


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Alexander the Great and the concept of homonoia

by

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The festivities at Opis in 324 B.C. are connected historically with the concept of *Homonoia* which was clearly stated into existence by Alexander the Great. It is the contention of the author that it was meant to personify or portray the *Grand Policy* of Alexander. It marked the beginning of Alexander's aim to consolidate his position over the vast empire which his conquests had created.

The empire of the East presented far more difficult and complex problems for Alexander and the Macedonians, than the small, relatively homogeneous Hellenic world had previously faced. The old policies of both Philip and Alexander were designed for a small empire with analogous problems and conflicts. Consequently the Hellenic oriented policies were severely limited to deal with the numerous and large problems which were besetting the empires of the Orient.

Homonoia was to become the ideological cornerstone of Alexander's *Grand Policy* which was in the process of formation, in order to meet the challenges of the new empire, to arrest or check problems which it could not solve and to create a new world order. I do not exclude the possibility that Alexander was motivated by a noble inspiration and desire for world unity. However, *Homonoia* came to be identified with political forces such as foreign policy, leadership and political institutions, and it was translated into political terms. Thus, *Homonoia* was a force of arrest and creation simultaneously and consisted of the following features:

- a) the fusion of cultures
- b) deification of Alexander
- c) economic reorganization of the empire
- d) social and nationalistic revolutions, the return of mercenaries, and the arresting of the conflict
- e) an enlightened personal rule and the incorporation of certain features of an imperialistic democracy.

a. fusion of cultures

Alexander of Macedonia was only twenty years old when he became king in 336 B.C., succeeding his father Philip, who was assassinated the same year. According to Plutarch, Alexander the Great was born on the sixth day of Hecatombaeon, probably in July or August of 356 B. C. He was the son of Philip II and Olympias. Olympias came from the royal house of Epirus and traced her descent from Achilles. From his father's side, Alexander was a descendant of Heracles through Caranus.¹

1. Plutarch, *Lives*, Vol. VII, Second Edition. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1928, p. 225.

Alexander grew up under the strong influence of his mother as well as his father. His relationship to Heracles, the greatest hero of the Hellenic world, was probably beyond any serious question.¹ At the age of thirteen, Philip entrusted him to Aristotle who had become the most influential of Plato's pupils. Aristotle taught Alexander philosophy, medicine, botany, zoology and geography, and inspired him with deep love of the art of healing, poetry and Greek culture.²

When Alexander became the king of Macedonia in 336, he had already acquired a considerable amount of knowledge in theory from his teacher, Aristotle, and in practice from his father and his generals. Philip and his generals taught Alexander the art of war, diplomacy and administration. Early in 340 B.C. Philip left Alexander in charge of the government of Macedonia when he set out to conquer Byzantium.³

Alexander remained in charge of the government for more than a year. His ability to continue the efficient administration of Philip was demonstrated quite well. Alexander's test in the art of war came only two years later in 338 B.C. in the Battle of Chaeronea. In this particular military engagement, Alexander displayed great bravery and won from Philip the highest approval.⁴ Plutarch says that Philip was happy to hear the Macedonians say after the Battle of Chaeronea that Alexander was king and Philip the general.⁵

In the diplomatic arena Alexander demonstrated his ability by the agreement which he concluded with the Athenians in 338 B.C.⁶ The death of Philip found the Macedonians preparing for an invasion of Persia as it had been decided by the first pan-Hellenic Council of Corinth in 338 B.C.

It was the early spring of 334 B.C. when Alexander set out to invade the Persian Empire with a force of about 45,000 troops. The strategic plans of Alexander were not entirely of his own. The decision to invade Persia had been made by Philip II and was approved by the first pan-Hellenic Congress at Corinth in 338 B.C. An invasion of combined Greek forces under the direction of Macedonia against the Persian Empire was high on the agenda of Macedonia's foreign policy. The Persian control of Asia Minor, the Asiatic coast of the important straits of the Dardanelles, and the Black Sea was a

monumental threat and obstacle to Macedonia's policy of expansion. Philip's victories against the various eastern Balkan tribes and his success in the dismantling of the Athenian Empire in southeastern Thrace and the northeastern Aegean were meaningless as long as the Great king controlled Asia Minor. Through the Greek city-states of Asia, the Persian king could instigate revolutions and interfere very easily in the internal affairs of the Macedonian Empire as he had done with the Greek city-states in 383 by the Treaty of Sousa and in 378 through the Peace of Antalcidas.

Thus Alexander's first important decision was very consistent with the basic principles of Macedonian foreign policy. This vast empire covered a territory of more than fifty times that of his own and had a population twenty-five times as great.

A brief timetable of Alexander's conquests is as follows:⁷

- 334 B.C. The Invasion of Asia Minor
- 334 B.C. The Battle of Granicus
- 333 B.C. The Battle of Issus
- 332 B.C. The Siege of Tyre
- 332 B.C. The Invasion of Syria and Egypt
- 331 B.C. The Conquest of Syria and Egypt
- 331 B.C. The Battle of Gaugamela or Arbela
- 327-326 B.C. The Invasion of India

Thus, in a relatively brief period of seven years Alexander managed to bring the entire Middle East under his military control. As soon as he had accomplished this task, he set out to those conquered peoples as well as to the Greeks a new order of life based upon the principle of *Homonoia*. It is this single principle which can be used as a mirror in order to reflect the role of Alexander in world history and the historical process of the fourth century B.C.

Ten years had passed since the time that Alexander had set foot on the Asian continent. During those years the war of conquest had been successfully carried out. Alexander decided that a grand five days' holiday was necessary in order to celebrate a unique festival which would emphasize the successful completion of the war and the beginning of a new era of international understanding and cooperation between the victors and the vanquished. The festival was to symbolize the marriage of Europe and Asia.⁸ Alexander himself married Statira who was the oldest daughter of Darius. Hephaestion received Drypetis, a younger daughter; Craterus, a niece of Darius; Perdicas, the daughter of the satrap of Media; Ptolemy and Eumenes, two daughters of Artabazus;

1. *Ibid.*

2. Fuller, J.F.C., *The Generalship of Alexander the Great*. London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1958, p. 57.

