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professional self - images and political perspectives in the Greek military

by

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The contemporary Greek Army Officer Corps is examined to determine its professional role and political orientation within the modern Greek social structure. The focus of the study is the construction of a typology of professional self-images and dimensions of professionalism of one-hundred career army officers. An effort is made to relate social background characteristics and perceptions of the military profession to the officer's political and ideological perspectives. It was found that: 1) Greek officers did not perceive «managerial» qualities as superceding «heroic» attributes for military leadership and 2) Irrespective of the officer's professional orientation and social background characteristics, he favors intervention into politics if the political leadership is incapable of mediating between social groups in reaching a consensus regarding national and international issues.

Geopolitically, economically and socially Greece occupies a middle-of-the-road position between East and West. Since its inception as a modern state in the first quarter of the 19th century, she has undergone a turbulent and interrupted process of social and political modernization in the Western European sense. Like the emerging nations of the third world which acquired their independence from the colonial powers in the period following World War II, Greece emerged from a prolonged authoritarian Ottoman rule with roots too shallow for the development of democratic institutions. From the very beginning of nationhood, Greece was faced with domestic problems which had been further aggravated by her lack of natural resources and her premature entrance into international politics.

The emergence of modern Greek social structure is an expression of a concomitant development and modernization of its military organization and its professional corps of officers. From the very beginning of Greek «nation building» especially during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 and between the interim of the two World Wars as well as in the aftermath of World War II, the military has played a pivotal role in the process of modernization of the Greek social and political structure.

The military has emerged as the most comprehensive, corporate and effective professional organization in modern Greece. (Campbell and Sherrard,

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1968: 401-403.) In addition to conventional military training and professional commitments both as a national army and as a *bona fide* member of the NATO military organization, the Greek military has been active in promoting construction, transportation, communication, forestry, technical education and training of manpower, assisting in natural disasters, health, agriculture and irrigation and athletics.

Frequently in countries which are undergoing «the stress of transition» in their efforts to modernize and westernize rapidly, military organizations are socially and politically significant (Lovell, 1969). They are significant not simply in what Harold Lasswell called «the control and management of the institutionalized means of violence» of the profession of arms, but because they possess resources and skills which are in demand during the modernization process. In the case of Greece, it is too early to tell whether the recent military intervention will lead to the redirecting of the course of political and social change. Therefore, this study has been limited to the task of gathering empirical data¹ with respect to two crucial questions: 1) What are the professional and career self-images and social background characteristics of the army career officers? and 2) Given the officers' professional, social and career characteristics, what are their political and ideological perspectives regarding national and international issues? More specifically, the focus of this study is to suggest a typology of professional self-images, to relate it to the officers' political attitudes and to see the interdependence between the military and social structure. In this study professional self-images will be used interchangeably with the concept of «professionalism» which is defined by Seymour (1963: 20-23) as «the advocacy of a set of attitudes and behaviors believed to be appropriate to a particular occupation». Professionalism or professional self-image is then a prescriptive rather than a descriptive concept.²

professional self-images

In his study of the *American Professional Soldier*, Professor Janowitz (1960: 21-36), has noted a decline in heroic attitudes among American professional officers. Heroic self-images and attitudes are not altogether absent from contemporary American military professionals, Janowitz suggests; however, a gradual transformation from a «heroic self-image» to that of a «managerial self-image» has taken place. It has also been noted (Janowitz, 1960: 225) that «Every profession assigns to itself a higher status than outsiders would be willing to concede, and every leadership group has a self-image which fails to correspond to the image the public holds.»

1. See Footnotes at the end of this article (p. 27).

Following Janowitz' lead, John Lovell investigated the professional socialization of West Point cadets (Janowitz, 1964: 125). Lovell found no significant decline in heroic attitudes during the socialization process of the cadets in terms of their preferred branch of service. Thus those attracted to the branches where the tradition of personal charisma, valor and leadership continue to be emphasized were more likely to have a «heroic» orientation more so than those in branches where technical skill was the dominant prerequisite for success. The officer's self-image is a composite of his own personality development and organizational experiences (Janowitz, 1960: 228). It is also a reflection of societal and cultural characteristics. Throughout his professional military career, the officer's self-image changes.

Despite the fact that the basic structure of the officer's personality remains unchanged, changes in his professional role during his career do have an effect on his self-image and personality. His organizational experiences both in his early professional socialization as a cadet and later in his military career modify his self-image. As a professional soldier, he acquires general and specific knowledge and expertise pertinent to his corresponding professional role and rank. He learns certain attitudes and an ideology by incorporating into his self-image a set of values, conceptions, beliefs, and ideals that set him apart from other social groups in society. At the same time these emergent attitudes create in him a commitment, a sense of missionary zeal and a «consciousness of kind» as a member of a professional officer corps.

How does the Greek army officer perceive himself? What changes have occurred in his self-image over the years? Is there a «managerial» transformation of the Greek army's professional officer? Does he still maintain his «heroic» self-image? Despite the difficulty of quantifying the officer's responses to my questions, I was able to construct a typology of the officers' self-images and self conceptions.³

Typology of Professional Self-Images. The self-images of the officer corps can best be depicted and analyzed in terms of an ideal construct composed of two major macro-level models: a societal-cultural, Greek military model and a Western-technological-military model. Individually, each of the two macro-level models consists of three micro-level components. The former is made up of the *pallikar-leventis-philotimo* self-image syndrome. Such a self-image is a product of indigenous societal and cultural values as well as Greek military virtues that address themselves to the more «heroic/primitive» aspects of the officer's self-image. The latter consists of the technologist-managerial-specialist self-image syndrome. This is a product of exogenous technological and military in-

fluences of Western Europe and the United States. These influences lend themselves to a more competitive /professional self-image of the officer. Despite the fact that both of these self-image syndromes were found to be present among the officers, they have recently been undergoing a gradual transformation into a new fusion or synthesis of the two.

The aforementioned typology is depicted as follows:

Diagram: Self-Images of the Army Officer Corps

Self-Image I: Pallikar-Leventis-Philotimo Syndrome.

