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the breakdown of parliamentary democracy in Greece, 1965-67

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Opposing the conventional reliance on political sociological variables as too deterministic an explanation of political phenomena, the author has taken a conceptual approach to the analysis of the breakdown of parliamentary democracy in Greece between 1965 and 1967. This approach emphasizes personal and volitional factors rather than broad structural and cultural determinants. [J. Chernoff]

On April 21, 1967, a bloodless *coup d'état* brought an end to parliamentary democracy in Greece. As had occurred so many times before in modern Greek history, a period of constitutional government was to be succeeded by military rule. Although the actual coup took nearly all observers by surprise, the crisis of Greek parliamentary democracy had long been too readily apparent. Indeed, the turbulence of the Greek political scene had become a kind of running story in the international press for close to two years preceding the eventual colonels' junta.

Once the new military government demonstrated its staying powers, it was not long before a series of analyses appeared which attempted to explain the collapse of democracy in Greece. Across the ideological spectrum there was common agreement that the Greek parliamentary system was inherently unstable: the Right spoke of the threat of communist subversion; the Center of the machinations of the Palace; the Left of a reactionary regime masked by a parliamentary façade. Moreover, intellectual opinion of various persuasions was especially prone to define Greek politics as completely subject to perfidious American influence. Even less passionate social analysts similarly stressed the formidable structural and cultural obstacles that blocked the development of viable democratic forms in Greek society. Those looking at the lessons of history pointed to the repeated interventions of the military in the political life of twentieth-century Greece—eight coups counting the one in 1967. Social scientists variously documented the country's socio-economic imbalances and its archaic personalistic politics. Commentators concerned with cultural variables placed great weight on the democratic incapacities of the Greek national character, and the artificiality of Western parliamentary structures imposed on a Levantine society.

Thus both polemical and analytical accounts were typically in accord that the breakdown of Greek parliamentary democracy was in some sense inevitable, that the actors in the modern Greek drama were playing some kind of predetermined roles. Yet, these explanations of why democracy in Greece necessarily failed are not entirely convincing.¹ If we

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1. See Notes at the end of this article (p. 14).

shift attention away from the operation of impersonal forces and toward the immediate political arena, a different kind of perspective is revealed. A *leitmotif* of this essay is that there was nothing inevitable about the collapse of Greek democracy from a structural or cultural standpoint.² Rather, one must look to the particular circumstances which brought about the political crisis of 1965-67. It will be proposed that prior to the April 21 coup there were repeated instances in which alternative steps could have averted the demise of the parliamentary regime.

Although the discussion to be given stresses the volitional aspects rather than the inexorable developments of Greek political life, it neither ignores the wants of broad segments of the population nor the social bases of political movements. But there is the premise that comprehension of the breakdown of a parliamentary democracy requires special awareness of events occurring within a relatively confined political arena. Another premise is that the impact of external influences on the internal dynamics of Greek politics is fundamental but not all limiting. The charge that covert American intervention operated against parliamentary democracy in Greece is a serious one, and—to anticipate—has some substance in my judgment. But to illuminate the role played by the United States must not obscure how Greek democracy was too often ill served by its elected and institutional leaders.

the Greek setting

The Greek War of Independence (1821-1829) was the beginning of the end of close to four centuries of Ottoman Turkish rule. That this revolution ultimately succeeded was due as much to the intervention of the major powers as it was to the indigeneous struggle of the Greek people. Despite their conflicting motives and cross purposes, a guarantee of an independent Greek kingdom was eventually agreed to by Great Britain, France, and Russia. The first monarch, Otho, a Bavarian prince, assumed the throne in 1833. The Greece of that period consisted of the Peloponnese, the southern portion of the Greek mainland (Roumeli and Attica), and certain nearby islands. Today this area is still known as «old Greece». Over the next century Greece expanded (through cessions from Great Britain, and wars with Turkey and Bulgaria) to include the Ionian Islands (1864), Thessaly (1881), Crete (*de facto* in 1898), Macedonia and Southern Epirus (1913), the Aegean Islands (1914), and Western Thrace (1919).

The incorporation of these territories dominated Greek political life and foreign affairs from the nation's inception until 1922. In that year Turkish forces inflicted a catastrophic defeat on the Greek Army in Asia Minor.³ In the wake of the *débâcle* over a million Anatolian and Istanbul Greeks fled to the

Greek mainland creating an immense influx of refugees (close to one-quarter of the total Greek population in 1925!) with profound consequences on the nation's social and political life.

Although the Asia Minor disaster irrevocably shattered the Greek *Megali Idea* of a resurrected Byzantine Empire, Greece further expanded following World War II when the Dodecanese Islands were acquired from Italy in 1947. The issue of *énosis* (i.e. union) with Cyprus reappeared with special force in the 1950's. Despite a compromise of sorts that led to the establishment of an independent Cyprus republic in 1960, the ultimate status of the island is still unsettled. Hopes to acquire «Northern Epirus» (in southern Albania) are also periodically raised, but the claim has not been pushed seriously in recent decades.

Returning to events on the domestic scene, Otho's reign abruptly ended in 1862 with a bloodless coup. A new monarch, George I of the Danish House of Glücksborg, was enthroned in 1864. (Subsequent Greek monarchs have all been of the Danish dynasty.) Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a large migration from the countryside to the cities led to the growth of an urban bourgeoisie. This formed the social basis of a liberal political force which began to contest the old power holders made of the royal court, large landowners, and village notables. The latter part of the nineteenth century also saw the development of the modern Greek Army which was charged with pursuing Greece's territorial expansion and policing its growing borders.

Dissatisfactions with the royal family, Greece's financial difficulties, and impatience in acquiring «unredeemed» Greek territories culminated in a military revolt in 1909. A group of reformist young officers summoned the Cretan leader, Eleutherios Venizelos, to head the government. A new constitution was promulgated which reduced the powers of the monarchy and established a genuine parliamentary system. In Greece's first modern elections held in 1912, Venizelos' Liberal Party won a resounding victory.

In 1913 George I was assassinated and his son, Constantine I, succeeded to the throne. The new King and his Prime Minister quickly came to lead opposing political camps. Matters became aggravated with the outbreak of the First World War. Venizelos supported the Allied cause while Constantine I's German sympathies led him to advocate a neutralist policy for Greece. A confused situation developed which eventually ended with Constantine I leaving Greece in 1917. But the constitutional question of the King's powers had become a major controversy in Greek politics, a situation which extends into the present.

Venizelos himself suffered an electoral defeat in 1920. Constantine I was recalled to Greece only to be ousted again by a military coup in 1922. That same

year George II, Constantine I's son, ascended to the throne for an initial two-year reign. Another military coup in 1924 abolished the monarchy entirely and transformed Greece into a republic. The republic, however, proved no more stable than the monarchy. Parliamentary elections and military regimes were interspersed with coup and counter-coup. In 1935 the republic ended when George II was restored to the throne. In 1936 an outright military dictatorship was established under General Ioannis Metaxas with George II as titular head of state.