3. Wheeler, Benjamin Ide. *Alexander the Great. The Merging of East and West in Universal History*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1900, p. 64.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

5. *Op. cit.*, Plutarch, *Lives*, p. 245.

6. *Op. cit.*, Wheeler, p. 72.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 476.

Nearchus, the daughter of Mentor; Seleucus, the daughter of Spitamenes the Bactrian.¹

Along with the plan of promoting intermarriage as a positive step towards building a new order, Alexander was facing seriously the question of the reorganization of the army in order to promote better the concept of *Homonoia*. Many of his Greek troops had grown old and were no longer fit for fighting. Many of them had already shown a basic disagreement with his treatment of the conquered races.

In reorganizing the army Alexander found that at least ten thousand of his Greek troops (mainly from Macedonia) would have to be retired and sent back home. At the same time he began to introduce regiments of Bactrians, Parthians, Arachotians, and Zarangians into his army. Many of these Asiatic armies had already fought bravely with him in the Indian invasion of 327-326 B.C. This, of course, also constituted a political move, and it was clearly in line with the generous and noble treatment which Alexander had already given to the conquered races.

Since his stay in Egypt Alexander seems to have begun to understand that the best policy of establishing an enduring and successful government in a foreign territory was to be based primarily upon a close and honest cooperation between the victor and the conquered.² The principle of cooperation had been developed by and large by his father, and it was incorporated into the Macedonian foreign policy. The treatment of Athens and other Greek city-states, which, with the exception of Thebes, submitted to Macedonia's power, was generous, and they were urged to join a cooperative organization. Philip discovered that brute force alone could not serve best the imperial interests of his state and he was glad to share his culture, religion and economic interests with other states as long as the basic interests of Macedonia were promoted.

However, what Alexander seems to have understood well while he was in Egypt was that the principle of cooperation had to assume greater dimensions and a broader base. The Macedonian principle of cooperation was limited only to the Greeks, and it was not applicable to the barbarians; Alexander found that the time had come to break down the barrier of barbarism and to reform this principle if he was to use it meaningfully and effectively in his new empire.

When Alexander announced his decision to promote cooperation between the victor and vanquished to the army in the summer of 324 at Opis, a storm of protests was raised immediately by the

Greek troops. They felt that they had been used by Alexander, and now when he found them useless he was casting them aside. Many of Alexander's troops had already been annoyed; they were angry with his identification with the Oriental culture and specifically with his assumption of Oriental dress and his favorable behavior towards his new subjects and their gods.³

In replying to their protests and charges of total submission to the culture of the barbarians, Alexander angrily ordered the execution of thirteen soldiers and took immediate steps to reorganize the army. He ordered the formation of Persian units, some bearing Greek names, in order to replace the Macedonian units which were in the state of revolt.

As soon as Alexander's decision became known, his soldiers, heartbroken, came to the doors of his palace and they refused to leave unless Alexander would forgive them. With tears in his eyes, the King came immediately out to meet his weeping troops and he listened to the grievances of his troops pronounced through their spokesman Callines: "ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ λυποῦντά ἐστι Μακεδόνας ὅτι σὺ Περσῶν μὲν τινας ἤδη πεποιήσαι σωτῆρς συγγενεῖς, καὶ καλοῦνται Πέρσαι συγγενεῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ φιλοῦσί σε. Μακεδόνων δὲ οὕτω τις γέγυενται ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς."⁴

To these charges Alexander replied: "Ἄλλ' οὐμὰς γε, ἔφη, ξύμπαντας ἐμαυτῷ τίθεμαι συγγενεῖς καὶ τὸ γε ἀπὸ τοῦτου οὕτω καλέσω."⁵

Following this act of reconciliation, the troops returned joyfully to their camp while Alexander ordered the celebration of the event by a great feast. In this gigantic feast, Greeks, Persians, Indians and other national groups sat next to each other, dancing, singing and drinking from the same bowl. Alexander prayed for many blessings and especially for *Homonoia*.⁶ Εὐχeto δὲ τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τε καὶ κοινωνίαν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῖς τε Μακεδόσι καὶ Πέρσας. Western translations like the Loeb Series identify *Homonoia* with Harmony. This tendency has led to serious gaps in the scholarly research concerning ideological and political problems in the fifth and fourth century B.C. Plato uses both concepts in the Republic with distinctly different meaning and intent.

Aristotle says that *Homonoia* approaches closely friendship ("Ἡ δ' ὁμόνοιά ἐστι μὲν σύνεγγυς τῇ φιλίᾳ). *Homonoia* presupposes that people have mu-

3. Arrian, *History of Alexander the Great and Indica*. Translated by E. Iliff Robson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949, p. 227.

4. Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander*, VII, ii, 3-8.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, p. 241. (Loeb, P.A. Brunt and others translate *Homonoia* to harmony.)

1. *Ibid.*, p. 477.

2. Savill, Agnes, *Alexander the Great and His Time*. London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1950, p. 56.

tuality in their thought process and possess the *directly analogous* determination aiming towards a common achievement. Isocrates speaks often about *Homonoia* as an ideological basis for pan-Hellenic unity. Shaken with emotion Alexander the Great prays for *Homonoia* at Opis in 324 B.C.

The translation of *Homonoia* to harmony is not correct. Ὁμόνοια (*Homonoia*) means union of mind, ψυχή and body. The word Ὁμόνοια carries with it some kind of noble and spontaneous community spirit, it implies dynamic action and movement, it transcends conflict, it seeks catharsis and γαλήνη for the blood stained human civilization, it lifts man from the earthly world and thrusts him toward the rising sun.

