


## HAPSc Policy Briefs Series

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# HAPSc

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## Topic 1

### Democracy and Civil/Human/Social Rights

# Escalated Force as a Model of Protest Policing: A Case Study of the Rotterdam 2021 Protests<sup>1</sup>

Karolina Owczarek<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract<sup>3</sup>

Since the pandemic outbreak, the Netherlands has been repeatedly gripped by protests over successive restrictions. Protesters were often characterized by aggression and violence, so they had to be demobilized to restore order to the streets. In some cases, the police were forced to use coercive measures. Nonetheless, the November 2021 protest in Rotterdam caused considerable controversy. During the demonstration, gunshots were fired at demonstrators for the first time in a dozen years. This article aims to attribute the strategy of police action during the Rotterdam protests to one of the two models determined by McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy and operationalized by Rak. The study draws on qualitative source analysis and the content analysis technique. The most opinion-forming Dutch news sites, both Dutch- and English-language, were used as sources. These sources were supported by international news sites and channels on the streaming service YouTube. Additionally, the Rotterdam police's Twitter account and the official politie.nl website were analyzed. A theoretically grounded hypothesis was posited that: during the Rotterdam protests in November 2021, the police, due to the dynamic development of the rally, used a model closer to an escalated force. However, it did not occur in its pure form.

**Keywords:** Protest; protest policing; police; riots; civil disorder.

## Introduction

Since the pandemic outbreak in the Netherlands, protesters have opposed the restrictions. Nevertheless, the initial protests were peaceful. The first significant unrest occurred in January 2021, when the rulers decided to impose a curfew to protect the public from the spread of coronavirus. After the announcement, violent clashes lasted for three days in cities such as Eindhoven and Amsterdam. Cars were set on fire, public property was destroyed, and there were attacks targeting police officers carrying out orders. Despite previous demonstrations, the most controversial protests occurred in Rotterdam on November 19, 2021. During the earlier gatherings, police were permitted to use water cannons and dogs or mounted police to end demonstrations. There were also multiple arrests, but it was not until Rotterdam that the first gunshots were fired. It caused a stir among the public both in the Netherlands and internationally. This article aims to attribute the strategy of police action during the Rotterdam protests to one of the two models of protest policing, i.e., escalated force and negotiated management.

<sup>1</sup> To cite this paper in APA style: Owczarek, K. (2022). Escalated Force as a Model of Protest Policing: A Case Study of the Rotterdam 2021 Protests. *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series*, 3(2), 8-13. <https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33776>

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<sup>3</sup> This research paper is a result of the research project Civil Disorder in Pandemic-ridden European Union. It was financially supported by the National Science Centre, Poland [grant number 2021/43/B/HS5/00290].

## Theoretical and Methodological Framework

Clark McPhail, David Schweingruber, and John McCarthy determined two models of protest policing, i.e., negotiated management and escalated force. Joanna Rak (2021) operationalized them. Police behavior is on the continuum determined by the following dimensions: (I) the extent to which the police respect and protect the rights of protesters; (II) the extent to which the police are tolerant of disruptions occurring during an ongoing protest; (III) the nature of communication between the police and demonstrators; (IV) the extent and manner of the use of arrests as a method of managing demonstrators; (V) the extent and manner of the use of force or in combination with arrests to control demonstrators (Rak, 2021). The extreme values of protest policing determine a continuum. The first is a value corresponding to escalated force, while the second is that of negotiated management.

The extent to which police respect and protect the rights of protesters: (1) officers do not recognize freedom of assembly. Moreover, permits for protests are not issued. (2) officers protect freedoms, which is its primary purpose occurring on par with protecting life and property.

The extent of police tolerance for disturbances occurring during an ongoing protest: (1) The police only recognize peaceful forms of protest. Any disruptions that occur that include conditions previously unknown to protest officials are not tolerated by law enforcement. (2) All of the protesters are protected. Unregistered protests that arise spontaneously do not require a permit. While the police seek to limit possible disruptions caused by demonstrations, these are not a reason to end them.

The nature of communication between police and demonstrators: (1) communication between law enforcement and demonstrators is minimal. Police avoid consulting and negotiating with protesters before and during gatherings. (2) Communication is a necessary form of organized assemblies that protects the right to assemble and maintains control over it. It keeps the disruptions that occur at a level acceptable to the police. The police strive to support interaction with protesters before and during the assembly. Protesters need the police to protect a given gathering. The police do not have total control over the protest, as part of it is handed over to the protesters, who have their coordinators (Rak, 2022).

The scope and use of arrests as a method of managing demonstrators: (1) arrests are not necessarily supported by legal grounds; they also occur in the absence of violations of legal norms. The response to breaches of the law is immediate. During arrests, physical force is applied, particularly to protesters who appear to be the most active; (2) They are used arrests as a last resort and only against those protesters who have committed violations of legal norms. The necessary documentation is drawn up

from the conduct of such actions, and numerous warnings precede the arrests themselves. Protesters are repeatedly informed that they are violating the law and allowed to stop their activities.

The extent and manner of using force instead of or in conjunction with arrests to control demonstrators: (1) despite the occurrence of arrests, the use of force as physical punishment against protesters is also emerging. By physical force, we mean using tear gas, batons, electric stun guns, horses, and dogs. The force gradually escalates until the goal is achieved - compliance with police orders; (2) force is used only when required to carry out duties such as protecting people, public order, and property. Clashes with protesters are avoided, and negotiation and cordoning off the demonstration area is essential (Rak, 2021).

Qualitative source analysis using the content analysis technique has been used to conduct this study. As a research tool, the models presented by McPhail, McCarthy, and Schweingruber and operationalized by Rak (2021), sources such as the most opinion-forming Dutch news sites and English-language Dutch news sites will be analyzed. The analysis will be supplemented by international sources such as CNN, BBC, Reuters, and The Guardian. It should be noted that most of these broadcasters also have their channels on the YouTube streaming portal, so in addition to written information, footage of November 19, 2021, protest in Rotterdam can also be found. In addition, the Twitter feed of the Rotterdam police (POL\_Rotterdam) will be analyzed as an additional source as the official police website (politie.nl). The analysis will consist of reviewing written information and videos, as well as photos of the protests. Then, based on the literature, an attempt will be made to assign to which of the two extremes of the five variables the actions taken by officers fit. Based on the literature, a theoretically grounded hypothesis was established: During the November 2021 protests in Rotterdam, the police used an escalated force model due to the dynamic nature of the rally.

## Research findings

The cause of the outbreak of the protest, and subsequent rioting, was the tightening of existing regulations in the Netherlands regarding the coronavirus pandemic. After the resurgence of infections, the Dutch government decided to introduce a partial lockdown whereby bars and restaurants could be open until a maximum of 8 p.m. At the same time, stores had to close at 6 p.m. When the present riots broke out in November, they considered introducing a 2G rule (DeTelegraaf, 2021). The introduction of this rule would have restricted the use of sectors such as culture and food service to unvaccinated people, who until now had been able to use these sectors with a negative test for COVID-19 (Deutsch, 2021). This proposal could have been perceived as an attempt to segregate society. Further consequences may have been the feeling born in the protesters portrayed by Reicher

and Stott (2020), that is, a division between "us" (the unvaccinated, who do not support restrictions) and "them" (those in power and the police officers who carry out the orders of those in power). The Netherlands was the first Western European country to decide to implement a partial lockdown starting in the summer of 2021.

On November 19 at around 8 p.m., about 100 people gathered on the Coolsingel in Rotterdam for an unregistered protest (DutchNews, 2021). Initially, according to the mayor, they knew of the upcoming demonstration thanks to intelligence services and wanted to give the protesters a place to express their views. Nevertheless, more people showed up than expected, and the situation developed rapidly. The police quickly lost control of the aggressively behaving crowd (Volkskrant, 2021). Therefore, the mayor issued an emergency order (Noodbevel), which prohibited people from being in and around Coolsingel and the two train stations. This emergency order is given in the event of disturbances or riots but can also be issued in fear of them (Article 175). Train services have also been suspended. These legal regulations, which automatically qualify the protest as illegal, meet the criteria of the escalated force model.

The tolerance for community disruption is much closer to the escalated force model. From the onset of the first aggressive behavior considered disruption, the mayor of the city of Rotterdam introduced the previously mentioned emergency order. As the recordings and police statements on Twitter (post from 9:27 p.m.) show, warning shots were fired initially (1-1-2 Renkum, 2021).

Communication between protesters and police also leans closer to the escalated force model. During the many previous protests in the Netherlands, a high level of police activity could be seen, among other channels such as Twitter or directly at the rally through voice messages with requests to leave the area. However, in the footage analyzed, the police only use sound signals like sirens and light signals (NBC News, 2021). Missing are any voice announcements that could have been heard during previous protests in the Netherlands (BBC, 2021).

The fourth dimension, regarding arrests, is questionable, as hundreds of demonstrators showed up at the demonstration, but only 49 people were arrested, according to a Rotterdam police release (Politie, 2021a). Police also asked for footage and photos of the riots to arrest those who acted unlawfully during these protests. They sought to apprehend all law-breaking protesters, as evidenced by posts on Twitter and the official police website. As mentioned earlier, voice announcements and warnings about law-breaking demonstrators are not heard in the riot footage, which locates protest policing closer to the escalated force model. Nevertheless, the footage of arrests does not show special police brutality as it did a few months earlier in Hague, which situates protest policing close to the negotiated

management (NBC News, 2021). Accordingly, in the absence of unambiguous characterizations of extreme police behavior, the present arrests must be placed between the model of negotiated management and the escalated force.

The final dimension is the extent and manner of the use of force. Officers took actions that caused much controversy after the events in Rotterdam. Rotterdam Police admitted to using firearms in an official statement. Warning and target shots were fired (Politie, 2021b). They were to protect the protesters and people from other institutions (fire departments) that had come to deal with the unrest and prevailing chaos in the streets (The Guardian, 2021). In the end, four people were injured by gunfire in the protest, while the total number of injured people who required assistance was 7. However, firearms were not the only means of using force to secure this protest. Both dogs, horses, special police forces, and water cannons were used to demobilize and disperse demonstrators in the streets. These measures aimed to bring the chaos that engulfed Rotterdam that night under control as quickly and effectively as possible.

## Conclusions

Police used a model closer to the escalated force than negotiated management when securing the Rotterdam protests on November 19, 2021. This conclusion allows us to accept the previously stated hypothesis. An essential element in this regard was the failure to issue voice commands before using force, as was the case during previous protests. Moreover, the definition of the protest as illegal, the lack of tolerance for any disruption, or the previously mentioned lack of communication between the police and the protesters proves that the police acted against the protesters and did not protect them and secure the demonstration.

The protesters were characterized by aggression and violence from the very beginning. The riots also resulted in injuries to officers, one of whom required hospitalization. Setting fire to cars and throwing bicycles, stones, or fireworks at police officers was not a peaceful attempt to express their views. Moreover, the radicalization of the protesters may have resulted from the division between "us" (the protesters) and "them" (the police, the mayor of Rotterdam, and the government). Media reports and a press conference by Rotterdam Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb indicate that police recognized hooligan fan groups during the riots. It may have influenced the course of the current protest, but it does not justify how the police acted with so much force in such a relatively short period.

Not all actions taken by the police could be placed on the extreme value continuum for the escalated force model. The protesters' behavior limited the use of the negotiated management model by the police. However, the decisions and reactions they made were immediate. Nevertheless, their steps

were closer to escalated force model. During the protest, there was a lack of communication between protesters and the police. It was decided to suppress the protest in the shortest possible time, with all available means authorized by the mayor of Rotterdam.

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# Taking Over the Role of Law Enforcement by National Television: The Case Study of Women's Strike Protests in Pandemic-Ridden Poland<sup>1</sup>

Kamila Rezmer-Płotka<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract<sup>3</sup>

The study aims to show how the media took over the role of law enforcement by categorising who and how broke the law during women's protests. These protests took place during the second wave of the pandemic. It all started with the judgment of the Constitutional Court, which decided to restrict abortion law in Poland. The method used in the study is a qualitative analysis of sources published on Tvp.info. The analysis made it possible to answer the question of how public television assessed and categorised the activity of protesters and why it is possible to talk about taking over the functions of the security services. As a result, the way the protests were reported became a form of mediatised control of protest. The research hypothesis is that National Television, as the ruling party's propaganda tool, was enabled in order to take over the police function of ensuring public order and security in crisis situations in relation to the protests. Based on the analysis, the paper introduces recommendations to the ruling party and subordinated national television in order to restore neutrality and realise the original functions of national television.

**Keywords:** Women's Protest; Poland; police; public television; abortion.

## Introduction

National television in Poland operates under the Broadcasting Act of 29 December 1992, which stipulates, *inter alia*, that "Public broadcasting carries out a public mission by offering, on the terms set out in the Act, to the whole society and its parts, diverse programs and other services in the field of information, journalism, culture, entertainment, education and sport, characterised by pluralism, impartiality, balance and independence as well as innovation, high quality and integrity of the message" (Act of 29 December 1992). Since 2015, the national media in Poland have been completely subordinated to the ruling party. Accordingly, they began to act solely in its interest. Public television has started to play the role not only of creating public opinion but also manipulating information in such a way as to discredit opponents and even make them seem as enemies of the democratic system (Rak, 2021). National television uses specific techniques for propaganda purposes. Including gatekeeping, it allows presenting only this information that promotes the ruling party, with the

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omission or dedication of little attention to the positive actions of the opposition. Secondly, framing is used, thanks to which control over the content of the message and the way it is presented. This makes it possible to propose a way of interpreting the phenomenon. The last technique involves manipulating the viewers' emotions (Sobczak, 2017: 140–152).

During the second wave of the pandemic (contractually: the period from September to December 2020) in Poland, there were mass protests related to the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal that a premise for abortion about severe and irreversible handicap or incurable life-threatening illness is not constitutional. So far in Poland, the issue of abortion has been regulated based on the Act of 1993, the so-called abortion compromise that allows abortion to be carried out in three defined cases. These cases are: pregnancy with a risk to the woman's health or life; a high likelihood of irreversible foetal impairment and incurable life-threatening disease; suspicion that pregnancy results from a criminal act, such as rape (Act of 7 January 1993). In this way, a decision was made to tighten the existing law. Due to the importance of this event and the mass protests of citizens, mainly women, during the pandemic, when the right to assembly was significantly limited (Rezmer-Płotka, 2020; Osiewicz, 2020), the media reported in detail on their course.

However, how national television reported these events indicated that it had taken over the role of the police in the field of ensuring public order and security in crisis situations. In a democratic state, the costs of repression are higher than in the case of other regimes, hence the need to legitimise one's own actions (Davenport, 2007: 10). In Poland, one of the tools allowing to obtain legitimacy for decisions taken by the ruling party has become national television.

If police control of protests can be treated as an indicator of state authorities' general approach to controlling particular dissident groups, then there is a possibility that politicised national television may also be such an indicator (Earl, Soule & McCarthy, 2003: 582). The media took over the role of law enforcement by categorising who and how broke the law, which is the competence of the police. Stigmatisation through the use of terms such as "anti-patriotic" or "communist" by the government and police stimulates repression (Combes & Fillieule, 2011: 8). In the proposed study the level and the means of stigmatization from the government through the media is examined as well as the way that the latter have taken the role of security services in Poland.

The study aims to show how the media took over the role of law enforcement by categorising who broke the law. The method used in the study is a qualitative analysis of sources published on Tvp.info (TVP.info). The study included all materials directly related to the protests in the period from 22.10. 2020 to 30.10. 2020. As a supplement, the later effects of the police actions from that period (until

December 2020) were also indicated. The data was collected according to key words such as: protest, women, pandemic, police, abortion, women's strike, women's protest, protests, Warsaw, Constitutional Tribunal, abortion compromise. In addition, news was limited to the indicated time period only and the following research assumption was adopted: how did the media take over the functions of the police and how did they perform them? The analysis made it possible to answer the question of how national television assessed and categorised the activity of protesters and why it is possible to talk about taking over the functions of the security services in area of ensuring public order and security in crisis situations. The research hypothesis is: National Television, as a propaganda tool of the ruling party, is enabled in order to take over the police function of law enforcement in relation to the protests.

### **Women's protests against the restriction of abortion law**

Abortion law in Poland has constantly aroused many emotions, and attempts have been made to change it. One of the more severe attempts occurred in 2016, a year after Law and Justice party won the elections. Then there was the so-called black protest or umbrella protest because citizens protested on the streets of Polish cities dressed in black and holding umbrellas in their hands (Chmielewska, Druciarek & Przybysz, 2017). However, there were no changes in the so-called abortion compromise at that time.

Another attempt at change was successful, and the compromise on abortion was violated. The protests that took place after the verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal were organised in many Polish cities. Their common denominator, apart from expressing their lack of acceptance of change, was the symbol of red lightning. Over time, spontaneously organised protests turned into an organised women's protest movement headed by Maria Lempart. Women expressed their opposition in various forms, including social media, on the streets, in the residences of hierarchs of the Catholic Church, at the entrances and exits from the Sejm building, and before the house of the ruling party's leader.

The most important protest was held under the slogan "Everyone in Warsaw", which took place on 30.10.2020. On that day, thousands of citizens marched through the streets of the capital city, calling on the ruling party to resign and loudly advocating respect for human rights, a secular state (the Catholic Church in Poland is an important actor in social life) or independent courts. After this protest, there were others, but none were so significant and attractive of such media attention. At the end of November 2020, demobilisation and a significant decrease in the frequency of protests could be observed.

## National Television as the police against protesters

National television discredited the protesters and assessed their actions at various levels. Based on the analysis, the following main sections were distinguished: categorising protesters; demonstrating activity that threatens the stability and integrity of the state (including anti-patriotic activity); identifying risks to the health and safety of citizens; assessing the activity of protesters.

Within the "Categorising protesters" section, the following can be distinguished: use of terms commonly considered offensive or biased, pejorative, e.g., "abortion supporters", "feminists", "crude boss"; and discrediting the opposition, which was supposed to blend in with the crowd and manifest aggressive behaviour.

The section that deals with activities "threatening the stability and integrity of the state" concerns mainly: anti-patriotic actions, e.g. demanding a change in the name of the roundabout, which refers to "one of the fathers of independence", vulgarity, attacks on the Polish state, anarchist inspirations, abuses by comparing the current situation with martial law in Poland; attacking the police by protesters, violating their bodily integrity and threats, scuffles, aggression; vandalism manifested by the desecration of religious symbols, songs and the devastation of church buildings by protesters; pointing to the illegality of organised assemblies.

In the section "Identifying threats to the health and safety of citizens", news regarding the protests during the pandemic and an increased risk of infections are classified.

The last section, "assessing the activity of protesters", concerns news designed to show: lies and scandalous statements of people associated with the demonstrations; linking the leader of the women's movement and her controversial statements with the opposition; guided by hate speech by protesters; recalling examples of people supporting protests who have so far performed carols (religious songs) during holidays or planned to perform them; pointing to the decline in citizens' interest in the demonstrations and their illegality, and to polls that showed little support for the liberalisation of abortion and so-called abortion on demand.

The actions of the police towards the protesters, about whom information appeared in the media and were to be an adequate response to the behaviour considered dangerous. In addition, later examples of well-known protesters who were punished for their actions were indicated, such as „grandmother Kasia", who was sentenced by a court sentence to a fine for violating bodily integrity and insulting the police (Tvp.info, 2022).

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The paper's main purpose was to demonstrate how the media took over the role of law enforcement by judging who broke the law. The classification was created based on the analysis of information placed on [tvp.info](http://tvp.info). It presents ways of portraying and categorising protesters and includes: categorising protesters; demonstrating activity that threatens the stability and integrity of the state (including anti-patriotic activity); identifying risks to the health and safety of citizens; assessing the activity of protesters.

Since 2015, the national media in Poland have been completely subordinated to the ruling party. Consequently, the message was designed to consolidate the ruling party's position on the political scene and maintain a stable electorate. This is possible due to the creation of recipients' views and interpreting the phenomena in a way beneficial to the party. It was manifested, among other things, in relation to assemblies and protesters against restricting abortion laws. The Law and Justice essentially identifies with Christian values and the Catholic Church, so generalising and labelling protesters as supporters of abortion by National TV is not surprising. Moreover, it presents a critical attitude towards the opposition and discredits it by highlighting specific incidents and statements or looking for connections with, for example, the controversial leader of the women's movement. The way protests and protesters are presented is very biased, unambiguous and negative. As a result, how the protests were reported and the protesters described became a form of mediatised control of protest. Creating such an image of protests and participating people contributes primarily to their discrediting in the eyes of public opinion. Secondly, it forces television viewers to accept these interpretations as their own. Thirdly, people are strengthening their conviction that the government is striving for protection, stability and security in the state and that the protesters are creating chaos and threaten social order. In a country where the Church plays a significant role, presenting protesters as undermining Christian values or being anti-patriotic, makes them an internal enemy. In addition, selective citation of controversial statements and behaviours adversely affects the image of those taking part in the protests, and thus the importance of the cause for which they are fighting loses its importance. The study contributes to our understanding of the takeover of police functions by the mass media subordinate to the ruling party. It is important from the perspective of propaganda studies and the meaning of the media for the political system. The media are becoming a tool in the hands of the government, which allows, for example, to legitimise undemocratic actions.

The recommendations that can be proposed based on the analysis should primarily include re-creating regulations that would prevent the monopoly on national television. It would be in line with the Broadcasting Act of 29 December 1992 and the initially assumed function of national television,

which was to educate citizens crucial for a stable democracy (Rak & Rezmer-Płotka, 2022). A significant factor is the actions aimed at enabling citizens to create their own opinions based on providing information devoid of emotions and biased opinions of journalists. It is worth considering that those responsible for the Framework Programme should represent different political views and be able to conduct a constructive dialogue. The protests revealed that the image of the police in the eyes of the public has also deteriorated significantly (Rak, 2022). It eventually enabled National Television to take control of them and make evaluations, to enter the role of security services. For this reason, action should be taken to rebuild the authority of the police and restore its social role, which is to be an apolitical service between the government and citizens. Thus, the police should not duplicate political discourse and lead to the social marginalisation of citizens with particular views but act as an independent state administration body that ensures the safety of all citizens, without using excessive force against people with different political views than the ruling party. In a democratic system, political interests cannot be pursued by taking over selected police functions.

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## Big Data, Sentiment Analysis, and Examples during the COVID-19 Pandemic<sup>1</sup>

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### Abstract

Applied research in Big Data has gained popularity and is already transforming corporations, public sector, health care and subsequently everyday life. Big Data are being analysed for a variety of reasons, e.g., predict Brexit negotiating outcomes, optimise operations in agriculture, map and analyse human mobility trends under non-pharmaceutical interventions during the recent pandemic. The period of the COVID-19 pandemic has been characterised also by an ‘infodemic’, meaning an overabundance of both good and bad information. This information needs to be managed effectively as it can yield valuable insights when analysed. In this paper the terms of Big Data, Geospatial Big Data and Sentiment Analysis are presented along with selected cases, from the international literature, of the use of Big Data and analytics during the COVID-19 pandemic.

**Keywords:** Big Data; Spatial Big Data; Sentiment Analysis; COVID – 19.

### Introduction

Applied research in big data has gained popularity and tends to be driven by organisations, researchers, governments and academia that explore methodologies to capitalise on big data, gain economic benefit from revealing relationships, trends and patterns, and not only (Diareme and Tsiligiridis, 2018), e.g. commerce user-generated content about brands is an important source of Big Data that can be transformed into valuable information (Kauffmann et al., 2019). In addition, the rise of Internet of Things (IoT) along with the Internet of Everything (IoE) denotes the need for Big Data solutions. Smart objects connected to the IoE enable researchers, for example, to improve agriculture and food security, optimise logistics, identify and contain fatal infections, decrease pollution in some of the world's largest cities (Zhan et al., 2022).

Under the above concept all devices such as smartphones, transportation facilities, public services, and home appliances are used as data creator devices, and data comes in heterogenous formats. Data can come from structured data sources, semi-structured or unstructured, in addition data can also be spatial. Moreover, the size of the data generated is calculated not in terabytes but in Petabytes,

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Zetabytes or even Brontabytes and Geabytes. One source of Big Data is data generated in social media as well as comments posted online. Human beings share their good or bad opinions about subjects, products, and services through internet and social networks, and the ability to effectively analyse this kind of information is seen as a key competitive advantage to better inform decision (Alaoui & Gahi, 2019). Examples of Big Data analysis range from the prediction of Brexit negotiating outcomes (Georgiadou et al., 2020) to green supply chain management (Q. Zhang, Gao, & Luqman, 2022) and, along with artificial intelligence, help transform Healthcare Management (Efthymiou et al., 2020), and advance pandemic preparedness and response (Tacconelli et al., 2022)

## **Big Data**

For Big Data no single definition exists, and although the term at least as a phenomenon is not new (Smirnova et al., 2018) it has been used since the mid-90s, and was initially associated with size/volume of data (massive data). Today the term refers to datasets that are too large or too complex (Cobb et al., 2018) to be handled by traditional technologies. Some important properties have been described such as the 3Vs (Volume, Variety and Velocity)(Mir et al., 2021), and 5Vs (Volume, Variety and Velocity, Veracity, Variability). Other additional Vs have been proposed, such as Verification, Validation, and Visualization for spatial data, and although their value is debatable, they do touch on important concepts related to the entire pipeline of big data collection, processing and presentation (Diareme and Tsiligidis, 2018).

Since no international benchmarks for the above exists, working with Big Data means that, depending the case, traditional technologies do not suffice, in cases lack scalability, flexibility and/or performance (Oussous et al. 2017), for the extraction, collection from many distributed sources, store, scrub, load, and in general management of the data needed. Today it is typical to see big datasets being processed, as per case, by Artificial Intelligence algorithm, supervised or unsupervised machine learning algorithms to ultimately extract new knowledge. Frequently we also see terms such as “smart house”, “smart city”, “smart agriculture”, and in general smart information systems that combine Big Data and Artificial Intelligence (Mark, 2019).

In addition to the above, spatial computing is becoming significantly important with the proliferation of mobile devices, location-awareness, and not only. Geospatial data primarily revolves around the spatial analysis and classification of events, objects, or phenomena having an element of embedded location (Mir et al., 2021). Geospatial Big Data (GBD) can be broadly defined as data sets that include locational, spatial information, as well as map features, and that exceed the capacity of widely available hardware, software, and/or human resources (J. G. Lee & Kang, 2015; S. Li et al., 2016).

Analysing GBD can have a positive effect in many various fields, from environmental protection to the effective control of self-driving cars (S. Shang et al., 2021). It should be noted that for many scientists, spatial data, under cases, were all along big data. Since much of the data in the world can be georeferenced (S. Li et al., 2016), and since today geospatial data acquisition is implemented in everyday used devices, leading to the augmentation of the volume of data available, the effective management, and visualisation of such data is very important. Moreover, rapid advancements in technologies have resulted in new sensors and large volumes of geospatial data that, so far, have not been fully exploited (Riswantini et al., 2021). The massive Point of Interest Data provided by online platforms, e.g. Baidu (Y. Zhang et al., 2019), Google, OpenStreetMap enable scientists and organisations from various fields to experiment with these technologies and spatiotemporal models.

Challenges concerning Big Data include extract-load-transform methodologies, management of the data, cleaning of the data, need for novel processing and decision-making algorithms and interdisciplinary cooperation depending on the case or field of application. In general, the steps of Cleaning, Aggregation, Encoding, Storage and Access, that we also see in traditional data management, are present in the case of Big Data but are more difficult to deal with because of the complexity of the nature of Big Data. The recent popularity of Big Data has led to the development of several systems and services and the extension of pre-existing ones, open and proprietary ones (Diareme and Tsiligridis, 2018).

It should be noted that there is an ongoing dialogue on human rights, the protection of the people's privacy and security, the need for data anonymisation and not only, as well as security of infrastructure. Important topics in this dialogue are also the ownership of data, bias of data sets, westernisation of data and the digital divide and the need for equal representation of all people from all backgrounds into big data sets (Mantelero, 2018), e.g. gender balance in machine learning datasets is important to stop perpetuating gender ideologies that negatively affect models that have gender as a parameter (Efthymiou et.al., 2020b). It should be noted at this point that the value deriving from the analysis of Big Data is related, also, to the complexity and accuracy of the models and of the algorithms used. However, such a technical analysis is outside of the scope of this opinion paper.

## **Big Data and Sentiment Analysis**

Nowadays, more and more organizations need to handle and analyse a big volume of opinionative text data from various Internet sources. This kind of data is referred in research as User Generated Content (UGC). From a commercial point of view, the UGC is a positive or a negative statement

made by consumers about a product, service, or a whole company, which can be available to a multitude of people and institutions via the Internet (Liapakis et al., 2020). It is notable that previous researches have shown that the UGC is more reliable to consumers compared with the traditional methods of communication (Chong et al., 2016; Liapakis et al., 2020). The problem that is created is that the involved companies or other stakeholders cannot analyse all the UGC that is produced due to the large volume and the diversity of the information (Liapakis et al., 2020). Another problem is that the vast majority of UGC does not consider the rules of spelling, syntax, and grammar (Kim et al., 2004) and this creates many difficulties in understanding and analysing customers' big data. Automatic processing of UGC still represents a challenging task (Sanguinetti et al., 2022).

The above problem can be approached with the Sentiment Analysis (or Opinion Mining). This methodology utilizes Natural Language Processing (NLP), Information Retrieval (IR), Computational Linguistics and Machine Learning (ML) techniques for extracting subjective information from source materials (Liapakis et al., 2020). It is a new field of research in Informatics, which uses modern techniques for mining and analysing a large amount of unstructured opinionative text data that is, among others, continuously produced in social media networks. The main purpose of this methodology is to classify the UGC into two polarities: Positive or Negative.

Sentiment Analysis relies on two types of techniques, i.e., machine learning and lexicon-based. Machine learning techniques are divided into supervised and unsupervised approaches. There is a large amount of literature work dealing with the above approaches. Some well-known supervised approaches are the Naïve Bayes, the Support Vector Machine, and the K-Nearest Neighbours (KNN). On the other hand, some known unsupervised machine learning approaches are the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) and the probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis (pLSA). These approaches are quite consuming only in particular circumstances (e.g. instances that evaluate only one factor) and in most cases are implemented easily (Liapakis et al., 2020). The methodology is also applied in three levels: document-level, sentence-level, and aspect-level. The document-level is recommended in cases that a document expresses opinions only for an entity (product, service etc.). The sentence-level is recommended in cases that a sentence expresses a single opinion about an entity and from only one person. The aspect-level which is called also entity or feature level detects the sentiment for the aspects of an entity.

### **Big Data and COVID-19 related analysis**

Since early 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic caused by SARS-CoV-2, is affecting the entire globe impacting and profoundly changing life. Furthermore, the spread of the COVID-19 global pandemic

has generated an extraordinary volume of data, thus the term ‘infodemic’ has been used, e.g. individuals frequently express their views, opinions and emotions about the events of the pandemic on Twitter, Facebook, etc. (Xu et al., 2022), and create the need to manage and monitor these data in order to obtain relevant information (Piccarozzi & Aquilani, 2022) as well as to manage the changing needs of many economic sectors. Moreover, for COVID-19 pandemic no past observations could be used to provide a relevant signal about its potential economic (Barbaglia et al., 2022), and not only, impact.

Below we present selected examples of the use of Big Data as well as Sentiment Analysis during the COVID-19 pandemic. For an extensive list of publications and additional areas of applications, to the ones mentioned below, the interested reader is referred to Alsunaidi et al. (2021), Haafza et al. (2021) and Zhang et al. (2022). Shi et al. (2021) analysed massive CT lung image among COVID-19, CAP, and nonpneumonia subjects in order to improve understanding of COVID-19. Qiu et al. (2020) used internet search data to investigate symptom characteristics of COVID-19. For additional information on how big data and epidemiological data can be used to help get a better understanding of COVID-19 the interested reader is also referred to Leung et al. (2020).

