On the economic models of migration: Some empirical results for the Spanish case

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The discouraging record of the last two decades, however, particularly in relation to the rapid urbanization and growing levels of urban unemployment in developing nations, plus the fact that comparative data on wage rates show that urban-rural differentials are slightly increasing over time in absolute terms, has underlined the inadequacy of treating migration as a phenomenon of secondary importance. As a matter of fact, the selective characteristics of the migration process are precisely what many scholars claim to be the key reasons for the perpetuation of underdevelopment in poor areas.

The main purpose of this study is to analyze the internal development process that has been taking place in Spain (probably the very last country to follow the Western model with success) in the logic of the above scheme. Did both internal and external migration lead to a wage convergence between sectors and between regions? Did income and capital grow faster in the poor regions? Our study tries to provide answers for these related questions using a macro-aggregate model with migration as a key variable.
II. economic models of migration

Without question, the phenomenon of accelerated rural-urban labor migration has been the principal cause of both the high rates of urban population (since the level of rural-urban migration has been and will continue to be the principal determinant of the supply of new job seekers) and the rising levels of urban unemployment.

Since it is generally accepted as a fact that limited capability of the industrial sectors in less developed countries absorbs both urban population growth and rural migration (Morawetz, 1974; Bairoch, 1973) and that migration tends to be the key determinant of the urban labor supply, a better understanding of the nature and causes of the migration process is a basic ingredient for those government policies intended to ameliorate urban unemployment and poverty in developing areas. For policy planning, several questions are of immediate interest:

1. What factors influence a person's decision to move?
2. Is urban migration responsive to policy instruments so that present flows can be changed?
3. Is deliberate interference with present migration flows justified?

The literature on the determinants of migration is useful in addressing the first two questions. With these studies, discussed in the following sections, we can examine the characteristics of migrants; factors affecting the decision to move; and the likelihood that government policies and programs whether specifically directed at migration or not will change migration flows. The third question whether governments should try to change migration flows is more difficult to answer. A judgement is required as to optional migration levels, given a particular country's characteristics and governmental objectives; and not only the individual but also the social costs and returns associated with existing migration levels would need to be estimated. Something that no one has tried so far.

II. 1. Models of Migration as an Investment in Human Capital

These models are based on the neoclassical theory of investment and have appeared largely in the works of the Chicago school, in particular Sjaastad (1962) and Schultz (1962). Within this theory, internal migration is viewed in a costs-and-returns framework such that, for an individual to migrate, his expectations must be that the costs of migration are equal to or less than the difference in the present discounted values of the streams of benefits in the source and receiving areas.

In other words, for the discrete time period case, migration occurs if:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{T} \frac{W_u}{(1+i)^t} - C(0) - \sum_{t=0}^{T} \frac{W_r}{(1+i)^t} = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where

- $W_u =$ expected annual wage in the urban sector
- $W_r =$ expected annual wage in the rural sector
- $T =$ time horizon
- $i =$ rate of discount
- $C =$ costs of migration

Some conceptual problems (also related with the abundance of data) show up when we try the measurement of the differential between opportunity cost and economic returns. First there are nonmarketed components of rural and urban income including goods and services produced by households for self consumption, which are of particular significance in rural areas, and public goods provided by the government, which are of relatively greater importance in urban areas. Second, to determine the urban income that yields a level of economic welfare equivalent to specific income in the rural areas poses an index number problem if there are differences in relative prices between rural and urban areas. Third, the use of discounted values introduces a measurement problem. The discounted values of urban and rural income streams over the time horizon $T$ is

$$WD_u = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \frac{W_u}{(1+i)^t} \quad \text{and} \quad WD_r = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \frac{W_r}{(1+i)^t}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where $i$ is the discount rate. Since precise information on time horizons, discount rates, and change in income over time are not available for most of the less developed countries, there is no way to use equation (1) without experimenting with different levels for these factors.

In general, the literature of empirical investigations of the human capital model is very extensive and generally successful in explaining the direction and stages of migration as well as determining who migrates. However, it presents serious methodological problems.

1. In general, variables defined for the end of the period are frequently used to explain migration that occurred over the period (misspecification of variables).