The scenes which took place at Opis symbolize and underline the climax of Alexander's drive for *Homonoia*. He demonstrated that he wanted some kind of unity to be established among the Greeks, the Persians and other tribal or racial groups. At Opis Alexander clearly departs from the political philosophy of his teacher, Aristotle. It seems that Alexander arrived at the conclusion that the line between barbarians and non-barbarians had to be drawn, not on racial, ethnic or tribal boundaries but rather on individual ones based on Greek ideals such as φιλία and ἀρετή.¹

I must now try to explore the development of *Homonoia* in the mind of Alexander. In this exploration I will try to show the relationship of such a process, to the experiences, difficulties and policies of Alexander.

Plutarch suggests that Alexander had at least a plan concerning the reorganization of the East after her submission to his will.² This plan was probably vague but, nonetheless, it proposed to better the civilization, culture and welfare of the peoples of the East.

Concerning the treatment which Alexander reserved for the vanquished, Plutarch goes on to say that Alexander did not follow Aristotle's advice to treat gently the Greeks and harshly the non-Greeks but like a hero aware of his cosmopolitan mission tried to unite all his subjects into a congenial society, offering without discrimination the olive branch or the thunder to everybody.³

From these statements it seems apparent that Alexander realized that the security and ultimate survival of this empire was directly linked with *Homonoia* which was to identify with the refined, re-evaluated, enlarged and reformed old Macedonian foreign policy principle of cooperation. Diodorus

Siculus says that Alexander was planning to move in the future against «the Carthaginians and the others who live along the Coast of Libya and Iberia and the adjoining coastal region as far as Sicily.»⁴

Alexander's future plans and intentions are not at all clear at this point. Although we do not know how accurate and reliable Diodorus's source is, one can safely conclude that if Alexander had any plans whatsoever, involving future conquests either in the East or in the West, he had to consolidate his conquests up to this point. We know that Greece was not at all pacified and remained potentially the most troublesome area of the Empire. We also know that most of the Macedonian troops were old and tired after many years of fighting.

If we assume that Alexander was guided by elementary common sense he could rely neither on the Greeks, nor on his old and tired Macedonian troops to keep the empire under control; and if he was any kind of Strategos he must have known that before going on hoping to rule what he conquered, he had to secure his back by making some sense out of the chaos which his brilliant victories had produced. If Alexander was to put his house in order even for a period of a few years in order to return to Macedonia or to go on conquering the rest of the world, then he had to rely on some kind of cooperation from his subjects. For if Alexander failed to think this way, we must conclude that he was nothing but an egocentric megalomaniac or a dreamer, totally controlled by his evergrowing passion to kill, conquer and destroy. It is conceivable that Alexander was guided in some period of his life by the shadow of Achilles.⁵ It is dangerous, however, to conclude that Alexander never responded to social and political problems and never considered «purely rational calculations.»⁶ Although Alexander did not have to be the author of brotherhood idea he could have used it just as well for his own purposes.

However, Plutarch seems to believe that Alexander had formulated a plan concerning *Homonoia* before he crossed the Hellespont in 334 B.C., and that his treatment of the Asiatic peoples as well as his reorganization of the empire were simply implementations of his pre-formulated policy.⁷

However, Plutarch does not tell us to what extent Alexander was committed to *Homonoia* before he undertook his campaign against Persia and to what degree and detail his plans were formulated before 334 B.C. To conclude as Plutarch does, that Alexander had a plan formulated well in advance, it seems

1. P. A. Brunt, *Greece and Rome* (1965), pp. 215.

2. Plutarch, *Moralia*, Vol. IV: Translated by Frank Cole Babbitt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 341.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 397-399.

4. Diodorus Siculus, Vol. VII, Book XVII, p. 21.

5. Arrian, I. 12. 1.

6. P. A. Brunt, *Greece and Rome*, 1965, pp. 208.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 401.

to me, is not safe. Rather, I think, it is more proper to measure Alexander's commitment to *Homonoia* in the light of the growing opposition from his generals and his troops to his treatment of the vanquished peoples and the ways in which he was reorganizing the East.

From 330 B.C. to 327 B.C. a constant deterioration of relations between Alexander and his troops, his staff, and his generals can easily be accounted for from the information supplied both by Arrian and Plutarch.

Around July, 330 B.C., Darius was dead. This meant that Alexander was now the undisputed leader of the Persian Empire. The Persian opposition to Alexander came to an end with Darius' death and now Alexander showed a commitment to the principle of respecting and vitalizing existing institutions of government which displayed some validity and efficiency.¹ Persian noblemen and other capable leaders were admitted to Alexander's court while Persian satraps were being restored to the control of the provinces which they before governed.² Soon Alexander began occasionally assuming Oriental dress and displaying an increasing admiration and respect for the civilization and culture of the Orient. Plutarch says that Alexander preferred the Persian dress for its simplicity over the Median which was more or less a compromise between the Oriental and the Macedonian dress.³

During the autumn of 330 B.C., Alexander discovered a plot against his life, and according to Arrian, Philotas, one of Alexander's top generals and son of Parmenion, was convicted by clear proof. Philotas was executed and at the same time his father, Parmenion, was also put to death, mainly from fear of rebellion against the king. Philotas was the first Macedonian of high rank who expressed openly his opposition to Alexander's fair treatment and respect for the Oriental peoples and their civilization. Alexander stood firm in his decision and he paid the price of executing two of his best military leaders. The death of Parmenion was especially a dark spot in the career of Alexander, because Parmenion was the oldest of his generals and had guided both Philip and Alexander to great victories.