Azzaoui et al. (2021) proposed a Social Network Service Big Data Analysis Framework for COVID-19 outbreak prediction in smart sustainable healthy city, where Twitter platform is adopted. They analysed over 10.000 openly shared tweets of USA users using NLP. Data were collected during a two months period from August 1, 2020 until September 30, 2020. According to the authors the method proposed is able to predict the next COVID-19 outbreak and related hotspots 7 days earlier, more or less, than the government authorities. Other researchers, e.g. X. Li et al. (2020), have analysed big data to improve the predictability of COVID-19. Galetsi et al. (2022) identified several Big Data Analytics and artificial applications developed to deal with the initial COVID-19 outbreak and the containment of the pandemic, along with their benefits for the social good.

Hu et al. (2021) took a big data driven approach to analyse mobile device location data (spatial data) of over 150 million monthly active samples in the United States. According to the authors the study successfully measures human mobility with three main metrics at the county level: daily average number of trips per person; daily average person-miles travelled; and daily percentage of residents staying home. Lu et al. (2021) retrieved park visit-related Instagram posts published in the four cities in Asia between December 16, 2019, and March 29, 2020 and found that there is a 5.3% increase in the odds of people using greenspaces for every 100-case increase in weekly new cases. Rice and Pan (2020) analysed park visitation as important to maintaining wellbeing during the COVID-19 pandemic and examine factors influencing changes in park visitation. The data used derived from the

Google's COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports as well as available park mobility data from 97 countries in the Western region of US. Shang et al. (2021) explored the user behaviors and environmental benefits of bike sharing. An additional notable example of both online and offline data is the Early AI-supported Response with Social listening of the World Health Organisation (EARS). EARS is using NLP and machine learning in order to analyse millions of opinions every month, structure them into categories and intents, so that actionable insights can be produced based on how public conversations are evolving every day (World Health Organization, 2021). Lately, several studies have been published that explore COVID-19 vaccination hesitancy using sentiment analysis and data from social networks. For such cases the interested reader is referred to (Xu et al., 2022) and Qorib et al. (2022). In the latter publication, apart from the proposed methodology, a comparative study of 14 publications on COVID-19 vaccine Sentiment Analysis is presented.

During the pandemic, data from social media have also been used for supply chain management. Other studies also address maintaining social distance in real time using image processing (Melenli & Topkaya, 2020), the development of COVID-19 Surveillance Dashboard (Peddireddy et al., 2020), detecting illicit product sales (Mackey et al., 2020), and retail analytics from which organisations can make decisions to anticipate the COVID-19 effects, specifically, to produce production possibility curve, reduce shortage and avoid surplus using demand and supply curves, and detect current economic conditions (Sharma et al., 2021).

## Conclusions

Findings from the international literature suggests that governments and policy makers can benefit from analysing Big Data and UGC. Sentiment Analysis can be used as a real-time tool by policymakers and organisations who are always in need of information to collect input and identify citizens'/customers preferences, trends, and needs. UGC can reveal the range of society's preferences and possibly advocate distinct policy and decision-making paths (Georgiadou et al., 2020). Governments have begun to use large datasets mined from social media to identify patterns of individual and group sentiment that may reveal, among others, the degree to which they support or oppose their policies. This is similar to businesses, which have been integrating customer comments expressed online into new product creation. (Riswantini et al., 2021).

It has been highlighted that during the pandemic, policymakers need short-term predictions and nowcasts of the current state of the economy to design timely policy actions and assess the success of various activities in mitigating the pandemic's negative effects (Barbaglia et al., 2022; Ferrara et al., 2022), in protecting societal well-being, and also to have a better understanding of citizens

evolving concerns and information needs (World Health Organisation, 2021). Big Data have become an important support system in dealing with global healthcare crisis as well as a tool for economic sustainability, and social well-being during period of crisis. Participatory social media data as well as other spatial data have been in the centre of the attention.

The analysis of Big Data, enables the development of prediction models and analytical tools for a variety of applications; as presented. The added value deriving from adopting – implementing such analytical tools and models has become apparent for both public and private sector. However, Big Data quality can completely hinder the analysis of data (Alaoui & Gahi, 2019). For this, effective management of data is important but is not the sole important aspect. The EU has already taken steps in strengthening both investments and policies to support digitisation and research and innovation activities as well as adopted new regulations, eg. The Data Act, adopted by the Commission on 23 February 2022 (European Investment Bank, 2021). Policymakers and researchers should not only in the aspect of data quality and security but also consider the impact of data processing on fundamental rights and collective social and ethical values (Mantelero, 2018). The dialogue on ensuring optimal quality of data should be strengthened as well as actions to close the digital divide globally.

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## Emancipation Through Education: The Galician Women's Rights Activist Anastazja

Dzieduszycka (1842-1890)<sup>1</sup>

Anna Citkowska-Kimla<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

Contemporary new approaches to political history take into account – in addition to typical issues related to the state and its representatives – the history of women and the history of gender. Currently, as Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger puts it, the notion of politics is also understood as the space of action within which decisions binding for the collective are made and implemented. Historically, what was political had definite boundaries and was shaped in different ways. The contemporary, broader understanding of the political makes it possible to include in the sphere of public communication also those social groups that had limited opportunities for political action. Therefore, as postulated by Ute Frevert, the previous activities of women who were considered “apolitical” should be reinterpreted, because taking into account the dynamics and historical volatility of the communication space will allow for examining women’s involvement in the public sphere. The main aim of the considerations is to reconstruct women’s activity (still constituting the margin of historical research) on the example of the work of Anastazja Dzieduszycka, a Galician activist for the education and emancipation of women. This primary objective is related to secondary ones. One of them is to show the seeds of the emancipation movement in Galicia. Dzieduszycka is one of the first suffragists who made a lot of effort to break the existing schemes, stereotypes, social barriers and existing culture. She made the first important step towards modern thinking about women. Unveiling her precursory thinking and actions in this area is one of the most important goals of the analysis. My research includes the following conclusions: Dzieduszycka’s pioneering activity proceeds from the starting point, which is the education of teaching staff in new institutes established for this purpose. Thanks to this, young women were raised to independence, which was forced by the hard social and economic situation in which they found themselves. The final goal, however, was the emancipation of women.

**Keywords:** emancipation; education; gender rights.

## Emanzipation durch Erziehung. Die galizischen Frauenrechtsaktivistin Anastazja

Dzieduszycka (1842-1890)

Anna Citkowska-Kimla

### Abstrakt

Zeitgenössische neue Ansätze zur politischen Geschichte berücksichtigen - neben den üblichen Fragen des Staates und seiner Repräsentanten - auch die Frage der Frauengeschichte und der Geschlechtergeschichte. Heute wird Politik, wie Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger es formuliert, auch als der Handlungsräum verstanden, in dem kollektiv verbindliche Entscheidungen getroffen und umgesetzt werden. Historisch gesehen hatte das Politische bestimmte Grenzen und wurde auf unterschiedliche Weise gestaltet. Ein zeitgemäßes, breiteres Verständnis des Politischen ermöglicht die Einbeziehung gesellschaftlicher Gruppen, die in der

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öffentlichen Kommunikationssphäre nur begrenzte Möglichkeiten zum politischen Handeln hatten. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es notwendig, wie Ute Frevert postuliert, vergangene Aktivitäten von Frauen, die als "unpolitisch" galten, neu zu interpretieren, da die Berücksichtigung der Dynamik und der historischen Variabilität des kommunikativen politischen Raums es ermöglicht, das Engagement von Frauen in der öffentlichen Sphäre in Betracht zu ziehen. Das Hauptziel der Analyse ist die Rekonstruktion eines bisher unerkannten Frauenaktivismus (der in der historischen Forschung immer noch eine Randerscheinung ist) am Beispiel von Anastasia Dzieduszycka, einer galicischen Aktivistin für die Bildung und Emanzipation der Frauen. Dieses Hauptziel ist mit Nebenzielen verknüpft. Eines davon ist die Darstellung der Ursprünge der Emanzipationsbewegung in Galicien. Dzieduszycka ist eine der ersten emanzipierten Frauen, die viele Anstrengungen unternommen hat, um die bisherigen Muster, Stereotypen, sozialen Barrieren und die bestehende Kultur zu durchbrechen. Sie machte den ersten wichtigen Schritt zu einem modernen Frauendenken. Die Aufdeckung ihres bahnbrechenden Denkens und Handelns in dieser Hinsicht ist eines der wichtigsten Ziele der Analyse. Die Schlussfolgerungen lauten unter anderem: Dzieduszyckas Pionierarbeit geht von der Ausbildung eines Kaders von Lehrerinnen in den zu diesem Zweck neu eingerichteten Instituten ("Vorbereitungsschulen") aus. Auf diese Weise wurden die jungen Frauen zu der Unabhängigkeit erzogen, die die durch die Krise veränderte soziale und wirtschaftliche Lage, in der sie sich befanden, erforderte. Das Ziel war jedoch die Emanzipation der Frauen.

**Schlüsselwörter:** Emanzipation; Bildung; Geschlechterrechte.

### **Eine neue Auffassung von politischer Geschichte bzw. vom Begriff des politischen Handelns**

Aktuell erweitert sich die Politikgeschichte als Disziplin, die sich mit dem Staat und politisch handelnden Personen befasst, um Fragestellungen zur Geschichte der Frau bzw. zu Geschlechtern. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger definiert etwa eingangs das Politische als „Handlungsraum, in dem es um die Herstellung und Durchführung kollektiv verbindlicher Entscheidungen geht.“ (Stollberg-Rilinger, 2015; Universität Wien, n.d.). Historisch gesehen hatte das Politische definierte Grenzen und wurde unterschiedlich geformt. Gegenwärtig ermöglicht dessen erweitertes Verständnis, innerhalb der öffentlichen Kommunikation auch soziale Gruppen zu berücksichtigen, deren Möglichkeiten für politische Aktivitäten eingeschränkt waren. In diesem Zusammenhang ist – wie Ute Frevert postuliert (Frevert, 1995) – die bisherige Aktivität von Frauen, die als „apolitische“ galten, neu zu interpretieren, da es die Berücksichtigung von Dynamik und historischen Veränderungen im politischen Kommunikationsraum ermöglicht, das Engagement von Frauen im öffentlichen Bereich mitzuberücksichtigen.

Dank der Forschungsstränge von herstory (Robin Morgan) füllt sich eine Lücke in der bisherigen Geschichtsschreibung, in der sozialpolitische Fragestellungen aus männlicher Perspektive dargestellt wurden. Diese Rekultivierung des weiblichen Tätigkeitsfeldes ermöglicht, angesichts des dominanten Androzentrismus' alternative Strömungen in der historischen Forschung aufzuwerten und folglich eine alternative Sichtweise auf Mitteleuropa an der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert.

Dieser neue Ansatz in der historischen Forschung bzw. das aktuelle Verständnis von politischem Handeln, die bisher nicht zu klassifizierende Vorgänge innerhalb des Spektrums politischer Aktivität

berücksichtigen, ermöglichen die Analyse von Anastazja Dzieduszyckas Arbeiten unter diversen Gesichtspunkten. So eröffnen sich neue Forschungsperspektiven auf die Habsburger Monarchie, welche bisher übergangen worden sind, und damit wird auch das Hauptziel der vorliegenden Arbeit definiert: Die Berücksichtigung bisher übergangener Fragestellungen wie Aktivismus von Frauen; deren soziales Engagement; pädagogische und journalistische Aktivitäten; Grundlagen<sup>3</sup> und organische Arbeit; Versuche einer realen Einflussnahme auf herrschende Verhältnisse; Kampf um persönliche Freiheit, Privateigentum, Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz. Diese Fragestellung sind für die vorliegende Analyse des Wirkens von Anastazja Dzieduszycka, einer galizischen Lehrerin und Kämpferin für Frauenrechte, essentiell.

## **Ziele**

Hauptziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist die Rekonstruktion, der bisher nicht berücksichtigt Aktivität von Frauen (bis heute in der historischen Forschung vernachlässigt) am Beispiel der galizischen Erziehungs- und Gleichberechtigungsaktivisten Anastazja Dzieduszycka.

Aus diesem Hauptziel ergeben sich Nebenstränge, wie die Darstellung von Emanzipationsbewegungen in Galizien; genauer gesagt, jener Probleme, mit denen sich die ersten polnischen Emanzipationsaktivistinnen auseinandersetzen mussten, um öffentlich wahrgenommen zu werden bzw. Einfluss nehmen zu können. Dzieduszycka gehörte zur ersten Generation, die sich vor allem darum bemühte, die vorherrschenden Schemata, Stereotypen und sozialen Barrieren ihrer Zeit zu überwinden. Sie unternahm einen ersten wichtigen Schritt in Richtung moderne Sicht auf weibliche Belange. Ihre diesbezügliche Vorreiterrolle im Denken und Handeln aufzuzeigen, zählt zu den wesentlichen Analysezielen.

Ein weiteres ist der Versuch, sui generis die moralische Mission engagierter Frauen im öffentlichen Raum darzustellen, als das noch systemisch erschwert war. Dank der Themen, mit denen sich Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts die ersten Emanzipationsaktivistinnen beschäftigt hatten, stärkten sich weibliche Identität, Kreativität und der Glauben an die Möglichkeit, Aufgaben und Ziele der modernen Frau zu realisieren.

Diese neue Methode der Geschichtswissenschaft, die den bis dahin öffentlich überhörten Diskurs berücksichtigt, beinhaltet auch die „Sisterhood“<sup>4</sup>. Diese wird verstanden als Solidarität unter Frauen; in diesem Fall mit jenen, die höchstens in den Fußnoten der Geschichtsbücher

<sup>3</sup> „Grundlagenarbeit“ und „organische Arbeit“ sind Grundbegriffe des polnischen Postivismus, der zeitlich etwa dem Naturalismus entspricht. Postivismus bezeichnet eine literarische und soziale Bewegung, die nach dem Scheitern des Januaraufstandes mit der Romantik bricht und auf Wissenschaftsgläubigkeit setzt und einen Kult der Arbeit forciert.

<sup>4</sup> „Schwesternschaft“ in nichtreligiöser Bedeutung.

existieren. In der Definition von bell hooks heißt das Triple Oppression<sup>5</sup>. Über die bisher verschwiegene Aktivität von Frauen zu schreiben ist somit Ausdruck der Solidarität mit Aktivistinnen, deren Namen erst entdeckt werden, die von der Geschichte bisher verschwiegen wurden bzw. bloß selten und nebenbei erwähnt wurden.

Ein weiteres Ziel ist, das Gefährdungspotenzial darzustellen, dem Frauen jener Tage ausgeliefert waren. Dank dieses Wissens wird es einfacher, potentielle gegenwärtige Gefahren zu diagnostizieren. Die damalige Situation der Frauen kann zu einer Geschichtsstunde über Politik, Ideologien und Kultur unserer Tage werden - einer auch heute notwendige Geschichtsstunde.

Der Forschungsstand zu Dzieduszycka und ihren Verdiensten ist keineswegs beeindruckend. Sie wurden im Zusammenhang mit Bildungsfragen im 19 Jahrhundert gestreift (Falkowska, 2018), ihr Biogramm fand Aufnahme ins kanonische Polnische biografische Wörterbuch (Hulewicz, 1938) und ihr Lebenslauf wurde von Lech Ślawiński in *Z myślą o Niepodległej* [In Gedanken an die Unabhängige] besprochen. Darüber hinaus gibt es bloß eine polnische Werkbiographie von Joanna Falkowska: *Przeciw marzycielstwu. Działalność edukacyjna Anastazji z Jełowickich Dzieduszyckiej (1842-1890)*” [Wider die Träumerei. Die pädagogische Aktivität von ...], Toruń 2014.

Die wesentlichen Methoden der vorliegenden Arbeit sind die Analyse historischer Quellen sowie die biografische Methode zur Beschreibung von Leben und Werk. Darüber hinaus werden ihre Ansätze aus den Zeitschriftenbeiträgen beschrieben bzw. mit anderen Ideen verglichen.

### **Der geschichtlich-geschlechtliche Zusammenhang**

Die Analyse der pädagogischen und journalistischen Aktivitäten von Anastazja Dzieduszycka vor dem Hintergrund der multikulturellen Monarchie eröffnete die Möglichkeit, die Frauenbewegung in einem weiteren Zusammenhang, sei es politisch, sozial wie auch ökonomisch darzustellen.

Die Donaumonarchie des fin de siècle war ein Sammelsurium diverser kultureller und ideologischer Strömungen. Wesentlich in diesem Zusammenhang sind die virulenten nationalen Befreiungsbewegungen, verschiedene Nationalismen sowie sozialistische Strömungen. Der Nationalismus mit seiner Blut-und-Boden-Ideologie hielt an der traditionellen Verteilung der Geschlechterrollen fest, während der sozialistische Internationalismus, der den Aufbau übernationaler Verbindungen der arbeitenden Klassen propagierte, dabei auch die Frauen

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<sup>5</sup> (b)ell hooks vertritt (ähnlich wie Paulo Freire) den Standpunkt, Schweigen sei ein Zeichen von Entmenschlichung sowie Druckausübung, während Sprechen Befreiung ausdrücke und Handlungsfähigkeit symbolisiere. Der Schritt vom Schweigen zum Sprechen sei wie der Übergang vom Objekt zum Subjekt, ein Übergangsritual (rite de passage), eine aktive Veränderung (hooks, 1989; 2013).

berücksichtigte. An der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert wurden auch feministische Ideen von der rechtlichen und beruflichen Gleichberechtigung der Frauen formuliert. Diese betrafen auch den Zugang zur Bildung. Zu diesen Strömungen gesellten sich des Weiteren die enorme Entwicklung des Kapitalismus' sowie der (Schwer-) Industrie (Górska, 2016). Das Werk von Dzieduszycka ist angesichts dieser Veränderungen als wegweisend zu bezeichnen.

Die Lage der Frauen war zu dieser Zeit in Europa durch patriarchale Strukturen gekennzeichnet. In Galizien entwickelte sich die Emanzipationsbewegung auf Grund der kulturellen Rückständigkeit recht schwach. Daher konzentrierten sich soziale Aktivistinnen in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts auf die Überwindung dieser Misere mittels Propagierung von (konfessioneller) Volksschulbildung bzw. auf die Hebung des Unterrichtsniveaus in privaten Mädchenpensionanten. Dabei ist zu betonen, dass sich das soziale Engagement von Frauen hinsichtlich des pädagogischen Inhaltes auf die Überwindung des sprichwörtlichen Still- und Rückstandes im Kronland konzentrierten. Im 19. Jahrhundert tauchten auch die beiden wichtigsten Forderungen hinsichtlich der Frauenfrage auf: die Öffnung des Bildungssektors<sup>6</sup> und Erwerbsarbeit für Frauen (Wojnarowska, 1854).

Der in Entwicklung begriffene Feminismus jener Tage war keineswegs kohärent. Die Bewegung entwickelte sich in Wien ganz anders als in der verarmten galizischen Provinz. Der Kampf der polnischen Frauen um freien Bildungszugang gestaltete sich auch in den jeweiligen Teilungsgebieten (Habsburger-Monarchie / Preußen / Russland) unterschiedlich (Mrozowska, 1971). In doktrinärer Hinsicht war die Emanzipationsbewegungen im österreichischen Teil fortschrittlich und bildete gleichsam eine Blaupause für den Kampf um Wahlrecht und Zugang zu Bildung. Innerhalb der Bewegung selbst kam es zu diversen Diskrepanzen und Animositäten (so zwischen polnischen und ukrainischen Aktivistinnen bzw. tschechischen und cisleithanischen). Der idealistische Mythos vom Zusammenleben der Volksgruppen innerhalb der Donaumonarchie negierte zwar nationale Konflikte, trotzdem kam es zu nationalen Auseinandersetzungen. Als Beispiel mag jener zwischen Ukrainern (Ruthenen) und Polen dienen. Erstere betrachteten die Polen als Kolonisatoren, genauso wie diese wiederum die Österreicher. Es ist daher wesentlich, sich ins Gedächtnis zu rufen, dass nationale Rivalitäten auch vor Feministinnen nicht Halt gemacht haben. Es gab in dieser Beziehung nicht nur keine Geschlechtersolidarität über die Nationalitätsgrenzen hinweg, vielmehr zeigt das Beispiel polnischer Aktivistinnen, dass diese auf entsprechenden Druck ihre Unterstützung für ukrainische Demonstrantinnen zurückzogen und eine über nationale Einheit fehlte (Górska, 2016).

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<sup>6</sup> Diese Ideen wurden, trotz einer generell kritischen Haltung gegenüber der Emanzipationsbewegung, in der konservativen Tageszeitung „Czas“ [Zeit] vertreten.

Galizien bildete aufgrund der politischen Situation den idealen Nährboden für die Herausbildung einer polnischen Emanzipationsbewegung<sup>7</sup>, da hier unter österreichischer Verwaltung Autonomie herrschte und dieses Kronland für verschiedene Paradoxa gut war: Es beförderte die nationale polnische Identität und beherbergte gleichzeitig unterschiedliche ethnische Gruppen, unter denen es zu Spannungen kam (so wie zwischen Polen und Deutschen im preußischen Teil). Galizien war zu dieser Zeit gleichsam hybrid (Bhabha, 2010), es gab keine dominierende Ideologie (Wolff, 2010)<sup>8</sup> und diverse Nationen und Kulturen (polnische, ukrainische, österreichische, jüdische und sogar ungarische bzw. armenische) beeinflussten sich gegenseitig.

## Biografische Skizze

Anastazja Julianna Ewa Dioniza war die Tochter von Edward Jełowicki und Felicja, geborene Dąbrowska. Ihre Familie gehörte zu den begüterten Großgrundbesitzern und war verwandt mit den Adelsgeschlechtern Czetwertyński und Tyszkiewicz. Sie wurde 1842 auf dem elterlichen Besitz in Woskodawice (Wolhynien) geboren und erhielt eine sorgfältige Ausbildung: „auf einem Gut am Lande, von aufgeklärten Eltern, unermüdlich dem Kindeswohl besorgt und für die Ausbildung derselben große Kosten übernehmend“ (Dzieduszycka, 1871: 5).

Ihre Ausbildung basierte auf der Methode der Klementyna Hoffmanowa, von der sich Dzieduszycka in ihrer späteren pädagogischen Praxis distanzieren sollte, da sie diese als anachronistisch sowie unter den neuen sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen als ungeeignet erkannte. Anastazja Dzieduszycka heiratete sehr früh den Grafen Izydor Dzieduszycki (1842-1888). Dieser war aktiv am Januaraufstand 1863 gegen die russische Teilungsmacht involviert (und auch – ebenfalls erfolglosen – Wolhynienabenteuer des Grafen Wojciech Komorowski), Absolvent der Universität Lemberg mit einem Doktortitel der Philosophie und darüber hinaus Mitglied der polnischen Akademie der schönen Künste sowie ein bekannter Historiker sowie politisch in Ostgalizien aktiv.

Das Schicksal meint es aber nicht gut mit der jungen Dzieduszycką: Sie verlor ihr Vermögen, ihre beiden Kinder starben und der Ehemann wurde geisteskrank. Er verstarb vorzeitig unter ungeklärten Umständen mit 46 in einem Irrenhaus nahe Lemberg<sup>9</sup>. Wenn sie auch an diesen schweren Schicksalsschlägen nicht zerbrach, so zeigten diese doch gesundheitliche Folgen.

Der Verlust des Vermögens brachte Dzieduszycką zum Lehrberuf: „Ich bin glücklich“, schreibt sie,

<sup>7</sup> In Kongresspolen (dem russischen Teil) gab es dank eines politischen Wechsels in Russland merkbare Veränderungen im Schulwesen für Mädchen. In Warschau entstanden erste staatliche Schulen und Mädchenpensionate, die auch in nationaler Hinsicht bedeutend waren.

<sup>8</sup> Wolff beschreibt die im Kronland herrschende Anarchie, Unmoral und fehlende zivilisatorische Standards.

<sup>9</sup> Die Todesumstände von Graf Dzieduszycki blieben ungeklärt (so wie die Obduktion mehrere gebrochene Rippen auf).

„daß ich mich von nun an ausschließlich dem Unterrichte widmen kann, ist es doch der dankbarste Ressort“ (Dzieduszycka, 1890: 247 zitiert nach: Słowiński, 1993: 269). Den Großteil ihres Lebens verbrachte sie in Lemberg und Krakau. In Letzterem übernahm sie im Lehrerseminar für Frauen im März 1879 die Funktion einer „stellvertretenden Oberlehrerin“, um zwei Jahre darauf (August 1881) zur „wirklichen Oberlehrerin“ zu avancieren. Sie unterrichtete Polnisch und hielt Vorlesungen zur Pädagogik.

Dzieduszycka arbeitete fünf Jahre in diesem Lehrerinnenseminar und gab daneben (aus finanziellen Gründen) Privatstunden. In dieser Zeit verschlechterte sich ihr Gesundheitszustand. 1884 musste sie sich für ein halbes Jahr beurlauben lassen, um ein Jahr darauf in den Ruhestand entlassen zu werden. Grund dafür war auch bei ihr eine Geisteskrankheit, die sie zwang, die letzten fünf Lebensjahre im Kloster der Barmherzigen Schwestern in Posen zu verbringen, wo sie am 16. Mai 1890 mit 48 verstarb.

Die Nachrufe dokumentieren ihre herausragenden Leistungen für und in der Pädagogik. So hieß es in der „Kronika Rodzinna“ [Familienchronik]: „Ihr fundamentaler Vortrag sowie der Umgang mit den Schülerinnen hinterließ in den Köpfen und Herzen derselbigen unauslöschliche Spuren“ (Słowiński, 1993: 270), oder in der galizischen Zeitschrift „Szkoła“ [Schule]: „Was für eine Lehrerin sie war, mögen die zahlreichen Oberschülerinnen im Lehrerseminar zu Krakau, die sie verehrten und vom ganzen Herzen liebten, bezeugen. Sie konnte diese einnehmen in der heißen Liebe zum gewählten Berufe und dem erhabenen Verständnis für die Heiligkeit und Erhabenheit der patriotischen Lehrerpflichten“ (Słowiński, 1993: 270).

Dzieduszycka hinterließ ein vielfältiges Werk: zum einen Pädagogisches (*Wypisy, przykłady i wzory form prozy i poezji polskiej. Książka do czytania dla użytku średnich zakładów naukowych żeńskich*<sup>10</sup>, Kraków 1881), dann Kinderliteratur<sup>11</sup> (*Jak sobie działy radziła: opowiadania nauczające dla czytelników od 9 do 13 lat*<sup>12</sup>, Warszawa 1877; *Co dzieci czytały w chwilach wolnych*<sup>13</sup>, Warszawa 1910) und Übersetzungen (Natur- und Reiseerzählungen sowie Mythologie aus dem Deutschen und Englischen); nicht zuletzt die in Galizien erschienenen Ausgangswerke für die vorliegende Arbeit: *Kilka myśli o wychowaniu i wykształceniu niewiast naszych* [Einige Gedanken über Erziehung und Bildung unserer Mädchen], Lwów 1871 (2. Auflage Warschau 1874); *Gawędy matki*<sup>14</sup>, Lwów 1872

<sup>10</sup> Einträge, Beispiele und Vorlagen für polnische Prosa und Lyrik. Ein Lesebuch für mittlere Lehranstalten für Mädchen.

<sup>11</sup> Das Verfassen von Kinderliteratur galt seinerzeit als typische Frauenbeschäftigung (Bilewicz, 1996).

<sup>12</sup> Wie das Kindlein zurechtgekommen ist: lehrreiche Erzählungen für Leser von 9-13 Jahren.

<sup>13</sup> Was Kinder in der freien Zeit lesen.

<sup>14</sup> Was die Mutter sagt.

sowie *Listy nauczycielki poświęcone nauczycielkom ludowym i uczennicom seminariów nauczycielskich żeńskich* [Briefe einer Lehrerin an Volksschullehrerinnen und Elevinen in Lehrerseminaren für Frauen], Kraków 1883.

## **Erziehung**

Die Schlüsselrolle zu einer umfassenden Erziehung spielt laut Dzieduszycka die Mutter. Sie sei Lehrerin und auch Vermittlerin religiöser und moralischer Grundsätze. Eine Mutter, die ihre Nachkommenschaft entsprechend erziehe, gestalte deren Leben: „eine umsichtige Mutter bereitet die Zukunft des Kindes mit dessen Erziehung vor“ (Dzieduszycka, 1875a: 194). Die Mutter ist ebenfalls für die Einführung des Kindes in die soziale Umgebung verantwortlich. Mittels adäquater Erziehung ihrer Kinder kreiert eine Mutter (Staats-) Bürger: „Die Aufgabe der Mutter also ist, Einfluß auf die Gesellschaft zu nehmen, indem sie diese ihre Kinder zu künftigen Bürgern erzieht, die auf die gesellschaftliche Ausrichtung achten“ (Dzieduszycka, 1872: 5).

Laut Dzieduszycka ist „die schönste Anstellung der Frau die Stellung als Mutter“ (Dzieduszycka, 1871: 225). Mit dieser Stellenbeschreibung sind natürlich auch diverse Verpflichtungen verbunden. So soll die Mutter etwa ihre Kinder genau beobachten, um rechtzeitig deren Talente und Interessen zu erkennen. Damit verbunden ist die Notwendigkeit – und das ist im Emanzipationskontext wesentlich – zur ständigen Mütterfortbildung (insbesondere in pädagogischen Belangen). Dzieduszyckas Argumentation erinnert an eine analoge Beweisführung des Thomas von Aquin, der, nachdem er das Besitzrecht nicht vom Naturrecht ableiten konnte, dies auf dem indirekten Weg vollzog: Da wir die natürliche Neigung auf Nachkommenschaft besitzen, müssen wir auch über Mittel zu deren Unterhalt verfügen, und somit ist das Recht auf Eigentum der logische Schluss. Eine ähnliche Taktik kommt in den *Listy nauczycielki* [Briefe einer Lehrerin] zur Anwendung: Da der Zeitgeist die öffentliche Forderung nach Bildungschancen für Frauen nicht gestattet, hat sie den logischen Schluss von der angeborenen Veranlagung der Frau zur Mutterschaft angewandt: Um ihrer Sendung als Mutter zur Gänze nachkommen zu können, müsste sie sich auf diesem Gebiet entwickeln. Dank eines erworbenen pädagogischen Wissens, kann sie dieser Lebensaufgabe besser nachkommen. Im Artikel *O tym i owym* [Über dies und jenes] heißt es: „eine Mutter kann nie früh genug mit der Arbeit an sich selbst beginnen, um sich für die sie zu erwartende Stellung als Lehrerin vorzubereiten“ (Dzieduszycka, 1875: 194).

Daher sollen Mütter zur Pflichterfüllung die Bürde der Bildung auf sich nehmen. Diese Pflicht zur ständigen Weiterbildung betrifft allerdings auch Lehrerinnen. Hierbei dachte sie insbesondere an Volksschullehrerinnen, denen sie viel Aufmerksamkeit widmete. Dementsprechende Fragestellungen

wurden in den Listy [Briefen] von 1883 (Dzieduszycka, 1883: 18) behandelt. Dzieduszycka streicht dabei das Sozialprestige des Lehrerberufes hervor, weist aber gleichzeitig auf typische Belastungen und Herausforderungen hin. Lehrer(innen) müssten nämlich ein gutes Auge, Gehör, eine kräftige Stimme und Lungen haben sowie „wetterfest“ sein (widrige Witterungsbedingungen während der Anfahrt zur jeweiligen Volksschule). Die Arbeit als Lehrerin würde im Grunde die ganze Zeit in Anspruch nehmen, sei sie doch „jeglichen Tages, praktisch keine Pause kennend“ auszuführen und gehöre zu den „physisch und moralisch beschwerlichsten“ (Dzieduszycka, 1883: 18).

