Conflict in a peacekeeping organization: UNFICYP

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An analysis of the formal organization of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Arguing that it is in the comprehension of external and internal sources of conflict that much of the underlying structure of UNFICYP is revealed, the author has used the conflict framework as the interpretative variable. This framework is defined as the ascertainment of «the kinds of differentiation within an organization and the examination of the amount and types of conflict deriving from these internal cleavages». This assessment is then evaluated in terms of its application to mono-national military organizations. [J. Chernoff]

On March 4, 1964, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution which recommended the establishment of an international force to keep the peace in Cyprus. The eastern Mediterranean island-republic was in a state of virtual civil war as fighting broke out between its Greek and Turkish communities. The first units of the United Nations Force in Cyprus—UNFICYP—arrived on the island three weeks later. A new episode in the chequered history of international peacekeeping forces was about to begin.¹

The mission of UNFICYP (pronounced «OON feh sip») defined by the 1964 Security Council resolution was «...to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions».² Subsequent semi-annual resolutions passed by the Security Council have kept the United Nations Force in Cyprus in being through the time of this writing (summer, 1970). Although the basic dispute between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus has remained unresolved, UNFICYP has made positive progress in its primary task of pacifying the Cypriot inter-communal war. UNFICYP, moreover, has also made a substantial contribution in restoring Cyprus to conditions of normal order and stability. In at least these respects, the United Nations Force in Cyprus contrasted favorably with other U.N. peacekeeping forces in the Congo and Middle East. The Secretary General has thus been able with accuracy to term UNFICYP a «successful» peacekeeping operation.³


the organization of UNFICYP

UNFICYP had a total strength in 1970 of approximately 3,700 persons: 3,500 military personnel, and 200 civilian staff. (See appendices 1 and 2 for an organizational chart of UNFICYP, and a breakdown of constituent units by nationality.) The civilian side consisted of an official staff of about ten persons: the Special Representative to the Secretary General, political and legal advisors, an administrative section, and a public information office. These U.N. civilian officials were serving indeterminate tours in Cyprus. About another 20 or so persons on routine U.N. field service tours acted as secretaries or drivers to the civilian staff. Another civilian component of the U.N. presence in Cyprus were the 175 police officers who made up the United Nations Civilian Police (UN CIVPOL). Drawn in almost equal numbers from Australia, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden, UN CIVPOL performed liaison functions between the police forces of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

It was the military side, however, which was by far and away the numerically dominant component of UNFICYP and which gave the United Nations presence in Cyprus its distinguishing quality. The bulk of the military personnel were found in six national contingents, each consisting of approximately 500 officers and men. These national contingents were drawn from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Ireland, and Sweden: respectively referred to as Cancon, Dancon, Fincon, Britcon, Ircon, and Swedcon. Each of the national contingents was charged with responsibility for a specific region of Cyprus. Depending on the locale of their deployment, the national contingents performed duties such as: guarding «Green Lines» (i.e. de facto borders between Greek and Turkish communities within cities); manning outposts—«O.P.'s»—on the edge of Turkish enclaves in the countryside; patrolling both Greek and Turkish Cypriot areas to monitor military movements and buildups, and supervising daily automobile convoys of Greek civilians through Turkish-controlled areas.

Each of the six national contingents were all similar in their being organized along the lines of reduced infantry battalions. They also shared in common a six-month tour of duty in Cyprus. There were, however, major differences between the national contingents in their recruitment and formation. Britcon and Cancon were ongoing integral military units composed entirely of regular career soldiers. Such units as the «Pompadours» of Great Britain and the «Black Watch» of Canada were made up of men who had soldiered together before coming to Cyprus and would presumably continue to do so afterwards. Dancon, Fincon, and Swedcon, on the other hand, were formed specifically for UNFICYP duty and were demobilized after their tour (to be replaced by another ad hoc unit). Moreover, the Scandinavian contingents consisted—except for senior officers—of reservists who had taken a temporary break in their civilian pursuits to volunteer for UNFICYP duty. The Irish contingents followed yet another pattern. Like the other English-speaking contingents, Ircon consisted of career regular soldiers, but like the Scandinavian contingents, it was an ad hoc volunteer unit formed specifically for a six-month tour in Cyprus.

