some social aspects of the return movement of Greek migrant workers from West Germany to rural Greece

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The object of this paper is to examine some social effects of intra-European emigration and the return movement on traditional rural Greece and on returners themselves.

The evidence is based on a survey I undertook among returners on two Greek islands, Rhodes and Corfu, as well as on observations I gathered during my two-month stay on these two islands in July and August 1973.

Before proceeding to examine the socioeconomic position of returners in these two islands as well as their relationship to the patronage and friendship institutions and their political attitudes, I will give a brief outline of the socioeconomic position of migrants in receiving Western European societies, which will help in the analysis of the proposed problems under research.

a. the socioeconomic position of migrants in Western European societies

The characteristics of migrant groups in the countries of Western Europe are well known. Migrants occupy the lowest stratum in the labour market of these countries. They tend to be heavily concentrated in certain industries or occupations such as building, engineering, textiles and clothing, catering, domestic service. These are the sections which have either the lowest pay or the worst working conditions, or both.

In Germany, for example, the overwhelming majority—nearly four-fifths— are in the secondary sector of the economy, i.e. in manufacturing industries and in building. Two-thirds of male foreign employees are concentrated in three industrial groups: metal production and engineering, building and other manufacturing industries.[1] Two-thirds of foreign women workers are concentrated in four manufacturing industry groups: textiles and clothing, metal production and engineering, electrical goods and other manufacturing industries.

In Switzerland we find nearly three quarters of male foreign workers concentrated in five occupational groupings: building, engineering, hotels and catering, wood and cork, agriculture. Three quarters of women workers are concentrated in six groupings: hotels and catering, textiles, commercial occupations, clothing, domestic service, engineering.[2]

Considering the socioeconomic status of mi-

1. Castles, S. and Kosack Godula, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*. Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p.71.
2. Ibid., p. 71.

grants in Western Europe, Castles and Kosack report that in general they occupy the least desirable jobs which are rejected by indigenous workers. In France the overwhelming majority of immigrants are manual workers. Only 6.3 per cent of the employees fall into the non-manual categories.[1] In Germany the overwhelming majority of Southern Europeans are unskilled or semi-skilled workers, between 7 and 16 per cent are skilled workers but virtually none have non-manual occupations.[2]

The position of migrants in regard to unemployment is also unfavourable. Patterns of unemployment differ in different countries. For example, in France and Britain migrants are more likely to be unemployed than other workers, while in Switzerland and Germany there are few unemployed migrants, but this is because they are either not permitted to remain in the country, or because the unemployment benefit they receive does not make their stay worth while. However on the whole, immigrants suffer more from unemployment than the indigenous population.[3]

What are the factors which cause the subordinate position of migrant workers in the class structure of European societies?

It is commonly believed in these countries, especially by the working class, that migrants possess characteristics which place them at the bottom of the social hierarchy. It is believed that they come predominantly from the rural backward areas of Mediterranean societies, that they are illiterate, that the majority have never had any vocational training or any kind of experience in the industrial or service sector and therefore lack the necessary background for any social or economic mobility in the receiving societies.

How do facts correspond to this image? According to Böhning, two-fifths of the male foreign workers in Germany have migrated from a town, about a quarter from villages and the rest from cities.[4] 42 per cent of the Turks and 27 per cent of the Greeks stem from cities.[5] The seemingly high proportion of Turkish town dwellers, Böhning argues, boils down to below average figures if place of birth is compared with place of residence at time of departure. The same could be argued about Spanish data (44 per cent come from cities with over 50,000 population).

The educational level of migrants is higher than is generally assumed. Of all foreign workers in Germany, not more than 3 per cent lack the ability to read and write.[6] Table 1 presents the educational level of Greek migrant workers in West Germany and compares it to the educational level of the total Greek population. The data are based on the Greek census of 1961.

On the basis of these data we can assume that Greek workers in West Germany have a higher overall level of education (particularly higher in secondary education) than that of the total Greek population.

According to Böhning the educational level of Italians in Germany does not differ much from that of the Italian non-migrant population.[7] The level of Spanish migrants is slightly higher and that of the Turkish ones considerably higher than that of the respective home population.

Fewer than one-fifth of the migrants do not seem to have completed their primary schooling, but between 20 per cent and 50 per cent of those who have done so have undergone some further general or vocational training.[8]

Therefore, from the educational point of view the great majority of the migrants are not in a qualitatively different category from their colleagues in the receiving countries, who generally supplement their statutory minimum schooling with vocational training. The only difference lies in the content and standards of the education that they both receive in their respective societies.