Dzieduszycka war auch hinsichtlich des Widerstandes gegen den damaligen Erziehungsstil eine Vorreiterin. Dieser fußte zu einem Gutteil auf Grundsätzen der erwähnten Klementyna Hoffmanowa<sup>15</sup>. Dzieduszycka kritisierte das seinerzeitige romantische Bildungskonzept, das sich auf Träumereien und Gartenlaube-Lektüre konzentrierten und diverse Exaltiertheiten hervorbringen würde. Sie hatte den Mut, auf die anachronistischen Mängel des Hoffmanowa-Modells hinzuweisen, da die zeitgenössische Frau eine geistige Entwicklung, die den neuen Lebensbedingungen Rechnung tragen könnte, bräuchte (Dzieduszycka, 1871: 1-2). Dabei merkte sie an, dass sich die gesellschaftspolitischen Bedingungen verändert hätten und die Bildung der Frauen diesen Anforderungen ihrer Zeit sowie deren Position in Gesellschaft und Staat anzupassen wären. Dass sie dafür den Kreis häuslicher Verpflichtungen (das Private) überschreiten müssen, sei dabei von zentraler Bedeutung. Ihre Rolle beschränke sich nämlich nicht auf Mutterschaft und Ehe<sup>16</sup> und solche Aufgaben wären für die moderne Frau zu geringe Herausforderungen. Lässt man die zeittypische Ideologie außer Acht, so verkündete sie überaus aktuelle Ansichten hinsichtlich einer notwendigen Selbstständigkeit der Frauen, deren Lebenstüchtigkeit, des erforderlichen Allgemeinwissens und der Fähigkeit, ein aktiver Teil der Gesellschaft zu sein<sup>17</sup>. Dzieduszycka stützte ihr Modell auf neueste wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse und passt somit zu den Warschauer Positivisten ihrer Zeit, die besonderen Wert auf Vernunft bzw. Empirie in der Wissenschaft legten<sup>18</sup>. Diese begriffen Gesellschaft in organischen Kategorien und suchten nach Analogien zwischen Evolution und gesellschaftlicher Entwicklung.

Die Mutter fördert im Kind auch die Wertschätzung der Arbeit: „Lehre es, Arbeit und jedwede Tätigkeit früh als Privileg zu schätzen, welches den Menschen adelt, zu dem er fähig ist und dessen er im Maße seiner Entwicklung würdig wird [...]. Lehre es, die Perfektion zu lieben und nach ihr zu

<sup>15</sup> In pädagogischer Hinsicht stand sie Friedrich Wilhelm August Fröbel (1782-1852), dem Begründer der Kindergärten nahe.

<sup>16</sup> Derartige Ansichten formulierte Klementyna Hoffmanowa.

<sup>17</sup> Diese Forderungen klingen wie ein Echo von Eleonora Ziemięcka (1819-1869), der „ersten polnischen Philosophin“ und Autorin von *Myśli o wychowaniu kobiet* [Gedanken zur Erziehung der Frauen] (Warszawa 1843).

<sup>18</sup> Beispielsweise Aleksander Świętochowski, Bolesław Prus, Piotr Chmielowski.

streben [sowie] in Ruhe und frohen Mutes an sich zu arbeiten” (Dzieduszycka, 1881a: 130). Dzieduszycka erhebt in ihren Schriften die Arbeit in den Rang einer staatsbürgerlichen Pflicht: „staatsbürgerliche Pflicht ist nicht nur kämpfen, sondern auch arbeiten” (Dzieduszycka, 1871: 182). Das Zitat von der zu erreichenden Perfektion führt zu einem weiteren Schluss: Hier wird der starke Einfluss einer absoluten Ethik sichtbar, die das Ideal so hoch hält, dass der Mensch sich dadurch annähert, indem er tagtäglich seine eigenen Schwächen überwindet (ein Nachklang platonischen Denkens, das von Augustin für das Christentum adaptiert wurde). Eine zweite doktrinäre Führte in diesen Ausführungen führt zu David Hume, der ausführte, dass es vom pädagogischen Standpunkt gut und zielführend sei, dem Menschen ein hohes (vertikales) Ideal zu setzen, damit dieser die eigenen Schwächen überwinden könne, um dadurch ein Besserer zu werden. Die Vorgabe horizontaler Vorbilder würden ihn dagegen bei seinen Perfektierungsbestrebungen demotivieren.

Erziehung habe laut Dzieduszycka auf religiösen Fundamenten zu stehen. Wenn auch ihre Aktivität in vielerlei Hinsicht positivistischen Schlagworten entsprach, so weicht diese, wenn es um die religiöse Dimension der Erziehung geht, hiervon ab. Der Positivismus schreckte sie durch Atheismus, Materialismus, Organismus und Evolutionslehre ab: „der Positivismus kennt keinen Gott [...] und demnach ist der Mensch ein materieller Organismus, im Ergebnis einer letzten organischen Evolution lebendiger Wesen ein materiell perfekter Organismus” (Dzieduszycka, 1874: 61).

Allerdings finden sich in ihrem Werk auch positivistische Schlüsselbegriffe. Zumindest drei solcher Grundideen lassen sich festmachen: Grundlagen- und organischen Arbeit sowie Utilitarismus in der Erziehung und Bildung junger Frauen. Grundlagenarbeit hebt die Lebensqualität der ärmsten und benachteiligten Bevölkerungsschichten. Könnte man diese sozialen Gruppen in die Gesellschaftsstruktur integrieren, würde dies das nationale Wohl stärken. Grundlagenarbeit hatte also die Aufgabe, sich um das gesellschaftliche Fundament zu kümmern. Die Aufgabe von Lehrern, Ehrenamtlichen oder Ärzten wäre es, die gesellschaftlich ausgeschlossenen Schichten hervorzuheben und zu zeigen, welch wichtige Rolle sie in der nationalen Geschichte zu spielen hätten. Die Grundlagenarbeit war, als Polen von den Landkarten Europas verschwunden war, des Weiteren eine Form des Widerstandes gegen die Germanisierung und Russifizierung. Neben dieser Grundlagenarbeit existierte im polnischen Positivismus das Schlagwort von der organischen Arbeit, die eine Steigerung der Wirtschaftskraft innerhalb der polnischen Bevölkerung zum Ziel hatte. Die Organismus-Metapher diente dem Nachweis, dass selbst kleinste Elemente (entsprechend den unteren sozialen Schichten) eine wesentliche Rolle für die Funktion des Ganzen hätten. Für das gesellschaftliche Wohl war die harmonische Entwicklung aller Schichten wesentlich. Dzieduszyckas Arbeitsbegriff deckte sich mit dem Kanon positivistischen Gedankengutes. Arbeit war zugleich der

höchste Wert wie auch Grundrecht und nicht zuletzt Pflicht. Sie sei Bedingung für Wohlstand und Fortschritt sowie – gleich der Religion – Quelle allgemeiner moralischer Prinzipien: „Du hast kein Ergebnis ohne Arbeit, Du hast keine Arbeit ohne Schweiß [...], Arbeit adelt und macht aus Euch richtige Menschen“ (Dzieduszycka & Seredeński, zitiert nach: Słowiński, 1993: 277).

Eine weitere Beobachtung von Dzieduszycka bezieht sich ebenfalls darauf: Wenn Frauen von früh bis spät arbeiten, haben sie Probleme, ihre Rolle als Mutter und Ehefrau zu erfüllen. Als Ausgleich für ihre Bemühungen bekämen sie aber die Zufriedenheit ihrer Nächsten: „siehest Du sie zufrieden und lächelnd, so nimm denn diesen Anblick als heiligste Belohnung“ (Dzieduszycka, 1871: 201). Heute würde das Schicksal so hart arbeitender Frauen grundlegend hinterfragt: Wann bekommt eine berufstätige Mutter Erholung oder Zeit für sich? Solche Fragen waren allerdings erst ein weiterer Schritt im Emanzipationsprozess, der um Wertschätzung der Haushaltarbeit kämpft bzw. um deren finanzielle Graduierung. Einen ersten in diese Richtung unternahm Dzieduszycka im 19. Jahrhundert in Galizien, indem sie auf die Überbelastung berufstätiger Frauen hinwies. Die Diagnose ermöglichte eine Suche nach Lösungen und Ansätzen zur Verbesserung der Situation. Sie stellte etwa die Forderung nach Lohnerhöhung, um die Arbeitszeit so weit zu verkürzen, dass ein würdiges Leben möglich wäre.

Hier sind die äußerst wichtigen Postulate nach Selbststudium und eigenständiger Entwicklung der Frauen hervorzuheben. Bereits Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts erkannte Dzieduszycka, dass Frauen sich selbst um ihre Entwicklung kümmern müssen. Vorerst war der Dienst am Anderen (Kind, Schüler, Gesellschaft, Nation) das Argument für so eine Entwicklung, aber der originäre Blick von Dzieduszycka auf die Rolle der Frau - zuerst im Leben des eigenen Kindes, später auch in jenem der Schüler - dient einem universelleren Ziel: der Entwicklung eigener Fähigkeiten bzw. der Investition in die eigenen Kompetenzen. Diese Idee ist es wert, als Pioniertat von Dzieduszycka hervorgehoben zu werden. Damit eröffnete sie einen Zugang zur heute wohlbekannten eigenständigen Entwicklung. Ihr verdanken die Frauen Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts das Verständnis um den unabdingbaren Wissenserwerbs, des Selbststudiums und der Überwindung jenes Minderwertigkeitsgefühls, das ihnen etwa von der erwähnten Hoffmanowa eingeredet worden war. Stattdessen kämpfte sie für den Glauben an die eigenen Fähigkeiten, Kompetenzen und die Möglichkeit, das eigene Schicksal und Glück selbst in die Hand nehmen zu können.

## Bildung

Das effizienteste Mittel zur Gleichberechtigung war die Presse. In Frauenzeitschriften<sup>19</sup> wurden unter anderem Erziehungsfragen behandelt. Bevor diese aber zum vorherrschenden Thema wurden, waren darin Hauswirtschaftsthemen vorherrschend. Dzieduszycka war eine der ersten, die sich dieser Thematik überhaupt annahmen<sup>20</sup>. Ihr Engagement und das ihrer Mitstreiterinnen finden bis heute Wertschätzung: „Diese mutigen und vielseitigen Journalistinnen verdienen angesichts ihrer Leistungen, die sie in die Diskussion um die Gleichberechtigung der Frau auf dem pädagogischen Sektor eingebracht haben, besondere Beachtung“ (Falkowska, 2018: 9).

Eine interessante Beobachtung von Dzieduszycka zum Wesen der Bildung der Frau war, dass diese ohne Bildung sich nicht nur nicht immer nützlich beschäftigt, sondern im Gegenteil zu schädlichen und banalen Beschäftigungen neigen würde. Außerdem würde sie durch fehlende Bildung die Leistungen Anderer, etwa von Gelehrten, Industriellen, Handwerkern, Bauern usw. geringschätzen: „sie weiß nicht, wie viel Entbehrungen [...] und Mühen jene Arbeiter beständig der Menschheit darbringen“ (Dzieduszycka, 1871: 184). Dzieduszycka kommt angesichts dessen zum Schluss, dass Frauen zum Wohle der Gesellschaft gebildet sein müssten. Diese Argumentation wird mittels eines patriotischen Motives verstärkt: Die Frau hat auch Pflichten gegenüber ihrer Nation, die sie allein als gebildete Person erfüllen kann, wodurch sie ihre Rolle innerhalb der Gesellschaft und Nation begreifen könne. Polen überwinde eben dank gebildeter und engagierter Frauen die Niederlage, wirtschaftliche Krise und den Selbstzweifel. Dzieduszycka appellierte in ihren Zeitschriften, doch darauf zu achten, dass Erziehung und Bildung der Frau der sozialen und materiellen Lage anzupassen seien.

Ein wichtiger Aspekt betrifft die Rolle jener Frauen, die sich nicht innerhalb von Familie und Beruf, sondern (und auch) der gesamten Gesellschaft verwirklichen. Sie beschränken sich nicht nur auf Mutterschaft und Ehe, sondern sollen vielmehr gebildete und vollberechtigte Bürgerinnen sein. Um jede dieser Rollen aus gesellschaftlicher Sicht gedeihlich erfüllen zu können, müsse der Staat gewisse

<sup>19</sup> Zu den wichtigsten Periodika jener Tage zählten: „Pierwiosnek“ [Die Schlüsselblume], die erste polnische Zeitschrift, die allein von Frauen betrieben wurde und sich der Rolle der Frau in der Gesellschaft widmete; „Dziennik domowy“ [Das häusliche Blatt], eine Frauenzeitschrift, die sich der großpolnischen Initiative der praca organiczna [organischen Arbeit] verschrieben hatte; „Dziennik Mód Paryskich“ [Pariser Modenblatt], eine Lemberger Moden- und Literaturzeitschrift, die später in „Tygodnik Polski. Pismo poświęcone Literaturze, Obyczajom i Strojom“ [Polnische Wochenzeitung. Zeitschrift für Literatur, Sitten und Kleidung] unbenannt wurde. Frauenfragen wurden auch im „Dziennik Warszawski“ [Warschauer Tagblatt] und „Dziennika Literackiego“ [Literarisches Tagblatt] behandelt.

<sup>20</sup> Außerdem nahmen auch Eleonora Ziemięcka, Narcyza Żmichowska, Kazimiera Bujwidowa, Józefa Śmigielska, Karolina Wojnarowską und Antonina Machaczyńska Stellung.

Grundbedingungen erfüllen: persönliche Freiheit, Privateigentum<sup>21</sup> (daher die Forderung nach Erwerbstätigkeit) oder die Gleichheit vor dem Recht gewährleisten. In ihren Artikel geht sie noch weiter und stellt im Vergleich mit ausländischen Neuerungen die Frage nach politischen Rechten: „es gibt Länder, in denen die Frau bereits heute ehrenhaft und nutzbringend eine politische Stellung innehaben kann“ (Dzieduszycka, 1871: 204-205). Überzeugend trat sie den konservativen Ängsten vor einem übereilten gesellschaftspolitischen Strukturwandel entgegen und argumentierte, den weiblichen Geist zu beschäftigen, hieße, diesen vor Faulheit, Verbrechen sowie materiellen und geistigen Verfall zu schützen. Wesentlich ist auch, dass Dzieduszycka nicht nur aufzeigt, was Frauen für die Gesellschaft tun können, sondern auch fragt, was die Gesellschaft für Frauen machen könne. Die Antwort ist einfach: ihnen Bildung ermöglichen. Auch hier stellt sie den Vergleich zu anderen Ländern her bzw. zu den Bildungsmöglichkeiten in den restlichen polnischsprachigen Gebieten. Dabei schneiden letztere sehr schlecht ab. Anstatt in ein Lamento zu verfallen bietet sie Lösungen an. So sei das Volksschulwesen auf dem Land zu fördern, sodass auch Mädchen am Unterricht teilnehmen können, da ansonsten: „alle entweder zur Armut daheim bestimmt sind [...] oder als Dienstboten ihr Auskommen“ werden finden müssen (Dzieduszycka, 1871: 196). Das Wesentliche an dieser Beobachtung betrifft die archetypische Abgeschlossenheit der Frau im Häuslichen und die Beschränkung ihres Aufgabenfeldes auf den Haushalt. Die Einrichtung von Schulen würde den Mädchen die Chance auf ein anderes Leben eröffnen und die Beschränkung auf einen einzigen Lebensweg überwinden. Andere Länder hätten das Schicksal der Mädchen zu verändern gewusst: „All das, was wir hier anraten, ist hinlänglich bekannt und wird mit Erfolg im Ausland angewandt“ (Dzieduszycka, 1871: 199). Es würde reichen, die erfolgreichen Praktiken aus dem Ausland ins polnische Schulwesen zu implementieren.

## **Emanzipation**

Die wesentlichen Gründe für die Emanzipation der Frau waren die gestiegenen Ansprüche, ein wachsendes kulturelles Interesse sowie die neuen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Verhältnisse. Im Werk von Dzieduszycka dominiert in dieser Hinsicht die Annahme, dass es sich hierbei angesichts der veränderten sozialpolitischen Bedingungen um einen natürlichen Prozess handle<sup>22</sup>. Die sozialen Veränderungen, die mit der wirtschaftlichen Krise in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jhs. zusammenhängen, als zahlreiche landwirtschaftliche Güter unrentabel wurden, würden also auf natürliche Weise die Emanzipationsbewegung initiieren. Besonders schmerzlich bekamen das die

<sup>21</sup> Dzieduszycka appellierte, das Eigentum von Frauen vor missbräuchlicher Verwendung durch die Ehemänner zu schützen. Siehe: Dzieduszycka (1871: 225).

<sup>22</sup> Detaillierter über die historische Situation polnischer Frauen (Żarnowska & Szwarc, 1992: 15).

Frauen aus dem Landadel (wie die Autorin selbst) zu spüren. Dzieduszycka beschreibt etwa in der Zeitschrift „Niwa“ den Unabhängigkeitsverlust in Folge des Bankrotts (Dzieduszycka, 1878: 190). Die äußeren Umstände erzwangen die Erwerbsarbeit von Frauen. Wenn Männer den materiellen Status, auch nach der Übersiedlung in die Stadt, nicht gewährleisten konnten „nahmen ihre Frauen, Schwestern und Töchter eine Arbeit auf, lernten was sie konnten, griffen so gut es ging auf zuvor erworbene Kenntnisse zurück, überwanden sämtliche Schwierigkeiten, um bloß irgendeine brotbringende Beschäftigung zu finden“ (Dzieduszycka, 1878: 191). Hier formuliert sie keine neuen Thesen, da bereits vier Jahre zuvor in der „Niwa“ über diesen durch die wirtschaftliche Situation erzwungenen sozialen Wechsel berichtet worden war. Außerdem wurde darauf hingewiesen, dass die Frauen auf derart tiefgreifende Veränderungen nicht vorbereitet waren und die finanzielle Selbstständigkeit durch die Umstände erzwungen worden war. Diese Tatsache hätte – im Wortlaut der Redakteure – die „Reife“ der Frauen beschleunigt und als Folge hätte der weibliche Bevölkerungsanteil begonnen, Reformen und Verbesserungen für sich einzufordern<sup>23</sup>. Diese betrafen in erster Linie die Entlohnung, die kaum das Notwendigste abdeckte - von finanzieller Unabhängigkeit ganz zu schweigen. Damit schloss sich der Kreis, da Frauen ohne qualifizierte Lehrerinnen nicht entsprechend auf die neuen Lebensbedingungen vorbereitet werden könnten. Daraus ergab sich, dass die Forderung nach Bildung (und mittelbar nach entsprechendem Lehrpersonal) eine Bedingung sine qua non für deren Emanzipation war. So wäre ein Lehrkörper aufzubauen, welcher der neuen sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Realität Rechnung trage. Dadurch entwickelte sich die Idee von „Vorbereitungsschulen“ für moderne Erzieherinnen. Die Unterrichtsfächer sollten dort weit gestreut sein: von humanistischen über Mathematik, Natur- und Sozialwissenschaften bis zu Medizin und konkreter Berufsvorbereitung. In solchen Instituten konnten Mädchen ab dem 16. Lebensjahr ausgebildet werden. Um Lehrerin zu werden, müssten innerhalb von drei Jahren drei Kurse absolviert werden. Dzieduszycka war auf diesem Gebiet eindeutig Pionierin und einige Forderungen wurden in Kongresspolen (russischer Teil) sowie den Lehrerinnenseminaren in Galizien nach 1867 umgesetzt (in Lemberg, Breschan, Krakau und Przemysl).

Ausdruck fand die Emanzipation in der Forderung nach einer Erwerbsarbeit für Frauen, die Selbstständigkeit ermöglichte. Dzieduszycka erwarb sich diesbezüglich Verdienste, indem sie die Gründung berufsbildender Schulen forderte, um Frauen den Zugang zu konkreten Professionen zu ermöglichen. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt, durften sie keine Berufe ausüben, die für Männer reserviert

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<sup>23</sup> Szkoła przygotowawcza żeńska, »Niwa« 1868.

waren. Sie fasste daher Handwerks- und Handelsschulen sowie technische Lehranstalten ins Auge (Dzieduszycka, 1872: 94).

Auf den Schultern der Frauen lastete nicht nur die Verantwortung für die Erziehung künftiger (Staats) Bürger sondern auch für das Schicksal der Nation. Dzieduszycka wandelte auch das in Emanzipationsargument: Erziehung verdankt man den Frauen, aber um dieser Aufgabe entsprechend gerecht zu werden, ist Bildung notwendig. Sind die Frauen nicht „geformt“, dann geht die Nation zu Grunde. „Ihre Erziehung hat also nicht ausschließlich auf das eigene Schicksal Einfluß, sondern wirkt auch mächtig auf jenes der gesamten Nation. Wehe dem Volke, dessen Weiber leichtfertig, verdorben, ungebildet! Untergang oder schmerzensreiche Verwandlung sind ihm verheißen!“ (Dzieduszycka, 1871: 6).

Der neue Zeitgeist drückte sich bei Dzieduszycką in Grundsatzfragen aus: Kann eine Frau studieren? Kann sie Ärztin werden? Um das zu erreichen, müssten sie zuerst die Gesellschaft vom Wunsch nach Wissen überzeugen, um anschließend nach einem Erfolg separate Hochschulen gründen (Dzieduszycka, 1881a: 153). Dzieduszycka bewies eine gesunde Dosis Realismus bei der Formulierung erreichbarer Ziele (wie erwähnt forderte sie diesen von Mitstreiterinnen und hielt sich selbst daran). Ihr ist bewusst, dass „es heute nicht unsere Aufgabe ist, von vorhinein unmöglichen und unbegründeten Phantastereien hinterherzujagen, sondern nach gegebenen Kräften und in bestimmten Bereichen an der Verwirklichung gerechtfertigten Forderungen zu arbeiten“ (Dzieduszycka, 1881b: 644). Zu diesen „gerechtfertigten“ und realisierbar Ideen zählt sie die Gründung von Frauenschulen (Pensionaten) und „höheren Kursen“. Man sieht also, in welch engen Kategorien das Denken über die Gleichberechtigung abließ. Dzieduszycka zog nicht einmal die Möglichkeit von öffentlichen bzw. privaten Gymnasien für Mädchen in Betracht. Diese Ideen waren noch weit entfernt und diesbezüglich wurden bloß erste Schritte gesetzt. Die (eingeschränkte) galizischen Autonomie von 1867 erzwang rasche Änderungen in der Lehrerausbildung. Benötigt wurden Lehrkräfte für das Grund- und Mittelschulniveau sowie für Berufsschulen. In einer besonders prekären Situation befanden sich diesbezüglich die Volksschulen. Daher rief der Landesschulrat 1871 ein dreijähriges Lehrerseminar für Männer und Frauen, dass man mit dem vollendeten 15. Lebensjahr besuchen konnte, ins Leben. Ein Abschluss war allerdings keiner Universitätsausbildung ebenbürtig und interessanterweise waren bis zum Ende der Monarchie die Anstalten für Männer ungleich unpopulärer, während es umgekehrt immer mehr Bewerberinnen als Plätze gab<sup>24</sup>. Dies belegt erstens das Bedürfnis, die häusliche Sphäre hinter sich zu lassen, zweitens den Wunsch nach Ausbildung,

<sup>24</sup> Bis zum Ende der Monarchie gab es acht Lehrerinnen- und 16 Lehrerseminare.

drittens den Wissensdrang, viertens das Streben nach Erwerbstätigkeit, die fünftens eine unabhängige Existenz garantieren würde. Die große Nachfrage nach Lehrerinnenseminaren lag im Zustand des galizischen Schulwesens begründet<sup>25</sup>. Einerseits ersetzen diese die Mittelschulen – das erste Gymnasium für Mädchen eröffnete 1896 in Krakau (und war somit das erste auf polnischem Boden) und 1897 erkämpften die Frauen in Galizien das Recht auf Universitätszugang (Zachara, 1937). Zum anderen bot der Abschluss jungen Frauen ohne Vermögen die Chance auf ein zwar bescheidenes aber unabhängiges Leben. Das war im wirtschaftlich rückständigen Galizien von enormer Bedeutung. Das Interesse am Lehrerinnenseminar war aber auch dem Mangel an Lehrerinnen für die unteren Volksschulklassen geschuldet.

## **Zusammenfassung**

Ein wesentliches Ergebnis sind die logischen Zusammenhänge in den wegbereitenden Forderungen von Dzieduszycka. Die Grundlinie verläuft vom Ausgangspunkt, das ist die Lehrerinnenbildung in neuen dafür geschaffenen Institutionen („Vorbereitungsschulen“). Das ist die Vorbedingung für die Ausbildung und Erziehung junger Frauen zu einer Eigenständigkeit, die durch die krisenhafte soziale und wirtschaftliche Situation erzwungen worden ist. Zielpunkt ist die Gleichberechtigung der Frauen.

Bezüglich ihrer pädagogischen Ansichten bricht Dzieduszycka mit dem Ansatz von Klementyna Hoffmanowa und nähert sich den Ideen von Friedrich Fröbel an - in emanzipatorischer Hinsicht an Eleonora Ziemięcka. Diese Linie zeigt den Bruch mit der Tradition und den Aufbruch zu einer modernen Pädagogik. Die polnische Erziehungswissenschaft verdankt ihre Transformation eben diesen Pioniertaten von Dzieduszycka.

Dzieduszyckas Artikel über Erziehung entziehen sich einer eindeutigen Bewertung. Sie bloß als Vorreiterin für ein modernes Bildungswesen bzw. der Emanzipation zu präsentieren, wäre parteiisch und übertrieben. In diesem Teil ihres Œuvres gibt es auch konservative Ansichten, was auch nicht verwundert sollte, da in jenen Zeiten – wie bereits erwähnt – ein Diskurskanon verpflichtend war. Nur auf diese Weise eröffnete sich die Chance, gehört zu werden und der vorherrschende Erzählcharakter war patriarchal und religiös. Deshalb finden sich Aussagen wie: „Das Ziel der Erziehung ist die Vorbereitung des Menschen auf die Erfüllung seiner irdischen Aufgaben gemäß dem Willen Gottes“ (Dzieduszycka, 1875b: 281). Das ist auch der Hintergrund, warum Familie und Schule den „christlichen Geist bewahren“ und diesen auf die jüngere Generation „ergießen“ (Dzieduszycka, 1875b: 281).

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<sup>25</sup> Eine besondere Rolle als Bildungsanstalten für Frauen spielten in den 1870ern Klöster in Galizien (Ursulinen, Schwestern von der unbefleckten Empfängnis).

Dzieduszycka war weder Anarchistin noch revolutionär. Sie erfüllte einerseits die traditionellen geschlechtsspezifischen Rollenerwartungen und suchte andererseits nach realen Möglichkeiten, ihre modernen Ideale umsetzen zu können. Dabei dürfen die historischen Umstände nicht übersehen werden: In der konservativen Monarchie war für die Infragestellung des status quo eine gehörige Portion Mut, Selbstsicherheit und ein starker Glaube an die Ideale bzw. Mission (bessere Bildung und Erziehung) nötig. Derartige Charaktereigenschaften führten zu Aktivitäten außerhalb der eigenen vier Wände, jenem Raum also, der seinerzeit Frauen zugestanden worden ist.

Zu dieser Zeit war, insbesondere in „besseren“ Kreisen, für Frauen selbst das Schreiben für eine Öffentlichkeit suspekt. Es galt als wider die weibliche Natur. Und natürlich ist zu betonen wie wichtig das journalistische und belletristische Wirken von Frauen war. Über diese Schiene nämlich konnten sie die häusliche Schwelle, die Grenze des Privaten, überschreiten. Emanzipation ist daher ein immanentes Merkmal dieses Werks. Schriftstellerei innerhalb eines patriarchalen Gesellschaftssystems durchbrach das Identitätsschema von Frauen im 19. Jahrhundert (Sandra & Gubar, 1984). Auf diese Weise brachen sie mit der gesellschaftlichen Rollenerwartung vom Dienst am Anderen, wenn sie diese auch in einem gewissen Sinne erfüllten – indem sie der Emanzipation der Frauen dienten.

Interessant ist daher die Bewertung der Dzieduszyckaschen Ideen durch die Zeitgenossen: einerseits galt sie als radikal (hinsichtlich der Emanzipation), aber auch als konservativ (die starke Betonung der Religiosität in ihrem Werk). Die „Radikalität“ in ihren Artikeln wurde vom Journalisten Stanisław Bronikowski kritisiert, der diese als „totale Emanzipation“<sup>26</sup> bezeichnete. Auslöser dafür war die Forderung nach Erwerbsarbeit für Frauen und diese sei abzulehnen, denn: „die heilige Berufung der Frau ist Hausarbeit und Kindererziehung“ (Bronikowski, 1877: 123). Diese Meinung ist stellvertretend für den damaligen Diskurs über die Rolle der Frau, der öffentliche Teilhabe abgesprochen wurde „Das öffentlichen Leben ist nicht die Bestimmung der Frauen. [...] Ihr Tätigkeitsbereich und Ruhmesplatz ist der häusliche Herd im Familienkreise“ (Polski, 1889: 25, zitiert nach: Słowiński, 1993: 284). Zustimmung dagegen fand sie beim Journalisten und Kritiker Edward Prądzyński, der in seiner Rezension ihrer *Kilka myśli o wychowaniu* [Einige Gedanken über Erziehung] feststellte: „Sie stand auf dem Grunde radikaler neuer Begriffe und sehnte sich nach der vollkommenen Gleichberechtigung der Frau“ und „die Reichhaltigkeit des Inhalts, Lebenskenntnis, Richtigkeit der Ansicht, das vernünftige Streben nach Verwirklichung der kühnsten Erfordernisse des Fortschritts“ schätzte (Prądzyński, 1893: 191). Allerdings ist anzumerken, dass Dzieduszycka in

<sup>26</sup> Kann auch als „rücksichtslose Emanzipation“ übersetzt werden.

ihren Vorschlägen nie so weit geht, Frauen und Männer vollständig gleichzustellen; dabei handelt es sich um eine Überinterpretation von Prądzyński.

Die emanzipatorischen Stränge sind also bei Dzieduszycka im zeitlichen Zusammenhang zu sehen: Um im seinerzeitigen Diskurs gehört zu werden, waren die Rahmenbedingungen zu beachten. Hätten sich die Frauen einem kompromisslosen Nonkonformismus verschrieben, wären sie auf gesellschaftliche Ablehnung gestoßen und hätten somit die Chance auf Gehör sowie auf Veränderungen vertan. Deshalb war im Namen der Effizienz auf Originalität bzw. Innovation zu verzichten und sie musste sich in ihrem medialen Auftritt auf die gültigen Konventionen beschränken. Nur so eröffnete sich die Möglichkeit, wahrgenommen zu werden. Innovationen liefen Gefahr, „marginalisiert, ausgestoßen und vom Diskurs ausgeschlossen zu werden“ (Kubicka & Czerwińska, 2009: 14)<sup>27</sup>.

Betont werden muss auch, dass Dzieduszycka sich selbst nie in den Vordergrund drängte, ganz im Gegenteil: Es dominiert die Ausrichtung auf den Anderen, genauer gesagt, auf das Los der Frauen. Ihr war am Fortschritt gelegen, an der Erziehung für Frauen, an einem erweiterten Begriff von Arbeitsethik – und all das begründete sie mit der Autorität der Religion. Mit ihrem Engagement in der Frauenfrage errichtete sie für polnische Mädchen das Fundament einer (nationalen) Bildungsstruktur. Sie erlebte nach der Niederschlagung des Januaraufstandes, in einer Zeit extremer sozialer und wirtschaftlicher Veränderungen, - auch persönlich - schwierige Zeiten. Trotz allem war sie von ganzem Herzen der Sache verpflichtet, zeigte Veränderungspotentiale auf und unternahm erste Schritte in deren Richtung. Sie war hinsichtlich des damaligen Bildungssystem und Bewusstseins realistisch und wusste, dass weder das System noch die Frauen auf akademische Bildung vorbereitet waren. Die Schulen in Polen begannen sich erst soweit zu entwickeln, dass auch Frauen ein Universitätsstudium ins Auge würden fassen können. In ihren Publikationen, insbesondere in den Artikeln in der „Niwa“, definierte sie die Stoßrichtung ihrer Ziele. Die Schlüsselrolle bei der Emanzipation spielte die Erziehung - und daher der Titel der vorliegenden

Arbeit, der den Grundgedanken von Dzieduszycka wiedergibt: Emanzipation durch Erziehung. Die politische, gesellschaftliche und kulturelle Situation bewirkte eine Veränderung der Frauenrolle in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Die traditionelle Mutterrolle, die auf das Häusliche beschränkt war, wandelte sich in Richtung gebildete und berufstätige Frau, die materiell (relativ) unabhängig ist. Dzieduszycka ist diesbezüglich als Fürsprecherin in die Geschichte eingegangen. Aufgrund ihrer Zeitschriftenartikel, Bücher und ihres Engagements gewann die Rolle der Frau in der

<sup>27</sup> Über das Paradoxon des Sprechens innerhalb eines herrschenden Diskurses (derzeit sprechen wir innerhalb einer liberalen Demokratie) (Žižek, 2007).