This self-image was most prevalent from the Balkan Wars (1912, 1913) to World War II. These ideals have been incorporated into the cultural value system of modern Greek society from the time of the War of National Independence against the Ottoman Empire. The concept of *pallikar* is part of the Greek legend carried over from Byzantine frontier days to the present. It is a re-current theme in Greek ballads and national demotic poetry and tradition. It portrays the «hero-image» of a person who fights for a cause or an ideal such as liberty or social justice. In its ideal form, a «pallikar» confronts death itself and only death can bring about the *catharsis* of his soul and of his *agonistic* spirit. For him, the social relations and social solidarity are predicated through a system of social equality in a *gemeinschaft* type communal life. Stratification is conceived only in terms of social honor, social values and deference. His incentive to fight does not derive from gain but from an inner compulsion and moral imperative for something which transcends the «self».

The concept of «*leventis*» is related to the military virtues of physical manliness, stature, graciousness of movement and glamour as well as to the moral

qualities of a magnanimous and brave man. Like «*pallikar*», the person who possesses the quality of *leventia* has something intrinsic and unique about him, an «*air*» which one acquires through training or something potentially there for further development and growth. It is both a product of culture and society as well as character training and is a desirable attribute for those who lead men in peace and war. It is at once a moral and existential quality, something analogous to a chivalrous man. Honor and self-sacrifice for a noble ideal are also ingredients of «*leventia*», a strong belief in the so-called «honorable profession of arms». Furthermore, the «*leventis-image*» depicts a person of pride, self-reliance and inner direction. He too, like «*pallikar*» perceives life on equalitarian terms and in terms of achievement rather than ascription. Following are some direct quotes from the officers themselves:

«The Greek soldier likes the «*leventis*» type, i.e., raiding forces and the recently created marines enjoy a »special esteem and splendour in the Army... The manner of selection of the enlisted man in terms of his »stature, inner pride and physical and manly qualities »are highly esteemed in the Army.»

Another officer recognized the indispensability of the *leventia* in the officer's self-image:

«Even if an officer combines all the professional qualifications, he still must possess the *leventia* image »and the spirit of self-sacrifice. This is especially »true for young tactical military commanders.»

This officer, while granting that an officer must be knowledgeable, still feels that he must be endowed with *leventia* in order to be a «good officer»:

«We are proud people. The officer possesses the »Greek *leventia*... The soldier respects and admires »that type of commander who demonstrates both »qualities of «*leventia*» and «knowledge»... If the soldier thinks of his officer as a man of leather gloves »and a briefcase (meaning the bureaucratic managerial type), he is not impressed and won't follow his »orders in the battlefield.»

In the officer's person, the soldier must see the personification of *leventia*.

The term *philotimo* literally means «one who loves honor» but synecdochically defined, it means dignity, self-esteem, generosity. A person who has *philotimo* is conscientious in his work, a worthy man of zest or zeal who wants to be distinguished. *Philotimo* is what distinguishes a Greek from a non-Greek and a Greek officer from a non-Greek officer. «External coercion (Dorothy Lee, 1953: 81-84) without internal submission has no bearing on the maintenance of *philotimo*», and «warmth within firmness, exuberance within austerity and discipline are also indispensable traits of Greek *philotimo*». Ideally, every Greek must possess it to be a Greek. *Philotimo* finds

its fullest expression in the self-image of the Greek officer. The greater the intensity of one's *philotimo*, the greater the degree of one's Hellenicity. It is on this concept of *philotimo* that the entire network of military relationships between enlisted men, commissioned officers and civilians can be understood and explained. It is also on the *philotimo* quality that an officer perceives himself as fundamentally different from other social groups and professions. In the officer's opinion, when a Greek loses his *philotimo* then he ceases to function as a social and constructive human being. When selfishness and extreme individualism replace altruism and social consciousness, then *philotimo* no longer serves its usefulness. It is this *philotimo* that gives the Greek his uniqueness and his cultural identity and like a control mechanism exerts influence on his character and exhorts him toward self-sacrifice, self-enhancement and self-realization. In the officers' judgement, Greek politicians had lost this quality of *philotimo* and this was one of the reasons which prompted the army to intervene in the political processes, both at present as well as in the past. According to the officers, the military intervention was a crisis of Greek *philotimo*. They felt that if external military coercive power existed without the internal Greek submission that the quality of *philotimo* generates, the military revolution of April, 1967 would have no wide-societal support and would have failed in its genesis. In fact, *philotimo* is what one might call the national Greek character trait.

The *pallikar-leventis-philotimo* syndrome and especially the former two components are most prevalent among the combat arms, especially in the Infantry. One might expect that these attributes are most developed among the younger officers. However, these qualities are not unique only to the military profession but one can find their fullest expression in the military because of the nature of the profession and because of the institutional and personality characteristics of the military man. It must be emphasized that these qualities are closer to the emotional-sentimental side which constitutes the more primitive aspects of human behavior.

Self-Image II: Technologist-Specialist-Managerial Syndrome. The post-World War II era witnessed the development of a new managerial and professional ideology which has affected the Greek military self-image and its officer corps as well. The technologist-specialist-managerial syndrome is the other aspect of the officer's self-image which is equally important especially in light of modern technological and scientific development. From the Balkan Wars up to World War II there existed a strong orientation of military socialization and training in tune with the traditional

and more conventional aspects of self-image and roles which led to certain routine tasks of the military. However, the *pallikar-leventis-philotimo* syndrome self-image was not sufficient for the new technological changes and socio-political and economic realities which had been taking place both within and without the military milieu.

For the contemporary Greek Army to be accorded professional and managerial status and to become an equal, full-fledged NATO partner, a readjustment of its military self-image was necessary. The officer corps had to develop along with the *pallikar-leventis-philotimo* self-image a more rational, organizational and professional self-image.

Despite the fact that the degree of technological and professional sophistication of the military organization reflects the technological and industrial level of society at large, it can be argued that smaller armies (such as Greece's), more than any other social organization, are replicas of larger armies as long as they are attached to supra-national military organizations or pacts—i.e. NATO, SEATO, WARSAW, CENTO, etc. This is especially true of those nations which are considered strategically and militarily attached to such super-powers as the United States and the Soviet Union.

