


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D. H. Lawrence – Bertrand Russell

*Their short «hectic» friendship and
commitment to social reform*

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The social instinct poses present man with complex questions. Both D. H. Lawrence and Bertrand Russell, the «pariah» novelist and the active philosopher, have responded to most of the controversies with acute sensitivity. As Raymond Williams observes, «what were seen at the end of the nineteenth century as disparate interests between which a man must choose and in the act of choice declare himself poet or sociologist, were, normally, at the beginning of the century seen as interlocking interests».

This paper attempts to connect two great names which, despite a period of attachment to each other, have been standing apart in our consciousness as representing two antipodal attitudes to socio-political problems. Notwithstanding the disparity of their conclusions they converge into establishing a most important truth, the recognition of duality in life, a reality which is gaining new force in our times.

Since «the permanent and the transitory have to be distinguished afresh by each generation»,¹ in our disorientated times the writer is a major figure in moulding our ideological growth. «To him have we turned for the help that we seem unable to get from the traditional sources of state and school and church.»² The shift of focus is not to be lamented since the range and depth of a sensitive writer enables his reader to discriminate against the grossness of a subtle propagandist.

«Today everything is changed,» Camus writes, «and even silence has dangerous implications.»³ The question is not so much whether a modern writer imposes or not his own vision of life on the reader but whether the writer's true message can be revealed through a tangle of misconceptions and misjudgements. «One becomes weary of being slandered», D. H. Lawrence regrets.

Both Lawrence and Russell⁴ attacked each other vigorously. One can discern though the

1. T. S. Eliot, *The Literature of Politics*, C. P. C. No. 146 (London, 1955), p. 17.

2. *The Politics of the Twentieth Century Novelists*, edited by Panichas (New York, 1971), p. xxix.

3. *Ibid.*, p. xxvi.

4. B. Russell (1872-1970) by birth and education a whig aristocrat, is a scientific and rationalist philosopher in the English empirical tradition of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume. He was brought up in a wealthy household and educated privately till he went to Cambridge.

D. H. Lawrence (1885-1930), the son of a miner, was educated at a national primary school and provincial grammar school and university college. He belongs to a tradition of working-class culture which goes back to the mystical, heterodox Puritans and 'mechanic -preachers' of the seventeenth century. From *The Politics of the Twentieth Century Novelists*, «D. H. Lawrence», by Vivian de Sola Pinto, p. 31.

formative influence they exerted on each other in their brief but «hectic» relationship. To go beyond the factual reality, one should transcend not only their personal abuses but also the whole range of critics following them who have been referring exclusively to their bitter comments.

Lawrence and Russell met in their belief that «there was something important to be said about the reform of human relations», as Russell confirms in his autobiography. The World War of 1914 shook both the «mystagogic poet» and «the mathematic logician» into an imperative necessity to «awaken people to their deeper needs».¹

On February 12, 1915, in his first letter to Russell, Lawrence urges,

I write to say to you that we must start a solid basis of freedom of actual living—not only of thinking. We must provide another standard than the pecuniary standard, to measure all daily life by. ...There must be a revolution in the state. It shall begin by the nationalising of all industries and means of communication in one fell blow. Then a man shall have his wages whether he is sick or well or old—if anything prevents his working he shall have his wages just the same... all dispossessed owners shall receive a proportionate income—no capital recompense for the space of say fifty years. Something like this must be done. It is no use of saying a man's soul should be free, if his boots hurt him so much he can't walk. But we shall smash the frame. Then only shall we begin living... Till then we are fast within the hard, unliving impervious shell.²

Lawrence sounds in this letter like a committed revolutionist of our times, expressing the socialism of a man like Morris. «There can be little doubt that he and Morris, would have felt alike about much that has subsequently passed for socialism».³ Raymond Williams comments.

Russell writes on the question of land property,

«It is a singular example of human inertia that men should have continued until now to endure the tyranny and exhortation which a small minority are able to inflict by the possession of land... If men were reasonable, they would decree that it should cease tomorrow, with no compensation beyond a moderate life income to the present holders.»⁴

1. Mary Freeman, *D. H. Lawrence, a basic study of his ideas* (New York, 1955), p. 84.

2. D. H. Lawrence's *Letters to Bertrand Russell*, edited by Harry T. Moore (New York, 1948), pp. 30, 34.

3. Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society 1780-1950* (Penguin, 1963), p. 209.

4. B. Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London, 1927), p. 216.

David Cavitch focusing on Lawrence's phrase «in one fell blow» dismissed the latter's point of view on nationalisation, as «cavalierly voiced proposals» and «naïve». The same critic refers to B. Russell as «analytically minded» and «familiar with the complexities of economics as viewed by his friends John M. Keynes», without minding Russell's statement that land property «should cease tomorrow». Schematic ways of expressions ought to be taken for what they are, mere emphatic pronouncements.

When they met, Lawrence was twenty-nine years old, Russell was forty-three. «I liked Lawrence's fire. I liked the energy and passion of his feelings. I liked his belief that something fundamental was needed to put the world right.»⁵ Russell refers to Lawrence in his autobiography. They both felt enthusiastic about the need for social regeneration, so they set out to work together. Russell moulded in the tough reality of political pragmatism was unshaken in his firm belief in the nucleus of a few persons as an upstart of a wide reform. He referred to socialism, a movement started only by a few isolated theorists, and the successful cause of women's emancipation, once regarded «a crank's crusade», as convincing examples against the creed of the irrationality of politics. All the same, he forewarned, «those who wish to gain the world by thought must be content to lose it as a support in the present».⁶

Lawrence very much in the same line suggests fervently, «it is not our wickedness that kills us but our unbelief».⁷ He wrote passionate letters;

February 16, 1915 (to Russell)

...so a vision of a better life must include a revolution of society. And one must fulfil one's vision as much as possible... If people all turn into stone or pillars of salt one must still talk to them...⁸

March 15, 1915 (to Russell)

...I wish you would swear a sort of allegiance with me.⁹

July 6, 1915 (to Russell)

...Are you doing the lectures. I have dropped writing my philosophy but I go on working very hard in my soul. I shall lift my voice in the autumn in connection with you, not apart.¹⁰

September 5, 1915 (to Russell)

...We are going to start a little paper...¹¹

September 5, 1915 (to Lady Cynthia Asquith)

5. Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography*, Vol. 11, 1914-1944 (London, 1971), p. 20.

6. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London, 1927), p. 226.

7. *The Collected Letters of D. H. Lawrence*, edited with an Introduction by Harry T. Moore, Vol. I (London, 1970), p. 342.

8. D. H. Lawrence's *Letters to B. Russell*, edited by Harry T. Moore (New York, 1948), pp. 36, 37.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

11. D. H. Lawrence's *Letters to B. Russell*, edited by Harry T. Moore (New York, 1948), p. 55.

...You must subscribe and find one or two people who care about the real living truth of things, for God's sake not people who only trifle and not care. I'm going to do the preaching-sort of philosophy—the beliefs by which one may reconstruct the world.¹

October 14, 1915 (to Lady Cynthia Asquith)

...I don't want the Signature (the periodical) to be a success. I want it only to rally together a few passionate constructive people.²

Is this «fatuous correspondence» and «shedding of thousands of ideas at random over the situation?»³ But then there is no political fight which has not been a romantic entertainment in its conception. The failed effort has been repeatedly sanctified,

Wer immer strebend sich anstrengt
denn können wir erlösen,

Goethe pronounces in his *Faust*.