Gesellschaft an Substanz und neues Gewicht. Ihre Verdienste werden vor allem bei der Entwicklung von Mittelschulen für Mädchen in Galizien sichtbar. Aber auch außerhalb des Kronlandes wurde sie durch ihre Beiträge in den Zeitschriften „*Bluszcz*“ [Efeu], „*Niwa*“ [Gefilde] oder „*Kronika Rodzinna*“ [Familienchronik] wahrgenommen ... und wirkmächtig. Zu ihren Lebzeiten entstanden sukzessive Frauenvereine bzw. Institutionen, die sich mit der sogenannten Frauenfrage beschäftigten. Als Beispiel mögen wissenschaftliche Lesezirkel sowie Lehrerinnenvereine dienen. Besonders letztere trugen zur beruflichen Emanzipation der Frauen bei, indem sie materielle Hilfe oder Unterstützung zum Selbststudium leisteten. Dzieduszycka unterstützte so einen Verein, der 1873 in Krakau entstanden war, finanziell. So konnten ein Lehrerinnenheim, -sanatorium und eine Bibliothek unterhalten werden (Falkowska, 2018: 36).

Die Darstellung von Anastazja Dzieduszyckas Werk zeigte auch die schwierige Situation von Frauen in der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie auf. Das Beispiel dieser Aktivistin kann den Frauen von heute als Inspiration dienen, dass es wert ist, seiner Berufung zu folgen. Das Wissen um die Geschichte der Emanzipation kann Frauen auf dem Weg zur Realisierung eigener Ziele nur dienlich sein. Diese Geschichte schafft einen gemeinschaftlichen Raum, in dem die moderne Frau Schwestern im Geiste finden und auch der eigenen Aktivität eine tiefere Bedeutung verleihen kann. Sie hilft, die Universalität bestimmter Probleme, mit denen die Pionierin zu kämpfen hatten, zu verstehen.

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## Topic 2

### Public Policies, Social Policies and Welfare State

## Diverse People in Diverse Businesses: Creating an Ecosystem around Inclusiveness<sup>1</sup>

Eleftherios Foivos Vasilopoulos<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

In Greece only one out of three people with difficulties in basic activities is employed (Eurostat, 2011). These significantly low employment rates among people with disabilities (PwDs) have negative implications regarding their living standards, making them economically dependent on social benefits and socially excluded. One of the main factors for that issue is the deficient rates of absorption of PwDs in the private sector, although multiple EU and Greek policies for the increase of these rates currently exist. This policy brief emphasizes on the existing situation, the reasons why disabled people are excluded from the private labor market and the potential of investing in all-inclusive work-systems for businesses. Finally, it provides policy recommendations, on both European and national level, for motivating enterprises to increase diversity in their workforce, through the creation of an EU Disability Inclusion Index and Regional Disability Projects.

**Keywords:** People with Disabilities; Inclusion Policy; Disability Strategy; Labor Market; Social Entrepreneurship.

### Introduction

According to Eurostat, approximately a quarter of the EU-27 population had a long-term disability due to health problems (Eurostat, 2022a). For disabled people, their integration to the labor market is directly associated with their social inclusion. In accordance with Article 27 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (United Nations, 2006), persons with disabilities have the right to work on an equal basis with everyone else. However, the unemployment rates of disabled EU citizens remain high. The implications of low employment rates amongst disabled persons have a negative impact on their living standards. In fact, during the past decade, almost one out of three disabled EU citizens was in a high risk of facing poverty or social exclusion, depending heavily on social transfers (Eurostat, 2022b). In Greece, a main reason for the low disability employment rates where, approximately 30% of PwDs are employed (Eurostat, 2021), is the unclear situation regarding the legislature and the governmental initiatives on disability (Strati & Evangelinou, 2007). As a result, PwDs are dealing with extensive difficulties in finding and maintaining a job in a business. Thus, their absorption in the private labour market and the creation of an all-inclusive context remains an unsolved issue.

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## Existing Situation

In order to find solutions about that issue, the EU launched the Disability Strategy for 2021-2030 (European Commission, 2021), built upon the Disability Strategy for 2010-2020 (European Commission, 2010), a policy to reassure the protection of the fundamental rights and the participation of disabled people in every aspect of social life. The Disability Strategy focuses on increasing PwDs participation into the labor force, through setting EU standards for an all-inclusive working environment, according to the provisions of the UNCRPD (United Nations, 2006). Nevertheless, EU policies must be combined with targeted actions at the national level.

### *Additional information*

In Greece, the national legislation provides the basic framework for the occupation of PwDs in the public sector. According to law 2643/98 (Official Journal of the Hellenic Republic 220/A', published: 28/09/1998) on the field of employment, a minimum percentage of employees with disabilities is legally established for both public and private sector. Regarding the private sector, Greek businesses with more than 50 employees are obliged to cover 8% of their staff with disabled employees. In the public sector, the corresponding percentage is 5%, while people with minimum disability percentage 50%, who are registered in OAED's records of the unemployed, are going through a special hiring process.

Concurrently with the announcement of the EU Disability Strategy for 2021-2030, the Greek government published the National Plan of Action on the Rights of People with Disabilities in 2020 (Government of Greece, 2020). The plan aims to improve education and create new jobs for the disabled in the public and private sector in the next few years. Regarding the private sector, it provides motives to businesses to overhaul their workplaces and hire more disabled people, for example through covering 90% of all costs for the recruitment of a disabled person, including increase in subsidies for payments in part-time and full-time jobs. The main institution that participates in accomplishing these goals is OAED- Hellenic Manpower Employment Organization- in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Culture and Sports. However, even if the plan shows some important improvements in comparison with older initiatives, the measures regarding the private sector seem to be limited.

## The disability employment gap

The disability employment gap is defined as the difference between the employment rate of non-disabled people and the corresponding rate for the disabled. According to Eurostat, EU employment

rate of non-disabled people was at 71.7%, while the disability employment gap was estimated at 24.5% (Eurostat, 2022c). Thus, the employment rate of disabled people was approximately 47.2%, which means that less than one out two PwDs had a stable job. In Greece, the non-disabled employment percentage is significantly lower, at 58.3%, with the disability employment gap being slightly higher, at 28.2% (Eurostat, 2022d). Therefore, in 2020, only one person out of three with long-lasting activity limitations was included in Greek labor market (Eurostat, 2021).

## **Reasons for exclusion/Difficulties in the private sector**

- **Inaccessible workplaces**

Many Greek businesses don't have the necessary – and required -facilities to make their working environment accessible for disabled people, according to EU standards (CEN-CENELEC, n.d.) & (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2019) & (Lecerf, 2019). At the same time, it is possible that they are not willing to overhaul their workplace, to provide their disabled employees with accessible tools and technology and to cover their transportation costs, as they consider it a high-cost procedure with low potential to increase productivity.

- **Underemployment**

Employers tend to avoid hiring people with long-lasting limitations, as they believe that, because of their disability, these people won't be as productive as people with no activity limitations (Brodey, 2019). However, even if a disabled person is occupied, there is still a high possibility that it will be underemployed, which means that it will be occupied in a part-time job which does not reflect its skills or financial needs (Brodey, 2019). In some cases, underemployment can be combined with in-work poverty, that is poverty among the employed population. According to Eurostat in Greece, 13% of employed people with disabilities were facing in-work poverty in 2019 (Eurostat, 2019).

- **Struggling with hiring procedures**

Common recruiting ways often may not be suitable for people with disabilities (Accenture, 2018). Therefore, many PwDs, for example a neurodivergent person, that could be someone with autism, Tourette Syndrome, dyslexia, and other differences in learning and mental health, may be excluded from a job that they are adequately qualified for, due to an unsuitable hiring method for them.

- **Lack of motivation to find a job**

All these difficulties that PwDs are facing in the labor market have discouraged them from seeking for a job. Under these circumstances, the vast majority of disabled people are economically depended

in social transfers. According to Eurostat, in 2019 79.3% of the Greek population – and almost 68% of EU’s population- with a long-standing activity limitation would be living on the edge of poverty without the social benefits (Eurostat, 2019).

- **Absence of a targeted framework around Supported Employment**

Supported Employment is defined as a personalized model of support for disabled people to find and retain paid employment long-term. The EU Disability Strategies (2010-2020 & 2021-2030) underline the importance of Supported Employment, as a way of increasing disability employment rates. Yet, Greece has no legal framework to support the implementation of that method, except for some exceptional initiatives. Thus, it’s not a widespread practice among institutions and foundations related to that field. As a consequence, PwDs are not provided with the appropriate assistance from the state, during their effort to enter the labour market.

### **The “inclusion incentives” for businesses**

#### **Enhanced innovation**



As Haben Girma, the first deafblind graduate from Harvard Law School, once wrote in Financial Times, “difference drives innovation” (Girma, 2017). Enhancing the inclusiveness in enterprises can lead to innovative practices, as there will be new perspectives regarding hiring procedures (Bernick, 2022), working methods and types of products (Accenture, 2018).



#### **Safe, modern and productive workplace**

Improving the workplace and providing the employees with technological tools is beneficial for everyone, as it ensures that everybody, disabled and non-disabled employees, can access working facilities with safety. Moreover, a diverse work environment can lead to enhancement of productivity, for instance, by lowering staff turnover by up to 30% (Workplace Initiative, 2017), while all the new technological tools can contribute to developing fresh working methods, in combination with AI.



### Improved reputation and more funding opportunities

In Greece, very few businesses have included disability diversity in their Human Resources Management policies, their services and products. However, there are some exceptions, such as the case of Kotsovolos company (Kotsovolos, n.d.). Kotsovolos recently introduced its disability inclusion program “Technology without obstacles”, which is supported from major tech companies, Microsoft and Samsung. Thus, the initiative has led to international exposure for the company, a key element for the increase of its reputation and funds. Consequently, the example of Kotsovolos shows that ensuring the appropriate funding to design and create an accessible work environment is an achievable plan for many Greek companies, SMEs and even small start-ups, that will increase their attractiveness not only to investors, but also to the consumer base.



### Diverse supply base

Disabled people are representing an important part of the consumer market, especially if their relatives and close social circle is added (Accenture, 2018; Hughes, 2020). As a result, producing all-accessible products and services will lead to the expansion of the supply base in a growing, untapped market that is consisted, only in the EU, of more than 100 million citizens.

## Recommendations

- ❖ Following America’s paradigm: A European Disability Equality Index

The Disability Equality Index (DEI) is an existing benchmarking method in USA that is created from Disability:IN, a worldwide non-profit resource for business disability inclusion, that evaluates the participating companies regarding of the inclusiveness in their workspace. Companies are being marked in the areas of culture and leadership, workplace accessibility, employment practices, community engagement and supplier diversity. Businesses are assessed on a scale from zero to 100. These with a score of 80 or more are considered as “Best Places to Work for Disability Inclusion” (Disability:IN, 2021).

In EU, this idea could be implemented in two levels. At first, through the formation of an “EU Disability Inclusion Index” for businesses, as an assistive, non-compulsory tool for evaluating EU enterprises in national level, created from EU institutions in collaboration civil society’s organizations, such as the European Disability Forum. The EU DII will be based on the EU regulations and standards, so that it provides widely accepted criteria that correspond to the EU’s labour market situation. However, it is important to outline that the EU DII should not be a regulation, but an optional tool for the member-states, so that they can use it as a way to increase motives for businesses and to improve the efficiency of their national disability policies concerning the private sector.

Regarding the evaluation criteria, these could be similar with those that are used from DEI in USA, which are culture and leadership, workplace accessibility, employment practices, community engagement and supplier diversity. Nevertheless, more areas could be added, such as product accessibility, which should be shaped in accordance with the Directive on the accessibility requirements for products and services (European Parliament & the Council of the European Union, 2019) that aims to ensure that a number of services and products are accessible for all within the member states.

In Greece, before the utilization of the EU DII, some preparatory steps would be needed. First of all, the state should focus on engaging Greek NGOs -related to disability issues- to collaborate with OAED, with a view to undertake the organization of the process. The procedure should contain three main fields of action: the terms of submitting an application for enterprises, the creation of an Evaluation Committee and the formation of an award system.

To begin with, participating to the EU DII should be free of charge for businesses. Nonetheless, each business will have to make a short video presenting its policies on disability, in combination with a policy paper that will describe them in more detail.

Afterwards, the Evaluation Committee, consisted of both OAED employees and members from the civil society, will be responsible to evaluate the applications and proceed to an on-sight assessment of the enterprise’s work environment. Finally, the award system should contain two types of awards. The first type could be the Awards per category, for instance the “Disability Smart Built Environment Award” or the “Disability Smart Recruitment Team Award”, which are some of the categories being used in the initiative “Disability Smart Awards”, from Business Disability Forum. The second type could be related with the final score that an enterprise has in the EU DII. Therefore, there could be fundraising awards for high-score businesses, so that they invest on new methods of work diversity,

and also targeted funding and consultation for low and middle score businesses, so that they can improve their disability policies.

### ❖ Regional Disability Projects,

Projects undertaken by OAED in collaboration with the civil society that provide free support and advice to Greek SMEs on disability and how to accomplish an inclusive workplace. Such actions can be found in UK, for example in the project “Smarter London SMEs”, an idea from the non-profit organization Business Disability Forum (Business Disability Forum, n.d.). In addition, awareness-building activities, in-work education programs on disability for the staff, surveys on PwD employment and pilot programs, for instance the experimental creation of Human Resources Management units specialized on the Supported Employment, could be some effective supplementary projects for improving inclusiveness in business environment.

## Conclusion

For disabled people, their integration to labor market will be a key factor for their social inclusion and the enhancement of their living standards. The EU has created the basic infrastructure through its Disability Strategies, while the Greek Government seems to have been mobilized the last two years through the National Plan of Action. Nonetheless, the efficiency of both the Disability Strategies and the national initiatives regarding the improvement of inclusiveness in Greek enterprises is questionable. Therefore, more targeted actions are needed, such as Regional Disability Projects and especially a mechanism such as the EU DII. In Greece, the utilization of the EU DII could highly motivate Greek businesses, and especially SMEs, as it will be an important opportunity not only to increase their reputation and funding but also to achieve exposure on EU-level.

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## Covid-19 Impact on Greek Tourism Sector and the Implemented Policies<sup>1</sup>

Konstantina Briola<sup>2</sup> & Helen Briola<sup>3</sup>

### Abstract

Tourism is one of the most important economic activities internationally and many countries (e.g. Portugal, Spain, Greece) are highly dependent on the tourism sector. Tourism has always been considered a priority sector in Greece and significant capital investments have been made over the years for its development. The pandemic has driven the global economy into a severe recession and many industries have been significantly affected by the measures taken, including the tourism industry. In response to this crisis, the Greek government, aiming to further develop the tourism sector and restore tourist flows to normal levels, used a series of measures. In this paper, we study the effects of the implemented policies on tourism during the pandemic. Our results indicate that the policies had a direct impact on the increase in tourism flows.

**Keywords:** tourism; covid-19; policies; pandemic; tourism flows.

### Introduction

Tourism is one of the most important economic activities internationally and many countries, such as Portugal, Spain and Greece, are highly dependent on the tourism sector (Katemliadis & Papatheodorou, 2021). It has been argued that the tourism industry promotes the financial development of countries and its benefits are widely distributed in national economies (Oxford Economics, 2012; Sotiriadis & Varvaressos, 2015). Tourism has always been considered a priority sector in Greece and many capital investments have been made, and in turn they develop the country's economy and generate sufficient employment opportunities for its population.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led many countries (e.g. Cyprus, Italy and France) to take a number of measures, such as travel restrictions, to limit the spread of the virus. However, measures such as travel restrictions and border closures are proving to be directly linked to sustainability issues on businesses in the tourism sector (OECD, 2020). In response to this crisis, many countries used measures to restore this sector, such as Greece, that focused on policy-making and formulated programs to support the tourism sector.

In this paper, we investigate to what extent the policies implemented by Greece to strengthen the tourism sector affected the tourist flows during Covid-19. Specifically, we used the database of the

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Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) and focused on two variables: the number of expenditures on personal trips and the age of individuals for the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021. What we assume is that if the correlation of travel expenses through these years is high, the policies had a direct impact on the increase of tourism flows.

### **The importance of tourism in the Greek Economy**

It is well known that Greece has been one of the most popular tourist destinations and its geographical diversity attracts significant investments in the tourism sector. Tourism has always been considered a priority sector in Greece and significant capital investments have been made over the years for its development (ports, roads, exploitation of natural resources, etc.). In this context, Greece attracts many visitors from both Eastern Europe and Asia (Lolos et al., 2021). The tourism industry in Greece is considered a separate financial activity and an important source of income for the Greek economy (Katemliadis & Papatheodorou, 2021).

During the financial crisis, tourism mitigated the negative effects of the recession and led the country to positive growth rates (INSETE, 2021a). The importance of tourism in shaping the country's GDP and boosting employment is significant, especially if we consider that in Greece tourism contributes directly to 20% of the country's GDP (INSETE, 2020a). Also, travel and tourism generated, directly and indirectly, around €27 billion in 2021, up from €15.5 billion in 2020 (Statista Research Department, 2022). At the same time, due to the dispersion of tourist destinations throughout the country, tourism plays an important role in generating income in many regional units (INSETE, 2021a). Thus, tourism tends to be used to reduce regional gaps and promote regional development (Soukiazis & Proenca, 2008; Karoulia et al., 2016).

In Greece, many capital investments have been made through tourism, which strengthen the country's economy and generate employment opportunities. Specifically, tourism boosts employment in businesses that offer tourism services (e.g. transport services, accommodation, catering) and in sectors that support or supply these organizations (e.g. industry, construction, utilities) (Nikoli & Lazakidou, 2019). Therefore, tourism development is widely recognized as a positive means of reducing unemployment, especially considering that it employs more than 900,000 people, representing 20% of the workforce (INSETE, 2020a).

### **Covid-19 Impact on Greek Tourism**

The COVID-19 pandemic began in December 2019 and was considered a pandemic on March 11, 2020 (World Health Organization, 2020). Although an emergency protocol was established on

January 23, 2020 to prevent further infection, the new virus was spread across the world. Following the recommendations of the World Health Organization, a number of countries (such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark) took restrictive measures (such as closing borders) to reduce the infection rate and protect their residents. Also, countries such as Cyprus, Italy and France, aiming to limit the spread of the virus and support national health systems to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, decided to apply a series of restrictive measures to their citizens (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2022).

Accordingly, the Greek Government, wanting to limit the spread of the Covid-19 disease and contribute to mitigating the consequences of the pandemic on the domestic economy, implemented a series of measures. Some of the measures implemented in 2020-2021 are the following:

- 1) Prohibition of outdoor gathering (Government Gazette 5046/ B'/14.11.2020)
- 2) Social distancing (Government Gazette 4566/B'/15.10.2020)
- 3) Restrictions on internal movement (Government Gazette 1585/B'/25.04.2020)
- 4) Mandatory use of face covering masks (Government Gazette 1780/B'/10.05.2020)
- 5) Entry screening practices for infectious diseases among travelers at points of entry in Airports (Government Gazette 3401/B'/13-08-2020)
- 6) Regulation for the maximum number of people at social gatherings in homes and public spaces (Government Gazette 3429/B'/14-08-2020)

Indeed, the pandemic has driven the global economy into a severe economic recession and many industries have been significantly affected by the measures taken, including the tourism industry (The World Bank Group, 2020). In this context, measures such as border closures and travel restrictions have put tourism businesses at viability risk (OECD, 2020). The pandemic reduced international travel, causing a huge blow to many international economies in the world, which ultimately affected the global economy (Dupeyras et al., 2020).

For example, due to the pandemic and travel restrictions, consumer purchasing behavior has changed dramatically, leading to a near-complete cessation of tourism activities and businesses (e.g. hotels, restaurants and airlines) (Allaberganov, Preko & Mohammed, 2021). According to the World Tourism Organization, in May 2020 the number of international tourists dropped by 98% globally, leading to an overall decrease of 56% in total visitor numbers for the period January – May 2020. Accordingly, the losses in revenue for tourism businesses worldwide are estimated at €320 billion for the same period. However, according to the latest UNWTO World Tourism Barometer, international

tourist arrivals almost tripled from January to July 2022 (+172%) compared to the same period in 2021. This means the sector recovered almost 60% of pre-pandemic levels (World Tourism Organization, 2022).

## **Tourism's Recovery Strategies**

Tourism has been one of the sectors worst affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, leading to a loss of \$4.5 trillion in T&T GDP and 62 million jobs in 2020 (World Economic Forum, 2022). As the impact of COVID-19 on tourism and hospitality is paramount, government support during this crisis has been essential (Fong et al., 2020). The World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC) is encouraging countries affected by the pandemic to formulate policies and programs to provide the necessary support to the tourism sector, the industry's workforce, and provide financial incentives for companies and businesses affected by the pandemic (WTTC, 2020).

In response to this crisis, many governments used measures to restore the tourism sector. For example, the Chinese government implemented measures that varied by region. To be more specific, in eastern China, which is more densely populated, the government focused on tax reduction and gave financial support to the residents whereas tourist protection and inspection was the primary objective of central regions (Shao et al., 2020). Accordingly, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Japan have rolled out various programs that provide discounts, coupons and subsidies for domestic travel (World Economic Forum, 2022).

The Greek government, aiming to further develop the tourism sector and restore tourist flows to normal levels, used a series of measures. The Ministry of Tourism finances 38 projects (e.g. Implementation of infrastructure projects, Implementation of Human Resource Development Projects, Projects to strengthen the competitiveness of Tourism, etc.), which aim to accelerate the recovery of tourism and empower the country's economy (Ministry of Tourism, 2021).

An attempt to revive domestic tourism was the "Tourism for All" program. The purpose of the program was to strengthen domestic tourism, which is part of the government's broader strategy to support Greek households and businesses against the effects of the global inflationary crisis, and the budget for the program was set at €100,000,000.00 (Ministry of Tourism, 2021). The beneficiaries - citizens with an individual income of up to 16,000 euros and a family income of up to 28,000 euros - were able to issue an e-voucher, which they could use for their stay at any hotel or accommodation in the country that they choose. Accordingly, within the framework of the National Vaccination Program against COVID-19, a prepaid card (€150) was given in 2021 to people aged 18 to 25 who got vaccinated against Covid-19. The financial facility took the form of a digital debit card - known

as "Freedom Pass" - and could be used to cover costs for travel and entertainment, including airfare or ferry tickets, vehicle rentals, accommodation, admission to museums and archaeological sites (Government Gazette 4675/B'/09-10-2021, 2021).

## **Dataset and Experiment**

### **A. Dataset**

In this paper, aiming to investigate whether the policies implemented by the Greek Government to strengthen the tourism sector affected tourist flows during the pandemic, we used data from the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). For the purpose of the study, we focused and studied the relationship between two variables: the number of expenditures on personal trips and the age of individuals. In this context, we obtained data from ELSTAT for the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021. It is worth mentioning that for 2022 the data from ELSTAT is not yet available.

### **B. Experiment**

Aiming to analyze these two variables (number of personal travel expenses and age), we used the Pearson correlation coefficient, which is a commonly used nonparametric method of detecting associations between two variables (Taylor, 1987: 409). Pearson's linear correlation coefficient ( $r$ ) takes values between -1 and +1. When  $r$  is closer to +1 (-1), it is considered that there is a strong positive (or negative) correlation, while when  $r$  is closer to 0, it is considered that there is a weaker correlation. Therefore, it is considered to be a strong correlation if the correlation coefficient is greater than 0.8 and a weak correlation if the correlation coefficient is less than 0.5.

In the context of null hypothesis testing, we are using p-value in order to quantify the idea of statistical significance of evidence. The p-value is found in almost all statistical analyses and can take values between 0 and 1. A p-value close to 0, indicates that the observed difference is unlikely to be due to chance, whereas a value close to 1 suggests no difference between the groups other than due to chance. In general, the smaller the p-value, the stronger the evidence against the null hypothesis (Dahiru, 2008).

Our approach consists of one experiment and the procedure can be summarized in the steps below:

1. Grouped the amount of personal travel expenses by year and age.
2. Compute Pearson Correlation Coefficient between each year's personal travel expenses.
3. Compute the p-value for each correlation coefficient.

For the purpose of this study, we used the general-purpose programming language Python in order to preprocess the data and compute correlations and p-values, since it is commonly used for this kind of computation.

## Results


The figure below (Figure 1) shows the correlation matrix between years. Each cell in the table shows the correlation between two years, for example for years 2018 and 2019 the correlation coefficient is 0.997366. The color scale represents the value of the correlation between two variables: dark blue highlights strong correlations while light green highlights weak correlations.

**Figure 1: Correlation matrix between years (2018-2021)**

	2018	2019	2020	2021
2018	1.000000	0.997366	0.977249	0.984352
2019	0.997366	1.000000	0.968132	0.977419
2020	0.977249	0.968132	1.000000	0.994393
2021	0.984352	0.977419	0.994393	1.000000

In order to evaluate the statistical importance of our results we also calculated p-values for each year. Our results can be summarized in Figure 2.


**Figure 2: P-values for each year (2018-2021)**



As we notice from the figure above, p-values range from  $1.02 \cdot 10^{-27}$  (the lowest p-value) to  $2.51 \cdot 10^{-15}$  (the highest). These results indicate strong evidence against the null hypothesis, as there is less than a 5% probability the null is correct (and the results are random), since all of them are less than 0.05.

Afterward, we calculated the percentage change of the amount of personal travel expenses between the years 2018 - 2019 and 2020 - 2021 in each age group since we noticed from the correlation matrix above that the years 2018 - 2019 and 2020 - 2021 had the strongest correlation coefficient. The results are shown in Figure 3.

**Figure 3: Percentage change of the amount of personal travel expenses between years 2018 - 2019 and 2020 - 2021 by age groups**



As we notice, the percentage change of personal travel expenses from the year 2020 to 2021 is quite greater than the percentage change from the year 2018 to 2019. This can be explained both by the relaxation of measures and the implemented policies. As we observe, there is a great increase in travel expenses in all age groups. This increase might be caused by the implemented policies such as "Freedom Pass" and "Tourism for All", since greater amounts of money were spent in the tourism sector.

## Conclusion

In this paper, we studied the effect of the implemented policies to strengthen the tourism sector during the pandemic. In Greece, tourism has always been considered a priority sector and significant capital investments have been made over the years for tourism development and one of the sectors worst affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. In response to this, the Greek government aimed to further develop the tourism sector and implement policies to strengthen this sector.

For this purpose, we examined the correlation between the number of expenditures on personal trips and the age of individuals from 2018 to 2021 by calculating the Pearson Correlation Coefficient to study the effects of implemented policies on tourism. Our results indicate that there is a strong correlation between the years 2018 - 2019 (pre-pandemic) and 2020 - 2021 (pandemic). Afterwards, we calculated the percentage change of the amount of personal travel expenses between these years and we noticed that it is quite greater from the year 2020 to 2021, indicating that the implemented policies might have contributed to the increase of tourism flows.

A possible extension of our work would be the application of our approach in the year 2022. Moreover, we could also study which type of transport was used (airplane, train, car) or the type of accommodation (hotel, hostel, camping). Lastly, we could use other correlation coefficients such as Spearman Correlation Coefficient to evaluate which correlation coefficient is the best for our approach.

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## Topic 3

### Sustainable Development and Environmental Policies

## Environmental Degradation and Threat to Human Security: A Case Study of Delhi's Air Pollution Problem<sup>1</sup>

Jayant Chandel<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

The paper is an attempt to understand the current policy response to tackle air pollution in Delhi, India. It takes a human security approach to challenge some of the mainstream assumptions which inform the current top-down policy response. Then it tries to provide openings for a more holistic policy foundation based on our discussion on the literature about human and environmental security.

**Keywords:** Anthropocene; air pollution; environment; human security; environmental change; security.

### Introduction

The consequences of the human actions on the planet and its environment are so widespread and pervasive that “earth scientists now frequently refer to the present period of geological history as ‘the anthropocene’” (Dalby, 2013: 27). With large scale infrastructure and industrial development due to human activities there has been dramatic changes in the biosphere of the planet and they are bringing about “chemical and biological transformations” which has triggered this much talked about phenomenon of ‘Global Environmental Change’ (GEC). By building these ‘concrete jungles’ we are in fact altering the topography of the planet and, according to Dalby (2013: 27), “concrete and asphalt are effectively new rocks in the earth system”. Nowhere the effect of these concrete jungles and biological transformations is more apparent than that in the air quality of Delhi, especially around the advent of winters, where a combination of regional and local factors, such as auto pollution, construction activities and farming practices like burning of stubble trigger a plethora of top-down but late response from the state and people suffer for weeks as a consequence. The current policy of Graded Action Response Plan (GRAP) has failed to offer much respite to people despite being in place since 2017. The paper by looking at the debates on environmental security within security studies/international relations literature points to the weakness of such policy responses and instead tries to offer an alternative policy starting point on the basis of this literature.

The paper will try to analyze the threats these environmental changes pose to humanity in general and the marginalized and poor communities or individuals in particular. As St Clair (2010: 180)

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argues it is the actions of affluent people and countries which created this worldwide problem, but it will have the most lethal effect on “those who have contributed least to the problem”. The first part of the paper will focus on the debates in the field of the nature of threats around environmental security and which referent objects need to be protected. The second part of the paper will try to show how a human security approach is the best way to solve this problem and there is a need to move away from the top down to bottom-up policies which makes the common stakeholders not just spectators but also participants.

### **Environmental Security: Threats and Debates**

The overall literature on environmental security can be divided into two approaches around the issue of environmental security; the traditional view and the human security view. The traditionalists view environmental damage as an indirect source of insecurity as it leads to conflicts and migrations due to resource scarcity whereas non traditionalists consider it a grave issue in its own right which should be dealt without linking it to national security. According to Dalby (2012), environmental security started to gain interest in late 1980 from certain policy makers in the USA and USSR (after the Chernobyl accident). Thereafter, there was some discussion about environmental degradation and resource depletion as a threat to the security of states. Dalby(2012) contends that literature in 1990 was similar to the literature of 1980 wherein the issue was portrayed as the problem of global south and as not something that could affect global north directly. One major influential literature of the era was an article by Robert Kaplan (1994). He is focusing on third world countries and arguing that environmental change will induce conflict and force poor people to migrate towards the affluent countries of the developed world. He links the phenomenon with national security. According to Hartmann (2013: 48-49) this “neo-Malthusian environmental security discourse” gives a message that “poor and displaced people are dangerous”. She further contends that the links between environmental degradation and migration are complex. Mainstream literature on climate conflicts invokes the age-old stereotypes of dangers posed by the “over breeding peasants” (Hartmann, 2013: 48).

Recently, Mazo (2010:13) linked the global phenomenon of climate change with the interests of the developed states, arguing that they should try to mitigate its effect because it is in their security interests to do so. He further argues climate change should "also be part of an overall approach to national security and defense planning" (Mazo, 2010:141). Recently, there were similar attempts by the US defense and Intelligence establishments, such as the CIA and defense think tanks such as the Centre for Naval Analysis. For instance, the CIA launched the Center on Climate Change and

National Security. All these initiatives have one goal i.e. to consider the issue from a national interest perspective and now there is evidence of increasing entanglement of US aid and its national security objectives (Hartmann, 2013). Such attempts to address this threat, which is global in nature, is problematic because it obfuscates the severity of global warming.

These dystopian accounts also fail to question the economic and development model largely responsible for these disruptions. One of the major drivers of the current industrial revolution is the coal and fossil fuel powered machines which are the most significant factor behind the "climate change crisis" (Dalby, 2013:28, 29). According to scholars such as Luke (2009: 14, 15) the ascent of the world market as the hegemonic ideology has placed the world market system above all other aspects of life hence "each state, society and culture must be managed along the lines of a corporate capitalist enterprise". This makes it very difficult to change developmental models of our society as the top-down approach privileges certain interests. Hence, in the case of Delhi/Northern India in the discourse around the issue it is the farmers who are discussed the most and other factors like vehicular pollution and round the year construction in and around Delhi/NCR region. It is because they are deemed significant and much more prominent economic activity than farming. But as Hough (2008:162) attests, politics is infected with the "perception of utilitarian gain" as governments always tend to protect their economic and 'national' interest. As almost all the actors (both state and non-state) are driven by their traditional interests and preferences.