Metaxas achieved widespread support only shortly before his death when the Greek Army repulsed Italian invading forces in the winter of 1940. However, Greece was now in the Second World War. German forces quickly intervened and Greece was soon occupied by Axis powers. The Greek government was forced to flee to Egypt where—with strong British support—a government-in-exile was set up under George II. In Greece itself the Axis occupation, which lasted until the closing days of World War II, was particularly brutal and oppressive. Except for a small collaborating group, deprivation was massive throughout Greece. Close to one-tenth of the population perished, over a half-million persons dying of starvation alone. During the war years contact between the exile government and the situation in Greece was only sporadic.

Resistance groups formed early in the occupation period, the most successful by far being the communist-led National Liberation Front (EAM). EAM with its military arm, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) gradually acquired effective control over most of the countryside. The political program of EAM/ELAS was based on vaguely socialistic lines some of which were implemented in the areas under its control. Concretely, EAM/ELAS was unwilling to back the return of the King and insisted on its right to maintain its armed forces into the post-war period. When German troops began to withdraw from Greece in late 1944, the latent hostility between the resistance forces and the government-in-exile broke into the open.

On the heels of the German evacuation, a government of «National Unity»—in effect operating under British auspices—headed by George Papandreou returned to Athens. Whether EAM/ELAS sought to take power by force or not following the German evacuation is still disputed. In any event, the Papandreou government's attempt to dissolve EAM/ELAS led to armed conflict. In December 1944, British and Greek government forces drove EAM/ELAS from Athens. Despite an agreement between EAM/ELAS and the Greek government in early 1945, a period of «White Terror» ensued in which many members of communist partisan groups were detained, arrested, or killed.⁴ Following a government-held plebescite, George II returned to Greece in 1946. A year later he died and

was succeeded to the throne by his brother, King Paul.

The Papandreou government itself had given way by early 1945 to a bewildering succession of cabinets. A state of political instability had begun which lasted into the early 1950's. The conflict between government and communist forces which had temporarily abated broke out with even greater violence in 1946. For three more years Greece was to experience a Civil War whose devastation was in many ways even more severe than that suffered during the Second World War. Eventually the tide of battle turned against the communist insurgents. Two pivotal occurrences working against the communists were the 1947 Truman Doctrine in which American military aid and advice replaced that of the British; and Tito's closing of the Yugoslavian frontier to communist guerrilla units in 1949.⁵ By 1950 Greece was about to enter an unaccustomed era of peace, although political stability was still elusive.

In both 1950 and 1951 national elections were held, but with inconclusive results. In less than two years some seven cabinets took brief turns at the helm of government. In the latter election, however, a new political group had emerged, the Greek Rally headed by Field Marshal Alexander Papagos. Although professedly «non-political», the Greek Rally was a conservative force whose basic appeal lied in its promise to bring an end to political turmoil. In the 1952 elections, the Greek Rally won half of the popular vote and an overwhelming majority in the parliament. By the time of his death in 1955, the stern Papagos as Prime Minister had fulfilled his basic promise of bringing stability to Greece within the parliamentary framework. Nevertheless, this was gained at the expense of an internal economic policy which showed little improvement in the living conditions of the mass of the Greek population, and a foreign policy which moved Greece into even closer dependence on the USA.⁶

After the death of Papagos, King Paul appointed Constantine Karamanlis Prime Minister. Karamanlis dissolved parliament and formed his own conservative National Radical Union (ERE) to replace Papagos' Greek Rally. In elections held in 1956 ERE, while polling a minority of the popular vote was able, through a self-serving electoral system, to win a parliamentary majority. Subsequent elections in 1958 and 1961 followed a similar pattern: ERE gaining popular pluralities along with decisive parliamentary majorities.

Although it appears undeniable that in 1958 and 1961 ERE was genuinely polling substantially more votes than any other single opposition party, the fact remains that both these elections were marred by excessive strong-arm tactics on the part of government supporters. Indeed, the aura of a semi-police state could never be overcome during Karamanlis governments. In addition to electoral fraud and intimidation,

there was the continued detention of communist prisoners and the government's refusal to repatriate Greeks who took refuge in Eastern countries after the end of the Civil War. There was also evidence that the government was not always in control of its own agents. This was dramatically apparent in the murder of the left-wing deputy Gregorios Lambrakis in the spring of 1963, a killing for which senior police officials were culpable.

If the Karamanlis government was vulnerable in its practise of civil liberties, its performance on the economic scene was more creditable. During the eight-year tenure of Karamanlis, the bases of a modern Greek economy were laid: large-scale public works were initiated and completed, Greek industry began to develop, the drachma became a sound currency, and Greece's economic growth was impressive by all standard indicators. Yet despite improvements in living standards, problems persisted: resentment against continuing poverty grew, Greek workers by the hundreds of thousands sought employment in the factories of West Germany, the country's trade balance continued to worsen, and foreign capital was introduced on what many considered unfavorable terms to Greece. On the foreign scene, the Karamanlis government kept Greece staunchly in the Western camp, although its NATO relations were strained by the growing virulence of the Cyprus dispute. When a compromise agreement gave Cyprus its independence in 1960, Karamanlis was put on the defensive by domestic opponents who accused him of betraying the *enosis* cause.

In June 1963, ostensibly following a minor dispute with King Paul, Karamanlis suddenly resigned and went into self-exile in Western Europe (where he has since remained). Confronting ERE in the ensuing electoral campaign was a newly invigorated Center Union headed by George Papandreou, still robust despite his 74 years. Elections held in late 1963 resulted in a narrow parliamentary majority for the Center Union, thus giving the prime ministership to Papandreou. In February 1964 another election was held in which Papandreou's Center Union won a resounding parliamentary majority and—even more impressive—an absolute popular majority. King Paul, stricken with cancer, lived only long enough to swear in the Papandreou government; he was succeeded by his 23-year-old son, Constantine II. It appeared to many observers in the mid-1960's that Greece was about to enter an era of both liberal progress and parliamentary stability.

Like the Karamanlis government, Papandreou was firmly oriented toward the West in international affairs. But there were elements in the Center Union which were critical of Greece's too close alignment with NATO and the United States. On the domestic front, the Center Union government took a more

lenient position toward communist prisoners, renegotiated contracts with foreign firms investing in Greece, substantially increased government expenditure, and inaugurated major educational reforms. Despite the overdueness of the Papandreou policies, many experienced observers considered Papandreou more a firebrand opposition leader than a responsible prime minister in office. Not only were his administrative abilities in doubt, but he placed excessive emphasis on beating dead political horses and digging into old records to prove that ERE and Karamanlis were utterly corrupt. In many respects the Papandreou government seemed to be squandering its impressive political mandate on personal issues.

The political situation became increasingly tense and was compounded by personal conflict between Papandreou and Constantine II. But behind the animosity between Prime Minister and King lay deeper issues. Papandreou's supporters saw him as a spokesman for progressive domestic change, a more independent foreign policy, closer scrutiny of foreign capital invested in Greece, and the architect of the dismantlement of police state agencies. For their part, opponents of Papandreou saw a demagogue who was initiating an unsound economic policy causing inflation and a weakening of the drachma; and who was unwittingly opening the way for a communist takeover by undermining the Greek political system through his personal attacks on the monarch.