Viewed in this respect and regardless of the industrial/technological level of development of the country concerned, an army with a professional officer corps must follow the model of a larger army. For a military to be accorded professional status, there must be structural and behavioral criteria of professional competence above and beyond national standards. Furthermore, the efficiency and competence of a modern army mirrors both the kind of leadership provided by the officer corps and its technical equipment. One must expect officers of professional armies to acquaint themselves with theories of tactics and strategy, learn the principles of war, and use a modern weaponry system and techniques. In view of the new technological and organizational revolution, the military roles of the officer corps became too complex and differentiated to qualify for professional status. The officer had to master new techniques and readjust his self-image. More rigorous and competitive training and specialized knowledge were needed. The Greek officer could not stand before his men and his contemporaries, military or civilian, without sufficient knowledge in subjects outside of his particular specialty, expertise and general knowledge. Rank and organizational authority along with a war record were not enough to convince the soldier of the indispensability of the military virtues. The military became interrelated with other economic and political institutions. Thus the officer had to learn how his pro-

fession was related to other professions and organizations in the Greek social structure.

That the officers are aware of the need for a larger dimension to their self-image is reflected in their statements. For example, one said that:

«The present officer is more modern (meaning more «educated»). He is not the *Karavana* (involving an «officer who thinks of the messpot and of food only) »type of earlier times; he does not lack anything when »compared with the professional officers of other »countries. The officers are among the best of NATO »and allied schools. The Greek officer has something »of an additional air about him.»⁴

Another officer summarized these changes in a more direct way:

«Up to 1940, the officer was more of a *pallikar* type »and less the managerial/professional type... the nature of modern military warfare and technology »changed the training of the officer corps...»

While the officer has readjusted his self-image from a *pallikar-leventis-philotimo* type to a more technologist-specialist-managerial type, it must be emphasized that the Greek officer has not lost his traditional «heroic» qualities. Both elements are present in a new fusion of military virtues and professional competence. Most of the officers felt that not only are these qualities present in the senior army officer whose military virtues were tested in the battlefield, but they are also found among the younger army officers although in a more latent stage. It is perhaps the social and cultural values and traditions which reflect a self-image of the military vis-a-vis the image of civilian society.

Managerial and technological trends and developments naturally had an effect on the military profession and organization. One might hypothesize that because some nations have not reached high levels of industrialization and managerial development, their armies are expected to retain the «heroic» qualities. Especially, those nations occupying a low or semi-developed industrial and managerial status. Despite the fact that Greece is considered a Western nation, the suggestion can be made that it occupies an intermediate position of industrial development and one should expect its army to retain its «heroic» qualities.

There are also geographic, historic and strategic factors which cannot be altered and in this sense, the army and its officer corps cannot be completely transformed to a technological type army. The combined type is the most prevalent self-image in the contemporary Greek Army Officer Corps. The fusion or synthesis of the two is also reflected in the officers' quotes.

«The heroic is present in the Greek officer but it is »enriched by us—the younger officers—who have enhanced and brightened the *pallikar-leventis* image »more prevalent of the older officer, with more edu-

»cation and training. The soldier of earlier times preferred the *leventis* type and the heroic fighter while »the present ones prefer that type of officer who combines both the heroic and the managerial...»

Another officer perceives his role in this manner:

«Knowledge is absolutely indispensable for the officer »for his responsibilities are many. Knowledge is intertwined with life and death. We are undergoing a »change. We are engaged in continuous study and »research. But the heroic type has not disappeared »from the self-image of the Greek officer; neither will »it in the future under any development of the army. »The war is won 75 per cent of the time by psychical »and moral power and 25 per cent by material means. »You must have a heart to effectively use the means: »the military commander has to make decisions. Such »types made the revolution; they combined both professional competence as well as the heroic qualities...»

One theme prevails through all the interviews with the army officers—namely, that the most desirable self-image of the Greek army officer is the one which maintains an equilibrium between the emotional, *pallikar-leventis-philotimo* elements and the rational, specialist-professional-managerial. There is a fusion of the two rather than a division. However, to what extent are these attributes present in the army officers? Or what is the ratio of heroic vs. managerial in the mixed type cannot be ascertained. Answers may only be inferred from the officers' responses, interpretations and judgements. Whether there is a discrepancy between the prescriptive and descriptive self-image is not only an empirical question but a normative issue as well.

Organization and later the professionalization of the Greek military were not indigenous phenomena. From the middle of the 19th century to that of the 20th century, a succession of Italian, French, British and American military advisers and missions left their marks on the Greek military. Analogous developments can be observed in the armies of the emerging nations.

In certain aspects the training of the Greek officer is similar to the American professional military model. However, the Greek officer feels that his training and education are more diversified than that of his American counterpart. He perceives himself as professionally competent both in his own specialized branch and in other branches of the military. This is understandable since both the Greek military and social structure at large have not yet reached the high level of specialization and division of labor characteristic of a more highly differentiated, industrial society. It is also a matter of economics. Being only semi-developed, Greece, occupying an intermediate level of industrial development, cannot afford to have a highly «specialized» army and officer corps. One officer remarked, «Over-specialization is a luxury and is not a substitute for military leadership.» This, however,

does not imply that the Greek officer perceives himself as less competent professionally than his American or NATO counterpart. In fact the Greek officer believes that he has greater flexibility and ability, especially in matters of military strategy and tactics. This belief is attributed to Greece's strategic and geopolitical position and the officer's experience in both conventional and non-conventional combat.

The officer's chances for promotion are regulated by a rigid system of educational military screening, something not prevalent in Greek civilian society. In the latter nepotism and *enoiocracy* (favoritism) frequently have been the determining factors for advancement. Promotion is easier and faster in larger armies due to the need arising from vacancies and the greater specialization of officer personnel.

