socioeconomic change and cabinet composition in Greece: 1946-1974

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1. purpose of the study and theoretical framework

A major hypothesis in elite studies, suggests that elite characteristics reflect societal needs and aspirations while their change over time coincides with broader socioeconomic change. Originally this is the famous Marxian thesis that a positive relationship exists between the position of a group in the production process and its position in the political process.[1] Mosca on the other hand sees that elite change reflects not strictly a change in economic conditions but rather a broader balance of social forces.[2] This means as Prewitt and Stone put it that, «new social interests and new social groups express themselves in the life of a nation».[3] Similarly, Joseph Schumpeter points out that the functional role of political leadership is justified by displaying the necessary skills and qualities that changing economic conditions would require for the management of society.[4]

There is, however, a noticeable exception to the above thesis. Thus, Robert Michels' «law of oligarchy» points to the self-perpetuation of a ruling elite which either blocks social changes or despite these changes it strives to maintain its own privileged position.[5] Michels reduces the influence of social change as independent variable while on the other hand he stresses the role of leadership as independent variable. Contemporary students of elites point to both these aspects of leadership. As Seligman puts it, «recruitment patterns both reflect and affect society».[6] Thus, while a society's political culture, values and aspirations influence the social profile and recruitment of the elite, its behavior and policies influence in turn systemic goals and stability.[7] One could extend the research further by investigating questions like: Do changes in socioeconomic development affect changes in elite composition? What is, for instance, the impact of urbanization—a dominant feature in postwar Greece—in affecting elite recruitment? Did more urbanites become cabinet

1. Harold D. Lasswell, «Agenda for the study of Political Elites» in Dwaine Marvick, ed., *Political Decision Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 276-278.

2. Geraint Parry, *Political Elites* (New York:Frederick Praeger, Publishers, Inc. 1969), p. 59.

3. Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, *The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power and American Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973), p. 163.

4. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1950), pp. 268-290, and Prewitt and Stone, *op. cit,* p. 163.

5. Prewitt and Stone, *op. cit.,* p. 20.

6. Lester G. Seligman, «Elite Recruitment and Political Development», *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 26, No. 3 (August, 1964), pp. 612-613.

7. William B.Quandt, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications Inc. 1970), pp. 195-197.

members? Overall, how does the modernization process affect the profile of the elite?

In the following analysis an attempt will be made to explore quantitatively some aspects of the foregoing hypothesis. The objectives will be: 1) to delineate some persistent patterns of the cabinet elite in Greece over time and examine whether they reflect societal goals and aspirations; 2) to find some correlational measures between these patterns and socioeconomic development.

2. techniques of analysis and the results of the study

Although Cyrill Black[8] has placed the take-off stage of Greek socioeconomic transformation to be in 1919, the country still remains in the midst of a period of accelerated development. W. Rostow characterizes the take-off period as one of rapid industrial expansion and modernizing of traditional sectors, while new men of urban culture and technological skill rise to power.[9] The period under study

8. C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), p. 91.
9. W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1960), pp. 6-9 and 57. See also W.W. Rostow, *Politics and the Stages of Growth* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1971), p. 99.

1946-1974 may be considered as a transitional period in Greece. Therefore, one could expect that these changes would be reflected in the composition of the elite as the hypothesis has suggested. An appropriate method used here to delineate such patterns is factor analysis.[10] It enables one to reduce a large number of background characteristics, which constitutes our raw data,[11] into clusters of interrelated variables that underline the composition of the elite. The BMD X 72 technique was utilized with an oblique rotation, which gives better clustering of variables.[12] Oblique rotation was thought to be more

10. R. J. Rummel, «Understanding Factor Analysis» in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. II (1967), 448-451.
11. Total 23 background characteristics were considered in seven cabinets—1946, 1950, 1961, 1956, 1965, 1970, 1974. Percentages of ministries falling in each characteristic were computed. Subsequently, these percentages were factor analyzed. See *infra*. List of variables (23 background characteristics: 1. Urban Origin, 2. Rural Origin, 3. Rural/Urban, 4. Law, 5. Economics, 6. Medicine, 7. Military Field, 8. Humanities and Social Science, 9. Technology, 10. Law/Economics/Political Science, 11. Military/Law/Medicine, 12. Liberal Professions, 13. «Politicians», 14. Academics, 15. Military Officers, 16. Bureaucrats, 17. Economic Occupations,18. BA Level, 19. MA Level, 20. Ph.D. Level, 21. Studied in Greece only, 22. Studied in Greece & Abroad, 23. Age.
12. J. Dixon (ed.), *Biomedical Computer Programs, X - Series Supplement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 90-96.