2. Among others, see Bowles (1970), Schultz (1971) and Sahota (1968).
2. Perhaps the most striking factors of these studies, is the lack of policy implications for planning. Indeed, these models answer only the first of the three questions posed at the beginning of this work; consequently, though methodologically correct, their practical shortcomings are obvious when one tries to extract policy recommendations from the empirical results.

Directly related to that is a very important policy question: Is migration caused by pull or by push factors? For some economists who have applied the human capital model to migration studies, the approach that divides factors influencing the decision to migrate into those that «push» individuals out of the rural areas and those that «pull» them into the urban areas is frequently only a crude version of the human capital theory. They argue that labelling push factors, such as low rural wages or lack of availability of land as strong, is roughly equivalent to stating that the opportunity costs of migration are low. To say that pull factors (such as high urban wages and the availability of work) are strong is roughly equivalent to stating that the expected gross returns to migration are high. As a consequence the point of view that rural conditions alone influence migration rates is rejected on the basis not only of the theoretical analysis but also on the historical evidence that countries with relatively rich agricultural sectors have had relatively high rates of outmigration to the urban sector.

On the other hand, other scholars have considered the decision to migrate as a two-dimensional process. The first dimension involves the decision of whether or not to relocate, while the second dimension concerns the question of where to relocate. Within this approach, the personal characteristics of a migrant, particularly age and education tend to influence the first phase of the migration decision significantly. The second phase, on the other hand, tends to be a function of the labor market characteristics, such as higher relative wage rates, lower unemployment rates and so forth. According to this approach, then, a complete model of the migration decision should encompass both the personal characteristics of migrants and the labor market characteristics of the destination area.

Certainly, the distinction between push and pull factors is a delicate one and, because of the problem of dealing with aggregate data (such as happens in the Spanish case), it is very difficult to formulate op-

II. 2. The Todaro Model

In the spirit of the permanent income hypothesis, Todaro (1969) suggested a modification of the migration model by making the decision to migrate a function of two variables: (1) the urban-rural income differential and (2) the probability of obtaining an urban job. Through analytical development of the model, Todaro suggests certain policy implications for developing countries in order to reduce the size of the urban traditional sector, mainly based on concentrated efforts of governments at making rural life attractive, and concludes:

«...as long as the urban-rural income differential continues to rise sufficiently fast to offset any sustained increase in the rate of job creation, then even in spite of the longrun stabilizing effect of a lower probability of successfully finding modern sector employment, the lure of relatively higher permanent incomes will continue to attract a steady stream of rural migrants into the ever more congested urban slums.»

Todaro’s work represents, therefore, the most notable exception within migration’s literature. By realizing the inability of the urban sector to absorb not only its own natural growth but also migrant flows from rural areas (a fact that is now accepted by many scholars), Todaro presents for the first time a very realistic picture of the consequences of the rural urban migration process in today's less developed countries: increasing urban unemployment rates. Its relevance for policy at this time lies in the fact that, if empirical data verified the model at the micro-level, then the policy implication is that investment is needed to increase rural income and employment opportunities rather than attempting to add urban jobs.

As a matter of fact, given the existence of chronic urban unemployment and the substantial urban-rural real income differentials that characterize most developing nations, Todaro (1976) develops analytically the conditions under which an autonomous increase in urban job creation can, in fact, lead to an increase level of urban unemployment. As a consequence, Todaro does not foresee a strictly urban
solution to the urban unemployment problem and strongly supports rural development as the only way of alleviating the employment problem in developing countries.

II. 3. Determinants of Migration: Limitations of the Studies and Empirical Results

The empirical studies of migration within developing and developed countries is very diverse; and the type of study undertaken has often depended more on what data were available than on their relevance for policy making. As a consequence, the reliability of many of the studies is reduced by small samples and the poor measurement of the relevant variables. However the relatively sheer number allows certain generalizations:

1. The migration literature provides strong empirical support for the importance of economic incentives in the decision to migrate. Econometric work in the decision to migrate shows, for example, that migrants tend to move from places of lower economic opportunities to areas with higher potential opportunities.

2. Econometric migration functions (which have a heavy economic bias) typically explain well over 50 percent of the migration rates variances and in some cases between 60 and 70 per cent! The young and more educated, who dominate the migration flows, have strong economic incentives to move; urban places seem to have an attraction over and above narrow, employment-related opportunities; but, in general, it is difficult to separate the «bright lights» effect from the income effect.

