here the individual no longer has available the most valuable thing, i.e. whatever he may set at the top of the scale of values, since the individual as bearer of the religion in the universal religion—as we have seen—does not find himself in a situation of salvation but of damnation. This means in other words that here the individual himself has to seek and find the greatest value, since it is not given to him. Through this the individual begins to think and act independently so that he either aligns himself with a group of his choice which promises him the salvation which he seeks, or he finds a group himself which promises to others the salvation that he has found or believes he has found through revelation, faith, reflection, etc. Between these two possibilities, i.e. between alignment in a group and the founding of new groups, there are, of course, various other possibilities, such as, for example, aligning oneself within a group in order to renew it and to reform it. In every case, however, it is obvious that the individual is in a position to think and to act independently, which includes the possibility

of his questioning the tradition with which he is faced as an individual, should he perceive it to be leading to damnation or, if he is a charmatist and finds disciples who accept him as such, he can reject it and alter it more or less revolutionarily. The more the individual perceives the feeling of damnation the greater will be the urge towards dynamic changes, so that experience of a situation leading to damnation implies instability and plurality of those values which lay claim to being of greatest value, i.e. by being the absolute value which bestows salvation.

In these circumstances various situations can arise which provide the starting point for systems of values having traditions whose stability or capacity for change depend on whether the conceptions of values which have been handed on favour or inhibit the individual's own actions in removing the situation of damnation that has been experienced. So, in the final analysis, the forms by which damnation is lifted and the ways of acting occasioned by these, comprise the most important factors which are decisive for overcoming a tradition and for the rise of a new one.

The ways of removing damnation and the corresponding ways of acting are closely allied to whatever is experienced and recognised as being damnation. As we have seen, in the folk religions and in the framework of the traditions which have arisen through them, isolation of the individual from his group was equivalent to damnation, and removal of damnation is identical to membership of one's own group, and, therefore, there is a limit to the possibilities and to the kinds of action because of the total dependence on the group. In the universal religions, however, the content and forms of damnation are determined by the individual, who seeks his own salvation independently from the group, since every individual experiences and recognises this damnation in a different way. Strong personalities who appear as charismatic leaders or teachers become founders of religions or philosophies which promise the salvation and its realisation which has been experienced and recognised by the founder. We are, therefore, always faced—despite numerous systems which promise salvation—with three important basic models. In the first place salvation is sought in absolute spiritualism, mysticism, contemplation, etc., and at the same time the world and its notions of what is valuable are totally denied or ignored; another direction considers the world as an object of rational perception and conscious fashioning in the conviction that as well as divine works, one's own actions are necessary to release from, or remove of damnation, while the third sees the overcoming of the individual's

damnation in materialism. Culture and the systems of values based on it are orientated in these three directions, and variations of them, and this is how the various traditions of an eastern and of a western stamp arise.

V

Christianity, which contributed considerably to the development of complex western societies with all their characteristics including industrialisation, favoured independence from both the family and the tribe, in that it offered personal salvation, independent of political, social or financial ties. Anyone who wished could renounce his dependence on all values of a material or imaginary kind, and could find his salvation in Christ, who promised mankind real *freedom* and independence. It must not be overlooked that Christianity was established as a religion for the *individual*, which helps him to release himself from damnation by deciding personally for Christ and his teaching.

