

Greece: five years after the coup*

by

Theodore A. Couloumbis

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and comments

by

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* Written in May 1972

Δημοσιεύομεν κατωτέρω άνευ περιορισμών την επιστολήν και τὸ ἄρθρον τοῦ κ. Θεοδώρου Α. Κουλουμπῆ, Καθηγητοῦ τῶν Διεθνῶν Σχέσεων τοῦ Ἀμερικανικοῦ Πανεπιστημίου τῆς Washington, ὡς εἶχονεν ὑποσχεθῆ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ τεῦχος ἀριθμ. 11-12 (Ἰανουάριον-Ἰουνίον 1972, σελ. 3 τοῦ ἐξωφύλλου), σεβόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ συγγραφέως ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ περιοδικοῦ μας.

Ἡ πρόκλησις τοῦ κ. Κουλουμπῆ οὐδόλως μᾶς ἠνώχλησε, διότι ὑπῆρξε σταθερὰ καὶ συνεπὴς ἡ τακτικὴ μᾶς νὰ δημοσιεύομεν καὶ ὄνσμενεῖς διὰ τὸ σημερινὸν καθεστὸς τῆς χώρας μᾶς ἀπόψεις, ὅπως συνέβη τοῦτο καὶ μετὰ τὸ ἄρθρον τοῦ κ. Jean Siotis ὑπὸ τίτλον «Some Notes on the Military in Greek Politics», τὸ ὅποιον ἐδημοσιεύθη εἰς τὸ τεῦχος μᾶς 7-8 (Ἰανουάριον-Ἰουνίον 1971, σελ. 29).

Τὸ πρόβλημα ὅμως, ἂν θὰ ἔπρεπε δηλαδὴ νὰ δημοσιευθοῦν τὰ κείμενα τοῦ κ. Κουλουμπῆ ἢ ὄχι, ἐδημοσιεύθη κυρίως ἀπὸ τοὺς ἐξῆς δύο λόγους:

- 1) ἀπὸ τὸ ἀνεπιτυχὲς χιῶσμορ καὶ τοὺς ἀήθεις χαρακτηρισμοὺς, πὸν περιέχονται εἰς τὴν επιστολήν του, καὶ
- 2) ἀπὸ τὴν δημοσιογραφικὴν δομὴν τοῦ ἄρθρον του, ἡ ὁποία οὐδόλως ἀνταποκρίνεται εἰς τὰς ἀναγκαῖας προσδοθεῖς διὰ τὴν δημοσίευσίν του εἰς ἐπιστημονικὴν Ἐπιθεώρησιν.

Παρὰ ταῦτα ἀπεφασίσασμεν νὰ δημοσιεύσωμεν ἀμφότερα τὰ κείμενα, ἐπαριέμενοι τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῶν κρίσιν εἰς αὐτοὺς τοὺς τοὺς ἀναγνώστῃς καὶ στεροῦντες τὸν κ. Κουλουμπῆν ἐτέρας εὐκαιρίας ἐκόλουσ θριαμβολογίας!

Ὁ πρόλογος εἰς τὸν ὅποιον ὁ κ. Κουλουμπῆς ἀναφέρεται ἔχει ὡς ἀκολούθως:

As we had promised in our issue No. 11-12 (January-June 1972, page 3 of the cover), we are publishing as a whole the letter and the article of Mr. Theodore A. Couloumbis, Associate Professor of International Relations of the American University, Washington, respecting not only the author's wish but the principles of our journal as well.

Mr. Couloumbis' challenge did not embarrass us at all, for it has been our consistent policy to publish also views unfavourable to the present regime of our country, as it was the case of Mr. Jean Siotis' article «Some Notes on the Military in Greek Politics», published in issue No. 7-8 p. 29.

The problem, however, as to whether we had to publish Mr. Couloumbis' texts or not, originated mainly from the two following reasons:

- 1) *the unsuccessful humour and the unusual terms contained in his letter, and*
- 2) *the journalistic structure of his article which in no way meets the requirements for publication in a scientific review.*

Nevertheless, we decided to have them both published, letting our readers judge them for themselves while depriving Mr. Couloumbis from a second opportunity of easy boasting!

The prologue referred to by Mr. Couloumbis is the following:

«...Un an presque après le Congrès de Varna (Congrès International de Sociologie, Bulgarie, 1970) une discussion politique sur la situation en Grèce a eu lieu à la Chambre des Représentants aux USA. A

cette discussion ont pris part les professeurs de sciences politiques M. M. George Koussoulas et Théodore Kouloumbis, ... nos lecteurs grecs en ont pris connaissance.

Cependant, il serait intéressant et instructif de rendre en public le contenu d'un entretien que j'ai eu avec le Professeur Th. Kouloumbis, qui depuis 1966 rend régulièrement visite à notre Centre pendant les vacances d'été, qu'il passe habituellement en Grèce. Si je me permets de porter à la connaissance de nos lecteurs cet entretien, c'est pour offrir l'occasion à M. Th. Kouloumbis de faire connaître à ses étudiants américains le point de vue des spécialistes des sciences sociales, qui vivent en Grèce et partagent les peines et les espoirs de leur peuple.

Au Professeur Th. Kouloumbis j'ai vivement reproché d'avoir déclaré devant la Commission de la Chambre des Représentants que l'Ambassadeur des USA devrait se mêler aux affaires intérieures de la Grèce, notamment en désapprouvant publiquement le Gouvernement actuel de notre pays. Le Professeur Th. Kouloumbis s'est excusé de sa déclaration et m'a avoué qu'il est mécontent d'avoir donné pareille réponse à l'insistante question d'un membre de la dite Commission. Néanmoins, quelques semaines après, le Professeur Th. Kouloumbis s'est présenté à nouveau devant cette Commission parlementaire des USA pour affirmer, en sa qualité de spécialiste des sciences politiques, que lors de son dernier voyage en Grèce il n'a remarqué aucun progrès vers la libéralisation du régime. Pourtant, pendant notre entretien, M. Th. Kouloumbis avait avoué être favorablement impressionné de constater en Grèce une pleine liberté de pensée en un respect des droits de l'individu. Entre autres, il avait remarqué en vitrine des librairies d'Athènes les récentes traductions en grec du Livre rouge de Mao, du Journal intime de Che Guevara, des écrits de H. Marcuse, etc.

Enfin de compte, pour le Professeur Th. Kouloumbis la seule critique à adresser au Gouvernement grec concernerait son insistance à ne pas permettre encore le fonctionnement de partis politiques. Cependant, mon interlocuteur avait convenu que toute évolution de la vie politique en Grèce ne concerne que les Grecs qui vivent dans leur pays en non pas les parlementaires ou les intellectuels vivant dans les pays étrangers. Après cela, n'est-il pas très étonnant que, devant la Commission de la Chambre des Représentants des USA, M. Th. Kouloumbis ait pris une attitude tout à fait différente de celle que je viens de décrire? A M. Th. Kouloumbis lui-même il appartient de répondre à ma question...

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 20016

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE

June 16, 1972

Dear Mr. Dimitras:

This letter is in response to certain statements of yours contained in the prologue of the *Revue de Recherches Sociales*, No. 7-8, of January-June 1971 (published in 1972). In this prologue you allege that what I told you in private conversations is not in harmony with my public statements before US Congressional hearings.