Following this incident, another one occurred in 328 B.C. in Samarkand, which constitutes the most grievous misdeed of Alexander. This particular incident involves the murder of Clitus, the man who had saved his life in the battle of Granicus, by Alex-

ander personally. Both Plutarch and Arrian believed that Alexander and Clitus had lost control of their tempers from excessive drinking at a supper held in honor of Dioscuri. However, in the bitter verbal exchange between Clitus and Alexander there is revealed the deep resentment of Clitus to Alexander's plan and belief in cultural fusion, and at the same time Alexander's commitment to *Homonoia*.⁴

Still another incident occurred in 327 B.C. which dramatizes further the growing commitment of Alexander to new cosmopolitanism. Following Philotas and Clitus, it was now Callisthenes, the philosopher, a relative of Aristotle, and Anaxarchus of Abdera, who opposed openly the act of *Proskynesis* (prostration). This act had been introduced by Alexander as a form of etiquette from the Oriental culture.⁵

Callisthenes had also criticized the growing trend of cosmopolitanism. These acts of Callisthenes, as well as his involvement in a plot against Alexander's life, infuriated Alexander and soon Callisthenes was arrested, under orders from Alexander. He died some months later in chains. The death of Callisthenes created hostility between Alexander and Aristotle.⁶ Theophrastus, in a pamphlet, branded Alexander as a tyrant and Demetrius of Phalerum joined Cassander, the enemy of Alexander. Theophrastus and Demetrius worked out a doctrine of chance which was applied to Alexander while the Peripatetic School, of which Callisthenes had been a member, projected Alexander as a despot and a tyrant.⁷

In the early spring of 327 B.C., Alexander launched a clean-up operation in order to subdue certain tribes in the extreme East of Sogdiana. While defeating the Bactrians there, Alexander fell in love with Roxana, the daughter of Oxayartes. According to Arrian, Alexander did not use the right of the conqueror in order to take Roxana, but he proposed an honorable marriage. Plutarch also believed that Alexander's marriage to Roxana was a dignified love affair.⁸

This noble act of Alexander seems to constitute another step in his policy of conciliation and amalgamation, to the disappointment of the Greek Old Guard. If we sum up and assess the importance of the above-mentioned incidents, one can observe a constant growth in Alexander's commitment to *Homonoia*, particularly from 330 to 324 B.C. The highest degree of Alexander's commitment to *Homonoia* was reached at Opis in 324 B.C.

1. *Op. cit.*, Wheeler, p. 384.

2. Diodorus Siculus, Vols. VII, VIII and IX. Translated by C.H. Oldfather. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 341.

3. *Op. cit.*, Plutarch, *Moralia*, p. 403.

4. *Op. cit.*, Plutarch, *Lives*, p. 321.

5. *Op. cit.*, Wheeler, p. 411.

6. *Op. cit.*, Plutarch, *Lives*, p. 385.

7. *Op. cit.*, Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*, p. 82.

8. *Op. cit.*, Plutarch, *Lives*, pp. 360-361.

b. Alexander's deification

The issue concerning Alexander's deification has been a controversial argument among historians regarding its substance and validity, as well as its purpose and meaning. I intend not to take part in the dispute; rather it seems to me it is necessary to bring about an account of Alexander's visit both to the temple of the Delphic Apollo in 335 B.C. and to the temple of Ammon at Siwah in the midwinter of 332-331 B.C.

From Plutarch we have the information that Alexander received the title ἀνίκητος («invincible» or «unconquered») from Pythia when he visited the sacred temple of Apollo at Delphi in 335 B.C. However, Diodorus says that Alexander received the title of Invincible from Ammon at Siwah. Clearly, there is here a basic disagreement between the two historians as to the place and time, when Alexander received this title. But no historian dealing with Alexander has ever questioned the existence of a legend concerning this issue. There are some valid reasons to defend Alexander's deification on the ground of the psychological and political utility of such a move. W.W. Tarn believes that the deification «was entirely a political matter.»¹

It seems quite logical that the psychological reasons were also very important. Psychologically, it was necessary for a supreme leader and ruler to project on the masses of his subjects the supreme image with which they could identify. Since the religions of the Middle East were polytheistic, allowing for the existence of a large number of different gods who had a human personality full of passions and desires, Alexander's deification could produce a supreme devotion on the part of his subjects to his leadership and could make the masses identify more readily with his goals and drives, thus eliminating a great deal of possible opposition to *Homonoia*. It seems also probable that the masses of Asia were in need of heroes to whom they attributed supernatural qualities, because of the profound crisis which their religions were facing.

Consequently one may view Alexander as the super human who spreads the gospel of *Homonoia*. His deified personality fulfils the psychological need of the masses for the supernatural and thus enhances the moral power and appeal of *Homonoia*.

c. the economic reorganization of the empire

The measures of finance and economic development that Alexander conceived in order to organize his empire on a new economic basis after the military

conquests were terminated, are closely connected with *Homonoia* because they seem to be an integral part of his Grand Policy.

Planning to reorganize the economic structure of the Near East, Alexander found it necessary to engage in an exploration of the seas and the land. For this reason Archais was given the task of making certain preliminary surveys of the Coast of Arabia and of producing a detailed report concerning some possible inlets for harbors, docks and sites for new cities.²

The myths concerning the size and limits of the Caspian Sea were of a deep concern to Alexander and he intended to discover whether the Caspian Sea had any connection with the Great Ocean which was supposedly encircling the *Oikoumene*. For this project a large number of ships were ordered to be constructed on the shore of the Caspian Sea in order to be ready for the day when the expedition would be undertaken.