Concerning the occupational skills of migrants, three-fifths of the male population were skilled prior to emigration.[9] As in the field of education, Greek and Spanish migrants are slightly, and the Turkish considerably better trained on average than their respective non-migrant population. But their occupational experience is related mainly to non-industrial work and partly to the semi-industrial work of the building sector. Only a quarter have come into direct contact with industrial work before emigration.[10]

Evidence from statistical data, therefore, does not justify the lack of opportunities for occupational and social mobility of migrants in West Germany because it proves that a considerable number of them do not possess the characteristics that the receiving society claims that they do. The same, it could be argued, is the case in many other Western European countries.

It is evident, therefore, that these characteristics which serve to distinguish migrant groups

1. Ibid., p. 81.
2. Ibid., p. 82.
3. Ibid., p. 92.
4. Böhning, R., *The Social and Occupational Apprenticeship of Mediterranean Migrant Workers in West Germany*. Dipartimento Statistico Mathematico, Florence, 1971, p.17.
5. Ibid., p. 17.
6. Ibid., p. 19.
7. Ibid., p. 20.
8. Ibid., p. 20.
9. Ibid., p. 23.
10. Ibid., p. 23.

from the rest of the society are ascribed to them in order to justify their subordinate position. Migrants, therefore, are the object of «race» prejudice.

To the question of whose interest it is to keep the migrants in this position, the answer might be given that it is in the interest of the ruling class of capitalist societies. «Race prejudice» thus serves the interests of capitalist exploitation.

Racialist ideology is usually considered to take physical characteristics as the criteria for assigning people to inferior or subordinate social positions. The physical characteristics and the inferiority which is alleged to go with them are used as an excuse to keep the coloured groups subjugated. However, in cases like we have in Western Europe, where many groups are not coloured, the ruling class employs other than physical characteristics to justify exploitation. Therefore, we may apply the term «racialism» in a broader sense in the case of migrant groups in Western Europe as well. Racialism, whether it refers to physical or other characteristics, serves to justify the subjugation of certain groups by other groups. Race prejudice is given substance in different discriminatory policies of governments and employers. These policies restrict length of stay, changes of occupation or job, changes of place of employment, changes of place of residence, possibilities of language or vocational training, as well as other possibilities of social and economic promotion with the aim of keeping migrants in low socioeconomic positions.

b. the socioeconomic position of returning migrants in rural Greece

Most of the returners we interviewed in Rhodes and Corfu have not spent more than 4-6 years abroad. An important number of them have been alternating between Germany and Greece in the last ten years.

The aim of the survey was to investigate the characteristics of the returners, their reasons for coming back, as well as their motives and inducements for emigrating, their evaluation of their experience abroad, its usefulness for their future in Greece, their reasons for settling in their village of origin, their use of savings made abroad, their occupational mobility and their future prospects.

The basic reason for undertaking this survey was the lack of official data on the problem. In fact, returners have only just begun to engage the attention of the responsible authorities in Greece and in other Mediterranean countries. Therefore, the data at our disposal are limited and not precise because they are based on statistics which take for granted that a returner is one who declares when entering the country that he or she has the intention of settling permanently. However, these statistics do not take into account that returners may easily change their minds about settling permanently in Greece, or that others who declare that they are coming in order to visit their relatives may decide to settle permanently. Until such time as systematic surveys are made in connection with population censuses, or in other ways more specifically concerned with returning migrants, one is forced to rely on estimates and opinions that are so diverse and contradictory as to cloud any attempt at assessing the scale of the return movement to Greece.

The reasons I chose Rhodes and Corfu to do the research were the following:
a) These two islands are characterised by a significant return movenent (which is rather an exception in rural areas in Greece) and, therefore, I would not have much difficulty in finding returners to interview and in selecting a sample.
b) The YWCA organisation which sponsored the project had local centres in these two areas which could provide facilities for the field work.

Those who were interviewed had a) to have resided in Germany for more than one year, and b) to have settled in rural areas for at least nine months. The more temporary settlement usually corresponds to a kind of holiday returners take in order to relax and look after their family and their interests in the village, while they live partly on the unemployment allowance they are entitled to if they have earned a certain amount of wages in Germany.

Our sample in Corfu consisted of 49 persons of which 13 did not participate, while in Rhodes it consisted of 40 cases of which 4 did not participate. In Rhodes the number of women interviewed was 22 while in Corfu it was 20.