Russell's and Lawrence's plans to raise their voice on social reform together in the Winter of 1915 fell through, yet before they parted negative-constructive criticism had been exchanged between them, which came out as a living force.

Russell confesses in his autobiography,

«I did in fact acquire a certain stimulus from him (Lawrence), and the book⁴ that I wrote, in spite of his blasts of denunciation, was better than it would have been if I had not known him.»

Lawrence asked persistently for Russell's unsparing comments on his work.

February 26, 1915 (to B. Russell)

... I wish you'd tell me when I am foolish and over insistent... I don't want you to put up with my talk when it is foolish because you think perhaps it is passionate.⁵

1. *The Collected Letters of D. H. Lawrence*, edited by Harry T. Moore (London, 1970), p. 364.

Aldous Huxley confirms that Lawrence could not help feeling «profoundly responsible» for the evils and miseries of the society he fled from, and Raymond Williams refers to Lawrence as being «deeply committed, all his life, to the idea of reforming society». Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society 1870-1950* (Penguin Books, 1963), p. 203.

2. *The Collected Letters of D. H. Lawrence*, edited by Harry T. Moore (London, 1970), p. 370.

3. Richard Aldington, *Portrait of a Genius but...* (The life of D. H. Lawrence 1885-1930) (London, 1950), p. 153.

4. The book, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, which came out of Russell's lectures in the beginning of 1916, «was something of a landmark» in his career and «it is still of outstanding importance». Allan Wood, *Bertrand Russell, The Passionate Sceptic* (London, 1957), p. 92.

5. *D. H. Lawrence's Letters to B. Russell*, edited by Harry T. Moore (New York, 1948), pp. 70, 71.

and on June 8, 1915

...I send you the first quarter of my philosophy. I depend on you to help me with it... help me and tell me where I can say the things better.

Lawrence came from a working-class background where uncouth rows and entire lack of privacy were balanced by the giving of comfort, the open making up and a strong communal feeling. He considered hate as salutary and honest as love and abusive language acceptable within a whole attachment.⁶ He wrote to Russell,

September 14, 1915

The article you sent me is a plausible lie, and I hate it. ...What you want is jab and strike like the soldier with the bayonet, only you are sublimated with words... Let us become strangers again.⁷

Russell in his autobiography refers to the «devastating effect» this letter had upon him, his contemplation of suicide just then, and finally his decision «to have done with such morbidness».

Lawrence, however, admits with revelatory straightforwardness in his next letter,

November 17, 1915

...my quarrelling with you was largely a quarrelling with something in myself, something I was struggling away from in myself.

and to another friend in very much the same tone.

September 9, 1915

Russell and I have parted for a little while, but it is only in the natural course. The real development continues even in its negation under the winter.

It would be rather superficial to ascribe the survival of their relationship to «parental instinct» on Russell's side and «tenderness» on Lawrence's part, as Harry T. Moore does with some reservation (he says, «perhaps»)⁸. A friendship described as that seems too circumscribed and uninspired to do any credit to the calibre and nerve of the two men. It gives falsely a picture of no dimension.

6. Russell acknowledges to a friend that aristocratic, traditional and disciplined background, such as they had, might trammel «the primitive free instincts which give rigour and creativeness to such men as D. H. Lawrence for instance», admitting all the same the feeling of selfassurance and responsibility to public affairs with which his class has endowed him. *The Early Memoirs of Lady Ottoline Morrell*, edited by R. Cuthowe-Hardy (London, 1963), p. 292.

7. *D. H. Lawrence's Letters to Russell*, edited by Harry T. Moore (New York 1948), pp. 59, 60.

8. *D. H. Lawrence's Letters to B. Russell*, edited by Harry T. Moore (New York, 1948), p. 11.

Apart from the fact that Lawrence himself refers to «real development» even in the time of «negation», he would not consider anything less than a true and vital relatedness.

He urges,

Men must get into touch and to do so they must forfeit the vanity and the noli me tangere of their own absoluteness.¹

and elsewhere,

I call it helping people to have faith... I do believe in it. We are so egoistic that we are ashamed of ourselves out of existence. One ought to have faith in what ultimately is, then one can bear at least the unpleasant things which one is en route.²

Lawrence abhorred the superficial and the sensational in human relations. He does not spare some young people he has met his harsh criticism,

They are cased each in a hard little shell of his own and out of this they talk words. There is never for one second any outgoing of feeling and no reverence, not a crumb or a grain of reverence... I will not have people like this—I had rather be alone.³

Harry T. Moore suggests that the quarrel between D. H. Lawrence and B. Russell can be described as one «between emotion and reason». It is true that eloquent passages in the writings of both men can testify to this interpretation. Yet, there is no reason why we should elaborate on a preconceived categorical classification—instinct and reason—of Lawrence and Russell when they themselves proceed to undercut the impression their dominant nature gives and acknowledge the existence of an opposed polarity.

Lawrence feels that the intense and overwhelming sovereignty of mind had desiccated the vitality of the roots of instinctive life. He fights to restore the balance. An emotionally educated man, Lawrence believes, is as «rare as a Phoenix». There is a series of portrayals of shrivelled «Idea-mongers» in his writings. He is always full of scathing for the cerebral avidity of self-conscious personality in facile witty and irresponsible talk and he grins at the prospect of a scientific «fair-and-square» world. He talks of the middle class as diseased, saddled with mental conceit and constantly straining to cover-up or

distort deep real emotions.⁴ Yet, in his essay on Human Destiny, he writes explicitly, «Man has a mind and ideas, so it is just puerile to sigh for innocence and naive spontaneity... Emotions by themselves become just a nuisance. The mind by itself becomes just a sterile thing, making everything sterile... You've got to marry the pair of them».⁵

Russell would not so promptly accept his being referred to just as «an apostle of intellect and reason», since he clearly states, «If it is supposed that I dislike strong emotion or that I think anything except emotion can be a cause of action then I most emphatically deny the charge».⁶

He considers problematic the fact that, dominant as the life of impulse is in all our activities, it is trivialised; continuously thwarted spontaneous impulses in this case will result in lack of vitality or issue in blind and cruel actions, he believes.

There is no clash whatever between Lawrence and Russell over the latter's view that «instinct, intuition or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or refutes».⁷

Unfortunately Lawrence made use of a rather equivocal term to refer to the deep flowing impulsive life, the pristine creative centre which, opposed to the mental consciousness, had been silenced for too long, and claimed recognition as a second centre of consciousness, «the blood-consciousness»; this term has been traduced as «blood cult of Rosenberg»⁸ and travestied as «rubbish»,⁹ «sexual morbidity»¹⁰ or «emotional

4. Lawrence is poignantly aware of a polarity in his life, when he is confronted with the problem of his belonging to a social class. He deeply feels the beauty of the outflowing warmth, the generosity and the passion of the working class people. «I cannot for anything in the world forfeit my passionate consciousness and my old blood affinity with my fellow men... for that other thin, spurious mental conceit, which is all that is left of the mental consciousness once it has made itself expulsive», he says. [Lawrence on Education, edited by Joy and R. Williams (Penguin, 1973), pp. 20-21.] On the other hand he cannot submit to the limitation of the narrow outlook, prejudice and limited scope of ideas of the working class people: «one can belong to no class», he regrets.

