


The Greek Review of Social Research

Vol 24 (1975)

24 B'



Greece and the United nations

Van Coufoudakis

doi: [10.12681/grsr.433](https://doi.org/10.12681/grsr.433)

Copyright © 1975, Van Coufoudakis



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

To cite this article:

Coufoudakis, V. (1975). Greece and the United nations. *The Greek Review of Social Research*, 24, 292–301.
<https://doi.org/10.12681/grsr.433>

Greece and the United Nations

by

Dr. Van Coufoudakis

*Assistant Professor
Political Science Department
Indiana University at Fort Wayne*

The growing complexity and interdependence of the multistate system is reflected in the evolution and growth of international organizations with constantly expanding political, economic, and social functions. Although the international organization process can be traced back to the nineteenth century,¹ it was World War I and the advent of the League of Nations that ushered the era of international organization as we know it today.

Greece was one of the original signatories of both the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter and has held continuous membership in these organizations. Greece also became a member of the specialized agencies of the United Nations as well as of other regional organizations, such as OECD, NATO and the Council of Europe, and finally an associate to the EEC.²

Given the extent of Greek participation in international organizations, this paper will focus on the participation of Greece in political organizations only, with emphasis on the United Nations. References to such institutions as NATO and the Council of Europe will be made only in relation to the Greek participation in the United Nations.

In the pages that follow I will examine the reasons for Greek participation in the United Nations, and the effects of such participation on Greek foreign policy and Greek domestic politics. I will also analyze the question of how Greece utilized the United Nations to protect and promote vital Greek foreign policy objectives in the post-World War II period. I will also show whether the realities of Greek participation in the political activities of the United Nations fulfilled the Greek expectations of the role that this organization would perform in the promotion and protection of Greek interests.

Greece: some general characteristics

Before proceeding with the analysis of the Greek participation in the United Nations, a brief listing of some general characteristics of Greece relevant to this discussion is in order.

(a) Since her establishment Greece has been under the influence, protection, as well as the intervention of the great powers in both her domestic and foreign affairs.

1. See the rise of the Public International Unions, the first permanent international organizations. Ex. ITU (1865), UPU (1874).

2. Greece, faced with expulsion, withdrew from the Council of Europe on December 12, 1969. Similarly, because of the 1967 military takeover in Greece, the EEC Association was «frozen.» Since the restoration of democratic government in Greece late in July, 1974, the Greek Association to the EEC has been reactivated.

(b) The strategic location, financial weakness, military vulnerability, the weak political institutions, and the territorial aspirations of Greece in the era of the *Megali Idea*, increased both the dependence on and interference by the great powers in Greek affairs.¹

(c) Greece, by ethnic, cultural, political, economic, geographic, and psychological orientation and tradition, belongs to the Western world. Yet because of its developing economy, Greece shares many of the problems, characteristics² and economic aspirations of other LDC's.

(d) In contrast to the global interests and commitments of the great powers, which have included and affected Greece since her independent existence, Greece by definition is a local power. The primary foreign policy concerns and objectives of the country have also been localized in the immediate geographical region of Greece. Even though such objectives were often pursued in international conferences or international organizations,³ this did not change the local character of these interests. It actually emphasized the limits of the capacity of Greece to bring about even limited systemic changes on her own, especially when such changes conflicted with the policies and interests of the great powers.

(e) Finally, there is also the question of «national pride,»⁴ which in the long history of Greece has provided a powerful psychological force that has allowed the Greek public and its officials to rationalize even the greatest setbacks without despair. But it has also made Greece look upon herself as the only law-abiding and moral member of the international community. This has frequently been reflected in the definition of the objectives of the nation's foreign policy; the means utilized for its implementation, and the responses of the Greek government and the public when confronted with the opposition of the great powers in matters considered vital to Greek national interests.⁵ Some of these characteristics, as pre-

viously listed, have been important determinants of Greek international behavior and their significance will be shown further in the pages that follow.

motivations for Greek participation in international organizations

The fundamental reason for the participation of Greece in international political organizations must be found in the weakness and small state characteristics of that country as previously outlined.

The experience of the interwar period only increased the concern of the Greek policy makers about the growing inequality between small and large states and the perceived threats from the policies adopted by the great powers in areas affecting Greek interests. Observing this common dilemma faced by many small states, Robert L. Rothstein concludes⁶ that there are two policy options available to them to compensate for their weakness. One is neutrality and non-alignment from great power conflicts. The other is deriving strength by association with other states, their alliances and international organizations.

Looking at the behavioral and policy manifestations of Greece since 1914, I can conclude that Rothstein's latter option has been the only one that Greece has been able to follow with any degree of success. This point will be analyzed in the pages that follow. This is not to suggest that neutrality or non-alignment is incompatible with membership in international organizations. It is my contention though that in this time period, neutrality or non-alignment has been a virtually impossible policy for Greece to follow.