With the increasing collectivity of Christianity, however, the pressing question arose, whether one as a Christian could contribute something towards the removal of damnation and, in particular, what the correct course of action might be now that one had found salvation in Christ and in faith. Because of this, there arose within the framework of Christianity the two great traditions, eastern and western Christianity. The main characteristics of the first tradition are: heavily emphasised religious feeling, passive, other-worldly asceticism and strongly marked individualism, which, however, remains socially unproductive as it is found in men who seek their salvation in absolute spiritualism, mysticism and contemplation. Thus, there was a complete division between contemplation and activity, which removed the other-worldly asceticism of the eastern Church from the realm of action. Parallel to the abandonment of the world by the eastern tradition arose the Orthodox Church, whose system of values was the result of a mixture of collectivism, nationalism and irrationality or religious feeling, which could not lead to rational systematisation and ordering of the individual's way of life, and correspondingly to economic and social life, which was restricted or completely prevented from in the eastern-orientated countries. Here, the individual feels himself safe in collectivity, because he thinks he has found his salvation in his national Church. Dependence and participation are regarded as virtues, which are strengthened by the fact that the eastern Church attaches more importance to the passive virtues

such as martyrdom, poverty, etc. and less to the active. In short, the eastern tradition, which influenced and still influences the social, political and economic development of those countries which follow that tradition, carries no seeds of dynamic change, so that a re-assessment of values, which industrialisation demands or which can be forced through when industrialisation has taken place—this re-assessment is made difficult if not totally prevented from the beginning. In this respect Greece is an interesting example of a country which, although part of highly-developed and industrialised Europe, has a social structure orientated towards a system consisting of a mixture of religious and national convictions, which promotes values, norms and attitudes that reject all systems of values which contradict the indigenous tradition. Here, we see a traditional society whose system of values stands firmly in the way of any innovations. Dependence is more highly esteemed than self-sufficiency, and if the individual cannot find his salvation by fitting in to the framework of the traditionally orientated group, then he must remain in a constant state of damnation or else seek his salvation by emigrating to an industrial society of western stamp, whose plurality of values offers him greater prospects of salvation than the narrow system upon which his native society is built.

Even in the West we are now experiencing a monopolizing of the most important value, namely the salvation for which man strives, which during the Middle Ages was only to be found collectively, that is, in the Church. When one remembers that in the Middle Ages man worried about life after death, as that life seemed more important than this life on earth, then it is understood that this concern about salvation played an important role at all levels of society, even including rulers and emperors, in man's concept of values. This attitude to life gave the intermediaries between this world and the next, that is the Church and the Clergy, a special position in society—a fact which was true throughout the whole of the Middle Ages. The removal of individual damnation was possible only through total dependence on an order decreed by God. Kings, crowns, throne, state, command, obedience, governing, serving, honour, punishment, etc., are some of the values which this order sanctioned and which stamped western tradition during the Middle Ages.

What distinguishes this tradition from that of the East is the fact that whereas the eastern Church conceived the legitimacy of its order *effectually*, that is, it offered guarantees through emotional sacrifice, the western Roman Catholic

Church legitimised by *rationalising values*, that is, by faith in its absolute authority as an expression of binding values. Thus, three important phenomena are explained: a) the pact, which institutionalised Christianity entered into with the various ruling powers and classes; b) the jurisdiction of the varying social order which the pact mentioned under a) implies; and c) the legitimizing of the rule of one man over another as a means of removing the damnation of the individual. The western and eastern traditions are further distinguished by the fact that the western synthesis «Prayer and Work», which really originated in the East, deteriorated because of a one-sided emphasis on Prayer and became the basis of asceticism. While asceticism in the East remained a *disordered*, passive asceticism of the monks, western asceticism was *rational* and active, both as other-worldly asceticism and later also as worldly asceticism. And so, within the framework of western tradition two values have made deep roots, which will later not only favour but also accelerate industrialisation. These values are: work and order in life.

VI

The most important role in the birth of a new dynamic tradition, and which gave strong impulses to western social change, is played by the Individualism-Collectivism scheme mentioned at the beginning: and thus man appears on the stage of history awaiting the removal of his damnation not by other men or groups, but by God alone. *Martin Luther* and the *Reformation* led by him broke upon history. The word «Reform», from the latin «reformatio», means «*new form*» and «*innovation*». This new form and innovation rests on Luther's conviction that God cannot and will not allow anyone to rule the soul of the individual. As a Christian, the religious man must rely on himself. Individualism in the West goes through a religious legitimization which gives the individual new opportunities to find and realise his salvation independent of collectivism, that is, through personal thought and action. And so the individual soon discovers that his damnation is identical with his self-inflicted inarticulation. From now on he hopes to remove this condition by declaring *freedom* from all previous expression the highest value.