5. D. H. Lawrence on Education, edited by Joy and Raymond Williams (Penguin, 1973), p. 217.

6. Bertrand Russell, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (London, 1957), p. 11. Russell in the ethical sphere agreed with Hume's dictum, «Reason is and ought to be the slave of passions». Bertrand Russell, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (London, 1954), p. 8.

7. Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic, and Other Essays* (London, 1970), p. 17.

8. V. S. Pritchett, *The Living Novel* (London, 1946), p. 132.

9. Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography*, Vol. 11, 1914-1944 (London, 1971), p. 22.

10. F. R. Leavis, D. H. Lawrence, *Novelist* (Penguin, 1970), p. 22.

1. Colin Clarke, *River of Dissolution*, D. H. Lawrence and English Romanticism (London, 1969), p. 105.

2. Middleton Murray, *Reminiscences of D. H. Lawrence* (London, 1936), p. 51.

3. *The Collected Letters of D. H. Lawrence*, edited with an introduction by Harry T. Moore, Vol. 1 (London, 1970), p. 332.

disease».¹ Russell comments in his autobiography, «He (Lawrence) had a mystical philosophy of 'blood' which I disliked», and «I rejected it vehemently though I did not then know that it lead straight to Auschwitz».² This statement has been made an easy reference for all the sequence of critics who would name Lawrence a pre-fascist and applaud Russell's «correct» insight.

With the wisdom of hindsight one did not need special perspicacity to diagnose signs of fascism in the works of many writers after the first world war. On the contrary, «it became a fashionable pastime in Britain».³ It is interesting to refer here to the fact that when Shakespeare's *Coriolanus* was produced in Paris, in the late thirties, the audience reacted riotously, «The communists believed that the play was a libel on the proletariat, the fascists thought it was a satire on dictatorship».⁴ This can remind us that a work of art may be made to seem to support conflicting political doctrines.

It is difficult to explain why Russell let himself adopt the suggested view on Lawrence's supposed pre-fascist «blood-cult». We might assume that Russell did not come to terms with Lawrence's merciless, though well-meant, criticism, which became scathing under the name of Sir Joshua, posing as «the learned dry baronet of fifty», «who was always making witticisms and laughing at them in a harse horse laugh», the stiff bodied «elderly sociologist» «whose mental fibre was so tough as to be insentient». (*Women in Love*) Lawrence's artistic vein would not spare his friends the caricaturing. Perhaps Russell's resentment struck back as fiercely.

It is of more importance to us to realise that within the political ferment of this period, in the midst of influential acquaintances primarily concerned with public life, Lawrence the novelist absorbed new experiences; these he transmuted into alternating social tableau in his book *Women in Love*, and critical political thought in his discursive essays and post-war novels, *Aaron's Rod*, *Kangaroo* and *Plumed Serpent*, dissecting mystical-political leadersip.⁵ «These novels are

less cohesive than most of his other work, though more richly coloured than any of the rest.»⁶

In the brief period Lawrence and Russell stayed antagonistically together, they confirmed each other in a common vision, their «quest for a new social certainty, which gained in clarity force and dimension as it proceeded. They pursued and worked their vision out, each in his own way.

«We shall unite in our knowledge of God—not perhaps in our expression of God», Lawrence wrote to a friend. Lawrence and Russell did; in a time of still unadmitted, faint throbbings of new life which they brought forth into consciousness.

Raymond Williams commenting on the response of sensitive minds to the implications of the early industrial period makes the following remark. «The growth of the new society was so confusing even to the best minds, that positions were drawn in terms of inherited categories which they revealed unsuspected and even opposing implications. There was much overlapping, even in the opposite positions... The effort which men had to make, to comprehend and to affirm was indeed enormous; and it is the effort the learning in experience which is important for us to know.»⁷

It is in this light that it would be worth considering the lines of argument D. H. Lawrence and Bertrand Russell followed in regard to social reform, starting from a common point and gravitating to one belief even when drifting apart in their proposals.

The unifying principle to which they both pay their utmost tribute is *the principle of growth*.⁸ They abide by Heracleitos's «Τὰ πάντα ρεῖ» and

6. Graham Hough, *The Dark Sun, A Study of D. H. Lawrence* (London, 1956), p. 90.

7. Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society 1780-1950* (London, 1963), pp. 38-39.

8. Both Lawrence and Russell have admitted the process of change as development in their own personal lives.

Russell writes, «My philosophical development can be divided into various stages according to the problems with which I have been concerned and the men whose work has influenced me. There is only one constant preoccupation, I have throughout been anxious to discover, how much we can be said to know and with what degree of certainty or doubtfulness». Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development* (London, 1959), p. 11.

Lawrence also asserts, «while we live we change, and our flowering is a constant change. But once we fall into a state of egoism, we cannot change. The ego, the self-conscious ego, remains fixed... And we are then safe inside the mundane egg of our self-consciousness and esteem». D. H. Lawrence, *The Crown, Selection from Phoenix* (Peregrine, 1971), p. 441. Misconception of this statement by thinking of Lawrence as «a Protean» can be easy; Lawrence illustrates superbly the constancy of an unchanging element in differentiated forms of being through his image of diamond and coal, both of which consist of carbon. It is the immutable carbon he looks for with an intensity that disquiets the relaxed reader.

1. Ibid., p. 27.

2. Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography*, Vol. II, 1914-1944 (London, 1971).

3. Robert Lucas, *Frieda Lawrence* (London, 1973), p. 27.

4. Kenneth Muir, *Shakespeare's Tragic Sequence* (London, 1972), p. 175.

5. In his Reith Lectures (1948) Russell states, «Artists, and writers are nowadays almost the only people who may with luck exercise a powerful and important initiative as individuals and not in connection with some group». *Authority and the Individual* (London, 1970), p. 96.

serve to «a continual fashioning of fresh needs by the impulse which is life and which alone gives unity to the process».¹ Russell considers hankering after power in its possessive form an evil in itself and offers as an alternative his firm belief in «development without dominion». Lawrence declares as the tenet of a new morality, «the bringing forth of an everchanging, ever-unfolding creation, in the service of which ideals become instrumental, since *«Life is more than any idea»*».² He does not hesitate to accept that the principle of growth entails fight and hatred since the unknown issue of life always thrusts itself forward to break through the acknowledged forms and come into being. «There will always be hate and conflict», Lawrence writes in a concluding note on Russell's manuscript of his 1915 socio-political lectures, «It is a principle of growth: every bud must burst its cover and the cover doesn't want to be burst. But let our hatred and conflict be really part of our vital growth, the outcome of our growing, not of our desire for sensation.»³

No doubt this is a most dangerous concept of religion, open to misconception and liable to hubris; it needs the courage and the reverence of a brave soul to unravel to its full capacity of growth and to pay homage all along to the creative unknown around. It also implies that a precarious balance between polarised ends has to be maintained since both ends will claim acknowledgement.