All these issues became centralized in Papandreou's efforts to bring the military under civilian control, or—depending on the viewpoint—to purge career Army officers. The Prime Minister made it government policy to retire conservative-monarchist senior staff and command officers. Matters came to a head in May 1965 with the revelation of the so-called «Aspida» (Shield) affair. The military had uncovered within its own ranks an alleged conspiracy of left-wing junior officers. Implicated in «Aspida» was Andreas Papandreou, the Prime Minister's son, and to many his father's heir apparent in the Center Union. Whether to prevent its fabrication or to suppress evidence concerning his son's activities, George Papandreou requested the resignation of his Defense Minister, Petros Garoufalias, so that he, the Prime Minister, could assume that portfolio and thereby control the «Aspida» investigation.

Whatever the Prime Minister's motives, his demand provoked a constitutional crisis. Constantine II refused to dismiss the pro-royalist Garoufalias who had originally been included in the Papandreou cabinet as a concession to the King. In a heated personal confrontation on July 15, 1965, George Papandreou stated to the King that only the prime minister had the right to decide the cabinet. Papandreou told the King he would resign the next day if he were not al-

lowed to appoint himself minister of defense. The King took this verbal declaration as a formal resignation and Papandreou was in effect dismissed from the government. It was from this moment that the beginning of the end of Greek parliamentary democracy can be dated. But before continuing the narrative, the social bases and development of party politics in Greece requires an expository background.

parties and politics

Despite the instability of the Greek political system, there has been a rather surprising durability in Greece's major political formations over the past half century. One can meaningfully speak—albeit with some arbitrariness—of Right, Center, and Left in Greek politics. Although party names and leaders changed over time, although often characterized by internal feuding and breakaway factions, each of these three groupings tended to take more or less different stands on such issues as the monarchy, foreign policy, and the nature and degree of domestic social reform. Moreover, although not as closely linked to identifiable social bases as is found in most Western European societies, each of these political groupings had discernable differences in the sources of their popular support.

The Center in Greece derives from the Liberal Party founded by Eleutherios Venizelos in 1912. From its inception, the Liberals were critical of the monarchy, though its leader was never truly republican. Originally articulating the interests of the new bourgeoisie and white-collar workers, the Liberals also drew heavily from the refugees who arrived in Greece following the 1922 Asia Minor disaster. It was also under Venizelos that the expropriation of large estates was begun thereby creating an independent peasantry in Greece. Regionally, the Liberals polled best in the newly acquired Greek territories and Venizelos' home island of Crete.

The Right as a distinctive political grouping was largely engendered in response to the cohesiveness of the Liberals. Supporters of Constantine I banded together in what became known as the Popular Party or Populists. Pro-royalist, anti-Venizelos, and extremely traditional on social issues, the Populists became the leading conservative force in Greek politics. The Populists tended to find the bases of their support among the traditionally oriented peasantry especially in the regions of «old Greece».

While bitterly hostile to each other and opposed on significant issues, the Liberals and the Populists shared much in common. Both parties centered on and were dominated by the personalities of their leaders. Moreover, both of their political organizations were based on «patron-client» relationships.

The loyalty of the peasant voter was determined by his allegiance to a locally prominent person who in turn depended on a national party leader for patronage and official prestige. In practical terms, this meant the local party figure would act as an intermediary between the peasant and the otherwise impersonal bureaucracy. In many cases, this relationship fostered surrogate kinship ties through the *koumbaros* role, i.e. the patron becoming his client's best man and/or godfather of his client's children. Although this web of personal allegiances was most typically a rural phenomenon, it existed in cities as well. Indeed, the patron-client relationship has been a prevailing feature of Greek political life from the War of Independence into the contemporary period.

Differing from both of the «bourgeois parties» was the Greek Communist Party (KKE). Emerging as a small political organization in the wake of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution, the KKE at first appealed to a small number of middle-class intellectuals. Through the 1920's it began to make inroads among refugees from Asia Minor and—through labor union activity—industrial workers (particularly in Thessaloniki). Both on ideological grounds and because it had little *largesse* to distribute, the KKE eschewed the traditional patron-client mode of Greek political organization. The KKE was always handicapped by its failure to make headway in the countryside, the smallness of the country's proletariat, and by severe internal fights over personalities and issues of tactics. Nevertheless, by the mid-1930's the KKE had made impressive gains in parliamentary elections and was becoming a force to be reckoned with in Greek politics.

The establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936 brought a halt to all democratic political activity. It was not until after World War II that parliamentary politics was to resume. During the Second World War, the Liberals and the Populists continued their feuds in the government-in-exile; while in occupied Greece the KKE became the dominating force in the EAM/ELAS resistance. With the outbreak of the Civil War the KKE was driven underground; it has remained illegal in Greece since 1947. During the Civil War period the government leaders were variously chosen from Liberal and Populist factions.

The advent of the 1950's saw a return to the «normal» politics of Greece. Despite the sweeping events and catastrophic wars of the preceding decade and a half, the three major political formations of Right, Center, and Left were resumed in only slightly altered form. The conservative Populists gave way to Papagos' Greek Rally (1951) which in turn was replaced by ERE founded by Karamanlis (1956) and later headed by Panayotis Kanellopoulos (1963). Another right-wing party, though a minor one, was

the Progressives, a personal vehicle of Spiros Markezinis.⁷ Although usually closely allied with ERE, Markezinis' group maintained its separate parliamentary identity.

For a period in the early 1950's the center spectrum of Greek politics was shared by three parties: the Liberals continuing under their old label, now headed by Sophoklis Venizelos, the son of Eleutherios Venizelos; a personal party of George Papandreou who had lost a leadership struggle within the Liberals to the younger Papandreou; and the National Progressive Union of the Center (EPEK) founded by General Nicolaos Plastiras, a well-known republican since the 1920's.⁸ Toward the end of the decade the political scene had become even more fragmented with nine different centerist parties taking part in the 1958 elections. The two major centerist groups, however, remained those respectively headed by Papandreou and Venizelos *fiis*. (Plastiras' EPEK having died with its leader in 1953.)

Although differences of issue were minimal among the numerous centerist parties, each was dominated by the desire of its leader for personal authority. But on the common impulse to break the power of ERE, George Papandreou succeeded in 1961 in uniting a single Center Union. This process in political fusion temporarily overcame the individual ambitions of the various political personalities involved. Though losing the 1961 elections, Papandreou maintained the Center Union's solidarity by mounting a furious and persistent attack on the legitimacy and morality of ERE. In this endeavor Papandreou was able to exploit mass protests and virulent press criticism of the government. Under the pressure of Papandreou's «relentless struggle», an atmosphere of crisis was created with which the ERE government was unable to cope. As a result of elections held in 1963, the Center Union won a narrow plurality and Papandreou became Prime Minister. George Papandreou's hold on the leadership of the Greek Center seemed confirmed by his party's landslide electoral victory in February 1964. (Papandreou's long-time Liberal rival Sophoklis Venizelos had died several weeks earlier.)