A seventh national force, though not of contingent size, was the Austrian Field Hospital (AFH). The AFH was a 50-man military unit, including nine erstwhile civilian medical doctors and dentists fulfilling their Austrian military obligations. The AFH had the responsibility of treating UNFICYP soldiers whose ailments (or wounds in the event of combat) could not be handled by national contingent medical officers. The AFH also offered free dental care, a service of which great advantage was taken by UNFICYP personnel. Like the national contingents, the AFH personnel also served a six-month tour of duty in Cyprus.

In addition to the nationally homogeneous six contingents and Austrian Field Hospital, there were two multi-national military units in UNFICYP. One was the small 60-man Military Police Company consisting of soldiers drawn from each of the six national contingents. «M.P. Coy» had jurisdiction over UNFICYP soldiers outside the camps of their respective national contingents. The UNFICYP Military Police, however, had no powers of punishment; violators were returned to their national contingents for disciplinary action.

With the exception of the Military Police Company, only Headquarters UNFICYP existed as a multi-national unit. With its approximately 500-man complement (about 50 officers and 450 other ranks), Headquarters was composed of representatives from each of the seven nations contributing to the United Nations military force in Cyprus. Both at the Headquarters offices and the Headquarters Officers Mess there was a genuine intermingling of disparate nationalities. Even at Headquarters, however, the multinational representation was largely limited to staff officers; all seconded to UNFICYP from their home military establishments to serve minimum one-year tours in Cyprus. The supporting infrastructure and lower ranks of Headquarters UNFICYP was almost entirely a British affair. UNFICYP's logistics, ordnance, workshops, air support, reconnaissance squadron, and transportation corps were closely allied with the British Sovereign Base Areas. These «S.B.A.'s» were themselves a vast complex of preexisting British military installations on Cyprus. That the logistical difficulties which had plagued other U.N. peacekeep-
ing forces were minimal in Cyprus was due largely to UNFICYP’s material dependency on the support of S.B.A.’s.

collection of data

From October 1969 to May 1970, I was in Cyprus doing full time research on UNFICYP. Owing to my credentials as an accredited correspondent and the cooperation of the U.N. Press Office, I was granted the status of «temporary official assignment» with UNFICYP. This allowed for my virtual complete access to all levels and ranks of UNFICYP military personnel. During the time of the field research, extended periods were spent with each of the national contingents, the Field Hospital, the Military Police Company, and Headquarters. In addition to formal interviews with 100 military officers (close to one-third of the entire UNFICYP officer complement), my findings are based on participant-observations in a variety of contexts: tactical situations, formal social affairs, informal gatherings, and perusal of UNFICYP documents and records. The openness of UNFICYP to the probings of a visitor allowed for a wide ranging opportunity to examine the social organization of a peacekeeping force. Perhaps, in some ways, this researcher was able to get a more complete picture of the social dynamics of UNFICYP than many of its formal members.

sources of conflict

The variety of theoretical schemes available to the analyst of formal organizations are legion. Yet when all is said and done, there are probably only two major conceptual approaches to the examination of concrete social organizations. One approach is to ascertain what are the stated goals of the organization and then examine how much success or failure the organization has had in achieving these goals. The second perspective is to ascertain what are the kinds of differentiation within an organization and then examine the amount and types of conflict deriving from these internal cleavages. In this paper I have adopted the latter frame of reference.

There is the premise that the conflict approach can serve as an especially appropriate analytical framework to describe all social organizations. It does not imply that UNFICYP was a notably conflict ridden organization, but it does mean that UNFICYP like any social organization had its own internal and external sources of social strain. It is by this elemental comprehension of the inherent conflict in a social structure that researchers can begin to determine the essential sociological makeup of the organization under analysis. What follows then is in no sense an exposé of UNFICYP, but rather the application of a general form of social analyses to one particular formal organization.