Your «recollections» of our conversations are, I am afraid, for the most part either taken out of context or complete figments of a rather creative imagination. For example, I never told you in the summer of 1971 (or any time since 1967) that I had observed a situation of «freedom of thought and respect for the rights of the individual» in Greece. This is unthinkable and naive, while martial law is still in effect in parts of Greece. And while there is complete absence of the institutional trappings of a democratic-competitive system (i.e. political parties, elections, parliamentary legislation, uncontrolled mass media and unpoliced institutional and associational activity). I am tempted, however, to agree with you that there is still freedom of thought in Greece, but there is definitely no freedom of expression. Thank God, our scientists have not yet invented effective instruments for the monitoring of thoughts.

Now let me turn to the subject of American intervention in the domestic affairs of Greece. I have studied this subject in some detail (see my *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences*, Yale Univ. Press, 1966), and my conclusion is that the US has played and is still playing a nearly pervasive role in the political affairs of Greece. As I have stated elsewhere, «great inequality plus contact between two nations, spells intervention». Perhaps, in an ideal world Greece would be happiest as a totally sovereign and independent nation. The ideal is not the real world, however. In fact, the bulk of the literature today alleges that the present Greek regime is in large part the result of US intervention in Greek affairs! As for my own view, I would prefer no intervention at all from any external sources. If, on the other hand, politico-strategic imperatives render American intervention *inevitable*, then I would choose intervention favoring democracy rather than intervention favoring dictatorship.

The next topic discussed in your prologue deals with my observations on the «liberalization trends» in Greece. My views on this subject have been adequately expressed in the vfore-mentioned hearings. Let me quote: (Quoted from «Greece, Spain and the Southern NATO Strategy», Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, July-September 1972.)

July 12, 1971:

«Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think there is any chance that the present government will restore constitutional government under present policies?

Mr. COULOMBIS. There is always a chance, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is there a likelihood?

Mr. COULOMBIS. Yes; there is a likelihood, but I think in the long-range future, in the very long-range future, which becomes irrelevant for those who are living in this decade.» (p. 13).

September 15, 1971:

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Between this last visit you made in July and August, and the previous time (April 1971), did you discern any steps, movements or political acts indicating the return to democratic principles?

Mr. COULOUMBIS. No. There was a change of government in Greece, and there were a number of new ministers—considered technocrats—introduced into the government, and there were, also, various administrative reshuffles. For example, a few ministries were fused together into larger ministries, but no steps, no announcements, and no implementation of important laws, such as the law on political parties, such as the formation of a constitutional court or Council of the Nation, none of these steps have taken place which would allow the ordinary observer to discern the active preparation for political processes and for elections.

I did not discern any of this, nor was I told by any of my interviewees, approximately forty of them, that they expected serious developments toward the restoration of democracy, meaning elections, forthcoming (p. 402).

The present government has been in power for a number of years, and it has a number of individuals that it could rally around to form a political party also. So there is no question, should the opportunity be given, very quickly the people can organize their own political parties, their leaders, and seek the electoral mandate. But there appears to be no serious indication of this happening.

I am talking about a fact, not an intention. There are a lot of intentions.

The Prime Minister of Greece has repeatedly argued for the restoration of democracy from the very first speech as a prime minister to the present time. He has been constantly promising restoration. But political observers must judge a trend in terms of the objective steps rather than the goodwill or intentions of a given individual, and I am pessimistic rather than optimistic. (p. 403).

I must point out sadly that the above observations which I made a year ago, are very much applicable today! There is nothing, incidentally, which would please me more than to be proven wrong regarding these pessimistic assessments on the chances of democratization in Greece.

Let me close this communication by saying that I consider my role as that of a political scientist, but also as that of a man. As a political scientist, I am interested—given my limitations and those of our discipline—in discovering and documenting objective conditions. Here, I have to be especially careful not to confuse my own hopes or preferences with the phenomena under observation. As a man, I have certain values and principles to which I wish to remain true. They involve, primarily, respect for democracy and freedom, and a belief that a society can realize its best in a free, competitive and well-governed system, where all the people freely choose their representatives.

Since our last conversation, I have made yet another working trip to Greece (April 19 to May 6, 1972). During my visit, I conducted approximately forty interviews with representatives of the Greek political spectrum. The enclosed document is an essay containing and updating my impressions on contemporary Greece following this latest trip. My predictions regarding «liberalization» remain pessimistic still.

You are free to publish this essay, provided you publish it as a whole—rather than quoting out of context or selectively. The same should apply to my letter. I am hopeful that you will respect my wish, especially if you are interested in cultivating an image of a relatively detached director of an academic research institution, rather than an image of a relatively skillful propagandist of a not so representative military regime.

Sincerely,

THEODORE A. COULOUMBIS

Associate Professor of
International Relations

Ἐπί τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἄρθρου τοῦ κ. Κουλουμπῆ, ἡ Ἐπιθεώρησις μας δὲν ἠθέλησε νὰ προβῆ εἰς ἰδικὰ τῆς σχόλια. Ἐπροτιμήσαμε νὰ ἀναθέσωμε τὴν κριτικὴν τοῦ ἄρθρου τούτου εἰς τὸν ἑλληνικῆς καταγωγῆς Ἀμερικανὸν καθηγητὴν κ. James Brown, ὁ ὁποῖος ὁμιλεῖ τὴν ἑλληνικὴν καὶ ἔχει μελετήσει ἐπιστημονικῶς τὴν ἑλληνικὴν πολιτικὴν ζωὴν (βλ. καὶ ἄρθρον τοῦ «Political Performance within Politics: a Case Study of Greece, 1963-1967» εἰς Ἐπιθεώρησίν μας, τεύχος 11-12). Τὰ σχόλια τοῦ κ. J. Brown δημοσιεύονται κατωτέρω μετὰ τὸ ἄρθρον τοῦ κ. Θ. Κουλουμπῆ. Ὁ κ. J. Brown συνόδευσε τὴν κριτικὴν του μὲ τὴν ἀκόλουθον ἐπεξηγηματικὴν ἐπιστολήν:

As far as the substance of Mr. Couloumbis' article is concerned, we did not wish to proceed on by having our own comments published in our *Review*. We preferred, instead, to entrust the critique of this article to Prof. James Brown, an American of Greek origin who speaks Greek and has studied accurately the Greek political life (see his article «Political Performance within Politics: a Case Study of Greece, 1963-1967» in our *Review* No. 11-12, as well). Mr. James Brown's comments are published here below after Mr. Th. Couloumbis' article. His critique is accompanied by the following explanatory letter:

SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

December 12, 1972

Dr. Elias Dimitras, Director General
National Centre of Social Research
1 Rue Sophocleous
Athens (122), GREECE

Dear Dr. Dimitras:

I just received your telegram and I apologize for not having put my critique of Professor Couloumbis' article in the mail sooner. I hope that I have not affected the *Journal's* publication date.

My critique primarily concentrates on Couloumbis unwillingness to consider the underlying problems of Greek political and social institutions that ultimately led to April, 1967. I think that this is essential for one to understand Greek politics. Furthermore, it is always very easy to fault a government or a person for what he hasn't done or is doing... this is the crux of his article. My intent is to present the substantive issues.

Thank you very much for this opportunity to contribute to your publication.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES BROWN
Assistant Professor

THE ARTICLE OF TH. COULOUMBIS

the regime

My latest trip to Greece coincided with festivities in commemoration of the 5th anniversary of the «Revolution», as the Greek military regime likes to call

the outcome of its military coup of April 21, 1967. As I walked around the busy downtown streets of Athens, I immediately noticed large wall posters abundantly exhibited on trees, telephone poles, kiosks, and walls of buildings. The most prominent aspect of these posters was the digit «5». Closer examination indicated that the «5» stood for «Five golden years of the Revolution, Five golden pages». It had a definite psychological effect on the viewer. Five years means permanence. Five years means a small lifetime. Five years means the death or abandonment of many a finite dream.