Much as the old Populists were succeeded by ERE, and as the Liberals had their lineal descendant in the Center Union, the Left also reappeared as an integral political force in Greek society. The outlawed KKE played a central—if not always clear—role in the formation of the United Democratic Front (EDA) which has taken part in every Greek election since 1951. Although strongly communist influenced, EDA had always included many persons who were not communists but who for one reason or another opposed the status quo. Among the factors underlying EDA's appeal were: families of Civil War prisoners and exiles desiring clemency and repatriation for their

relatives; disgust with the maneuverings of old-line politicians and parties; and opposition to Greece's foreign policy, especially its NATO membership and handling of the Cyprus question. Much of EDA's grass-roots support was due to its organizational links with leftist labor unions and youth groups.

Thus, by the middle 1960's, the three distinctive political formations were very reminiscent of Greek politics over a generation back. There were even persistent similarities in the support given by different sectors of the population to the contemporary parties of the Right, Center, and Left. ERE was more the party of owners of shops and businesses and, especially in «old Greece», of farmers. The Center Union drew more from the salaried employees and civil servants, and the rural regions which had been the stronghold of the elder Venizelos. EDA found its basic support among discontented intellectuals, industrial laborers, and lower-paid service employees, particularly among the families of Asia Minor refugees.

Although there were these discernable differences in their social bases of support, both ERE and the Center Union—like their Populist and Liberal predecessors—were fundamentally similar in their organization. The mass support of both the ERE and Center Union was based on a web of patron-client and kinship relations to local political figures which crisscrossed social strata. Moreover, ERE and the Center Union were both run with a total disregard of internal democracy; Papandreou ran the Center Union as autocratically as had Karamanlis the ERE. Unlike the bourgeois parties of the Right and Center, EDA—like the KKE in the 1930's—possessed a formal organization independent of patronage ties, and a cadre selected on the basis of party loyalty rather than personal influence. Likewise, EDA's parliamentary representation was issue oriented and not just a collection of special pleas.

Given in the Table are the percentages of popular votes and parliamentary seats in Greek elections since 1952. Because of the workings of the electoral system there was often a lack of correspondence between

Percentages of Popular Vote by Political Groupings in Greek Elections, 1952-1964. (Corresponding percentages of seats in parliament given in parentheses.)

Election	Right Parties	Center Parties	Left Parties	Independents
1952	50 (82)	35 (17)	10 (—)	5 (1)
1956	50 (55)	48 (44)*	—	2 (1)
1958	44 (58)	31 (16)	25 (26)	—
1961	50 (58)	34 (34)	15 (8)	1 (—)
1963	43 (45)	42 (46)	15 (9)	—
1964	35 (35)	53 (58)	12 (7)	—

* The Center and Left ran in electoral coalition in 1956; separate party totals are not available.

the popular vote and parliamentary representation.⁹ For twelve years (1952-1963) the Right maintained a decisive parliamentary majority with a popular vote of between 44 and 50 percent. During this period of conservative supremacy, the major opposition group was found in the Center (although an electoral quirk in 1958 gave the Left the second largest parliamentary representation in 1958).

The political picture changed fundamentally in 1963 when the Center gained the ascendancy and ERE became the opposition party. In the last elections held in 1964, the parliamentary breakdown out of a total of 300 deputies was: Center Union, 173 seats; ERE, 98 seats; Markezinis' Progressives in coalition with ERE, 7 seats; and EDA, 22 seats. This was the party distribution in parliament at the time of Papandreou's confrontation with the King on July 15, 1965.

constitutional crisis: 1965-67

Following the «resignation» or «dismissal» of George Papandreou, Constantine II sought to form another government without resorting to new elections. The King's strategy was to select a prime minister from within Papandreou's own Center Union. Within an hour of Papandreou's resignation (thus giving credence to speculation that the Palace had pre-planned Papandreou's dismissal), Constantine II charged George Athanasiades-Novas with forming a new government. Athanasiades-Novas, a middle-of-the-road Center Union leader and President of the Parliament, accepted the commission but was able to muster only twenty supporters from his own party. Even with the parliamentary votes of ERE and Markezinis' Progressives this was not enough. The King next turned to the Deputy Prime Minister, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, who came from the conservative side of the Center Union. Stephanopoulos agreed to accept the mandate if the Center Union caucus approved. The caucus, still loyal to Papandreou, refused his request. On the third try, the King went to the Center Union's left and selected the moderate socialist leader, Elias Tsirimokos. Although this attempt gained some support within the Center Union, it too failed when the Progressives declined to vote for a left-wing prime minister backed by the right-wing ERE.

Finally, on September 24, 1965, —over two months since Papandreou's resignation/dismissal—a cabinet was formed. The head of the new government was Stephanopoulos, who with other Center Union deputies had by then openly broken with Papandreou. The Stephanopoulos government was voted in with the slimmest of majorities, 152 in favor and 148 against. The opposition was made up of the 126 Center Union deputies remaining loyal to Papandreou

and the 22 EDA votes. The vote in favor of the new government consisted of 105 ERE and Progressive deputies and 47 breakaway Center Union deputies. However, only the Center Union dissidents formed the actual government!

The severance of the defecting deputies from the Center Union—quickly labeled the «apostates»—required either a strong sense of courage or greed, depending on the viewpoint. Along with accusations of acceptance of bribes, the fact remains that each and every one of the Center Union defectors became a minister in the new government with attendant privileges of patronage and influence. For their part, the Center Union dissidents claimed their numbers would have been greater had it not been for fear of reprisals including threats of death. In any event, believing their position would be strengthened by organizing themselves as a new party, the Center Union defectors—eventually 45 deputies—formed themselves into the Liberal Democratic Center (FDK) in the early summer of 1966. FDK, however, always remained a political anomaly: a splinter party from the former government party being kept in power by the former opposition.

In the meantime the ouster of George Papandreou had become a full-blown constitutional crisis. Under the 1952 Constitution the monarch had the right to appoint his ministers subject to a vote of confidence. Further, there was no constitutional doubt that the King need necessarily select the leader of the largest political party for prime minister.¹⁰ Where the Constitution was unclear, however, was whether the monarch must call new elections in the event of dismissing a government—such as Papandreou's—which had received a vote of confidence and had never been overridden by a vote of no-confidence. Papandreou insisted that if the King did not reappoint him, Parliament therefore must be dissolved. This would entail, according to the Constitution, the holding of new parliamentary elections within 45 days after dissolution, and the convocation of the new parliament within three months. Constantine II had every reason to fear that parliamentary elections might well turn into an unfavorable plebiscite on the monarchy itself. Thus, the King sought to use the vagueness of the Constitution both to keep Papandreou out of the prime ministership *and* not to call new elections. By undercutting Papandreou within his own party and forming a government from a Center Union faction, the King's efforts were successful—albeit in a pyrrhic sense, only.