This is due to a number of reasons. Because of her strategic location, Greece has frequently found herself at the center of great power controversy to the point of being coerced to take sides in great power conflicts. This is best exemplified by the events surrounding Greece's entry into the two World Wars. Similarly, the domestic controversy about the nature of the Greek political system during the interwar period had attained by 1945 ideological dimensions characteristic of the developing confrontation between the great powers. Thus even if Greece desired to show detachment from a major international crisis, this detachment was not recognized by the great powers. Furthermore, one must consider the nature of Greek politics; the fact that considerable foreign influence has been exercised in the domestic and foreign pol-

the question of external support to guerrillas during the late 1940s as against the Cyprus rebellion 1954-1958. Finally, see the government's rationalization of the withdrawal, or expulsion, of Greece from the Council of Europe as against the Council's stand against Britain on the question of Cyprus.

6. *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 23-45.

1. Primarily England and France prior to World War II and the United States since 1947.

2. Lack of significant natural resources; the attitudinal and institutional framework both public and private, that makes a high level of economic activity possible. See: Alec P. Alexander, *Greek Industrialists* (Athens: Center of Planning and Economic Research, 1964), pp. 77-130. Howard S. Ellis, *Industrial Capital in Greek Development* (Athens: Center of Planning and Economic Research, 1964), pp. 17-26, 106-198, 313-335. S. G. Triantis, *Common Market and Economic Development* (Athens: Center of Planning and Economic Research, 1965), pp. 21-60, 227-232.

3. Ex. The Peace Conferences following both World Wars and the utilization of the United Nations in the Cyprus problem.

4. See also Stephanos Zotos, *The Greeks: Dilemma between Past and Present* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 3-21, 142-170, 181-185, 251-257.

5. See the Greek response to the 1923 Corfu incident with Italy as against the 1925 Greco-Bulgarian incident. Similarly,

icies of the country, and finally the interest expressed by both the Greek political leaders and their public to be on the winning side of major international conflicts. The latter motivation has been inspired by both the expansionist objectives of the *Megali Idea* and the promises by the great powers themselves for such coveted territories.¹ As a result, any form of neutrality or non-alignment has not been possible in recent Greek history. As for the pro-neutralist tendencies that developed between 1958 and 1965 under the strains of the Cyprius problem, history will still have to show whether such tendencies would have been realized given the interplay of domestic and foreign political forces in Greece.²

In order to guarantee her security, Greece has therefore turned to the great powers, their alliances, and international organizations. My emphasis of course will be on the Greek participation in the United Nations.

Other authors³ stress a small state's perception of its systemic role, rather than the need for external assistance for security purposes, as the distinct attitude and motivation for participating in international organizations. Yet the Greek experience since 1919 only partially conforms to the systemic role approach. Such a perception has only been secondary to the political and security motivations of Greek participation in international organizations and derives from the country's conception of its place in history as outlined earlier in this paper.

Through her membership in the institutionalized system of the League of Nations and the United Nations, Greece expected to find an additional instrument for the protection and promotion of Greek national and security interests. For Greece, these institutions potentially possessed the ability to exercise political pressure and restraining power against the great powers through combined action with the other members of these organizations. In this respect the experience of the League of Nations was somewhat disappointing. Yet the realities of the politics of the interwar period only increased Greece's interest to participate and strengthen the international organization system.⁴

1. Such as on Asia Minor, the Dodecanese Islands, and Cyprus.

2. This article examines the period up to the restoration of democratic government in Greece in 1974. Thus the new prospects for Greek foreign policy will not be examined here.

3. Robert O. Keohane, «Lilliputians Dilemma: Small States in International Politics,» *International Organization*, XXIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1969), pp. 296-297. The author states that «... a major function of international organizations—perceived by many small and middle powers—is to allow these states acting collectively to help shape developing international attitudes, dogmas, and codes of proper behavior.» p. 297.

4. S. Calogeropoulos-Stratis, *La Grèce et les Nations Unies* (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. 1957), pp. 5-37, 139.

Participation in the political and security affairs of international organizations had additional advantages for Greece.⁵ These institutions represented the recognition, at least in theory, of the sovereign equality of their members, as well as the equality of their rights, in spite of the evident inequality of power, influence and authority among small states and the great powers. Finally, these institutions offered Greece the opportunity to participate in the new system of institutionalized international relations and conference diplomacy after decades of open direction of the international system by the great powers. These characteristics of international organizations were particularly appealing to a country like Greece whose leaders and public are possessed by a strong sense of national pride deriving from the country's historical achievements.

Participation in international organizations, however, was not the only method of protecting and promoting Greek interests. Since her independence, Greece has sought the friendship and assistance of such great powers as Britain, France, and the United States, as well as membership in bilateral and multilateral alliances sponsored by these powers. Given the limited collective security potential of the United Nations, and its predecessor, Greece has had to rely on alternate arrangements to supplement her security. But even though the Cold War and the developments in military technology have largely undermined the limited collective security functions of the United Nations, the factors mentioned in the preceding pages as motivating the participation of Greece have retained their significance. Thus political motivations have been the preponderant determinants of Greek participation both at the League of Nations during the interwar period and the United Nations since 1945.