Soon I discovered, however, that hundreds of these posters plastered on main thoroughfares, such as Stadiou, Panepistimiou, and Academias Streets, were clustered provocatively under legible signs carved on the walls proclaiming starkly: «The affixing of wall posters is strictly prohibited by law».

I muttered to myself: «What kind of a 'law and order' regime is this that breaks so blatantly its own laws?». I asked the same question later of some of the regime's officials. The response was puzzling: «Well, you see, Mr. Professor, these are the deeds of the extreme rightists in our group. The lunatic fringe, so to speak. They like to rub it in. They want the Greek people to become conscious of the fact that five years means business. But, of course, these people are not representative of the main thrust of our regime».

What is, then, the main thrust of the Papadopoulos regime five years later? What are its objectives and what are its practices and norms today? Very much as in the case of the «forbidden poster», there seem to coexist in Greece today two systems: a formal system and an operative system.

The formal system is represented by the Constitution of September 1968. It is the law of the military regime. It is a constitution approved by close to 92% of the Greek people voting in a referendum, but under the pressure of martial law. The Constitution provides for a parliamentary system, with a strong executive, a military establishment independent from civilian control, and a weakened—verging on the ceremonial—king. The Constitution also provides for the protection of civil rights and liberties, a multi-party system, a free press, and other standard characteristics of Western-style democracies. This, then, is the formal system, and Greek officials point to this constitution when they are asked to spell out their visions for Greece.

The operative system, however, is another story. Relying on Article 138 of the 1968 Constitution, which «permits» the regime to apply the whole charter gradually and incrementally, the regime has kept important portions of the Constitution (providing for some democracy) on ice. So there is no parliament in Greece today. Instead, there exists a «mini-parlia-

ment», known as the advisory committee, which is co-opted by a hand-picked group of «electors». Even this non-representative body has no more than advisory and consultative powers on legislation. Further, there are no political parties permitted to function and no elections. Instead, the three organized institutions, through which political participation—and hence power—is exercised, are the armed forces, the bureaucracy, and the church hierarchy. The two major informal institutions of support are the big business groups (local and foreign) and the Great Power ally, the United States. Martial law—or its «shadow», as Papadopoulos likes to refer to it—is still in effect in the major urban centers, while rural Greece is carefully controlled by appointed (rather than elected) local officials, carefully buttressed by the reinforced formal and informal security apparatus. The King, ever since his ill-fated counter-coup of December 13, 1967, has been residing in a small villa in Rome, still formally the head of the Greek state, still reimbursed for his services, his portraits and those of Queen Anna Maria together with that of Georgios Papadopoulos still adorning official rooms. But the operative functions of the King are now in the hands of Georgios Papadopoulos, who assumed the Regency from ousted General Georgios Zoitakis early in 1972. Papadopoulos, as if trying to prove to his other ministers that they are underworked, is now serving as Regent, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Government Policy.

The trend, if any, in Greece these days appears to favor the longer range perpetuation of the operative system, rather than the full application of the 1968 Constitution. In fact, Greece reverberates with rumors, every so often, regarding the possible intentions of the «Revolution» (i.e., Papadopoulos). Will he proclaim Greece a republic minus king and assume the presidency himself? Or will he put the question of Republic or Monarchy before a popular referendum? Will he force the King to abdicate in favor of young Prince Paul (aged 5), thus trying to play the lead in a Francoesque scenario? Or will he ask the King to return to Greece and formalize with his presence the gradual application of the 1968 Constitution? Or, finally, will he merely continue protracting his present «indecision», once more proving the old French maxim that there is nothing more permanent than the temporary? Most knowledgeable people—regardless of political persuasion—seem to argue that Papadopoulos will opt for the last among these alternatives, i.e., «protracted indeterminacy». This appears to be in keeping with Papadopoulos' style, so far, of a cautious incrementalist, who enjoys playing the balancing game, who avoids taking great risks, who likes to have multiple options, and who—above

all—realizes that his present strategy has netted him five years of uninterrupted power.

But protracted indeterminacy is not, necessarily, a condition free of peril for the fortunes of Georgios Papadopoulos. As a «friendly opponent» of his regime told me, the problem with indeterminacy is that «Greece has been pregnant for five years, but no child is being born. Greeks have been promised a 'revolutionary' birth or rebirth, and—on occasion—the mother cries out with rhythmic agony...but in the end it all proves a false alarm and the people go back to awaiting the next set of pains». It is in outlooks such as these that one begins to identify three emerging trends within the not-so-revolutionary womb of the Greek regime.

The first group is the «parenthesis closers». They are most vocally represented by retired Colonel Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos, who resigned in protest from the regime's revolutionary council and assumed a publicly critical stance by providing frequent signed articles for the Athens conservative opposition daily, *Vradyni*. Stamatelopoulos begins with the premise that the 1967 military intervention *was* absolutely necessary to save the country from anarchism, chaos, corruption, and a possible leftist takeover. However, he feels that the Army's role should have been limited to acting as a «parenthesis» in Greek politics, to restore a new order (the 1968 Constitution) and to quickly return to strictly military functions, leaving politics to the civilians (or retired and resigned military) and to the electoral process. What Stamatelopoulos and like-thinking men seem to fear is that the parenthesis is beginning to assume proportions of a chapter, if not a volume, of modern Greek history. Further, they fear that the collective nature of the «revolution» is gradually giving way to the projection of the «cult of the individual»—Georgios Papadopoulos. Finally, they worry that the politicization of the armed forces and their functional diversification is likely to weaken their primary function: external defense.

The second group, «the dictatorship backers», are open advocates for an unadulterated, traditional, and publicly proclaimed dictatorship of the Right. Longing for the days of the Metaxas authoritarian regime (1936-40), they argue that today's regime should drop its democratic pretensions, proclaim a firm but paternalistic dictatorship, and purge all «leftist suspects» from the ranks of the «revolution». A man quite often mentioned in connection with these attitudes is retired Colonel Ioannis Ladas, currently serving as the regime's Deputy Minister in charge of the local affairs of Central Greece.

The third group is the «revolutionaries». They claim that 20th century Greece has been ripe for a revolution, suffering from inequality, backwardness,

and masked oppression in the hands of a narrow caste or elite known as the «Kolonakiotes» (a wealthy or high-status set living at the fashionable Athens quarter of Kolonaki). Greece, according to this view, needed a revolution to rid itself of this wretched political, economic, and social «katestimeno» (as «establishment» is referred to). In the post-World War II period there were only two movements, according to the «revolutionaries», from which genuine revolution could credibly originate. The first were the Communists (who were supplemented in the 1960s by the Andreas Papandreou forces), and the second were the «middle-range» officers in the armed forces. Where the first group failed, the second (the middle-range officers) succeeded. Being recruited from the lower and middle ranks of the Greek people, these officers (the argument goes) are aware from personal experience of ordinary people's pains and passions.

The «Revolution of April 21, 1967», according to this third point of view, has remained «incomplete» to date. It has dealt a blow only to Greece's political establishment, while the economic and social establishments still remain intact. If a new, «post-revolutionary» Greece is going to emerge, it has to be both nationalist, in the tradition of Ion Dragoumis, and socialist, in the tradition of Alexandros Papanastasiou. It has to work for the equitable redistribution of income, the supply of ample social services for all people, and the restoration of Greece to its national dignity—free of foreign corrosive interventions which have plagued the modern Greek nation since its 19th century genesis. These views are publicly propounded in the writings and speeches of the «theoreticians of the Revolution», men such as Demetrios Tsakonas, Georgios Georgalas, and Vassilis Frangos. These attitudes and directions, if taken seriously, would prove especially attractive among the younger of Greece's officer corps, who are, kiddingly, referred to as «Kadafides» (after Lybia's young military strong man, Qadhafi).