3. While in the past a large fraction of migrants found jobs in reasonably short periods, this trend is seriously threatened by the increasing rates of urban unemployment that characterize the existing situation in less developed countries as has been pointed out by the Todaro model.

The basic equational form of the migration function which has been used for econometric estimation is as follows:

\[ M_{ij} = f(W_i, W_j, U_i, U_j, Z_i, Z_j, d_{ij}, C, E) \]  

The independent variables used to explain migration include wage levels \( W \), either monetary or expected, using the Todaro approach; unemployment rates \( U \); proportion or size of urban population \( Z \); distance \( d \); costs of information \( C \) and the error term \( E \).

Several limitations of the econometric function should be kept in mind. First, the level of aggregation since, as some authors have shown, the determinants of migration are sensitive to different levels of aggregation. Second, the migration variable used in some of the studies presents conceptual and econometric difficulties. Explaining cumulative migration flows up to a recent year \( t \) with variables measured for only the year \( t \) will probably result in a simultaneous equation bias since past migration levels may be influencing present wage and employment levels. As a matter of fact, wages and employment both affect and are affected by migration. Third, most of the time the independent variables are poorly measured; income estimates especially (either per capita income or average earnings) are very difficult to obtain particularly in rural areas. Additionally, very little attention has been devoted to the fact that «proxy» variables are frequently used instead of the true variables (e.g., years of schooling to measure years of education); and it is important to note that, except in cases where the proxies fall into the category of pure error in variables, it does not follow that using even a poor proxy is better than using none at all.

III. some empirical results for the Spanish case

This section deals with the consequences of internal migration movements in Spain and their effects on employment generation and regional income distribution within that country. The general hypothesis is that, due to the selective characteristics of the internal migration process (see Table 1), an unequal development pattern between regions has occurred from which the in-migration regions have greatly benefited. In order to test this hypothesis, this section has been organized in three parts. The first part provides both the theoretical and empirical analysis of how movements of capital and labor may not have to wage equalization when the restrictive assumptions of the neoclassical model are relaxed, specially when—as happens in the Spanish case—labor and capital move in the same direction.

The second part presents an analysis of interprovincial wage differentials in Spain using the «heuronic» wage approach. The need for such an approach is based on the fact that changes in wage-differential indices over time ought to be adjusted for changes in the characteristics of the regional labor