Hence, policy responses around the issue of air degradation in North India are always driven by the various interest groups and blame gaming between various provincial governments and the central government. Hence, unlike the state centric approaches towards security, the human security approach instead focuses either on the human beings as individuals or as part of a community as a referent of security (Gasper, 2010). This approach instead allows the policymakers to make people centric policy approach while taking into account the interests of the most vulnerable communities.

### Human Security Approach, GRAP and Delhi Air Pollution

Security is a 'contested' concept. O'Brien et al. (2013:4) assert that "has both objective and subjective dimensions attached to it". They further contend that an understanding of both these aspects is very significant for understanding the issues involved in the idea of human security. Gasper (2010: 23) contends that "the concept of human security redirects attention in discussions of security, beyond the nation-state level, beyond physical violence as the only relevant threat/vector, and beyond physical harm as the only relevant damage."

O'Brien defines the idea of Human Security in the context of GEC as:

*“a state that is achieved when and where individuals and communities have the options necessary to end, mitigate or adapt to threats to their human, environmental and social rights; have the capacity and freedom to exercise these options; and actively participate in pursuing them”.*

(Cited in Moser, 2013: 279)

Hence, the best way to protect the lives of individuals and communities vulnerable in the face of GEC could be achieved by their empowerment. Moser (2013: 280) identifies empowerment along with “development, poverty eradication, greater disaster resilience and adaptive capacity” as the means as well as the end. She draws parallels between the concept of human security and empowerment and points out that both the approaches talk about “the capacity and freedom to exercise choice, and active participation in that choice” (2013: 282). There are diverse sources of systemic disempowerment of a community or individual. Systemic discrimination and disempowerment dehumanizes people and obstructs individuals or communities from deciding their destiny and also their ability to deal with issues related to their lives (Moser, 2013: 284). In this context the observation of St Clair and Lawson (2013) is significant as they question the belief that poverty is reduced by development activities and these development activities are hindered due to environmental change. In fact, it is this development model which is creating environmental degradation and poverty (St Clair & Lawson, 2013: 205).

Economic theory is distant from this aspect of reality and hence present day economic models consider the present development models ideal for poverty reduction. There is a need to reverse this process and “egalitarian societies and health of the planet” should be the priority, not the present system, which is the main problem behind the GEC (St Clair & Lawson, 2013: 209-211). St Clair (2010: 185-187) argues that market-based solutions have failed to have any effect on the reduction of poverty; such programs are supported by the World Bank. She also insists that we need to develop a robust welfare system and efforts should be taken to reduce the wealth gap (St Clair 2010: 180). O’Brien et al., argue that there is need to focus on the "systems, structures and development paradigms that perpetuate insecurities" along with a deeper understanding about the "human dimensions" involved in the issue. Furthermore, they contend, "transforming how we perceive, experience, respond to and create change is a powerful leverage point for promoting human security" (2013:1-2). In addition, there is also a need to ponder over the issue of community empowerment, Ramallo and Ostrovskaya (2013) cite the case of Bolivia where indigenous communities which constituted the most marginalized part of the society were legally granted the rights over resources like water. This happened after indigenous communities started to mobilize around the issue of access to water and natural gas (Ramallo & Ostrovskaya, 2013) (Also see Goldman 2009). Such changes can only be brought if we think through the logic of human security.

It is in this context that limits of current policy of GRAP to tackle degradation of air pollution in Delhi and northern India should be understood. The policy incorporates a set of actions to be taken based on the severity level (poor, very poor, severe and severe+) of the air pollution in Delhi and National Capital Region (NCR) (Indian Express: 2022). This is decided by the Air Quality Index and when the air quality reaches a certain threshold a fixed set of steps is taken at the behest of state and local authorities. In 2022, it has so far failed to curtail the continuing severity of the air pollution as just during the first week of November the state authorities invoked the severe+ measures. Clearly the earlier efforts to curb the pollution level continues to give very limited relief if there is some. If we look at the data provided by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, since 2018, we can see that in the month of November during the period of 2018-2022 the AQI index has failed to improve significantly (PIB Delhi 2023). So, while the government report triumphantly declares that during the period of November 2022 Delhi saw a remarkable improvement in the air quality (AQI 320) which is a significant improvement over the November 2021 pollution level (AQI 377). According to the report it is a reflection of the success of the state policy. This interpretation is highly selective which looks just at the last year's data and compares it with the data from 2022. The AQI in 2019 was 312 so the long term data doesn't align with the argument that the AQI level is improving after introduction of the GRAP in 2017. Such top-down and ad hoc policy initiatives are bound to have limited impact in long term because of the nature of the policy itself which is passive in nature. Only involvement of people and a human centric approach which takes into account the agency of the communities at the margins will make an impact.

## Conclusion

The above discussion of mainstream top-down approach of tackling environmental degradation clearly demonstrates the fault lines in current pollution control measures in Delhi/NCR. Clearly, there is a need to have a long term solution which involves incorporating the interests of common stakeholders such as farmers of nearby regions, industrial/construction development and common people. Without involving these actors, these top-down ad hoc policies will always be limited in their impact. Currently farmers have no long term incentive to stop burning the stubble despite all the hue and cry made every year when winter arrives. Similarly, the constant increase of private vehicles can also not be solved by a simple top-down approach when severity level rises. We need to make public transport more accessible for the common public and much more secure for women passengers. Furthermore, banning/limiting construction/industrial activities just for a short period is no solution. We need to make these activities greener by bringing regulations around rampant construction activities round the year along with solving the issues like stubble burning. Just asking

public/industries to refrain from certain economic activity as crisis arises is not going to solve this recurring problem. Hence, in simple words it is by empowering the actors and making them active participants by making long term policy goals, which may bring better control of air pollution in Delhi. Only people centric and bottom up approach will make things better in the long term. The above discussion provides us the template to move forward towards a more holistic policymaking.

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# Greening International Trade: Unilateral Tendencies and the Role of International Institutions<sup>1</sup>

Djego Abedinaj<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

International climate and trade regimes are becoming increasingly interchangeably linked to each other. Over the last months' discussions about greening the international trade have rapidly increased, aiming to take concrete steps towards climate mitigation. Some countries such as the EU have come up with courageous unilateral measures such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and Germany forwarded by introducing to the G7 the idea of a Climate Club. Bypassing international institutions might be flexible to move forward, but at the same time may create fragmentation of the international regimes. This policy brief maps the new unilateral tendencies towards climate-related measures on trade policy and also examines the internal dynamic within the international organization. Firstly, it starts by analyzing how the regime complexity of climate change has left space for non-multilateral tendencies to emerge. Second, it maps the new tendencies and then explores how we got there. And lastly, it draws some insights into the potential risk of a more fragmented international climate regime may pose for international cooperation.

**Keywords:** Climate governance; International trade regime; Informal initiatives; International Institutions.

## Introduction

The Paris Agreement signed in 2015 marked an important step towards decarbonization of global economy and also served as a milestone of multilateral cooperation. It served to create a common framework, guidelines, and principles in order to move forward on a multilateral basis. However, the emergence of unilateral policies such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) introduced by the European Union (EU) has raised discussion about the effectiveness of these schemes for cross-border carbon pricing policies (European Commission, 2021; Council of the EU, 2021). According to latest (2022) National Determinant Contributions (NDCs) submissions under the Paris Agreement (Doelle, 2016), two-thirds of countries are considering using carbon pricing to achieve their emission reduction.

On the other hand, the emergence of informal modes of governance such as the German Presidency's idea on G7 for a Climate Club seems to have gathered consensus as well. What about international institutions such as the UNFCCC and the WTO? Why countries are bypassing international institutions to push forward the climate agendas? Why international institutions can't deliver? This

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policy brief will try to give an overview of the current state of emerging tendencies that are growing out of the institutions, and also explain the actual gridlock under the UNFCCC and the WTO. This policy brief maps the recent policy approach on international climate policy and such as the EU CBAM or Climate Clubs, explore the relationship with the multilateral institutions. Furthermore, it seeks to explore what might be the consequences of unilateral approaches to climate policy and how these policy approaches can be back on track at the multilateral institutions.

### **Institutionalized and non-institutionalized modes of international cooperation**

The climate crisis is definitely a global challenge that required a comprehensive approach. In 1992 United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established as an international convention to create some common ground for the multilateral cooperation. But on the other side, the WTO regime has ambiguity closures on trade tariffs established to push forward environmental related agenda through trade policy (Droege et al., 2018; Laurens et al., 2022; Tosun & Lang, 2017). The interaction of the UNFCCC and WTO regime is an example of “regime complexity”, defined as interaction of international regime on the conditions of the lack of hierarchy (Alter & Munier, 2009).

The implications of regime complexity have been driven in various modes. In some cases, the fragmentation of regimes may create conditions for smaller environment groups, where they can address more effectively their interest (Bulkeley et al., 2018). In others, regime complexity may create conditions for big players to leverage their power within international institutions and create cross-institutional political strategies where actors need to update with the international institutional environment and adjust their political strategies targeting different institutions to reach their objectives.

Likewise, the interplay of different authorities including their spheres of authority and their relationship with state and non-state members leave space for condensation and divergence preferences (Zurn, 2020). Additionally, the divergence preferences could be considered legitimate and provide a form deliberative participation on decision making within the international institutions, being increasingly present they leave space for politicization and norm contestations.

In that regard, the regime complexity of climate change has created space for emergence of informal forum take on role on climate agenda on non-governmental organizations (NGO). Between state lead international institutions and NGOs, a competition emerged to take a bigger space on policy area over the resource, legitimacy or role in coordinative processes (Westerwinter et al., 2021). As Alter and Meunier (2009) states, the international regime complexity reduces the clarity of legal obligation by

introducing overlapping sets of legal rules and jurisdictional governing issues, what has been reflected on global climate governance. Various international institutions have been established to deal with issues that concern climate change (Ovedendko & Koehane, 2012), however the legitimacy and effectiveness questions are raised regarding the work that has been done.

The density and diffusion of international institutions is likely to lead towards contestation or other forms of engagement (Morse & Keohane, 2014). The contestation of global governance leads to other form of governance that tries to escape institutional channels and find counter-institutionalization (Zurn, 2018). Especially, during the times of gridlock in decision-making, the tendency of countries is to engage on informal initiatives and forums such as G7 or G20. These trends are becoming even more evident over the last years due to the slow progress made within the international institutions (Lake, 2013).

Despite the emergence of the informal modes of governance, the multilateral framework such as the UNFCCC, the WTO has a crucial role to play on adjusting the current international trade regime with the need to expand the coverage towards more environmental regulation. Density of issues and increasing of technical complexity should be a driver for deeper cooperation rather than fragmentation of the system itself.

### **Mapping new trends of climate policy on international trade**

The recent trends are likely to produce new realities in global economic governance. In the current political context, even more, countries have raised their ambition to have a role on global climate governance. The emerging markets have already more powerful leverage of bargain power to pursue their policy objectives. They are asking for more power and trying to find their allies by grouping within international institutions, showing some new forms of a “competitive multilateralism” (Jones et al., 2019). As a consequence, the authority in global economic governance is being even more decentralized (Wouters et al., 2018). That does not necessarily mean the emergence of a bipolar world, rather than different models of globalization that are linked and interact with one another.

A new phase of multilateralism is emerging with no global leading power, which Jeffery Sachs (2020) calls the “Kindleberger moment”. The post-pandemic area retreated states to think on their own to handle the consequences and left a gap in multilateral institutions to address the crisis (WTO, 2021). Emerging powers such as Brazil, India, and Turkey are trying to take advantage by asking for more recognition and will continue to do so. But on the other hand, some other optimistic scenarios might take place as a need to address challenges regarding the advancement of the agenda on climate change, by increasing policy coherence between international trade and climate regime.

The EU was the first mover to initiate a legislative proposal, the CBAM as an autonomous measure aiming to avoid carbon leakage. The CBAM is the first cross-border pricing scheme, aiming to start implementation by 2027 and be fully implemented by 2033 (European Commission, 2022). Among the political concerns from emerging economies such as Brazil or South Africa, the CBAM has opened discussions and scenarios about the future of cross-border carbon pricing schemes regarding the economic cost that the emerging economies need to take, technical and regulatory feasibility, compatibility with the WTO and the EU ambition to create a level playing field.

The EU CBAM seems that just has broken the ice of international carbon pricing. As the CBAM is moving forward, many discussions have been accompanied for its comparability with the WTO. Emerging countries like Brazil, China, and India have not been friendly and welcoming towards the EU CBAM (Eicke, et al, 2021). As a response to climate governance, the German Presidency of G7 has proposed a Climate Club as a flexible forum to discuss and increase the comparability of climate regulation policies and push forward the climate agenda at the international level (German Presidency, 2022) among G7 countries in order to advance faster on the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

In addition, based on the last (2022) National Determinates Contributions (NDCs) the list of countries that are willing to take into consideration implementation of the carbon pricing schemes is rising. The willingness to implement carbon pricing raise further challenges regarding the regulatory environment and the comparability level among different legislations. The United States is also taking into consideration designing a carbon border tax and other countries such as China are preparing implementation of nation-wide carbon pricing policies.

New environmental related measures have appeared not only through cross-border mechanism, but also through the existing trade deals that for many years has reduced barriers and boost trade among countries might be subject to the extension of environmental clauses. Recently the EU has announced the revision of the EU-Mercosur trade deal. Furthermore, the increasing number of countries taking into consideration or have already implemented carbon pricing schemes increase the regulatory risk for companies operating overseas. As the legislative regime is in the early phases of implementation or about to be implemented, the comparability of legislation has still considerable gaps, and further work needs to be done on that regard.

### **Internal dynamics within the international institutions**

The recent developments within international institutions such as UNFCCC and WTO are demonstrating that countries are still far from having a consensus on issues related to trade and

climate. Group alliances among the countries around the COP become even more important drivers of the divergence within international institutions. Constantly, the pressure for emerging countries on the WTO, by requiring better access to international markets, has been intensified by creating alliances and groups around emerging powers such as Brazil, India, and China. Divergences in position have raised the pressure at the COP on more developed economies. And on the other side, group alliances around South Africa for instance are challenging of multilateral pledge part of the Paris Agreement such as NDCs arguing for divergences in capacities to turn pledges into action and meanwhile asking for more flexibility (van Asselt, 2014; van Asselt & Zelli, 2018).


The WTO has launched a work plan to work on trade-related climate measures and policies. These discussions are part of the informal working group Trade and Climate Change aiming to dig deeper into understanding and bringing into the WTO best practices of countries related to trade and climate measures, maximizing environmental benefits without compromising economic ones (WTO, 2022a). In 2020, members of the WTO launched a discussion under the trade and environmental sustainability work plan “Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions” (TESSD). TESSD provides a forum within the WTO to facilitate the dialogue and create a common understanding of the emerging issues that all the members are currently facing.

According to the WTO, environmental-related notifications have been growing constantly over the last decade, showing a higher sensibility consciousness to leverage trade policy for the environmental-related objective. Especially over the last 6 years, the number of environmental related measures has been steadily increasing. Most of the environmental-related measures from 2009-2019 have been in energy efficiency. On the sector-specific basis, most of the measures taken are related to the manufacturing industry. However, the emergence of environment-related measures may create a friction between domestic regulatory regimes which are associated with higher costs and bureaucracy. Additionally, they often serve as a tool to leverage market preferences or exclude certain products from other competitive markets. Those divergent patterns of regulation have also somehow been legitimated by the principle of “*common but differentiated responsibilities*” in the Paris Agreement, which might be subject to interpretation even on the regulatory approach to certain policy instruments.

Furthermore, apart from political pressure on international institutions, the regulatory burden is shifting to international trade. Being considered among the actives of carbon emission, the carbon footprint embedded in international trade is identified in different forms such as transportation etc. In that regards, OECD, has given an important contribution by working specifically on cross-border institutional regulatory cooperation and providing the experience of countries with the design and

implementation of carbon pricing policies. International Monetary Fund (IMF) has opened a dialogue about an international carbon price floor, aiming to facilitate and create the basis for further inter-institutional cooperation regarding the emergence of carbon pricing schemes (IMF, 2021). However, the dialogue is still in its early beginnings and yet far from reaching a common ground.

**Figure 1: WTO Environmental Database**



Source: WTO (2022b).

## Discussion

The role of international institutions should be at the core of policy preferences in order to maintain a rule-based international trade regime. They need to be more active and increase their role in adjusting regime divergences between international trade and climate regimes. The recent trends of unilateral policies have created more space for the fragmentation of environmental governance.

Second, the emergence of different carbon pricing policies in developed and developing economies. Informal modes of governance such as the Climate Club or Coalition of Trade Ministers for Climate change should serve as discussion forums aiming to find common ground for further international cooperation and avoid harm to the economy by a continuous change of climate regimes.

Third, the role of international regulatory organizations such as the OECD in providing the best international regulatory practices will become even more important. The need to reform several aspects of the existing regime and to make more space for sustainable measures is significant. However, the new climate-related policy measures need to be coordinated among stakeholders and should aim to reduce the risk of regime fragmentation.

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## Topic 4

### Migration and Refugee Issues

# Polish Local Government Aid to Refugees from Ukraine on the Example of the City of Poznań<sup>1</sup>

Adrian Wojtasz<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 resulted in a mass migration of refugees. Poland, as a neighbour, took in those fleeing the war and deployed them in cities in different parts of the country. A large part of the population was taken in by towns and cities in the east of Poland, but Ukrainian citizens were leaving further west. One city that provided assistance was Poznań, which, in cooperation with many local institutions, created living conditions for the refugees. The article analyses the actions that the local government carried out to deal with the migration crisis and what goals guided them.

**Keywords:** migrants; refugees; Ukraine; aid; Poznań.

## Introduction

The outbreak of armed conflict within Ukraine has resulted in an influx of refugees into bordering countries. One of them was Poland, which has so far accepted more than 7.7 million people (Straż Graniczna, 2022, November 14). Assistance to persons at risk is guaranteed by the Republic of Poland through “The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”, also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention (Konwencja, 1951). According to a report by the Centre for Analysis and Research of the Union of Polish Metropolises, most refugees from Ukraine went mainly to 12 cities. These were: Białystok, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Katowice, Kraków, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Rzeszów, Szczecin, Warsaw and Wrocław (Raport o uchodźcach z Ukrainy, 2022). One of the first actions of the Polish government was the adoption by the parliament of the Act on “Assistance to Ukrainian Citizens in Connection with the Armed Conflict on the Territory of Ukraine”. This happened already on 12 March 2022. It regulated many issues related to social life and the existence of refugees in the new reality. Those who crossed the Polish border after 24 February 2022 were given the possibility of legal residence for a period of 18 months (Ustawa o pomocy, 2022). Article 12. para. 4. of the same Act gives the possibility, among others, to the local self-government, on its own initiative and within the scope of its financial resources, to provide assistance to Ukrainian citizens. Previously, they did not have such possibilities. In Poland, local self-government is divided into three levels: commune,

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district and voivodeship. They are not subordinate to each other, but operate on the principle of subsidiarity (Dolnicki, 2021: 316-324).

The city of Poznań, when organizing aid for refugees in the Greater Poland voivodeship, took a joint initiative with a number of organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, and established a provincial reception point and a warehouse for aid products (Poznań, 2022, February 28). The aim of this paper is to present the ways in which local government in Poland provides aid. The activities of the authorities of the City of Poznań, which is an important urban centre in the western part of the country, are used as a case study. The following research questions are addressed in the paper: How does Poznań stand out from other cities in providing assistance to refugees? What measures have been taken to assist refugees arriving in the city? These were answered by attempting a situational description from the outbreak of war in Ukraine until September 2022.

## **Reception Point**

Already at the beginning of the war, the administration of the City of Poznań made a concerted effort to welcome refugees into the agglomeration. Cooperation was established with the Poznań International Fair and the Greater Poland Voivode, who is the central government's representative in the region. Since 28 February, a reception point has started operating in one of the fair halls at the main railway station (Poznań, 2022, February 28). The hall was divided into 3 zones: information and registration, café and storage and accommodation. The point on the grounds of the Poznań International Fair was set up to provide refugees with a hot meal or basic medical care. Volunteers, who were soon recruited, provided key information on their status and residence options (Caritas, 2022). From the reception point, refugees were also deployed to their assigned places of stay. At the same time, 700 accommodation places were prepared in the halls of the Poznań International Fair, while 400 places were prepared in the nearby Arena Performance Hall. These activities were carried out by the MTP Group Company in cooperation with the Greater Poland Voivodeship Office in Poznań, the Poznań City Hall and the In\_Spire Foundation. Overnight, an accommodation facility was set up in the halls of the Poznań International Fair. On the first day of its operation, all the places were occupied (MTP, 2022).

A storage area was set up in Pavilion No. 4, where Poznań residents were able to bring donations of food, hygiene items and clothing from 2 March 2022. Blankets, sleeping bags, mattresses, medicines and clothing were also stored in the 3,6000 sq m hall. The items were later transported to a location near Lublin in the Podkarpackie voivodeship, where the warehouses of the Government Strategic Reserve Agency are located. Only from there they were distributed to the war-affected area of

Ukraine. Some of the donated items were distributed to refugees in Greater Poland (Poznań, 2022, February 28).

In August 2022, the reception desk was moved to another building in the Poznań International Fair complex. This was due to the reduced number of refugees coming into the city. All services offered by the office were retained there, these included SIM card registration, medical care, COVID-19 vaccination, legal and psychological advice (TVP, 2022, August 10).

## Own City Actions

Resolution No. LXI/1136/VIII/2022 of the Poznań City Council of 24 March 2022 introduced a specific list of assistance for refugees from Ukraine. According to the provisions of this document, the city is to provide them with accommodation, all-day collective meals, financing of transport, provision of cleaning and personal hygiene products, clothing and food and other products necessary for day-to-day functioning, supporting the process of adaptation, integration and professional activation, financing of municipal services, financing of educational tasks related to the education, upbringing and care of children and pupils (Uchwała, 2022). In accordance with the decision of councillors and the Municipal Transport Company, all Ukrainians who arrived in Poland after 24 February were given the opportunity to travel free on public transport. Travel on buses and trams within the Poznań agglomeration was possible on the basis of special certificates (Poznań, 2022, June 7). The document was valid for 30 days from the date of issue, but the decision was extended to 60 days. In June 2022, Poznań city councillors decided that all certificates could be used until a maximum of 30 June. After this time, refugees had to buy the same tickets as Poles (Radio Poznań, 2022). The free travel was motivated by the municipal authorities so that refugees could deal with some of the formalities, such as applying for a national identification number (PESEL) organizing a place to stay or applying for cash benefits.

A municipal helpdesk has also been set up in Poznań on Bukowska Street to specifically assist refugees who have settled in the city. Its opening took place on 28 February 2022. The site was administered by Poznań City Hall staff employed by the Department of Health and Social Affairs (Poznań, 2022, March 19). In addition to the possibility of obtaining food products, advice from a lawyer and a psychologist is offered there. It is also possible to sign up for Polish language classes. There are also plans to run classes for pregnant women (TVP, 2022, April 19). The initiative called 'Czuły Poznań-Punkt Bukowska' (Tender Poznań - Bukowska Point) brought together many volunteers who also provided knowledge of the Ukrainian language. A special guidebook was produced, which included information about the city, a map of the centre of Poznań and a Ukrainian-

Polish glossary. The guide was distributed, among others, at the City Assistance Point and at the reception desk (Czuły Poznań, 2022).

Poles who decided to welcome refugees into their homes could count on financial support from the city budget. This was part of an aid programme guaranteed by the government in Warsaw. The benefit amounted to PLN 40 per person per day (approximately €8.50) and was paid for a maximum of 60 days. The money is intended to cover the costs associated with providing accommodation and food for Ukrainian citizens. Applications for the benefit were made on paper at the office of the Municipal Housing Resources Board, as well as online via the Electronic Platform of Public Administration Services. City officials verified the applications to ensure that the number of people applied for in a particular flat matched the number stated in the document (Poznań, 2022, March 22b).

Assistance activities were also carried out by a specialized unit of the Poznań City Hall, the Municipal Family Assistance Centre. Employees of this institution assisted refugees in completing applications for social benefits such as the parental benefit, the family care capital and the "Good start" benefit. The Municipal Family Assistance Centre was also active in granting social assistance benefits, which were of an ad hoc and short-term nature. Refugees from Ukraine were also entitled to non-monetary assistance, which included meals for children and young people, food products or food allowance, Periodic allowance, Care services, Protected housing, Social work, Specialist counselling, and Crisis intervention (MOPR, 2022)

## **Education**

In terms of education, pupils from Ukraine were admitted to Polish schools. For the first month of the war alone, 3013 children found a place in Poznań schools (Poznań, 2022, March 22a). In contrast, 4417 Ukrainian pupils were admitted to schools from the new school year. At the same time, special preparatory classes were launched, in which study lasts one year with the possibility of extension to two years. Students learn Polish language and culture in such classes. In the 2022/2023 school year, 17 additional preparatory classes have been launched. However, pupils from Ukraine have the opportunity to attend classes with children from Poland. Additional Polish language classes are provided for them. In groups of up to 15 pupils, they can take lessons for 6 hours a week. The city authorities have always indicated that no Ukrainian children were admitted to schools under special conditions (Poznań, 2022, September 8).

## **Conclusions**

As the capital of the province, Poznań was able to carry out large-scale relief operations for refugees. The fact that the buildings of the Poznań International Fair were used for this purpose seems

exceptional. The capital of Greater Poland appears to be an important destination port on the map of the country. It is therefore an important centre in western Poland, which has started to carry out activities with such important partners as the government administration in the region and the MTP Group. The measures that were implemented from the beginning were well-thought-out and could be refined over time. We note this by looking at the aid measures through the objectives of their application. The impossibility of estimating the end of the conflict in Ukraine led to the creation of aid plans on a large scale and also on a long-term basis. It should be noted that the city's strategy includes tasks such as teaching refugees to speak Polish, making them economically independent and establishing contact with the local community. These three factors are part of the concept of social adaptation of Ukrainians in Poland (Klaus & Chrzanowska, 2007: 3). With each passing day, the activities carried out by the City of Poznań were reviewed and updated on social media profiles and websites. The actions sometimes went beyond the usual duties imposed by law, and should therefore be appreciated. The social work applied introduced the possibility for Ukrainian families to strengthen and regain their ability to function in their new environment and to develop their life activities (Klaus & Chrzanowska, 2007: 19). At a later stage, it is important to consider how these measures actually influenced the adaptation of Ukrainian citizens in the poznanian region and whether they could have been better guided.

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## Topic 5

### International Relations and International Security

# Recognition and Non-Recognition of a State Resulting from Secession: Case Studies of Annulled Status of the Turkish Cypriot Entity after its Declaration as "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" and Kosovo<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

This paper approaches the situation of a state's recognition or non-recognition, in cases arising from secession. In particular, the international law will be presented, regarding the recognition of states that come from secession and have been created, either on the occasion of prohibited violence use, or for the sake of rehabilitation due to human rights violations. After that, the cases of the Turkish Cypriot annulled status entity after its declaration as the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" and Kosovo will be examined. The overview and legal evaluation of these two cases, can provide useful conclusions regarding the legalization of a state recognition that has resulted from secession.

**Keywords:** International Law; Secession; Cyprus; Kosovo; Human Rights; State Recognition; Liberal Political Theory; Diplomacy; United Nations; Security Council.

## Introduction

International law is a modern tool for international human behavior regulation. The invocation of this is used in order to prevent war, to resolve interstate or supranational disputes, as well as to remove the use of violence between any legal entity or people. Today, it increasingly constitutes an international legal system that deeply governs the international community and regulates policy and organizational principles.

In the light of international law, jurisprudence has been formed based on the decisions of international organizations, such as those of the international court, in order to define specific conditions and procedures, under which a new state can be recognized by other states and organizations. These conditions are not mandatory, but largely determine the foreign policy of state entities and direct the activity of international legal entities.

## State Recognition/Non-recognition

The creation of a state is identified in two specific methods. Firstly, in a primary way, it can gather at a specific moment, all the elements necessary for its creation. Secondly, in a derivative way, it can be

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detached from another state and create an autonomous state entity (Fabry, 2013; Roukounas, 2015).

The recognition of a state, is a unilateral legal act by which one or several state entities declare that they recognize or implicitly accept the rights and obligations of the recognized state to the international community (Roukounas, 2015). The possibility of recognizing a state, is a powerful diplomatic and negotiating "weapon", in the hands of the existing countries, as they can manage it properly, taking advantage of the international circumstances and securing their interests (Lawteacher, 2021).

The character of a state's recognition can be "declaratory" or "constitutive". The term "declaratory" means that the recognition appears as a factor of confirming a reality and strengthening the legal existence of the state, while the term "constituent" means that recognition is a step towards the completion of the creation of the new state (Roukounas, 2015). Furthermore, there is no specific recognition methodology, which facilitates the diplomatic management of the matter. It could be done through several procedures such as an international protocol of recognition of a country's independence or through a simple declaration of state political head (Roukounas, 2015). It is of highly importance to mention that, recognition can take the form of "De facto" or "De Jure" recognition (Florea, 2014). By using the concept of "De facto" is meant the imposition of the state entity's existence on the international stage, while "De Jure" means that the entity has been created, in a way that is "legal" under international law (Busch et al., 2020).

Then, regardless of the recognition of a new state, an important factor that increases the power of a recognition is the geopolitical power of the entity that carries it out (Newman and Visoka, 2021). A new state, which carries the recognition of states with significant political, economic and military power, is objectively easier to be imposed on the international community (Roukounas, 2015). However, at bilateral level, legal recognition between states is of great importance for the conduct of daily activities, such as economic activity, cooperation of government agencies and exchange of critical information (Coppieters, 2018).

### **Creation of a State by Secession**

Secession is the officially declared separation of a territorial entity, from an independent state, which aims to fulfill the aspirations of a specific population group and create an autonomous state (Liakouras, 2007). The population group does not necessarily prevail numerically in the specific area, but may, supported by external factors, proceed with separatist actions. In a more detailed sense, secession is the means, manifested unilaterally through the rebellion of a national group, which aim

to terminate the powers of the state, in its territorial area, and to assume them, by the authorities of the new state entity under formation (Boykin, 1998).

The concept of secession cannot be used in cases of states creation, that was formed with the consent of the state to which it previously belonged, as well as in the case that this state was established with the provision of international organizations (Liakouras, 2007).

Secession, as an event, is treated negatively, based on the systemic status quo arising from international law, as well as from the diplomatic customary law of states. It is an event with negative ramifications, as it is a derivative of violence acts and fragmentation of the territorial integrity of a pre-existing state (Liakouras, 2007). This fact conflicts with the basic principle of respect of the territorial integrity of states, in accordance with international law. This is derived from the Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, from resolutions 1514/1960 and 2625/1970 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as well as from the final act of Helsinki of 1975, which mentions the great importance of territorial integrity and the respect to the right of self-determination, always in connection with the safeguarding of the existing borders.

However, secession can be viewed in the light of protecting the human rights of a population group. Supporters argue that self-determination is a permanent right people can use to establish their own state with independent structures, especially when the denial of the human rights of a population by the state, makes secession the only viable option (Henders, 2010).

Regarding the right of self-determination, there is a multitude of international jurisprudence and decisions, which support its existence and the need to implement it. Specifically, relevant reference is made in articles 1 and 55 of the United Nations Charter, in resolutions 1514/1960 and 2625/1970 of the United Nations General Assembly, in 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as in the declaration of Vienna in 1993 (Efthathiou, 2013). The principle of self-determination was developed, in order to support the formation of new states in the post-colonial era, however of the minimum territorial cost for the country that is being divided. The nation states where mostly multinational, a factor that led to the development of international law, regarding the protection of minority rights and minority ethnic populations within a territory (Neuberger, 2001).

Therefore, the dimension of a separatist action is twofold. It may either have taken place for a number of reasons with the prohibited use of force, or it may have arisen for reparation due to human rights violations of a population.