There is a fourth group which one could call the «bureaucrats» or «technocrats» or «managers». Men such as these are found in all regimes, and they provide the ballast which presumably keeps the ship of state afloat regardless of the strength of the political winds. Since the «technocrats» are likely to serve with equal enthusiasm any of the above groups, we will not dwell on them any further.

In the meantime, one can safely say that all three categories above prefer the present indeterminacy to a return to the pre-coup 1967 system, which, for them, might raise the specter of severe punishment, up to and including physical liquidation. So, if they cannot realize the «ideal worlds», their next best bets are to stick with the status quo. Interestingly, all three of the above groups believe and argue that Georgios Papa-

dopoulos is explicitly or implicitly in harmony with their special views, being «forced» only to make the necessary compromises in the «short run» in order to accommodate for the disparate groups which have placed themselves under the flag of the April 21st «Revolution».

Papadopoulos and his closest lieutenants, in their most recent speeches and statements, appear to be moving subtly but steadily away from the «parenthesis closers». On April 21, before Greece's rapidly increasing television audience, Papadopoulos read a statement which avoided any reference to democracy and/or the full application of the 1968 Constitution, elections, or such similar utterances. He said, on the contrary, that Greece is governed *today* in the style required by her national needs. Beyond this, he added, there exists no absolute model for the uniform governance of all peoples. Politics are to be developed for each country in accordance with the unique experiences and needs of each country. (This all rings to me as a vague mirror-image echo of Marshal Tito's protestations in 1948 for a «Yugoslav Road to Communism».)

First Deputy Premier Stylianos Pattakos has also been asserting publicly that elections in Greece are farther away than ever because «the people do not want them», being fed up with elections and old politics. The regime's official spokesman, Byron Stamatopoulos, even went as far as to assert, during a recent speech in Macedonia, that the governmental «baton of authority» will be passed on *directly* to the Greek youth from today's regime. Some of the skeptics quipped that Stamatopoulos would have been better advised to use «whip» rather than «baton».

the political forces

So far, we have been talking as if Papadopoulos and his regime existed in a vacuum. Is there no reaction to their plans and policies? What is the role of the Greek political forces, both at home and in exile? What about the students, the workers, and the people in general?

Prior to the 1967 coup, there operated in Greece three major political parties and two minor ones. The major parties, from Right to Left, were ERE (National Radical Union), EK (Center Union), and EDA (Unified Democratic Left). The two splinter parties were Spyros Markezinis' Progressives (commanding between 2 and 5% of the popular vote), and a centrifugal group which spun off the Center Union in 1965, called ΦΔΚ (Liberal Democratic Party).

It was as a result of a serious crisis, between the forces of ERE plus King Constantine on one side facing the forces of the Center Union on the other, that the present rulers cultivated the proper climate for their take-

over. Today, the preponderance of Greece's politicians, with some exceptions to be mentioned below, are unified in an «intellectual front», if not an organizational one. There is a coordinated political leadership under the aegis of Panayotis Kanellopoulos (ERE)—the last pre-coup prime minister of Greece—joined by Georgios Mavros and Ioannis Zigidis for the EK, and Demetrios Pappaspyrou, the last President of the Greek Parliament for ΦΔΚ. They issue periodically declarations or announcements to local and foreign press representing as many as 167 Greek parliamentarians. These declarations decry the dictatorship in Greece, the absence of civil rights and freedoms, the progressive cultural and economic isolation of Greece from Western Europe, and, generally, the social and cultural backwardness which the Greek dictatorship perpetuates—thus generating the nucleus of a revolutionary situation which might, eventually, plunge the country into tragic bloodshed through guerrilla conflict.

They point their collective finger at the United States for insistently aiding and abetting this oppressive regime, thus alienating Greeks—a traditionally pro-American population—and cultivating sure-fire anti-Americanism.

This unified set of political forces is opposed to dynamic and bloody resistance, for they fear the kind of scenario which has managed to ravage Vietnam so totally. For them, the solution has to be «political». And the United States—which, according to them, still maintains central influence over the Greek establishment—must play a key role in the process toward the restoration of democracy. Specifically, the US has to demonstrate unequivocally (either through NATO or unilaterally), by word as well as action, that it is in favor of the restoration of democracy in Greece.

The minimum which these unified political forces appear to be willing to accept is the return of a genuine electoral process, albeit under the 1968 Constitution. Acceptance or rejection of the 1968 Constitution (which they do not like) is not a major issue for them. What is vital, however, is that contingent elections provide a *genuine* opportunity (e.g., free press and access to radio and television) for the political forces to compete for the vote of the Greek people.

The implicit recognition of the 1968 Constitution is a major concession on the part of the political world, so far as I can judge the situation. By accepting the 1968 Constitution, through their willingness to participate in elections, the unified political forces are legitimizing the dictatorial parenthesis since 1967. The evidence, therefore, of a major «compromise offer» on the part of the politicians is now unquestionable. The specific details of «transition» toward democracy vary, and alternative proposals are numerous. But

the following basic ingredients of compromise are evident throughout:

(1) The US must press the Greek armed establishment (and the regime) to apply—in full and by a date certain—its 1968 Constitution, thus leading to elections.

(2) The regime must give way to an «interim government» (of generals, or of nonpolitical personalities, or a regime headed by a nationally known political figure, such as Konstantinos Karamanlis) which will—under emergency powers—prepare the country for elections. That is, it will provide an orderly period of about eight months to a year, so that political machinery (parties, coordination, candidates, electoral laws) may be established.

(3) The present rulers will be free to return to private life, or to set up their own political party and solicit the vote of the Greek people.

Naturally, there is something «non-optimal» about this sequence of transition. A prominent and respected political figure told me, while shaking his head quite sadly, that, although he would not fight against the above «compromise», he would be forced to retire from such politics. He told me:

You see, I consider myself more as a national pedagogue and less as a politician. And I fear that this «compromise» legitimizes *ex post facto* the use of force and the illegal seizure of power by the junta in 1967. There is such a thing, you know, as *social learning*. And I fear that our young men and women will be taught by all this that successfully applied violence pays. Ideally, the junta should have been made a bad example by proper punishment. But, we do not have the power to do it. And to lead the country to revolution and bloodshed is to raise the price of meting out political justice to socially prohibitive levels.

The dilemma is unquestionably profound! But it appears that, in an imperfect world, the politicians in Greece are ready to settle for the «lesser evil», since the price of attaining the «absolute good» is civil war, a situation where the means outweigh in cost the value of the desired—but not necessarily achievable—end.

The politicians of the Greek Left (whose regular following in the postwar period has hovered around 15% of the popular vote) are not included organizationally in the unified movement discussed above. Their views, however, appear to be quite similar, if not identical, with the rest of the spectrum. The Left, today, is a skeptical, frustrated, disillusioned, and philosophically resigned group. They understand, now, that, in the imperatives of the geostrategic game, Greece has to be a «satellite» of the US, as much as Czechoslovakia has to be a Soviet «satellite». They feel, therefore, the Left's role in Greece must be in the future a «bourgeoisified» role, much in the style of the French, Italian, or Cypriot Communist parties.