Military professionalization in Greece is based on an elaborate system of professional education. Service academies are modeled after the United States academies and represent the basic professional socialization of the cadets. Upon graduation from the service academy, the cadet is commissioned as a second lieutenant and is sent to a specialized military school. The apex of military professional education is the War College and the School of National Defense. There, a highly selective and competent group of officers are prepared for future leadership roles in the military. Needless to say, professional military education is predicated on a rigorous and competitive system of examinations both in terms of recruitment and admission as well as military training and educational standards. The objectives in these professional schools are to develop flexibility of mind, foster initiative, cultivate critical judgement and acquaint future military leaders with crucial issues in Greek society. The American military supplies the Greek army with both professional «ethos» and technical equipment. And in the words of many officers: «The Greek officer lacks nothing in terms of his professional competence when compared to his NATO counterpart.»

correlates of professional self-images

The aforementioned types of professional self-images can be related to selective social backgrounds and career characteristics. In this section of the study the *Pallikar-Leventis-Philotimo* self-image syndrome will be referred to simply as «heroic» and the specialist-technologist-managerial as «managerial».

The cumulative table shown below is based on the empirical data derived from the personal interviews with the one-hundred officers.

Urban-Rural Continuum. No strong relationship exists between the officer's place of birth and his perception of a professional self-image. There is little

or no relationship between an officer's rural background and his self-perception of the «heroic» image. Whether he comes from a rural or urban background, the officer tends to perceive himself as a «mixed professional» type. Thus 55 per cent of those with an urban background, 53 per cent with a rural background and 36 per cent with a semi-urban background were of the mixed type. This finding might thus lead one to hypothesize that the ideology and professional socialization of the army officer corps transform the officer to a similar style of life and self-image regardless of his urban /semi-urban /rural background.

Region. Regional origin of the officers and their professional self-images are related to the officers from Southern and Central Greece. For Northern Greece and the Islands, there is no difference in the officer's self-perception. Thus, officers from Southern Greece were found to be 31 per cent managerial, 18 per cent heroic and 51 per cent combined or of the mixed or combined type. Of the officers who came from Central Greece, 41 per cent were found to be of the mixed type, 12 per cent managerial and 47 per cent heroic. On the other hand, officers from Northern Greece were equally distributed among the three types, whereas the islanders were divided between the «managerial» and «mixed types».

Age. The older the officer is, the more likely he is to perceive himself as the «heroic» type. The younger officers are more likely to perceive themselves as the «managerial» type. Thus, in the 50-55 age category 14 per cent were «managerial», 50 per cent «heroic» and 36 per cent of the «mixed types». In the age categories ranging from 38 to 43 and 44 to 49, the concentration was mainly in the «mixed type». Although within each age group the percentages of officers who identified as heroic types were the same, there were differences in the percentages of officers who classified themselves as «managerial». Lastly, 55 per cent of those in the age group 35 to 37 perceived themselves as managerial, 8 per cent as heroic and 37 per cent were mixed.

Rank. There is a relationship between rank and the mixed professional self-image. Approximately 50 per cent of the generals were of the managerial type. The remainder was equally distributed between heroic and mixed types. Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels and Majors tended to view themselves as mixed types. Thirty-five per cent of the majors were managerial, 19 per cent heroic and 46 per cent mixed. Among Lieutenant Colonels, 21 per cent perceived themselves as managerial, 24 per cent as heroic and 55 per cent as mixed. For colonels, the distribution was 39 per cent heroic, 46 per cent mixed and 15 per cent managerial. It is

Table 1. Types of Professional Self-Images by Selective Social Background Characteristics

Selected Social Background Characteristics	Percentages of Army Officers Who Were:				
	Man.	Heroic	Mixed	Total	(N) ¹
Place of Birth: ²					
Urban	27	18	55	100	(22)
Semi-Urban	35	29	36	100	(37)
Rural	27	20	53	100	(41)
Region: ³					
Southern	31	18	51	100	(61)
Central	12	47	41	100	(17)
Northern	33.3	33.3	33.4	100	(12)
Islands	50	—	50	100	(8)
Not Ascertained	50	—	50	100	(2)
Age:					
50-55	14	50	36	100	(14)
44-49	26	24	50	100	(29)
38-43	35	19	46	100	(46)
35-37	55	8	37	100	(11)
Rank:					
Generals ⁴	50	25	25	100	(4)
Colonels	15	39	46	100	(13)
Lt. Colonels	21	24	55	100	(29)
Majors	35	19	46	100	(54)
Arms: ⁵					
General	50	25	25	100	(4)
Infantry	26	19	55	100	(51)
Artillery	25	38	37	100	(16)
Armor	10	20	70	100	(10)
Engineers	40	20	40	100	(5)
Signals	63	13	24	100	(8)
Supply & Transportation Corps	33	17	50	100	(6)
Combat Experience:					
Combat Experience	25	25	50	100	(67)
Non-Combat Experience	42	9	49	100	(33)
Higher Military Education:					
War College Graduate	18	37	45	100	(38)
Non-War College Graduate	37	23	40	100	(62)

table 1. continued

Foreign Language: Fluency in at least one language	57	14	29	100	(7)
Some Language Competence	45	18	37	100	(40)
Little or None	16	34	50	100	(44)
Not Ascertained	20	45	35	100	(9)
What Makes the Military Different:					
Military Qualities or Virtues	12	27	61	100	(33)
Institutional Values and Qualities	37	20	43	100	(60)
Institutional Superiority Organization	42	29	29	100	(7)
Career Motivation:					
Family and Friends	29	29	42	100	(21)
Social Values	28	22	50	100	(72)
Personal Advancement	58	14	28	100	(7)
Primary Qualities of a Good Officer:					
Ethics and Character	21	22	57	100	(73)
Managerial, Technical Skills	51	26	23	100	(27)

1. Number of cases in which percentages are based given in parentheses.
2. *Urban*: All the cities with a population of 50,000 or over; *semi-urban*: 5,000 to 50,000 population and *rural*: 5,000 and below.
3. *Southern Greece* includes: Peloponnese, Crete, Attica and greater Athens, Sterea Greece and Euboea; *Central Greece* refers to Thessaly only; *Northern Greece* includes Macedonia, Epirus and Thrace and the *Islands* refer to the Ionian and Aegean Seas.
4. Generals are not differentiated by arms or services. At the time this study was conducted there was only a three star general. Recently, a four star general was introduced in all the branches of the armed forces.
5. The army includes the five combat arms (infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, and signals) including the raiding forces and the marines and the services (i.e. technical, economic, medical, supply and transportation, etc.).

from this group of middle-ranking officers that the present military regime draws its support.