«In the duality lies fulfilment»,⁴ Lawrence emphatically asserts, and Russell does not recoil from the deep duality in ethics «which however perplexing», as he admits, «demands recognition.»⁵ It is at this juncture that both the artist and the mathematical philosopher meet as two seekers of the truth.

Ever since Luther asserted the right of private judgement to oppose collective judgement, the individual emerging as a new potential unit has called for validity. The unimpeded growth of the individual, even at the cost of long established norms, became the primary interest for Russell and Lawrence; yet the solutions they offer to the form of the organic re-integration of the new man

in modern society diverge to a large degree.⁶

In the beginning of our century they both looked into the State, Industry and private Property, the School, Marriage and the Church, as institutionalised units, and found them unrewarding to the modern individual, since they had grown «in some measure hostile to life».⁷

«While the belief in Authority was alive», Russell writes, «free co-operation was compatible with inequality and subjection»,⁸ now our institutions should be so fundamentally changed as to embody that new respect for the individual and his rights.»⁹ Russell believes the balance is still tilted on the side of Authority and he aims at diminishing the power of the State, which, being a vast organisation and a sham democracy, manufactures and manipulates public opinion to feed the State's greed for power. Minorities and weaker nations are being exploited for the same reason, while the established rights of the privileged remain safe with their tutular and servant, the State.

The problem of the «taming of power» was one which Russell always recognised and to which he continually returned. But he did not manage to strike the right balance between authority and freedom. He points out in 1948, «Between those who care for social cohesion and those who value primarily individual initiative, there has been an age long battle ever since the time of the ancient Greeks. In every such perennial controversy there is sure to be truth on both sides; there is not likely to be a clear-cut solution, but at best one involving various adjustments and compromises».¹⁰

Russell would like to see the industrial associative Guilds federated in a congress which would be of equal standing with a Parliament selected on constituency basis.¹¹ Devolution of power would thus counter-balance the remote authority of the State. «There is a traditional objection to

6. As Raymond Williams puts it, «It is unlikely to reach an agreed end in our thinking but it is difficult to know where else to begin. We have only the melancholy evidence of powerful and clashing movements that begin elsewhere. When this is so, every renewed affirmation counts». Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society 1780-1950* (Penguin, 1963), p. 208.

7. B. Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London, 1927), p. 65.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

10. Bertrand Russell, *Authority and the Individual* (The Reith Lectures) (London, 1970), p. 119.

11. Russell elaborates on Guild socialism (thought of by Cole) in his book *Roads to Freedom, 1918*. Raymond Williams comments, «The Guild Socialists failed in their effort to extend this (associative life) over society as a whole, but their emphasis was and remains creative and indispensable», *Culture and Society 1780-1950*, p. 191.

1. B. Russell, *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* (London, 1970), p. 24.

2. *Lawrence in Education*, edited by Joy and Raymond Williams (Penguin, 1973), On Human Destiny, p. 221.

3. D. H. Lawrence's *Letters to Bertrand Russell*, edited by Marry Moore (New York, 1948), p. 95.

4. D. H. Lawrence, *Selected Essays* (Penguin, 1972), Love, p. 29.

5. Bertrand Russell, *Authority and the Individual* (The Reith Lectures) (London, 1970), p. iii.

every imperium in imperio», he says, «but this is only the jealousy of the tyrant.»¹ Nevertheless, he admits the fact that some of the State functions ought to be extended so as to cope first with glaring economic injustices by the nationalisation of land property and large enterprises of national interest.

Despite his acclaiming individual freedom, Russell asserts that the organised life of a community with modern industrial and scientific technique is indispensable as mechanism, «not something to be valued of its own account». At an international level «anarchy is even more dangerous as between highly organised nations than as between individuals within a nation».²

Lawrence disapproves of anarchy for the same reason that he turns down the democratic ideal. «A democracy is found in the end to be obscene», he declares, «for it is composed of myriad dis-united fragments, each fragment assuming to itself a false wholeness, a false individuality.» At this point we are confronted with a major contradiction in Lawrence. Though he trains and continually urges the individual to stand by his own soul, he ultimately mistrusts the average person's capability to become self-integrated,³ and follow his own deepest flow of life. Instead, Lawrence sees each separate little ego becoming «an independent little principality by itself», on false presumptions. In this case, he believes, men should be prepared to participate in a collective wholeness of a hierarchical society where each part would be organic and vital.

His structure of society is pyramidal on the basis of the inequality of power. «Men are powerful or powerless, more or less. We know not how or why. But it is so. And the communion of power will always be a communion of inequality».⁴ Lawrence writes. The word inequality at this point should not disconcert us.⁵ Law-

rence acknowledges as powerful only those people who do not seek power; the will to obtain power, the desire of one man to dominate his fellow man, this is «the great serpent to destroy», he emphatically asserts.

Lawrence refers to the aristocracy and the elected leader of his ideal society as people who accept their status in deep responsibility since power rushes into them as life from the unknown. They should all be initiated in the mystery of creation, subjected only to their reverence for «the incalculable life gesture». If it comes that the ever successive leader abuses his own power in hubris, then his flame will be finally consumed by those who have yielded to his charisma, and justifiably so. At this juncture Lawrence considers the modern dilemma of «being distorted by power or left hanging without power».

Lawrence does not seem to notice that it takes an integrated individual to know how to recognise and then yield to his superior in «power». His scheme of hierarchical society built on the modern semi-coherent man is bound to assume a rigorous form of despotism, which he disclaims in the first place. His pyramidal social structure may be criticised as utopic and mystic; yet his negative analysis of modern democracy remains profound and piercing.

In his fiction Lawrence wavers between submitting his ego to a natural leader or rejecting him and standing faithful to his own supreme individuality. Finally relatedness becomes, we could say, an absolute for Lawrence, as a social prerequisite;⁶ therefore he attempts to maintain a precarious balance between polarised entities on some meeting-ground. In the following paragraphs, Don Ramon, a priest-like political leader, refers to this meeting point, symbolically as a Morning Star. «And the star that is between three people, and is their meeting ground, shall not be betrayed. And the star that is between all men and all women, and between all children of men, shall not be betrayed. Whosoever betrays another man, betrays a man like himself, a frag-

1. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London, 1957), p. 73.

2. Bertrand Russell, *Freedom and Organisation* (London, 1968), p. 41.

3. Russell also notices that self-knowledge is side-tracked. It seems, he observes, «...men desire to enslave others more than they desire to free themselves». (*Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 230). The result is most people ignore their potential, let their will betray their impulse and finally become a tool for the fulfilment of the will of others. This truth does not seem to make Russell despair. He never stops urging the individual to resolve the inner conflicts of impulses or desires, avoiding subjectivism and morbid absorption in his own emotions, so that he may finally connect with the life of others towards an objective end.

4. D. H. Lawrence, *A Selection from Phoenix*, Blessed are the Powerful (Peregrine Books, 1971), p. 511.

5. Raymond Williams comments on a passage by Lawrence

about equality, in this way. «This seems to me to be the best thing that has been written about equality in our period.» *Culture and Society 1750-1950* (Penguin, 1963), p. 210. Lawrence asserts in this passage that there is no need of comparison between two different people, «there is only this strange recognition of present otherness». If we depart from our intrinsic being into the material, mechanical order then equality or inequality comes in.