The systematic sample was selected from the lists of returners which the secretaries of the villages in those two islands provided, on the basis of the following two stipulations: a) that the sample should contain more women returners than men, due to the particular interest in women migrants of the organisation which sponsored the project; b) that the total number of the sample should not exceed 30 per cent of the average number of returners during 1971-73. This number was determined by the limited time available to us for field work.

What follows is a brief summary of some of the research findings, especially those which have to do with the socioeconomic position of the returning migrants.

The more emigration proves a failure, that is, from the economic point of view, the more do returners tend to settle in their areas of origin. Most of the returners we interviewed belong to this category. It can also be postulated that in these two rural areas the more emigration is a failure, the more likely the migrant is to return to his original occupation. This does not hold true for most women in the sample, who, after return, usually prefer only to look after their family and children.

The majority of migrants in the sample have not acquired any occupational skills or vocational training abroad. Only a few of them have learned a craft such as, for example, the builder's trade. As we have already pointed out, because of the employers' own interest and less because of the insufficiency of their background, migrants are engaged in low-grade positions and on mass-production lines, which do not require extensive training. They may be trained to the pace and discipline of specialised mass-production, but this does little to improve their existing occupational level. The non-acquisition of vocational training by migrants is due to the fact that the German government and the firms which employ them do little about such training. Basically, foreigners are recruited to take up the jobs which are abandoned by indigenous workers and which fall mainly into the unskilled or semi-skilled categories. In Germany migrants theoretically share the same opportunities with indigenous workers for participating in vocational training courses. However, the problem of the language and the migrant's lack of industrial background create a barrier to their participation in these programmes.

Another difficulty is that vocational courses are usually offered in the evening, and since the migrants' primary aim is that of merely earning as much money as possible in the shortest possible time, they are seldom disposed to make the sacrifice of time and money demanded by vocational and further training.

However, there is no doubt that the great majority of migrants are initiated into the modes of industrial work as opposed to those of agricultural production. This means that they familiarize themselves with the milieu of industrial work places and the rhythm of the production process.

In Rhodes and Corfu the industrial experience of returners is of no use to them due to the lack of industry in these two areas and also because the only kind of employment migrants do not seem to consider after return is industrial work. This is because they consider it to be of low status.

They also tend to be very mistrustful of the labour market of their home country. Quite often they believe they have acquired some sort of skills and that they cannot find in Greek factories jobs corresponding to their new qualifications and pretensions. We agree, therefore, with some Turkish sociologists who write that the mere fact of emigration has raised these workers to a new social status which alienates them from the wage-earning class.

However, their experience abroad, their fair knowledge of the language as well as their apprenticeship to a craft, for example, the builder's trade, has helped a significant number of returners (men) in Corfu as well as in Rhodes to obtain better paid jobs in tourism and construction.

This, of course, has been due to the evolution of the market in these two islands. The creation of new jobs in tourism and construction has been more marked in Corfu than in Rhodes, due to its most recent touristic development.

In general we can say that in these two islands emigration has been on balance a success for the individuals, even for those who have not changed occupation and obtained better paid jobs, because as a result of the time spent abroad everyone interviewed has succeeded in ameliorating his own and his family's living conditions, at least for the time being.

As our interviews have shown, migrants' savings are most often employed for daily consumption and for the improvement of the living conditions of the migrants' families, thus providing reasonable subsistence for a part of the population which would otherwise be destitute. Other important uses of the migrants' savings are:

a) To enlarge, modernise, build or buy a house, sometimes in urban areas, but more frequently in the area of origin.

b) To buy land.

c) To buy agricultural and other kinds of machinery.

d) To set up a small business or commercial establishment (shop, bar, restaurant).

e) To buy cars and motorcycles for private or business uses.

The few cases in our sample that have built a shop with the intention of opening a small business have done so in their village of origin, which most of the time has a declining population and, therefore, a declining probability of survival. Even worse is the case of the very few who buy a small property. There is little chance that they may be successful, since one of the many reasons for leaving the country was the meagre profitability of the land, which they now buy as a symbol of social promotion.

Therefore, we can say that in these two areas we have the feeling that the productivity of the migrants' savings when invested is very small. In any case their volume is certainly modest and their impact on the development of these two areas very marginal indeed. We can also say that returners in our sample have provided very little economic innovation or change; their channels of investment are culturally defined. Migration confers status which has to be maintained by investing in traditional symbols of prestige as well as in some modern symbols of consumption.