There is another factor that has affected Greek participation in international organizations, particularly since World War II. This has been the interest shown by successive Greek governments in broadening the political horizons of the Greek public. The 1922 Asiatic *débâcle* and the post-World War II political environment marked, at least for the influential political leadership, the end of the *Megali Idea*. Thus membership in the United Nations in particular served domestic political objectives as well. By attempting to reorient and transform the narrow nationalist outlook of the public into an international perspective, successive Greek governments hoped to release themselves from the political risks and bondage that the *Megali Idea* had imposed on their less fortunate predecessors throughout

5. The paper excludes questions of economic advantages derived from participation in international organizations.

the first century of the country's independent existence.¹

These then have been the reasons for the Greek participation in the political and security affairs of international organization. In the pages that follow I will examine various aspects of the Greek participation in the United Nations. Before proceeding though, a word of caution must be added as to the nature of some of my conclusions. Much of the discussion concerns the influence of governments on others and of international organizations on governmental policy. I, therefore, must point out that these conclusions are presented without any claim to scientific finality. Such methodological weakness is due to the difficulty of measurement and of proving causality in questions pertaining to influence. Thus the reader must approach these conclusions with this limitation in mind.

the United Nations and Greek diplomacy – impact and effects

Two major foreign policy problems, with clear domestic implications and origins, confronted Greek diplomacy since 1945. These were the Greek Question, and the Cyprus Question.² Greece, in both instances, resorted to the United Nations not so much because of her commitment to the institutionalized method of dispute settlement, but for other important political reasons which will be briefly discussed in the next few pages.

Greece, with the urging United States and Britain, brought the Greek Question to the United Nations Security Council on December 12, 1946. Some of the reasons for this action are to be found in the inability of the postwar Greek governments to manage the Greek problem by political and military methods, the apparent involvement of outside powers on the side of the insurgents, and the earlier actions at the Security Council by Ukraine and the Soviet Union.³ In this manner, Greece attempted to expose the actions of the Greek guerrillas and her northern Communist neighbors, and mobilize the support of other United Nations members on her behalf. Furthermore, with the identity of interests between the Greek and the American government, the organization's legitimizing power became the chief political instrument in

the search for a decisive solution of the Greek Civil War. Thus while the military solution was pursued at the battlefield, the presence of the United Nations encouraged the great powers to institutionalize their conflict and limit the scope of the fighting within Greece.

The Cyprus Question shows that Greece resorted to the United Nations only because of her inability to bring about bilateral negotiations with Britain, leading to peaceful change of the status of the island. The 1954 appeal to the General Assembly was originally intended to act as leverage toward such negotiations and was largely motivated by pressures emanating from both Cyprus and from within Greece. With the persistent diplomatic inability of the Greek government to achieve its original objective, the continued appeals to the General Assembly were not only due to the pressures of domestic and Cypriot politics, but were also intended to act as preventive devices over British actions considered as totally against the Greek interests. It was clearly understood then in this case that the organization itself could neither alter the colonial status of the island, nor later on to revise the independence treaties. The Greek policy makers, though, expected the organization to supplement the otherwise limited Greek diplomatic influence.⁴

In both instances, then, Greece, like any other state, selected the methods and institutions that at the time she felt would promote her interests the most. And consequently the presence of the United Nations did not preclude or exclude other simultaneous courses of action outside the organization.⁵

What other methods then were utilized by Greece in the Greek Question and the Cyprus Question? In the former case, because the Greek Civil War represented an early test of the effectiveness of the NLF idea, both sides chose to seek a decisive battlefield solution to the problem. Thus the Security Council, the General Assembly and the subsidiary organs created to deal with the Greek Question became supporting political actors in the Greco-American cast that was engaged in the forcible resolution of the dispute. Also, the Security Council and the

4. For an extensive study of the 1954-1958 period see Stephen G. Xydis, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1967). Also Stephen G. Xydis, «The UN General Assembly as an Instrument of Greek Policy: Cyprus, 1954-1958,» *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XII (June, 1968), pp. 141-58. Also of particular relevance is the work by François Crouzet, *Le Conflit de Chypre, 1946-1959* (Brussels: Etablissements Emile Bruyat, 1973), and Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 7-35.

5. This was also emphatically affirmed in the interviews with members of the Greek delegation to the United Nations mentioned in footnote 1.

1. This fact was also acknowledged to the author by members of the Greek delegation to the United Nations in interviews conducted in 1973.

2. All references to the Cyprus Question pertain to the colonial phase of the dispute. Although this article makes occasional references to the post-1963 phase of the dispute, the reader is reminded of the fact that the main diplomatic effort at the United Nations in this period was that of the Republic of Cyprus.

3. January 21, 1946 and February 6, 1946 respectively.

General Assembly provided the stage upon which the great power actors and their proxies pursued the verbal portion of their confrontation.

