

special report

ethnic conflict in a strategic area: the case of Cyprus

by

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FOREWORD

For the past quarter of a century the Cyprus Question has been one of the most important issues in Greek politics. Indeed at certain critical junctures this problem had a determining impact on the course of Greek political history. This has become abundantly clear since the dramatic events of the summer of 1974: the relentless search of a «solution» to the Cyprus problem not only contributed decisively to the advent of the military dictatorship in 1967 but it also was one of the decisive factors which led to its disintegration seven years later in the wake of its fatal adventure in Cyprus. Developments since the collapse of the junta and the return of parliamentary government in Greece, have made it increasingly apparent that the future of democracy in this country will be once again closely connected with the evolution of the Cyprus problem and its ramifications on the foreign relations of Greece.

Besides this critical importance for Greek politics the fate of Cyprus especially in its current phase demands attention on its own merit. The intense suffering of the people of Cyprus calls urgently for clarification of the processes that led up to their tragedy. In addition the Cyprus affair can be very instructive concerning the nature of contemporary international politics in general and power configurations in the Middle East in particular. The turn of events in Cyprus since the summer of 1974 also pose, with great urgency, the problem of survival of smaller nations in the contemporary international system. The concreteness with which this problem was posed in Cyprus, has turned the cause of the island and its people not only into a challenge to the conscience of the world but also into a testing ground for all those institutions and values which embody humanity's best hopes.

The above are just a few hints at the enormity of the problem of Cyprus and the consequent need of enlightened discussion, information and awareness about all its dimensions. The current crisis and the debates over possible settlements have underlined the necessity of a better understanding of the problem if the errors of omission and commission of the past are to be avoided. As a contribution in this direction we present in this issue of the Review a paper by two political scientists working in American Universities, on the ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Inadequate knowledge or disregard of the real issues in this conflict has led Cyprus from one tragedy to the next. We hope that the substantive information and interpretative arguments presented in this well documented paper will stimulate interest in this grave problem by placing it in its proper perspective.

THE EDITORS

introductory

Social change has been viewed by successive generations of scholars and by diverse theoretical doctrines as a process of development and improvement with generally desirable consequences. The origins of this understanding which has conditioned many theories of modernization, can be traced back in the Enlightenment idea of progress and in nineteenth century social optimism over the prospects of humanity—as well as in an unstated belief in the universal relevance of the Western liberal experience. Nevertheless the actual experience of the transition from traditional to modernizing society which at a heightened pace has been under way on a global scale since the second World War, has beclouded the long cherished optimism by dramatizing the enormous costs at which change is achieved. Indeed one could say that this new awareness of the price of change is alerting the attention of social theorists to a problem that the achievements of Western society have tended to obscure: the heavy human and other costs which had to be paid in the long process towards the consolidation of modernity in Europe and North America.

In our recent experience the most telling indication of the costs of change, has been the increase in the incidence and scale of violence within changing societies. The decade of the 1960s has been marked by a generalized rise in the occurrence of civil violence in both modernizing and highly advanced societies. Civil violence accompanies the movement of social change and tends to assume the form either of praetorianism in the absence of effective political institutions, social revolution against existing social and political structures or communal conflicts over the scope of a political system in encompassing diverse ethnic groups and national communities.¹

Communal violence and ethnic conflicts have appeared with increasing frequency and intensity since the dissolution of the colonial empires in the 1950s and 1960s. The first instance of widespread ethnic violence has accompanied the attainment of Indian independence in 1947 and the partition of the Indian subcontinent. By the 1960s communal conflicts had erupted in many other recently independent states but in a variety of forms ethnic divisions were intensified to the point of violent explosions in advanced, post-industrial societies (notably the United States) as well. In view of this generalized experience it has been persuasively suggested that modernization fosters ethnic conflict as social mobilization and the

politicization of primordial attachments tend to disrupt the fragile structures of ethnically diverse societies. Modernization tends to intensify and politicize rather than stamp out ethnic diversity.² It would seem nevertheless that ethnic conflicts in developing and highly advanced societies coming as they do at different points in the continuum of social change, are not exactly identical phenomena and consequently explanatory theories of ethnic conflicts will have to consider this distinction and account for the differences.

Although older scholarly orthodoxy regarding the relation between modernization and ethnic integration has been incisively criticized, still a great deal has to be learnt about ethnicity and ethnic conflicts for the existing lacunae and deficiencies in the theoretical literature to be remedied.³ Before attempting generalizations and theory building it is best to proceed inductively by looking at the dynamics of particular conflicts. The following analysis of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus is attempted in this spirit. We hope that the empirical evidence from the study of the sources, conditions and various characteristics of the conflict between the two Cypriot ethnic communities offered here, will contribute towards the development of a more effective conceptualization for the comparative analysis of ethnic conflict.

dimensions of the latest tragedy

Developments in Cyprus in the late 1960s and early 1970s were marked by a general relaxation of ethnic tensions, economic boom and a continuing inter-communal effort in search of a negotiated settlement of the ethnic conflict in accordance with the basic needs and requirements of both ethnic communities. The constructive involvement of the United Nations in containing friction and in reducing the level of confrontation by means of the policing and mediating activities of the UN Cyprus peace keeping force (UNFICYP) in the military field, as well as in promoting a resumption of Greek-Turkish Cypriot contacts aimed at reaching a commonly acceptable constitutional arrangement in the political sphere, had set in motion several hopeful trends foreshadowing a

2. See Walker Connor, «Self Determination: The New Phase,» *World Politics*, vol. 20, no. 1 (October 1967), pp. 30-53 and *idem*, «Nation Building or Nation Destroying,» *World Politics*, vol. 24, no. 3 (April 1972), pp. 319-355. For a recent analysis of the relation between social change and ethnic conflict see Daniel Bell, «Ethnicity and Social Change» in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, ed. by Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1975, pp. 141-174.

3. The recent volume edited by Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity, op. cit.*, is a significant contribution but does not cover the experience of all ethnically diverse societies.

1. See Samuel P. Huntington, «Civil Violence and the Process of Development,» *Adelphi Papers*, Number 83 (December 1971), pp. 1-15. Civil violence is used here to denote violence within states in contradistinction to international violence.

successful resolution of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus.

Noting all this an observer might have concluded that Cyprus could potentially develop into a paradigmatic case of conflict resolution which in a comparative perspective could be of considerable value as a model to other ethnically troubled parts of the world. At the same time however, observing the growth of terrorist extremism on the right wing fringes of the Greek Cypriot community, the procrastination and repeated delays in the intercommunal negotiations and the escalation of covert and overt foreign interference in the affairs of Cyprus, one was also becoming increasingly aware of the dangers of a new catastrophic explosion.

During the first half of the year 1974 a series of events which largely fell beyond the Cypriots' own control, led to the realization of the second of the two possible scenarios outlined above. The strained relations between the democratically elected government of Cyprus' President Archbishop Makarios with the military dictatorship then ruling Greece, culminated in the coup of July 15, 1974. The coup was planned in Athens and executed by the Greek officers of the Cyprus National Guard and the Greek military contingent stationed in Cyprus (in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Alliance).

The coup met with considerable armed resistance and caused violence and bloodshed among the Greek Cypriots but it managed to set up a short-lived puppet regime. Archbishop Makarios was rescued out of Cyprus by the United Nations forces and the British Royal Air Force. Realizing the dangers involved in their adventure, the anti-Makarios putschists avoided systematically to attack or threaten the Turkish Cypriots and appealed to them to cooperate with the new regime for a continuation of the intercommunal discussions.

The overthrow of the legitimate constitutional order, however, afforded a perfect opportunity for Turkey to execute a policy adopted since the 1950s. This policy aimed at the partition of Cyprus. Seizing the pretext furnished by the coup and arguing that Cyprus' independence had been violated by Greece, while also invoking her rights and obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to intervene and restore the upset *status quo*, Turkey mounted an invasion of Cyprus with air, sea and land forces in the early hours of Saturday, July 20, 1974. Britain, also a guarantor of Cyprus' independence, had earlier in the week refused a Turkish proposal for a joint intervention.

In the battle of Cyprus that raged between the 20th and the 22nd of July 1974, the invading Turkish forces, despite superior numbers and equipment, suffered many losses and met with fierce resistance on the part of the poorly armed and badly organized Cyprus National Guard. When a cease-fire was ar-


ranged by the United Nations in the afternoon of July 22nd the Turkish forces had managed to establish themselves on a limited beachhead west of Kyrenia on the northern coast of Cyprus. After repeatedly violating several cease-fire agreements—including one signed at Geneva by the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, Turkey and Greece on the 30th of July 1974—the invading Turkish forces proceeded on August 14-15 on a new offensive which culminated in the partition of Cyprus along a line running from Kokkina in the west through the Turkish quarter of Nicosia to Famagusta in the east. The occupied area includes the entire Kyrenia district, the western and northern regions of Nicosia district, almost all of Famagusta district with the Karpass peninsula and parts of Larnaca district—in all about forty per cent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The map that appears in Figure I shows the advances of the occupation forces in Cyprus.¹

These events have left Cyprus in an immense human tragedy. The human toll of the violence has been five thousand dead and up to fifteen thousand wounded. In addition there are about three thousand missing persons, especially young men who vanished during the fighting in the summer of 1974. All this gave rise to a sense of grief which permeated all aspects of life in Cyprus in the several months following the invasion.

As a result of the invasion, the war and the occupation of northern Cyprus, a refugee wave has uprooted one third of the population of Cyprus from their homes. Out of a population of approximately 650 thousand an estimated 180,800 Greek Cypriots and about 17,000 Turkish Cypriots have become refugees. The predicament of these people is described in Table I which presents a detailed account of

1. As of this writing sources on the 1974 crisis include mainly press reports and primary documents. For good political accounts by an experienced journalist see the series of articles by Stanley Karnow in the *New Republic*, September 7 to October 5, 1975 and *idem*, «America's Mediterranean Bungle», *The Atlantic*, February 1975 (vol. 235, no. 2), pp. 6 ff. Useful reports on the crisis have appeared in all major news publications. Note for instance *The New York Times*, September 9, 1974, p. 8 and *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 1974, no. 245, pp. 1, 4-6. The following Congressional documents contain valuable information on the crisis and the role of the United States: House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, *Cyprus 1974*, Hearings, 93rd Congress, Second Session, August 19 and 20, 1974, Washington, D.C., 1974; Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Refugees, *Humanitarian Problems on Cyprus*, Hearings, 93rd Congress, Second Session, September 26, 1974, Washington D.C., 1974 and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Refugees, *Crisis on Cyprus: 1974*, Study Mission Report, 93rd Congress, Second Session, October 14, 1974, Washington D.C., 1974.

FIGURE 1. Advances of the Occupation Forces in Cyprus, July 22-August 16, 1974



the various categories of persons who have been affected by the war and the occupation.¹

As the winter of 1974-75 set in, the most acute problem was that of shelter and accommodation since many refugee camps became uninhabitable with the coming of rainy and windy weather. Although most of the refugees have found shelter in all sorts of available structures from schools and monasteries to stables and warehouses or managed to squeeze in with friends and relatives, there are an estimated twenty thousand who still remain under inadequate shelter and thus are exposed to the vicissitudes of changing weather. As of this writing the Cypriot refugees are facing their second winter under tents. Relief pouring in from Greece, the Hellenic diaspora and international organizations (United Nations and International Red Cross) has been barely sufficient to cover the essentials of subsistence.