TABLE 1. *Rotated Factor Matrix of 23 Elite Characteristics (1946-1974)*

Factor I* Traditional versus Modern Elite		Factor II Coercive versus Persuasive Leaders		Factor III Academic versus Practical Trained	
Rural Origin	.72	Military Field	− .89	Law	.85
«Politicians»	.91	Officers	− .87	Age	.85
Urban Origin	− .62	Bureaucrats	− .73	Ph. D.	.61
Academics	− .85	MA Level	− .68	Businessmen	− .87
Economic Background	− .84	Rural/Urban	.84	Military/ Medicine/ Law	− .54
Technological Field	− .79	Liberal Professions	.82		
Study Abroad	− .82	BA Level	.81		
		Medicine	.70		
		Social Science/ Humanities	.57		
		Law/ Economics/ Political Science	.60		
Cumulative Total Variance	.35		.62		.76

* Only loadings with r.> 50 are presented.

appropriate because it is assumed that background characteristics would have high inter-correlations. However, the factor correlation matrix indicates that factors tended to be orthogonal rather than oblique.[13] Table 1 displays three patterns of elite characteristics, 76% of the total variance. Their main feature is the clustering of background characteristics with high negative as well as positive loadings.

The first factor (35% of the variance) delineates a pattern of conflicting elite elements, that is, those of rural origin (.72) and feudal «politicians»,[14] (.91) contrasted with highly educated academics (−.85), those with modern economic (−.84), and technological background characteristics (−.79) and those studied abroad (−.82). This finding is significant because it points to a «modern» versus «traditional» dichotomy in the elite.[15] The modern component consists of urban academics, economists and technocrats many of whom studied abroad, in contradistinction to the traditional elite sector of non-technologically oriented politicians, many of whom are rural based. The second factor (27% of the variance) discerns a pattern mainly of two professional groups whose conflict in politics has dominated Greek society — military officers (−.87) and liberal professions (.82). The liberal professions, the majority of whom are lawyers, are seen in opposition to military officers and generally state employees.[16] The third pattern

13. The factor correlation matrix for both the factor solutions is given below:

a. First Solution

Factors	1	2	3
1	1.00	.04	.19
2		1.00	−.06
3			1.00

b. Second Solution

Factors	1	2	3
1	1.00	.00	−.11
2		1.00	−.14
3			1.00

14. The term «politician» testifies to an ascriptive aspect of political mobility in Greece. This is a kind of inherited political feudalism, that is a «family-dominated» political office which goes from father to son, from brother to brother and from uncle to nephew and so on. We have labeled these family successors in political office as «politicians» because they did not hold any post before their election and rarely, if any, exercised an occupation. See Keith Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 345; he suggests that the «category of politician» is a function of the biographical sources. We are arguing exactly the opposite.
15. Karl Deutsch, «Social Mobilization and Political Development» in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds. Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1971), p. 392-393.
16. Quandt points out that in non-competitive political systems

(14%) underlines the contrast between the aged (−.85), highly educated (−.61) and those with a legal training (.85), against those who have a practical occupation-businessmen (−.87).

The three patterns explicate some of the salient conflicts still ongoing in Greek society—urban versus rural cleavage, modernity versus tradition, and practical expertise versus generalists.[17] As W. Rostow points out, «some of the most difficult political problems of the take-off and drive to technological maturity, thus, lie in agriculture and rural life, modernizing to some degree but generally lagging behind the dynamic cities while still retaining great political cleavage».[18] At the elite level, a struggle between traditional and modernizing leaders over power may last several generations,[19] thereby the country experiences a steady resistance from «traditional landed regional interests».[20] But finally as Rostow asserts, «the take-off usually witnesses a definitive social, political and cultural victory of those who would modernize the economy over those who would either cling to the traditional society or seek other goals».[21] What Greece may be experiencing now is the end of a struggle between tradition and modernity as it is reflected at the top elite level.[22]

The second part of the hypothesis—the coincidence of elite and socioeconomic change—will be tested by a correlation and subsequently a factor analysis. It is expected that those sociobackground characteristics correlated with socioeconomic measures would load highly on the same factor. As it has been suggested earlier socioeconomic change generates demands of new groups who claim participation in decision making, in this case at the cabinet level. If the major hypothesis holds true, one would expect for instance that urbanization and education should have increased the number of urban based, highly educated ministers into cabinet. A number of variables have been chosen to indicate the processes of socioeconomic development like industrialization, urbanization, education, communications, transportation, social welfare, etc. Overall 24 socioeconomic measures were used to match an equal number of elite characteristics, making thus a total of 48 variables.[23]

liberal professions strive to gain advantage over the state officials in regard to elite positions. See Quandt, op. cit., pp. 198-199.
17. Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats: Military-Administrative Regimes and Political Development (Boston, Massachusetts: Hughton Mifflin Co., 1973), pp. 111-112.
18. Rostow, Politics and Stages, op. cit,. p. 99.
19. Black, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
20. Rostow, The Stages, op. cit., p. 7.
21. Ibid., p. 58.
22. Deutsch, op. cit., p. 392.
23. The primary source for measuring socioeconomic change was the «Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive» at the