With the installation of Stephanopoulos as prime minister and the formal creation of FDK, the King undoubtedly hoped the governmental interregnum was over. In fact, the Stephanopoulos government did surprise most observers by displaying some stay-in

power and even passing some major legislation. Yet, while Papandreou's hold on the Center Union declined in Parliament, his popularity continued great in the country at large. With an upsurge of popular sentiment behind him, Papandreou did not hesitate to encourage strikes and street demonstrations in his behalf. The Left, which was in common cause with Papandreou's demands for new elections, took what advantage it could during this period of widespread political indignation. Although EDA was more a participant rather than an engineer of the pro-Papandreou demonstrations, their presence was sufficient to alarm the Right, the Palace, and the military hierarchy. Speculation about an imminent *coup d'état* became increasingly common. By the end of 1966 events had escalated from an imbroglio between Papandreou and Constantine II to a major constitutional dispute to a *crise de régime*.

Moreover, by the end of 1966, the ERE became restive in the role of supporting a government in which they were not represented. The ERE leader, Kanellopoulos, also believed his party might do well at the polls after all; a reaction against the turmoil of the past 18 months was beginning to be evident. With ERE withdrawing its votes from the FDK government, Stephanopoulos resigned as prime minister on December 23, 1966. The next day an interim non-political government, receiving the support of both ERE and the Center Union, was sworn in with the sole mandate of holding elections six months hence. The new caretaker prime minister was Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, governor of the Bank of Greece and a man respected for his impartiality.

Before the Center Union gave its votes to the Paraskevopoulos government, however, a short-lived dispute flared between the Papandreou, father and son. The left caucus of the Center Union led by Andreas Papandreou (and accounting for about one-quarter of the Center Union deputies) viewed the election proposal as a Palace bid for the support of the conservative wing of the Center Union.¹¹ Nevertheless, the senior Papandreou's will to hold elections—and presumably resume the prime ministership in the new parliament—prevailed; the entire Center Union gave its votes of confidence to the interim government. Opposing the Paraskevopoulos government were only FDK and EDA, both of whom feared the elections would be held under an electoral system handicapping their «minor» parties.

In late March 1967, the case of Andreas Papandreou and the «Aspida» affair were again the occasion of a new crisis. The State Prosecutor requested the parliamentary immunity of Andreas Papandreou (who was now alleged to be the civilian leader of the military conspiracy) be lifted. Although there was no likelihood Parliament would revoke the immunity of

one of its members, a more serious problem existed. According to the Constitution, the parliamentary immunity of a deputy extended for only 30 days after the dissolution of parliament while elections could be held as late as 45 days after dissolution. In practical terms this meant there was a 15-day interval in which Andreas Papandreou could be arrested. The Center Union responded by seeking to extend the immunity of a deputy for the whole period between the dissolution of Parliament and new elections. Kanellopoulos and ERE rejected this as unconstitutional. A compromise that Paraskevopoulos would personally guarantee no arrests would be made before the elections was not acceptable to the Center Union. On March 30, 1967, the Paraskevopoulos caretaker government fell.

By this time the possible combinations to form a government were becoming exhausted. Events outside of Parliament were also heating up again with a wave of violent demonstrations, student riots, and strikes. On April 2 Constantine II made an indirect offer to George Papandreou to form an all-party government which was turned down. The King next turned to Kanellopoulos and asked him to form a minority ERE government; hopefully by luring small-party support with the promise of an electoral system based on straight proportional representation. Despite several days of intensive negotiation, Kanellopoulos' efforts were unavailing. Parliament was dissolved on April 14 and elections called for May 28. Most observers predicted a victory for the Center Union, although some thought George Papandreou's popular support was eroding.

The elections never took place.

the end of a regime

The Military Takes Over. Throughout 1966 and especially during the final political crisis in the spring of 1967, rumors abounded of an imminent military *coup d'état*. Informed speculation had it that the King and very senior military officers would intervene to prevent elections which might turn into an anti-royalist referendum. But when the coup did come in the early hours of April 21, 1967, it was masterminded by a group of relatively unknown colonels. Commentators subsequently surmised that the colonel's coup had beaten the King's coup to the punch—much to the unwitting surprise of the Palace.

The leaders of the junta were not the kind of persons privy to the confidences of the Palace. And, as later events proved, their loyalty to the King was very conditional. Nor was the junta in accord with the *politikos kosmos*—that circle of sophisticated Athenians of various ideological persuasions who long dominated the arts, professions, academia,

and press in Greece as well as its politics. In contrast to the *politikos kosmos*, the junta were austere products of the provincial petty bourgeoisie who strongly valued the traditional morals of Greek community life. They were practising Christian Greek Orthodox, many of whom were under the influence of «Zoi», a lay religious organization devoted to evangelic education directed toward youth. Indeed, the colonels' junta seemed to display almost as much resentment toward the moral laxities and prerogatives of the Athenian upper class as it did toward the subversion of the communists.¹²

But whatever social distinctions can be made between the putative King's coup and the actual colonels' coup—and they are meaningful, the fact remains that it was a *military* regime which displaced the constitutional parliamentary government. From its viewpoint, the military had good reason to fear another George Papandreou government (and even more so one headed by Andreas Papandreou). Under the preceding Papandreou government, military expenditures had been reduced and it could be assumed that further cuts in the military budget were in the offing in the event of another Center Union government. Moreover, if Greece adopted an anti-NATO stance, the very *raison d'être* of the military was threatened. There was also the significant fact—overlooked by most observers of the Greek scene—that the pay scale of military officers had severely lagged behind civilian rates during the 1964-66 inflationary period.

But, most important, George Papandreou when prime minister had announced his intentions to Parliament to retire officers of doubtful loyalty to his government. From the conventional liberal perspective this could be interpreted as an effort to bring the military under civilian control. But from the Army's standpoint, the Papandreou proposals would destroy the integrity of the officer corps based on a conservative political homogeneity which went as far back as the Metaxas dictatorship and was confirmed during the years of the Civil War. Left and Center elements may have correctly felt that the armed forces had become a «parallel state» requiring depoliticization. The military saw this as repoliticization and a provocation to its basic institutional integrity. It were these issues which gave the «Aspida» affair such significance.¹³

The fact that the colonels had used a NATO plan of operation to execute their coup was frequently given as *prima facie* evidence of American complicity.¹⁴ Left and Center spokesmen (and after Constantine II's exile in December 1967, those of the Right as well) asserted that the military takeover could only have been undertaken with, at the least, American acquiescence, or with, more probably, active American involvement. There was no denying that the Greek military was closely locked into broader American

strategy and that the armed forces were dependent on the United States for material support. Thus it would seem eminently plausible that if the United States saw its interests endangered in Greece, it would take steps to avert such an eventuality. There was also the *realpolitik* factor that from the time of the Yalta Agreements, the Russians have tacitly accepted Greece's inclusion in the Western sphere of influence, first under the British and later the Americans.

It is certainly a cardinal tenet of Greek political culture that nothing of importance can happen in Greece without the approval of the United States. And it was manifestly evident that since the Truman Doctrine, American influence was omnipresent on the Greek political scene. There was the Civil War which the government won with the help of American military advisors and weapons. In 1950 the United States was instrumental in bringing about a governmental coalition which led Greece into NATO. In 1952 the United States insisted on changes in the electoral system which favored Papagos' Greek Rally. During the Karamanlis years, ERE was considered the «American Party» (in much the same way as EDA was the «Russian Party»). In the early 1960's, the Kennedy Administration indicated it would support a more liberal government thus fostering the rise of the Center Union. (Ironically enough, Andreas Papandreou was accused in his early political career of being an American agent.)