7. An excellent review of the empirical results of the migration models, may be seen in Yap (1977).


TABLE 1. Migrants' Structure by Region during the Period 1961-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>In-migrants (1)</th>
<th>Out-migrants (2)</th>
<th>(1) - (2) = (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 15-24 years Active population</td>
<td>Males 15-24 years Active population</td>
<td>Males 15-24 years Active population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Galicia</td>
<td>52 18 36</td>
<td>54 26 44</td>
<td>-2 -8 -8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cantabrico</td>
<td>53 20 37</td>
<td>52 15 33</td>
<td>1 5 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. West Duero</td>
<td>51 17 32</td>
<td>53 22 37</td>
<td>-2 -5 -5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. East Duero</td>
<td>51 15 31</td>
<td>54 24 40</td>
<td>-3 -9 -9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Madrid</td>
<td>53 23 38</td>
<td>52 17 36</td>
<td>1 6 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. West Tajo - Guadiana</td>
<td>52 16 33</td>
<td>53 23 38</td>
<td>-1 -7 -5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. East Tajo - Guadiana</td>
<td>52 15 33</td>
<td>54 22 40</td>
<td>-2 -7 -7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. West Ebro</td>
<td>53 19 36</td>
<td>53 19 36</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. East Ebro</td>
<td>52 18 42</td>
<td>52 20 41</td>
<td>0 -2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Northeast</td>
<td>54 25 43</td>
<td>52 18 40</td>
<td>2 7 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Levante</td>
<td>52 18 35</td>
<td>52 25 36</td>
<td>0 1 -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. East Andalucia</td>
<td>52 18 32</td>
<td>53 25 39</td>
<td>-1 -7 -7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. West Andalucia</td>
<td>51 19 31</td>
<td>53 25 39</td>
<td>-2 -6 -8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Canarías</td>
<td>53 19 37</td>
<td>52 18 34</td>
<td>1 1 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The empirical evidence for the Spanish case during the period 1957-1973 is by no means conclusive. Using the variability coefficient (V*) which essentially measures the deviation of the regional per capita income from the national average income, Ferrer Andreu obtained the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>V*, using provinces</th>
<th>V*, using regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947-1960</td>
<td>0.4394</td>
<td>0.2745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-1970</td>
<td>0.4140</td>
<td>0.2755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1970</td>
<td>0.3860</td>
<td>0.2765</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using another variant of the variability coefficient (V*)—basically the standard deviation of regional incomes per capita divided by the national mean—for the different provinces, the pattern of convergence becomes more evident as can be seen in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>V*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>0.3950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>0.3714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0.3335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.3414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0.3406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0.2990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0.3084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.2918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0.2743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However this tendency towards convergence may be more a consequence of an increase in the national mean than of an increase in the relative income of the low-income provinces. Having this in mind, a very
TABLE 2. Annual Average Wage per Worker in the Provinces with Higher Out-and In-Migration Rates during the Period 1957-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highest in-migration rates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alava (306.2)</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>131.0</td>
<td>164.5</td>
<td>224.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid (263.5)</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>170.0</td>
<td>192.2</td>
<td>255.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona (225.8)</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>106.9</td>
<td>150.3</td>
<td>177.5</td>
<td>231.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vizcaya (225.8)</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>117.0</td>
<td>157.9</td>
<td>196.4</td>
<td>267.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baleares (166.7)</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>116.9</td>
<td>146.7</td>
<td>197.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alicante (148.4)</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>105.4</td>
<td>133.1</td>
<td>173.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>138.6</td>
<td>168.4</td>
<td>224.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest out-migration rates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuenca (-289.0)</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>112.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badajoz (-280.5)</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>121.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caceres (-264.9)</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>101.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaen (-244.0)</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>124.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teruel (-244.0)</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>104.3</td>
<td>124.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciudad Real (-243.0)</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>110.3</td>
<td>127.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>118.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{PIR} / \text{POR} = d
\]


38

different picture appears if we look at the results of Table 2, where the average wages per worker of the provinces with the highest in-migration rates are shown. According to that Table, the ratio of annual average wage per worker between the provinces with the highest in-migration rates (that also show higher values of per capita income) and those with the highest out-migration rates (d) show an uneven trend with a slight tendency to increase in comparison with the beginning of the period, contradicting somewhat the wage convergence hypothesis.

According to Mochón (1975), the theoretical equilibrating process does not take place because, while labor movements follow the direction suggested by the neoclassical theory shifting from low-wage provinces, capital flows also follow the same direction as labor flows benefiting the rich provinces where the rate of profit of capital is relatively higher. In spite of its reduced framework and some statistical shortcomings,11 the Mochón model emphasizes that the theoretical equilibrating process may not be reached due to the relative immobility of capital and concludes that the provincial equalization of factor prices from a neoclassical perspective will only happen when the presence of agglomeration diseconomies (increasing social costs in overpopulated areas) makes it more profitable for capital to move towards the relatively poorer provinces. But once again, the time period might be rather long.

III. 2. Analysis of Interprovincial Wage Differential in Spain

One issue of considerable importance when one deals with the consequences of migration movements within a country is how interregional and intersectoral wage differentials have changed during the migration process and whether or not migration has tended to diminish them.

According to Table 3, the intersectoral wage differential ratio (B) increased slightly in Spain during the period 1963-1974. Furthermore, and according to Table 2, the ratio of annual average wage per worker between the provinces with the highest in-migration rates (d) also show an uneven trend with a slight tendency to increase in comparison with the beginning of the period. Could we infer from these figures that internal migration movements have tended to widen the intersectoral and interregional wage differentials within the country?

The question of how wage differentials have changed over time has to be answered with some care.