TABLE 2. *Rotated Factor Matrix of 48 Elite and Social Change Variables (1946-1974)*

Factor I * Traditional Recruitment versus Social Mobilization		Factor II Coercive Military versus Traditional Ideologues		Factor III Generalists versus Specialists	
Rural Origin	.98	Rural /Urban	.83	Law (Background	.98
Military /Law Medicine (Combined Background)	.62	Medicine (Background)	.70	Ph. D. Level	.55
«Politicians»	.67	Humanities / Social Science (Background)	.57	Greece as Place of Higher Learning	.62
Percent of Population in Other Activity	.57	Liberal Professions	.77	Age	.77
Newspaper Circulation Per Capita	.70	BA Level	.83	Technology (Background)	.66
Size of Cabinet	−.69	Newspaper Circulation p.c.	.51	Law/Economics Political Science (Background)	−.57
Energy — Production in Kgs. p.c.	1.00	Urban Origin	−.63	Economic Occupations	−.84
Energy Consumption in Kgs. p.c.	−.97	Economics	−.53	Per Cent of Population Employed in Agriculture	−.70
National Income in U. S. $ p.c.	−.85	Military (Background)	−.88	Cities of 20,000 + p.c.	−.86
Per Cent of Population Employed in Industry	- 1.00	Military Officers	−.90	Cities of 10,000 + p.c.	−.83
		State Employees	−.71	Size of Military/ Population	−.65
National Government Revenue p.c.	−.96	MA Level	−.78	Radios Per Capita	−.61
National Government Expenditure p.c.	−1.00	Greece and Abroad (Studied)	−.59		
Imports Per Capita	−1.00	Per Cent of Population Employed in Other Activities	−.62		
Exports Per Capita	−1.00	Cities of 100,000 + Per Capita	−.56		
National Defense Expenditures p.c.	−1.00				
Size of Military/ Population	−.50				

(continued)

TABLE 2. *Rotated Factor Matrix of 48 Elite and Social Change Variables (1946-1974) (continued)*

	Factor I* Traditional Recruitment versus Social Mobilization	Factor II Coercive Military versus Traditional Ideologues	Factor III Generalists versus Specialists
Radios Per Capita	−.63		
Primary and Secondary School Enrollment p.c.	−.67		
University Enrollment p.c.	−. 83		
Proportion of World Trade	−.51		
Telephones Per Capita	−.98		
Passenger Cars Per Capita	−.98		
Physicians Per Capita	−.87		
Technology (Background)	−.52		
Academics	−.74		
Cumulative Proportion of Total Variance	.45	.64	.80

* Only loadings with r.>50 are presented.

The three patterns that emerged from factor analysis (80% total variance) show that there exist contrasting tendencies between changes in the socioeconomic sphere and cabinet recruitment. Indeed, as Table 2 indicates the three leadership patterns which emerged from the earlier factor analysis (Table 1) persist through the socioeconomic changes occurring in Greece during the post-war period. The first factor (45% of the variance) discerns a pattern in which the traditional characteristics of the Greek

cabinet elite—rural origin (.98), military background (.62) and political feudalism (.67) —load positive, while all measures of socioeconomic development load negative. On the contrary the proportion of technological fields (−.52) and highly educated academics (−.74) have the same direction with socioeconomic indices. The pattern may be labeled «traditional recruitment versus social mobilization». The second factor (19% of variance) gives a pattern which shows that in Greece the military's presence in

Center for Comparative Political Research of the State University of New York at Binghamton. Some of these data have been updated by checking the most recent United Nations Statistical Yearbooks. One reason for using a large number of socioeconomic variables was to match an equal number of elite characteristics. The specific variables have been chosen:
1) to achieve comparability with other similar findings; 2) to achieve complementarity in measurement; and 3) to cover a large number of systemic dimensions. Thus, variables like world trade, imports, and exports were chosen to uncover the sensitivity of the elite recruitment to external factors.
Government crises stand for measuring domestic instability; similarly, military expenditures and military size may increase when the military came to power or vice versa. The other socioeconomic variables are: 1) Urbanization: Cities of 100.000