Another important problem concerning trade was the establishment of sea communications between India and Persia. Harbors and dockyards of great dimensions were ordered to be constructed at Babylon and Patara. The Tigris River was made more navigable, the harbors of Clazomenae and Erythrae were improved, while a new Phoenicia on the coast of the Persian Gulf was projected.³

In order to facilitate the exchange of commodities and to stimulate trade, Alexander revolutionized finance. One of the first problems which he attacked in the area of finance was that of coinage. The problem was to reconcile the decimal coinage of Persia (one gold daric—20 silver sigloi) with the duodecimal of Philip II (one gold stater, attic standard—24 silver drachmae, Phoenician standard).⁴ The solution which Alexander proposed was based on the adoption of the Attic standard, thus making the stater equal to 20 silver drachmae, which were acceptable in Asia. By doing this Alexander succeeded in avoiding competition with the coinage of Athens and almost made her a trade partner. As the treasures of Darius which had remained hidden and out of circulation for a long time began to circulate freely over the empire, the Persian money was demonetised and the Persian gold fell below Philip's basic ratio.⁵ The uniformity of coinage stimulated and promoted trade to a large degree.

The project of city building was one of those at the top of Alexander's list. Alexander engaged in an enormous city building project by founding at least 17 cities. Even if we take this minimum figure of 16

2. *Op. cit.*, Savill, p. 145.

3. *Op. cit.*, Fuller, p. 273.

4. *Op. cit.*, Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, Vol. II, p. 130.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

1. Tarn, W. W., *Alexander the Great*, Vol. I: Narrative. Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 112.

Alexandrias and one Alexandrette,¹ it is not difficult to appreciate the magnitude of this project. By building a number of cities Alexander initiated a vast scheme of colonization in Asia.² However, this colonization was much different from the kind of colonization which the Greeks before Alexander had practiced because it was clearly and deliberately planned, and thus it was not restricted to building cities near the sea with a homogeneous group of settlers. Alexander's colonization included cities that were away from the sea, and settlers who were a mixture of several diverse elements coming from groups with wide political, religious and cultural backgrounds.³ A typical Alexandria was settled with Greek mercenaries, traders, natives and Macedonians. Greek women were sent also into these settlements to help balance the culture between the Greek and the Persian.

Diodorus says that Alexander was planning in conjunction with his future military campaigns against North Africa, Iberia and Sicily to build an elaborate network of shipyards and cities involving population shifts from one continent to another.⁴

Most of the Greek city-states depended on the non-Hellenic world for wheat and corn supplies. Thessaly and Macedonia were large producers of wheat, but the production was not enough to satisfy the requirements of the populations of the other city-states. In 330 B.C., Alexander decided to introduce a solution to the problem of food shortage in Greece. Cyrene, a city in Northern Africa included in his empire, was to undertake the task of supplying the Greek states with corn from 330 until 326 B.C. The trade agreement between Cyrene and the Greek states was preceded by a friendship alliance between Cyrene and Alexander in 331 B.C. while he was on his way to visit the oracle of Ammon.⁵ Such a commercial intercourse was highly beneficial for Alexander's efforts and desires to establish a firm control over his empire and to arrest the forces of disintegration. In Greece his prestige rose and the pro-Macedonian forces were strengthened. With the economic situation improving, possible social unrest due to food shortage was temporarily eliminated. The stimulation of trade in the eastern Mediterranean area produced positive effects on the economic stability of the area. The opening up of new lands by Alexander offered a relief to the declining Greek trade.⁶

d. social and nationalistic revolutions arresting of the conflict

The process of revolution which became so powerful before Alexander's time, continued to undermine the structures of the Hellenic and Asiatic societies during Alexander's reign as well. This problem was one of extreme concern for Alexander. The national independence struggle and the accompanying social revolutions, were threatening the vast Macedonian empire with disintegration. Let us look at the national struggle and social revolutions during the reign of Alexander, and then consider the steps which Alexander took in order to improve the situation and to establish order and control over his subjects.

When Philip came to Corinth in 336 in order to attend the first pan-Hellenic Congress, he declared, to the delight of the pro-Macedonian delegates of the Congress, that any attempts for social revolution in the city-states would be crushed by the combined strength of the forces of the League and those of Macedonia.⁷

The first revolution which Alexander had to deal with were a series of uprisings in Thrace and Illyria. Local tribes in both regions tried to throw off the yoke of the Macedonian rule as soon as Philip died. Alexander brought his armed forces immediately into the revolted areas and crushed the Thracians first and the Illyrians soon after.⁸

The operations in Thrace and Illyria were still in progress when Alexander learned about the revolt of the Greek city-states.⁹ The Thebans wanted to expel the garrison which Macedonia had placed in the Acropolis of the city and to rid themselves of their pro-Macedonian rulers who supported the army of occupation. At the same time they appealed to the Athenians and the peoples of other city-states for help.

Alexander rushed to the gates of Thebes leading his entire army. After a determined struggle for freedom or death, the Thebans submitted to the will of Alexander. More than six thousand Thebans died for their freedom, while over thirty thousand were captured and the loss of property reached very large proportions. Alexander decided to punish the Thebans severely in order to demonstrate beyond any doubt his determination to crush revolutions with all his might.

Alexander wanted to identify his decision with the interests of the League and the pro-Macedonian circles of Greece. So he put the fate of the Thebans

1. *Ibid.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Op. cit.*, Diodorus, Vol. VII, Book XVII, p. 21.

5. *Op. cit.*, Diodorus, Vol. VII, Book XVII, p. 49.

6. Wason, Margaret, O., *Class Struggle in Ancient Greece*. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., p. 165.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

8. *Op. cit.*, Diodorus, Vol. VIII, Book XVI, p. 139.