This freedom is to be understood as the right of the individual to self-sufficiency and independent thought and action. It is not an end in itself, but is a means to the realisation of that which the

individual sees as salutary, that is, an absolute value for himself and his group. Viewed in this light, freedom led to a plurality of values in the West and today, in the scale of values within industrial societies of western stamp, there is on the one hand considerable supply and on the other considerable demand. Tradition, or a traditional way of thinking and acting, and the corresponding values co-exist and compete with a number of values with which the individual must come to terms in a complex society, for the basic situation of the individual in this society is characterised by the fact that he is enclosed in a mass of societies at the same time. And so conflicts arise, for example, conflicts about one's role, which may also cause values to conflict. This is best seen within the framework of the family, where agreed values may conflict with values which have come to exist in economic, political or social life. The name «*plural society*» expresses that we are dealing with a social system within whose framework the individual must daily decide which values may be reconciled with what he regards as the highest value.

The plurality of values and the plural society are effects or, better, side-effects of industrialisation, which may help or hinder it. They in no way caused industrialisation, for industrialisation arose basically because in the West the world became an object of rational recognition and definite form, after man had contrasted himself as an independent subject with this objective world. And so the realms of culture, business, government and science were recognised as separate, with the result that these realms became independent, compared to the authoritarian claim of institutionalized Christianity, which as a Church often wanted to subjugate the above-mentioned realms to a system of order and values—often by force. This granting of independence, however, was only possible because western man discovered that happiness or salvation can be neither presented nor arranged. One must make them for oneself.

Of great importance for the development of industrialisation, moreover, was the ascetic protestant conviction that *occupational fulfilment* was to be regarded as a mark of grace or salvation. An so, such things as work, effort, success, order, system, etc., reach new heights in the scale of values. These values, especially work, coupled with the rise of freedom as the highest value, created the basic conditions, that is, independent thought and action above all, within a planned, systematic and methodical daily life, which then gave important impulses to industrialisation. With that, industrialisation is linked to

a great extent with the removal of damnation from the individual.

The moment the individual made his personal faith—in the sense of being seized by what must concern him—the only criterion of value, he then knew that his damnation could be avoided only if he were in a position to act according to his faith. There arises then, not only the plurality of values already mentioned, but also the struggle for a society which will guarantee the individual freedom to follow the path of salvation which he is convinced is correct. Various egalitarian movements, struggles against social inequality and every manifestation of man's rule over man are then more easily understood, if viewed within a system of values at whose origin is the discovery that the individual has a claim to freedom, in order to allow himself to become a whole man, which of course implies respect for others.

In these conditions, traditional systems of values which find their validity in a separation of the political, economic and social world into upper and lower, that is, in inequality, force, restriction, uncertainty and fear—these systems have reduced their chances of survival to a minimum. In the place of values such as superiority, command, obedience, ruling, serving, honour, punishment, crown, majesty, etc., there survive such values as democracy, freedom, independence, tolerance, respect for the opponent, compromise, etc. The fact that these values are not really new discoveries has been, and still is, very important when considering their success. They rather represent a re-discovery, which was possible because there were individuals who sought their salvation not in collectivism, but in direct and personal contact with what they regarded as of greatest value. Such individuals are also to be found in those pioneers who discarded the old European world and its traditionally orientated systems of value, and who tried to realise ideal freedom and equality in a new world. And so arose that mixture of enlightenment and evangelical Christianity which, in the form of «American religiosity», directs the American way of life. In the same way there also arose that plurality of values which demands respect for all values, which mean something to one's fellow-men. The existence of considerable supply and demand in the scale of values in western industrialised societies, and above all the negative side-effects of these phenomena, are the price which the individual must pay in order to be free to remove his damnation as he thinks fit, that is, in keeping with his faith. But they are also the guarantee that there can always be a re-valuation of values, which keeps the difficult path open for the man seeking the highest value.