6. «I think societal instinct much deeper than sex instinct and societal repression much more devastating. ...I am weary even of my individuality and simply nauseated by other people's», Lawrence admits in one of his letters. D. H. Lawrence, *Selected Letters* (Penguin books, 1971), p. 164.

ment. For if there is no star between a man and a man, or even a man and a wife, there is nothing. But whosoever betrays the star that is between him and another man, betrays all and all is lost to the traitor. Where there is no star and no abiding place, nothing is, so nothing can be lost.»¹

A common belief can sustain and bring about the integration of a community; both Lawrence and Russell seem to subscribe to this unifying truth. Yet, we are well aware of the difficulty of a total social interest including and reconciling all individual integration.

Russell names as our common enemy, the love of possession, explicit in the status of money as the ultimate test of success in life and, implicit in subtle forms of possessiveness within education, marriage and religion.

«All our political thought, Imperialist, Radical or Socialist, continues to occupy itself exclusively with men's economic desires as though they had real importance», he says. The present economic structure encourages the maximisation of profit and the fact that people mutilate their nature to come up to the set standards of success does not allow any systematic antimanipulation campaigns by the enlightened of our times because they themselves have been trapped. Life is exhausted of emotion, pinned down to fixed purposes that drain all freshness of thought.

The chief test of an economic system, according to Russell, is not whether it increases prosperity or secures distributive justice, though both are desirable, but whether it does not shrink man into a lifeless agent, deprived of whatever creative initiative in a vast organisation where the impersonal employer dictates everything. The only solution would be the re-organisation of industry in an industrial federation consisting of autonomous units where the voice of each voluntary member would carry weight in the management. Russell recognises the difficulty of handling this problem but he feels a partial solution should not be ignored for the merit of some beneficial effects.

Lawrence is acutely aware of the fact that money, and money standards have turned us into traitors of life. His pungent irony about money at

the price of freedom is vented in his brilliant poem «Wages». Here are some stanzas from it:

The work-cash-want circle is the vicious circle
that ever turned men into fiends.

Earning a wage is a prison occupation
and a wage earner is a sort of gaol-bird
Earning a salary is a prison overseer's job,
a gaoler instead of a gaol-bird.

Living on your income is grandly strolling
outside the prison
in terror lest you have to go in. And
since the work prison covers
almost every scrap of the living earth,
you stroll up and down,
on a narrow beat, about the same as a prisoner
taking his exercise.

This is called universal freedom.²

As Russell puts it, «The wish to plunder others is recognised, in theory, to be bad; but the fear of being plundered is little better. Yet these two motives between them dominate the nine tenths of politics and private life».³

Both Lawrence and Russell see clearly the «glaring economic injustices»,⁴ in the present system and advocate re-distribution of wealth through nationalisation of land and the restriction of capitalist enterprise. Actually they regard the restoration of justice by law as non-problematic compared to the fact that the goal of a materialistic utopia has become so absorbing that people have lost their souls over it.

The Gospel line, «Take no thought, saying what shall we eat? or what shall we drink? or where withal shall we be clothed?» becomes an alternative guide line for a noble and free life, very appealing to both Lawrence and Russell. However, man's strongest need remains the need for security which he purchases at the price of

2. D. H. Lawrence, *A Collection of Critical Essays*, edited by Mark Spilka (New Jersey, 1963), p. 139.

3. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London, 1927), p. 237.

4. Lawrence writes in a letter, «I read with shame of the miners' 'hampers' and the 'Fund'. It is a nice thing to make them live on charity and crumbs of cake, when what they want is manly independence. The whole scheme of things is unjust and rotten, and money is just a disease on humanity».

Russell believes that private property has no justification except historically through the power of sword, and he even questions the validity of inheritance as an established natural right.

1. D. H. Lawrence, *The Plumed Serpent* (Penguin Books, 1973), p. 347. Lawrence writes to friends of his in the same spirit, «We are co-believers first. And in our oneness of belief lies our oneness. There is no bond anywhere. I am not bound to agree with you nor you with me. We are not bound even to like each other: that is as it comes. But we gravitate to one belief, and that is our destiny which is beyond choice. And in this destiny we are together». D. H. Lawrence, *Selected Letters* (Penguin, 1971), p. 99.

his freedom.¹ For the moment it is only the marginal minority who can disregard the fearful orthodox belief that «to abjure money is to abjure life». Despite this truth, Lawrence and Russell have blatantly exposed the spurious penny value and in doing so they have balanced the respect we owe to the unacknowledged creativity of impulsive life.

They were also both concerned about the inconsistency of most educationalists as idealists who cultivated habits against life, acclaiming social climbing and concealing the actual inequalities since those who succeeded were on the way to profit by the system, all the time «fawning and cringing before industrialism and materialism»,² as Lawrence puts it.

Russell doubts the validity of educational institutions which have exploited their power as formative political establishments to recruit students to the creeds they foster. He believes a departure from complete freedom is unavoidable since «education is essentially constructive and it requires some positive conception of what constitutes a good life».³ Nevertheless, the only way authority can be tempered when seeking to «mould» the young, is to cultivate respect towards «all that lives and especially human beings». It does not follow that one should acquiesce to the opinion of others but at least comprehend by imaginative apprehension the grounds for opposition. This entails the risk of «good form», as a superficial open-mindedness and readiness to hear all sides with hidden indifference and underlying inflexibility which is in itself dead, incapable of growth.

No institution inspired by fear, lest the cherished beliefs should prove delusions, can further life.⁴ Educational institutions should be the nucleus of growing force against sectarian tradition and subtle indoctrination⁵ into set habits, for ex-

ample the present cult of education as a road to money.

Lawrence on the other hand, far from despising or regretting the delights of knowledge,⁶ exposes the false self-importance and self-righteousness of well-educated though emotionally drained adults. The over-development of a mind, «the frightful universality of knowledge», do not command Lawrence's respect as ideals. «The highest quality is living understanding, not intellectual understanding»,⁷ he states explicitly.

Lawrence advocates State schools, so that children of every class would «get a common human basis, a common radical understanding». Physical training, and domestic training at real workshops (not just fancy handwork) run always parallel to mental work which starts at a slow pace from the three R elementary stages and moves on steadily to the highest possible level of arts and science for those who have a natural bent.

Lawrence mocks the confusion about the cherished ideals in education to mould the young into the perfect individual and the perfect citizen. Not that he rejects these ideals, but he exposes their false grounds. He blames both the mother and the teacher for pressing the child into expected posturings and «self-conscious attitudinising» which is a rampant disease among the well-to-do classes and is also spreading fast into the working classes. This modern self-conscious man, product of the falsified ideal of individual expression in Education, repels Lawrence.⁸ He invests the priest-like teacher and headmaster with the responsibility to help reverently the true nature of each child when hesitantly begins unfolding towards its own full capacity.⁹

bias; also dogmatism in religion should be replaced by inquiry into paralysed creeds, their equal importance underlined. «It is in the early childhood that the lesson live-and-let-live must be taught», he asserts. Bertrand Russell, *Sceptical Essays* (London, 1970), p. 126.