9. *Ibid.*

into the hands of the representatives of the Greek city-states who had participated in a meeting organized by him, in order to deal specifically with the case of Thebes.¹

Following this action against Thebes, Alexander proceeded to demand that the Athenians surrender to him the leaders of the anti-Macedonian party. Because the people of Athens refused to betray Demosthenes and Lycurgus, their most effective leaders, and because they displayed a deep solidarity with the two men, Alexander withdrew his demand wanting probably to lessen the tensions between Macedonia and Athens and to strengthen the hand of the pro-Macedonian party of Athens.²

Five years after the destruction of Thebes in 335 B. C. Alexander fought the battle of Arbela which decided the ultimate fate of the Persian Empire. When word came to Greece that Persia was ready to fight her most decisive battle against Alexander, the city-states decided to seize this last opportunity and to strike against Macedonia for their freedom, being alarmed with the terrific growth of the Macedonian power. At the same time a revolution was in process in Thrace and this seemed to offer the Greeks an additional hope.³

While Antipater, the leader of Macedonia during Alexander's absence, was preoccupied with the revolution in Thrace led by Memnon, the Spartans issued an appeal to all the Greeks to unite in defense of their freedom. Soon most of the Peloponnesians and the northern Greeks joined forces and declared war against Macedonia. Athens, however, stayed out of the revolt because the pro-Macedonian forces there were very strong.⁴

Antipater upon learning about the Greek revolt, came immediately to terms with the revolutionaries in Thrace and moved all his forces against the Greek revolution. In a furious battle that took place in Peloponnesos, Antipater crushed the revolution after sustaining heavy casualties.

In the meantime, social revolutions were going on in many islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea. In 333 B. C. the admiral Memnon sailed against Lesbos, Chios and other islands of the Aegean and with the help of the oligarchical parties took control of these islands. Alexander responded immediately to the situation and encouraged the democratic elements of these states to fight against oligarchy. There are three inscriptions which vividly express

the social struggle in these places, that became virtually a clash of oligarchy against democracy, stimulated by outside forces.⁵

In a letter to the Chians, Alexander «orders the return of all the Chians who were exiled by the oligarchy, to their city and the establishment there of a democratic constitution. A board of elected (νομογράφοι) law makers, whose number is not specified, is to record and correct the laws, removing anything which conflicts with the democratic government of the state and with the restoration of the exiles, and the laws, so codified and amended, are to be submitted to Alexander for ratification. Chios is to supply at its own expense twenty fully equipped triremes to the King's Hellenic fleet.»⁶

Alexander also ordered the punishment of all the Chians who cooperated with the Persians and supported oligarchy, by banishment from all the city-states. In the meantime, in cooperation with the council of the League of Corinth, Alexander ordered through a resolution of the League the trial of all the Chian citizens who supported oligarchy and who were still residing in Chios. Any dispute arising between returned exiles and those who stayed in the city should be judged in Alexander's own court, and until a settlement was reached, the King was to station in the city an adequate garrison, which would be maintained by the Chians.

With the growth of the Macedonian power, the Athenian pro-Macedonian party also grew in size and importance. Isocrates and Demades were the leading figures of the pro-Macedonian movement in Athens. As this party grew with the help of the Macedonian power and influence, it successfully counterbalanced the anti-Macedonian party of Demosthenes. The result of such a balance of political forces in Athens was a paralysis of the Athenian foreign policy. When the Spartans called for a pan-Hellenic revolution against the Macedonians in 330 B. C., the Athenians decided to remain neutral because of a deep split in their ranks. The majority of the Athenian masses favored, however, the revolution.⁷

With the power of Macedonia reaching unprecedented proportions and the revolution of 330 B. C. been crushed by Antipater, the struggle among the Athenians was greatly intensified. The party of Demosthenes became almost desperate for an opportunity to revolt.

Late in 327 B. C. the state of Athens decided to honor Memnon II. The uncle of Memnon II, Memnon I, was the Admiral of the Greek mercenaries in the Battle of Issus. It is indeed very strange and

1. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

3. Hicks, E. L. and Hill, G. F., *Greek Historical Inscriptions*. New and Revised Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901. p. 305.

4. *Op. cit.*, Tod, No. 193, p. 268; *op. cit.*, Diodorus, Vol. VIII, Book XVII, p. 297.

5. *Op. cit.*, Hicks and Hill, pp. 294, 301, 303.

6. *Op. cit.*, Tod, No. 192, pp. 263, 264; *op. cit.*, Hicks and Hill, No. 158, pp. 301, 302.

7. *Op. cit.*, Hicks and Hill, p. 306.

interesting to find Athens in 327 displaying such a courage as to honor a member of a family that had rendered such distinguished services to the Persian cause.¹

Fully aware of the unrest in the Greek world, expressed in terms of national and class struggles, Alexander wanted to *arrest* these forces and proceeded to take certain steps in that direction to secure a better cooperation between the city-states and his empire. He dealt first with the problem of the exiles. The social strife in Greece during the fourth century led to a large number of revolutions fought primarily between the forces of oligarchy and democracy. Because of these revolutions, a large number of exiles gathered in Asia Minor, fleeing mainly from the fear of reprisals from the victorious party, and with the hope of returning to their states at a later time to instigate a counterrevolution. Alexander properly recognized that as long as these exiles remained away from their homes, they would always be a potential threat and could initiate the spark of revolution in his empire.

Under these circumstances, Alexander decided upon the restoration of the exiles. In the early autumn of 324 he sent Nicanor to the Olympic festival with an Edict which pertained to the restoration of the exiles. The Olympic festival offered an excellent propaganda ground, and thus Nicanor «caused the victorious herald» to read letters from Alexander which contained the decision of the King to restore all the Greek exiles except the Thebans and those who were guilty of murder or sacrilege. In addition, he dissolved the Arcadian Leagues and other alliances, except the League of Corinth.²

Diodorus tells us that the measure was welcomed in most of the states, although there was some opposition from the Aetolians and the Athenians.³ Thus Alexander's attempt to arrest the social forces in Greece was an apparent success. The Edict was therefore a wise exercise of personal power, in the interest of peace.⁴

e. Alexander's enlightened personal rule and foreign policy

From the beginning of Alexander's political career, his actions appear to be directed to arrest and control the phenomena of class conflict, and those caused by political and national revolutions. He seems also interested to extend the foundations of Macedonian foreign policy which was based upon the principle of expansion in territory and influence.