In the Cyprus Question, Greece placed great emphasis in the diplomatic effort in the General Assembly. The simultaneous use of other channels of action though was intended not only to supplement the limited influence of Greece in the Assembly, but also it came about because of the Assembly's limited potential to act in questions of peaceful change. Among these supplementary tactics, Greece utilized appeals to the Council of Europe in an effort to pressure further the British government over its policies on Cyprus and in turn to strengthen the Greek case in the General Assembly. The use of force was also extensively employed on Cyprus under the sanction, if not also the aid of the Greek government, not only to pressure the British to concede to the unionist demands, but also to keep the Cyprus Question under consideration in the Assembly. In pursuing these supplementary channels of action, successive Greek governments discovered that the successful use of force by an independent underground organization, geographically distant and supported by the local population, often complicated and even threatened the task of the Greek diplomats at the United Nations.¹

Did the involvement of international organizations in these two major foreign policy problems of Greece increase or decrease the influence of Greek governments in their handling of these problems? In both instances the involvement of the United Nations increased the diplomatic options available to Greece and provided an important supplement to Greek diplomacy. The United Nations provided the channels through which the issues of each dispute could be publicized and exposed. The organization was also used for bringing pressure to bear against actions contemplated or actually carried out by Greece's adversaries. These included actions of states² as well as of such an institution as NATO in the Cyprus Question. NATO's hostile attitude toward the Cyprus Question and its attempts to intervene in the dispute showed not only that organizations to which a state belongs often have divergent political perspectives, but that such organizations can often be rivals and that they can be used to check one another.

Furthermore, because of the unusual degree of coincidence among Greek and American interests

and the influence of the United States in the United Nations, Greece was able to benefit from the organization's legitimization capacity in the Greek Question. As a result, the legitimization politics of the organization were marshalled by Greece and the United States in the political campaign against the guerrillas, as well as in the nation-building effort within Greece.

In the Cyprus Question the objectives Greece was seeking by her resort to the United Nations were not fully achieved.³ Yet it is my position that with the limited political influence of Greece and the international politics of the period,⁴ she would have been unable to achieve as much without the United Nations. The reason for this conclusion lies in the fact that Greek diplomacy would have been deprived of the significant supplementary channels of action that the organization provided it within this instance.

So far the discussion has centered on the advantages of Greek participation in the United Nations. Did Greece, though, also face any restraints that would not have been present in the absence of such organizations? The restraining effect of the United Nations involvement in the Greek Question was manifested in a variety of ways, especially as the organization came to play such a significant political role in the resolution of the Greek Civil War. One

3. For a controversial and significant critique of Greek diplomacy and the objectives sought by Greece in the Cyprus Question, see Pantazis Terlexis, *Diplomatia kai Politike tou Kypriakou: Anatomia Enos Lathous* (Athens: Rappas, 1971). Greece moved toward the compromises in Zurich and London under the inability to achieve her goals at the United Nations; the threat of the implementation of the second MacMillan Plan; and the effect of the Cyprus Question on the outcome of the 1958 Greek parliamentary elections. The other parties to the dispute were also forced to modify their goals as well. Britain's changing strategic needs in the area following the 1956 Suez experience and EOKA's struggle, along with the domestic and international pressures created by the Cyprus Question, contributed to the decision to accept the Greco-Turkish agreement which provided for Britain's security needs. Turkey in turn having started from maximum demands centering around the cession of Cyprus to Turkey, and later the partition of the island, achieved more than it ever expected in terms of protections to the Turkish Cypriot minority. Factors contributing to the Turkish willingness to negotiate were the Greek willingness to compromise; the economic and political problems faced at home by Menderes; the threats to Turkish security created by the instability in the Middle East following the 1958 Iraqi coup. All parties were also affected by their fear of communism and the deterioration of NATO's S. E. flank. The official Greek position during these negotiations is given by Stephen G. Xydis in his latest book *Cyprus-Reluctant Republic* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1973). Professor Xydis had access to the Karamanlis and Avetoff archives.

4. The limited size of the anti-colonial bloc prior to 1960; the concern of the United States about the Middle East and the cohesion of NATO in the aftermath of Suez; and the opposition of the United States to the continuous Greek appeals to the United Nations over Cyprus.

1. General Grivas in his memoirs shows several instances of disagreements and lack of coordination between Athens and Nicosia. Charles Foley (ed.), *The Memoirs of General Grivas* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965). See also François Crouzet, *op. cit.*

2. For example during the 13th session of the Assembly against the implementation of the second MacMillan Plan.

such manifestation was seen in the insistence of the United States and Britain on maintaining in Greece a semblance of Parliamentary politics as well as governments representative of the non-Communist Greek public. Furthermore, the constant pressure by the Soviet Union on the question of the death sentences imposed by Greek tribunals did eventually contribute to the relaxation of such policies at the urging also of the United States and other members of the Western coalition. Finally, the involvement of the United Nations also contributed to the institutionalization of the dispute and toward the limiting of the hostilities in Greece only.

Similarly, in the Cyprus Question, Greece was forced to justify her claims and actions over Cyprus in the General Assembly. This was particularly evident in the government's justification of the use of violence by EOKA and the manner in which the Greek government supported EOKA's activities. In the post-independence portion of the Cyprus Question, the involvement of the United Nations did not preclude the independent support of the Cypriot government by the Greek Army. Once more, though, the pattern of support was affected by the involvement of the Security Council and UNFICYP of the island. Furthermore, because so much emphasis was placed on the diplomatic effort through the United Nations, Greece had to modify considerably her goals during the colonial phase of the Cyprus Question and accept Britain's negotiation proposals even if in essence such negotiations often undermined the original Greek goals.