With respect to the migrants' prospects, our interviews have shown that half of the persons in our sample plan to return to Germany. Therefore, for a number of returners the time spent at home may be considered as a period during which they look after their property and their family, while examining the possibilities of economic advancement at home. They feel that after what they have experienced abroad, working in socially undesirable jobs and living in regimented or dilapidated hostels, they are entitled to something better back home. However, if the home areas cannot match either the security of employment or the higher real wages they are likely to go abroad again.

For most of them the solution is to be found in alternating between Germany and Greece, aiming that one day they will be able to establish a small business of their own in urban areas. We can classify, therefore, this category of returners as a new category of persons, the proletarian petit bourgeois, characterized by high geographical as well as occupational mobility and small property.

c. friendship, patronage and the returning migrant

I will start the analysis of the institutions of patronage and friendship in the context of traditional rural Greece, by trying to explain the meaning of honour and shame, the values which regulate patron-client and friendship relationships to the traditional Greek.

Pitt Rivers[1] has defined honour as the value of a man not only in his own eyes but also in the eyes of society. Honour, then, is the self image that an individual projects and which is accredited by others. Shame is the denial of this image by others as being false. In other words, consciousness of negative or critical public opinion. A person of good reputation is taken to have both honour and shame.

1. Pitt Rivers, J., *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*. Ed. Peristiany, John. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1965, p. 21.

I shall now try to examine the criteria by which honourable behaviour is assessed, as well as the practical consequences for an individual of having more or less honour.

Peristiany[2] writes that the three social categories with which a Greek identifies himself most readily are the family, the community and the nation. They provide in most contexts the duality necessary for differentiation for the cleavage between «us» and «them».

The same is reported by Campbell,[3] who writes that for the Sarakatsani the concept refers particularly to the honour of the individual and the family. These two points of reference rarely lead to any conflict of loyalties since the solidarity of the elementary family is so complete.

Honourable men and women, writes Campbell,[4] should possess certain moral qualities. These have to do with manliness for men and sexual shame for women. To be a man an individual must show himself to be courageous and fearless, strong in body and mind. Women should try in dress, movement and attitude to disguise the fact that they possess the physical attributes of their sex.

The extent to which individuals possess these qualities is always judged in relation to a group, primarily the family. The Greek term for experiencing self as a part of a system of group relatedness is «philotimo», which in Greek means love of honour. «Philotimos» refers to the consistency of an individual's behaviour with the roles he is assigned as a member and an integral part of a greater entity, primarily the family, and with the preservation of the public image this demands.

Honourable behaviour, then, is linked to the performance of family roles in the way that the amount of honour that an individual possesses prescribes. The amount of honour that an individual possesses is also based on material attributes.

The most important of material attributes are wealth and education. Wealth can be calculated on the amount and quality of land, livestock or other property owned, or on income. It seems most common for a man's moral character to be played off against his material attributes.

Why are moral characteristics so important in

2. Peristiany, J., «Honour and Shame in a Cypriot Highland Village», in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*. Ed. Peristiany, John. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1965, p. 21.

3. Campbell, John, *Honour, Family and Patronage*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, p. 268.

4. Ibid., p. 269.

assessing honourable behaviour? S. Hudson[1] offers several reasons which account for this:

Firstly, in a face to face community where people have lived most of their lives in close proximity, all details of their own and of their family's behaviour in the past and present are known. Secondly, in the past the material attributes of a family and/or individual were largely a matter of chance. Where property is divided equally among all the children, wealth will depend largely on demographic accidents and the point of time in the developmental cycle of the family. In an economy open to risks wealth may depend on good weather, well placed fields, lack of sickness and other factors largely outside a man's control.

On the other hand, a man is felt to be responsible for his moral character. To evaluate a man according to his moral worth is to evaluate what he himself controls. Thirdly, moral character which is evaluated by judgements rather than objective measurements, such as the number of fields, is most open to different interpretations. Lastly, the emphasis on morality can be used to illustrate the ideal equality of all men who are born morally equal even though they may be born into different material circumstances.

Davis[2] writes that honour is potentially an absolute ranking system. Each individual has a unique position which is based on material and moral characteristics as well as on family name.

Past family behaviour has an important bearing on present and future evaluation. The family name can be considered as a storage of honour which, to a large extent, is inherited.

The varieties of family role performances are sufficiently great and sufficiently public to account for the fine gradations of honour on the basis of which a traditional Greek makes an absolute discrimination among families.

Honour, therefore, is attributed primarily to domestic groups. The amount of honour an individual possesses is the amount of honour that his domestic group possesses. Inappropriate conduct of any member of the family reflects on all others.