Although the full circumstances of America's role in the 1967 military takeover may never be known, the probability is that Americans in official capacities were ready to go along with a King's coup, but that the actual colonels' coup caught the United States government unaware. It should also not be overlooked that the official American presence in Greece was many faceted (the Embassy, the Military Mission, CIA, and AID) and often at cross-purposes. A balanced understanding of the breakdown of democracy in Greece must be wary of the lure of a too easy causal emphasis on the American role. Such an oversimplified interpretation can only serve to cloud analysis by ignoring the inherent failures of the Greek political system and its ruling class. As a trenchant critic of the United States role in Greece has written: «It is of course ridiculous to maintain that the dictatorship was purely a product of US intervention.»¹⁵

The Erosion of Legitimacy. According to the junta leaders, the immediate trigger of the April 21 coup was the need to prevent disorder and bloodshed at a Center Union rally planned for Palm Sunday at Thessaloniki. In the military's mind the accelerated tempo of domestic unrest in the middle 1960's was cause enough to move the armed forces from a pos-

ture of watchful apprehension to one of direct military intervention. Although the military's rationale was undoubtedly self-serving, the undermining of public order was one of the root causes in breakdown of Greek constitutional government. Any adequate explanation of the erosion of the legitimacy of the parliamentary system must emphasize the telling effects of promoting political goals through extra-parliamentary means.

Following his ouster from the prime ministership, George Papandreou exploited domestic turmoil on a scale new to Greek urban politics. Strikes were generally in those sectors of the working population where Center Union strength was greatest: civil servants, bank employees, postal workers, teachers, hospital staff, and telecommunication technicians.¹⁶ It was only in the spring of 1967 that EDA-influenced unions (notably construction workers) began to take a major part in the labor unrest. More ominous was the Center Union's propensity to organize mass public demonstrations in which violence always lurked in the wings. One of the most impressive of such demonstrations was on July 15, 1966—the anniversary of Papandreou's removal from government. Scores of thousands of Center Union supporters passed in motorcade before the balcony of Papandreou's house in an intimidating display of mass solidarity.

It must be reiterated, however, that the exploitation of extra-parliamentary force was not introduced into Greek politics by the Center Union. The period of «stability» during the Karamanlis regime featured the thugery of the notorious Civil Guard which helped bring in ERE majorities in rural areas. The murder of Lambrakis in 1963 was the most dramatic, but only one instance of right-wing political repression. All segments of the Greek political spectrum (but, perhaps, the EDA least of all) were too quick to use extra-legal means to advance their sectarian causes. In this sense, the military takeover did not deviate all that much from the practises of erstwhile parliamentary leaders.

Exasperating the fundamental problem of public order were other factors undercutting the legitimacy of Greek constitutional government. During the parliamentary crisis of 1965-67, the trials of both the «Aspida» conspirators and the Lambrakis' murderers were going on. Accusations were made of fabrication or suppression of evidence along with the implication of high personages not on trial. The likelihood of obtaining due process of law within established procedures was now brought into public question. Its impartiality questioned, the prestige of the legal system was severely diminished, and with it that of the entire political framework.

Through an unfortunate coincidence in time, the Greek Orthodox Church was also exposed to sweep-

ing scandals during the same period. The unseemly ambitions of bishops seeking transfers from poor to rich dioceses became publically known and received extensive press coverage. Matters were not helped by allegations of homosexuality within the Church hierarchy, including the newly appointed primate of Greece (he resigned and was eventually exonerated). Although the Church scandals were unrelated to the contemporaneous political drama, the tarnishing of such a central institution in Greek society could only contribute to a general malaise toward the existing state of affairs.

Another factor having debilitating consequences on the legitimacy of the parliamentary system revolved around bureaucratic arrogance. By the time of the 1967 coup, the Greek civil service itself had become an object of widespread resentment. Although documentation is elusive, the excruciating passage of an individual through a circuit of officious civil servants was an affront which nearly all of the adult population had shared. Encumbered by efforts to maintain social distance and overlegalistic interpretations of regulations, the civil bureaucracy played a not insignificant role in the general disgust with things governmental. Certainly a listing of prime factors which undermined the Greek political system must prominently include the alienation of its citizenry from the channels of government with which they dealt directly.

Personalities and the Parliamentary Failure. Ultimately one returns to the personalities involved in the breakdown of Greek parliamentary democracy. As head of state it is hard not to fault Constantine II for a series of grievous errors. Although staying within the letter of the Constitution, the young King almost unfailingly compounded one political miscalculation after another: (1) his too quick—and probably preplanned—acceptance of Papandreou's «resignation» in July 1965; (2) his creation—through cynical offers of power—of an *ersatz* parliamentary party from Center Union dissidents (FDK) in September 1965; (3) his abandonment of FDK by bringing about the Center Union-ERE agreement resulting in the Paraskevopoulos government in December 1966; his efforts to install a minority ERE government following the fall of the Paraskevopoulos government in April 1967. During all these maneuvers the King displayed an inexperience in the give and take of parliamentary processes, an insensitivity to what was happening to the political climate in the country at large, and a basic incomprehension of the nature of democratic politics.¹⁷

But Constantine II's political failings were not alone in contributing to the collapse of the Greek parliamentary system. The King's poor judgement was

matched by the intemperateness of his *bête noire*, George Papandreou. During 1961-63, Papandreou kept the Center Union together as an opposition party by embarking on a campaign of «relentless struggle» against ERE. Originally focusing on the intimidations of the 1961 elections, Papandreou's attack eventually came to castigate the government as utterly evil in every respect. When Prime Minister himself (1963-65) an inordinate amount of time and energy was spent in unearthing old political scandals and capitalizing on past ERE misdeeds. Following his ouster as prime minister, Papandreou began a second «relentless struggle» (1965-67), this time with the added ingredient of mass protest. Although much of Papandreou's fiery rhetoric could be dismissed by the *cognoscenti* as only personal style, his root attack on the nature of party politics was accepted at face value by many Greeks.

The parliamentary personages who figured so prominently in contemporary Greek politics were by and large products and maintainers of the traditional party system based on patron-client relationships. Un beholden to consistent party identities or organizational loyalties, they formed and reformed whatever short-term alliances would advance their individual careers. A resume of the political fluctuations of George Papandreou is indicative of the general pattern. In the early decades of the century Papandreou is associated with Eleutherios Venizelos' Liberals. In 1933 he sets up his own «socialist» (actually centerist-republican) party. In 1936 he runs as a member of a regional party. In late 1944 he is the anti-communist prime minister heading a pro-royalist government of «National Unity». In 1946 he is part of a center-right coalition. In 1950 and 1951 he immodestly heads the «George Papandreou Party». In 1952 he enters parliament as a member of the rightist Greek Rally. In 1956 he joins his center party in electoral coalition with the leftist EDA. In 1958 he is back under the Liberal banner sharing leadership with Sophoklis Venizelos. In 1961 he forms and heads the Center Union. In 1965 he is moving toward a *de facto* coalition with EDA. In late 1966 Papandreou is in parliamentary alliance with the Right in support of the Paraskevopoulos government. With such a political lineage, it is little wonder George Papandreou's credentials as a responsible political leader could be held in question.