TABLE I: *Displaced Persons and Others in Need on Cyprus (as of November 1, 1974)*

I. Refugees:	
1. Greek Cypriots in Government-controlled areas:	
Satisfactorily sheltered with friends/relatives or in second homes rented	57,600
Living in public buildings, schools, etc.	5,800
Housed in permanent structures, but overcrowded conditions & will have to move	89,700
Living in shacks, garages, unfinished structures	11,000
Living in tents	9,000
Living in the open, under trees, in makeshift open shelters	7,700
Total	180,800
2. Turkish Cypriots in Government-controlled areas:	
Living in tents on British Sovereign Base areas	8,500
In isolated villages, cut off, or in controlled villages/enclaves	22,000
Total	30,500
3. Greek Cypriots in Turkish-occupied areas:	
Living in cut off villages, or displaced	9,000
4. Turkish Cypriot refugees in Turkish-occupied areas:	
Moved from the south to the north, and includes some refugees from 1963-64	8,500
II. Prisoners of war and detainees, both sides:	
All have been released under UN auspices	6,000
Total	234,800

Source: Crisis on Cyprus: 1974 (Study Mission Report of the Subcommittee on Refugees of the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Oct. 24, 1974), p. 19.

1. Detailed documentation on the problem of the refugees is available in the Study Mission Report *Crisis on Cyprus 1974*, cited above, pp. 18-43 and in Senate Committee of the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Refugees, *World Hunger, Health and Refugee Problems, Part V: Human Disasters in Cyprus, Bangladesh, Africa*. Hearings, 93rd Congress, Second Session, August 20, 1974, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp. 1-23, 163-196. For the human aspect of the refugee problem see the two articles by Brigadier Michael Harbottle in *The Times* (London), October 17 and 21, 1974.

All this is just the material and tangible dimension of refugee life. The whole ordeal has affected deeply the Cypriots' outlook on life and the confident optimism bred by the prosperity of the recent past has been gradually replaced by a sense of desperation and anguish. Out of this grows a living consciousness and appreciation of the tribulations of other peoples who had been less fortunate than the Cypriots in their recent history.

The intense human suffering of the refugees has been, of course, the most serious of Cyprus' recent problems. However, there have been many other problems as well. The coup, the war and the occupation shattered the island's flourishing economy. The sheer physical destruction has been enormous: it began with the demolition of public buildings the day of the coup and culminated with the raids of the Turkish airforce which set huge areas of Cyprus' best forests afire and bombed to ruins hospitals, schools, hotels, industrial buildings and tourist attractions. Then came the looting of the occupied areas and the destruction of a great part of the crops and livestock all over northern Cyprus. Preliminary estimates of overall economic damage and material destruction as of September 1974, put the costs up to the equivalent of the expenditures of the last eleven years in Cyprus' general budget.²

As a consequence of the fact that the most important of Cyprus' natural resources and the most economically developed areas are in the occupied northern region, the economy suffered huge losses in production, exports and tourism. It has been estimated that about 4.5 million dollars in economic production were lost every day during the several months after the invasion. In addition, there are the losses resulting from the idleness forced on the refugees—roughly one third of the economically active population—and the costs of their maintenance estimated at 4.6 million dollars a month.

The economic growth and prosperity of the past ten years have accumulated enough reserves to meet the emergencies of the first several months but the extent of the devastation has been such that the outlook for the future appears very grim indeed unless normal economic activities are resumed immediately.³

2. According to a Memorandum made available to the authors by the Government of Cyprus, some quantitative indicators of destruction are the following: (a) Overall economic damage: 350 million Cyprus pounds; (b) Damage to household properties: 100 million Cyprus pounds; (c) Forest destroyed: 100 square miles (20% of the total forested area in Cyprus); (d) Losses from tourism: 30 million Cyprus pounds.

3. See the reports in *The New York Times*, January 27, 1975, p. 12 and *ibid.*, January 29, 1975, p. 6 and *Christian Science Monitor*, January 8, 1975, p. 3A. The Planning Bureau of the Republic of Cyprus has compiled a useful factual report:

The picture of human pain and material destruction that opens this paper, conveys just a dim sense of the tragedy that has so suddenly replaced Cyprus' many achievements and hopes in her fourteen years of independent statehood. Still our distressing description has not so far accounted for the origins of the conflict and the historical sequences of events that led up to today's depressing situation. Although the humanitarian facet of the problem certainly looms larger than anything else in the wake of the latest crisis, there is a background in politics and conflict which must be examined if the whole issue is to be comprehended. Indeed, Cyprus' grievous experience underscores the urgency of the problems raised by ethnic conflicts and points up the pressing need to attain a better understanding of the issues involved—in the hope that out of our analytical efforts more appropriate and humane resolution strategies will develop.

In the following pages we will try to present first a general survey of the politics of ethnic conflict in Cyprus and then we will outline and evaluate a number of initiatives, attempted at a variety of levels, aiming at a resolution of the problem in one direction or another. Our purpose is to present a general political profile of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus by drawing on the relevant material that has been made available by considerable scholarly research and the publication of pertinent primary sources. We hope that our survey of sources and research and our outline of events and problem-areas will provide an adequate introduction to the general problem of ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Although our focus remains political, we appreciate the need of a comparative study of the deep historical roots and the structural and attitudinal dynamics of the conflict between the two Cypriot communities.¹ A few relevant hints offered in the following pages, are meant to suggest the direction that future research should follow.

the politics of ethnic conflict: from coexistense to segregation

The origins of the contemporary problem of Cyprus go back to the Ottoman conquest of the island from the Venetians in 1570-71. The most momentous effect of the Turkish conquest was the creation of a

Moslem minority in Cyprus. According to Ottoman practice, part of the invading forces settled in Cyprus as *sipahis*—or military landholders—taking over as their *timars* or *chifliks* the feudal estates of the former Frankish nobility. If these were the original forefathers of the Turkish minority, its numbers were soon swelled by the Islamization of Greek inhabitants who were induced to escape that lot of subject *rayas* by joining the religion and enjoying the privileges of the ruling *millet*.² These Islamizations can be systematically documented from tax registers which have survived from the period of Turkish occupation. There is convincing evidence that there were conversions of Greek Cypriot villagers to Islam as late as 1825-28. The best testimony however is afforded by the names of Christian saints borne by several Turkish villages in Cyprus—e.g., St. John, St. Nicholas, St. George—and the fact that until recently many of the Turkish Cypriots, especially in the Paphos area, were in fact Greek speaking Moslems.³

These Moslems lived in peace with the Greek Cypriots who formed the overwhelming majority of the population throughout the centuries of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus—thus extending to Cyprus the pattern of peaceful symbiosis of Orthodox Christian and Moslem peasants that obtained in Anatolia, especially in such areas as Cappadocia and Pontos, until the Greeks were expelled from Asia Minor in 1922-24. This peaceful coexistence manifested itself in a shared folk piety and a common life style that survived intact in those areas of Asia Minor that remained away from the battlegrounds of the Greek-Turkish war that raged during 1919-1922 in Western Anatolia. The memories of this peaceful past are still invoked by the moving receptions of those Greeks who in recent years have been returning to visit their erstwhile villages. The same is largely true of those parts of rural Cyprus where Greeks and Turks lived in mixed or neighboring villages. In this context an undeniable tradition of mutual help and cordial-

2. For the meaning of *millet* and the *millet* system see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 335.

3. For the history of Cyprus as an Ottoman province see Sir George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. IV, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1952, Part I (pp. 1-400); Sir Harry C. Luke, *Cyprus under the Turks 1571-1878*, London, Oxford, University Press, 1921; Doros Alastos, *Cyprus in History* London, Zeno Publishers, 1955, pp. 234-301.

For the ethnological evolution of the population of Cyprus in this period see Theodore Papadopoulos, *Social and Historical Data on Population, 1570-1881*, Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre, 1965. For the problem of conversions to Islam see the evidence presented in *Idem*, «Πρόσφατοι Έξισλαμισμοί Ἰαγροτικῆς Πληθυσμοῦ ἐν Κύπρῳ» (Recent Islamizations of Rural Population in Cyprus), *Κυπριακὴ Σπουδὰί*, Vol. 29, 1965, pp. 27-48. Cf. C.F. Beckingham, «The Turks of Cyprus», *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 87, Part II, July-December 1957, pp. 165-174.

Economic Consequences of Turkish Invasion, Nicosia, Public Information Office, October, 1974.

1. For an analysis of these aspects of the problem see the interpretative essay by Paschalis M. Kitronilides, «Cyprus: The Nature of Ethnic Conflict», in Th. A. Couloumbis and S. M. Hicks, eds., *US Foreign Policy toward Greece and Cyprus* (Washington, D.C., The Center for Mediterranean Studies, 1975), pp. 83-97.

ty in the personal sphere survived the vicissitudes of political history.¹

This was the social legacy of intercommunal relations inherited by the British when they took over the administration of Cyprus in 1878 in the context of a rearrangement of power relations in the Near East sanctioned by the Treaty of Berlin.² In the span of eighty years of British rule between 1878 and the late 1950s, only one minor incident of intercommunal violence is reported.³

It is true that in the intricate politics of the Legislative Council which functioned from 1881 to 1931, the colonial rulers managed repeatedly to play the representatives of the two communities against each other.⁴ Political representation in the Legislative Council reflected the traditional Ottoman system of social organization based on religious communities (*millet*s) which was retained by the British and formed the fundamental principle of their handling of the politics of Cyprus. In the context of this policy the *millet* system was gradually politicized and provided the organizational foundation for the national differentiation of the Cypriots.⁵ Despite this process which was encouraged by British policy, the Turkish members of the Council sided occasionally with their Greek compatriots to promote the common interests of the island, especially regarding taxation and finance. Even over the issue of *Enosis*, the demand for union with Greece for which the Greek Cypriots had been clamoring for generations, the two communities did not come to blows. True, the Turkish Cypriot leaders registered consistently their opposition to *Enosis* but this disagreement was never strained so far as to be expressed in violence.

1. For the historical character of the phenomenon of Greek-Turkish symbiosis see the monumental work by Speros Vryonis, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh to the Fifteenth Century*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1971, especially pp. 444-497. Cf. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, «Ὁ ἐξισλαμισμὸς τῆς Μικρῆς Ἀσίας καὶ οἱ ἱστορικὲς καταβολὲς τῶν ἐλληνοτουρκικῶν σχέσεων» (The Islamization of Asia Minor and the Historical Origins of Greek-Turkish Relations), *Μικρασιατικὰ Χρονικά*, vol. XVI (to be published 1975).

2. For a detailed account see D.E. Lee, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878*, Harvard Historical Studies, no. 38, Cambridge, Mass., 1934.

3. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 518-19.