Arms. One might expect that the type of arm or service an officer belongs to does influence his perceptions and professional self-image. Thus, the infantry officer, being in a branch which sees more combat than the others, might be expected to perceive of himself as more the heroic type. However, this is not so. Among infantry officers, 26 per cent classified themselves as managerial, 19 per cent as heroic and 55 per cent as mixed. Among artillery officers 25 per cent were managerial, 38 per cent heroic and 37 per cent mixed types. The signal corps officers perceived themselves more of the managerial type and the supply and transportation officers more of a mixed type.

Combat Experience. Whether an officer had combat experience had no effect on those who perceived of themselves as mixed. However, it does make a difference among those officers who perceive of themselves as managerial and heroic types. Among those officers with combat experience, 25 per cent were managerial, 25 per cent heroic and 50 per cent mixed. Somewhat different were the self-images of those who had no combat experience. Forty-two per cent were managerial, 9 per cent heroic and 49 per cent mixed.

Higher Military Education: War College. Whether an officer is a War College graduate has no bearing if he identifies as mixed but it does make a difference for managerial and heroic types. Among the War College graduates, 18 per cent were managerial, 37 per

cent heroic and 45 per cent mixed types; and those who were not graduates of the War College were found to be 37 per cent managerial, 23 per cent heroic and 40 per cent mixed types.

Foreign Language. Speaking a foreign language does have a positive effect on the officer's professional self-image. For instance, more than half of those who were fluent in at least one foreign language tended to be of the managerial type, whereas only 16 per cent of those who had little or no knowledge of a foreign language could be classified as managerial. Even those who reported some language competence as compared with those who reported little or none tended to be of the managerial type. Thus, among the former, 45 per cent belonged to the managerial type while 18 per cent were heroic. Although the knowledge of a foreign language widens the officer's professional perspective, it does not, however, make him less ethnocentric.

What Makes the Military Different? Military qualities or virtues as well as institutional qualities or values differentiate the military from other social institutions. This is especially true for those officers who perceived themselves as mixed types. Thus, 12 per cent of those who reported military qualities or virtues as reasons which differentiate the military from other social institutions were of managerial type, 27 per cent of the heroic and 61 per cent of the mixed types. Thirty-seven per cent of those who mentioned institutional qualities or values as the differentiating factors was managerial, 20 per cent heroic and 43 per cent mixed types. And of those who mentioned institutional superiority of organization, 42 per cent was managerial, 29 per cent heroic and 29 per cent mixed.

Career Motivation. The choice of one's profession or a commitment to a career is influenced by one's social values. Some are motivated by material values in their choice of career, others by such social values as prestige or ideals. No matter how an officer perceives his professional self-images, the mixed types superceded both the heroic and managerial types. For those who reported family and friends as the main influences for career choice, 29 per cent were of managerial type, 29 per cent of the heroic and 42 per cent of the mixed type. Of those who mentioned social values as the main career motivation, 28 per cent were managerial, 22 per cent heroic and 50 per cent mixed types. Among those reporting personal advancement, 58 per cent belonged to the managerial type, 14 per cent to the heroic and 28 per cent were of the mixed type.

Primary Qualities of a Good Officer. From the Greek officer's point of view, a «good officer» must possess

more qualities than a professional man in the civilian sense of the term.⁵ Of those officers who reported ethics and character as the most important qualities of a good officer, 21 per cent belonged to the managerial type, 22 per cent to the heroic and 57 per cent to the mixed types, while of those officers who mentioned managerial and technical skills as the primary qualities of a good officer, 51 per cent were managerial, 26 per cent heroic and 23 per cent mixed types.

Social Class Background. Table 2 pertains to the relationship between the occupational or class background of the officer's father and the officer's own attitudes toward professional self-images.

The father's occupation and social class make no great difference as to an officer's professional self-image. Since a majority of the officers were identified with the mixed type of professional self-image, neither the father's occupation nor social class was an influential factor. One notices, however, that those whose fathers were either military career officers or owners of small farms held identical professional self-images. Those officers whose fathers were small businessmen viewed themselves as the least heroic.

We may say that professional self-images among the Greek army officers were perceived in terms of interdependent types of self-images or dimensions of managerial, heroic, and mixed types of professionalism. It is possible for the same officer to combine «managerial» as well as «heroic» qualities irrespective of his social or career characteristics. However, self-images do not necessarily reflect actuality. Ideal types are not empirical realities but rather useful abstract devices for analytical purposes. Given the professional self-images and their social correlates of the career officers, what then are their political orientation? In the following section, an effort is made to describe and analyze the officer's political perspectives.

Table 2. Occupational Background of Officers' Fathers and the Officers' Attitudes Toward Professional Self-Images

Father's Occupational Background	Percentages of Army Officers Who Were:			
	Managerial	Heroic	Mixed	N=100
Middle-Class:				
Military Career Officer	22	22	56	100 (18)
Adm. Professional, Technical and High Status White Collar	31	31	38	100 (16)
Other White Collar and Proprietors of Small Businesses	38	16	46	100 (32)
Working Class:				
Owners and Operators of a Small Farm	25	22	53	100 (32)
Skilled and Unskilled or Semi-Skilled & Blue Collar Worker	—	100	—	100 (2)

political perspectives

Professor Janowitz in his path-breaking study of the American military professionals states: «The analysis of the social origins of the military is a powerful key to understanding of its political logic, although no elite behaves simply on the basis of its social origin...» (Janowitz, 1960: 81). On the other hand, the late C. Wright Mills in his highly provoking and criticized book argues that (Mills, 1959: 192) «Social origins and early background are less important to the character of the professional military than any other high social type.» How applicable are these almost contradictory statements in the Greek military? Are social origins, professional self-images and career characteristics related to political attitudes in the Greek military?

The Greek army officer professes to be «above politics». To be «above politics», Professor Janowitz claims, an officer must be non-partisan on political issues. Being above politics in Greece does not mean that the officer corps is «apolitical». Consequently, whenever a challenge was raised as to the legitimacy of civilian control of the military or political institutions were incapable of mediating between social groups, the military felt justified in intervening in order to correct and to reorient the political order. It has been suggested (Huntington, 1968: 194) that in societies where politics lack autonomy, complexity, coherence and adaptability, all types of social groups and institutions become directly engaged in general politics. Countries which have political armies also have political labor unions, political clerics, political bureaucracies, etc. To some extent this was true in Greece before the recent military intervention. In other words, the Greek military acted merely as one of the general politicizing social forces and institutions.