6. He says clearly, «whoever misses his education in history misses his fulfilment in the past». D. H. Lawrence, *Movements in European History* (OUP, 1921), p. XIII.

7. Lawrence on Education, edited by Joy and Raymond Williams (Penguin, 1973), Education of the people, p. 140.

8. «...they are too much for me, all of them like so many little barrel-organs grinding their own sensations, nay their own very natures, out of their own heads: and become so automatic at it they don't even know they are doing it.» Lawrence on Education, edited by Joy and R. Williams (Penguin, 1973), p. 164.

9. Lawrence was so deadly opposed to imposed didacticism that he even guarded the readers from the novelist's conscious efforts to bring forth his own personal values. He advised the readers to listen for the deep low voices in a novel. «Trust the novel», he suggested, «not the novelist.»

1. Herman Hesse has satirised the ideal of security in *Steppenwolf*. «A man cannot live intensely except at the cost of self. Now the bourgeois treasures nothing more highly than the self (rudimentary as this may be), and so at the cost of intensity he achieves his own preservation and security.» Herman Hesse, *Steppenwolf* (New York, 1963), p. 52.

2. Lawrence on Education, edited by Joy and Raymond Williams (Penguin, 1973), Education of the people, p. 145.

3. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London, 1927), p. 165.

4. Russell was one of the first to use the probabilistic view of science as a constant warning against various dogmatic views. John Carew Eccles, a scientist awarded the Nobel Prize, presents clearly this line of thought, when he says, «I can now rejoice even in the falsification of a cherished theory because this is a scientific success».

5. Russell advocates that History books should be submitted to an international commission and become free of patriotic

As for the ideal of the perfect citizen in the name of goodness and brotherhood Lawrence does not hesitate to expose it as a noble phrase, covering up self-assertion, self-importance, suffused sentimentalism, spurious sympathy and even «malevolent bullying». «If love of humanity brought on the Great War let us see what frank and honest egoism will do. Nothing so horrible we bet»¹, he scoffs. As an alternative he puts forth sympathy coming from deep emotions together with the terrifying acceptance that «no person is responsible for the being of any other person». Each one is starrily single and ultimately self-responsible, yet, the very accomplishing of his individuality «rests upon his fulfilment in social life», Lawrence points out.

Both Lawrence and Russell tackle with great delicacy the problem of the increased sense of individuality within the marriage bond at the turn of this century.

In his book, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916) Russell refers to the relationship between a man and woman as a critical one which incurs, at present, confusion is going through the transition stage to equality,² and admits that «no cheap and easy solution of this trouble is possible».

So far as the authority of the man was unquestioned and sincerely believed there was an instinctive fulfilling relation between a man and a woman rarely achieved among educated people in our times. To perpetuate a situation run only by one will would be anachronism;³ Russell believes we need to go forward, make the necessary readjustments, and try to strike a balance as of two equal wills seeking a trembling stability.

The impending danger is that the momentum of the long suppressed part—the woman in this case—might assert a supremacy toppling the equilibrium to the damage of both interested parts. For the present the man should forget about the wish for mastery and channel the surplus of his vigour and initiative to activities compatible with the woman's need for developing a long stunted ingrowth.

If there is continuous fight for self-assertion between two hostile, separate, egotistic units, then the hunger for inner companionship, remains unappeased. «I doubt if there is any radical cure except in some form of religion», Russell says

and he goes on, «As religion dominated the old form of marriage so religion must dominate the new. But it must be a new religion based on liberty, justice and love not upon authority and law⁴ and hell fire.»⁵

Russell finds love as a supreme object in marriage too circumscribed and inadequate. Respect for «the spirit of life in each other» promises a satisfactory and self-sufficient relation, yet, it really becomes potential when it loses its self-centredness beside the life of the universe without becoming trivial. A man and a woman, instead of turning aside, remaining outsiders, shut into their well-established privacy, had better unite themselves in the dumb striving of people towards the unknown. Participation in something bigger than the family is enriching and expansive. Love then is linked to some infinite purpose and unfolds the seriousness and depth of which it is capable.

Neither does Lawrence endorse the shut-in exclusiveness of a married couple, «stewing in its own little privacy»,⁶ since the relationship with other fellow men and the cosmos can free and enlarge the scope of private life.⁷

He is also very much concerned that one should let one's soul live its own life even within a marriage bond. This does not infer that married people, in Lawrence's mind, should exist each in his own separate sphere indulging in self-absorption, the one excluding the other, not the least so; their life in togetherness consists in the power of communing with and renewing each other, without fusing in oneness or sticking like two «jujube lozenges».

4. Russell fought for the necessity of the modification of the divorce law in England which had outlasted its justification in its rigid form. Although he thought «life long monogamy is best when it is successful», nevertheless in an unsatisfactory marriage it became destructive by fostering hypocrisy.

5. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London, 1927), p. 191.

6. D. H. Lawrence, *Women in Love* (Penguin, 1973), p. 397.

7. Lawrence's absorbing intensity with each of the above three vital connections deceives his reader into mistaking that very relation as the only imperative one, embracing and commanding the others as of minor importance. Yet, a study of Lawrence's essays makes it explicit that the trembling stability of the balance of all three connections is a matter of life. To grow into understanding of Lawrence's writing, we should bear in mind his following lines,

«That I am part of the earth my feet know perfectly, and my blood is part of the sea. My soul knows that I am part of the human race, my soul is an organic part of the great human soul, as my spirit is part of the nation. In my own very self, I am part of my family... So that my individualism is really an illusion. I am part of the great whole and I can never escape. But I can deny my connections, break them and become a fragment. Then I am wretched.» D. H. Lawrence, *Apocalypse* (London, 1932), p. 223.

1. D. H. Lawrence, *Selected Essays* (Penguin, 1950), pp. 37, 39.

2. One of the progressive causes which justified Russell's persisting fighting in the early twentieth century, was Women's Rights.

3. Russell admits that there was vitality and mobility in Medieval society dominated by ordered hierarchy. But this whole order of ideas is vanishing.

In «The Man who Died», Lawrence describes the coming together of a man and a woman with intensely individual life, meeting on a common ground which was beyond the personal life of either. In this poem, *Manifesto*, the concept of the perfect dual unison in one is crystal clear along the following lines,

I shall be cleared, distinct, single as if burnished
in silver
having no adherence, no adhesion anywhere,
one clear, burnished, isolated being, unique,
and she also, pure isolated complete,
two of us, unutterably distinguished, and in
unutterable conjunction.¹

Conjunction does not in the least imply possessiveness. «Say of nothing: it is mine. Say only: it is with me», Don Ramon's² message rings out.

Lawrence exposes the naked battle of wills between a man and a woman, «each attempting to destroy the other by breaking through the protecting wall of his or her ego».³ He is puzzled and equally repelled by the greed of the «liberated» woman to absorb, to own, to control and be dominant. He notices that the modern man has become weak, uncertain and unsafe; in his effort to react and impose himself on the self-opinionated, unflinching wife he employs unmanly and spurious tactics, either his sheer destructive self-will or his deceiving humble adoration. The whole relation then between a man and a woman degenerates, either into a conflict to death, each striving for the mastery of the other, or in «one round of pleasure» until the nerves collapse.