4. For politics under the British *ibid.*, Part II and Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-381. For the earlier period of British rule the most detailed account is that by Philios Zannetos, *Ἱστορία τῆς Νήσου Κύπρου ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀγγλικῆς καταχρῆς μέχρι σήμερον*, (History of the Island of Cyprus from the British occupation to the present day), vol. II, Larnaca, 1911.

5. For an analysis of this process see Adamantia Pollis, «Systemic Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus», paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Washington, D.C., February 1975, pp. 14-21.

The *Enosis* movement emerged in the 19th century and it essentially represented an extension to Cyprus of the wider historical phenomenon of European nationalism. In its social character and political aspirations the *Enosis* movement was similar to the Italian *Risorgimento*, the movement for German unification and the irredentist movements of the Balkan nations. Similar *Enosis* movements aspiring at unification with the Kingdom of Greece had developed in Crete, Macedonia and the Seven Ionian islands in the 19th century. Timid under the Ottomans in the 19th century, the *Enosis* movement was intensified under the British and reached a peak in the nationalist rebellion of October 1931.⁶ Meanwhile, in 1925 Cyprus had become a British Crown colony after Turkey had renounced all rights of sovereignty over the island by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.⁷

The 1931 uprising, aspiring to *Enosis* with Greece, was forcefully put down by the British and the civil liberties of the Cypriots were suppressed. The repression of all political life and national expression that followed this uprising, was largely responsible for the intransigence that the *Enotist* leaders manifested in dealing with the constitutional proposals of the British government after the Second World War.

In the wake of the Second World War the national demands of the Cypriots were formulated as a claim of self-determination in the context of the movement of decolonization.⁸ A plebiscite organized by the Ethnarchy of Cyprus in 1950—after the British rulers refused to conduct one—showed an overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots favoring union with Greece.⁹ The British refused to discuss the future of Cyprus even in the face of increasing political agitation in the island.¹⁰ The subsequent intransigence

6. The account of the *Enosis* movement in Hill, *op. cit.*, pp. 488-568 is very detailed but obviously biased and lacks any wider perspective. It should be read in the light of Alastos, *op. cit.*, pp. 330 ff. and Michel Dendias, *La Question Cyprote aux points de vue historique et de droit international*, Paris, Sirey, 1934 which is still the most adequate treatment of the *Enosis* movement.

The best account of the 1931 uprising is still perhaps that by Arnold Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1931*, London, Oxford University Press, 1932, pp. 354-394.

7. Cf. *Treaty of Peace with Turkey*, Signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, Cmd 1929, London, H.M. Stationary Office, 1923. Note Article 16 (p. 21) by which Turkey renounces all rights of sovereignty on territories outside her frontiers as specified in the treaty; and Article 20 (p. 23) by which Turkey recognizes the annexation of Cyprus by Britain.

8. Developments in Cyprus between 1946-1959 are covered in detail in the recent two volume work of François Crouzet, *Le Conflit de Chypre, 1946-1959*, Brussels, Bruylant, 1973.

9. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 266-277. For the reactions of the Turkish Cypriots, pp. 303-307.

10. *Survey of International Affairs 1954*, by Coral Bell, London, Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 173-184. The British attitude was expressed in the refusal of Prime Minis-

surgence growing on all sides in the years 1950-1955, culminated in an anticolonial guerilla rebellion lasting between 1955 and 1959 and spearheaded by EOKA, the underground National Organization of Cypriot Fighters.¹

Until then the conflict had been primarily between the Greek Cypriots and the British while the Turkish Cypriots remained relatively uninvolved. It was not until 1957-58 that the tensions prevailing in Cyprus generated intercommunal violence on a considerable scale for the first time. The eruption of ethnic violence in the late 1950s came as the result of a process of increasing differentiation between the two Cypriot communities which had until then coexisted in a traditional society. Socioeconomic modernization, slow but steady under the British, and the spread of literacy transformed the traditional religious and linguistic differences into the bases of the development of a distinct Greek and a distinct Turkish national consciousness. In the political sphere, as nationalism grew among Greek Cypriots and as demands for broader political participation rose against British colonial rule, the Turkish Cypriots as well became increasingly conscious of their ethnic identity and their rights of participation in Cypriot affairs. Further, as the educational systems of the two communities were modeled on those of Greece and Turkey respectively, the symbolism of nationalist antagonism that grew out of the long historical confrontation of the two nations, was transposed to Cyprus. As a result of all this a commonly shared system of social communication that could conceivably form the basis of an integrated society, was precluded from developing.²

ter Eden to discuss the future of Cyprus with Greek Prime Minister Papagos and in the statement by the Minister of State at the Colonial Office Henry Hopkinson in the House of Commons that change of sovereignty over Cyprus could not be contemplated. All this could and was interpreted by the Greek government and the Greek Cypriots to mean that a settlement through direct Anglo-Greek diplomacy was not possible. For relevant documents see *Documents on International Affairs 1954*, ed. by D. Folliot, London, Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 227-242. See also Stephen G. Xydias «Toward Toil and Moil in Cyprus,» *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, no. 1 (Winter 1966), pp. 1-19, for events leading up to the outbreak of the anticolonial struggle in Cyprus.

1. On the EOKA struggle see Doros Alastos, *Cyprus Guerilla: Grivas, Makarios and the British*, London, Heinemann, 1960 and Charles Foley, *Island in Revolt*, London, Longmans, 1962. Crouzet, *Le Conflit de Chypre*, Vol. II, pp. 481-649 provides the most recent and synthetic account drawing on voluminous documentation.

2. For the theoretical foundation of these views cf. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1953. For a conceptualization of the political implications of socio-economic change, on which the previous discussion is based, see *idem*. «Social Mobilization and Political Development,» *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV, no. 3, September 1961, pp. 493-514.

Against this background there emerged the contention over the spoils of independence which was felt to be imminent once the British indicated their willingness to hand over the government of the island to the Cypriots themselves.³ Fortified in their antagonism by the support of their respective motherlands and by British colonial policy which as a rule discouraged ethnic integration in the territories of the Empire,⁴ the two Cypriot ethnic communities found it increasingly difficult to compromise. Discord developed over both the form and the method of independence. The Greek Cypriots fought for union with Greece through the exercise of the right of self-determination. The Turkish Cypriots expressed interest in continuing British rule or securing a partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey to be decided by these outside powers and Britain. The irreconcilability of these positions led to heightened tensions which exploded in violence. Thus the workings of social mobilization and the political choices of the years 1945-1955 resulted in the translation of the traditional religious and linguistic differences into ethnic conflict.

Accommodation or drastic surgical solutions were extremely difficult in view of the communal demography and ethnic geography of Cyprus. As Table II indicates, the Turkish Cypriot community never exceeded twenty-five percent of the population. In-

TABLE II: Percentage Distribution of Population by Religion at Census Years


Religion	1881	1891	1901	1911	1921	1931	1946	1960
All Religions	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Greek Orthodox	73.9	75.8	77.1	78.2	78.8	79.5	80.2	77.0
Moslem (Turkish)	24.4	22.9	21.6	20.6	19.8	18.5	17.9	18.3
Armenian—								
Gregorian	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.0	0.8	0.6
Roman-Catholic		0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3		0.2	0.8
	1.1					0.7		
Maronite		0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4		0.5	0.5
Other	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	2.8

Source: Statistics and Research Dept., Ministry of Finance, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1970, No. 16, Nicosia; Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus, 1970, p. 24.

3. On the precipitation of ethnic conflict by the approach of independence cf. Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1973, p. 22: «... as soon as independence or foreign economic pressures make interdependence and pooling of scarce resources imperative, institutional expressions of cultural separateness become threats to stability, instead of the assurances of social harmony they once were.»

4. See Adamantia Pollis, «Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy, The Case of Cyprus,» *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, no. 4, July 1973, pp. 575-599. For the historical origins of this policy cf. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1968, pp. 10-11.

FIGURE II: Distribution of Greek and Turkish Villages over the Island



deed, since the 1920s its numbers had dropped below twenty per cent. Being thus an overwhelming majority of the population, the Greek Cypriots remained intransigent in their claim of self-determination by majority rule. Conversely, the extreme dispersion of Turkish Cypriot settlements all over the island, shown in Figure II, made it impossible to find a geographic basis for partition—a solution suggested first by the British and espoused by Turkey since the mid-1950s.¹

The continuing anti-British guerilla struggle of the Greek Cypriots, the consequent endemic diplomatic confrontation between Britain, Greece and Turkey and mounting pressures from NATO and the world community, built up to such a point of tension that the parties to the conflict finally settled for a compromise: on August 16, 1960, following the Zurich and London agreements of the previous year and protracted negotiations in Cyprus thereafter, Cyprus emerged as an independent state.²

The Zurich and London agreements, concluded in February 1959, reflected the ethnic duality of Cyprus as well as the power balance of the contracting parties. The British acquiesced to the loss of a colony, but secured rights to sizable sovereign bases on Cyprus. Further, in the confrontation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it appears that the mainland Greeks felt so pressed to reach a settlement that they gave up more than their fair share of bargaining

chips to the Turkish side. The United States, being intimately involved with both Greece and Turkey, applied continuous pressure on both junior allies as well as on the Cypriots to settle amicably and to heal the «festering sore» in the southeastern flank of NATO.³

The Zurich and London agreements, and the Constitution which was based on them, set up the Republic of Cyprus, which was given the status of sovereignty and independence and soon attained UN membership. However, on independence day Cyprus was bound by three treaties. The Treaty of Guarantee between Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey (the three guarantors) was designed to safeguard the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus, simultaneously permitting the «guarantors» in concert or independently, to interfere in Cyprus to uphold the state of affairs created by the 1960 treaties and to prevent either *Enosis*, the Greek maximalist position, or *Taksim* (partition of the island between Greece and Turkey), the Turkish answer to *Enosis*. The Treaty of Alliance committed Greece and Turkey to come to the aid of Cyprus in case of external aggression and allowed them to station one military contingent each on Cyprus on a 60/40 ratio. By the Treaty of Establishment Great Britain secured two sovereign base areas at Dhekelia and Akrotiri-Episkope in Southern Cyprus.⁴

The basic principles of the constitutional organization of the Republic of Cyprus were agreed upon at Zurich between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. During the subsequent London conference they were presented to the Cypriots to guide the work of the commission which was to draft the Constitution of Cyprus. The Constitution took more than a year to draft and its major provisions were as follows: Cyprus would have a presidential regime with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, each elected by his respective community and each possessing final veto power on matters dealing with foreign affairs, defense and internal security. The Council of Ministers should include three Turkish Cypriots out of its ten members. At

1. The escalation of conflict in the 1950s has stimulated voluminous writing on the Cyprus Question, including many accounts by journalists, official papers and many pamphlets explaining the respective viewpoints of those involved. The bibliography of primary sources in Crouzet, *Le Conflit de Chypre*. Vol. II, pp. 1155-1166, though incomplete is very useful. Robert Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*, London, Pall Mall, 1966 is a useful account by a distinguished journalist with great experience in the politics of the Eastern Mediterranean. Important scholarly studies of this phase of the problem of Cyprus are, in addition to Crouzet, Stephen G. Xydīs, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958*, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1967, Leontios Ierodiakonou, *The Cyprus Question*, Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971, and Pantazis Terlexis, *Διπλωματία και Πολιτική τῶν Κυπριακῶν: Ἀνατομία ἐνὸς λάθους* (*Diplomacy and Politics of the Cyprus Question*), Athens, Rappas, 1971. The most serious statement of the Turkish point of view is that by Suat Bilge, *Le Conflit de Chypre et les Cypriotes Turcs*, Ankara, Publications de la Faculté des Sciences Politiques de l'Université d'Ankara, 1961. Finally a valuable source of information, criticism and insights is Ch. Christides, *Κυπριακὸ καὶ Ἑλληνοκυπριακὰ: Πορεία μᾶς ἔθνικης χρεοκοπίας*. (*The Cyprus Question and Greek-Turkish Matters*), Athens, 1967.