Alexander's mission was to understand the general phenomenon of the crisis, to examine the nature of various forces, to shape these social thrusts into a mainstream; thus directing the historical process. In this endeavour Alexander's personal charisma becomes his most powerful weapon. Alexander's moral quality was expressed vividly by his feelings of compassion for others. This quality was unique in the Ancient world. As W.W. Tarn writes, «No public man throughout Greek history is, I think, to have shown pity. It was womanly, and best left to poets and philosophers.»⁵ His treatment of women is also unique in the entire ancient history. On more than one occasion he demonstrated his special respect for women. When two Macedonian soldiers had outraged the wives of some of the mercenary soldiers, Alexander ordered Parmenion «in case the men were convicted, to punish them and put them to death as wild beast born for the destruction of mankind.»⁶ When the Macedonian troops entered victorious into Persepolis, Alexander ordered them to spare the persons and the ornaments of women, while he treated the captive wife, mother and daughters of Darius with royal respect and dignity, unparalleled for the time.⁷

Alexander's charismatic personality was not divorced from his foreign policy. His charisma was reflected in the success of his military campaigns, foreign policy and administration. Perhaps the most important feature in Alexander's over all policy was his enlightened personal rule. The enlightened leadership of Alexander was a function of his unusual charisma and his educational background, greatly enriched by the teaching of Aristotle and Isocrates, and shaped further by the cosmopolitan spirit of the age.

As it has previously been mentioned, Alexander's foreign policy at the start of his reign was almost identical with that of his father. He began his international adventures from the point at which his father left off, namely a military expedition against the Persian Empire. Macedonia was clearly on an expansionistic move in the fourth century with prime object and concern the creation of an empire of large dimensions and power, establishing itself as the dominant power in the Greek world and the Balkans.

Under Philip's dynamic leadership the state of Macedonia began to expand in all four directions. After a series of brilliant military operations and even more brilliant diplomatic victories by Philip, the state of Macedonia by 336 B.C. had forced almost all of the Greek city-states, the peoples of Illyria, Thrace and those inhabiting the areas south of the Danube, to submit to her control and administration.

1. *Op. cit.*, Tod, No. 199, pp. 283, 284.

2. *Op. cit.*, Tod, p. 297.

3. *Op. cit.*, Diodorus, Vol., IX., Book XVIII, p. 35.

4. *Op. cit.*, Hicks and Hill, p. 312.

5. *Op. cit.*, Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, Vol. II, p. 449.

6. *Op. cit.*, Plutarch, *Lives*, p. 287.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

In order to consolidate his rule in the empire, and to reorganize the conquered nations under the Macedonian «ideology» and institutions, Philip needed an effective foreign and domestic policy. This policy was made up mainly of two parts. The first pertained to the «Inner Front.» Internal peace, order and security, according to Philip's policy, rested on the co-operation of the subjects with the empire. For this reason he worked laboriously to organize and finance pro-Macedonian parties in a number of the city-states by aiding not only the oligarchies and tyrannies but assisting also any faction which promised to further Macedonian interests.¹

Within his «Inner Front» policy, Philip allowed for double standards. He offered cooperation and cultural amalgamation to the Greek-speaking peoples but excluded the non-Greek people from such a privilege on the basis of their culture. To the barbarians Philip offered only submission.²

The other side of Philip's policy was concerned with external peace and security. The Macedonian empire could not be externally and internally secure unless all opposition in the Greek world and in the Balkans was crushed, and Persia was rolled back from the Aegean, the Straits, the Black Sea and Asia Minor.

Alexander inherited this roughly-outlined Macedonia policy of imperial expansion. The rebellions that occurred soon after he came to power, challenged his control over the Macedonian empire. Alexander reacted swiftly to the crisis, put down decisively the rebellions and defended the Macedonian interests.³

The rebellion of the southern Greek city-states led by Thebes challenged Alexander's attitude towards the Hellenes. Consistent with the Macedonian foreign policy toward the Greeks, Alexander refrained from using brute force at the beginning and demanded only a change in the Theban government. The chief aim of Macedonia in regard to her relations with the city-states was to install pro-Macedonian satellite governments there, thus avoiding using force unless the situation was out of control. When his demand was not satisfied, Alexander put aside the Macedonian «olive branch» and used the thunder.⁴

In dealing with the governments of the various city-states, Alexander tended to differ with the policy of his father. Instead of supporting oligarchies and tyrannies as Philip for the most part had done, Alexander preferred to support democracies. Thus he stimulated the democratic forces and supported changes and revolutions which overthrew the reac-

tionary oligarchs and aristocrats in favor of the democratic commerce oriented classes.

In 333-332 B.C. Alexander instigated and fostered social revolutions in Chios, Erythrae, Eresos, and other city-states. These revolutions overthrew the pro-Persian oligarchies in favor of the pro-Macedonian democracies.⁵ In 378 Eresos joined the new Athenian Confederacy and remained democratic until the Social War in 357 B.C. Then the town came under the Persian influence. Three tyrants who were also brothers named Hermon, Heraios and Appolodoros ruled the towns until 334 B.C. During the year of the battle of Granikos Alexander promoted a revolution in Eresos with democratic forces coming to power.⁶

It must be pointed out here, that probably Alexander was not supporting democracies because he believed in the ideology and was emotionally or intellectually committed to the system. Probably he discovered that the goals of his foreign policy were best promoted by supporting social change leading to democracies. The opportunism of Alexander is shown in the oration of Demosthenes, *on the Treaty with Alexander*, delivered about 333 B.C. in which Alexander is accused of a double-standard policy and inconsistency of maintaining tyrants in Messenia and expelling them in Eresos.⁷

The attitude of Alexander towards the peoples of the Orient was basically consistent with the main concepts and aims of the Macedonian foreign policy. However, a marked difference was the radical change that occurred in the Macedonian principle of cooperation.