Historically, the political allegiance of the officer corps from 1915 on was divided between Republicans and Royalists. After World War II, the officer's allegiance to the king was based primarily on anti-communist sentiment rather than on any loyalty to the traditional legitimacy and authority of the monarchy. The latter was found to be especially true among the junior and middle-ranking officers. Events in post World War II in the form of the communist movement and insurrection in Greece from 1944 to the early 1950's led to the development of a strong anti-communist ideology among the officers. It is this generation of officers which fought and defeated the communists and which is now in power in Greece.

The most frequent reasons that were given by the officers as a rationale for the military intervention into the political and social processes of Greece on April 21, 1967 were communist threat, political decay

and incompetence and moral/social degeneration of society at large. Table 3 below shows the attitudes of the officers toward the recent intervention in politics and their professional self-images.

Table 3. Percentages of Attitudes Toward Intervention and Professional Self-Images of Career Army Officers

Attitudes Toward Intervention Due To:	Managerial	Heroic	Mixed	(N)*
Communist Threat	26	24	50	100 (80)
Political Decay & Incompetence	28	26	46	100 (75)
Moral/Social Decay	17	22	61	100 (23)

* Total adds up to more than 100 per cent since some of the officers gave more than one reason for intervention.

In the present context interventionism is given to mean the factors leading to political intervention, that is, communist threat, political decay and incompetence and social/moral decay of society at large. It has been suggested (Huntington, 1958: 77) that professionalism is a deterrent to military intervention in politics.⁶ On the other hand it has been argued (Finer, 1962: 25-30) that the «principle of civil supremacy» and not «military professionalism» is an inhibiting factor of military intervention in politics. In the Greek case, the latter was found to be true.⁷ There was no relationship found between professionalism and non-interventionism in the Greek case. Since factors were interrelated, any one of them could provoke a national crisis which would generate a feeling of fear or a mood of uneasiness within the ranks of the officer corps. Therefore, whether the officer perceived himself as the managerial, heroic or the mixed type professional, he was likely to favor political intervention if these factors were present.

In the decades following World War II the officers were alarmed by what they regarded as the failure of Greek politicians to understand the real motives of the communists. This political miscalculation, they contended, led to guerrilla activities between 1946-1949. The territorial integrity and security of Greece were and still are threatened by communist subversion. Despite the fact that the Communist Party was outlawed after World War II, it was looked upon by the officers as the most organized minority other than the military.

In 1963, the majority of the officers saw the ascent to power of the Centrist Union Party as a threat to national security. In addition, the officers believed that the politicians were more intent upon promoting their own interest than the public interest. Politicians, the officers claimed, had sacrificed national interest to political expediency. Further, that the old politicians did not hesitate to collaborate with the extreme left. On the other hand, the officer corps

saw itself as placing the national interest above all things; therefore, officers were concerned about Greece's over all social, economic, and political development.⁸ From the officers' point of view, Greek *philotimo* was abandoned by the Greek politicians. Since the latter had become corrupt, only the army remained as a healthy social organization in Greek society.

According to the officers, the old political world was bankrupt and incapable of comprehending the new social realities in Greece. For example, political parties were unable to distinguish between a semi-developed nation and one which was emerging in the developmental tradition of Western Europe. Further, the country needed new leadership to unify the Greeks and to chart a new course for social, political and economic development. The officers felt that political chaos and factionalism were responsible for the recurrent crises in the 1960's and that only they were capable of preventing civil war.

Democracy, the officers claimed, had been debased in modern Greece and had become a slogan for political expediency. In the words of many officers: «In Greece, we cannot apply the ideal form of democracy. As an ideal, democracy is fine but the way it »was being practiced here in Greece, it had the stamp »of profit, self-interest, expediency, and oligarchical »tendencies.»

The officers contended that democracy implies able people who are social minded and responsible and believe in a social mission and self-denial. How could democracy emerge in a system operated by corrupt, self-serving politicians they asked?

Career Satisfaction and Disappointment. Political disenchantment of the officers was also reflected in their responses to the queries: «What was your chief career satisfaction and conversely, what was your chief career disappointment?»

Career satisfaction reflects not only an officer's self-image but the way others think of him as well.

Table 4. Officers' Attitudes Toward Career Satisfaction and Professional Self-Images

Chief Career Satisfaction	Managerial	Heroic	Mixed	(N)
April 21, 1967 (Day of the military intervention)	26	32	42	100 (50)
Other	32	14	54	100 (50)

Table 5. Officers' Attitudes Toward Career Disappointment and Professional Self-Images

Disappointment	Managerial	Heroic	Mixed	(N)
Political or Societal	31	21	48	100 (61)
Personal or Career	28	17	55	100 (18)
None	24	33	43	100 (21)

Of those who reported that April 21, 1967, the day of the revolution, was their chief career satisfaction, 42 per cent was of the mixed type while 32 per cent was heroic and 26 per cent managerial. Those mentioning something other than April 21, 1967 as their chief career satisfaction were more of the mixed and managerial and less of the heroic type with 54, 32 and 14 percentages respectively. Among those officers who reported political or societal factors as their main career disappointment, 31 per cent was managerial, 21 per cent heroic, and 48 per cent mixed. Of those with personal or career disappointments, 28 per cent belonged to the managerial type, 17 per cent to the heroic and 55 per cent were mixed. Among those who claimed no career disappointment, 24 per cent was managerial, 33 per cent heroic and 43 per cent mixed.

Since factionalism had been a characteristic of the Greek political parties or political grouping, the officers felt that they had no other choice but to intervene. They believed that it was within their mission to intervene and thus to prevent bipolarization.⁹ Moreover, the ideological commitment of the officers increased as that of the political parties declined. The officers felt that as long as the Greek politicians were incapable of achieving consensus on public issues and at the same time remain strongly anti-communist, the army would have to intervene.¹⁰ This was expressed by a majority of officers irrespective of their professional self-images. The officers argued that it was the most managerial, professional and heroic officers who had brought about the revolution of April 21, 1967.