Honour is continually assessed. As Campbell[3] writes, «honour is something most families are presumed to have but which they may very easily lose if they do not guard it with all their resources of courage and self-discipline». It is granted or taken away by members of the same class, mainly neighbours, who are not close kin but who are in a position to know how an individual performs his domestic roles. They evaluate and re-evaluate honourable conduct through gossip about personalities and events. As Campbell[4] writes, «gossip never ceases and it seizes on the pettiest of details and circumstances». The loss of honour by one family is of importance to other families not related by close ties of kinship because it validates and in some sense improves their status.

Before examining why honour is important to the individual I shall try to discuss briefly the notions of responsibility and morality in Greek social relationships.

The fact that the individual in Greece is always judged as the protagonist of his family proves that the Greek is not an autonomous individual because he cannot set up personal goals.

Concomitant with the absence of the idea of an autonomous individual is the absence of the very notion of individual responsibility. In Greek culture responsibility has meaning only within the context of fulfilling his obligations and preserving his loyalties to the family. The same could be said about morality. For instance, the moral commitment to tell the truth, not to deceive, derives from the social commitment to whom it is due. Lying is legitimate and praiseworthy where its object is the protection and advancement of family interests. This is what has been defined by Stirling[5] as personal morality, and by Banfield[6] as a moral familism.

Now why is honour important to the traditional Greek?

In an economy where many goods and services cannot be bought for cash, villagers depend on non-cash exchange in the idioms of help where a more specific contact is made. In most rural communities in Greece the fortune of the average farming family commonly has a history of instability and bankruptcy so that even today's richer farmers have had no chance to cement themselves into a distinct class nor to build up any sort of endogamy or separate kin groups. Nor are differences in wealth great enough to have made any sort of classification easy. Wealth was never considered to be unaccompanied by insecurity and impermanence. Survival often depended upon cooperation. Dependence was both on the community as a whole in the form of financial relief,

1. Hudson, Susan, in *Gifts and Poison*, ed. Bailey, G. F., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971, p. 48.
2. Davis, John, *Honour and Politics in Pisticci*. Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 1969, p. 80.
3. Campbell, John, op. cit., p. 272.
4. Ibid., p. 314.
5. Stirling, Paul, *Impartiality and Personal Morality. Contributions to Mediterranean Sociology*. Ed. Peristiany, John (Act. Med. Social Conf. 1963), Mouton and Co., Paris, The Hague, 1968, p. 51.
6. Banfield, E., *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, Glencoe, The Free Press, New York, 1958, p.10.

and on neighbours and relatives for help with labour etc. in time of need. The effect was that of a seesaw. One gave help when necessary because one never knew when it would be needed by oneself.

Blau[1] describes the essential features of social exchange as follows: An individual for whom a service has been performed is expected to return the service on another occasion. If he does, then the other is encouraged to offer further services and a bond is established between the two. If the first does not reciprocate then he is labelled as ungrateful: the failure to reciprocate involves a loss of credit and a loss of trust until eventually, as his reputation spreads, the offending individual is excluded from further exchanges. A person who is unable to return services on which he depends, places himself in a position of subordination to the other who provides the needed services. One who has the resources but declines to reciprocate demonstrates a refusal to acknowledge the other as his equal. The two general functions of social exchange are, then, to establish bonds of friendship or to establish superordination over others.

In helping others it is necessary to keep a balance between giving and receiving. A man who makes his help too obvious and refuses returns will be suspected of trying to become stronger. He may arouse fear and so not gain a good reputation. Individualism is the avoidance of contact with others. Independence is the ability to cooperate but to avoid being regularly in a receiving position and so becoming indebted. Hence, it is the reciprocity in cooperation which maintains independence. This kind of reciprocity is defined as balanced reciprocity.

Another kind of reciprocity is defined as asymmetrical reciprocity. This kind describes a patron-client exchange. The patron has access to specialised services or resources. He makes these available to another man. The recipient has no control over the specialised services and to repay his debt he gives esteem or political support.

The benefits involved in social exchange do not have any exact price in terms of a single quantitative medium of exchange. This means that those involved cannot precisely specify the worth of approval or help in the absence of a money price.

The basic distinction between social and purely economic exchange is, according to Blau,[2] that social exchange creates unspecified obligations. Since there is no way of ensuring an appropriate return for a favour, social exchange requires trusting others to discharge their obligations. In traditional rural Greece it is honour which provides the basis for the trustworthiness between the contracting parties.