The Left in Greece will not have credible recourse to «dynamic means» (which have proven tragically counterproductive in the post-World War II era). Instead, it must restrict itself to the role of a «minority political opposition» which can never safely expect to come to power as long as the present Soviet-American strategic balance in the Mediterranean remains essentially unchanged.

Two political personalities, Spyros Markezinis (Progressives) and Evangelos Averoff (ERE), have assigned themselves the separate status of «bridge builders». Their attitudes, summarized, involve an acceptance of the «fact» that the regime is in power and that it cannot be removed. On the other hand, although the regime knows how to hold power, it does not know what to do with it. Therefore, the colonels must be «convinced» to gradually return power back to the civilians, who know what to do with it and who will return the country to the democratic system of government. Their bridge-building efforts so far have accommodated precious little in traffic.

This leads us to the next group of politicians, nicknamed «ephapsies», which could be loosely translated as the «Ivy League». These are approximately 20 parliamentary deputies of EK and ERE who had agreed to hold publicized meetings with Georgios Papadopoulos at his request. They are referred to as the «Ivy Leaguers» because, like ivy, they want to cling to strong supports wherever and whenever these can be found. The attitude of the Ivy Leaguers is summarized by the cynics as «if you can't lick 'em, join 'em». These ex-parliamentarians, however, explain their actions quite differently. Having lost respect for the bulk of the Greek politicians, and fearing that the present impasse can extend itself indefinitely, they argue that, by negotiating with Papadopoulos—and even, if necessary, working with him—they will be gradually paving the way for the legitimization process which might eventually lead to genuine and participatory democracy.

One final group must be referred to before we abandon the domestic political arena. This is a cluster of upper middle class intellectuals and professionals, with no previous parliamentary experience. They have banded around an organization entitled «Association for the Study of Greek Problems». The head of this organization, Ioannis Pezmatzoglou (ex-Deputy Director of the Bank of Greece and ex-Professor of Political Economy at the University of Athens), was recently arrested and displaced to a small village for allegedly arousing political passions and undermining the sense of security of the Greek people. The concept of the Pezmatzoglou Association, which is currently being threatened with dissolution, is to provide Greece with a «counter-establishment» to Papadopoulos' establishment, and not to allow the

forces which see Greece as a Western, democratic, and European-oriented nation to wither away.

Realizing that the old political forces had mismanaged affairs prior to the coup, and even more concerned with the rapid deterioration of affairs since 1967, this group feels that it could act as a nucleus and as an incubation chamber for the development of new political forces in Greece. Some of its members or supporters have experienced either jail or persecution and displacement at the hands of the Greek regime. The Association's activities have centered around the encouragement of critical, but nonviolent, expressions *vis-à-vis* the regime, including the sponsorship of books, articles, speeches, and conferences dramatizing the contemporary plight of the country.

the exiles

Outside Greece, mainly in Western Europe, but also in Canada, the US, Eastern Europe, and the USSR, one finds exiled and self-exiled Greeks representing the full spectrum discussed above.

The most prominent among them is Konstantinos Karamanlis. Aged now sixty-five, having served as Prime Minister of Greece 1956-63, he left the Greek political scene in November 1963 after suffering a narrow political defeat in the elections of that month. He has been living in Paris ever since, decrying both past and present in the Greek political system. Quite recently, his views have been carefully articulated in a political biography authored by France's octogenarian academician, Maurice Genevoix (Jokingly, some Athenian pundits refer to him as «Je ne vois pas»).

Karamanlis, in my opinion, fits best the role of the «bridge» between the regime and some form of democracy, because he combines the following important characteristics:

- (1) He is experienced in politics (eight years as premier).
- (2) He has been absent from the Greek political scene during the critical years of 1965-67, which provided the excuse and the opportunity for the military takeover.
- (3) The Greek politicians of all colorations seem to accept him as a unifying and compromising factor.
- (4) The Greek people appear to trust in his fundamentally democratic orientation and his ability to exercise vigorous and hard-headed leadership.
- (5) Being a conservative (ERE), his non-Communist and anti-Communist credentials are («in order»), which probably means that he would be acceptable to the US military-industrial complex-oriented foreign policy *vis-à-vis* Greece.
- (6) Above all else, Karamanlis seems to offer one extra ingredient compared to all other politicians either in Greece or abroad: he projects the image of a

leader who enjoys the «trust» of active-duty officers today, perhaps even up to and including members of the Greek regime, that he will not take «revenge» against them, if and when he comes to power.

Despite his relative anonymity outside Greece, and his sparse public announcements (two public statements since 1967 condemning the perpetuation of dictatorship), Karamanlis remains a very usable exile, and one quite likely to play an important role in the near future. Inside Greece, the Genevoix biography has been selling widely, meanwhile, and hundreds of copies are prominently displayed in many bookstores.

The most vocal Greek exile leader is Andreas Papandreou. Currently a professor of economics at York University in Toronto, Papandreou is grinding out books, giving speeches throughout the world, attending rallies and testimonials, and generally seeking to generate a resistance movement against the Papadopoulos regime. Papandreou has formed a resistance organization entitled PAK (Panhellenic Liberation Movement), and has argued for the need for active and violent resistance against what he considers to be a neo-fascist, puppet regime, imposed upon the Greeks by US Pentagon and CIA circles—who are, in essence, the true occupiers of Greece. The US needs a puppet regime in Greece, according to Andreas Papandreou, in order to maintain bases, facilities, access, and overflight rights there, and in order to use Greece as a rest and recreation area for US Sixth Fleet crews and their families—unwelcome elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Papandreou declares that post-junta Greece should become a neutralist nation, with strong social-democratic or socialist-democratic tendencies and without a king.

Papandreou's critics, in turn, accuse him of following an unrealistic policy, which may be theoretically desirable, but which is politically (i.e., tactically) unfeasible. By lashing out simultaneously at both the US and the USSR and by arguing for a Greece outside of NATO and for a «Europe to the Europeans», he is creating powerful antagonistic poles against his program and aspirations. By insisting on specific and ideologically puristic sets of policies, he is alienating many short-range allies who might have been invaluable in the process of enlarging the wave of opposition against the Papadopoulos regime. So, his critics argue, Papandreou is left with precious little in tangible support from the outside world (whatever third world revolutionary movements can offer him), while, internally, the most likely group to heed his «call to action» is the young («katafides»), rather than the «passive resistance» oriented general public.

Of course, Papandreou can respond to all this by branding it as defeatist talk, and by saying that there is no stopping for an idea whose time has come, and

that violent resistance is not the act of the many but the select few among those dedicated to a set of ideals.

The most speculative and philosophically oriented of the current exiles is the well known musician and leftist politician, Mikis Theodorakis, who is based in Paris. Theodorakis has recently resigned his membership in the Greek Communist party, thus exhibiting his disillusionment with bureaucratic state-capitalism of the Soviet type. Being still in a revolutionary mood, he feels that the Greeks should take time and take stock before making important moves. The time, now, in his opinion, does not appear ripe for violent resistance. From his statements, one can infer only that Theodorakis would counsel for political or subversive rather than open military means. In a recent trial in Athens, Theodorakis was found innocent of a pre-coup charge and, possibly, the road has been opened for his possible return to Greece—a matter of some speculation for Greece's observers.

The highest ranking exile is 32-year-old King Constantine. He lives in Rome, technically the head of state, but discharging few—if any—formal duties. Constantine has been silent on Greek affairs, for the most part. He has only once—and informally—set conditions for his return: i.e., the release of political prisoners, the lifting of martial law, and recourse to free and genuine elections. Otherwise, he has used much of his four-and-a-half-year exile to continue his studies at Cambridge, to read as widely as possible, and to participate in athletic events.