+, 20.000 +, 10.000 +. These measures include both large and small scale urbanization both which characterize postwar Greece; 2) Communications: Radios per capita, telephones per capita, newspaper circulation per capita; 3) Education: Primary and secondary school enrollment per capita; 4) Welfare: Physicians per capita; national government expenditures per capita; 5) Monetization of Economy: Includes national income in U.S. dollars per capita and national government revenues per capita; 6) Industrialization: Energy production and consumption in Kgr. per capita, per cent of population employed in the three economic sectors of production, which are industry, agriculture and tertiary factor (services); 7) Transportation: Passenger cars per capita. For details see a) Arthur S. Banks, *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive: User's Manuel* (Binghamton, New York: Center for Comparative Political Research, State University of New York at

cabinet [(−.90) and (−.88)] coincides with the phenomenon of urbanization especially the concentration of population into big cities (−.56) and the concomitant urban, non-industrial activities (−.62). It would be worthwhile for one to investigate whether the resulting violence and instability from urbanization is the intervening variable that causes increase of «managers of coercion» in cabinet, as Lasswell has suggested.[24]

On the other hand the high positive loadings on rural/urban origin (.83) and liberal professions (.77) indicate that the presence in cabinet of the traditional fields of law, medicine and humanities hardly can increase under a process of large scale urbanization. Similarly, the third pattern (16% variance) indicates the coincidence of small scale urbanization (−.86 and .83), with the presence of practical skills in cabinet technological fields (−.66) and economic occupations (−.84). The socioeconomic indices and especially the percent population employed in agriculture (−.70) and communications (−.61), are inversely related to the pattern, while the aged, highly educated academics (.55) and legally trained leaders are positively related. The pattern can be labeled «generalists versus specialists».

3. conclusions

The findings substantiated through the factor analysis, are most interesting. The patterns discerned manifest the particular pathologies and antinomies of a rapidly modernizing country like Greece. It was explicated that there is a conflict between traditional particularistic versus modern universalistic elements of recruitment as well as between generalists and specialists.[25] Karl Deutsch points out that, «social mobilization tends to generate also pressures for a more general transformation of the political elite. It tends to generate pressures for a broadening and partial transformation of elite recruitment and of elite communications.»[26] Thus, in modernizing countries as they pass from agraria to industria, traditional agriculturalists and generalists are replaced by urban professionals and skilled technologists. This transition takes place gradually and what Greece is experiencing now is a conflict still between tradition and modernity.

As Cyril Black put it, «traditional ideas and institutions have an extraordinary stay in power». Considering that only three decades of socioeconomic change have been examined in this study, it is difficult to assess the full interaction between social change and elite transformation. In summary one may argue that the cabinet elite in Greece has tended to resist changes in its recruitment patterns brought about changes in the socioeconomic sector of the society. Therefore, there is a lag between elite transformation and socioeconomic change.

Binghamton, 1975). b) For definition of the specific indices see Arthur S. Banks, *The SUNY - Binghamton Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive: Variable Definitions and Sources,* Technical Report No. 2 (Binghamton, New York: Center for Comparative Political Research, SUNY Binghamton, N.Y., 1972).

In addition to 23 background characteristics *(supra* fn. 11) we added as new variables: 24. Government Crises, 25. Size of Cabinet, 26. Energy Production in Kgs. per capita, 27. Energy Consumption in Kgs. per capita, 28. National Income in US $ per capita, 29. Per cent of Population Employed in Agriculture, 30. Per cent of Population Employed in Industry, 31. Per cent of Population Employed in other Activities, 32. National Government Revenue per capita, 33. National Government Expenditure per capita, 34. Imports per capita, 35. Exports per capita, 36. National Defense Expenditure per capita, 37. Cities of 100.000 + per capita, 38. Cities of 20.000+ per capita, 39. Cities of 10.000+ per capita, 40. Size of Military Population, 41. Radios per capita, 42. Newspaper Circulation per capita, 43. Primary and Secondary School Enrollment per capita, 44. University Enroll-

ment per capita, 45. Proportion of World Trade, 46. Telephones per capita, 47. Passenger Cars per capita, 48. Physicians per capita.

24. For an earlier statement of his famous «Garrison State Hypothesis» see, Harold D. Lasswell, «The Garrison State» in the *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 46 (January, 1941), pp. 455 - 468, also his, «The Garrison State Hypothesis Today» in Samuel I. Huntington (ed.), *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 51-69.

25. Robert D. Putman, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Inc.. 1976), pp. 197-205.

26. Deutsch, *op. cit.,* p. 392.