Lawrence does not doubt for a moment that the man is the outrider, the adventurer, the «leap ahead», the forger of consciousness, but he remains bewildered about the present woman. «A strange 'spiritual' creature is woman today», he says, «driven on and on by the evil demon of the old logos never for a moment allowed to escape and be herself.» He would rather have the woman remain faithful to her pivotal emotional centre, herself connected more immediately than the man to the deepest flow in life. «We're in equipoise in difference—but in difference», he stresses, «not in sameness.»⁴ Yet, notwithstanding his trusting the age-old differences between a man and a

woman, Lawrence in his essay on Thomas Hardy asserts that women «with their own independent cool-lighted mind life» should certainly have our respect as if they were vestals in our world, intrinsically detached from common human fulfilments. Eventually Lawrence seems to mistrust the power of the present woman to overcome the split inside herself, reconciling the loyalty owed to the innermost power of her own womanhood and the demanding commitment to assert her own individuality, in a world full of antagonistic self-wills.

«I believe in marriage»,⁵ he says, and he means a life long one. The sense of the permanent in marriage is for him a necessity for inward peace, «even if it carries the sense of doom!» since monogamy can sustain the nourishment of soul throughout a life time. The evernewness in marriage runs parallel to the everchanging rhythm of the year and further development for both the man and the woman is for Lawrence a prerequisite to their bond, the perfect love being in itself inadequate. «If she stayed put, I might as well love a pepper-pot», he comments humorously.

Lawrence repeatedly expressed his unshaken belief in the primary importance of the phallic connection between a man and a woman. In a letter about his book *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, he writes, «As I say, it's a novel of the phallic consciousness: or the phallic consciousness versus the mental-spiritual consciousness: and of course you know which side I take. The versus is not my fault, there should be no versus. The two things must be reconciled in us».⁶

To take sex like a «cocktail» was for Lawrence nothing more than impoverishment of blood. Neither does he narrow the sexual connection between a man and a woman down to mere copulation. To avert any misconception and to restore to its proper place Lawrence's notion of sex as a «great unifier» which makes people's heart vibrate in warmth and togetherness, here are his own words: «If I can really sympathise with a woman in her sexual self, it is just a form of warmheartedness and compassionateness, the most natural life-flow in the world. And it may be a woman of seventy-two, or a child of two, it is the same. But out our civilisation, with its horrible fear and funk and repression and bullying, has almost destroyed the natural flow of sympathy between men and men, and man and woman».⁷

1. D. H. Lawrence, *Selected Poems* (Penguin, 1971), p. 40.

2. Don Ramon is a «priest-like» political leader in Lawrence's book, *The Plumed Serpent*.

3. Russell, in his *History of Western Philosophy*, points out that «this theme has become familiar through the writing of Strindberg, and still more of D. H. Lawrence». B. Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (London, 1961), p. 657.

4. Lawrence in *Education*, edited by Joy and Raymond Williams (Penguin, 1973), *Education of the people*, p. 194.

5. D. H. Lawrence, *Selected Letters* (Penguin, 1971), p. 42.

6. H. M. Daleski, *The Forked Flame*, A study of D. H. Lawrence (London, mcmxv), p. 259.

7. D. H. Lawrence, *Selected Essays* (Penguin, 1972), pp. 100-101.

«What is actual living?», Lawrence asks himself. «It is a question mostly of direct contact», he answers. Both Russell and Lawrence are acutely concerned with re-establishing the threefold organic relatedness of man to God, to the woman and to his fellow man by restoring the power of instinct alongside with the power of mind and spirit.

The decay of dogmatic religion did not rob Russell of religiousness, though he was a professed critic and opponent of the Christian church as an institution. According to Russell¹ sincere Christian believers have kept the flame of spirit burning, which is an excellent contribution, yet they cannot establish the prestige of traditional religion for these people who have lost faith because their minds are active not because their spirit is dead.

It is not so much that the creed of the church is wrong, but that whatever becomes a dogma threatens intellectual integrity, especially when position, income and power are bound up with its acceptance, Russell says. The teachings of Christ are admirable but inadequate for modern social and political problems. The first step towards a new religion is the substitution of a morality of initiative and hope for a morality of submission and fear; also the social and personal elements which stand apart, the first pervading the Catholic, the second the Protestant Church, should fuse together in the religious moulding of the modern man.

It is well known that a full human life springs from the ever threatened interaction of three life forces; instinct, mind and spirit. Instinct is at war with either spirit or mind, and spirit and mind are at war with each other. Spurious excellence overgrowth or shrinking of one of these powers tends to shrivel the expansive development of the self. Moreover so long as man is absorbed in striking some precarious balance inwardly he cannot let his energy flow into objective ends, he becomes cramped and his attitude to life is negative and barren.

In the Middle Ages the Catholic Church perfected an organic society together with a most balanced synthesis of mind, instinct and spirit. All three were curtailed to fit into a set pattern which became rigid when the Church, being a symbol of undisputed power, proved at times rapacious and oppressive; it challenged then the loyalty of its subjects to an orderly and fixed scheme.

1. In a superbly written chapter in his book, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916), Russell sets out to destroy traditional declining principles with due respect and reconstruct new vital ones with the vigour of a reformer.

Today it is the mind that has grown at the expense of spirit and instinct. Cynicism and intellectual destructiveness devour any personal or impersonal desire and produce emptiness.

The life of spirit has suffered in recent times because of its association with traditional religion, its hostility to the life of mind and the fact that it seems to call for renunciation. It is true, it demands readiness for renunciation when needed, but it is as capable of enriching individual existence as mind and instinct are.

Instinct is the immediate link with our fellow men, the vital bond to collective life which nourishes the separate self by the feeling of union and togetherness. It can keep us in bondage, in blind unthinking growth, if the mind does not intervene to judge critically purposes towards which instinct is drawn. Remote as the mind stands, it separates a man inwardly from others and it can paralyse or atrophy instinct. But the moment the mind becomes cynical and destructive, checking the instinctive bonds, there comes spirit not to thwart instinct but to reinforce it by universalising the impulsive desire for immediate union. Instinct becomes purified since it is absolved from its insistence on absorbing individuality and obsession with built-in relations. It regains and retains its power solidly against the cynical mind.

Spirit without the empiricism of instinct becomes impersonal. Religious feeling is not adequate to establish a vital bond between men, it lacks in earthy warmth, replacing it by intense impersonal compassion which will not do.

Both patriotism² and the love between a man and a woman though vigorous in impulsive expression, have the same defects, narrow exclusiveness and outrageous disregard of the outside world. Mind then is entitled to shafts of unsparing criticism and satire of the holiest of feelings. Yet, this stage may become the threshold to a new life nourished by the deeper desires and the insight of spirit. We feel then that it is the poverty of our nature that prevents us from extending the instinctive love in imagination outwards.