Honour, therefore, is important to the traditional Greek because it is on the basis of the amount of honour that an individual possesses, that the recruitment of patrons, clients and friends takes place. As Davis[3] writes, honour is indispensable for the backing of informal contracts of the patron-client and/or friendship type because it provides a key to the relative trustworthiness between the contracting parties. Trustworthiness is important because through these contracts crucial goods and services are exchanged. Honourable conduct is a way of acquiring influential patrons and friends, thus increasing the amount of honour that one already possesses, which can be translated as greater access to resources and amelioration of one's socioeconomic position.

Patronage and friendship offer one of the main channels for social mobility in Greek society. This results in the depreciation of the part played by personal worth in the social system. People do not see success as the reward of hard work and the use of one's talents, but as the result of influential contacts or craftiness in manipulating social relationships.

As Boissevain[4] writes, patronage is a self-perpetuating system grounded in the value system of the society. Many of the conditions which give rise to the need for protection are simply the result of the successful operation of patronage.

I shall now examine the effect of intra-European migration on the value system of honour and shame that migrants carry with them. What I am arguing with regard to the possible changes that occur in Germany and upon return is based on personal evidence from the research I undertook in Rhodes and Corfu. However, I am treating the problem more for the sake of asking questions than of trying to answer them, since I believe that positive evidence can only be gathered through systematic research on the subject.

In his article «The formation of Ethnic Groups» J. R. Charsley[5] argues that a basic process in ethnic group formation is the one which evolves the creation, modification or selection of appro-

1. Quoted by Layton, Robert in *Gifts and Poison*, ed. Bailey G. F., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971, p. 48.
2. Ibid., p.102.
3. Davis, John, op. cit., p. 80.
4. Boissevain, J., Patronage in Sicily. *Man* (N.S.) 1966, p. 44.
5. Charsley, R. S., «The formation of ethnic groups» in *Urban Ethnicity*. Ed. A. Cohen, Tavistock Publications, London, 1974, p. 365.

priate categories of interaction by migrant groups in order to communicate with the host society. The categories of interaction, writes Charsley,[1] correspond to social identities borne by individuals. They are equally labelled according to recognised social identities that pre-date migration. The process can be thought of as consisting of a succession of proposals and acceptances or refusals of identities in interaction situations. I argue, therefore, that the identities that Greek migrants project based on appropriate familyrole performances, will be rejected by the host society, which has no knowledge of the value system of honour and shame. Instead, new values will be communicated to them. The extent to which the migrant will reform his idea of himself will depend on whether he will be able to relate the new values communicated to any definite role or institutional behaviour. The whole process will depend on which roles are made available by the host society, on which are accepted by the migrant and the extent to which migrants will learn to cope with the performance of new roles.

As Eisenstadt[2] writes, the process of learning and reformation of concepts is in some ways not unlike the basic process of an individual's socialization in any society.

Charsley[3] points out that the interactional system influences the arrangement of social relationships among migrants and is influenced by it. Since honour is of little relevance in interacting with the host society, we may conclude that this influences the arrangement of the social relationships of migrants in such a way as to diminish the importance of the patronage and friendship institutions.

The patterning of social relationships in such a way is also influenced by the socioeconomic position of migrants in West Germany.

Migrants in West Germany cannot judge whether someone is behaving in the way that his honour prescribes because quite often he is from another village or place and they do not know his exact socioeconomic position back home and they cannot easily detect it from external appearances since honour ranking is absolute. Therefore migrants in Western Germany have the possibility of projecting a different self from the one they are used to at home and one more in accordance with the new roles undertaken. On the other hand the time spent abroad is considered as a period of transition during which they aspire to change their socioeconomic status, not through the traditional institutions of patronage and friendship but through personal effort, that is to say hard work. The motivations of all migrants being the same, none are interested in observing the other's behaviour, whether it is honourable or not.

When migrants return to Greece honour continues to be of little relevance to them as a category of interaction with their fellow villagers. Returners tend to pay less attention to whether their conduct is honourable or not, because due to the money they bring back with them, or sometimes because of the simple fact that they have been to Germany, their claims to a new self, irrespective of family role performance, are accepted by their fellow villagers.

Emigration enhances the prestige of an individual although quite often his socioeconomic position remains the same. The money that is brought back helps to establish this enhanced prestige because it is invested in symbols of prestige, particularly consumption symbols.

One of the reasons which make the fellow villagers of migrants accept the non-relevance of honour as a category of interaction with them is that they have an interest in excluding them from the patron-client and friendship institutions which constitute for them the main access to resources and betterment of their socioeconomic positions.