Conflict between UNFICYP and the United Nations Organization

Conflict between UNFICYP and the United Nations Organization. Strain between the UNFICYP organization in Cyprus and the United Nations Organization (UNO) in New York was apparent on several counts. One major source of dissatisfaction with UNO revolved around the lack of funds appropriated to UNFICYP military expenditures.

A Headquarters staff officer: «This is the biggest penny pinching outfit you can imagine. The U.N. wastes millions on foolishness, and we can’t even buy a wide-angle camera. Can you imagine! For a few pennies they will jeopardize the success of the whole operation.»

A contingent commander: «New York is always trying to cut back on the money it sends here. Do they ever look at the extravagance of those sitting in air-conditioned offices in New York. The military side is the only thing in the whole United Nations running on a budget. UNFICYP has been the U.N.’s only bargain in value delivered.»

Another source of contention with UNO was the restrictions placed on the UNFICYP military in the performances of its mission.

A Canadian officer: «We’re sent here with our hands tied behind our backs. We’re like traffic cops, we can only wave our hands. The politicians won’t let us have any authority. If we could use a little muscle, this whole mess would be over in two weeks.»

A Danish officer: «Ralph Bunche made his biggest mistake when he backed down after the Agreements [i.e. establishing the status quo in Cyprus] were made. Since then the Cyps can push us all over the place. We should never have lost the right of complete freedom of movement. Politics overrode military considerations and pushed back the chances of ever getting peace here.»

A Finnish officer: «An officer’s first responsibility is the safety of his men. This the U.N. has taken away from us. Here we are nothing more than a toothless paper tiger. We are supposed to be peacekeepers. That’s why they gave us these bullet-proof hats [pointing derisively at the blue beret of UNFICYP].»

A Swedish officer: «New York is always fouling us up. Anytime we want do something positive we have to clear it upstairs where somebody will find a reason to turn us down. You know what the U.N. is? It’s like two elephants fucking. Lots of noise, grunts, and groans, and shit on the ground. Then it takes 24 months to see what comes out.»

Conflict between UNFICYP and the home military establishments of contributing nations. Because of the nature of the recruiting system—men seconded and
units temporarily assigned to Cyprus from their home armies—UNFICYP often found itself at odds with the military establishments of contributing nations. Most of this strain centered around assignment of military personnel to the Headquarters UNFICYP staff. Whether or not an officer’s tour would be extended depended ultimately on decisions made back in his home country’s defense ministry. In one instance brought to my attention, a certain staff officer sought to extend his Cyprus tour and was encouraged to do so by UNFICYP. He was nevertheless reassigned home in the wake of a small imbroglio. The aftermath was that the officer and his supporters felt that UNFICYP had not supported his case with sufficient vigor, while his home military establishment perceived UNFICYP as meddling in standard assignment practices. Needless to add, the officer’s standing in his own national army was compromised (he resigned shortly after returning home).

There was also the general question as to what effect assignment to Cyprus had on the military careers of UNFICYP’s serving officers. On this issue there were mixed views. Some believed U.N. duty offered an opportunity to demonstrate personal capabilities in an operational force, while others felt that absence from the mainstream of military advancement at home was detrimental to their military futures. The latter possibility, of course, could be a serious source of organizational strain. In either event, the elemental fact was that UNFICYP was an anomalous military structure: an officer served in a centrally commanded international force, but the power of permanent assignment and promotion rested in his home military organization. This meant that no matter what an officer’s personal commitment toward a U.N. peacekeeping force might be, he knew that in both the short and long run his career advancement depended entirely on how he was evaluated within his own national army.

A Canadian officer: «Well it’s hard to tell what would be better for my career. Being in Cyprus doesn’t hurt it any. But it would be better to have a battalion back home. No question about that. U.N. duty is like pulling a long T.D.Y. [temporary duty assignment].»