## Prohibited Use of Force (annulled status of the Turkish Cypriot entity)

The Cypriot state became independent from the United Kingdom, as a consequence of the Zurich and London agreements of 1959. The form of democracy shaped on Cypriot soil, was a bi-communal structure between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, in which the Greek Cypriot side, maintained supremacy at all levels of power. Each community maintained its special characteristics, but not at such a level that an environment of acute conflict could be formed, due to social and cultural differences. In this context, the founding agreements of the Republic of Cyprus demonstrated the Cypriot people as the only body of self-determination, united and did not grant a separate status of power to the two communities. The bi-communal status of the Cypriot people may emphasize cultural differences, but it did not deprive any part of the population of institutional participation. Simultaneously, the institutional representation and balance of the entire population was ensured, in every dimension of the legislative and executive power (Liakouras, 2007; Tselepou, 2021).

The Republic of Cyprus committed itself with the agreements of 1959, following specific principles that would be foreseen in its constitution. Among these commitments, was the obligation not to unite with the other state entity or partition. In 1963, the president of Cyprus, Makarios, proposed the constitution's provisions revision which resulted in the negative reaction of the Turkish Cypriot community and the first rift between the two communities. The Turkish Cypriot side, withdrew itself from the Cypriot government and created community enclaves, choosing isolation and essentially carrying out the initial secession, as it denied the powers of the Cypriot Republic, in its regions. Then, in 1964, the UN sent a peacekeeping force to the region, which further affected the population unity of the area. Nevertheless, in the same year, the representation of the Republic of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot community received international recognition. This representation continued in the following years, with other diplomatic moves of Cyprus, such as its accession to the European Union in 2004. This demonstrates the uninterrupted and perpetual operation of the Cypriot state, which does not stop because of the internal problems created by the acts of the Turkish Cypriot community (Liakouras, 2007; Tselepou, 2021).

With its successive actions, the Turkish Cypriot side, taking advantage of incidents between the two communities, established a temporary Turkish administration, in the areas it controls, from 1963 and escalated the self-determination movements gradually until 1967. Negotiations that took place between the two sides in 1967-1974 had no result. In 1974, a coup d'état took place overthrowing the Cypriot president Makarios and installed an administration friendly to the Greek dictator regime. On this occasion and in order to "protect" the Turkish Cypriot community, Turkey made two military invasions.

The Turkish invasion in Cyprus, created special conditions for Turkey and gave the chance to demand the consolidation and recognition of Turkish Cypriot self-government on the island, in the form of secession. Furthermore, in the context of its absurd demands, at the Geneva conference in July 1974, it wished to ensure the permanent and legal establishment of its military forces in the occupied territories, refusing to return to the content of the 1959 agreements (Liakouras, 2007).

After the second invasion in 1974, the General Assembly of the United Nations, through the unanimous resolution 3212, appealed to all states to respect the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Efforts that followed by the international community aimed at federalizing and ensuring the indivisibility of the Republic of Cyprus. However, they had no result, with the Turkish Cypriot community constantly escalating its actions, in the direction of secession and independent administration (Liakouras, 2021).

The result of these actions was the declaration of the self-proclaimed "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in 1983. However, the declaration of independence was deemed invalid and non-existent by the United Nations, based on the resolutions 541/1983 and 550/1984 of Security Council, while urging non-recognition thereof. The unilateral declaration was deemed legally invalid, as it is the result of Turkey's military intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, violating fundamental principles of international law (Efstathiou, 2013).

Through studying the case of the Turkish Cypriot administration in Cyprus, it becomes clear that, the entity formed as a result of the illegal use of force from the Turkish Republic. Turkey, misinterpreting the provisions of the 1959 agreements and interpreting in its own way provisions of international law on the protection of ethnic groups, carried out military invasions into the Republic of Cyprus, forcibly depriving Cyprus of its state powers, in a large part of its territory. In addition, Turkey attempts, from July 1974 until today, to legitimize the illegal actions in the eyes of the international community and proceeds to illegally colonize the occupied Cyprus' territories. It is clear that the Turkish intervention, constitutes a direct violation of the provisions mentioned in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in resolutions 1514/1960 and 2625/1970 of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Liakouras, 2021).

### **Reparation due to human rights violations (The case of Kosovo)**

Liberal political theory mentions that governments have the obligation to provide protection and security to citizens, living within their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the specific theory claims that the state must respect the fundamental rights of its population. In case the above conditions do not exist,

the population may seek self-determination, in order to be protected from the “incomplete” exercise of state power (Beitz, 1979; Birch, 1984).

Another extension of liberal political thought, promotes that a population voluntarily forms a political entity as a state, legitimizing it through its support. If this legalization is lifted, part of the population may be led to self-determination (Beran, 1984).

Self-determination comes as a democratic demand of the freedom and equality of a population, against the central state power that oppresses it, by depriving it of basic freedoms and protection. Both protection of the human existence and spiritual status of a population is ensured, through the freedom of expression and the determination of the conditions under which it wishes to operate. Democracy is the internal self-determination of the people, in the form of a state establishment, in order to ensure the necessary freedom for them (Moore, 2003).

In the case of Kosovo secession, a significant question occurs. Was it a case of the Kosovars' desire for self-determination, against the denial of their autonomy by the Serbian state, or was it a comprehensive plan for the secession of the Albanian-speaking community against the Serbs?

In order to answer this research question, we must study the historical constitutional development of the region of Kosovo. Kosovo's status as an autonomous entity was established both by the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Yugoslavia of 1946 and 1947, and by the ratifications of 1963 and 1974 (Efstathiou, 2013). By recognizing the autonomy of Kosovo, Tito attempted to manage the dynamics of the Albanian-speaking populations within his territory. However, his decision formed the conditions for the development of the Albanian national identity, which led to the reduction of the Serbian population in the region. Autonomy and self-determination became a “request”, for the population of the region, which acquired extensive local powers and rights to control local state agencies and organizations.

Nevertheless, in 1989 the Serbian authorities unilaterally revoked Kosovo's autonomy so that the government could regain political control of the region. The 1992 constitutional amendment, simply ratified the change, as there was no longer any reference to the autonomous province of Kosovo (Worldstatesmen, 1992). The disenfranchisement did not stop there, as in the following period, legislative initiatives of the central government attempted, through the administrative and judicial expulsion of the Albanian-speaking population, to change the demography of the region in favor of the Serbs. The situation led to a flare-up of conflict between Kosovo's ethnic groups, with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) establishing operational activity since 1997 (Efstathiou, 2013).

It is clear that the people of Kosovo were deprived during the period of Milosevic's rule, from their internal self-determination and any concept of human rights, which endangered even their physical existence as an ethnicity. The Security Council with its decisions 1178/1998, 1179/1998, 1217/1998, 1218/1998 found the violations and with decision 1244/1999, set the area under the protection of the United Nations (Sicilianos, 2003). The international community intervened decisively through NATO and the conflict ended. Serbia was forced to withdraw its military forces from the region, giving way to international military forces of the United Nations. In 2008, after intense diplomatic and political processes, Kosovo declared its independence, which today has led to its recognition by one hundred and thirteen states (Efstathiou, 2013).

Despite the aforementioned, in the above case of secession, a violation of the basic principles concerning the protection of the territorial integrity of state entities exists. The violation of Albanian-speaking minority's rights led to the intervention of the international community with military means, in a way that destroyed the territorial integrity of the Serbian state and was allegedly a clear interference in its internal affairs. For these reasons, Kosovo's declaration of independence was condemned by a number of countries at the United Nations. In particular, countries such as Serbia, Russia and China demanded that the declaration should be considered invalid and condemned it to the United Nations.

## Conclusions

Taking the aforementioned into consideration, the concept of secession and the recognition of a state resulting from this process is a complex issue, which cannot be examined under a broad general framework of rules. It is observed that, based on the international literature, there are a number of legal and interpretative provisions of International Law. These provisions compose a picture in which secession can be legal and illegal, always depending on the geopolitical environment in which it takes place (Crawford, 2007). Some interpretations even reach the point of full recognition of the process of secession, through revolutionary actions against the central state authority (Lauterpacht, 1947).

However, in order to evaluate a secession, many special factors should be analyzed, concerning both the particular historical and social characteristics of the populations, as well as the geography, the local economic and the political balance. Plus, it is important to understand the will to act of powerful states in the region and how they try to impose their interests (Neuberger, 2001).

It is clear that the international legal order, attempts to simultaneously protect both the individual and collective human rights of populations and minorities, while guarding the cohesion of existing state entities. In order to achieve this, it defines, through international law, new rules guaranteeing the right

to secession, under specific terms and conditions, which focus on the preservation of human dignity (Efstathiou, 2013).

In the case of Kosovo and the violation of the human rights of the local region's Albanian populations by the Serbian authorities, the international community did not stand idly by. With gradual steps of involvement and through the processes of the Security Council, decisive involvement in the field ensuring the freedoms of the Kosovars and promoted reconciliation processes between the two warring sides was carried out. Determining factors that led to the UN involvement in the region, were the previous recognition of Kosovo as a semi-autonomous entity by Yugoslavia and its already existing administrative autonomy.

Regarding the case of the annulled existence of the Turkish Cypriot entity, the involvement of the Turkish state in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus is obvious. Gradually, the Turkish state, in cooperation with a small number of Muslims in the region, created conditions of rivalry between the Cyprus populations. In addition, Turkey took advantage of the gradual political mistakes of the Cypriot Republic and the indifference of the international community, in order to carry out a brutal military intervention, in the absence of substantial grounds. The violation of international law, both during the interventions and the "independence" of the northern part of the island in the following period, is evident. However, interests of powerful states in the wider region of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, did not allow in previous years, the decisive involvement of the international community in favor of the unity of the island, under the Republic of Cyprus.

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# Minilateralism for Multilateralism: What Role for the EU in the Instrumentalization of the Japan-Australia Strategic Partnership<sup>1</sup>

Effie Charalampaki<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

The era of “permacrisis” gives rise to minilateral arrangements increasingly at the expense of embedded multilateralism in regional governance. The area of the Indo-Pacific has become the bedrock of minilateral security cooperation. The 2022 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) between Japan and Australia complements the hub-and-spokes system and poses an opportunity for the European Union to advance its own strategic compass and address regional security and economic issues in transformative and dynamic ways. Minilateralism poses opportunities and challenges. The paper presents policy recommendations for the EU so as to instrumentalize the 2022 JDSC and concludes that despite the merits of informal and non-binding minilateral arrangements, minilateralism should be used to overcome the stalemates in multilateralism rather than replacing inclusive, legally binding, formal agreements that aim at an order-building architecture which advances the role of international institutions.

**Keywords:** Japan; Australia; EU; Indo-Pacific; minilateralism; cooperation; security; governance; regionalism.

## Introduction

Offsetting China’s security challenge, the need for tighter economic ties, an appetite for peripatetic diplomacy, and the need for strategic cooperation in the sectors of energy and security governance “stress the use of ‘minilateral’ initiatives increasingly -involving multiple, but relatively manageable numbers of states- to supplement existing alliance partnerships.” (Nilsson-Wright, 2017: 17). Nilsson-Wright argues: “Doubts about the reliability and durability of the international order and regional stability are increasing the pressure on Australia and Japan to develop new forms of cooperation to hedge against uncertainty” (2017: 1). Both Japan and Australia have embraced a cross-regional dual identity of two nations that seat in the region with one foot pointing east and the other west, becoming unifying elements of an evolving strategic culture that re-imagines the Indo-Pacific in the context of the Liberal International Order (LIO). This has great implications for actors such as the European Union (EU) that are also seeking to advance their own autonomous strategic culture and resilience architecture as self-luminous global powers.

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Multilateral fora, however, seem to have become rigid and difficult to adapt, especially after the covid-19 crisis. “A characteristic of 21st century international governance is the rising importance of alternative types of collective cooperation” (Moret, 2016: 2). As 21st century global governance becomes more and more networked, governance structures that require multilevel coordination, such as security governance, could be better represented by non-hierarchical, decentralized, bottom-up, informal networks of cooperation that foster “innovation, compartmentalization and speed” (Moret, 2016: 3; Slaughter, 2004). This paper examines the opportunities and challenges that arise by minilateral arrangements, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, and the window of opportunity that opens for the EU to capitalize on the 2022 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) that Japan and Australia agreed on in order to advance its own strategic compass, partnerships, influence and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific area. The paper concludes that the merits, convenience and informality of minilateralism should not overshadow the facilitated access to reduced transactions costs that inclusive, vertical multilateralism provides for middle powers and small states in security governance.

### **Minilateralism: The “New” Multilateralism After Covid-19?**

In this general climate of permacrisis that characterizes the post-covid era, global uncertainty, geopolitical fluidity and unpredictable transnational dynamics press global and middle powers, small states and international organizations to reconsider regional security architectures and the burdens that binding alliance treaties carry. The growing great power rivalry and the political and economic antithesis between the USA and China, that has led to continuous confrontations and stalemates at the expense of international security and cooperation regarding pressing issues such as global health governance, climate change, food insecurity and militarized conflicts, have a spillover effect to the relations of regional powers and small states that increasingly seek to keep their distance from the geoeconomic and security dilemmas that choosing sides entails.

Maxilateralism is extremely time-consuming and requires mechanisms to overcome structural complexity, as the Paris Agreement (2015) and the Montreal Protocol (1989) have shown. Multilateralism fosters binding, inclusive treaties and conflict resolution processes, but it is equally time-consuming and inherently complex due to negotiation dynamics that eventually expand the bureaucratic structure of international institutions, rendering them difficult to reform. Especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mearsheimer’s argument that as the balance of power shifts in the global order, “states are likely to be reluctant to join a collective security effort because the system effectively transforms every local conflict into an international conflict” (1994: 32); and Keohane and

Victor's observation that "structural and interest diversity inherent in contemporary world politics tends to generate the formation of regime complexes rather than a comprehensive integrated regime," frame the debate in favor of a more flexible and disaggregated approach to international cooperation (2010: 2).

The shift to "slowbalization" and the ineffectiveness of international institutions to strategically foresight transnational crises and implement crisis mitigation mechanisms that transform dynamic, chaotic patterns of transboundary uncertainty into opportunities for creative policy solutions, as the Covid-19 crisis showed, suggest that regionalization processes are increasing, especially when multilateral frameworks that revolve around a grand power become rigid or conflict with domestic political interests. This is particularly prominent in the region of the Indo-Pacific that is arising as the bedrock of strategic minilateral cooperation in security governance. "Minilateralism can come in several flavors, from regional centered outfits to functional issue-based coalitions of the interested and identity-focused blocks of like-minded allies or partners" (Anuar & Hussain, 2021: 2). It is narrower than multilateralism and revolves around the informal efforts between two, three or four states "to address a specific threat, contingency or security issue within a finite period of time" (Tow, 2019: 235). As Gilley debates: "Middle powers are particularly sensitive and agile in their behavioural diplomacy when filling new niches, identifying new needs, and shifting their strategic and tactical stances as circumstances change" (2016: 657). According to Cha, minilateralism's traits are: "1) a small number of participants relative to multilateral security groupings; 2) its ad hoc characteristics as such groupings are usually formed and disbanded without an institutional legacy; 3) a typical focus on mostly traditional security issues "(Cha, 2003: 116-117, as cited in Tow, 2019: 235-236).

"Bilateralism is based on preferentialism," especially in security systems, "and changes its goals and priorities on a case-by-case basis;" this kind of conduct ultimately allows powerful states to form collective defense architectures on the multilateral dynamics that emerge out of bilateral negotiations (Blum, 2008; Tag, 2017: 2). These dynamics have been very typical in the Asia-Pacific region after the 1952 San Francisco Treaty that established the "hub-and-spokes" asymmetric alliance system. Since then, the creation of regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and others, has encouraged dialogue but also fragmentation and has not managed to provide concrete plans for a regional security order (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002). Minilateral initiatives come to fill this void in the Indo-Pacific as "coalitions of the willing" that seek flexible consensus on quantifiable geostrategic objectives and ad hoc, non-binding, functional regulatory arrangements. Minilateralism,

if carefully handled, can become the basis for embedded multilateralism and the creation of innovative regional orders.

There are challenges, however, to this form of aligning interests and cultivating meaningful and trustful interconnections and interdependence. Naím argues that minilateralism, as a policy prescription, must “bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem;” he calls this number “the magic number of minilateralism” (2009). Defining this “magic number,” however, creates problems of normality and legality, as “fewer members and a narrowly framed agenda could also perpetuate certain narratives that are detrimental to the minilateral itself<sup>3</sup>...Informality becomes a double-edged sword, as it contributes to a loss of focus in minilateral arrangements without organizing principles, while a fluid, non-hierarchical arrangement could create a leadership vacuum that works against minilaterals” (Anuar & Hussain, 2021:3-4). Minilateralism could undermine multilateralism, especially when a power-centric approach is adopted that obliges other nations to resort to network building in order to accelerate the formation of decision-making networks in the periphery of those power-centers, which may weaken the role of regional organizations and their consensus-building efforts that benefit small states’ national interest, the majority of which do not belong in minilateral arrangements -this is particularly prominent in the case of the Indo-Pacific. Since minilateral cooperation can be overshadowed by major power rivalry, minilateralism should be a platform for allowing multilateralism to flourish by coordinating small states and middle powers in security governance so as to encourage reconciliation, prosperity and political stability in regional settings (Singh & Teo, 2020; Tow, 2019). Finally, low institutionalization and informality favor poor accountability, “rampant forum shopping and, hence, the rise of club goods than public goods, and can be morally problematic” because of behaviors that normalize exclusivity and work against the agenda of an inclusive global governance -the “ASEAN minus x” formula is a characteristic example (Anuar & Hussain, 2021: 5). This eventually undermines regional strength and resilience since the three pillars of economic, political/security and social/cultural cooperation and integration in multilateral fora cannot be effectuated. Both the EU and ASEAN base their policy structures on these three main pillars.

### **The Japan-Australia Case: Bona Fide Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific**

On October 22, 2022, Japan and Australia renewed their “special strategic partnership and their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient” (Prime Minister of

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<sup>3</sup> This is particularly prominent with the China-containment narrative in all minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific area, such as the Quad.

Australia, 2022). Japan is the world's third largest economy and Australia's second largest source of foreign investment and third largest trading partner. This second non-formal, non-binding, bilateral JDSC sets the pathway for the implementation of the January 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) that advances the defense cooperation between the two countries. RAA, a "Status of Forces Agreement," allows for military interoperability in joint exercises and exchange of personnel in military-civilian operations, reflecting the outcome of ongoing negotiations between the two nations since the 2013 Information Security Agreement, the 2014 announcement of their Special Strategic Partnership in the 21st century, and the 2015 Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA), especially in regards to Japan's use of the death penalty which has placed RAA under review by the Australian parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. As Australia launched its Strategy for Abolition of the Death Penalty in 2018, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee repeatedly came at odds with the Japanese government's insistence on capital punishment. Despite this stumbling block in the bilateral relations of the two countries, Japan and Australia are determined to advance their strategic partnership with the latest JDSC.

The two countries had not renewed their bilateral security cooperation<sup>4</sup> since March 13, 2007 when they signed the first non-formal JDSC<sup>5</sup>, a non-binding agreement that mainly focused on cooperation on common regional interests, such as environmental disasters, humanitarian and refugee crises and regional development among others, and "their common purpose in working together with other countries through such fora as APEC, ARF and the East Asia Summit (EAS) to achieve the objective of a prosperous, open and secure Asia-Pacific region" (MOFA, 2007). Their strategic collaboration is further enhanced through annual Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations since 2007 ("2+2"), which rendered the two countries the capstone of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad<sup>6</sup>, reestablished in 2017) between Australia, Japan, India and the USA. The Quad framework has the prospect of including more partners such as New Zealand, Vietnam and South Korea ("Quad Plus") and even expanding further to include France, Indonesia, Taiwan, Singapore and the Philippines in order to strengthen trade and economic cooperation ("Quad++"). The 2021 AUKUS trilateral security pact between the USA, Australia and the United Kingdom

<sup>4</sup> Australia and Japan reestablished bilateral relations in 1952. Their post-war relationship began with the establishment of the 1957 Commerce Agreement, which led to deepened cultural ties under the 1976 Nara Treaty or Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

<sup>5</sup> This was the second security agreement signed between Japan and another country since 1945. The first was with the USA.

<sup>6</sup> The Quad originated in the four countries Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief cooperation when the 2004 tsunami disaster hit in the Indian Ocean.

created tensions in the Japan-Australia relations when Australia, in its quest for nuclear-powered submarines, cancelled the deals with Japan (\$40 bn.) and France (\$56 bn.) without notice.

The 2022 JDSC renders Australia Japan's most important regional partner in security governance after the USA, reaffirming their commitment to an open, rules-based, free regional order that is rooted in international law and is free from coercion. It solidifies their strategic partnership outside the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance of the Anglo-Saxon system (stemming from the original multilateral agreements BRUSA and UKUSA during and after WWII) to which Japan seeks membership in an effort to counter China's rise and the general climate of global uncertainty that Russia's invasion of Ukraine fosters on all fronts. The latest JDSC covers five areas of security governance at the regional and global levels: security and defense cooperation; economic security cooperation; climate, energy security and energy transition; bilateral trade and investment cooperation; and interregional and transregional cooperation in the context of international and regional organizations, international law treaties such as the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the transatlantic partnership and military alliances. The most important revisions in the 2022 document are: 1) The incorporation of Article 3 of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty<sup>7</sup> so that Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defense<sup>8</sup>, protecting the Australian military forces in times of peace and militarized conflict; 2) Several provisions in both countries' foreign, economic and security policy in order to counter China's rise; 3) A blueprint for a ten-year security cooperation that stresses resilience to aggression (including economic coercion), disinformation and other forms of interference as well as the reinforcement of international institutions and regional organizations in order to be more inclusive and transparent (MOFA, 2022).

### **Minilateralism for Multilateralism in East Asia: The Role of the EU**

The EU has a vested interest in security governance in the Indo-Pacific order. It is USA's biggest trading partner, China's second biggest, Japan's fourth biggest and Australia's sixth biggest. "The EU is the largest global investor, with a total stock of €11.6 trillion, compared to the US with €6.8 trillion, China €1.9 trillion and €1.5 trillion for Japan" (Borrell, 2021). Despite the impact of covid-19, the EU remains an economic superpower that fosters openness, development assistance and

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<sup>7</sup> The precursor of the AUKUS Treaty is the ANZUS Treaty, a 1951 collective, non-binding security agreement between Australia and New Zealand and, separately, between Australia and the USA as a security and defense pact between the three countries in an effort to deal with the rise of communism during the Cold War period and the resurgence of Japan after the end of WWII.

<sup>8</sup> Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security (2014, took effect in 2016) allows Japan to play a proactive role in the security and stability in the Indo-Pacific and the world by strengthening the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to provide logistics, support and search and rescue operations to the military forces of allied nations, as well as participating in international peace cooperation activities.

resilience in the global order while it combats the climate crisis and global inequalities (Borrell, 2021). Prosperity in Europe is closely linked to security and conflict resolution in East Asia, something that EU's policymakers have made clear in the Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (2007, updated in 2012), the EU's Global Strategy (2016), the updated EU-ASEAN Strategy (2020), and the new Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (2021). Thus far, "the EU's role in regional security has mainly taken the form of support for the relevant international, multilateral fora" (Casarini, 2017: 21). Europe's engagement in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific "goes well beyond trade and development aid to include high-tech, political, security and defense-related policy areas" (Casarini, 2017: 22). In 2019, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force and, in 2022, the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership was established, a framework for shared values and prosperity. The two actors have also established robust collaboration and exchange of knowledge for artificial intelligence (AI)-driven innovation; they are working on introducing the EU-Japan Digital Partnership; and they have founded the EU-Japan Center for Industrial Cooperation. On October 21, 2022, one day before the Japan-Australian JDSC was finalized, the EU-Australia Framework Agreement became also effective regarding a wide range of areas, such as foreign and security policy, climate change, sustainable development, economic and trade matters.

It is obvious that the EU's soft-power approach, lack of "binding military alliances in the area, and its neutrality vis-à-vis the region's outstanding territorial and maritime disputes" can establish the EU as a facilitator of dialogue in an array of issues, such as "the North Korean nuclear dossier," the restoration of JCPOA<sup>9</sup>, the stabilization of Afghanistan, and the Ukrainian conflict; a guarantor of trust-building between China, USA, Japan, Australia and many small states of the Southeast Asia region; and a capacity-builder, especially in "the management of nuclear resources" in the context of the EURATOM Treaty (Casarini, 2017: 26). More specifically, EU's Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific defines the region of the Indo-Pacific as the area from the African east coast to the Pacific islands, in contrast to USA's and Japan's conceptions of this space, which has normative and geopolitical implications for the viability and flexibility of the LIO that must make inclusivity one of its central pillars in the midst of geopolitical competition. It has, thus, implications for EU's quest for strategic autonomy which stresses the integration of member states' strategic visions and collective capacity building; resilience of global value chains; EU's self-actualization as a global role-model; and EU's autonomy from the influence of external actors, such as Russia and China, that induce complex interdependences which may be detrimental in times of transnational crises and regional

<sup>9</sup> The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or the Iran nuclear deal.

conflicts. Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine have demonstrated this prominently: the EU has found itself repeatedly dependent on Russia for energy supplies and on Asia, and especially China, for the imports of decisive materials such as masks, medical and pharmaceutical items, semiconductors and critical raw materials.

## Policy Recommendations

The EU must capitalize on the 2022 JDSC between Japan and Australia in order to:

- 1) Overcome the stalemates that characterize multilateralism in the “permacrisis” era. It should engage minilateralism’s rise in the Indo-Pacific to revive and expand multilateralism in security governance and not only by employing EU’s most appreciable public policy charisma: the capacity for “connectivity” inside and across regions as a key tool for cooperation, especially in times of uncertainty. Connectivity fosters multilateralism and vice versa, hence, they promote cooperation conjointly, and this is also the agenda of regional institutions such as ASEAN, ASEAN+3, EAS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The 2022 US Strategy for the Indo-Pacific also proposes a connectivity agenda with an emphasis on the digital domain and international law in maritime spaces. Since better connectivity requires multilateralism, the EU should create a distinct blueprint for a sustainable, smart and secure connectivity agenda for East Asia, that draws on the parameters of sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, seamless logistics, regulatory excellence and people mobility, as they unfold in the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 and the EU Strategy for Connecting Europe and Asia (2019). The 2019 Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between the EU and Japan and the 2022 JDSC between Japan and Australia should become a foundation for implementing EU’s Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo Pacific and its Global Gateway initiative that is paramount for establishing the EU as a connectivity and innovation hub in the Indo-Pacific region.
- 2) Instrumentalize minilateralism between Japan and Australia to compliment the San Francisco System’s alliance politics in order to transform the “hub-and-spokes” architecture to a “hybrid wide area network” (WAN) architecture (a combination of full mesh and hub-and-spokes systems): a form of “any-to-some” system within the LIO premises, that allows for the creation of mesh networks between international institutions, middle powers and small states. Despite the fact that the hub-and-spokes system is easy to manage because the main concern is always the hub, the incorporation of mesh networking allows for adaptability to increased or decreased scalability, less network latency, reliable collaborative agendas and open communication, all of which are important for complexity management in global governance.

Establishing a non-hierarchical modus-operandi in a multipolar system between middle powers, small states and regional/international organizations, especially when grand powers exhibit signs of decline, withdrawal, isolationist or unilateralist behavior that increase insecurity and instability in security alliances, increases self-organization and adaptability as free flows of information pass through the middle points of this architecture without needing the hub as a guarantor. Communication, thus, is greatly facilitated in times of global shocks. In this hybrid WAN system, the EU, Japan and Australia become, at the same time, both a hub and an ad hoc mesh network that connect the EU to East Asia and the Indo-Pacific via other minilateral arrangements, such as the Quad, and Japan and Australia to the transatlantic system without the US-China rivalry interrupting strategic cooperation and value chains. This is key in the promotion of strategic autonomy for the EU and resilience for the EU, Japan, Australia and all actors that form relations of interdependency with them in various sectors, especially in times of transnational crises or grand power rivalries when global value chains get interrupted.

3) Build trust, capacity and network-sharing via diversified diplomatic channels and concert diplomacy, which could be crucial for the free flow of information and consensus-building in minilateral fora that serve later as a building block for embedded multilateralism. The EU-Australia leaders' meeting that took place on November 16, 2022 affirms the importance of facilitating frequent and flexible agendas of global governance and national interest without the burdens of institutionalized bureaucracies. The versatility of the 2022 JDSC in an informal, non-binding setting frees the EU to adopt a networked strategy and a shared-values campaign in East Asia with the potential of fostering increased dialogue with China that is crucial for resolving the tensions in the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan strait and the East and South China Seas in a non-militarized manner. The 2022 JDSC is a response to the increased threat that both Japan and Australia feel by China on all fronts. It is an opportunity for the EU to advance its role as a peace-builder and facilitator of conflict resolution processes in the Indo-Pacific since the majority of minilateral initiatives have a defense-offense military character vis-à-vis China's rise and behavior in the region.

4) In light of grand power tensions, the EU's holistic approach to security governance can act as an integrative platform for problem-solving in a part of the world that does not have a clear conception of order and where great powers' conceptions of how this order should be clash on a regular basis. In this regard, the EU should work with Japan and Australia to strengthen the Asia-Europe Meeting's (ASEM), ASEAN's, EAS' and ARF's capabilities so as to offer flexibility and options to the small states of the region, that do not wish to align against China formally due to economic and trade costs, so as not to be excluded from the connectivity and innovation grids that the EU, Japan and Australia

can build in East and Southeast Asia. Minilateralism, hence, should become a basis for expanding LIO's multilateralism eventually and strengthening the ASEAN and transatlantic ecosystems.

The EU should introduce a “flexibility provision” pillar in its strategy for the Indo-Pacific that incorporates minilateralism as a foreign-policy tool that relaxes treaty commitments intentionally so as to induce trust-building and cooperation by encouraging states to yield deeper concessions (Kucik & Reinhardt, 2008). This not only will it draw small states and middle powers around multilateral fora in search of similar agendas and preferences, but also it will attract the USA and India to reconsider policies and preferences and renegotiate with friends and foes. In fact, the Japanese approach of engaging with India can facilitate the EU-India cooperation from sub-national diplomacy between India and EU's member states, such as the Netherlands, to a formal EU-India Comprehensive Agreement that is encountering roadblocks despite the commitment of both sides to the EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025 (2020).

Finally, EU member states could play a fundamental role in transforming EU's strategic compass in the Indo-Pacific and advancing its autonomy agenda as a global power. France, in particular, via its seven overseas territories, locates 93% of its exclusive economic zone in the Indian and South Pacific Oceans and has permanent military and naval forces in the region. France has developed its own Strategy for the Indo-Pacific (2018) which establishes close partnerships with Japan and India over maritime safety and security, management of marine resources, climate change and the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In this respect, EU's support for “flexible” trilaterals and quadrilaterals in the region, such as Quad+1 (+France), Quad++ in which Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, South Korea and New Zealand, that are France's strategic partners, could play meaningful roles in an ad hoc basis advancing their own interests at the same time, could connect the goals and strategic interests of the 2022 Japan-Australia JDSC to EU's Global Strategy and the Global Gateway in a more flexible and time-efficient manner. In addition, the fact that both France and the EU adopt an “open dialogue” stance toward China without antagonizing it stimulates the much-needed prospects for deeper cooperation and knowledge-sharing regarding innovation, climate change, issues of the global health governance agenda, conflict resolution and the promotion of the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Multilayered minilaterals need management and commitment even if they are not binding and formal. Only the USA has played a meaningful role thus far toward this direction. This is a window of opportunity that the EU must not waste in its quest for “self-actualization,” as it is proposed in the EU Global Strategy. In fact, the best strategy is to instrumentalize the Japan-Australia JDSC to create policies that allow security- and innovation-related domestic stakeholders (for example, businessmen

and scientists are prominent security stakeholders in Japan) to play a forefront role in the “connectivity” agendas of the three actors and their partners in order to allow minilateralism to unblur the fine lines regarding which countries align on specific issues and in what areas. This would develop a blueprint for concert diplomacy to develop bilateral and multilateral networks that advance LIO’s norms and interests in a part of the world that is still in search of order.