Constantine's options today are limited. He may find himself back in Greece, if the «political transition» formula, favored by most politicians, is adopted. This is even more likely to occur should the US adopt it as its genuine and official policy. Constantine will probably also return to Greece should Papadopoulos invite him to do so. But Papadopoulos, so far, has preferred the status quo *vis-à-vis* the King to any step of ousting him or inviting him back (the low-risk, high-balance policy). In any case, one can safely assume that, should the King return, under any alternative, his role will be limited to ceremonial rather than substantive power.

The most recent exile is Professor of Constitutional Law Georgios Mangakis, whose peculiar exit from Greece (mid-April 1972) via the US military base at the Athens airport and in the presence of the German Ambassador to Greece, Peter Limbourg, caused the ambassador to be named *persona non grata* and to be recalled by Germany. Mangakis had been released for health reasons from prison, where he had been serving an 18- yearsentence for allegedly participating in bombing plots. Mangakis is closer to the Pezmatzoglou-type forces, and his style and actions are hard to predict at this early stage. He has been offered a teaching position at Heidelberg University.

Interestingly enough, the removal from Greece of important personalities—who happen to have international reputations and connections—such as Andreas Papandreou, Mikis Theodorakis, Eleni Vlachou (the prominent conservative publisher), and, most recently, Professor Mangakis, is creating some negative effects within the ranks of the opposition. There is a natural tendency for the rank and file to become concerned with «elitism» and «special treatment» of any sort. This, in turn, reinforces the attitude that, eventually, those who will be most respected and valued will be those who stay in Greece to «face the music»—the persecution, jail, and psychological and even physical torture. «Privileged prisoners» and «privileged revolutionaries» are contradictions in terms. For this point of view, I would like to add that these critics do not realize the extent of psychological privation, despair, and mental torture that life in exile can be. Suffering is geographically indiscriminate, and only its styles and forms change.

Finally, the Communist exiles are currently in the midst of a deep crisis of unity. Their forces have been fragmented and have been, at least, trichotomized into pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese (internationalist-revolutionary), and nationalist bourgeoisified factions. It is ironic that the Greek rightist regime took over power and justified, initially, its takeover as a response to a serious Communist threat. This came at a time when the Communist forces in Greece had been experiencing a progressive decline as a result of internal fragmentation, bourgeoisification, and the reflection of wider schisms in the international Communist movement.

Summing up on exiles, one can say that they are not a force to be easily dismissed in the years to come. If nothing else, they offer the Greeks a psychological feeling—even if it is at times magnified or underrated—that they are ceaselessly working overseas for the restoration of democratic freedoms in the fatherland.

Large numbers of immigrants, especially the estimated 300,000 Greek guest workers in Germany, provide a long-range revolutionary potential of imponderable dimensions—assuming that the restoration of democracy does not occur in the foreseeable future.

Greece is a country heavily dependent on Western tourism and trade. Democratic ideals, like tourists, will continue flowing into Greece. One thing, then, appears certain: that the Greeks will not easily forget or grow unaccustomed to the democratic way of life.

the foreign factor

Greece, from the beginning of its modern history, has experienced constant intervention of great and

even medium-range powers in her internal affairs. The post-World War II period has been no exception. The United States succeeded Britain in 1947—through the Truman Doctrine—in the role of the «protector» of Greece and Turkey, following Britain's abdication from the area and the beginning of her gradual retreat from empire. Greece, through the October 1944 percentages agreement (between Churchill and Stalin), had been relegated to the British and, by succession, to the American sphere of influence. The Soviets appear to have respected the terms of this deal, to date, with religious exactness. This is a lesson that the Greek Communists have not learned easily. In their attempt to take power in Greece through the use of force, they met with the solid hostility of the West and the «benign neglect» of the Soviets. They fought against the tide of strategic imperatives, and they predictably lost. Today, Andreas Papandreou is asking his supporters to play a similar role (in the sense of fighting against Western military imperatives). The cards appear to be stacked against him, and the odds are truly slim.

The US since 1947, has played an extremely important role in Greece. US influence has been manifested through economic and military aid, amounting to well over four billion dollars since 1947, through close bilateral and NATO military cooperation (including the training of close to 11,000 Greek officers in the US), and through economic and cultural penetration by means of sizable trade, investment, and various cultural exchange programs. As a result, the Greek political culture asserts that nothing important can happen in Greece unless the US approves it. It is a logical deduction, therefore, for them to assume that the US engineered the 1967 coup and has been supporting the Papadopoulos regime ever since.

US policy, since 1967, has been officially stated as one of «dilemma», balancing political disappointment against strategic necessity. The substance of the policy, however, appears quite different from its letter. US military aid and support through loans and grants has reversed the downward trend of the mid-1960s, and since the 1967 coup it has been increasing steadily. It has been only as a result of intense congressional pressure that the Nixon Administration was forced to level off its military assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1972, rather than increase it in accordance with budgetary requests.

The operative policy of the US, as opposed to its formal policy, would be more than satisfied if Georgios Papadopoulos were to employ a democratic fig leaf, thus giving his regime some inauthentic trappings of a representative system, while camouflaging certain authoritarian unpleasanties. Papadopoulos, however, has not even offered a surface appearance of liberalization. If anything, the «trend toward con-

stitutionalism» which US officials had been predicting in the middle of 1970 has either atrophied or, more likely, been reversed.

US policy toward Greece in the 1970s appears, then, to fall into an anachronistic, cold-war pattern. US policy-makers seem to be more at ease dealing with a military-backed—albeit unpopular—regime than facing the necessary «inconveniences» which might result from a political government, answerable to its own people, in a free and open society. The US is opting to protect its short-term military interests at the expense of alienating nearly the gamut of the political forces of Greece. Thus it is further nourishing a reputation of siding with dictators rather than popular forces, as a matter of cold-war reflex. Needless to say, this policy is unwise and imprudent, as it has proven repeatedly in the past quite bankrupt—the more so because it has shed even the last few vestiges of morality.

the Greek people

Greece, in spite of its political system, today is a good society. Its people are overwhelmingly cohesive in all aspects of culture, and the country has been enjoying one of the lowest social crime rates on earth. The latter has been a traditional situation in Greece and is unrelated to the «law and order» regime since 1967.

The Greeks have had a traditional tendency toward underestimating their political leadership. This is primarily the result of judging their leaders absolutely rather than relatively—a tendency, that is, not to compare the Greek experience agains that of other nations in similar socio-economic status. When one, however, proceeds with such comparisons, the post-World War II parliamentary governments in Greece, from 1950 to 1967, begin to look very good. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth rates increased an average of 6% yearly in the 1950s, and these growth rates reached an average of 8% in the early and middle 1960s. This earned for Greece the fourth largest growth rate among non-Communist nations in the whole world—a rate which, incidentally, compares quite favorably with the experience of similar socio-economic status countries such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Turkey, and Egypt.

The record in other sectors of growth has, also, been quite satisfactory. For instance, numbers of schools and enrollments in primary and secondary education had been steadily increasing (reaching exponential levels in the 1965-67 period). The number of political parties had been decreasing (down to three major parties in 1967 from over 40 in 1950), a standard indicator of political development. And illiteracy has been combatted in a country where newspapers

are the chief opinion-making medium, compared to the remaining mass media.