A Swedish officer: «Because we don’t have a standing army, it is very important to be close to Stockholm to help your career. Promotions are so hard to manage, that you can easily lose out when you are removed from the powers that be. You can be forgotten if you are too far away from home.»

Conflict between Headquarters UNFICYP and national contingents. Much of the conflict between Headquarters UNFICYP and the national contingents was similar to that usually found between headquarters and line units in any military organization. There were criticisms by the national contingents that Headquarters was over-staffed and overly bureaucratic, or that it failed to take the contingents into account when policies were changed. For example, when the national contingents were redeployed in the spring of 1970 (in anticipation of a forthcoming reduction in UNFICYP strength), there was contingent resentment at the need to move out of established areas and be relocated in new surroundings.

A Danish officer: «It will be disastrous to move the contingents around. It takes years to get to know the local situation and who is who in both Greek and Turk sides. If Headquarters is thinking about cutting back, the first place to start should be at Headquarters. The men in the contingents are working full-time seven days a week, at Headquarters they work half-days five days a week.»

A Finnish officer: «The way redeployment has been handled, I think a Finn corporal could do a better job running UNFICYP. We hear stories of when we will move or where we will go. But we cannot know anything for sure. We are confused when we hear such different stories.»

But certain aspects of the conflict between Headquarters and the national contingents were unique to UNFICYP. The use of English as the official language necessarily placed the non-English speaking units at a disadvantage. There was also the recurrent feeling at the contingent level that national interests were being slighted at headquarters.

A Danish officer: «No matter how many people we have who know English, we are still handicapped by not being native speakers. And it also takes us a much longer time to prepare reports. They are too wordy.»

A Swedish officer: «Lots of wonder why they are not more Swedes at Headquarters. Count them. We don’t have as many as the others. You must always have somebody looking out for your interests at Headquarters, or they will run you over.»

A Canadian officer: «In that report [of the 1969 Economic Committee of UNFICYP] there was no mention that Canada is paying its own way. There are a lot of Canadians at home who would be damn mad if they knew we weren’t getting the credit we deserve. Why Headquarters didn’t bring this to their attention has bothered a lot of us. UNFICYP is a thankless job for Canada.»

Another vantage point illustrates a different kind of conflict between a Headquarters unit and the national contingents.

An officer in the Military Police Company: «We have a hell of a problem trying to get cooperation from the contingents. The Irish and the British try
to keep control over their own M.P.'s even though they are assigned to M.P. Coy. Another case. Just after I arrived, I had to send a Finn M.P. back to Fincon because he couldn't do the job. I mean he was lazy, mean, and dumb. To make matters worse he couldn't even say hello in English. Six months later Fincon is supposed to send us another man. They send back the same guy, only this time he's a sergeant. Now we're stuck with an absolute fuck-all who outranks my good men.

Conflict between national contingents within UNFICYP. One would expect differences between the national contingents would be a major source of conflict within UNFICYP. In fact there was such conflict, but the bulk of the inter-contingent strain derived from organizational features peculiar to UNFICYP rather than hostilities between nationalities per se. One such organizational tension was over the division of labor within UNFICYP.

A Swedish officer: «We can pull our maintenance on our vehicles, but we must send them to Dhekelia [in the S.B.A.'s]. This means the work is done slower and not as well as we could do it. But, of course, this is to give the Brits at Dhekelia a job. They have to find something for them to do. The Brits are using the U.N. for their own purposes.»

An Austrian officer: «The report [of the 1969 Economic Committee on UNFICYP] was unfair in the way it computed costs. This made the Field Hospital look bad compared to the British base hospitals. The report did not mention the work the Field Hospital is doing on dental treatment, out-patient care, and taking care of UNCIVPOL. The Chief Medical Officer at Headquarters was a Brit and he fixed the report to make us look bad and the S.B.A.’s good. The Brits are trying to get UNFICYP to use the British hospitals and close down the Field Hospital.»