Since the overwhelming number of the subjects in Alexander's empire were classified as barbarians, the principle of limited cooperation was obsolete for the empire unless it was reformed and broadened to include all subjects, by striking down the barriers that were separating the Greeks from the barbarians. The principle of the Inner Front could not be maintained only by the force of arms because of the limited resources of Macedonia and the large dimensions of the empire.

Alexander's speech at Opis can be seen as a great political performance, promoting his «Grand Policy.» It is indeed interesting to note that Alexander was actually dealing from a strong position at Opis against his revolted troops. A few days before the showdown at Opis between Alexander and his troops,

5. *Op. cit.*, Hicks and Hill, Nos. 157, 158, 159, pp. 294-304.

6. *Ibid.*, *Inscription*, No 157, pp. 299, 300. Also Demosthenes, *Olynthiacs, Philippics, Minor Public Speeches against Leptines*, Vol. I., translated by J. H. Vince (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 368, 469.

7. *Op. cit.*, Hicks and Hill, p. 300; Demosthenes, pp. 465-483.

1. *Op. cit.*, Hicks and Hill, p. 304.

2. *Op. cit.*, Fuller, pp. 36, 37.

3. *Op. cit.*, Plutarch, *Lives*, p. 283.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 255.

a powerful military force of 30,000 young Persian troops, trained for almost ten years in the Macedonian art of war and in the ideals of the Macedonian Empire had arrived at Opis and had camped in the outskirts of the city.¹

They were splendidly equipped with the full Macedonian armament and encamped before the city, where they were warmly commended by their king after demonstrating their skill and discipline in the use of their weapons. The Macedonians had not only mutinied when ordered to cross the Ganges River but were frequently unruly when called into an assembly and ridiculed Alexander's pretence that Ammon was his father. For these reasons Alexander had formed this unit from a homogeneous age-group of Persians, capable of serving as a counter-balance to the Macedonian phalanx.²

Although the «Grand Policy» of Alexander, contained some elements of the old Macedonian foreign and domestic policies of Philip II, it was a unique international program. It seems to have been born out of three ideas or purposes. First, it was the desire of Alexander to include in his empire and to bring under his personal rule a wide number of Asian and African nations.³

The second idea was identified with the expansionist policy of Macedonia in Greece and the Balkans and the consolidation of her control in these areas. The «liberation» of Asia Minor and the defeat of Persia was, according to the Macedonian policy, a political and military necessity for securing and organizing the conquered territories and peoples of Greece and the Balkans. The defeat of Persia was of prime importance for the Macedonian plan of expansion and consolidation. Darius III, the Great King of Persia, was sabotaging the Macedonian policy by encouraging Greek statesmen to resist Macedonia and was offering them great sums of money for this purpose.⁴

The third idea pertains to the desire and drive of Alexander to win the «peace offensive» and to consolidate his power and rule within the vast territories and numerous peoples which his military victories had brought under his control.

Homonoia was to be, according to Alexander, a powerful political weapon to be used in order to solve the problems of the empire and to create a new order through unity. Using the concept of *Homonoia* Alexander wanted to arrest the class

struggle, and the political, religious and economic crises as well as the hostility between the Greeks and the Asians which stemmed from their numerous conflicts. As such, *Homonoia* was to iron out these differences and struggles through a cultural fusion, colonization of certain key areas of the East by Greeks and Macedonians, economic reorganization of the empire, and a political system of Monarchy with democratic features.

Cultural fusion was to be brought about primarily through intermarriages. The second marriage of Alexander was clearly a politically motivated action, designed well in advance and executed at the proper time and place. In March 324 B. C., the armies of Hephaestion and Alexander and the fleet under the leadership of Nearchus met at Sousa as the military campaigns of Alexander came to an end.⁵ As soon as Alexander came to Sousa, he shifted his attention and policy from the military sphere to those of peace, stability, and the reorganization of his empire.

By the summer of 324 Alexander's policy was underway with the introduction of the campaign of cultural fusion. In a five-day grand feast he introduced mass intermarriage between his troops and the Persian women, «in order that by this sacred alliance might abolish all distinction between vanquished and victor.»⁶

The policy of colonization was another method used by Alexander aiming to arrest the national uprisings of the various national groups in the empire, promote commerce and industry and keep the vast areas of the Near East under his control, using the colonists to maintain the *status quo*.⁷

With Alexander began one of the most important colonization movements in history. This particular development brought about a certain degree of unity in the economic circles of Greece and the nations of the East that enabled the Greeks to establish themselves as the dominant nation in the Orient for more than one thousand years.

Alexander's conquests destroyed forever the slowly decaying city-state system and in its place erected the system of imperial monarchy based on cosmopolitanism and world politics.⁸ Due to his exceptional charisma, dynamic and enlightened leadership, Alexander became a hero for the entire world. To many people in the Orient his deification fulfilled a psychological gap. The world recognition, respect, admiration, and fear which Alexander enjoyed, helped to strengthen the Macedonian policy of imperial expansion and to make his and *Homonoia* indispensable elements in the transition from Polis to Oikoumene.

1. *Op. cit.*, Plutarch, *Lives*, p. 421.

2. *Op. cit.*, Diodorus, Vol. VIII, Book XVII, pp. 2-4.

3. Curtius, Quintus, *History of Alexander*, Vols. I and II. Translated by John C. Rolfe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 495.

4. Trever, Albert A., *History of Ancient Civilization*, Vol. I. New York: Brace and Company, 1936, p. 452.

5. *Op. cit.*, Wheeler, p. 373.

6. *Op. cit.*, Curtius, p. 495.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 485.

8. *Op. cit.*, Trever, p. 468.