The main problems facing Greece prior to the April 1967 coup were an inadequate and inequitable income distribution profile, a backward system of higher education, a bureaucracy that was relatively inefficient and tradition-bound, and a political system which was in need of drastic streamlining. Since the coup, the income distribution picture has not changed drastically (if anything, the gap between the very rich and the very poor has widened), and the situation in higher education has gone from bad to worse—since the problem of dictatorial control of university studies has been added upon numerous (unsolved) traditional problems (such as atrocious student-to-professor ratios, non-participation of students in the governance of the universities, and a virtual absence of post-graduate education). An attempt to decentralize the bureaucracy, beginning with August 1971, has not apparently brought about the desired effects in terms of efficiency and citizen satisfaction. And, finally, the situation in politics has retrogressed drastically with the elimination of democratic-competitive political activity (and attendant citizen participation) in the country.

The two hydrocephalic centers of Greece are found in the Athens-Piraeus and the Thessaloniki urban complexes. One witnesses there, and to a lesser extent in rural Greece, the inevitable pattern of modernization *qua* industrialization: the air of Athens, for example, is now badly polluted by the exhaust fumes of over 200,000 chain-smoking motor vehicles of all kinds, ably aided by air-jet emissions and numerous industrial belt polluters. The traffic jams of downtown Athens seek to rival those of New York City. The supermarket (called «self service» in Greece) is steadily displacing the personalized service that «Mom and Pop» stores were offering in the past. Tailors and seamstresses are being threatened by the ready-made suit and dress. Frozen foods, down to and including frozen vegetables, have made their cold and calculating entry into the market. The Greek self-service managers, however, wishing not to lose their traditional souls altogether, are freezing their plastic-packaged fish with head, gills, fish-eyes, and all. Apartment buildings are relentlessly eating away into the retreating ranks of private homes and their garden plots.

Television is doing its best to cut into an otherwise lovely system of social interaction. Greece—before TV and even still today—probably has the highest number of chairs per capita in the world. Most of these chairs are arrayed on sidewalks, parks, or near the seashore, and they accommodate people who enjoy watching other people—as a fine form of amusement—while sipping coffee, or enjoying a fine

pastry or ice cream, eating a hearty meal and listening to the social blend of voices of a crowd of strollers where young people, older people, and children are thoroughly well integrated. The Greeks today are fighting a valiant battle against the socially decentralizing effects of TV. For instance, they prefer to watch an important soccer game at the local patisserie (thus experiencing also the crowd effect) rather than in the so-called peace and quiet *cum* loneliness of their living rooms. TVs in Greece have not yet won their battle. «Peyton Place» and «Bonanza» and various imitation quiz shows seem to predominate in the generally dull sequences available. Only lately, a locally produced TV serial called «Unknown War» and shown twice a week during prime time is beginning to drive people off the streets and into their homes. The government, which has complete control of all radio and television, is contributing unwittingly to the battle against television. All news and commentary programs are remarkably biased and one-sided. One hears an endless panegyric of announcers' voices—cultured, exultant, melodious or high-pitched—praising «the accomplishments of the Revolution», being «thankful for the peace and quiet in Greece compared to places like Turkey, Italy, Ulster, Bangla Desh, Vietnam, and the US», recounting endless statistical figures on tourism, beds per capita, miles of paved road, and the like, in order to prove the effectiveness of the «revolutionary» regime. The average fellow responds to all this with a mixture of skepticism and indifference, while the wise guys have been known to quip that «they [the regime] are selling us seaweed and passing it off as silk».

The number one national pastime seems to be eating at restaurants. Thousands of restaurants in Athens range from the «koutoukaki» (a little romantic backyard-garden establishment serving mostly low-priced grilled meats) to the *bouzouki* and guitar-accompanied supper at reasonably priced tavernas, all the way up to the expansive and expensive tourist traps such as the Galaxy Room at the Hilton and many «cosmopolitan clubs» along the seashore. All these establishments are nightly packed with good-natured «parées» (groups of good friends) who advance eating into a multimedial art involving conversation, taste, humor, gossip, and—in a hushed tone—the inevitable political discussion.

What has impressed me about most restaurants, *koutoukia*, and cafes is the «honor system» being used. The waiter does not keep track of what he serves. The customer before departing recounts what the «table» consumed and the waiter presents the bill. This runs contrary to the conventional wisdom—usually manufactured by «quack sociologists» locally and especially abroad—to the effect that the Greeks are profoundly suspicious of one another, ungovern-

able, immature, selfish, and uncooperative. One does not have such thoughts walking down narrow Athens streets in the small dark hours of the morning, fearing nothing violent from his fellow man (in the form of muggings, sexual attacks, or existential acts of accumulated boredom and social weightlessness).

In this kind of «social paradise»—which, I must repeat, is not a function of Greece's present political system—the Greeks are living in a «political hell». When I asked a prominent Center Union politician to classify the present Greek system as either totalitarian or authoritarian, his answer was «Orwellian». There can be nothing but a corruptive influence exerted upon the Greek people by a regime which relies on martial law, surveillance, and informers, and which cultivates one-mindedness rather than skepticism, dialogue, counter-criticism, and competitiveness. All one needs to do to be co-opted in a position of some formal responsibility is to accept «the necessity of the revolution, to proclaim its current virtues, and to dedicate himself to its regenerative task». Despite the myth of the «profound corruptiveness» of the Greek political elites, with the possible exception of the «Ivy Leaguers» (mentioned above), very few Greek politicians have sought to rationalize away or compromise their democratic principles by joining the regime.

So we have a situation today where no Greek, including the Prime Minister/Regent, appears to be in favor of the status quo. Papadopoulos, for instance, will emphatically assure his listeners (in private sessions) that he is working day and night for the development of «genuine democracy»—implying (a) that such a perfect system is possible, and (b) that it never existed in Greece.

In the meantime, Greece is ruled by «interim dictatorship». The universities are controlled, the press is self-censored by a Draconian press law which is tantamount to outlawing criticism (if the latter were to arouse old political passions or cultivate a climate of insecurity).

Greeks have traditionally looked to their government for their satisfaction in a number of social service demands. Education is public. Medical services are available for the working and the needy. Hunting licenses, business licenses, permission to build, to teach, or to travel are all subject to some bureaucratic service. The fear, therefore, is acute that once a man becomes a «political leper» he and his family will find themselves as «social and economic lepers». Being out of work, unable to secure a passport or a new job because of political reasons, is not an envious condition to be in.

So the Greeks, as a rule—and especially those who have something to lose (and few don't)—compromise with the status quo. Privately, they hate it and criti-

cize it, and they pin their dimming hopes on the United States, wishing that the US will some day find the dictators superfluous or an unacceptable embarrassment, and will replace them with a more acceptable form of government.

There are some Greeks—still in the minority—who seem to think that the US does not have such overwhelming power over the regime, which by now has become very well entrenched: a garrison state. And so time passes, and soon the Greeks will be looking for the number «6» to commemorate the «golden pages» of contemporary Greek history.

The dilemmas are many for young and old alike. Young men—ambitious and willing to serve their country—have to hesitate before assuming public office for fear of being thought of as «collaborators» of the Regime. Older men and young alike are constantly (probably) involved in speculation as to their proper stance vis-à-vis the regime. Is their silence and seeming indifference and resignation to be considered as passive approval of the regime? Is violent resistance feasible against a regime that has geometrically increased its expenditures for armed and security services, especially if the American colossus appears to be backing it? Shouldn't Greeks, like Czechs and Hungarians, accept their dependent status rather than pay the incalculable costs that the Vietnamese are paying in their struggle? And the Greeks, like the Czechs, are 'figuratively speaking' a bourgeoisified, middle-aged population, definitely not ripe for the «nothing-to-lose» revolutionary attitude.