Another organizational strain centered on the quite real differences in the pay scales of the various contingents. On this score the British in particular had cause for resentment. Alone of the national contingents, Britcon received no special U.N. pay allowances. Although most pronounced in Britcon, the differential in U.N. allowances was a source of resentment for other nationalities as well. These allowances—paid for from United Nations funds were in addition to base salaries paid for by home military establishments—were highest for the Swedes and Danes: approximately $330 U.S. monthly for officers, and $100 U.S. monthly for other ranks. (See appendix 3 for pay schedules of UNFICYP military personnel.)

A British officer: «How do you think my men feel. A British soldier makes £10 a week and a Swede two miles down the road makes £30 a week for doing exactly the same thing. How do I explain to my men about making the world safe for peacekeeping. They want to know why they're not getting paid what that Swede is getting paid. And I don't know what to tell him myself.»

A British officer: «We had a British captain at Headquarters who found that his Danish driver was earning twice as much as he was. We feel like poor relations here. Even when we go to Cancon they do the treating because they know we don't have any money.»

An Irish officer: «We just don't talk politics with the Canadians, but my god, they're a rowdy bunch. Nobody likes a drink and a good time more than an Irishman, but those Canadians are something else again. They get loud too early, if you get what I mean.»

A Danish officer: «When we took over Xeros from the Irish, you couldn't believe the filth there was. These Irish aren't civilized. The first thing we did was kill millions of cockroaches. Millions and millions of them. We made mountains out of them and burned them. They even spoke Irish. The Irish were with those cockroaches for four years and lived together like one big family.»

Genuine hostility between nationalities, however, was rare. And in those cases where it was present, the animosity had origins long preceding UNFICYP assignment; most notably, that of many Irish toward the British, and a few British toward the Austrians.

An Irish officer: «Let's face facts. Anti-British feeling is ingrained in the Irish temperament. We Irish are cursed with long memories, maybe that's because we don't have much else. Even here in Cyprus a lot of the lads can't forget what the British did to their families not so long ago.»

An Irish officer: «We just don't talk politics with the English. It's better that way, because a lot of us couldn't control ourselves once we start talking and thinking about the old days and what's going on up North right now. It's a miracle there hasn't been a good punch-up between us yet.»
A British officer: «Don't forget all the top Austrian officers were Nazis. They run the Field Hospital just like a stalag. One of their officers can get damn obnoxious once he gets a few drinks in him. That's what he starts complaining 'why can't I wear my [Ghurka] bears? I won them in honor.' It's hard enough to forget the War without him always reminding us.»

By far, however, the most frequent point of dispute between the national contingents involved invidious comparisons of their respective military prowess and organizational effectiveness.

A Danish officer: «The British have an army to solve their unemployment problem. The Black Watch aren't soldiers, they're lumberjacks and timbermen from Canada. These are men who can't make a living at home and bring their troubles into the Army.»

A Swedish officer: «Our men are not collected from the slums of their countries. They are volunteers who have been carefully picked. They are the cream of the crop and a much higher grade of men than you would find in a regular group of soldiers. Just compare their intelligence and manners with the Brits and the Irish and the Canadians.»

A Canadian officer: «The Canadians and British are the only real soldiers here. The Irish are a sloppy army. The Danes and Finns are really civilians in uniform here for a vacation in the sun. The Swedes are just tourists, half-soldiers, professionals.»

By far, however, the most frequent point of dispute between the national contingents involved invidious comparisons of their respective military prowess and organizational effectiveness.

A Danish officer: «You quickly learn that the biggest nuisances can be your own countrymen. Sometimes we get a Dane policeman who thinks we are here to serve him. You can't let them take advantage, or else they are always intruding where they are not wanted.»