2. The pertinent documents appear in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs 1958*, 1959, (ed. by G. King), 1960 (ed. by R. Gott), London, Oxford University Press, 1962, 1963, 1964, pp. 376-395, 541-552, 422-427, respectively. The complex diplomacy of the years 1958-60 leading up to the independence of Cyprus, is studied in great detail in Stephen G. Xydīs, *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic*, The Hague, Mouton, 1973.

3. For the impact of the Cyprus problem on the politics of Greece see Theodore A. Coulombis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 93 ff. For Turkey, Frank Tachau, «The Face of Turkish Nationalism as reflected in the Cyprus Dispute», *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XIII, no. 3, Summer 1959, pp. 262-272. For the British decision to relinquish sovereignty over Cyprus see Naomi Rosenbaum, «Success in Foreign Policy: The British in Cyprus, 1878-1960», *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. III, no. 4, December 1970, pp. 605-627.

4. For the text of the Treaties of Guarantee and Establishment see *United Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. 382, 1960, pp. 3-16. Several pages of Annexes to the Treaty of Establishment follow. The Treaty of Alliance appears *ibid.*, vol. 397, 1961, pp. 287-295.

least one of three important ministries (Defense, Foreign Affairs or Finance) should go to a Turkish Cypriot citizen. The Turkish Cypriots also secured quotas of 40 percent in the Army and the Security Forces and 30 percent in the Civil Service—well in excess of their 18 percent share in the population. The fifty-member legislature was to be composed of Greek and Turkish Cypriot deputies on a 70/30 ratio. Each ethnic community was to elect its deputies separately. Separate majorities in each ethnic caucus were required to pass legislation on such matters as taxation, electoral procedures and the municipalities. Exclusively communal affairs were to be administered by the Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers. Further there were provisions for separate Turkish and Greek municipalities, separate taxation and separate administration of justice. The Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were annexed to the Constitution. Article 182 of the Constitution declared the provisions of final veto, separate majorities and fixed ethnic ratios as well as the two incorporated treaties as basic and unalterable.¹

It is obvious that this constitutional framework of the Republic of Cyprus was designed to contain and accommodate the ethnic conflict by satisfying some of the most basic requirements of the two Cypriot communities—e.g. by ruling out both union and partition. Beyond this however the Cyprus constitution, premised on ethnic dualism, did not contribute anything towards a substantive resolution of the past and potential intercommunal conflict. Its intricate formulas and cumbersome structures were precisely designed to freeze and perpetuate the ethnic division. Instead of encouraging cooperation it institutionalized separatist tendencies in its provisions for ethnic voting in parliament and split municipalities. Thus the public life of Cyprus was oriented by the very spirit of the constitution in the direction of ethnic antagonism instead of turning towards the democratic development of socially based party politics.

Constitutional experts everywhere concurred that the Cyprus constitution, despite its «ingenuity,» was practically unworkable.² In real life efficient government proved impossible and controversies quickly arose. The danger points centered on the question of the Army's composition (i.e. at what level should the units be ethnically integrated), the passage of tax legislation, the establishment of separate municipi-

palities and the implementation of the 70/30 ratio in the composition of the civil service.³

Predictably the psychological dynamics of the post-independence situation in Cyprus intensified these disagreements. The Greek Cypriots resented what they felt to be an unfair share of the bargain: although they had set aside their cherished aspiration for *Enosis* the final settlement gave them less than what the hard facts of their proportion in the population and their contribution to the economy would warrant. On the other hand the Turkish Cypriots were quite zealous in pressing for full enjoyment of their prerogatives under the Constitution, arguing that this was the only way to cope with the overwhelming numbers of the Greeks. Therefore the Turkish Cypriots remained extremely suspicious of any suggestions of change in the *status quo*.

The outcome of all this was tension and escalating discord—to the point that by 1963 the Government could not collect taxes because the Turkish members of the House would not vote for the income tax bill—not out of any reservations regarding its fairness to their community, but as a tactical move to force the establishment of separate municipalities and the immediate implementation of the ethnic ratios provided by the Civil Service clauses of the Constitution.⁴

In November 1963, with this stalemate in the background, President Makarios offered for consideration thirteen amendments designed to make the 1960 Constitution workable.⁵ These amendments sought primarily to abolish the requirement for separate ethnic majorities in the legislature, to merge the separate judicial systems for the two communities and to eliminate the veto powers of the President and the Vice President. While the Turkish-Cypriot community was studying these proposals, Turkey immediately and flatly rejected them and admonished the President to respect the provisions of the externally guaranteed Cyprus Constitution.

In the ensuing climate of heightened tensions a small incident escalated into all-out violence between the two fired-up communities during the last week of December 1963. Turkey threatened to intervene militarily as the new year was dawning. Active American pressure

3. Kyriakides, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-103.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86 for revealing views of Turkish Cypriot deputies.

5. The text of President Makarios' thirteen proposed amendments appears in *International Relations* (Athens), Vol. II, no. 5, April 1964, pp. 8-24. Cf. Dimitri Bitsios, *Κρίσιμος Ἔτος*, Athens, 1973, pp. 134-137 (English translation: *Cyprus, Vulnerable Republic*, Thessalonike, 1975, on the encouragement given to the Archbishop in this initiative by the then British High Commissioner in Cyprus).

1. The Cyprus Constitution is analyzed in Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968, pp. 53-71.

2. Cf. the analysis and evaluation in S. A. de Smith, *The New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions*, London, Stevens, 1964, pp. 282-296. Note the characteristic remark on p. 285: «Constitutionalism has run riot in harness with communalism.»

on all sides averted the escalation of the conflict into a Greek-Turkish war.¹

The communal violence that erupted in 1963 and punctuated the following year, was a later and more intense phase of the ethnic conflict which emerged in the late 1950s. It not only underlined the fact that ethnic conflicts tend to be of long duration and to persist over time despite intervals of (usually) uneasy peace, but it also showed that the bicomunal experiment conceived at Zurich and London primarily to meet NATO objectives, was ill founded and failed to contribute towards conflict resolution because it ignored the real issues and further distorted the relations of the two Cypriot communities by institutionalizing external interference in the politics of Cyprus.

Following the crisis of Christmas 1963 the British intervened using troops stationed at their bases to reestablish order, separate the combatants and achieve a cessation of hostilities. It was at that time that the «Green Line» was drawn along a narrow street in the old city of Nicosia by the British military authorities. This line has since separated the Turkish quarter of Nicosia from the remainder of the city and has remained a symbol of ethnic division.

In the critical days following the British intervention the initiative shifted to the old British metropolis. London, with strong US backing, attempted to set up a multinational NATO emergency force whose task would be to police the tenuously established truce lines. Greece and Turkey reluctantly agreed with this proposal, but Archbishop Makarios—fearing partition—staunchly opposed a NATO-generated «solution» on Cyprus. After a conference in London between the three guarantor powers and representatives of the two Cypriot communities failed in February 1964, the Government of Cyprus brought the problem to the UN Security Council.

With its resolution of March 4, 1964 the Security Council called on all member states to refrain from actions that might endanger the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus, urged restraint on all parties and recommended the establishment of an

international peace keeping force to be dispatched to Cyprus.²

The UN Cyprus Peace Keeping Force (UNFICYP) had as its primary purpose to interpose itself between the combatants after the cease fire and to act as an objective observer and facilitator of peaceful bargaining. The size of UNFICYP has fluctuated from 6,400 at its peak to about 2,400 at the time of this writing.

UNFICYP was staffed primarily with contingents from Britain, Finland, Canada, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden. It has been divided into brigades, companies, squadrons and other units which are commanded by their national commanders, who, in turn, take their orders from UNFICYP's commanding officer. The force was dispersed throughout the island, patrolling city streets and countryside, in order to discourage the accidental outbreak of local incidents. The UN Secretary General has been represented by a special envoy in Cyprus.

UNFICYP has been responsible to the UN Security Council, which authorizes and renews the Force's life twice a year. However, most day-to-day authority over this Force has been delegated to the Secretary General. Its activities have included the following:

1. Pacification efforts (negotiation, mediation, good offices);
2. Civic action (i.e. to help the re-establishment of normal services and institutions);
3. Information gathering (to help in establishing a detached and accurate empirical base of facts which could facilitate negotiations).

In short, UNFICYP has been acting both as a buffer and a link between the two ethnic communities. UNFICYP's mandate, however, has clearly excluded the «forceful imposition of peace» in Cyprus. So, whenever armed hostilities break out, the role of UNFICYP becomes more political-diplomatic and less military.

In the ten years of its operation between 1964-1974 UNFICYP has performed quite admirably and has been welcome to all sides. The only criticism voiced occasionally argued that UNFICYP unwittingly contributed to the freezing of the *status quo* (i.e. the *de facto* separation of the communities), and that its presence has become addictive for all the islanders who have grown psychologically dependent on this externally administered «pain killing» operation. In short, it could be said that UNFICYP managed to control but not to eliminate ethnic conflict,

1. For accounts of the 1963-64 crisis see Charles Foley, *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus Form Rebellion to Civil War*, Baltimore, Penguin, 1964; Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*, pp. 168-191; Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism, etc.*, pp. 104-134 which is based on detailed primary source documentation; George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1972, pp. 105 ff, which brings the story up to the 1967 crisis. On US involvement in that crisis see Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, *Facing the Brink*, New York, Scribner, 1967, pp. 16-36. For relevant documents see *American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1964*, Department of State Publication 8253, Released August 1967, pp. 555-603.

2. Text of the resolution in *19 United Nations Security Council Official Record, Supplement*, January-March 1964, pp. 102-103, UN Doc. S/5575 (1964). For the appeal and the debates see *19 UN SCOR*, Meetings 1094 to 1103 (17 February to 13 March 1964).

especially when the latter was exacerbated by externally planned interventions in the political affairs of Cyprus.¹

Since 1963-64 a stalemate developed between the two communities involving a *de facto* separation of Greek from Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot community was insulated in enclaves scattered throughout the island. These enclaves have been primarily based on the Turkish quarters of the six major cities and on a number of clusters of Turkish villages in the countryside. In the climate of tension and fear prevailing during the ethnic confrontation in 1964, a number of small and isolated Turkish villages and the Turkish quarters of some mixed Greek and Turkish villages were abandoned by their population which moved to the areas that later were consolidated into the enclaves.