Ultimately, one point remains clear. Although Greek diplomacy found a valuable supplement through the United Nations, Greek participation cannot be examined in isolation from the attitudes, the actions, and the relations prevailing at a specific time among the influential great powers as well as the great powers and Greece. This was best exemplified by the Greek Question. Yet the Cyprus Question in some ways displays more accurately the limited influence of Greece in the context of great power and international organization politics. Despite the apparent inability of Greece to promote her primary objectives against the combined opposition of the Western great powers, the Greek government, by taking its case to the General Assembly, showed considerable appreciation of the organization's political potential. The Greek government was able to put together and maintain a functioning political coalition in the General Assembly. Capitalizing on the growing membership of the organization and the evolving multipolarity in the international system, Greece, in spite of her pro-Western commitments, was able to prevent the application of solutions favored by her great power protectors,

undermine great power policies and even defy their political advice.

One more point must be mentioned on the effect of the United Nations on Greek foreign policy. Participation in international organization political activities, other than those mentioned previously, broadened the range and scope of Greek interests and obligations. Greece has been defined in the introductory section of this paper as a small state with local or regional interests. Yet Greece had also discovered that during the period of the Cold War, by belonging to an international organization which was part of the anti-Communist coalition, additional commitments were required on her than just votes on Cold War issues. Thus participating in the Korean War under the United Nations command involved Greece in an area far beyond the usual scope of her interests, even if in principle, Greece as a victim of Communist activity, was quite sympathetic to the plight of Korea. Similar is also the case of the Greek participation in the mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.¹

Participation in the United Nations, though, has had domestic political implications in Greece. This will be analyzed in the next section of this paper.

Greek domestic politics and the United Nations

Two basic questions arise at this point. One is what effect did Greek domestic politics have on the actions of the various Greek governments at the United Nations. The other question is whether the involvement of the organization in the issues I have discussed complicated the relations of the various Greek governments with their public.

The roots of the Greek Question were to be found in the domestic politics of Greece, which by 1946 had obtained ideological dimensions characteristic of the division between the great powers. The various post-World War II Greek governments became increasingly dependent on Britain and the United States for political, economic, military and diplomatic support. The reasons for this dependence were to be found not only in the unrepresentative character of these governments, but also in their inability to manage the domestic problems of Greece and primarily of the Civil War. This contributed to the low profile of Greece during the discussion at the Security Council of the Ukrainian and Soviet complaints. It also contributed to the emphasis of the United States on maintaining a semblance of representative

1. In pursuance of the various Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, Greece has introduced Laws 95/1967 and 540/1968 by which all economic transactions with Rhodesia are forbidden along with the transportation of Rhodesian commodities by ships under Greek flag and aircraft.

government in Greece through elections and coalitions of non-Communist parties.

The involvement of the United Nations in the various phases of the Greek Question appears to have strengthened the relations of the various Greek governments with the non-Communist public. By publicizing the actions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the findings of their subsidiary organs, the various Greek governments found an important supplement in their nation building effort. The only instance where the involvement of the United Nations could have complicated the relations of the Greek government with its public was in the Conciliation Commission's suggestion for normalization of Greco-Albanian relations. The Greek government avoided taking the initiatives that would have allowed for such normalization as they entailed the rejection of the long-standing Greek territorial claims against Albania. Otherwise, in the Greek Question Greek governments under the influence of the United States found an invaluable political instrument in the United Nations in pursuing their domestic as well as foreign policy.

In analyzing the Cyprus Question we must keep in mind the political environment in Greece in the post-1954 period. In contrast to the preceding case, this was a period of relative governmental and political stability. With growing evidence of economic recovery from the ravages of World War II and the Civil War, and the slow decline in the intensity of the Cold War, the numerous personality-oriented political parties, as well as the public, began focusing their attention on foreign policy matters more extensively than in the period of the Civil War.

The Papagos government received broad support in its decision to internationalize the Cyprus Question. The nationalism of the Greek public, the Greek Cypriot ability to affect Greek domestic politics, and Britain's unwillingness to discuss the Cyprus Question with Greece contributed to the government's decision to take its case to the United Nations.¹ Because of these reasons it is actually doubtful whether any Greek government could have avoided for long the Cyprus Question. The apparent inability of both the Papagos and the Karamanlis governments to promote the Greek objectives through the General Assembly and the opposition to the Greek claims by the Western great powers and other NATO countries, led to the politicization of the Cyprus Question in Greece. As a result, not only the various Greek governments were forced to continue their appeals to

the General Assembly, but Karamanlis was also confronted by 1958 with a total challenge of the overall foreign policy orientation of Greece by the opposition parties and the majority of the public. These factors were in turn manifested in the 1958 elections and contributed to the government's determination to bring an end to the Cyprus Question.²

Similarly, the eruption of the post-independence crisis on Cyprus in the closing days of 1963, which occurred at a time when Greece was undergoing major domestic political changes, could not allow any of the Greek political parties to overlook the need for revisions to the Cyprus independence Treaties. Thus the Greek government's actions both on Cyprus and at the United Nations were largely the result of domestic political considerations as well as of the ability of the Cypriots to affect Greek politics.