The special situation of the British with their large military bases on Cyprus made for another kind of resentment. Although relations between British serving in UNFICYP and the British military in the S.B.A.'s was not one of conflict, the Britcon soldier was hard pressed not to contrast his position unfavorably with that of British servicemen in the S.B.A.'s. The latter enjoyed more lenient pass privileges, more modern living accommodations, and a much greater array of post facilities. Thus the Britcon soldier suffered a
Conflict between military personnel and civilian staff within UNFICYP. Without doubt, the most structured conflict in UNFICYP was not between or within its constituent national forces, nor between different levels in the military hierarchy. Rather, the most evident strain was between UNFICYP military officers and the U.N. civilian staff in Cyprus. In one sense this was a restatement of the prevalent belief on the part of UNFICYP officers that the civilians staff—in Cyprus along with UNO in New York—was letting erroneous political considerations stand in the way of military effectiveness.

A Danish officer: «In 1967 the Dancon commander went down to an O.P. on the Green Line where a Danish soldier had been disarmed by some Turkish fighters. He went down there with an automatic weapon and waved it at the Turks. He threatened to shoot the whole bunch right there on the spot. It worked. But it got the commander into a lot of trouble with the civilians back at Headquarters. They were out of their minds. But that is the kind of officer I would want to serve under. An officer’s first responsibility is to look after the safety of his men. How can you bring peace if your men don’t respect you? This is what the civilian mind will never understand.»

An Irish officer: «A little while back there was a Finns soldier who was shot at from a Greek village. The Finns drove up their armored cars and threatened to shoot the whole village right then and there if there was another shooting. This was the only correct thing to do. Otherwise the Cypthinks you’re free game. You have to protect your men above all else. But the Fincon commander was in serious trouble after that. The Headquarters civilians really took after him. ‘No, no, no. You can’t touch a hair on a Cypriot.’ But I’d do the same thing.»

But beyond the almost pro forma complaints of the inadequacy of the civilian support given military commanders, there were numerous other tensions between military personnel and civilian staff within UNFICYP. These tensions derived from differences in social background, organizational authority, and socio-political attitudes. Indeed, the differentiation between the two groups made UNFICYP a kind of microcosm of the civil-military conflict long noted in independent state systems. Perhaps most apparent was the pervasive resentment of the UNFICYP officer corps toward the privileges and life styles of the U.N. civilian staff.

A Finnish officer: «The civilian staff are the aristocrats of Cyprus. They live like diplomats while soldiers do all the dirty work and live in old buildings and tents. I used to believe in the United Nations and give donations to it. But not after coming here. They should give money to those soldiers on the Green Line and the O.P.’s who deserve it. Not to the high living U.N. civilians.»

A British officer: «Just look at how a U.N. civilian lives and how a soldier lives. The Force Commander’s driver is [U.N.] field service. He makes as much as a British colonel. It’s on up the line the same way. They have duty free liquor and throw posh parties for the rest of the diplomatic corps in Cyprus. The whole diplomatic corps is in this Cyprus thing together.»

Compounding the military’s displeasure with the particular life styles of the civilian staff in Cyprus, there was a generalized resentment of what was thought to be a deepseated civilian arrogance and condescension toward military personnel. On the part of some UNFICYP serving officers, there was even an ultimate questioning of the very morality of the civilian staff in their peacekeeping role.

A Swedish officer: «Ralph Bunche—we call him «bunk»—detests soldiers. This is true of almost all U.N. administrative staff including that in Cyprus. It starts from the very top. We soldiers are a different breed to them. The big problem in the U.N. is racism. Not the usual kind, but civilian racism against the military. But we soldiers are like women. The U.N. can’t live with us, but can’t do without us.»

An Irish officer: «The administrative staff of the U.N. is a closed circle. It resents newcomers—especially if they are military. Once I had to deal with a U.N. official from New York who had been a corporal in the army. He hated officers no matter what their nationality. No matter what any officer said to improve UNFICYP we could hear him thinking ‘what does that idiot in a uniform know’. That was a complicated situation.»