Originally this movement appeared as the result of a quest for safety and refuge during the charged up atmosphere of hostilities. As time went by however and life was returning to its normal pace, especially after 1968, it became evident that the creation and sealing off of the enclaves was a measure designed to modify the ethnic demography of Cyprus and create at least a partial geographical basis for a political federation of the island, to replace the unitary state of the Republic of Cyprus.² Documentary evidence that has been made available subsequently tends to corroborate this view.³ The Turkish Cypriot enclaves remained inaccessible to the government of Cyprus

and have been virtual no-go areas for Greek Cypriots. The Turks gradually developed separate administrative structures (military, police, taxation and justice) within the enclaves and withdrew from participation in the Cypriot government which remained as the only internationally recognized authority in the island.⁴

It will be realized that the intensification of ethnic differentiation precipitated by the growth of Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, and the ethnic violence of the 1950s prevented, once Cyprus attained independence, an «integrative revolution» from taking off on the island.⁵ In the case of Cyprus the preconditions of some form of social, though probably not ethnic, integration were present in the sociological substratum of traditional coexistence still surviving in the countryside. The institutionalization of ethnic dualism however in the Cyprus constitution and the consequent political climate of communal divisiveness effectively blocked any policy initiatives which might have exploited the potentialities of social change in the direction of some form of integrative evolution rather than foster conflict.

In addition a number of powerful exogenous factors also arrested the possible pattern of coexistence from developing. At the origins of the ethnically based political disintegration of the Republic of Cyprus lay the legacy of British colonial policy, which, as noted earlier, tended to solidify ethnic divisions by means of separate organization of communal groups in the colonial territories.

An even more powerful factor have been the close linkages between the two Cypriot communities with Greece and Turkey respectively.

Since independence, and especially since the constitutional breakdown of 1963-64 the inter-ethnic intransigence of both Cypriot communities had been considerably fortified by the policies of Greece and Turkey. Both countries, Turkey more effectively than Greece, have been dealing with their respective ethnic communities on Cyprus with scant regard to Cypriot sovereignty. Clearly support and directives emanating from Ankara to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, have been a major factor in the creation of the enclaves and the promotion of the separation of the two Cypriot communities throughout the 1960s.⁶

1. Detailed accounts on the activities of the UNFICYP are provided in the reports submitted by the UN Secretary General to the Security Council every six months since 1964 and published in the Supplements of the SCOR (usually in the June and December issues). An important contribution to the subject is that by Michael Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970. Cf. also James Stegenga, «UN Peacekeeping: The Cyprus Venture,» *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1970), pp. 1-15.

2. Cf. Kemal H. Karpat, «Solution in Cyprus: Federation,» *The Cyprus Dilemma: Options for Peace*, New York, Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, 1967, pp. 35-54. This essay expressing the Turkish view on Cyprus, states that the concentration of the Turkish Cypriot community in certain areas of the island following the 1963-64 breakdown, created the geographical basis for a cantonal federation. The author suggests that four Turkish Cypriot and six-seven Greek Cypriot cantons could be formed and united in a federal structure which, he suggests, due to the special needs of Cyprus, ought to be tighter than that of Switzerland.

3. Cf. «Report of the Secretary General on the UN Operation in Cyprus,» Doc. S/6102, 12 December 1964, paragraph 32, 19 UN SCOR, Supp. October-December 1964, pp. 230-231; «Report of the Secretary General on the UN Operation in Cyprus,» Doc. S/6228, 10 March 1965, paragraphs 53-56, 20 UN SCOR, Supp. January-March 1965, pp. 118-119.

For the role of Turkey in all this cf. «Report of the Secretary General on the UN Operation in Cyprus,» Doc. S/5764, June 15, 1964, paragraph 119, 19 UN SCOR, Supp. April-June 1964, pp. 239-40.

4. The foreign diplomatic missions to Cyprus and UN officials continued to consult with the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Dr. Kuchuk and after February 1973 Mr. Denktash were considered as the Vice President of the Republic.

5. Cf. Clifford Geertz, «The Integrative Revolution: Primal Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,» *Old Societies and New States*, ed. by Clifford Geertz, New York, Free Press, 1963, pp. 105-157.

6. The Turkish insistence on the partition of Cyprus in the guise of geographical separation of the two communities,

Support from Ankara also made possible the neutralization of all moderate elements in the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots and the solidification of the separatist course advocated by the extremists. The escalation of extremism among Turkish Cypriot political elites in turn enabled Turkey to exercise total control and to maintain a firm grip over the enclaves which remained dependent on economic aid and military protection from the mainland.¹

Conversely, the vitality of the Cypriot economy and the effective political leadership of President Makarios combined to allow a considerable degree of independent initiative in the effort of the Cyprus government to secure the continuing independence of the island. The military dictatorship that came to power in Greece after the coup of April 21, 1967, however, had attempted systematically to quell the independent line of Archbishop Makarios by undermining his authority. The intra-ethnic conflict that developed among the Greek Cypriots as a consequence, complicated further all attempts at ethnic conflict management in Cyprus, to which we should now turn.

from legal arguments to attempts at conflict resolution: 1964-1974

During the ten years of ethnic crisis (1964-1974), both communities have advanced sets of well developed legal arguments designed to bolster their respective positions while working substantively on the political level in order to crystalize a *status quo* consonant with their interests.² Archbishop Makarios, the unchallenged spokesman of the Greek Cypriot point of view, has followed the road of seeking a solution through direct negotiations between the communities, while making maximum use of the good offices of the UN General Assembly and minimizing, to the extent possible, influences from Greece, Turkey, Britain, the United States and NATO in general. President Makarios has consistently argued that the 1960 Constitution and the treaties had been forced upon the Cypriot people and that these treaties have been blatantly inequitable.³ He feels that the provisions of the Treaty Guarantee permitting the

intervention of third states (the guarantor powers) as well as the fact that amendment of the Constitution—on which the Cypriot people never had the opportunity to vote—is excluded in eternity, are clearly incompatible with internationally recognized principles of sovereignty and independence.⁴

On the political side the Greek case rests heavily on General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX) of December 18, 1965 which takes «cognizance of the fact that the Republic of Cyprus, as an equal member of the United Nations is, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, entitled to enjoy and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference.» The Assembly has further called upon all nations, «in conformity with their obligations under the Charter, and in particular Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any intervention directed against it.»⁵

Resting therefore its case on the international recognition of Cyprus' sovereignty and evoking the generally acknowledged principle of majority rule and minority rights, the Cypriot government has offered consistently the following concessions in an attempt to reach compromise over this most thorny interethnic issue:

1. The adoption of a code of fundamental rights to protect the minority;
2. The requirement that the Turkish Cypriot participation in Parliament should be on the basis of proportional representation to the population of the Cypriot Turks;
3. The authorization for the minority to direct the «education, culture, religion, and personal status of its members;»
4. The acceptance of a UN Commission which would oversee the protection of minority rights for a specified period of time.⁶

The Turkish Cypriot position has also adopted a mixture of legal and political arguments in order to protect its interests. The Turkish Cypriots have accused President Makarios of failing to implement

4. For the full arguments of the Government of Cyprus concerning the Treaty of Guarantee cf. *19 UN SCOR*, 109th Meeting (27 February 1964), pp. 15-21. Cf. also the Charter of the United Nations, Articles 2 (1), 2(4) and 103, all of which can be invoked against the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee. This treaty also contravenes Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which, remarkably, has been voted for by Turkey.

5. *20 UN General Assembly Official Records*, 1402nd Plenary Meeting, 18 December 1965, pp. 2-11. The vote on this resolution was 47 for, 5 against, 54 abstaining. Text of Resolution 2077 in *20 UN GAOR, Annexes*, Vol. III, p. 13.

6. Cf. Greek Cypriot official views as outlined in the «Report by the UN Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary General,» paragraphs 92-93.

was formally reiterated to the UN Mediator. See «Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary General,» Doc. S/6253, 26 March 1965, par. 73-75, 97-98, 107-109, *20 UN SCOR*, Supp. January-March 1965, pp. 199-253.

1. For details see A. Pollis, «Systemic Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus,» pp. 31-34.

2. A very good recent study of the legal aspects of the disputes over Cyprus in their political context is Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958-1960*, London, Oxford University Press, 1974.

3. Cf. Xydis, *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic*, chapter XI, pp. 420 ff for the reservations of Archbishop Makarios concerning the agreements and the pressures exerted on him by the Greek government.

faithfully and equitably the 1960 Constitution from the very beginning. His Thirteen Amendments (November 1963) fly to the very face of Article 182 of the Cyprus Constitution which prohibits amendments. Beyond that, it is an accepted principle of international law that treaties are not subject to unilateral abrogation (*pacta sunt servanda*).¹

The Turkish view continues by denouncing the Greek Cypriot majority's policies of «exclusion and oppression» which have allegedly been designed to drive the Turkish minority from the island. Thus, the Turkish Cypriots purported to justify their stern resistance and the support they are securing from mainland Turkey on the foundation of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) which states :

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present treaty, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.²

In short the Turkish view initially was that the Zurich and London treaties and the 1960 Constitution remained valid and, as a minimum for a settlement, the parties involved should return to the *status quo ante* (1963). These remained the positions of the two communities during the period 1964-1974.

While the conflict has been simmering during the past ten years, reaching on occasion (twice in 1964 and once in 1967) peak levels threatening a simultaneous Turkish and Greek intervention in Cyprus which could escalate into a full-scale war between the two countries,³ efforts have been made to solve the Cyprus problem on at least four levels : a) international; b) regional; c) sub-regional; and d) local. Basically these four levels could be more simply divided in two : a) solutions imposed on the Cypriots by outside powers versus b) solutions arrived at by intercommunal negotiations between those directly involved by virtue of being the inhabitants of Cyprus.

On the international level of conflict management and resolution efforts the major focus should be

on the activities and initiatives of the United Nations in the Cyprus question. During the 1950s, while the struggle for decolonization was going on in Cyprus, Greece and the Greek Cypriots chose the UN as an instrument of policy. Although excluded from the process that brought about the Zurich and London agreements, the UN has proved a useful echo chamber and world public opinion forum generating some serious pressures upon the British to relinquish colonial control over the island. The role of the UN in the 1960s, the post-independence period for Cyprus, has been considerably more active and decisive than in the 1950s largely because the government of Cyprus placed more trust in the mediating efforts of the international organization, insisting that the Cyprus problem was *not* a Greek-Turkish dispute to be resolved by NATO.⁴ We have already spoken about UNFICYP.

Further, the UN Secretary Generals, through their official mediators Sakari S. Tuomioja of Finland and Dr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador tried to promote a policy of peaceful coexistence and engagement between the two communities while recognizing the unitary nature of the Cypriot state and recommending as the most likely path to a permanent solution direct negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with the encouragement (but not intervention) of all outside interested parties. In this question particular mention should be made of the Report on the mediating activities submitted by Dr. Galo Plaza to the Secretary General in March 1965.⁵ This is a document of highly enlightened statesmanship which with its suggestions of political formulas and structural arrangements and its pervading concern for human welfare, could be an invaluable basis of all resolution efforts. The Report, counseling against persistence in the pursuit of union or partition and recommending ample safeguards of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in a unitary state, was accepted by the government of Cyprus but rejected by the government of Turkey and consequently by the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community.