Unlike his father, Andreas Papandreou genuinely departed from the old-line personalistic politics. The younger Papandreou had returned to Greece from America in 1959 at the invitation of Karamanlis to establish a semi-governmental institute of economic research. In the United States he had been an academic economist of some distinction. As George Papandreou's political fortunes improved, the son be-

came active in the Center Union and (after relinquishing his American citizenship) became a minister in his father's government. Most independent observers credited Andreas Papandreou as a man especially well suited to deal with the problems of economic planning in Greece (he favored solutions along New Deal and Keynesian lines). Within the Center Union, he came to lead a group of reformers devoted to party organization and meaningful programs rather than the traditional issueless politics.

Andreas Papandreou's more fervent supporters saw him as a new force on the Greek political scene who had the skill and determination to move Greece into the modern world. His detractors, on the other hand, regarded him as a «parachutist» in politics who used his father's position to escape a dead-end academic career. Moreover, they saw him as an unstable personality whose arrogance matched his ambitions for power. Both admirers and critics agreed that Andreas Papandreou was trying to change the traditional assumptions of Greek politics. A perhaps neutral judgement is that Andreas Papandreou was a man of undoubted ability who was not innocent of *hubris*. In any evaluation, his supposed involvement with the «Aspida» conspirators became the *cause célèbre* which the traditional political system was incapable of handling.

the breakdown of democracy

The set of circumstances surrounding the breakdown of democracy in Greece was not without its ironies. The monarchy was designed to be a stabilizing force in the Greek political system; yet the King's performance made a farce of the constitutional framework. George Papandreou came into office with a mandate unprecedented in Greek political history; yet his own intemperateness discredited the legitimacy of the political system he sought to govern. Andreas Papandreou was seen by many as the herald of a new non-personalistic style in Greek politics; yet it was around his personality that the parliamentary system foundered.

The Greek Right endlessly invoked the bogey of communist subversion; yet neither the parliamentary EDA nor the illegal KKE played any significant part in the combination of events and personalities which brought on the *crisis de régime*. The Greek Center sought to reform the armed forces by bringing it under parliamentary control; yet these efforts only provoked the military into an even greater hostility toward civilian government. The Greek Left portrayed Greek politics as a coming conflict between the ruling class and the masses; yet the final denouement was more in the nature of a triumph of the provincial petty bourgeoisie over the Athenian *haut monde*.

If the analysis of the breakdown of Greek parliamentary democracy herein presented appears to over-

stress personal and volitional factors rather than broad cultural and structural determinants, this in fact corresponds with my own comprehension of what happened. But such a premise also serves the didactic purpose of partially redressing the extant commentary which too easily invokes impersonalistic explanations. This is not to say that political sociological variables are irrelevant—and I have consciously sought not to slight them; but it is to say that such variables set only vague parameters within which individual acts have decisive consequences. Certainly in the collapse of parliamentary democracy in Greece, the actions of only a few figures operating within a narrowing political arena were themselves of a determining quality.

The formal end of Greek democracy came dramatically on April 21, 1967. But the actions of the protagonists on the Greek political scene over the preceding two years had already drained the parliamentary system of its vitality. The military takeover was as much *coup de grâce* as it was *coup d'état*.

NOTES

1. Indeed, a counter set of equally plausible *ex post facto* propositions could be raised to argue that the Greece of the mid-1960's possessed certain unique advantages for the success of parliamentary democracy: Greece in early 1967 had a per capita income of over \$700 US, a figure well into the top quartile of the world's national economies; during the years 1963 through 1966, the GNP increased at an average of 8.0 per cent annually in real terms, one of the highest advances in the world; the distribution of national income in Greece appeared to be no more skewed toward the upper classes than in other Western societies; property ownership in rural areas was almost entirely in the hands of small-and medium-sized farmers; both agricultural underemployment and urban unemployment had been markedly reduced between 1958 and 1967. See, *Greece Annual Supplement, 1968*, London: the Economist Intelligence Unit, 1968; *Concise Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1967*, Athens: National Statistical Service of Greece, 1968; and *Postwar European Incomes*, New York: United Nations Publications, 1970.

Neither were factors on the political scene all that inauspicious for the stability of a parliamentary regime: a remarkably free press had developed in Greece since the early 1950's; a strong tradition of local government at the village level had endured since the Ottoman period; at the national level, parliamentary elections were increasingly free and non-coercive. Very significantly, it must be remembered that the 1963-64 Greek elections were the first time since World War II that a single strong and coherent party had ousted another such party by a decisive victory at the polls in *all of continental Europe*.

It should also be stressed that contemporary Greece is an exceptionally homogeneous society, almost entirely free of inter-religious conflict, ethnic cleavage, or regional separatism.

2. A detailed exposition of the conceptual approach used in this case study of Greek parliamentary democracy is given in Juan J. Linz, «The Breakdown of Competitive Democracies: Elements for a Model», paper presented at the Seventh World Congress of Sociology, Varna, September, 1970. Linz argues that conventional reliance on political sociological variables forces a too deterministic explanation of political phenomena; at the least, equal attention ought be given to those volitional

acts occurring in a narrow political arena which have decisive consequences for the maintenance or collapse of parliamentary regimes.

3. The Greek government rashly tried to implement the 1919 Treaty of Sévres (signed but never ratified by the major powers) which ceded Eastern Thrace, Smyrna, and an Asia Minor enclave to Greece. Following the Greek defeat, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 provided for a massive population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Although ending a 3,000-year-long Greek presence in Asia Minor, the transfer of populations created an ethnically homogeneous Greek nation.

4. The negotiations between the government and the communists were concluded in February, 1945, at Varkiza, outside Athens. The major provisions of the Varkiza Agreements were: (1) a plebiscite to be held on the question of the King's return; (2) the holding of general elections following the plebiscite; (3) the existence of a legal communist party and press; (4) EAM/ELAS to be demobilized; (5) political amnesty to be given to EAM/ELAS leaders but leaving other resistance fighters subject to criminal prosecution. The last point was regarded by many as a betrayal by the communist leadership of their rank and file.

5. The Civil War victory of the government was not due solely to American intervention and Tito's closing of the frontier. There were also manifold failings within the communist insurgency: the Communist Party's advocacy of an autonomous Macedonia impugned its Greek nationalism; there was a continuing expectation of Russian support which never came; the Greek communist leadership itself was bitterly faction ridden; the adoption of frontal military tactics was a blunder; the atrocities committed by the insurgents at least equaled those of the government forces; there was a strategic misassumption of the Greek populace's willingness to endure continued violence.