A Canadian officer: «You must remember that while we change every six months, the civilians stay on and on and on. This gives them a chance to dig in. They have their lives invested in this operation. If peace comes what would they do? You know the U.N. types, good at languages and not much anything else. Smooth and glib, but with no place to go home to. Men between countries. They live like ambassadors. The easiest way to save money for the U.N. is to
take away the limousines and big apartments of the U.N. officials here. What’s keeping us here is the civilians wanting to keep this thing going and milk it for all its worth.»

The underlying resentment of many UNFICYP military officers toward the U.N. civilian staff took one notable form in the rather frequent, and always favorable, mentions of Major General Carl von Horn. A Swedish career officer, von Horn had an impressive background in various peacekeeping activities, including command of the U.N. forces in the Congo. Von Horn had subsequently written a book scathingly critical of the U.N. civilian leadership. By a coincidental circumstance von Horn was living in retirement in Cyprus at the time of my field research. Although he was persona non grata in U.N. official circles—in and out of Cyprus—there were circumspect, if not subterraneous, informal contacts between von Horn and some UNFICYP military officers. But the comments given below were typical of many UNFICYP officers who had never personally met von Horn.

A Finnish officer: «Soldiers are always looked upon by the civilian staff as an inevitable evil. The military is something dirty for U.N. officials. This is what von Horn told so well in his book. If you see him, tell him he has many secret admirers in UNFICYP. He knows how soldiers are made to feel like second-class citizens by U.N. officials. We have three enemies in Cyprus, you know: the Greeks, the Turks, and the U.N. civilians.»

A British officer: «Von Horn wrote what a lot of us feel. Only we can’t so publicly. But somebody had to blow the whistle on what these U.N. civilians are doing to the military. Von Horn is a sort of underground hero to a lot of officers who’ve been in the U.N.»

A Danish officer: «There was this big sink last year. Von Horn had been invited to attend a Swedcon party. After all he was a retired major general in the Swedish Army and had many friends in Swedcon. When the U.N. civilians arrived at the party and saw von Horn there, they refused to sit down and became very nasty. A British officer who tried to smooth things over was accused of supporting von Horn and betraying the U.N. The civilian staff saw to it that he was quickly sent back to England.»

organizational conflict: U.N. peacekeeping vis-a-vis national military forces

A more complete assessment of the sources of conflict found in UNFICYP requires that they be evaluated in terms of whether they are unique to United Nations peacekeeping forces (as typified by UNFICYP), or whether they are general to military organizations in the main (as represented by mono-national military establishments). This is done in the comparisons given in Chart 1. The structured strains noted in UNFICYP—both civil military and intra-military—are categorized as to whether they are:

(a) applicable to most or all military organizations,
(b) characteristic of most or all military organizations, but especially evident in U.N. peacekeeping forces, and (c) characteristic of UNFICYP and other peacekeeping forces.

• One set of conflicts was that seemingly generic to military organization, inclusive of UNFICYP. Thus in civil-military relationships there was the dissatisfaction of UNFICYP military personnel with the amount of funds and kinds of facilities allotted for military purposes by civilian authorities. On this score certainly, neither its multi-national membership nor its peacemaking mission excluded UNFICYP from one endemic source of complaint on the part of armed forces establishments.

Within the military organization of UNFICYP itself, there were the tensions between staff and line units, between reserve officers and career officers, and between officers and lower ranks. Again these kinds of UNFICYP strains were organizationally akin to virtually all national armies.

On a second level, there were the conflicts characteristic of all or most military organizations, but especially evident in UNFICYP. The political restrictions placed by civilian authorities on field commanders in their use of force have often been a source of contention in civil-military relationships. However, the novel nature of the peacemaking mission—the very raison d’être of UNFICYP—placed especially heavy strains on the traditionally trained United Nations military personnel in Cyprus. Similarly, civil-military relations in national military establishments are often characterized by the military’s resentment of the higher living standards of civilian officials. Such resentment is aggravated by the military’s perception of civilian arrogance and condescension toward military personnel. These frequent sore points in standard civil-military relationships were exasperated in UNFICYP due to the smallness of the force and the resultant close interaction and observation between its military officers and civilian staff. Moreover, in most cases, the living and working conditions (but not pay) of UNFICYP military personnel were of a lower order than was the case in their home countries.