In contrast to the Greek Question then, as the preceding paragraphs have shown, the involvement of the United Nations in the Cyprus Question complicated the relations of the various Greek governments with their own public. Thus the Cyprus Question became an issue of partisan debate; the foreign policy orientation of Greece was challenged by the public; faith in Greece's alliances was undermined;³ and the public expressed a great deal of bitterness about the ability of the great powers to impose their political views on the «moral» objectives of the Charter.⁴ The difficulties Greece encountered at the United Nations in promoting the Cyprus Question and the ensuing politicization of the problem in Greece reflects another aspect of Greek politics. The frequent presentation of international organization affairs in the perspective of the ideals of the Charter,⁵ rather than of the dynamics of international politics, limited the range of public understanding as to why the government was unable to promote its objectives in the organization. Furthermore, in Greece the Cyprus Question had obtained the tone of a moral crusade

2. For relevant statistics and political analysis, see Theodore A. Coulombis, *Greek Political Reactions to American and NATO Influences* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

3. See the behavior of the other NATO members in the 1954-1958 period. Also, The Cyprus Question along with the Russo-Yugoslav rapprochement of 1955 undermined the Balkan Pact.

4. Typical is the reaction in Demetrios S. Bezanes, *To Kypriakon Zetema* (Athens: Ethnikistikos Syndesmos, 1959), pp. 14-17. The author protests in the characteristic manner of the period not only the «inability» and the «impotence» of the United Nations to assist in the resolution of the Cyprus Question, but also the overshadowing of the Charter's provisions by the national interests of the various states. The author suggests then that there is a discrepancy between the actions of the General Assembly and the Charter's provisions on self-determination.

5. Characteristic are the views included in Alexes Adonidis Kyrou, *Hellenike Exoterike Politike* (Athens: E. Zombolas Publishers, 1955), pp. 149-157.

1. For the Greek decision to go to the United Nations among various recent studies, see: François Crouzet, *op. cit.*, Pantazis Terlexis, *op. cit.*, and Stephen G. Xydias, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958*.

for self-determination, an objective also stated in the Charter and affirmed in the Assembly's earlier resolutions.¹ In this respect, even the experience of the Greek Question, where the political influence of the organization was thrown into the battle in support of Greece, had a negative effect on the public's expectations for the role of the organization in the Cyprus Question. Thus the failure to promote the original Greek objectives and gain recognition of the right of the Cypriots to self-determination was due either to the government's subservience to the Western great powers, or to the ability of these states to superimpose their values over those of the United Nations.

It was stated earlier in this paper that another motivation for Greek participation in international organizations was the need to direct the public's attention away from the narrow nationalism of the *Megali Idea* and thus liberate the government from the burdens and restrictions it imposed. It is somewhat ironic that in the Cyprus Question successive Greek governments found that the pre-World War II burdens of the *Megali Idea* had only been replaced by new political pressures at home created by the frustrations of international organization politics.

Undoubtedly in Greece, much like in other states, the degree of frustration with international organization politics depends on the illusions held by the public as to what can be achieved through international organizations in the present state of international politics. The situation in Greece is further complicated² by the absence of informed opinion elites on the subject, organizations promoting an understanding of such institutions, and any significant theoretical treatises in Greek by Greek writers³ on international organizations. Thus the Greek public, even today, remains unaware of international organization activities, politics, and the Greek participation in such organizations.⁴ This is particularly disconcerting because as the Cyprus Question has shown in vital questions of policy, there is a close interplay of domestic and international politics. And as Greece

was and remains a highly partisan state, this condition should be of major concern to the government.

other indicators of Greek participation in the United Nations

Three additional indicators will be utilized in this section to supplement the discussion of Greek participation at the United Nations; (a) the leadership role of Greece at the United Nations; (b) the seats occupied by Greece in important United Nations political organs; and (c) financial support of Greece for the United Nations.

After 30 years of continued membership at the United Nations, it can safely be said that Greece has failed to develop an independent and dynamic role in the organization. There are a number of reasons for the innocuous position of Greece in the United Nations. In the early days of the organization, the impact of Cold War politics, the total dependence of Greece on the United States, and the preoccupation with the domestic political and economical problems, did not allow Greece to develop an independent position at the United Nations. In the post-1954 period, even though Greece acted independently of the Western great powers in the Cyprus Question, this did not provide the basis for the creation of an independent role for Greece in the Assembly. The burdens of the Cyprus problem and, after 1965, the domestic political complications inhibited Greece from developing such an activist leadership role in the Assembly. For that matter, I have not yet seen any evidence that Greek diplomats ever had as one of their priorities the development of such a role for Greece. This also partially explains why, in the motivations for Greek participation in international organizations, the «systemic role» perception⁵ has never figured seriously in the minds of Greek policy makers.