So, to summarize, the approach of the international factor has been to leave the solution of the problem to the Cypriots alone and to provide good offices and other mediating and facilitative services from the outside while discouraging great power

1. For a fuller statement of Turkish arguments see *19 UN SCOR 1045th Meeting*, (18th February 1964), pp. 34-40.

2. *UN Treaty Series*, Vol. 382, p. 6

3. The unfolding of the conflict in the 1960s has not yet formed the object of scholarly studies comparable to those that analyze events in the 1950s. For general surveys see Ierodiakonou, *The Cyprus Question*, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-300; Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism*, etc., *op. cit.*, pp. 135-170; Linda B. Miller, *Cyprus, The Law and Politics of Civil Strife*, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1968.

4. The involvement of the United Nations in the Cyprus problem and the discussion of the issue in the Security Council and General Assembly repeatedly since 1964 is covered regularly in successive volumes of the *UN Monthly Chronicle*.

5. For full citation see note 6 of p. 282. For the substantive proposals of the Mediator note in particular paragraphs 132-148 on the issues of independence, self-determination and international peace; 149-157 on the structure of the state and 158-165 on the protection of the individual and minority rights.

(US, USSR) and middle power (Great Britain, Greece and Turkey) intervention in the internal affairs of the island.

On the regional level, efforts to solve the Cyprus problem have tended to follow the very direction that the government of Cyprus had constantly tried to avoid. The predominant element on this level has been the efforts of Britain and the United States through NATO to eliminate the last remaining *casus belli* in the affairs of Greece and Turkey, regardless of what this might mean for the fate of Cyprus.¹ As we indicated above, between December 1963 and February 1964 Britain attempted to organize a NATO regional force to supervise the truce in Cyprus.² This would have involved a three-month renewable NATO-recruited and British-commanded multinational force of 10,000 men which would have been placed under the political guidance of a committee of NATO ambassadors. Negotiations would have been enhanced through the efforts of an appointed mediator from a NATO country, other than Greece, Turkey, Great Britain and the United States. Turkey and Greece assented to this plan with some important qualifications. President Makarios, however, objected and asked instead for a force which would have been responsible to the UN rather than NATO. This, of course, was in keeping with the Cypriot policy of strategic non-alignment and active participation in the Third World movement.

The NATO level activities assumed a far more aggressive and interventionist nature under the initiative of the United States. In July of 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed the veteran diplomat Dean Acheson as a special mediator for Cyprus. Acheson's view was that the problem should be solved by direct agreement of Greece and Turkey within the spirit of the NATO alliance. This meant that the Cypriots, above all Archbishop Makarios, need not and should not necessarily be consulted. In the last analysis, a solution would have to be imposed upon the two warring Cypriot communities. Specifically, the plan woven by the aging diplomat would have taken the outward form of *Enosis* of Cyprus with Greece, and by extension, assured entry of Cyprus into the NATO complex. The Turkish side, however, would have been pacified with territorial concessions in the form of a sizable sovereign or leased base, extensive guarantees for the Turkish minority and the development of Turkish cantons in the Greek-controlled portion of Cyprus.³

1. The involvement of NATO in the 1963-64 crisis is assessed in Philip Windsor, «NATO and the Cyprus Crisis,» *Adelphi Papers*, no. 14, London, Institute of Strategic Studies, 1964.

2. For the relevant documents cf. *American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1964*, pp. 556-557.

3. For an official US assessment of the Cyprus problem

The Greek and Turkish governments initially accepted, in principle and quite cautiously, the Acheson proposals. President Makarios, however, denounced the plan as a barely disguised form of partition of Cyprus which was totally unacceptable to the interests of the Greek Cypriot population. Despite difficult odds and unbearable pressures upon the Archbishop, his views somehow managed to withstand the regional/strategic pressures orchestrated by the United States in the framework of the NATO alliance.

Perhaps the most important dimension added by the US to the Cyprus imbroglio has been in the US's restraining influence over Greece and Turkey to avoid an outbreak of war between them. For example, the US through a series of emissaries and mediators, has continuously counseled prudence and urged a negotiated settlement to be reached between Greece and Turkey. George Ball's trip to Cyprus in February 1964, Lyndon Johnson's telegram to Premier Inonu in July 1964 strongly counseling against Turkish intervention in Cyprus, Dean Acheson's mediating efforts in July 1964, and Cyrus Vance's frenzied activity in November of 1967, all illustrate this type of activity. A major departure from this style has been Secretary Henry Kissinger's orchestrated apathy vis-à-vis the bloody events of July-August 1974 in Cyprus.

The sub-regional level focuses on the efforts of Greece and Turkey to safeguard their national interests in Cyprus. Whether one speaks of the pre- or post-independence period of Cyprus (i.e. before and after 1960), it would be a safe assumption to make that both Greece and Turkey have placed their own general security requirements, and by extension their NATO obligations, as well as their domestic political exigencies on a higher priority than any concern they might have had with the welfare of their ethnic brothers in Cyprus.

As we have already pointed out, both Greece and Turkey have attempted to penetrate and control their respective ethnic counterparts in Cyprus, perceiving the two Cypriot communities as clients or, more euphemistically, junior partners. Naturally, Turkey has found it much easier to control the utterly dependent and economically depressed Turkish enclaves. On the contrary, President Makarios and the Cypriot government have proven a harder nut to crack, to the point that, particularly in the post-1967 period, one could say that the controlling influence of the Athens government was considerably

see George Ball, «The Responsibilities of a Global Power,» *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 51, 1964, pp. 476-477. For Acheson's own account of his activities see Dean Acheson, «Cyprus: The Anatomy of the Problem,» *Chicago Bar Record*, Vol. XLVI, no. 8, May 1965, pp. 349-356. For details about the provisions of the Acheson plan see *Tò Bήμα*, Athens, September 1, 1964, p. 1.

weakened in Nicosia. This was made abundantly clear in February 1972, when President Makarios ignored a public ultimatum from Athens to drastically restructure his government or resign. He did neither and survived.¹

It was thus becoming increasingly clear that in view of the Cypriots' resistance—which was eloquently expressed in the overwhelming popular support enjoyed by President Makarios—as well as because of the objections voiced by the Soviet Union, NATO could not impose an Acheson type of solution, short of using drastic military means. This created the political preconditions of a negotiated settlement to be reached through inter-communal talks, presumably premised primarily not on foreign strategic interests but on considerations over the welfare and interests of the Cypriots themselves.

This leads us to the local level of settlement efforts through direct negotiations of the two Cypriot communities. Thus we come full circle since the objectives and methods of conflict resolution encouraged on the international level have been essentially the same as the strategy of the intercommunal talks. Negotiations were initiated in June 1968 and continued in several phases until mid-1974 between Messers Clerides and Denktash representing the two ethnic communities. At a later stage two constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey were included to assist the two principal negotiators. The special representative of the UN General Secretary in Cyprus, attended as well.

The discussions covered many of the constitutional problems raised by the ethnic conflict and although the content of the negotiations remained secret, informed sources repeatedly intimated that significant progress was being made. At the later stages of the talks substantive disagreement was narrowed down over the issue of local government—the Greek side conceding that considerable decentralization was desirable but also insisting that the jurisdiction and functions of local government should not be such as to create essentially the infrastructure of a communal Turkish state within the unitary state of Cyprus.²

We believe that the intercommunal negotiations were the appropriate method of conflict resolution

1. For an excellent analysis of the relations between the governments of Greece and Cyprus in the period 1960-1972 see the essay by Alexander G. Xydīs, «Τὸ Ψυχολογικὸ Πλέγμα» (The Psychological Complex), in A.G. Xydīs, Sp. Linardatos, K. Chadjiargyris, *Ὁ Μακάριος καὶ οἱ Στραμαχοὶ τοῦ (Μακάριος and his Allies)*, Athens, Gutenberg, 1972, pp. 11-40.

2. Cf. C.A. Theodoulou, «Quelques aspects de la crise chypriote actuelle», *Politique Etrangère*, Vol. 37, no. 2, 1972, pp. 221-253. Agreement was repeatedly reported as being very close at hand, but in all those occasions the following pattern would recur on the behavior of the Turkish side: the Turkish

because they provided a channel of direct communication between spokesmen of the two ethnic Cypriot communities. In such a context misperceptions and misconceptions could be discussed and cleared up, common interests realized and the bases of agreement identified, if only good would prevail.³ The preconditions of a successful strategy of conflict resolution were indeed present in Cyprus and should have been apparent to any perceptive observer of the situation in the island during the past several years, despite the muted confrontation of the two communities.

To begin with there was the sociological basis of interethnic coexistence and cooperation which had not just been historically the feature of life in Cypriot traditional society but had survived largely intact in the ethnically mixed communities of rural Cyprus. The constructive record of the UNFICYP in conflict containment, added another useful precondition of conflict resolution. The UNFICYP could be used as an impartial police force to provide the necessary protection and security to all Cypriots once all other armed forces were removed from the scene. If the Greek and Turkish contingents and military personnel were removed from Cyprus and the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighting units were disbanded, not only the probability of recurrent collisions and explosions would be effectively checked, but also considerable funds would be economized to finance the stationing of a neutral and periodically rotating international force on a semi-permanent basis in Cyprus to act as an arbitrator and observer of the would-be settlement.⁴ We think that such a situation would guarantee effectively the

Cypriot negotiator would fly to Ankara to brief the Turkish government on the progress of the talks. Upon his return to Cyprus however the Turkish views would be invariably announced as hardened and the previous points of agreement discarded. This systematic subversion of all agreements reached in intra-Cypriot negotiations by Ankara, was last manifested in the rejection of an agreement over the operation of Nicosia International Airport, after the abortive resumption of talks in January 1975. See *The New York Times*, January 24, 1975, p. 3, and *Ibid.*, February 1, 1975, p. 2.

3. For the social psychological dynamics of such situations and the importance of direct communication for the resolution of conflict see John W. Burton, *Conflict and Communications: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations*, London, Macmillan, 1969. Cf. Herbert C. Kelman's evaluation of this work «The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution», in *Communication in International Politics*, ed. by Richard L. Merritt, University of Illinois Press, 1972, pp. 168-204. For an argument that by the late 1960s the Cyprus conflict was becoming a problem of misperception cf. John W. Burton, *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 55-59, 68-69, 75-77.

4. It should be added here that the government of Cyprus had repeatedly argued for demilitarization of the island in the context of a settlement. See for instance the «Report of the UN Mediator», paragraph 92.

security of the Turkish Cypriots so that they could feel free and safe to come out of the self-imposed seclusion of the enclaves and participate in the life of Cyprus. By guaranteeing peace and security therefore a permanent Cyprus UN police force could help create both the practical mechanisms and the psychological climate of ethnic reintegration.