The definitive study of the Greek Civil War from a pro-government viewpoint is George D. Kousoulas, *Revolution and Defeat*, London: Oxford University Press, 1965. For an account sympathetic to the insurgent side (but bitterly critical of Stalinism) see, Dominique Eudes, *Les Kapétanios*, Paris: Fayard, 1970.

6. The standard work on American-Greek relations is Theodore A. Coloumbis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

7. Markezinis is generally credited with being the architect of the «Greek economic miracle» through his influence on Papagos' and Karamanlis' economic policies during the 1950's.

8. Plastiras had served briefly as prime minister in late 1944-early 1945. He was forced to resign by his refusal to adopt a belligerent stand against EAM/ELAS. During a second tenure as prime minister in 1950-51, Plastiras again favored a policy of compromise with the communists. Alone of the post-war prime ministers, Plastiras sought to implement a policy of reconciliation with the Left.

9. The Greek electoral system is complex and usually constructed to serve the party in power. The system in use since 1956 was a type of «reinforced proportional representation». Three different kinds of constituencies were set up: (1) those with up to three members of parliament where all deputies came from the party winning an absolute majority; (2) those with between four and ten deputies where the party with the most votes got 70 per cent of the seat, the second party 30 per cent; and (3) those with more than ten deputies where a straight proportional system applied. Inasmuch as the smaller districts where in rural areas and the larger ones in the cities, the Right was likely to take all seats where it polled a popular majority while attaining proportional representation in constituencies where it was a minority. See, Keith R. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 143-144.

10. The right of the King to select a prime minister from other than the leader of the major parliamentary party had a modern precedent. Following Papagos' death in 1955, King Paul bypassed senior leaders in the Greek Rally to chose the relatively unknown Karamanlis.

11. This scheme has been attributed to Christos Lambrakis (no relation to the murdered EDA deputy of the same name), a press magnate of center-right political persuasion. The Lambrakis plan sought to isolate Andreas Papandreou by forcing him out of the Center Union into either EDA or his own left-liberal party. The elements of the Lambrakis plan were: (1) elections in late May 1970 under the Paraskevopoulos caretaker government; (2) George Papandreou abstains from an anti-royalist campaign; (3) if the Center Union (presumably purged of its left faction) did not receive a parliamentary majority in the elections it forms a coalition with ERE; (4) George Papandreou to be prime minister in the new parliament; (5) the King has the right to veto nominees to the Papandreou cabinet. See, Constantine Tsoucalas, *The Greek Tragedy*, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1969, pp. 199-203.

12. For a documentation of the social background and beliefs of Greek Army officers, see the empirical study of George A. Kourvetaris, «The Contemporary Army Officer Corps in Greece: An Inquiry into its Professionalism and Interventionism», doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, 1969.

13. Although the full circumstances surrounding the «Aspida» affair may never be known, the following provisional judgement may be in order: that elements in the Center Union sought to infiltrate supporters into military positions seems definite; that such a group known as «Aspida» existed seems likely; that Andreas Papandreou was personally linked to this group seems doubtful; that persons in the Palace and Army would falsify evidence to link Andreas Papandreou with «Aspida» seems probable.

14. Similarly, much has been made of the ties of the leaders of the April 21 coup with KYP (the Greek Central Intelligence Agency) which in turn is defined as an arm of the American CIA. Less has been made of the fact that the left-wing «Aspida» conspiracy was also centered in KYP. On this point, see John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, *Modern Greece*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, p. 274.

15. Tsoucalas, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

16. Papandreou's opponents argued that salaried workers in 1965-66 were suffering from a price inflation for which the Center Union's own economic policies were mainly responsible.

17. It is also plausible that as late as spring 1967, the King could have defused the political crisis with *la grande geste* of pardoning the convicted «Aspida» defendants.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Despite its recentness, the end of Greek democracy in the mid-1960's has already become the subject of an impressive body of literature. Because of the controversial nature of the circumstances leading to the collapse of the parliamentary regime, the viewpoints and analyses are quite varied and often diametrically opposed. Given below is an annotation of this literature coupled with their authors' attribution of the causes of the breakdown of parliamentary democracy in Greece.

Aujourd'hui la Grèce. Dossier, special issue of *Les Temps Modernes*, October, 1969.

Varied collection of essays on contemporary Greece. Basically a New Left critique which characterizes modern Greek politics as a succession of monarcho-fascist regimes. Breakdown attributed to repression of progressive forces and U.S. involvement in 1967 coup.

Jane P. C. Carey and Andrew G. Carey, *The Web of Modern Greek Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.

A readable account of Greek politics from the War of Independence to the 1967 coup. Subtly pro-royalist. Breakdown attributed to diverse factors: historical instability of Greece,

activities of communists, failure of Papandreou (*père et fils*) to abide by rules of the fragile political system.

John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, *Modern Greece*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.

Promises to be the definitive study of modern Greece for many years to come. Thorough, scholarly, and non-partisan. Breakdown attributed to existence of efficient and well organized national army in context of deficient and malorganized political structures.

George A. Kourvetaris, «The Contemporary Army Officer Corps in Greece», doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, 1969.

Empirical documentation of class origins and social attitudes of Greek Army officers in 1968. Analysis somewhat sympathetic to military government. Breakdown attributed to officer corps' fear of communist takeover, disgust with political instability, and dread of growing moral and social decay in Greece.

Keith R. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1969.

An excellent empirical documentation by a sophisticated political scientist of the issues and patron-client bases of Greek politics. Breakdown primarily attributed to deficient political culture and incapacity of traditional political system to modernize itself.

Ministry to the Prime Minister, *The Political Situation in Greece from 1944 to the Present*, Athens: Press and Information Department, 1969.

Representative of official statements periodically issued by the military government. Claims «history» will vindicate April 21 «revolution». Breakdown attributed to threat of communist takeover and political incompetence of parliamentary leaders.

Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, New York: Doubleday, 1970.

Personal account by a leading protagonist on the Greek political scene. Self-serving but valuable for its inside commentary on developments during the 1965-67 parliamentary crisis. Breakdown primarily attributed to perfidy of political opponents, and American collusion with anti-progressive forces.

Stephen Rousseas, *The Death of a Democracy*, New York: Grove Press, 1967.

The first book published on the 1967 coup. Subtitled «Greece and the American Conscience» it set pattern for left-liberal critique which exonerated Andreas Papandreou and attributed breakdown primarily to American collusion with anti-progressive forces.

Constantine Tsoucalas, *The Greek Tragedy*, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1969.

A trenchant Marxist (but non-communist) analysis of Greek society and politics. Well written and well reasoned. Breakdown primarily attributed to unwillingness of vested interests to countenance any change in bourgeois socio-economic structures.

Helen Vlachos, *House Arrest*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1970.

Self-serving and personal account by Greece's former leading conservative newspaper publisher. Worth reading because it represents viewpoint that is both right-wing and anti-junta. Breakdown primarily attributed to power seeking of boorish colonels.

Kenneth Young, *The Greek Passion*, London: 1969.

Professedly biased but important because it is only full-length defense of the 1967 coup and the military regime. Breakdown attributed to Greek historical proclivities toward political instability compounded by personality of Andreas Papandreou and threat of communist takeover.