Neither plurality of values nor the freedom of the individual to think and act individually are characteristics which can be called ingredients of an industrialised society. Russia and its social structure show unmistakably that industrialisation implies neither plurality nor democracy and that in an industrialised society opposing systems of values may arise. A point which we must also take note of is that the Russian industrialising system arose from the protest of the individual against the reigning tradition, and that this system represents a kind of religious substitute and a substitute religion, and that it has raised the western values of *work* and egalitarianism, together with the *Party*, to the level of the most salutary values.

Within the framework of our scheme of individualism - collectivism - individualism, *Karl Marx* certainly belongs to those who were unable to find their salvation in available systems of values and who, therefore, sought a new way by which to remove their perceived damnation. The answer which *Karl Marx* gave to the question «How can I ensure my happiness?» left no room for metaphysics and spiritual values, for *Marx* saw only one way of relieving man's situation, and that was a new economic structure for society. Originally, *Marxist* thought dealt simply with economic theory, which soon changed to a faith which promised man a paradise on earth. The price that man must pay for this is his freedom of thought and action, for in the *Marxist* societies of the Communist countries there is no room at all for independent thinkers. A system of values arose which shows similarities to the Church in the Middle Ages, in that it cuts out the personal life of the individual and at the same time it monopolizes the mission of salvation. We are dealing here with a pseudo-religion which acts both as a substitute religion and a religious substitute and which arose from the soil of the so-called Christian western world. The main characteristic of this «religion» is that it forces the salvation it invented upon mankind, while at the same time denying the individual the right to seek, find or realise his salvation elsewhere. This «religion» does not tolerate any other system of values alongside its own.

Between the great industrialised societies, that is, between Russia and the so-called capitalist West, there exists the third world consisting of a number of nations whose social structures lean towards systems which are mainly traditional. It would, however, be a fatal mistake to think that the mere removal of tradition in these countries

or the simple adoption of either socialist or capitalist systems from industrialised countries would provide the necessary conditions for the industrialisation and development of the third world. The famous-infamous Chinese cultural revolution should warn the third world to see the enemy of progress in their own tradition. What prevents progress is not tradition but traditionalism, the belief that the handed-down values are absolute and sacred, just because they do belong to tradition. This raises tradition itself to the highest value and at the same time relegates all other values.

The simple and uncritical acceptance of systems which have arisen within the framework of pluralism in western industrialised countries, can cause serious cultural conflicts, which always result from any attempt to impose a foreign way of life and thinking on an indigenous tradition. Growing into a culture and its basic values, it promises more success than forced acceptance of a foreign culture and its values. The cultural losses which result from this acceptance serve neither progress nor mutual understanding between nations.

No tradition itself but the basic adjustment of

the individual within a tradition is the deciding factor for progress and development, for both the so-called traditional as well as the so-called industrial societies have a common origin, rooted in a world of magic and mythology. In this world man discovered various ways which were supposed to free him from damnation. Some saw the method of salvation in the negation of the transitory, in that they regarded it as worthless, and others hoped to reach their goal by rationalising, altering and conquering this world. The latter brought about the disenchantment of the world and the enormous technological development which helped men to realise, among other things, that they are members of a world community which if it wants to survive must accept some *basic values* which are grouped around the idea of a unified mankind. And so we are experiencing now the promising phenomenon that while the traditional values are constantly undergoing reevaluation, other universally valid convictions are reached. The conviction, for example, that the survival of mankind demands the united front of all those «who believe that the Universe is still striding forward and we have been entrusted to let it do so». (Teilhard de Chardin)