But most important of all the new directions emerging in the political life of Cyprus and the dynamics of economic development seemed to be working in favor of an accommodation of the conflict. Politically the growth of moderation and realism had led to the conclusion that the pursuit of independent statehood was the safest course for Cyprus. This became official policy when in 1965 the government of Cyprus formally accepted the recommendations of UN Mediator Dr. Galo Plaza who explicitly counseled against persisting in the pursuit of *Enosis*. In repeated democratic elections the Greek Cypriot community had confirmed this policy by casting overwhelmingly their votes in support of Archbishop Makarios and his supporters and the «feasible» solution (i.e. independence) they advocated. This meant that the most fundamental and uncompromising demand of the Turkish Cypriots was met and consequently the way for an accommodation should have been open. Another hopeful indication in this direction was the emergence of socially based political parties which could conceivably cut into the ethnic cleavage as earlier instances of interethnic cooperation in trade unions or in the cause of Cypriot independence might suggest.¹

Economically the fast rate of growth and industrial expansion² had broadened the labor market and thus Turkish Cypriot workers who were kept secluded and idle in the enclaves could join the labor force and thus be economically reintegrated in Cypriot society as they had been in the past. Normal contacts could be resumed in all commercial and industrial areas once the separatist policy «from Turk to Turk» pressed on the Turkish Cypriots by their leaders, was modified or dropped. The econom-

ic reintegration of Cypriot society might also provide the means of redressing the inequalities in the levels of economic development of the two communities, thus removing one of the underlying structural sources of conflict.³ Indeed by the early 1970s increasing numbers of Turkish Cypriot workers were employed in projects of public works and general economic exchanges tended to be resumed between the two communities. Normal economic relations had never of course been severed in the agrarian economy of mixed rural communities.

With these trends in mind it is plausible to argue that the social and political context was ripe for a commonly acceptable Constitutional formula satisfying the basic needs and long standing objections of both sides and setting up the institutional framework of effective conflict resolution and social reintegration. To meet these requirements a viable model for Cyprus would have to be based on independence by ruling out all forms of union and partition. The institutional set-up should be premised on decentralization to allow ethnic autonomy and sharing in the central institutions of power to secure the integrated character of the state. The constitutional infrastructure of reintegration could be established if a number of divisive provisions of the 1960 Constitution were amended. For instance the Greek President and the Turkish Vice President would have to be elected by the entire population of the island. The representation of the Turkish side in Parliament, the bureaucracy and the security forces would have to be analogous to the percentage of Turkish population (18 %) rather than ranging up to 30 or 40 percent. On the other hand considerable autonomy and self-management would have to be recognized to the Turkish communities of the island in conducting their local and broadly cultural affairs (religion, education, etc.) to reassure them in their desire to preserve their highly valued ethnic identity.⁴ International guarantees could have been adopted to oversee and secure the effective operation of this autonomy. The Parliament however would have to be divided into Greek and Turkish caucuses voting separately only on residual matters dealing exclusively with

1. The emergence of political parties and electoral politics in their social context are examined in Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *Patterns of Politics in Cyprus*, unpublished thesis, Wesleyan University, 1972. Cf. Peter Loizos, *The Greek Gift: Politics in a Cypriot Village*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1975, pp. 235-88.

2. The best sources on economic planning and development in Cyprus are *The Second Five Year Plan, 1967-1971* and *The Third Five Year Plan, 1972-1976*, both prepared by the Planning Bureau of the Republic of Cyprus and containing all the relevant statistical information on achievements, targets and problems in the economic development of Cyprus. The performance of Cyprus can be best appreciated in a comparative perspective as presented in the special report on economic development published in *The UNESCO Courier*, February 1970 (23rd year), pp. 22-3; in a survey of 69 developing countries Cyprus is classified in the category of those with both the highest growth rate and per capita income in the decade of the 1960s.

3. Cf. Stathis Panagides, «Communal Conflict and Economic Considerations: The Case of Cyprus,» *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 5, 1968, pp. 133-145.

4. According to the 1960 Constitution such matters were to be administered by the Communal Chambers. See Constitution of Cyprus, Part V, Articles 86-111, in A.J. Peaslee, ed., *Constitutions of Nations*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1968, Vol. III, Europe, pp. 170-178. In his 13 amendments in 1963 President Makarios proposed the abolition of the Greek Communal Chamber and the delegation of its functions to a Ministry of Education for reasons of increased governmental efficiency. He stated however that the Turkish Cypriot community was free to retain its Communal Chamber.

intra-community affairs. The experience of 1960-63 had amply demonstrated that the entire Parliament would have to vote as a cohesive unit, abolishing the requirement of securing separate majorities of each ethnic caucus on all important legislation.

This was not an inconceivable way in which events could have developed and Cyprus might have become a model case of a fair resolution of ethnic conflict. Unfortunately the positive trends outlined above, were not allowed to come to fruition. Ethnic dualism has not been the only or even the primary cause of conflict in Cyprus. The dynamics of conflict resolution were effectively blocked by outside interference. Thus every time the intercommunal talks seemed to reach a point of substantial agreement on fundamental issues, the trend was reversed by behind the scenes manipulation of the Turkish Cypriot negotiator by the Turkish government in Ankara.¹ Writing with events since July 1974 in mind, we can assert with considerable certainty that despite its grudging endorsement of the interethnic negotiations, Turkish policy never abandoned the pursuit of partition which was first suggested by Britain in the 1950s and was later presented as the official Turkish view on Cyprus to the UN Mediator in 1965.² In the background of this posture was the fact that manipulation of the Cyprus issue in Turkish internal politics had proved a convenient diversion of attention from pressing domestic problems.³

In the pursuit of this aim Turkey was fortified by US policy which has favored some form of partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey—thus achieving both the eradication of a cause of conflict threatening the solidity of the southeastern flank of NATO and the incorporation of Cyprus, a territory with some strategic value,⁴ within the boundaries of two mem-

bers of the Western alliance. The disappearance of Cyprus as a sovereign Republic would also terminate the independent and neutralist outlook in the foreign policy of President Makarios—a policy resented by the Cold-Warriors in Washington. This is adequately indicated, we think, by US insistence on a settlement of Cyprus within NATO in the 1950s, by the Acheson plans promoted during the crisis of the mid-1960s and finally by American acquiescence in if not support for the Turkish invasion and violent partition of Cyprus in the summer of 1974. Probably the most eloquent indication of American attitudes on the problem of Cyprus is offered by the vote the USA cast against the innocuous resolution affirming the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, passed by the UN General Assembly in December 1965.⁵

Greece also was converted to the line of some form of NATO oriented partition, once the military dictatorship rose to power in 1967.⁶ The Athens colonels felt that some territorial concessions to Turkey would be desirable in order to satisfy the atavistic aspirations of Greek irredentist nationalism. Apparently such a foreign maneuver was expected to generate some popular sympathy for the repressive military regime. Hence the encouragement and direc-

is a mere 550 air miles. Cyprus thus occupies a peculiarly strategic location as an air base.» T. W. Adams, *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1971, p. 87.

5. The study of US policy toward Cyprus has been placed on an entirely new basis by the research of Van Coufoudakis who has presented convincing arguments and documentation supporting a view of a continuity of American policy since the 1950s in pursuit of the partition of Cyprus as the ideal solution from the vantage point of American interests. See Van Coufoudakis, «United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A case Study in Cold War Diplomacy,» in Coulombis and Hicks, eds., *US Foreign Policy toward Greece and Cyprus*, pp. 106-138.

6. More correctly it can be said that Greece agreed to cooperate in undermining the independence of Cyprus already under the governments that came to power after the fall of the Papandreou government in 1965. For an incisive critique see Ch. Chrestides, *Κυπριακό και Ἑλληνοτουρκικά (The Cyprus Question, etc.)*, pp. IX-CXXII and *idem.*, «Ἀκροῦς Ἀπόρρητον: Τὸ Προτόκολλο τῆς 17ης Δεκεμβρίου 1966 (Top Secret: The Protocol of 17 December 1966),» Athens, 1973.

On the policy of the Greek military junta toward Cyprus see Alexander G. Xydīs, «The Military Regime's Foreign Policy,» *Greece under Military Rule*, ed. by Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos, New York, Basic Books, 1972, pp. 191-209.

A strand of radical opinion tends to attribute the advent of the military dictatorship in Greece to the increasing urgency felt by NATO and the USA to quell the independent stands taken by the Papandreou government in opposing the partition of Cyprus. Cf. Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1970, pp. 129-141, and Constantine Tsoucalas, *The Greek Tragedy*, London, Penguin, 1969, pp. 153-165, 189-191.

1. See note 2 of page 286.

2. Cf. note 6 of page 282. For an informative survey of the views of the various political parties of Turkey on Cyprus see Ferenc Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 78-99.

3. Cf. Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 188. For the manipulation of the public's sensitivity over Cyprus in Turkish domestic politics, cf. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, pp. 99-114, 358-364.

4. The following view is revealing as to how Cyprus is perceived in certain American quarters: «As a center of operations directed toward the Soviet bloc—presuming over-flight rights with Turkey—Cyprus has great potential. Moscow is only 1500 air miles from Cyprus airstrips; Baku, the Soviet oil center on the Caspian Sea, lies only 1000 miles away; Rostov, a main industrial center on the Don River is 900 miles distant; Sverdlovsk, a center of Soviet heavy industry, is situated at a distance of 2000 miles, and the oil fields of Rumania are as near as 800 miles. In fact, Batum, the nearest point in the Soviet Union from Cyprus is only 830 miles away and the nearest city in the Soviet bloc, the Bulgarian city of Akhtopol,

tion of the several moves to unseat President Makarios.

The pattern of intra-ethnic discord that the Greek military regime encouraged in the ranks of the Greek Cypriot community escalated in the formation of extremist underground armed groups like the National Front (1969-1970) and EOKA-B (1971-74) which preached a revival of the *Enosis* movement.¹ These developments in turn exacerbated the fears of the Turkish Cypriots and undermined further the efforts at an accommodation of ethnic differences. Deprived of popular sympathy these campaigns of extreme right wing subversion and terrorism failed to unseat President Makarios who won reelection for a third term in 1973. Several documents captured during police operations against EOKA-B terrorism, clearly implicated the Greek junta and Greek officers serving in Cyprus. In a now famous letter to the figurehead President of dictatorial Greece, Archbishop Makarios expressed his abhorrence for military regimes and demanded the termination of the disastrous activities of the junta in Cyprus. As political oppression and bankruptcy were reaching their climax in Greece, the junta responded by engineering the coup of July, 15, 1974. This coup and the subsequent Turkish invasion have left Cyprus in the tragic condition which we described at the beginning of this paper.²

From the point of view of the future of the ethnic conflict the most momentous effect of the Turkish invasion, is the forceful demographic change imposed on the occupied areas of Northern Cyprus. This consists of a policy of moving Turkish settlers (either infiltrators from the South or colonists from Asia Minor) into Greek villages and towns

to occupy the properties of refugee Greek Cypriots.³ This process of forceful demographic transformation is placed in its proper symbolic context by turkicizing place names, by destroying monuments of Greek culture, by turning Orthodox churches into mosques and by erecting statues of Kemal Ataturk in the occupied areas. We can not forecast what the precise outcome of all this is going to be but there can be no doubt that it will have a powerful impact on the future pattern of inter-ethnic relations in Cyprus and elsewhere.

epilogue

Whenever Cyprus captured the attention of students of politics it did so as an international problem, an element in strategy and power relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. What has come to be known as the Cyprus Question, essentially a leftover of the Eastern Question of old, has fundamentally involved the issue of control over a strategically located island at the threshold of the Near East. In this paper we have tried to shift focus from the international to the domestic aspect of conflict over Cyprus by considering the emergence and unfolding of the ethnic dispute which has dominated the politics of the island for many years. (For the benefit of those readers who are interested in the international aspects of the problem of Cyprus, we have included all the relevant literature in the references.)