There is also another reason that must be taken into account and this is that Greece occupies a rather uncertain position in the «bloc» and «group» structure of the United Nations.⁶ Western, but yet on the periphery of the Western group, Greece, since 1954 and the Cyprus Question, has often deviated from the rest of the group in questions of colonialism and economic and social matters.⁷ At the same time, although, Greece, on a number of occasions, votes along with

1. United Nations Charter, Articles 1 (2); 2 (4); 55; and resolutions 637 (VII), 742 (VIII).

2. This was also acknowledged in my interviews with members of the Greek delegation to the United Nations in 1973.

3. Perhaps the only «realistic» interpretation of an international organization charter is that of Georgios X. Christopoulos, *Paratereseis epi tou Symphonou tes Koinonias ton Ethnon* (Athens: A. Kleisiounis, 1937).

4. Members of the Greek delegation to the United Nations confirm this. In the particular case of the Council of Europe, it was also acknowledged that the Greek public was hardly aware of its existence. The discussion allowed by the junta in Greece on the «withdrawal» or «expulsion» of Greece from the Council, produced no greater understanding of that institution given that the government justified its action on the grounds of «philotimo» and nationalism.

5. See section on motivations for Greek participation in international organizations and the related comments by Robert O. Keohane.

6. See Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 5-7, 31-33, 38-41, 44-45, 98-99, 124.

7. In other Western organizations Greece also deviates from the other members of the group, Ex. in the OECD along with

members of non-aligned groups or other LDC's, these alliances are temporary and are generally related to trade-offs over Cyprus¹ or matters of common concern with other LDC's in the area of trade and development. In turn, Third World states are aware of these reasons² and remain suspicious of Greece given her commitments to the West whether by political tradition or alliances. Furthermore, Greece herself feels uncertain of her relationship with the Third World states. As previously mentioned, Greece shares some common positions on a number of economic and political issues with states of the Third World, but she has neither the political background, the foreign policy orientation nor the political aspirations of the new members of the United Nations.³ Undoubtedly, Greece is an indirect beneficiary of the lessening of great power influence in the affairs of the United Nations that came about after 1960 because of the entry of the new states in the organization. But Greece, much like other Western powers, has expressed concern for the effectiveness of the organization because of the inconsistency of the numerical strength and the political influence of the new members. Thus Greece today finds herself in the position of supporting the United Nations and its activities, but yet not being able or willing to develop a dynamic and independent role in the organization.⁴

As a corollary to the role of Greece at the United Nations, one can examine the seats occupied by

Sweden and the Council of Europe prior to 1969; in NATO (prior to 1967) along with Norway and Denmark and France. See Thomas Hovet, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

1. Thus Greece supports the Afro-Asians on anti-colonial, apartheid, and Arab-Israeli issues. In the latter case the association with the Arabs has by tradition been more permanent.

2. In a lengthy talk with Greek officials over Cyprus, Prime Minister Nehru of India was reported to have said that once the Cyprus matter was settled Greece would once more become a «Western subject... without will or opinion of her own.» Gregorios Kasimates, *He Hellas kai ho Kosmos* (Athens: Serbinis Printers, 1961), p. 44.

3. See David A. Kay, *The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

4. This «split» personality of Greece at the UN was well manifested in the post-1964 phase of the Cyprus problem. The independent government of Cyprus did the lobbying among states of the Third World. The Greek role was supportive and provided a «western» link to Cypriot diplomats. See Robert O. Keohane, «The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly.» *International Organization*, Spring 1967 (Vol. 21, No. 2), pp. 221-237.

As for the last major outstanding Cold War question at the United Nations, that of Chinese representation, Greece almost to the end supported the American position. Finally, recognizing the changing climate at the United Nations, if not also the mood of the United States, Greece by 1969, shifted to abstention on the issue. In 1971 Greece voted in favor of the 22 power draft that required a 2/3 vote to deprive Taiwan of its credentials (Cyprus and Turkey abstained) and abstained on the 23 power draft expelling Taiwan and giving representation to Peking only.

Greece in important political organs of the organization. Given the peculiar position of Greece in the «group» structure, the pattern of geographical representation, the impact of the Cyprus problem in its relation with the United States, and the diplomatic isolation of the 1967-1974 period, Greece has only served one term in the Security Council and that in the seat allocated to Eastern Europe in 1952-53.⁵

The final indicator of Greek participation that will be analyzed is the financial support of Greece for the United Nations. This is one of many ways of indicating support for the organization and its activities,⁶ and has been selected because it shows what support a state intends to provide the United Nations, the impact that state has on the organization, and the willingness to bear the burdens of the organization.⁷ The latter is significant particularly for a developing state like Greece. The figures below are average annual payments to the United Nations and its related agencies and include assessed as well as voluntary payments actually made rather than just assessments and pledges. Of course, the average percent of increase in the 1960's was high in most cases because of the expansion of United Nations programs. What is important, though, is the increase in contributions over specific periods of time, and also the comparison with other contributions over the same time period.