### **Conclusion: Minilateralism for Multilateralism**

With the Indo-Pacific becoming the global center of gravity, representing 60% of global GDP and two-thirds of global growth, minilateralism has the prospect of advancing multilateralism in an area of the world that experiences “imperial fatigue” while the LIO is withering away. The Indo-Pacific region is already characterized by intense power rivalries which augment global uncertainty and insecurity in all governance structures. Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama’s prognosis that “for years to come, the Asia-Pacific [the Indo-Pacific today] will be a region that will exist somewhere between a balance of power and a community-based security order” was fairly accurate (2002:69). It is a vast space where several hegemonic, normative, social/cultural, political and economic orders collide, and the space where LIO’s viability and adaptability is already being tested. Alliance coordination, hence, needs management: minilateralism should be welcomed in EU’s foreign-policy toolbox because it assists policymakers to unclear priorities in order to prioritize policy agendas on shared critical interests and combat strategic ambiguity in the era of “permacrisis,” which is crucial for achieving strategic autonomy. The best way to achieving policy coordination is by the adoption of the same vision of “order” for the Indo-Pacific, based on a collective “strategic concept” for all LIO’s members, partners and stakeholders, that defines Indo-Pacific’s normative (free and open, respect for international law) and geographical structures (what are its boundaries and mapping) in order to understand the security environment holistically. This, in its turn, assists to overcome disinformation and populism agendas, nationalism, interruption of global value chains during grand power competition, mistrust and misappropriation of resources and capabilities in security governance, which costs time and money.

As Tatsumi and Kennedy note, dividing the geopolitical construct of the Indo-Pacific into strategic subregions according to sealane boundaries will revive multilateralism inevitably around clear security and defense agendas (2022: 11). Policy coordination for a large group of international institutions, middle powers and small states depends on defining clearly the subregional diplomatic theaters, such as the one of East Asia, and prioritizing minilaterals as a basis for multilateralism later, at a macro scale, where everyone should have an equal voice. The prioritization should enter into

force according to multi-sector specificities pertaining to economic, defense/security, maritime, infrastructure, humanitarian and human rights urgencies in alignment with LIO's scope and vision. For example, not all countries in the area have military concerns vis-à-vis China's agency -in fact, China expands prosperity and economic security for many small states in the Indo-Pacific region. Minilateralism, hence, allows for agendas to be developed. These are tailored to the needs and specific interests of middle powers and small states without the one-size-fits-all approach that multilateral fora adopt regarding key issues, that is centered around grand powers' dynamics and their national security strategy agendas. This may be the best way to deliver the message to China that the transatlantic partners and their allies are not there to antagonize it, but they have a vested interest in the consolidation of a rules-based order, which China is welcome to be part of (Tatsumi & Kennedy, 2022).

### *Overcoming the Neorealist and Neoliberal Narratives*

Gruber (2000) argues that strong states force weaker states in multilateral arrangements to adopt less than optimal options that weaker states accept than being excluded entirely from institutionalized cooperation. This is the neorealist paradigm, of course, which depicts the “reality” of multilateralism and explains the crisis it undergoes in a polycentric global order inside which power diffusion offers many alternatives to small states. Escaping the “power politics” trap, as Gruber notes, entails a “go-it-alone” power exercised by the regimes’ beneficiaries, and “that’s why minilateralism will work in some contexts but not in others” (Gruber, 2000; Walt, 2009). Ruggie states that “a hallmark of 21st century multilateralism is the rising prominence of alternative forms of collective action as complements to -and often substitutes for- traditional intergovernmental cooperation” (Ruggie, 1993, as cited in Patrick, 2015: 116).

“Formal organizations persist, but governments increasingly participate in a bewildering array of flexible networks whose membership varies based on situational interests, shared values, or relevant capabilities (Patrick, 2015: 116). Patrick calls this disaggregated, voluntary, transgovernmental, regional, multi-stakeholder, bottom-up arrangements the “new ‘new’ multilateralism” (2015: 116). Neoliberals, hence, are also becoming increasingly skeptical of multilateralism and highlight the failure of international institutions in the post-pandemic era. As Patrick states, “when it comes to multilateralism, bigger is rarerly better” (2014: 3). Drezner (2009) also argues that “multilateral cooperation is becoming an unresasonable obsession when it comes to decision-making.”

By picking and choosing among diverse actors, the EU can uphold the tenets of LIO in the Indo-Pacific, by supporting democratic powers’ ideas,” such as Japan’s and Australia’s, “for reforming

what liberal order actually means” since countries, like India, are still reluctant to engage fully with the EU “on democracy support without a far-reaching rebalancing of international power” (Youngs, 2018). Minilateralism for multilateralism, hence, helps the EU, other international organizations, middle powers and small states to deal with USA’s rentrenchment without weaken the LIO. As Rothkopf (2012) puts it, “for multilateralism, this is the moment before the dawn: multilateralism will ultimately flourish again not because it is more equitable but because we cannot solve global problems without it”.

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# Sino-North Korean Ideological Relations in Face of 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China<sup>1</sup>

Mariusz Kiersański<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the most important aspects of the ideological relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the face of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Policy Brief is divided into four parts: Reactions of the Workers' Party of Korea to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party CPC; Mention of Korea during the 20th CPC Congress; The role of CPC in People's Republic of China according to WKP and the Significance of Sino-North Korean ideological relations after 20th Congress of the CPC. The methodology included media and literature review, which were collected through Korean Central News Agency, Rodong Sinmun and documents of the 20th Congress of the CPC. This study makes evident the importance of ideological relations between China and North Korea.

**Keywords:** Communist Party of China; China; North Korea; ideology; international relations.

## Introduction

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) greatly emphasize the value and importance of mutual political relations. They are historically, economically, militarily and ideologically conditioned. China's support for North Korea dates back to the Korean War (1950-1953), when Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army covered almost the entire Korean Peninsula. Aid was provided to all DPRK leaders: Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, with short breaks. After North Korea's first nuclear test, China backed UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which condemned the test. Despite the temporary cooling down in mutual relations, they still remained the closest partners. Mainly for these reasons, China views North Korea quite differently from the United States or Western European countries. This is also partly due to the Cold War and Post Cold War world orders. The waning role of Russia and the growing role of China are making relations with the DPRK take on renewed importance. It is worth paying attention to the similarity of the political systems of both countries, which declare themselves to be socialist and people's republics, which differ in their adaptation to their own national conditions. In China it is Socialism with Chinese characteristic which is

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implemented by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and in DPRK it is Juche Idea, which is established by the Workers' Party of Korea (WKP). Another important common feature is that the two countries' systems were not rejected when systemic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe took place in 1989-1991. The numerous similarities in governance and geographic proximity make the PRC-DPRK relationship very important. This policy brief will attempt to shed some light upon the Sino-North Korean ideological relations in face of 20th congress of the CPC that took place from October 16 to 22, 2022 in Beijing. In particular, the analysis will attempt to answer the following questions: How did the Workers' of Korea Party respond to the CPC Congress? How was Korea mentioned at the 20th CPC Congress? How do WKP view the role of the CPC in China? What is the significance of Sino-North Korean ideological relations after 20th congress of the CPC? The answers to these questions will be considered in the following sections of the paper. From the perspective of data collection, the method which is followed is literature review and the information has been derived from Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Rodong Sinmun and Documents of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China.

#### Reactions of the Workers' Party of Korea to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China

The KCNA detailed the opening ceremony of the 20th Congress of the CPC, along with a summary of Xi Jinping's report (KCNA, 2022, October 16). The same was done due to the end of the Congress (KCNA, 2022, October 22). DPRK leader Kim Jong Un congratulated Chairman Xi Jinping on the 73rd anniversary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China. In the letter, he noted that the opening 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China, which will be "a very important event convened at a crucial moment" (Rodong Sinmun, 2022, October 16a). Similar wishes were made by the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (Rodong Sinmnun 2022, October 16). Similarly, wishes were also made by the Central Committee of the WKP and the leader Kim Jong Un on the occasion of the end of the 20th CPC Congress (Rodong Sinmun, 2022, October 24), including special congratulations on the election of Xi Jinping for the next term of government in China (Rodong Sinmun, 2022, October 24a).

#### **Mention of Korea during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China**

In Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China made by Xi Jinping General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects" it has been said that:

*We celebrated the 90th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army, the 40th anniversary of the launch of reform and opening up, the 70th anniversary of victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the global war against fascism, and the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People's Volunteers' departure for Korea to resist US aggression and aid Korea (习近平, 2022, October 16).*

In this excerpt from Report, Korea is mentioned as the country where the Chinese People's Volunteers helped and repulsed US forces. This shows that Korea continues to be China's historically important neighbor.

### **The role of CPC in People's Republic of China according to WKP**

According to the WKP, the Communist Party of China established and modernized a new China with remarkable results (Rodong Sinmun, 2022, October 16). It was pointed out that the election of Xi Jinping for the next term of the CPC Secretary General strengthened the party's international status, is a sign of the deep trust and expectations of all members of the CPC and the Chinese people, and will enable China to continue vigorously on the path of self-development (Rodong Sinmun, 2022, October 24). Chairman of the DPRK Kim Jong Un in his letter of congratulations to Xi Jinping wrote that the Congress was "an epochal milestone in promoting the historic process of the great revival of the Chinese people under the banner of socialist ideology with Chinese characteristics in the new era" (Rodong Sinmun, 2022, October 24a).

### **Significance of Sino-North Korean ideological relations after 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China**

North Korean media has repeatedly emphasized the importance of DPRK-PRC relations in the 21st century, especially from the perspective of the 20th CPC Congress. It is commonly mentioned that the Chinese are a fraternal nation to Koreans (KCNA, 2022, October 23). The leader of the DPRK Kim Jong Un wrote in his letter to Chairman Xi Jinping that "China and Korea are friendly between mountains and rivers, and the traditional friendship between the two countries has grown stronger over the years." He also pointed out that in the face of the changing international situation, the importance of strengthening mutual communication and unity between China and the DPRK is growing, also in the field of security in the region and in the world (Rodong Sinmun, 2022, October 16a). In Korean media reports it was emphasized that today both parties (WKP and CPC) defend the common interests of both nations guided by socialist ideology in a complex international environment. The Workers' Party of Korea assured that it will continue to actively cooperate with the

Communist Party of China to further strengthen the development of the common era, which is to be seen in all areas of Sino-North Korean relations (Rodong Sinmnun, 2022, October 16). The Workers' Party of Korea claims to have an unwavering stance to strengthen and develop friendship with China. He points out that both countries were fighting imperialism and building socialism. The entirety of contemporary ideological relations after the end of the 20th CPC Congress can be summarized in one sentence proposed by the WKP: "Today, the DPRK-China friendship has entered a new rise" (Rodong Sinmun, 2022, October 24).

## Conclusions

One of the most important political events in China, which is the Congress of the Communist Party of China, in October 2022 had a special place in the politics of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is worth noting that both Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un took power at a similar time and have held the highest state positions for nearly 10 years. This points to an additional similarity between the DPRK's governance systems and the changing system of the PRC as Xi Jinping began his third term in office, which is unique. The Workers' Party of Korea constantly monitored the 20th CPC Congress. She described the opening and closing ceremony and sent many letters of congratulations, also from Kim Jong Un himself. At the Congress, Korea was once quoted in the Xi Jinping Report to highlight the role of the Chinese People's Volunteers who helped the Koreans and supported the pushback of US forces. The Workers' Party of Korea emphasized the need for close cooperation with the Communist Party of China in the era of the changing and complex international situation. It could mean the Russo-Ukrainian war, North Korean missile tests, US military exercises in South Korea and the Sino-American trade war. The analysis can be used for further research on Sino-North Korean relations in the changing international order since the end of the Cold War, in which the United States is gradually losing its global hegemony, among others by the crisis of American democracy of 2020-2021 and the withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan in August 2021. As a result, questions may arise about the future of the Sino-North Korean ideological alliance in a time of changing international order.

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## The National Security Strategy of the USA: Background, Recent Developments and Future Considerations Regarding the International Security Environment<sup>1</sup>

Georgios Koukakis<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

The National Security Strategy is the official grand strategy document under which US foreign policy is implemented. The latest National Security Strategy of the United States was published in October 2022 and is expected to significantly influence U.S. relations with other global actors. This analysis briefly reviews the previous Strategies, highlights the main points of the latest one, and sets out some considerations regarding the shaping of the future security environment.

**Keywords:** National Security Strategy; National Security Council; Foreign Policy; USA; China; Russia.

## Η Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ: Ιστορικό, Πρόσφατες Εξελίξεις και Μελλοντικοί Προβληματισμοί Σχετικά με το Διεθνές Περιβάλλον Ασφάλειας

Γεώργιος Κουκάκης<sup>3</sup>

### Περίληψη

Η Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας είναι το επίσημο έγγραφο υψηλής στρατηγικής, σύμφωνα με το οποίο ασκείται η εξωτερική πολιτική των ΗΠΑ. Η τελευταία Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών δημοσιεύτηκε τον Οκτώβριο του 2022 και αναμένεται να επηρεάσει σημαντικά τις σχέσεις των ΗΠΑ με τους υπόλοιπους παγκόσμιους δρώντες. Η παρούσα ανάλυση πραγματοποιεί μια σύντομη αναφορά στις προηγούμενες Στρατηγικές, επισημαίνει τα κυριότερα σημεία της πιο πρόσφατης και παραθέτει ορισμένους προβληματισμούς σχετικά με τη διαμόρφωση του μελλοντικού περιβάλλοντος ασφάλειας.

**Keywords:** Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας, Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφάλειας, Εξωτερική Πολιτική, ΗΠΑ, Κίνα, Ρωσία.

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## Εισαγωγή

Το *Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφάλειας* (National Security Council) των ΗΠΑ ιδρύθηκε το 1947 δυνάμει του *Νόμου Εθνικής Ασφάλειας* (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2022), με σκοπό τη δημιουργία ενός διωπηρεσιακού επιτελικού οργάνου για τον συντονισμό όλων των κρατικών φορέων και υπηρεσιών που ασχολούνται με ζητήματα εθνικής ασφάλειας και την εναρμόνιση των αντίστοιχων πολιτικών. Το Συμβούλιο υπάγεται απευθείας στον Πρόεδρο των ΗΠΑ, έχει συμβουλευτικό χαρακτήρα<sup>4</sup> και υποστηρίζεται από ανάλογο επιτελείο (*National Security Council Staff*) με επικεφαλής τον *Σύμβουλο Εθνικής Ασφάλειας* (*National Security Adviser*). Αποστολή του επιτελείου είναι η γραμματειακή υποστήριξη του Συμβουλίου, η χάραξη στρατηγικής και η ανάλυση πληροφοριών, με σκοπό τον έγκαιρο εντοπισμό απειλών της εθνικής ασφάλειας για την αντιμετώπισή τους «εν τη γενέσει».

Όντας ο πρώτος θεσμός ανά τον κόσμο που εφάρμοσε μια ολιστική προσέγγιση στην εξέταση των ζητημάτων εθνικής ασφάλειας, το Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ αποτέλεσε το πρότυπο στο οποίο βασίστηκαν τα υπόλοιπα κράτη προκειμένου να συστήσουν τα δικά τους Συμβούλια, όπως το *Συμβούλιο Ασφάλειας* της Ρωσικής Ομοσπονδίας (Galeotti, 2019), η *Κεντρική Επιτροπή Εθνικής Ασφάλειας* της Λαϊκής Δημοκρατίας της Κίνας (Qin, 2014), το *Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφάλειας* της Τουρκικής Δημοκρατίας (Cizre, 2003), κ.ά. Επιπρόσθετα, λόγω αφενός της καθημερινής επαφής του Συμβούλου Εθνικής Ασφάλειας με τον Αμερικανό Πρόεδρο και αφετέρου του κομβικού ρόλου που διαδραματίζει το Συμβούλιο στη διαχείριση των ζητημάτων εθνικής ασφάλειας, το Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφάλειας έχει χαρακτηριστεί ως η πιο κυρίαρχη οντότητα των ΗΠΑ όσον αφορά τη χάραξη της εξωτερικής πολιτικής (Patterson, 2000:49). Μία από τις βασικές αρμοδιότητές του είναι και η εκπόνηση της *Στρατηγικής Εθνικής Ασφάλειας* (*National Security Strategy*).<sup>5</sup>

Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 3043 του Κώδικα των ΗΠΑ (U.S. Code), η Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας υποβάλλεται στο Κογκρέσο αρχικά εντός εκατό πενήντα ημερών από την ανάληψη των καθηκόντων κάθε Προέδρου και στη συνέχεια σε ετήσια βάση, ταυτόχρονα με τον ετήσιο προϋπολογισμό. Η επίδραση που ασκεί η Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας στην εξωτερική πολιτική των ΗΠΑ οφείλεται στο γεγονός ότι μέσα στο εν λόγω έγγραφο καθορίζονται τα ζωτικά εθνικά συμφέροντα και οι εθνικοί στόχοι των ΗΠΑ, η εξωτερική πολιτική που πρόκειται να εφαρμοστεί, οι αναληφθείσες διεθνείς δεσμεύσεις, καθώς και τα απαιτούμενα μέσα σε συνδυασμό με τους τρόπους χρησιμοποίησης αυτών,

<sup>4</sup> Ο Πρόεδρος των ΗΠΑ δεν δεσμεύεται από την απόφαση των μελών του Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Ασφάλειας, η οποία έχει περισσότερο χαρακτήρα εισήγησης, αλλά έχει τη δυνατότητα να λάβει διαφορετική απόφαση.

<sup>5</sup> Η Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ είναι συνήθως αδιαβάθμητο έγγραφο, χωρίς ωστόσο να αποκλείεται και η εκπόνηση συμπληρωματικού διαβαθμισμένου εγγράφου.

τόσο σε βραχυπρόθεσμο όσο και σε μακροπρόθεσμο επίπεδο (Office of the Law Revision Counsel, 2020). Καθορίζονται δηλαδή οι στόχοι (ends), τα μέσα (means) και οι τρόποι (ways) επίτευξης αυτών,<sup>6</sup> παρέχοντας με τον τρόπο αυτό το θεσμικό πλαίσιο εντός του οποίου οι κρατικοί φορείς θα χαράξουν και εν συνεχεία θα εφαρμόσουν τις επιμέρους στρατηγικές τους (Κουκάκης, 2022e).

## Οι προηγούμενες Στρατηγικές Εθνικής Ασφάλειας

Η πρώτη Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ εκδόθηκε το 1987 από τον Πρόεδρο Ronald Reagan (The White House, 1987). Κύριο χαρακτηριστικό της ήταν η έμφαση που δινόταν στη χρήση στρατιωτικών μέσων, χωρίς ωστόσο να γίνεται αναφορά στα υπόλοιπα (διπλωματικά, οικονομικά, κ.λπ) διαθέσιμα μέσα ή να επικεντρώνεται σε συγκεκριμένες γεωγραφικές περιοχές, γεγονός που κατά πάσα πιθανότητα οφειλόταν στα περιορισμένα χρονικά περιθώρια που διέθετε το επιτελείο για την εκπόνησή της (Snider, 1995:7). Η δεύτερη Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας εκδόθηκε το 1988 από τον ίδιο Πρόεδρο (The White House, 1988) και – σε αντίθεση με την προηγούμενη – εστίαζε στην ανάπτυξη της οικονομίας και τις συγκρούσεις χαμηλής έντασης (Snider, 1995:7), διαχωρίζοντας την υφήλιο σε έξι γεωγραφικά διαμερίσματα.<sup>7</sup>

Η επόμενη Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ εκδόθηκε το 1990 από τον Πρόεδρο George H. W. Bush (The White House, 1990), ενώ αξίζει να τονιστεί το γεγονός ότι λόγω των τρεχουσών εξελίξεων στην Ανατολική Ευρώπη - τις οποίες έπρεπε να λάβει υπόψη – η δημοσίευσή της καθυστέρησε σημαντικά (Snider, 1995:7-8). Ο ίδιος Πρόεδρος εξέδωσε δύο ακόμα Στρατηγικές Εθνικής Ασφάλειας το 1991 (The White House, 1991) και το 1993 (The White House, 1993), κύριο χαρακτηριστικό των οποίων ήταν η έμφαση στην ανάπτυξη της οικονομίας. Όσον αφορά τη χρησιμοποίηση των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων, η εν λόγω Στρατηγική επικεντρωνόταν στις περιφερειακές συγκρούσεις προβάλλοντας την έννοια της *αποτροπής* (deterrance), δεδομένου του γεγονότος ότι η Ε.Σ.Σ.Δ. είχε πάψει να αποτελεί απειλή για τις ΗΠΑ (Snider, 1995:8-10).

Η έκτη Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ εκδόθηκε το 1994 από τον Πρόεδρο Bill Clinton έχοντας τίτλο «Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας για τη Δέσμευση και την Διεύρυνση» (The White House, 1994), κύριο χαρακτηριστικό της οποίας ήταν η αξιοποίηση όλων των κρατικών φορέων και η «αποσύνδεση» της εθνικής ασφάλειας από την έννοια της απειλής και η συσχέτισή της με την προστασία του αμερικανικού τρόπου ζωής (Snider, 1995:10-13). Οι αμέσως δύο επόμενες Στρατηγικές που εξέδωσε ο εν λόγω Πρόεδρος το 1995 (The White House, 1995) και το 1996 (The

<sup>6</sup> Τα τρία αυτά στοιχεία αποτελούν βασικό συστατικό κάθε κειμένου στρατηγικού χαρακτήρα.

<sup>7</sup> Δυτικό Ημισφαίριο, Σοβιετική Ένωση-Ανατολική Ευρώπη, Δυτική Ευρώπη-NATO, Μέση Ανατολή-Νότια Ασία, Αφρική και Ανατολική Ασία-Ειρηνικός.

White House, 1996) διατήρησαν τον ίδιο τίτλο και παρόμοιο περιεχόμενο, ενώ η τέταρτη Στρατηγική του Προέδρου Clinton εκδόθηκε το 1997 με τίτλο «Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας για έναν Νέο Αιώνα» (The White House, 1997) και επικεντρωνόταν στη διπλωματία, την οικονομία και την προώθηση των δημοκρατικών θεσμών στο εξωτερικό, αναφέροντας παράλληλα την ανάγκη ετοιμότητας δράσης των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων.

Ο Πρόεδρος Clinton εξέδωσε τρεις ακόμα Στρατηγικές Εθνικής Ασφάλειας, από τις οποίες η Στρατηγική του 1998 (The White House, 1998) και η αντίστοιχη του 1999 (The White House, 1999) διατήρησαν τον ίδιο τίτλο με το έγγραφο του 1997 με τη διαφορά ότι είχαν μεγαλύτερη έκταση καθώς ανέφεραν περισσότερες λεπτομέρειες, ενώ η έβδομη και τελευταία Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας του εν λόγω Προέδρου εκδόθηκε το 2000 με τίτλο «Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας για μια Παγκόσμια Εποχή» (The White House, 2000), θέτοντας ως βασικούς στόχους την ενίσχυση της ασφάλειας στο εσωτερικό και το εξωτερικό, την εξασφάλιση της ευημερίας και την προώθηση της Δημοκρατίας και των ανθρώπινων δικαιωμάτων.

Η δέκατη τρίτη Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ εκδόθηκε από τον Πρόεδρο George W. Bush (Junior) το 2002 - ένα έτος μετά τις τρομοκρατικές επιθέσεις στους δίδυμους πύργους – και έδινε έμφαση στην υπεράσπιση της ανθρώπινης αξιοπρέπειας, την ενίσχυση των συμμαχιών για την καταπολέμηση της παγκόσμιας τρομοκρατίας και την πρόληψη παρόμοιων επιθέσεων, την εκτόνωση των περιφερειακών συγκρούσεων, τον περιορισμό της διασποράς των όπλων μαζικής καταστροφής, καθώς και την προώθηση του ελεύθερου εμπορίου και των δημοκρατικών θεσμών, μέσω της αναμόρφωσης του θεσμικού πλαισίου της κοινότητας πληροφοριών (The White House, 2002). Ο εν λόγω Πρόεδρος εξέδωσε μία ακόμα Στρατηγική το 2006, η οποία έθετε ως επιπλέον στόχο – σε σχέση με την προηγούμενη Στρατηγική – την εκμετάλλευση των ευκαιριών και την αντιμετώπιση των προκλήσεων της παγκοσμιοποίησης,<sup>8</sup> με απότερο σκοπό την εδραίωση δημοκρατικών καθεστώτων που θα ικανοποιούν τις ανάγκες των πολιτών τους και θα δρουν υπεύθυνα εντός του διεθνούς περιβάλλοντος (The White House, 2006).

Η αμέσως επόμενη Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ εκδόθηκε το 2010 από τον Πρόεδρο Obama (The White House, 2010) και προωθούσε την ανάπτυξη της «ήπιας ισχύος» (soft power) και των συνεργατικών σχημάτων. Τόνιζε όμως και τη δύναμη της «σκληρής ισχύος» των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων, καθώς επίσης και το γεγονός ότι οι ΗΠΑ θα χρησιμοποιήσουν κάθε απαραίτητη δύναμη για την αντιμετώπιση των απειλών της εθνικής ασφάλειας, όπως το δίκτυο της τρομοκρατίας με το οποίο βρίσκονταν – όπως χαρακτηριστικά αναφερόταν μέσα στο έγγραφο - ακόμα σε πόλεμο. Το

<sup>8</sup> Ως ενδεικτικά παραδείγματα αναφερόταν οι πανδημίες, το παράνομο εμπόριο και η καταστροφή του περιβάλλοντος.

2015 ο ίδιος Πρόεδρος εξέδωσε έπειτα από πολλές καθυστερήσεις<sup>9</sup> (Cancian, 2017:12) μία ακόμα Στρατηγική (The White House, 2015), η οποία επικεντρωνόταν στην εσωτερική ασφάλεια, την αντιμετώπιση της οικονομικής κρίσης, την κλιματική αλλαγή και την ενεργειακή ασφάλεια (Patrick, 2015), διατηρώντας μία σχετικά σκληρή στάση απέναντι στη Ρωσία και την Κίνα (Lucas & McInnis, 2016).

Η δέκατη έβδομη Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας εκδόθηκε το 2017 από τον Πρόεδρο Donald Trump (The White House, 2017), καθόριζε τέσσερις βασικούς πυλώνες δράσης<sup>10</sup> και προσδιόριζε έξι γεωγραφικές περιοχές ενδιαφέροντος,<sup>11</sup> ενώ αρκετοί τη χαρακτήρισαν ως μη ρεαλιστική ή ακόμα και μεταψυχοπολεμική, καθώς ερμηνεύτηκε ως μια προσπάθεια διατήρησης της πρωτοκαθεδρίας των ΗΠΑ στο διεθνές σύστημα (Inboden, 2018). Το εν λόγω έγγραφο ήταν επίσης γεμάτο αναφορές σχετικά με την προσπάθεια υπονόμευσης των ΗΠΑ από Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία της Κίνας, γεγονός που οδήγησε στην όξυνση των σχέσεων των δύο κρατών (Jost, 2017). Αξίζει τέλος να επισημανθεί ότι ανάλογες αναφορές υπήρχαν και ως προς τη δράση της Ρωσίας, του Ιράν και της Βόρειας Κορέας.

## Η ισχύουσα Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας

Στις 03 Μαρτίου 2021 – έξι εβδομάδες μετά την επίσημη ανάληψη των καθηκόντων του - ο Πρόεδρος Joe Biden εξέδωσε ένα έγγραφο στρατηγικού χαρακτήρα με τίτλο *Ενδιάμεση Στρατηγική Καθοδήγηση Εθνικής Ασφάλειας* (The White House, 2021) με σκοπό την παροχή κατευθύνσεων στα Υπουργεία και τις Υπηρεσίες μέχρι την έκδοση της νέας Στρατηγικής Εθνικής Ασφάλειας (The White House, 2022). Το εν λόγω έγγραφο έθετε τρεις προτεραιότητες,<sup>12</sup> συνέδεε την εθνική ασφάλεια με την κατανομή της ισχύος, την πρόληψη των άμεσων απειλών και τη διατήρηση ενός σταθερού και ανοιχτού διεθνούς συστήματος, ενώ εξακολουθούσε να χαρακτηρίζει ως απειλή τη Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία της Κίνας και τη Ρωσική Ομοσπονδία δίνοντας παράλληλα έμφαση στην κλιματική κρίση (Baumann, 2021). Υποστήριζε τέλος πως η ευημερία των πολιτών και η ανθεκτικότητα (resilience) της κοινωνίας είναι οι κύριοι παράγοντες που επηρεάζουν την εθνική ασφάλεια και όχι οι εξωτερικές απειλές (McInnis, 2021).

<sup>9</sup> Οι εν λόγω καθυστερήσεις ανάγκασαν τον Πρόεδρο Obama να παρέμβει προσωπικά στη διαδικασία χάραξης της Στρατηγικής Εθνικής Ασφάλειας, για τον καθορισμό των στόχων και τον περιορισμό της έκτασής της.

<sup>10</sup> Αυτή περιελάμβανε την «Προστασία του Αμερικανικού λαού, της Πατρίδας και του Αμερικανικού τρόπου ζωής, την «Προώθηση της Αμερικανικής Ευημερίας», τη «Διατήρηση της Ειρήνης μέσω της Δύναμης» και την «Εξάπλωση της Αμερικανικής Επιρροής».

<sup>11</sup> Τον Ινδο-Ειρηνικό, την Ευρώπη, τη Μέση Ανατολή, το Νότια και Κεντρική Ασία, το Δυτικό Ημισφαίριο και την Αφρική.

<sup>12</sup> Αυτές περιελάμβανε την «Προστασία της ασφάλειας του αμερικανικού λαού», τη «Διεύρυνση της οικονομικής ευημερίας και των ευκαιριών» και την «Προστασία των δημοκρατικών αξιών στην καρδιά του αμερικανικού τρόπου ζωής».

Στις 12 Οκτωβρίου 2022 ο Πρόεδρος Biden εξέδωσε τη δέκατη όγδοη Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ (The White House, 2022), η οποία περιελάμβανε πέντε μέρη.<sup>13</sup> Το πρώτο μέρος ανέφερε ότι η τρέχουσα δεκαετία είναι καθοριστική για το μέλλον της ανθρωπότητας, καθόριζε ως στρατηγικές προκλήσεις την αντιμετώπιση του ανταγωνισμού μεταξύ των μεγάλων δυνάμεων της εποχής αλλά και των συνεπειών της κλιματικής αλλαγής, της επισιτιστικής κρίσης και των λοιπών παγκόσμιων κοινών απειλών. Αναδείκνυε επίσης το ρόλο των ΗΠΑ, οι οποίες – σύμφωνα με το έγγραφο – παρέμεναν κυρίαρχη δύναμη σε παγκόσμιο επίπεδο, αλλά και τη φύση του σύγχρονου ανταγωνισμού η οποία αφορούσε στην υπεράσπιση της δημοκρατίας έναντι της αναθεωρητικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής των αυταρχικών κυβερνήσεων, αναφέροντας ως χαρακτηριστικά παραδείγματα τη Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία της Κίνας και τη Ρωσία. Τέλος τόνιζε πως ο βέλτιστος τρόπος αντιμετώπισης όλων των προκλήσεων είναι η συνεργασία και πως επιδίωξη των ΗΠΑ είναι μία ελεύθερη, προσβάσιμη, ευήμερη και ασφαλής διεθνή τάξη.

Το δεύτερο μέρος αναφερόταν στην ανάγκη προώθησης κρίσιμων εγχώριων επενδύσεων για τη διατήρηση της ανταγωνιστικότητας και την ενδυνάμωση της μεσαίας τάξης, επισημαίνοντας ότι τα όρια μεταξύ εξωτερικής και εσωτερικής πολιτικής στο σύγχρονο περιβάλλον είναι πλέον δυσδιάκριτα. Έθετε ως στόχο την εφαρμογή μίας σύγχρονης καινοτόμου βιομηχανικής στρατηγικής - σε συνεργασία με τον ιδιωτικό τομέα - για την ασφάλεια των κρίσιμων υποδομών και του κυβερνοχώρου, την ενδυνάμωση των δημοκρατικών θεσμών, την ανάπτυξη συμμαχιών με κράτη που συμμερίζονται τις ίδιες αξίες όπως η *AUKUS* (Corben, Townshed, & Patton, 2021),<sup>14</sup> η *Five Eyes* (Tossini, 2020),<sup>15</sup> η *Quad* (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Australian Government, 2017)<sup>16</sup> και η *G7* (European Commission, 2022) και τον εκσυγχρονισμό των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων εφαρμόζοντας μια ολοκληρωμένη αποτροπή, η οποία θα βρίσκει εφαρμογή σε όλα τα πεδία, τους φορείς, τα φάσματα των συγκρούσεων, τους φορείς και τους εταίρους.