Although the officers are strongly anti-communist and critical of the politicians, they are not strongly pro-royalist. A majority of those who were interviewed were either ambivalent or hostile toward the young king who attempted the abortive counter-coup on December 13, 1967. The Greek officer, like Greek society, is bound neither to a feudal nor to an aristocratic tradition. The institution of monarchy had been imported from Bavaria and Denmark and had not always enjoyed wide-societal support or popularity even among the officers.

If one places the officers on a conservative-liberal continuum, we can see that their conservatism is one of form rather than of substance. In Greece, however, it is unlikely that one can apply the Western European or American model of political conservatism. By his training, the officer respects not just law and order but social justice as well. These are, he feels, the most desirable qualities for an organized and democratic society. Consequently, despite the stratification and bureaucratization of the military organization, we may not ignore the fact that the army is a prototype of a *koinovion* or communal living in the Byzantine sense of the word. The officer's conservative orientation is more cultural than political.

He is neither a reactionary nor against social change. He respects such Greek traditions and social values as family solidarity, religion and ethnic consciousness which had long sustained a national «ethos» and had contributed to the survival of Greece as a nation. The officer sees modernity and tradition as complementary and interdependent. Whether young or old, he is an advocate of and contributor to the modernization of Greek society. At the same time he upholds those traditional forms which he feels are germane to the maintenance of cultural continuity and national existence.

The officer believes that the army is the embodiment of national ideals, identity and consciousness, and that throughout Greek history, the army and officer corps have become the symbol of national aspirations, dreams, and realities. Greek history, in the opinion of the officers, is an unfolding drama. The army and officer corps are integral parts of that history. The army and the modern Greek nation and its history are inseparable. All three, in the words of the chief of the Armed Forces are: «A testament of Greece's struggles and sacrifices, its epics and tragedies, its triumphs and its failures, its exaltations and falls...» (An address by Lieutenant General Angelis, General Chief of Staff.)

The officer's self-image and political orientation convey an underlying element of puritanism—a religious and moral certainty. Officers feel that they represent and live by a set of superior social values. To them the military profession is the repository of Greco-Christian ideals. This attitude is reflected in most of their political ideology. Officers expressed their feelings about puritanism in the following manner:

«The officer is popular; he represents the 'real Greek'.
»The revolution spoke to the hearts of the Greeks.
»The officer commands souls and dies in the fire;
»his profession is unique.» Another officer explained
»it in this way: «Every anti-social act or conduct
»by one officer reflects on the entire officer corps. We
»are like a big family—an integral part of society—
»our entire career is based on a strict code of ethics
»and decency both written and unwritten. We are
»watched and are visible. The ethical qualifications
»play the most important factor in our career advancement.» And still another officer put it in this manner: «Due to his mission, the officer must abide
»to a high ethical code. He makes no compromises
»with his conscience. Whatever he does is visible
»to everyone. Society expects him to possess a high
»moral code, to be the incarnation of the ideal.»

Morality is closely related to certain religious values. Both the army and the church are national institutions. The sword and cross have had strong symbolic value in Greece since the Byzantine era. It is not by accident that the armed forces are mentioned

in the liturgy of the Greek Orthodox Church. Both institutions perceive themselves as the guardians of Greek ideals and traditions. The national flag as well as the flags of the armed forces bear the cross. During national holidays and military celebrations, military leaders stand next to church dignitaries on reviewing stands. Both the civilian draftee and the professional soldier take their oath in the name of country and church. As one officer said,

«The army is the repository of the Greco-Christian
»ideals and principles. From the very early professional
»socialization, the officer is nourished with such values
»and ideals as faith in country, God and family honor.»

A majority of those interviewed believes that the role of the Greek military is substantially different from Western armies. This difference stems from more than social factors. It also derives from geopolitical, strategic and historical factors and from the hostility of neighbors, communist and non-communist. Moreover, such recent developments as the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, the war between Israel and Egypt, student unrest in Europe, the United States and elsewhere and the presence of the Russian fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean were cited by officers as evidence of the importance of Greece and its army for the defense of the West. These regional developments and political unrest in Greece generated a mood of uneasiness in the military and prompted the army's intervention in April, 1967.

Although the roles and objectives of all Western armies are similar within NATO, the Greek officers felt that their role is even greater and more tangible because of Greece's actual experience as the near-victim of communist aggression. Since the military is to defend the country from external and internal enemies, the communist threat, whether actual or potential, was a chief reason for the military's intervention.

The Greek army is based on universal male conscription, equality of treatment and meritocracy. It is, therefore, less prone to civilian political corruption, nepotism and expediency. Because Greece and the army do not have aristocratic or feudal pasts in the Western European sense, social class and background characteristics are de-emphasized in the Greek army. Irrespective of rank and years in service, the officers argued that they are more in agreement on national issues than are their civilian counterparts. Greek officers perceive of themselves as performing an important mission. They see themselves as idealistic, politically sensitive, social minded and more dedicated to Greece's destiny than are the civilian political counterparts. No Greek officer saw his professional military role merely as a means of earning a livelihood. Nor did he choose the army as his career solely for reasons of economic values and

incentives. Greece's army is national, institutional, and professional. Its political ideology reflects those aspects of national culture and of the social and political history of modern Greece—national salvation, morality, and an anti-communist crusade which have sustained Greece as a nation.

conclusion

In conclusion, one can only speculate on the significance and implications of some of the key findings not only for the Greek Army Officer Corps and its relationship to the modern Greek social structure but also for the study of other army officer corps and their role in social and political change in general. Greek army officers did not perceive 'managerial' qualities as superseding 'heroic' attributes for military leadership and 'good officership'. Despite the fact that the army officer corps is continually readjusting itself to fit into the Western European and NATO technological, professional and managerial model, it is very unlikely that it will abandon its 'heroic' self-image and orientation in the near future. Thus, one could tentatively suggest the hypothesis that those countries which occupy a tangible geopolitical and strategic position in the international arena of politics (i.e. Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean), their armies and their cadre, will tend to maintain their 'heroic' qualities.