The chances are that the supporters of violent resistance will not find much response in Greece, although their acts, when occasionally committed, are not condemned in the public mind but are considered as a form of violent political articulation in a country where peaceful but critical political articulation is stifled. On the other hand, the likelihood of low-key but continuous passive resistance of all forms is high. The critical newspapers *Vema*, *Nea*, and *Vradyni* are outselling the pro-regime newspapers decisively. Criticism is inching up, testing out the reflexes of the Draconian press law. Political conversations—quite often critical of the regime—are much more apparent, and the police appear to pretend not to listen. Theater is providing plays where symbolically the regime is castigated to the delirious delight of the «lights-out» protective anonymity of the crowd.

Housewives are complaining about creeping inflation (especially in the price of meat, and especially in the black market price of meat). Others fear that the US facilities for homeporting about nine ships of the Sixth Fleet and their families are going to act as a nuclear magnet in the eventuality of a nuclear war. Others fear that the beautiful waters of the Saronic

Gulf will become polluted by the oil streaks and garbage of the Fleet. Still others complain about the effect on the morals (especially through drugs) of the local population resulting from the new American cultural transplants in the middle of Athens.

As for the regime, it is going on governing. Showing few external signs of fatigue and having power progressively concentrated in the person of Georgios Papadopoulos, it is now trying to convince the people that the present apolitical (Portugalized) system of governance is not, after all, so bad, and that they should grow accustomed to it. Energies of the youth should be sublimated, to please the regime, in pursuits other than political, such as athletics, music, love, and—above all—the art of moneymaking.

As many «non-political» friends of mine told me in Athens, «We may have political dictatorship in Greece, but we have economic democracy—if not anarchy. We may not have the freedom to vote, but we have the freedom and the opportunity to make money». And that is what the regime is apparently interested in cultivating: economic, rather than politi-

cal men, who leave the act of refereeing to a small group of army-backed leaders, who quite often would prefer the facelessness of the technocrat to the glittering lights of a popular politician.

«When will you have elections? When will you apply your own constitution?» I asked a functionary of the present government. He looked at me and he said: «When the 20-year-old *Lambrakides* (Leftist Youth Movement operating prior to 1967) become 30 years old, get jobs, and become heads of families. Then, they will have enough stake in the society not to take off on anarchic stunts. Then, we will be ready for elections». Thinking that this already placed elections around 1977-78, I asked: «What about the next generation of 20-year-olds coming up?» «Oh», he said, «We are not worried about them, because they are growing up under the 'proper' education». Is this really the case? Will the next generation of young Greek men be non-political, economic men, unconcerned about normal democratic rights and freedoms? This is probably the central question for Greeks to ask themselves today!

A Critique on Th. Couloumbis' Article

by JAMES BROWN, *Assistant Professor of Political Science*

Rather than specifically challenge Professor Couloumbis' comments in his article. I would prefer to direct my comments to the fundamental problems that have plagued Greece since her independence, problems that Professor Couloumbis has neglected to consider. Any criticisms attempted by anyone regarding this government or its predecessors must inevitably come to grips with the issues that undergird its socio-economic and political arenas. It is relatively easy to find fault with the current government and its accomplishments, or any government, for that matter. Indeed, criticism is a simple process for those looking on; but the implementation and reconstructing of a society is extremely difficult and complex, especially in developing countries such as Greece, that do not have settled or established structures and institutions.

Space limits us for a detailed examination of Greece's socio-economic and political structures, but let me attempt to put into proper perspective the April 21st coup. I chastise Couloumbis for failing to consider the following factors as crucial variables in the events that followed the coup.

1. As Couloumbis is well aware, the big powers

imposed a parliamentary form of government on Greece in the 19th century at the time of her independence. But possessing a parliamentary government and actually utilizing viable functioning parliamentary institutions and their accompanying accoutrements are two separate questions that would require further independent study. I submit that Greece has never possessed nor developed indigenous parliamentary institutions; therefore, parliamentary government has never been able to function in Greece as we in the West have envisioned that it should.

2. Parliamentary government in 20th century Greece has been the exception rather than the rule. By this is meant military intervention has been nearly constant, either direct, including numerous coups or attempted coups, or indirect, through the exertion of influence on politicians or the Crown. During the first quarter of this century Greek society, its politicians and its military were divided basically between two groups: the Venezelists and the Royalists. These two schisms were instigators, respectively, of several coups. Mr. Couloumbis fails to mention that until this very day martial values have

always been exalted in Greece; this is known as the leventes-palikari syndrome. I would also question Couloumbis' thesis that many of the Greek politicians are committed to democratic government, its institutions and functions. Many of the parliamentary personages who have figured prominently in contemporary Greek politics were, by and large, products of the traditional party system based on the patron-client relationships. This implies that consistent party identification and loyalty is lacking, and that parties and alliances are formed and reformed strictly to advance particular individual careers. Furthermore, many of the politicians that Couloumbis would restore in a new parliamentary government are the self-same people who plotted to implement their own coup d'état in the first half of 1967 (January to mid-April). Their inability to organize was offset by the efficiency of George Papadopoulos and his cohorts to organize and implement the Greek contingency plan, and it was this fact that brought the April 21st coup to the fore. The main point here is that Greek politicians are not and never have been committed to democratic principles in the manner that Western nations consider fundamental for holding elected office. By the same token, the Greek military officer corps does not possess the degree of professionalism that Samuel Huntington (*The Soldier and the State*, 1964) contends is so fundamental to the officer corps of Western armed forces.

3. Another point that is overlooked by Couloumbis is the existing chaotic societal conditions in Greece during 1965-1967, in particular the strikes and political demonstrations. If one examines the Gallup «End of the Year Surveys of Greece» for this period one will find that the Greek populace was most concerned about rising unemployment, inflation, strikes and industrial disputes, and eco-

nomic troubles. Overall, the citizenry was quite pessimistic about the future. These concerns have, for the most part, been largely eliminated since 1967. In fact, the Greek economy has expanded by 8% annually since 1967. Coupled with these problems, the activities of the Left and such organizations as the Lambrakists in fomenting strikes and demonstrations were enough to alarm many sectors of Greek society, as well as the officer corps. The Greek Civil War left many deep scars on Greeks, scars which are very difficult to analyze but which are contributing factors to the April, 1967 coup, as well as to other subsequent events.

In essence, my argument with Mr. Couloumbis is his failure to take into consideration the foundations of Greek institutions and weigh them carefully when putting the accomplishments of this or any government into proper perspective. This writer is convinced that George Papadopoulos is a hard working man who would no doubt like to achieve many of the goals he has set forth. I do agree with Professor Couloumbis that it is unfortunate that the Constitution of 1968 has not been implemented and that free elections have not been held. But the desires of Professor Couloumbis and myself, as well as a great many other people, do not mitigate the fact that the actions of the politicians on the Greek scene, during the two years preceding 1967, have drained the democratic parliamentary system of what vitality it may have had.

Thus, in the end the politicians and their supporters must bear a great share of the responsibility for what exists today in Greece and for what George Papadopoulos is attempting to do. Democracy and its accompanying institutions require a grave obligation that is all too easily discussed but is exceedingly difficult to implement.

SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEYS ON GREEK EMIGRANTS, III (Upon the Return to Greece)

by Elie Dimitras in collaboration with Evan Vlachos

Introduction: The Special Study of Returning Greek Migrant Workers from Western Europe to Greece

I. Earnings of Greek Workers in Western Germany

II. Returning Migrant Workers from Western Europe

III. The Process of Migrant Worker Adjustment

Conclusion

Appendix

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