Greece: Mean Annual Contributions in 000's⁸

1946-50	1951-55	1956-59	1960-64	1965-69
149	235[+ 58%]	284[+ 21%]	980[245%]	2538[+ 159%]
Mean increase 1946-1969: + 121%				

The mean increase for Greece for the period of 1946-69 is only surpassed by Sweden (+ 126%), Finland (+ 169%), Austria (+ 179%), Japan (+ 126%) and is followed by Ireland (+121%) and Cyprus (+120%). Although some African and some Communist bloc states show significant if not greater increases, the amounts involved are minimal and are not therefore accurate indicators. In contrast to these figures

5. For that matter, even in the economic and social organs of the United Nations, Greece has occupied proportionately fewer and less influential positions compared to her neighbors, Yugoslavia and Turkey.

6. See John F. Clark, Michael K. O'Leary and Eugene R. Wittkopf, «National Attributes Associated with Dimensions of Support for the United Nations.» *International Organization*, Winter 1971 (Vol. 25, No. 1), pp. 1-25.

Other methods include General Assembly voting indices and Delegation size indices.

7. See the recent study by E. T. Rowe, «Financial Support for the United Nations: The Evolution of Member Contributions 1946-1969.» *International Organization*, Autumn 1972 (Vol. 26, No. 4), pp. 619-658.

8. E.T. Rowe, *op. cit.*, p. 623.

there are also: the USSR (+106%); the US (+35%); the UK (+27%); France (+33%); Yugoslavia (+56%) and Turkey (+39%). It is even more accurate to examine the question of the burden of contributions in terms of actual and adjusted GNP.¹

Annual Contributions	1946-50		1951-55		1956-59		1960-64		1965-69	
	%	Peren- tile Rank	%	PR	%	PR	%	PR	%	PR
Greece GNP	.010	11	.011	7	.010	9	.022	47	.037	66
Adj. GNP	.017	9	.017	5	.014	9	.029	31	.041	59
US GNP	.032	77	.025	71	.022	66	.035	73	0.29	56
Adj. GNP	.032	61	.025	29	.022	32	.035	52	0.29	32
USSR GNP	.033	1	.006	1	.011	15	.014	14	.017	21
Adj. GNP	.004	1	.008	1	.012	5	.015	5	.017	7

In general, the high support record on the basis of contributions made by Greece, especially in the 1960's, is indicative of a strong interest in the organization and its activities.² But a good part of this support is due to the United Nations peacekeeping on Cyprus which has served Greek objectives on the island since 1964. Toward UNFICYP, specifically, during the period of March 27, 1964, to December 15, 1972, Greece has contributed nearly \$11 million. This is the fourth largest contribution after the United States (\$52 million), Britain (\$30 million) and the Federal Republic of Germany (\$11.5 million). In contrast, for the same period, Turkey had contributed \$1.8 million for the Cyprus operation.³

It will remain to be seen in the future whether Greece, following a settlement of the Cyprus Question, will continue such high levels of financial support for the organization. It is my estimation, though, that this will not be the case and that Greece will return to lower levels of financial support as long as no other issue at the United Nations obtains the level of priority that Cyprus had had for Greek diplomacy since 1964.

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 634-635.

2. For Greece, like most other countries, the United Nations contributions still amount to a fraction of the GNP and a fraction of the military budget. See E.T. Rowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 650-654.

3. See letter and statement by Secretary-General Waldheim distributed to all UN delegations on January 30, 1973.

prospects

The preceding pages have outlined various characteristics of Greece, and how such characteristics affected Greek participation in the United Nations. Two key cases were also examined involving the United Nations and Greece. In general, it must be said that the reasons for which Greece joined the United Nations are still valid today, and are likely to remain so with the evolution of the international system toward multipolarity. For the reasons outlined earlier, the possibilities of a dynamic leadership role for Greece at the United Nations do not exist, unless a dramatic realignment of Greek foreign policy takes place in Athens. Yet the prospects for continued Greek participation at the United Nations are good, especially as the organization continues to deal with issues of relevance to Greece.

The 1969 withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe also raised questions as to the prospects of continued Greek membership at the United Nations. Such speculation though lacked seriousness. Even if the political conditions of the 1967-1974 period had persisted in Greece, the possibility of a similar forced withdrawal (or expulsion) on questions of violations of human rights would have been nil. This would be due to the different procedures, political climate and composition of the United Nations, and the fact that the Greek case would have never aroused in the Assembly a coalition such as the one witnessed in the same time period on the question of apartheid and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Since the return to political normalcy in Greece late in the summer of 1974 there is evidence indicating greater activism by Greece in international organizations. Such efforts seem to be directed primarily toward European regional organizations rather than the United Nations. This is not unusual though and is likely to remain so in the near future given the Greek economic needs, the new political image of Greece in the aftermath of the junta, and the «new look» in Greek foreign policy as it seeks to define its place among the other Western countries and break away from the influence of the United States for the first time since 1945.

One final comment is also in order. Despite the revival of interest in modern Greek politics and foreign policy over the past decade, the field of Greek participation in international political, economic and social organizations, remains relatively untouched. This may then be the time of reviving this relatively unknown side of Greek foreign policy.