Our findings which indicate no significant relationship between social and regional backgrounds and the political and professional perspectives of Greek army officers provide further empirical evidence to a contention of many observers of the Greek scene that the Greek social structure is not attached to any feudal or aristocratic tradition in the Western European sense and therefore social class and social origins are de-emphasized in the Greek Army Officer Corps. This raises the question as to the aristocratic vs. democratic model of social inequality in the social structure and its military organization in particular. Furthermore, this finding has implications for the study of social change in those societies which are in the process of transition and democratization. One can hypothesize that professionalization of the army officer corps operates as a deterrent in diminishing social class differentials and thus provides and encourages an egalitarian ideology for the social structure based on criteria of achievement rather than those of ascription.

Increasing 'professionalism' (Finer, 1960), or irrespective of the officer's professional self-image and orientation, does not reduce the propensity or capability of the military to intervene in the political and social processes. In Greece, the political influence of the Greek military grew concurrently with its increas-

ing organization and professional status, and effectiveness. Professional self-images and orientation varies within a given military organization in time and space.

In countries where armies have not accepted the 'principle of civil supremacy' in politics due to the inability of the political parties and institutions to chart a coherent program of political, social and economic change, the latter lose their legitimacy to rule and the military is prompted to intervene into politics in order to correct and re-orient political order. Whether such an intervention by the military into politics will redirect the political and social change in Greece is a matter not only of further empirical investigation but it is a normative issue as well.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ordinarily the term 'military' refers to all branches of the Armed Forces—Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. In this study however, the term military refers to the Army alone and the article is based on data collected from interviews with career Army officers.

The data reported in this study were gathered from personal interviews with a stratified sample of one-hundred career army officers and included officers with the rank of major to that of general. These officers were selected from the official listing of the Greek Army Corps of career officers which was made available by the Statistical Service of Greek Army Headquarters. An interview schedule was used which included questions concerning professional self-images, career and social background characteristics, and political perspectives of the officers. The interviews were conducted in the winter months of 1968-1969.

2. Very often the concept of 'professionalism' is used interchangeably with the process of 'professionalization'. See, for example, Huntington, 1968: 7-18; Strauss, 1963: 7-9; Kornhauser, 1962 and 1967. For an analysis of military 'professionalism' as an 'ascriptive' concept see Feld, 1966: 55-70. For a distinction between 'professionalism' as an ideology and 'professionalization' as a process see Vollmer, 1964; Vollmer and Mills, 1966; Hall, 1967—Paper read at the American Sociological Association, also 1969: 70-91. For pertinent studies also see *Archives European Journal of Sociology*, Tome VI, No. 2 (1965) and Jacques Van Doorn, 1968.

3. The construction of the typology of the officers' professional self-images was based on Professor Janowitz' typology of managerial/professional vs. heroic self-images of the American professional officers. While Janowitz' typology was useful as a guideline, it was only partially applicable to the Greek case. The subsequent description and analysis of the typology was based on empirical and historic data concerning the self-images of the military profession and its relationship to the Greek social structure. Some of the pertinent questions asked were: 'Do you think that the professional orientation of the Greek career officer is undergoing a transformation from that of the 'heroic' to that of the 'managerial' self-image?' 'Looking ahead twenty years from now, what trends do you see for the Greek military profession?' 'Do you think that most soldiers would like to serve under a man who never had combat experience?'

4. This additional air is the officer's national pride in his country, his glorious history and culture in which he feels he has a special mission to fulfill—that of defending his country at all costs.

5. An evaluation sheet of officer's desirable traits lists six main prerequisites of personal charismatic and professional qualifications of a good officer (Antigraphon Diadohikon Simio-seon Axiomatikon—An Evaluation Sample Sheet for the Officer, 1965). In order of importance, these qualities were: a) Ethical and psychic qualities including 19 items of criteria of military virtues (decisiveness, steadfastness, courage, discretion, initiative, honesty, sincerity, justice, responsibility, discipline, co-operativeness), b) Command and leadership qualities (personal ability, effectiveness authority, judgement, general posture, primary group relations with subordinates, *esprit de corps*, managerial ability), c) Professional competence or expertise (this included items such as professional competence in one's particular rank, competence for further development, general knowledge, technical competence, educational ability, ability to absorb new developments, methods, zeal, interest and a spirit of uneasiness of his service, effort to improve his professional knowledge, diverse experience and ability in administrative, organizational staff assignments and in education and the ability to carry it out with skill, efficiency, speed and constructive professional work), d) Health and bodily qualities, e) Other qualifications or disqualifications were also included, concerning the officer's personality characteristics, the quality of his family life, the kinds of relationships with his fellow officers and in general his attitudes toward his profession and the military institution. It will be sufficient to mention some of the questions included in this category: Does the officer show superior intelligence regarding his obligations? Is he faithful to the legitimate authority? Does he demonstrate dedication to his duty? Is he modest? Does he show a tendency of partisanship? Is he an egoist? Is he superficial? Is he an activist? Is he an alcoholic? Is he a good family man? and f) Combat experience.

6. However, in more recent writings (Huntington, 1968: 198) Professor Huntington argues that the most important cause of military intervention into politics is not military but political decay, the institutional character and the social structure in general.

7. The recent military intervention on April 21, 1967 is not the only intervention into politics by the military. In the past, the military intervened whenever the political elites were in political dissension and disarray and in times of internal political strife and social upheaval. For example, in the 20th century, the military has intervened in 1909, 1922, 1925, 1933, 1935, and 1936.

8. Similar observations have been made concerning this point by a number of social scientists (Finer, 1960: 23-71 and Janowitz, 1964: 63-74).

9. Both in the past and present, the military in Greece views itself as a unifying social force in Greek social and political structure insofar as its ideology aims at national unity and against bipolarization in the political spectrum. It seems that the military as a national, effective, and cohesive institution is capable of rallying wide-social support by appealing to the national sentiments and the *philotimo* of the Greeks especially in times of national crises.

10. There was the belief among the officers and by a large segment of the Greek civilian population that some politicians were soft or fellow travelers with the communists in order to achieve their political aims. In addition, some officers were disenchanted with the top military leadership and the king because of favoritism and other improprieties regarding the careers of certain officers.

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