On the same level of conflicts prevalent in most military organizations but more notable in UNFICYP were certain intra-military factors. A prime quality of much of the UNFICYP subculture centered in the invidious comparisons made between the UNFICYP contingents as to their respective military prowess, recruitment policies, and organizational merits. Although these comparisons were in fact based on real differences within UNFICYP, similar parallels can
be found within mono-national armed forces; namely, conflict between services and between elite forces and regular units. The division-of-labor squabbles between certain UNFICYP units and the British bases were in one sense unique to the Cyprus operation. But in another manner these were again similar to inter-service jurisdictional rivalries within single national military establishments.

On a third level was the set of conflicts normally absent in national militaries but characteristic of U.N. peacekeeping operations as typified by UNFICYP. None of the observed civil-military conflicts fell into this category. Rather, the strains peculiar to UNFICYP lay in its internal military organization. There was the apparently unavoidable difficulty resulting from the official use of a language which placed about half of the UNFICYP military personnel at varying degrees of disadvantage. That some negative stereotypes of other national units existed—whether preexistent or acquired in Cyprus—seemed likewise unavoidable. More serious, however, than either linguistic hurdles or unfavorable national images were the pay discrepancies between constituent national components. Whether due to initially higher base salaries received from home military establishments or the system of U.N. allowances for Cyprus duty, the resentment of the lower toward the higher remunerated was a pervasive source of tension within UNFICYP. Another conflict unique to U.N. peacekeeping forces was found in the relationship between UNFICYP and its contributing national military establishments. This was the structured strain resulting from the organizational separation of the power of assignment and promotion from the operational unit in which an officer served (i.e. between the officer's national army and UNFICYP). In other words, unlike service in the standard armed forces where duty and promotion/assignment are under the same chain of command, service in UNFICYP offered no permanent assignment nor any sort of advancement through United Nations channels. Indeed, UNFICYP duty could turn out to be a discontinuity in a military career path at home.

As is probably apparent, the organizational conflicts unique to U.N. peacekeeping forces do not necessarily derive from their peacekeeping mission per se. The strains resulting from differences in language, inter-unit national stereotyping, discrepant pay scales, and the intermesh of career paths alternating between international and home military assignments are also those similarly inherent in other multi-national commands. At the same time, the distinctive tensions emanating from the multi-national aspects of UNFICYP overlay other more basic conflicts typically found in mono-national military organizations. Thus, UNFICYP, along with its being the first major success in U.N. peacekeeping operations, displayed organizational qualities with ample precedent in conventional military structures.

We conclude then by reiterating a cardinal point made earlier in this essay. The use of a conflict frame-
work as an interpretive variable does not stigmatize UNFICYP as especially rent by strife. Indeed, the emphasis on conflict given in the description of UNFICYP has purposefully distorted reality by obscuring the countervailing tendencies toward consensus also existing in UNFICYP. But it is to say that like all organizations UNFICYP was no exception in possessing external and internal sources of conflict; and it is in the comprehension of these conflicts that much of the underlying structure of UNFICYP is revealed. Moreover, the conflicts of UNFICYP were in the main common to all military organizations with the added strains peculiar to multi-national forces. Finally, and perhaps most important, if and when the United Nations is employed as a peacekeeping force in other locales and crises, the sources of organizational conflict found in the UNFICYP case will almost certainly be recapitulated.

Appendix 1. Organization Chart of UNFICYP

Appendix 2. UNFICYP Military Personnel by Assignment and Nationality (January, 1970)


Note: Monthly UNFICYP allowances given in parentheses. Base pay from national army can be computed by subtracting UNFICYP allowances from total gross. * Based on unofficial sources.