Another reason is that their lack of influential contacts, due to their absence in Germany makes the returners unsuitable as potential clients, friends or patrons. On the other hand honourable conduct is not of as much importance to returners as before because their life chances do not entirely depend on it. Performance of family roles in the prescribed way is no longer considered the only possible way for social mobility.

Emigration, therefore, has the effect of making one category of people not entirely dependent for their advancement on the friendship and patron-client system.

The non-dependence of a category of people from the village society results in a decline in cultural consensus, as well as social control. The same effects are accentuated by the fact that emigration, together with tourism, as well as mass media, increases the cognitive knowledge of villagers. As Professor Stirling[4] writes, «In a large number of ways they do not share as they used to do the same socially created reality. Alternative models for action and for judgement of

1. Ibid., p. 365.
2. Eisenstadt, J. N., *The Absorption of Immigrants*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1954, p. 7.
3. Charsley, R. S., op. cit., p. 365.
4. Stirling, Paul, *Cause, Knowledge and Change. Turkish Village Revisited*. Unpublished article, p. 61.

action are known to exist, rules and customs become less specific and less mandatory, breaches of these more defensible and the area of tacit disagreements grows».

The fact that returners tend to pay less attention to honourable behaviour means that family roles become less self-generating for them; thus self ceases to be experienced as part of a system of group relatedness. Returners become more autonomous individuals, setting goals for themselves. The question is whether they become more or less responsible since they are not bound by their loyalties to the family and to the advancement of the family interests. Personal morality also has less meaning for them, since they tend to view the world less in terms of kin and non-kin.

d. political attitudes of returning migrants

I will try now to offer some hypotheses about the political attitudes of returning migrants on the basis of the same evidence I have used up to now, that is, interviews with returners in Rhodes and Corfu, as well as discussions with agriculturalists, social workers and local authorities.

Due to the lack of studies on the impact of immigration experience on the politicisation of Greek workers in Germany or in other Western European countries I will not be able to refer to any factors which have to do with the experience of migrants in the receiving countries and which might be relevant to the subject of my analysis.

As we have already mentioned, for a considerable number of returners in our sample the time spent at home is considered as a kind of holiday they take to look after their property, their family, and to consider the advantages of returning for good. This category of returners, as well as those who have settled permanently in their island, tend to experience the same kind of isolation, because although emigration results in enhancing their status among fellow villagers, quite often they discover that despite having raised their living standards they have not ameliorated their socioeconomic position at home and will have difficulty in doing so. The reason for this, as we have already explained, is that due to their absence abroad they have lost their network of influential contacts through which they could advance their interests. Also they find difficulty in reconstituting their networks, because having no access to resources they are not considered to be of interest as potential clients, friends or patrons.

Returners therefore tend to feel frustrated because they find themselves outside the patron-client and friendship system. To a certain extent this is understandable, because by being isolated they cannot advance their interests, but on the other hand their work in Germany makes them not entirely dependent on the patronage and friendship system for their economic and social advancement. Their small amount of money, if profitably invested, could give them an independent status. Also until a few years ago if things did not work well at home they could easily return back to Germany. It is therefore more their effort to remain traditional that makes them experience frustration. They feel that their society does not evaluate them as it should and does not reward their work as does Germany. They become disillusioned with social relationships and the value system that regulates these relationships. As a consequence, they tend to reject the value system of their society.

Intra-European migration also results in raising the aspirations of migrants. This is quite often manifested by the fact that returners complain that they cannot find any kind of job that corresponds to their new qualifications and pretensions.

The rise in expectations as well as belief in achievements of migrants results in a loss of the reference groups they had before emigration. What happens is that emigration makes visible to the migrants other more privileged groups. As F. Parkin[1] writes, the inability of the less privileged to see the more privileged is a protective strategy developed by those already resigned to a life of small rewards.

Returners, therefore, tend to experience what Allardt[2] defines as diffuse deprivation. Diffuse deprivation is a state of feeling which results when individuals lack normative reference groups, that is, groups with which to identify and from which to obtain their social norms and standards for social perception as well as comparative reference groups, that is, groups with which to compare themselves when they evaluate their status and their rewards.

The lack of comparative and normative reference groups makes migrants experience upon return a sense of uprootedness or uncertainty. We can therefore put forward the hypothesis that returners in rural areas will be apt, if mobilised, to join radical movements. This hypothesis is based on the theory of mass society.[3] According to this theory the supporters of radical movements are

1. Parkin, F., *Class Inequality and Political Order.* MacGibbon and Kee Ltd., Great Britain, 1974, p. 62.
2. Allardt, E., «Types of Protest and Alienation», *Mass Politics*, ed. E. Allardt and S. Rochan, The Free Press, New York, 1970, p. 57.
3. Ibid., p. 57.

described as uprooted and without ties to secondary groups, which in turn would bind the individual to the community or society at large.