11. The model is estimated only for the year 1971, and also has some statistical flows of relative importance, such as the high multicollinearity pattern in the aggregate production function between employment and capital stock \((r_{E,K} = 0.988)\) which can affect considerably the value and the sign of the coefficients, see García-Ferrer (1977b).
2. A substantial portion of wage variation is due to personal and locational characteristics of workers' wages in the Spanish case. As a matter of fact, more than 90 percent of the total variance for 1970 and 75 percent for 1960 are explained by the variables included in the wage equation.

3. The youngest and oldest groups of the labor force (e.g. age, sex, education, civil status, type of economic activity, etc.) are important sources of variation in workers' wages in the Spanish case. As a matter of fact, more than 90 percent of the total variance for 1970 and 75 percent for 1960 are explained by the variables included in the wage equation.

4. Another important portion of wage differential is due to differences in educational variables. While intermediate education (1-7 years) does not seem to affect wage differentials among provinces significantly, illiteracy (no education at all) and secondary education (more than 7 years) clearly affect wage variation.

5. Differences between corrected wage indices (ΔW*) and observed wage indices (ΔW) by provinces are rather small. As a matter of fact the pattern followed by ΔW* (as happened with ΔW) shows no signs of a wage convergence pattern among provinces, for the period 1960-1970.

III. 3. Interactions between Internal Migration Employment Growth and Income Distribution in Spain

Larry Sjaastad, one of the pioneers on migration research, recognized fifteen years ago the inadequacy of many migration studies to provide proper policy recommendations:

Migration research has dealt mainly with the factors which affect migration and how strongly they have affect it but little has been done to determine the influence of migration as an equilibrating mechanism in a changing economy. The movements of migrants clearly are in the appropriate direction, but we do not know whether the numbers are sufficient to be efficient in correcting income disparities as they emerge. There is a strong presumption that they are not.\(^{14}\)

In general, this has been true in most of the migration studies. Although, some of them have successfully explained the causes of the migration process, few of them have tried to explain at the same time both the causes and consequences (and their interrelations) within the same theoretical model. Furthermore, and from an econometric point of view there have been estimation problems caused by the use of uniaxional models. The results of that in

\(^{13}\) In the absence of rural migration movements, the active rural population might have had 48.2% of its 1970 population older than 40 years instead of the 54.7% that it actually had; see Leal, Naredo, Leguina, and Tarrafeta (1975).

\(^{14}\) Sjaastad (1962, p. 80)
many cases, have been «wrong» signs or insignificant coefficients on variables a priori thought to play a crucial role on the potential migrant's decision. This has been the main reason for using a simultaneous equation model (see Appendix) for the Spanish case in which we have included both out- and in-migration rates, but also the rate of income growth and the rates of employment and unemployment growth among the endogenous variables.

The model was estimated using Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) for the period 1960-1970. We can draw from such estimation the following conclusions:

1. The empirical results validate the simultaneous relationship of the model's structure. The present study shows that in-migration not only causes greater employment growth in urban areas but also induces greater income growth in these areas.

2. Moreover, the empirical results of the model do not seem to suggest that greater out-migration rates will foster greater income growth such that regional income differentials will narrow through interregional migration as predicted by the neoclassical theory. On the contrary, out-migration seems to depress such income growth as well as to depress employment growth.

3. Another finding relevant for policy provided by the empirical model is the validation of Todaro's paradox about employment elasticities. If in-migration to urban areas is so highly responsive to employment creation in these areas and if considerable wage differentials still prevail between sectors, the creation of new jobs in a situation (such as the existing one) of surplus labor in urban areas will indeed cause greater unemployment rates in these areas.

4. Our study also provides empirical support to the conjecture that both origin and destination characteristics are important factors in the potential decision to move. Consequently, push and pull factors are separable and can be identified for respective policy purposes.

IV. conclusions

In general, the consequences of both international and internal migration have never been evaluated. Such as evaluation would demand an answer to some painful political questions including: How many migrants are necessary? Are there any other alternatives for the surplus labor in agriculture? What kind of institutional and individual adjustments would be necessary to maintain labor in rural areas? Could labor-intensive technology be a profitable alternative in the long run?