Russell, the rationalist, reveals his mystic and religious self in the following lines: «Reverence and worship, the sense of an obligation to mankind, the feeling of imperativeness and acting under orders which traditional religion has interpreted as Divine Inspiration, all belong to the life

2. National pride is noble and unavoidable, yet when untempered it becomes inferior to a more expansive creed, which is what we need at present, Russell says and he confesses, «Love of England is very nearly the strongest emotion I possess». B. Russell, *Autobiography*, Vol. 11 (London, 1971), p. 17.

of spirit. And deeper than all these lies the sense of a mystery half-revealed, of a hidden wisdom and glory, of a transfiguring vision in which common things lose their solid importance and become a thin veil behind which the ultimate truth of the world is dimly seen. It is such feelings that are the source of religion and if they were to die most of what is best would vanish out of life.»¹

Lawrence is «eternally grateful»² for the wonder, the most profound element in man's life, that religious teaching and hymns instilled in his soul. «Man in his relation to a deity», he records, «is the proper study of Mankind.»³ The greatness of the mission of Christianity he acknowledges as past greatness. «If I had lived in the year 400, pray God, I should have been a true and passionate Christian. The Adventurer. But now I live in 1924 and the Christian venture is done... We must start on a new venture towards God,»⁴ he says.

The Church of Rome Lawrence respects for its organic function as a powerful social organism, its establishment of the permanence of marriage—the first autonomous entity against an unjust state—and above all its connecting man with the cyclic rhythms of the seasons through the great ritualistic festivities of the Birth, the Passion and Resurrecting of Christ. The meaningful flow of the year became a source of nourishment and renewal to the human soul.

The Protestant Church brought men in direct union with the God, another step of advance into freedom, «the freedom to believe as their soul prompts them.»⁵ Yet, this new mode of religion encouraged man to learn in apartness which is the scientific and mental way of knowing. The mystery man felt in connection with the Universe fizzled out. If scientific wonder had followed it would have been a most welcome continuity to religious mystery. However, the universe became matter and force for the human mind to test and apply its own forceful impact.

This separateness also moulded men and women into hard inaccessible entities. The new era of the posing of the ego under the over rule of the mental principle dawned. It remains for man to

fall back into relatedness with the living cosmos, this time, not through the withered Christian spirituality but through his revitalising senses.

In his essay «The Crown», Lawrence describes the combat between the lion, which stands for the active male principle of the mind and the Unicorn which stands for the passive female principle of the senses. The subjugation of either force to the other finishes off life itself. As Graham Hough remarks, the Crown is a prize worth having «as long as it is never won».⁶

Christianity, Lawrence says, has taught the hardest lesson, the lesson of love, yet it ended up in a self-sacrificial submission to necessity compelled by another law outside one's self. In his short story, *The Man who Died*, the prophet who came back into life admits, «I gave more than I took and that is also woe and vanity».⁷ He confesses that the compulsion of love he tried to lay on all men was wrong and therefore it ended in his being betrayed.

Modern Christianity, Lawrence feels, is inadequate because it regards man as a pure individual; his social collective side, which desires to assert itself in power it leaves unquenched. He craves for Jehovah and Christ, the lion and the lamb, love and power to unite in a new concept of God, The Holy Spirit, which is the unknowable. God then becomes many gods.⁸

Dealing with the polarity between the law which governs the life of one's fellowman and the principles of one's own being, Lawrence strives after the acceptance and respect of both.

Russell, very much in the same line of thinking, sets two general principles which could direct political movement in present times:

1. The growth and vitality of individuals and communities should be promoted as far as possible.
2. The growth of one individual and one community is to be as little as possible at the expense of another.⁹

6. Graham Hough, *The Dark Sun, A Study of D. H. Lawrence* (London, 1956), p. 226.

7. D. H. Lawrence, *The Short Novels*, Vol. 11 (London, 1956), p. 14.

8. N. Kazantzakis expresses very much the same idea, «My God is not Almighty», he says, «he clings to warm bodies; he has no other bulwark... He cannot be saved unless we save him with our struggles; neither can we be saved unless he is saved». Peter Bien, *Nikos Kazantzakis* (New York, 1972), p. 18.

9. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London, 1927), p. 230. It is interesting to refer to Karl Popper's reverse guiding principle, «Minimise avoidable suffering». Bryan Magee suggests that this principle is naturally subsumed by a second one, «Maximise the freedom of individuals to live as they wish». Bryan Magee, *Karl Popper* (London, 1973), p. 86.

1. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London, 1927), p. 208.

2. *Lawrence in Education*, edited by Joy and Raymond Williams (Penguin, 1973), p. 326.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

4. D. H. Lawrence, *Selected Essays* (Penguin, 1972), *Love and Life*, p. 48.

5. D. H. Lawrence, *Movement in European History* (OUP, 1921), p. 112.

Russell admits that the balancing of the two principles, vital growth on one hand and reverence towards life on the other, is not an easy matter in practice.¹ Germany's upsurging vigour in the twentieth century was incompatible with the vitality of her neighbours; Europe has used its energy to drain Africa, the ever active life of the man has held back the development of the woman.

Nevertheless, both Lawrence and Russell believe, the impetus of new life to grow can be compatible with the due acknowledgement of life around in a most delicate balance, provided that the motive of possessiveness shall not be the predominant regulator in human life.

The fraternisation of two polarised deities Apollo and Dionysus became real in the form of art. «And lo and behold Apollo found it impossible to live without Dionysus. The elements of humanism and barbarism turned out to be quite as fundamental as the Apollonian element... and then let us imagine how the apollonian artist with his thin monotonous art must have sounded beside the demoniacal chant of the multitude.»²

D. H. Lawrence and Russell have been striving for the conciliation of antithetical pursuits in real

life. Benjamin Barber observes that Russell aims simultaneously at two ends, dealing with a problem like anarchy and despotism in polar terms, which is why he cannot work out a solution. Barber points out that a theory that insists on both notions, «libertarian independence» and «a power-forged orderliness» is «hopelessly schizophrenic».³

No doubt about it. Yet to allow tacitly a false ideal to be pragmatically useful and serve instead of a new alternative way will ultimately prove a dead end. Both Lawrence and Russell attempted insistently to attain a precarious balance between polarised realities, a fact which—no matter if their schematic solutions diverge—is intrinsically valuable, indicating the growing necessity in our times to pay attention to the complexity of existing dualities, at least to recognise them in our haste to leap to a decision.

The casting away of dogmatism though entails the consequences of the line, «development without dominion», which the present man and his community will have to come to terms with, while moulding into a new form of integration.

«There are ideas», Raymond Williams comments, and ways of thinking with the seeds of life in them, and there are others, perhaps deep in our minds with the seeds of general death. Our measure of success in recognising these kinds, and in naming them making possible their common recognition, may be literally the measure of our future.»⁴

1. Russell thought unfavourable alterations and adverse claims have to be considered with due attention by the privileged so as to avoid a destructive clash of powers. Appeal to peace should not be made an excuse for the maintenance of the static sanctity of the status quo; anything that stands against the growth of a major political force, which in our times is labour, is deadly traditional.

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals* (New York, 1956), pp. 34-35.

3. Solipsistic Politics: Russell's Empiricists Liberalism, *Political Studies*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Oxford, March 1975, p. 26.

4. Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society 1780-1950* (Penguin, 1963), p. 322.