From a theoretical point of view we have tried to point at the relation between the workings of social change and the evolution of the ethnic conflict. The most significant finding in this connection seems to have been the fact that despite the effort to concentrate on domestic social and political processes, it is ultimately impossible to consider the nature of ethnic conflict in Cyprus without discussing international politics—especially at all those points when instability and strife escalate in the island. This points at the close linkages between the politics of inter- and intra-ethnic conflict in Cyprus with international power politics in the area. Instability in Cyprus tends to be telescoped and engulf the politics and foreign relations of Greece and Turkey, and through the 1950s and early 1960s British imperial policy in the Middle East as well. All this in turn affects the international equilibrium in a sensitive and fragile geopolitical region. Conversely, conflict and instability in Cyprus are influenced, and domestic developments are often distorted by the

1. For the sociological character and social bases of this movement see Peter Loizos, «The progress of Greek nationalism in Cyprus, 1878-1970», in J. Davis, ed., *Choice and Change: essays in honour of Lucy Mair*, LSE monographs on Social Anthropology, no. 50, 1974, pp. 114-133 and Kyriacos Markides, «Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The Case of Cyprus», *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 1, no. 2, May 1974, pp. 304-330.

2. The fullest account of these developments yet available is that by Laurence Stern «Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus», *Foreign Policy*, no. 19, Summer 1975, pp. 34-78. On the domestic processes leading up to the crisis see K.C. Markides, «Internal Weakness and External Intervention: The Collapse of the Cyprus Republic», Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, May 1975. An incisive forecast of the tragedy is Ch. Chresdes, «*Η Απτοκαταστροφή των Έλληνοκυπρίων* (The Self-Destruction of the Greek Cypriots), Athens 1973. *Idem*. «*Από τον Ιούλιο 1974 έκλεισε χρόνος* (A year has been completed since July 1974), Athens 1975 and Ploutes Servas, «*Η Κυπριακή Τραγωδία* (The Cyprus Tragedy), Athens 1975 offer critical analyses of the problem and its handling by the governments of Greece and Cyprus.

3. *The New York Times*, November 2, 1974, pp. 1,7; *ibid.*, January 17, 1975, p. 8; *ibid.*, February 10, 1975, p. 10 and *ibid.*, July 3, 1975, p. 2. On the pressures on the Greek Cypriots to leave the occupied area see *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 1, 1975.

attempts of outside powers to shape the political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in their own interest. Thus through a variety of social and political processes internal conflict in Cyprus is internationalized and therefore its outcome becomes dependent upon external factors.¹

Throughout this paper it ought to have been clear that external sources contributed greatly to the stimulation and exacerbation of conflict within Cyprus. At the initial stages British colonial policy and the nationalist influences emanating from Greece and Turkey provided the context and the momentum needed for the escalation of ethnic strife. Later on, Cold War American policies advanced through NATO nurtured the conflict indirectly first and more directly in the recent past (early 1970s)² in order to achieve the partition and NATOization of Cyprus. In this phase both Greece and Turkey became—willingly and consciously—the channels through which systemic NATO pressures were exercised on Cyprus, a non-member of the alliance. The close historical, national and social ties of the island with these two countries ultimately provided the most effective conduits to those who knew how to manipulate these intimate ethnic bonds in order to undermine and subvert the Republic of Cyprus. The contribution that the experience of Cyprus has therefore to make to the comparative study of ethnic conflict concerns primarily the importance of exogenous sources in the creation and intensification of communal antagonism.

Still the force of this claim rests significantly on the evidence that one can adduce in support of an argument that in the absence of outside pressures ethnic conflict could have been regulated in the context of democratic coexistence and elimination of violent confrontation. In this paper we have pointed at a number of indications, possibilities and trends which could be interpreted in this light. Indeed the history of Cyprus is as much one of ethnic diversity and conflict as it is a history of ethnic coexistence. A reading of this history clearly suggests that ethnic conflict may have been equally the result of certain political choices and political misjudgements within Cyprus as it was the outcome of outside policies. But it is equally clear from the historical record that

after the bitter experience of violent conflict both a maturity of political wills and the direction of social developments were pointing confidently toward conflict resolution.

There is nothing inexorable about ethnic conflict: complete ethnic assimilation and the creation of new unified nationalities is probably unrealistic to expect—and certainly we should *not* be understood to mean this when we talked of the possibilities of conflict resolution and political reintegration. But this is besides the point: ethnic coexistence based on mutual accommodation of fundamental needs and aspirations has proved possible wherever appropriate motivations could be put to work.³ What outside interference did in Cyprus was precisely to stifle the motivation for conflict regulation whenever it appeared. As a consequence Cyprus was never given even the chance to resolve its ethnic and political problems on its own. On the contrary both ethnic conflict and intra-ethnic dissension were always effectively manipulated by outside powers to promote their own objectives and designs on Cyprus. In this sense conflict within Cypriot society provided the needed opportunities to foreign intervention.

Therefore the claim that communal separation is the only workable solution to ethnic conflicts and, in the case of Cyprus, partition is the only alternative to continuing violence, appears very much like a self-fulfilling prophecy and conceptually is perhaps not unrelated to the failure of theories of ethnic conflict and political integration to take into account the disruptive effects of foreign interference. Characteristically the argument for partition is advanced in the case of Cyprus but not in connection with many other ethnically diverse societies ridden with communal problems. Indeed in Cyprus partition could be achieved only at the price of a bloody invasion, a vicious war and a policy of genocide designed to destroy the basis of ethnic coexistence before any other alternative strategies of conflict resolution could be tested: the development of class based democratic politics to supplant ethnic cleavages, the new loyalties that a development-oriented welfare state could have nurtured, the shared stakes in a developing economy, a cultural dialogue to replace the antagonism of traditional nationalist symbols and stereotypes with the discovery of common experiences and values. All of these carried real possibilities of peace and cooperation and it is for this reason that the fate of Cyprus is all the more tragic.

1. This and the following paragraph draw on the conceptualizations advanced in James M. Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 1-44 and *idem*, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, New York, Free Press, 1971, pp. 307-338.

2. Increasing indications of covert American involvement, destabilizing activities and encouragement of local subversion in Cyprus, are becoming available. Cf. Stern, «Bitter Lessons,» for some hints in this direction.

3. See Eric Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Number 29, January 1972, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

POSTSCRIPT

This profile of ethnic conflict in Cyprus was originally written in an attempt to increase awareness over the basic issues of the problem, after the dramatic explosion of the summer of 1974. The chronicle of ethnic politics in the island and pertinent international developments draws on relatively well established facts of history. Caught as we are in a continuing and fast moving crisis however, we must update in this postscript our references to more recent events. When this paper was written, an economic collapse of the badly shaken Republic of Cyprus, seemed within the sphere of probability. Fortunately this has not happened. Instead a miracle of economic survival seems to have been achieved, with outside assistance of course but drawing largely on the mobilization of the island's own human and material resources. This achievement points once again at the soundness of public policy and the viability of a Cypriot polity. Survival however does not mean recovery; and full recovery cannot be realistically contemplated before the root-cause of the disaster is removed: that is foreign occupation of a large part of the island must first be terminated before reconstruction can be attempted on safe foundations. The fact of survival only points at the will and ability of the Cypriots to come to grips with their predicament.

This note of optimism is not meant to suggest that the odds of the problem are decreasing. If anything the possibility of a settlement is made more remote by the intensification of certain trends which we noted in closing our account of ethnic relations in the main body of the paper. The colonization of occupied northern Cyprus by settlers from Asia Minor was stepped up in the fall of 1975. Anatolian peasants, out of the ethnological mosaic of Asia Minor, continued to be transported to Cyprus to change the ethnic balance in the population. The colonization has provoked not only the outcry of the Greek Cypriots, especially the refugees at whose expense the colonists are settled in occupied villages and towns, but also it has met with the discontent of the Turkish Cypriots who resent the presence of the intruders and in general the ruthless comportment of the occupation forces.

One of the most unfortunate developments in ethnic relations in the second half of 1975 has been the forced emigration to the north of the Turkish Cypriots of southern Cyprus. These people were forced, at the insistence of their leadership, to abandon their villages and urban quarters in Paphos, Limassol and Larnaca and become involuntary migrants to the north. This was the product of a deal during intercommunal talks in Vienna in July 1975. The movement of the Turkish Cypriots from the south was secured

in exchange of the toleration of the continuing presence of the Greek Cypriot population in occupied Karpass and the improvement of their treatment by the occupation forces. However a few months later, pressures on this unfortunate rural population are escalated to force them away from their ancestral hearths.

Thus the pattern of ethnic coexistence as it was set by a long shared history, is in the process of radical transformation. All this of course is brought about in order to create the conditions of a settlement that will finally meet the traditional Turkish objective of expansion in Cyprus, which at the moment is presented in the legal nomenclature of bizonal federation (after assuming in the past successively the names of partition, functional federation, cantonization, etc.). There can be no doubt that any such arrangement will not solve the problem, but it will only perpetuate the confrontation in all its intensity. Bizonal federation in the form demanded by Turkey will bring not only effective partition but also the establishment of a Turkish protectorate over the whole of Cyprus. The endemic instability that will certainly result will provide Turkey with new pretexts to complete the annexation of Cyprus in its entirety.

In any case the invasion and consequent dismemberment of Cyprus has radically altered the nature of the problem. It is not anymore a question of finding a constitutional *modus vivendi* between two ethnic communities. This of course remains one of the central issues but the most immediate and urgent problem at this moment is the fact of foreign invasion and occupation of a large part of the territory of a sovereign Republic. The problem is now more than ever before truly international and it is up to the international community to exercise pressures and impose sanctions upon its delinquent member to abide by the rules of world society and the law of nations. Only after the rectification of this grave violation of international law, can the problem of ethnic relations and the efforts for an accommodation return to the center of the stage where they deserve to be. Once again we fall back on the international dimension of the problem and the distortion of ethnic politics by outside factors. And by way of conclusion we may note that Congressional investigations under way in Washington at the moment of this writing, are producing evidence vindicating our allegations about direct American involvement in the latest crisis. After all it seems that either frenzied shuttle diplomacy or orchestrated apathy have always been designed to promote the same objectives. Once the full details of this activity are made public, it will be up to a critical social science, studying the nature of contemporary imperialism, to establish the precise reasons for this involvement.