Allardt[1] defines uprootedness or uncertainty as a type of alienation in which the individual does not clearly know what to believe, what rules to follow, what his position or motives are, how the situation is structured. According to Allardt, uprooted people can easily become mobilised, but their political activities are strongly expressive and unsystematic. Their political reactions consist less of systematic attempts to change the power structure then of a search for normative and comparison reference groups.

I should now like to put forward the hypothesis that it would be rather the middle peasants that would possibly transmit social unrest in rural areas and not the poor landless ones, the reason being that it is the middle peasants who keep a stake in the rural system and therefore it is among them that we find the greater number of returners either permanently settled or on holiday to look after their property and their family. Unlike this category, poor peasants, once abroad, tend to cut their ties with the land and try to amass as much capital as possible in order to settle independently upon return. Landless peasants, therefore, tend to remain more permanently abroad. E. Wolf writes about middle peasants that it is a common paradox that this stratum, which is the main bearer of peasant tradition, which is the most culturally conservative, which most depends on traditional social relations of kin and mutual aid among neighbours, is the most instrumental in dynamiting the peasant social order.[2] In the case of Greece what makes the category of middle peasants a possible transmitter of social unrest is that while retaining a foot in agriculture and trying to remain traditional they at the same time undergo the training of the industrial cities of Western Europe, which increases their vision of social groups and changes their value system.

From what we have pointed out up to now, intra-European emigration, at least of middle peasants, cannot be considered as a safety valve for Greece like other forms of migration, especially overseas and internal migration. Overseas migration, because of its permanent character, contributed in the past to the reduction of surplus labour in agriculture without creating further unemployment in the cities. Internal migration, on the other hand, does not create a category of uprooted people like intra-European migration. Internal migrants do not cut their links with the village, but adopt the role of intermediaries between that part of the family that has remained behind and a more privileged class in the cities. It contributes, therefore, to the maintenance and perpetuation of the patronage and friendship system.

1. Ibid., p. 57.

2. Wolf, E., *On Peasant Rebellions. Peasant Societies*. Ed. T. Shanin, Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1971, p. 270.

TABLE 1. *Educational Level of Greek Workers in Western Germany (1963), as Compared to Educational Level of Total Greek Population* (Percentage Distribution)*

(Census of 1961)

Educational level	Greek Workers in Western Germany 1963			Greek Population 1961		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
Primary School	80.5	78.0	79.0	86.2	91.4	88.9
(Unfinished)	(31.4)	(43.4)	(36.0)	(34.8)	(56.5)	(46.1)
(Finished)	(49.1)	(34.6)	(43.0)	(51.4)	(34.9)	(42.8)
Secondary Education	15.6	16.1	16.0	10.0	7.1	8.5
Higher Education	1.6	2.4	2.0	3.3	0.9	2.0
No answer	2.3	3.5	3.0	0.5	0.6	0.6

* 15 years and older

Source: E. Vlachos, *Worker Migration to Western Europe*, paper presented at the Fifth National Convention of the American Association for the advancement of Slavic Studies, Dallas, Texas, 1972, p. 19.

TABLE 2. *Return Migration to Greece*

Year	Total	Men	Women	Germany	Men	Women
1969	18,132	9,489	8,643	9,093	4,919	4,174
1970	22,665	12,284	10,381	11,553	6,531	5,022
1971	24,709	13,531	11,178	11,803	6,763	5,040
1972	27,522	15,088	12,434	13,535	7,623	5,912
1973	22,285	12,210	10,075	11,539	6,541	4,998
1974	24,476	13,597	10,879	15,414	8,665	6,749
1975	34,214	18,421	15,793	24,534	13,206	11,328

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Greece*, 1969-1976.

TABLE 3. *Emigration to Germany*

Year	Rhodes	Corfu
1963	666	689
1964	662	1,221
1965	757	1,007
1966	494	578
1967	18	10
1968	236	595
1969	672	875
1970	540	910
1971	240	387
1972	82	179
1973	42	28

Source: Ministry of Work.

TABLE 4. *Return Migration from Germany*

Year	Rhodes	Corfu
1971	58	171
1972	138	173
1973	208	149

Source: Ministry of work.
1971 census: Population of Rhodes = 70,110
" " Corfu = 90,680