Even if policy-makers had wanted to formulate aggregate cost-benefit analysis of the consequences of migration, they would have discovered that the welfare analysis of migration is virtually nonexistent and that it has been always overlooked because of the conclusions of the «free trade theorems». One of the most crucial assumptions of the trade theorems is to suppose that individuals have enough information to make rational decisions. Consequently, «if exchange is socially rational, then any voluntary exchange which actually occurs must be mutually profitable, since rational individuals do not commence unprofitable transactions». Since migration has been seen as something desirable and economically profitable for the migrant, the need for policy evaluation, consequently, has been neglected.

Finally, a very interesting policy conclusion can be extracted for developing countries characterized by a dualistic economy with surplus labor in the agricultural sector, as was Spain at the beginning of the 1960's. So far, Spain has been quite successful in achieving high overall growth rates with reasonably low levels of urban unemployment. This has been more the result of extremely favorable external conditions—which, among other things, absorbed 10 percent of the Spanish labor force in a situation of excess of labor supply—rather than the consequence of a well-planned developmental strategy. Unfortunately for developing countries in Asia and Latin America, the possibilities of international migration are extremely small; and for these in Africa, which is closer to Europe, the likelihood for such migration does not seem much better under the existing circumstances. In addition, the Lessons from Western Europe suggest that labor migration may not be a viable solution to unemployment problems. Most of the evidence suggest that there are short term benefits but longer term costs to both the sending and receiving societies: in times of recession the migrants become a social burden, not wanted at home while also aggravating social tensions abroad.

With limited possibilities for migration abroad, increasing internal rural migration movements, and high birth rates, the existing situation of urban unemployment is not surprising. This situation stems from the fact that industry has been regarded as the local point of economic development, with agriculture playing the role of a resource reservoir. It will be necessary to reevaluate this policy attitude for the future.

16. I owe this terminology to a personal phrasing by Professor Philip Martin.
APPENDIX: Structure and Variable’s Definitions of the Internal Migration Model for Spain

\[ \text{Outmigration Rate } \text{OMR}_i = f (\text{IMR}, \Delta \text{INC}, \Delta \text{EMP}, \Delta \text{UNR}, \text{INC}_{60}, \text{UNR}_{60}, \text{EDU}_{60}, \text{PROBE}, \text{IURB}, \text{DEN}, u_j) \]  
(5.2)

\[ \text{Inmigration Rate } \text{IMR}_i = f (\text{OMR}, \Delta \text{INC}, \Delta \text{EMP}, \Delta \text{UNR}, \text{INC}_{60}, \text{UNR}_{60}, \text{PROBE}, \text{IURB}, \text{DEN}, \Delta \text{BK}, \text{EU}, \text{DWS}, u_j) \]  
(5.3)

\[ \text{Employment Growth } \Delta \text{EMP}_i = f (\text{OMS}, \text{IMR}, \text{INC}_{60}, \text{IURB}, \text{DEN}, \text{DWS}, \text{NIP}, u_j) \]  
(5.4)

\[ \text{Unemployment Growth } \Delta (\text{UN}) = f (\text{OMR}, \text{IMR}, \Delta \text{INC}, \text{INC}_{60}, \text{UNR}_{60}, \text{NIP}, \text{DEN}, \text{DWS}, \text{CDI}, u_j) \]  
(5.5)

where each exogenous variable is defined below:

- \( \text{INC}_{60} \) = income per capita of person residing in province \( i \) in 1960
- \( \text{UNR}_{60} \) = rate of unemployment in province \( i \) in 1960
- \( \text{EDU}_{60} \) = total number of student registered in highschool divided by total population in province \( i \) in 1960
- \( \text{AGE} \) = percentage of people in the age group 15 - 24 over the total population
- \( \text{CDI} \) = degree of agricultural land concentration (proxy for degree of rural latifundia)
- \( \text{PROBE} \) = probability of finding an urban employment in province \( i \)
- \( \text{IURB} \) = index of urbanization in province \( i \)
- \( \Delta \text{EDU} \) = rate of education growth in province \( i \)
- \( \Delta \text{BK} \) = rate of increase of capital benefits (proxy for private investment) in province \( i \)
- \( \text{NIP} \) = natural increase of population
- \( \text{DEN} \) = regional dummies
- \( \text{DWS} \) = regional dummies
- \( u_1 ... u_5 \) = error terms

BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX: Structure and Variable’s Definitions of the Internal Migration Model for Spain

on the economic models of migration