Το τρίτο μέρος καθόριζε τις παγκόσμιες προτεραιότητες των ΗΠΑ, οι οποίες περιελάμβαναν τον «παραγκωνισμό» (out-competing) της Κίνας και τον περιορισμό (constraining) της Ρωσίας, τη συνεργασία για την αντιμετώπιση κοινών προκλήσεων όπως η κλιματική κρίση και η ενεργειακή ασφάλεια, οι πανδημίες και οι λοιπές βιολογικές απειλές, η επισιτιστική κρίση, ο έλεγχος των εξοπλισμών και η μη διασπορά των ΠΒΧ οπλικών συστημάτων, η τρομοκρατία και το οργανωμένο

<sup>13</sup> Το Μέρος I είχε τίτλο «Ο Ανταγωνισμός για Όσα Έπονται» (The Competition for What Comes Next), το Μέρος II «Επενδύοντας στη Δύναμή μας» (Investing in our Strength), το Μέρος III «Οι Παγκόσμιες Προτεραιότητές μας» (Our Global Priorities), το Μέρος IV «Η Στρατηγική μας ανά Περιφέρεια» (Our Strategy by Region) και το Μέρος V «Συμπέρασμα» (Conclusion).

<sup>14</sup> Συνεργασία στον τομέα της ασφάλειας με την Αυστραλία και το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο.

<sup>15</sup> Συνεργασία στον τομέα των πληροφοριών με την Αυστραλία, τον Καναδά, τη Νέα Ζηλανδία και το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο.

<sup>16</sup> Συνεργασία με την Ιαπωνία, την Ινδία και την Αυστραλία για την αντιμετώπιση προκλήσεων σε περιφερειακό επίπεδο.

έγκλημα, θέτοντας συγκεκριμένες παραμέτρους για την αποτελεσματική τους αντιμετώπιση, όπως η τεχνολογία, η κυβερνοασφάλεια, το εμπόριο και η οικονομία, η προστασία ομήρων και κρατουμένων καθώς και η καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς.

Όσον αφορά τέλος το διαχωρισμό σε περιοχές ενδιαφέροντος, το τέταρτο μέρος επικεντρωνόταν σε έξι γεωγραφικές περιοχές (regions), με πρώτη αυτή του *Ινδο-Ειρηνικού* την οποία οι ΗΠΑ επιδιώκουν να καταστήσουν προσβάσιμη, διασυνδεδεμένη, ευήμερη, ασφαλή και ανθεκτική σε συνεργασία με τα κράτη της περιοχής. Ακολούθως το έγγραφο αναφερόταν στην *Ευρώπη* με την οποία οι ΗΠΑ επιδιώκουν την ανάπτυξη στενότερης συνεργασίας<sup>17</sup> και στη συνέχεια στο *Δυτικό Ημισφαίριο* στο οποίο πρέπει να προωθηθεί η Δημοκρατία και η ευημερία. Ως τέταρτη περιοχή καθοριζόταν η *Μέση Ανατολή* στην οποία επιδιωκόταν η αποκλιμάκωση και η ενσωμάτωση μέσω πιο ρεαλιστικών στόχων, ως πέμπτη η *Αφρική* με τα κράτη της οποίας οι ΗΠΑ επιδιώκουν να συνάψουν συνεργασία και τελευταία η *Αρκτική* η οποία - λόγω της κλιματικής αλλαγής - έχει γίνει πιο προσβάσιμη από ποτέ και την οποία σκοπεύουν να διατηρήσουν ασφαλή. Αξιζει επίσης να τονιστεί το γεγονός ότι τόσο η *Θάλασσα*, όσο και ο *Αέρας* αλλά και το *Διάστημα* αναφέρονται ως περιοχές ενδιαφέροντος, οι οποίες πρέπει να διασφαλιστούν όπως και οι προαναφερθείσες.

## Συμπεράσματα

Επειδή η δημοσίευση της Στρατηγικής Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ πραγματοποιήθηκε σχετικά πρόσφατα – η εξαγωγή επομένως συμπερασμάτων ως προς την αποτελεσματικότητά της καθίσταται ιδιαίτερα επισφαλής – κρίνεται σκόπιμη η παράθεση ορισμένων προβληματισμών σχετικά με την επίδραση που πρόκειται να ασκήσει στο παγκόσμιο περιβάλλον ασφάλειας, ώστε να καταστεί δυνατή η λήψη προληπτικών μέτρων για την αντιμετώπιση ενδεχόμενων δυσάρεστων καταστάσεων. Ο πρώτος προβληματισμός αφορά τον τρόπο αντίδρασης της *Λαϊκής Δημοκρατίας της Κίνας*. Σύμφωνα με τις πρόσφατες δηλώσεις του Xi Jinping, η ηγεσία της Κίνας θεωρεί ως μία από τις βασικές αρχές της ειρηνικής συνύπαρξης των κρατών τη μη ανάμειξη άλλων κρατών στις εσωτερικές της υποθέσεις (Κουκάκης, 2022c). Η προσπάθεια επέμβασης επομένως των ΗΠΑ στον Ινδο-Ειρηνικό – μία περιοχή που παραδοσιακά ανήκει στην κινέζικη σφαίρα επιρροής - σε συνδυασμό με την ξεκάθαρη αναφορά περί «παραγκωνισμού» της Κίνας, ενδέχεται να επιφέρει περεταίρω κλιμάκωση των ήδη τεταμένων σχέσεων μεταξύ των δύο κρατών.

Ανάλογη αντίδραση αναμένεται και από την πλευρά της *Ρωσίας*, η οποία – εκτός από το γεγονός ότι δεν αναμένεται να ανεχτεί την προσπάθεια περιορισμού της από τις ΗΠΑ – στη Στρατηγική Εθνικής

<sup>17</sup> Όσον αφορά στον τομέα της Άμυνας, η Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας αναφέρεται στη διεύρυνση του ΝΑΤΟ, αλλά και την υποστήριξη των συμφερόντων της Ουκρανίας, της Γεωργίας και Μολδαβίας.

Ασφάλειας που εξέδωσε το 2021 αναφέρει ότι θεωρεί το *NATO* ως μία από τις μεγαλύτερες απειλές για την εθνική της ασφάλεια (Koukakis, 2022a) και πως θα διαφυλάξει τα ρωσικά συμφέροντα στην περιοχή της Αρκτικής (Buchanan, 2021). Η διεύρυνση επομένως του *NATO* που επιχειρούν οι ΗΠΑ με την ένταξη της Φινλανδίας και της Σουηδίας, η στενότερη αμυντική συνεργασία με την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, η συνεχής παροχή υποστήριξης στην Ουκρανία, τη Γεωργία και τη Μολδαβία (Koukakis, 2022b), αλλά και η επέμβαση στην Αρκτική – ενέργειες που αναφέρονται ρητά στη νέα Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας των ΗΠΑ – αναμένεται να επιδράσουν καταλυτικά στις διμερείς σχέσεις των δύο κρατών.

Ιδιαίτερο ενδιαφέρον επίσης αναμένεται να παρουσιάσουν νέα πεδία ανταγωνισμού όπως το διάστημα και ο κυβερνοχώρος, τα οποία λόγω της αλματώδους προόδου που σημειώνει η τεχνολογία - η οποία με τη σειρά της συμβάλλει με τον καλύτερο τρόπο στην ανάπτυξη της καινοτομίας – θα ασκήσουν μεγάλη επιρροή στη διαμόρφωση του μελλοντικού περιβάλλοντος ασφάλειας. Η αντιπαράθεση μεταξύ των κρατών έχει αρχίσει ήδη να μεταφέρεται από το συμβατικό πεδίο μάχης στα δύο νέα αυτά πεδία, με τους ειδικούς να κάνουν πλέον λόγο για διεξαγωγή υβριδικού πολέμου. Η νέα αυτή μορφή πολέμου - η οποία περιλαμβάνει τη διεξαγωγή πληροφορικών επιχειρήσεων (Κουκάκης, 2022d) και κυβερνοεπιθέσεων εκμεταλλευόμενη σε μεγάλο βαθμό τη διαστημική τεχνολογία - αναμένεται να αποτελέσει τον κανόνα στο νέο περιβάλλον ασφάλειας, με τη Ρωσία να ακολουθεί μία εξαιρετικά ενεργή στρατηγική σε αυτόν τον τομέα, καθώς «[...] αντιλαμβάνεται τον τομέα των πληροφοριών με γεωπολιτικούς όρους, με τον εγχώριο τομέα πληροφοριών να αντιπροσωπεύει μια συνέχεια των κρατικών της συνόρων, τα οποία θεωρεί ότι παραβιάζονται διαρκώς από ξένους εισβολείς» (Hakala, & Melnychuk, 2021).

Αξίζει τέλος να τονιστεί το γεγονός ότι – λαμβάνοντας υπόψιν και την απόσυρση των αμερικανικών στρατευμάτων από το Αφγανιστάν το 2021 – με τη δημοσίευση της εν λόγω Στρατηγική Εθνικής Ασφάλειας, οι ΗΠΑ παραδέχονται έμμεσα ότι η χρήση βίας, η ανάπτυξη δηλαδή ένοπλων τμημάτων σε μία περιοχή, δεν προωθεί εν τέλει τη σταθερότητα αλλά καθίσταται αναποτελεσματική. Για το λόγο αυτό επιχειρείται η αποκλιμάκωση της έντασης στη Μέση Ανατολή και η προώθηση της σταθερότητας και της ενσωμάτωσης εις βάρος του εκδημοκρατισμού, γεγονός που σύμφωνα με ορισμένους αναλυτές ενδέχεται να ευνοήσει τα ανελεύθερα καθεστώτα της περιοχής, θέτοντας ως παραδείγματα την Τουρκία και τη Συρία (Ryan, 2022).

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## Following the Example of Israel and Lebanon: Resolving Maritime Border Disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean<sup>1</sup>

Olga Tsoukala<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

The recent US-brokered agreement to delimit Lebanon's EEZ with Israel has created a new diplomatic and energy reality in the dynamically developing eastern Mediterranean region. This policy brief analyzes the new agreement both in terms of relations between the two states and the diplomatic and energy realities it creates in the region. Considering the political reality that Israel and Lebanon have so far seen as states without diplomatic relations, this policy brief concludes with a series of policy proposals to make the agreement an opportunity for de-escalation and a space of cooperation for the states involved, especially in the quest for energy security.

**Keywords:** Israel; Lebanon; EEZ; natural gas; energy diplomacy; Eastern Mediterranean.

## Ακολουθώντας το Παράδειγμα του Ισραήλ και του Λιβάνου: Επιλύοντας τις Διαφορές επί Θαλασσίων Συνόρων στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο

Όλγα Τσουκαλά<sup>3</sup>

### Περίληψη

Η πρόσφατη συμφωνία οριοθέτησης της Α.Ο.Ζ. του Λιβάνου με το Ισραήλ, με τη διαμεσολάβηση των Η.Π.Α., δημιούργησε μία νέα διπλωματική και ενεργειακή πραγματικότητα στη δυναμικά εξελισσόμενη περιοχή της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου. Το παρόν εγχείρημα πραγματεύεται την νέα συμφωνία, τόσο υπό το πρίσμα των σχέσεων των δύο κρατών, όσο και το διπλωματικό και ενεργειακό γίγνεσθαι, το οποίο δημιουργεί στην περιοχή. Λαμβάνοντας υπ'όψιν την πολιτική πραγματικότητα, η οποία ήθελε μέχρι τώρα το Ισραήλ και το Λίβανο ως κράτη χωρίς καμία διπλωματική σχέση, το παρόν εγχείρημα καταλήγει σε ορισμένες προτάσεις πολιτικής ώστε η συμφωνία να αποτελέσει ευκαιρία αποκλιμάκωσης και πεδίο συνεργασίας για τα εμπλεκόμενα κράτη, ιδίως στην επιδίωξη της ενεργειακής ασφάλειας.

**Λέξεις-Κλειδιά:** Ισραήλ, Λίβανος, AOZ, φυσικό αέριο, ενεργειακή διπλωματία, Ανατολική Μεσόγειος.

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## Εισαγωγή

Είναι γεγονός ότι, η Ανατολική Μεσόγειος, η οποία αποτελεί την πλέον αναδυόμενη υπο-περιφέρεια στη ΝΑ Ευρώπη (Τζιάρρας, 2020), απασχόλησε εκ νέου τη διεθνή επικαιρότητα με τις εξελίξεις στην ενεργειακή διπλωματία και το διεθνές δίκαιο κατά το σκέλος του δικαίου θαλάσσης. Όλως προσφάτως, την 27<sup>η</sup> Οκτωβρίου 2022, έλαβε χώρα η υπογραφή του τελικού κειμένου της συμφωνίας οριοθέτησης των θαλασσίων συνόρων μεταξύ του κράτους του Ισραήλ και του Λιβάνου (Al Jazeera, 2022). Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι η εν λόγω συμφωνία υλοποιήθηκε κατόπιν της διαμεσολάβησης των Η.Π.Α., οι οποίες και χαιρέτισαν την υπογραφή του τελικού κειμένου από τα συμβαλλόμενα κράτη (US Department of State, 2022). Αναλογιζόμενοι την πολιτική πραγματικότητα, η οποία βρίσκει τα δύο κράτη ως αντιπάλους στη Μέση Ανατολή, η εν λόγω συμφωνία, η οποία επιλύει ένα θέμα περισσότερο τεχνικό, αποκαλύπτει ένα νέο πλαίσιο διαλόγου και μία ευκαιρία για τα εμπλεκόμενα κράτη.

### Οι σχέσεις Ισραήλ-Λιβάνου: ευκαιρία για βελτίωση ή αναγκαία συγκυρία;

Προκειμένου να γίνει κατανοητή η σημασία της παρούσης συμφωνίας, κρίνεται αναγκαίο στο σημείο αυτό να γίνει μια συνοπτική αλλά περιεκτική αναφορά στις σχέσεις αμφότερων των κρατών. Κατά γενική ομολογία, οι σχέσεις μεταξύ του Ισραήλ και του Λιβάνου βρίσκονται σε μία κλιμακούμενη ένταση. Ήδη, από γεωγραφική σκοπιά, ο Λίβανος<sup>4</sup> αποτελεί στρατηγικής σημασίας περιοχή, ιδίως το νότιο τμήμα του, για το Ισραήλ, λόγω αφενός της παρουσίας Σιιτών, οι οποίοι δημιουργούν τρωτό σημείο στην άμυνα του Ισραήλ -λαμβάνοντας υπ'όψιν και την επιρροή που μπορεί να ασκήσει η Συρία κατά του Ισραήλ μέσω του Λιβάνου- και αφετέρου για πολιτικούς και οικονομικούς λόγους, κυρίως για την εκμετάλλευση των υδάτων του ποταμού Λιτανί (Κεφαλά, 2021).

Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι οι μαζικές προσφυγικές ροές των Παλαιστινίων, το έτος 1967 και 1970, κατέστησαν το Λίβανο ως χώρα υποδοχής. Το γεγονός αυτό σε συνδυασμό με την ενδοαραβική συμφωνία του Καΐρου, το 1969, η οποία επέτρεπε την κατοχή όπλων από τους Παλαιστινίους, δημιουργούσε πρόσφορο έδαφος για την επέκταση του αντιστασιακού μετώπου των Παλαιστινίων κατά του Ισραήλ, μια πραγματικότητα η οποία ενέτεινε τις σχέσεις των δύο χωρών (Κεφαλά, 2021). Λίγα χρόνια αργότερα, το 1978, το Ισραήλ εισέβαλε στο Λίβανο οδηγώντας το Συμβούλιο Ασφαλείας να νιοθετήσει το Ψήφισμα 425 (1978)<sup>5</sup>, σύμφωνα με το οποίο δημιουργήθηκε ουδέτερη ζώνη των Η.Ε. στην περιοχή όπου και εγκαταστάθηκε ο Μαρωνίτης συνταγματάρχης, Σαάντ Χαντάντ, ως επικεφαλής στη ζώνη ασφαλείας των Η.Ε. στο Νότιο Λίβανο.

<sup>4</sup> Ο Λίβανος ονομάζεται και ως η χώρα του Κέδρου (Κεφαλά, 2021).

<sup>5</sup> Η πρώην ΕΣΣΔ και η πρώην Τσεχοσλοβακία ψήφισαν «παρών».

Σταδιακά και κατ' εφαρμογή της αποστολής «Ειρήνη στη Γαλιλαία»<sup>6</sup>, έλαβε χώρα μία προσπάθεια για βελτίωση των σχέσεων στο ήδη τεταμένο κλίμα των δύο χωρών. Αρωγός στην προσπάθεια αυτή στάθηκε η θετική στάση του πρώην Λιβανέζου Προέδρου, Bashir Gemayel, ο οποίος από το έτος 1976 διατηρούσε δεσμούς με το Ισραήλ. Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι, η ανακωχή του 1949<sup>7</sup>, μεταξύ του Ισραήλ και του Λιβάνου, ήταν σε ισχύ, την περίοδο εκείνη. Οι σχέσεις των κρατών όδευαν στο ναδίρ, όταν το Σεπτέμβριο του 1982 δολοφονήθηκε ο Πρόεδρος Bashir. Επί της ουσίας, ενταφιάστηκε το εγχείρημα εγκατάστασης ενός Χριστιανικού καθεστώτος στο Λίβανο από πλευράς του Ισραήλ, αφού μετά τη δολοφονία οι Χριστιανοί Λιβανέζοι ανέπτυξαν ισχυρούς δεσμούς με τους μουσουλμάνους σε μια γενικότερη διάσταση των σχέσεών τους με το Ισραήλ (Abadi, 2020).

Σημείο σταθμός στις σχέσεις των δύο χωρών υπήρξε η εφαρμογή της Πολυεθνικής Δύναμης Ασφαλείας<sup>8</sup>, σύμφωνα με το Ψήφισμα 508 (1982) του Σ.Α., ως απάντηση στην επιχείρηση «Ειρήνη για την Γαλιλαία». Η Πολυεθνική Δύναμη Ασφαλείας απέβη ατελέσφορη, αφού ούτε οι άμαχοι έλαβαν την απαιτούμενη προστασία ούτε οι ισραηλινές δυνάμεις αποχώρησαν (Κεφαλά, 2021). Κατόπιν της αποχώρησης της Δύναμης, οι ισραηλινοί προέβησαν σε βιαιοπραγίες και σφαγές εξαναγκάζοντας τους Παλαιστίνιους φενταγίν να οπισθοχωρήσουν προς τα εδάφη υπό συριακό έλεγχο (Μπεκάα). Επισήμως και αφού ο στόχος επετεύχθη, το Ισραήλ απέσυρε τις στρατιωτικές δυνάμεις του, την 1<sup>η</sup> Ιουνίου του έτους 1985.

Ασφαλώς, η έκρυθμη κατάσταση στην περιοχή δεν σταμάτησε μετά την αποχώρηση των ισραηλινών. Κατά το έτος 1982, δημιουργήθηκε η τρομοκρατική οργάνωση, η οποία θα άλλαξε κατά πολύ την πορεία των σχέσεων μεταξύ του Ισραήλ και του Λιβάνου. Ο λόγος γίνεται για την τρομοκρατική οργάνωση με την ονομασία Χεζμπολάχ ή άλλως το κόμμα του Θεού. Οι σχέσεις του Ισραήλ και της Χεζμπολάχ βρίσκονταν σε διαρκή κλιμάκωση με αρνητικό πρόσημο. Μόλις το 1992 ο «ηγέτης» της Χεζμπολάχ δολοφονείται από τους ισραηλινούς, πυροδοτείται μία σειρά γεγονότων, τα οποία οδήγησαν τα δύο μέρη ένα βήμα πριν τον πόλεμο (Susser, n.d.). Μεταξύ των γεγονότων αξίζει να αναφερθούν με τη σειρά τα εξής: α) η δημιουργία ενός κράτους εν κράτει από τη Χεζμπολάχ στο Νότιο Λίβανο, το 2000, αγνοώντας πλήρως μαζί με τη Συρία το Ψήφισμα 1559<sup>9</sup> (2004) του Σ.Α., β)

<sup>6</sup> Η επιχείρηση «Ειρήνη για τη Γαλιλαία» ήταν σχεδιασμένη για να διώξει την PLO και τους Σύρους από τον Λίβανο και να ανοίξει το δρόμο για μια συνθήκη ειρήνης με τη λιβανέζικη χριστιανική ηγεσία υπό τον πρόεδρο του Λιβάνου, Bashir Gemayel (Susser, n.d.).

<sup>7</sup> Η Συμφωνία Ανακωχής του 1949 έλαβε χώρα κατόπιν μεσολάβησης των H.E. (Israel MFA, n.d.).

<sup>8</sup> Τον Αύγουστο του 1982, οι κυβερνήσεις των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών, της Γαλλίας, της Ιταλίας και της Μεγάλης Βρετανίας ανέπτυξαν μια πολυεθνική ειρηνευτική δύναμη στον Λίβανο σε μια προσπάθεια να σταθεροποιήσουν τη χώρα και να σταματήσουν τις μάχες μεταξύ της Συρίας, της Οργάνωσης για την Απελευθέρωση της Παλαιστίνης (PLO) και του Ισραήλ (Naval History and Heritage Command, 2020 & Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, 1983).

<sup>9</sup> Το Ψήφισμα 1559 (2004) προέβλεπε μεταξύ άλλων την απομάκρυνση των ξένων δυνάμεων από το Λίβανο και την παράδοση των όπλων από τις Λιβανέζικες και μη ένοπλες δυνάμεις.

η δολοφονία του Λιβανέζου πρώην Πρωθυπουργού, Ραφίκ Χαρίρι, το Φεβρουάριο του 2005 και γ) η ανάπτυξη από τη Χεζμπολάχ μιας εκτιμώμενης δύναμης από 12.000 έως 14.000 ρουκέτες Katyusha ικανές να πλήξουν ένα ευρύ φάσμα ισραηλινών πόλεων, κωμοπόλεων και χωριών, γεγονός το οποίο χρησιμοποιούσαν από κοινού το Ιράν και η Συρία για να πιέσουν το Ισραήλ.


Με την κατάσταση να έχει ξεφύγει και το Ισραήλ σε διαρκή αναβρασμό, την 12η Ιουλίου του έτους 2006, ξεσπά ο Πόλεμος του Λιβάνου, όταν μια ομάδα τρομοκρατών της Χεζμπολάχ πέρασε τα σύνορα προς το Ισραήλ και επιτέθηκε σε Ισραηλινούς στρατιώτες, οι οποίοι περιπολούσαν τα σύνορα (Susser, n.d.). Με μεγάλες ανθρώπινες απώλειες και υλικές καταστροφές και από τα δύο μέρη, εκατέρωθεν, ο πόλεμος έληξε την 12η Αυγούστου του ίδιου έτους, με το Ψήφισμα 1701 (2006) του Σ.Α.<sup>10</sup>, το οποίο προέβλεπε τη λήξη του πολέμου και την κατάπαυση πυρός (Israel in Greece, n.d.).

### Το νομικό και ενεργειακό πλαίσιο της συμφωνίας Ισραήλ-Λιβάνου

Λαμβάνοντας υπ'όψιν τα όσα εκτέθηκαν προηγουμένως γίνεται εύλογα αντιληπτή η σημασία του διακυβεύματος της συμφωνίας της 27ης Οκτωβρίου 2022. Πρόκειται για μια συμφωνία ιδιαζούσης σημασίας για την περιοχή και τα συμβαλλόμενα μέρη, η οποία φέρει ορισμένα ρηξικέλευθα γνωρίσματα. Πρωτίστως, αποτελεί την πρώτη συμφωνία οριοθέτησης θαλασσίων ζωνών μεταξύ κρατών, τα οποία δεν έχουν καμία διπλωματική σχέση, γεγονός το οποίο επιβεβαιώνεται και από τη μορφή της συμφωνίας, η οποία αποτελείται από δύο επιμέρους όμοιες συμφωνίες του κάθε κράτους με τις Η.Π.Α. (Ισραήλ-ΗΠΑ, Λίβανος-ΗΠΑ), δεδομένου του διαμεσολαβητικού ρόλου των ΗΠΑ στην επίτευξή της (Yiallourides et. al., 2022). Παράλληλα, η ίδια η οριοθέτηση, η οποία ακολουθήσε τη μέθοδο της ίσης απόστασης, αφορά σε κράτη με παρακείμενες και όχι αντικείμενες ακτογραμμές (Χάρτης 1), σε αντίθεση με τη συνήθη διαδικασία οριοθετήσεων, η οποία αφορούσε σε κράτη με αντικείμενες ακτές, όπως λ.χ. η Α.Ο.Ζ. Κύπρου-Ισραήλ (Yiallourides et. al., 2022).

<sup>10</sup> Μετά τη λήψη της απόφασης για παύση των εχθροπραξιών, δημιουργήθηκε μια ουδέτερη ζώνη από τον ποταμό Λιτάνι στο νότιο τμήμα της χώρας έως τη Γαλάζια Γραμμή, η οποία θα πρέπει να είναι εντελώς απαλλαγμένη από όπλα και προσωπικό, εκτός από εκείνα που ανήκουν στον Λιβανέζικο Στρατό και την ειρηνευτική δύναμη του Ο.Η.Ε. (UNIFIL, n.d.).

## Χάρτης 1: Η Οριοθέτηση Α.Ο.Ζ. Ισραήλ-Λιβάνου (2022)



Πηγή: MEPS, 2022

Στο σημείο αυτό θα πρέπει να γίνει μία συνοπτική αναφορά στις ήδη οριοθετημένες θαλάσσιες ζώνες, οι οποίες αναπόφευκτα επηρεάζονται -όχι απαραίτητα αρνητικά- από τη συναφθείσα συμφωνία, την οποία πραγματεύεται το παρόν εγχείρημα. Άλλωστε, η προβληματική γύρω από τη συμφωνία Λιβάνου-Ισραήλ ήταν περισσότερο πολιτική παρά γεωγραφική (Yiallourides, 2021). Συγκεκριμένα, ο Λίβανος έχει υπογράψει διμερή συμφωνία οριοθέτησης Α.Ο.Ζ. με την Κύπρο, το έτος 2007, η οποία δεν τέθηκε σε ισχύ, αφού δεν επικυρώθηκε από την Βουλή του Λιβάνου, λόγω του αμφισβητούμενου χώρου (Χάρτης 2), ενώ το Ισραήλ έχει υπογράψει, παρομοίως, το 2010, συμφωνία για την Α.Ο.Ζ. με την Κύπρο (Χάρτης 3), η οποία κυρώθηκε και από τα δύο κράτη, εκατέρωθεν και έχει τεθεί σε ισχύ (Yiallourides, 2021). Αμφότερες και οι δύο οριοθετήσεις ακολούθησαν τη μέθοδο της μέσης γραμμής.

Εστιάζοντας στο διπλωματικό προσκήνιο, το οποίο αφορά στα ανωτέρω κράτη καθώς και την Ελλάδα, παρατηρείται ότι, ήδη από το 2011, έχει λάβει χώρα μία ανοδική και ραγδαία πορεία διπλωματικών εξελίξεων μεταξύ του Ισραήλ, της Ελλάδος, της Κύπρου και του Λιβάνου. Σε επίπεδο τριμερούς συνεργασίας η Ελλάδα, η Κύπρος και το Ισραήλ έχουν αναπτύξει πολύ ισχυρούς και διαρκείς διπλωματικούς δεσμούς μέσα από τις Τριμερείς Συνόδους Κορυφής, είτε σε επίπεδο αρχηγών κρατών, είτε σε υπουργικό επίπεδο (εξωτερικών, άμυνας, ενέργειας κλπ.) (Tsoukala, 2021).


Σε παρόμοιο επίπεδο, λαμβάνει χώρα και η προσπάθεια οικοδόμησης ενός αντίστοιχου τριμερούς πεδίου διαλόγου μεταξύ της Ελλάδος, της Κύπρου και του Λιβάνου (Τζιάρρας, 2020), ήδη από το έτος 2019 (MFA, 2019) και ακολούθως το έτος 2021 (MFA, 2021).

### Χάρτης 2: Διαφιλονικούμενο τμήμα της Α.Ο.Ζ. Ισραήλ-Λιβάνου (2007)



Πηγή: Allinson, 2020

### Χάρτης 3: Η Οριοθέτηση Α.Ο.Ζ. Κύπρου-Ισραήλ (2010)




Πηγή: Sovereign Limits, n.d.

Συνεκδοχικά, το διακύβευμα της ανωτέρω συμφωνίας έγκειται στην Ενότητα 2 της παρούσης συμφωνίας σχετικά με την «έρευνα και εξόρυξη» υδρογονανθράκων μίας συγκεκριμένης προοπτικής κοιτασμάτων άγνωστης εμπορικής βιωσιμότητας, γνωστής και ως Qana Prospect, η οποία βρίσκεται στο Block 9 της Α.Ο.Ζ. του Λιβάνου (βλ. ανωτέρω Χάρτη 1). Σύμφωνα με το κείμενο της συμφωνίας (Ενότητα 2 σημεία (Γ), (Δ) και (Ε)), ο Λίβανος αποκτά το δικαίωμα να ορίζει το Διαχειριστή του Qana Prospect, ο οποίος πρέπει να είναι μια διεθνής εταιρεία εγνωσμένου κύρους, χωρίς να της έχουν τεθεί κυρώσεις και να μην είναι αμερικανικών, ισραηλινών ή λιβανέζικων συμφερόντων (Staff, 2022), προκειμένου να πραγματοποιήσει τις σχετικές έρευνες και εξορύξεις των κοιτασμάτων στο σημείο.

Στην περιοχή Qana Prospect (Block 9), επιχειρούν ήδη οι ενεργειακοί κολοσσοί τη ιταλικής ENI (40%) και της γαλλικής Total (60%), η οποία έχει δημιουργήσει δύο οχήματα ειδικού σκοπού, το Daja215 (20%) και Daja216 (40%), για τη μεταφορά των προϊόντων εξόρυξης, ενώ έχει εκδηλωθεί έντονη επιθυμία από το Κατάρ (Qatar Energy) να μετέχει της σύμπραξης, διαμορφώνοντας διαφορετικά το μέλλον της περιοχής Qana Prospect, σύμφωνα με το παρακάτω γράφημα.

### Γράφημα 1: Η περιοχή Qana Prospect



\* SAME CONSORTIUM WAS ALSO AWARDED BLOCK 4. ^ LEBANESE PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION.

Πηγή: Stevenson, 2022

Περαιτέρω, η ρωσική Novatek, η οποία επιχειρούσε ήδη το 2018 στην περιοχή, αντικαταστάθηκε από τη Λιβανέζικη Πετρελαϊκή Διοίκηση (LPA), το Σεπτέμβριο του έτους 2022, μετά την ανακοίνωση στις λιβανέζικες αρχές της Novatek Lebanon SAL, θυγατρικής του ρωσικού παραγωγού LNG, ότι θα αποχωρήσει από τη σύμπραξη με τη λήξη της περιόδου εξερεύνησης, την 22η Οκτωβρίου τ.ε. (Szymczak, 2022). Όμως, λόγω της ρητής πρόβλεψης να μη δραστηριοποιούνται στο Block 9, εταιρείες αμερικανικών, ισραηλινών ή λιβανέζικων συμφερόντων, η LPA αντικαταστάθηκε ως προς το ποσοστό της (20%) από το DAJA215 (Stevenson, 2022). Σύμφωνα με τις προβλέψεις του ως άνω γραφήματος, η πιθανή ένταξη του ενεργειακού κολοσσού της Qatar Energy στη σύμπραξη στην περιοχή Qana Prospect, θα διαμορφώσει το μέλλον των ερευνών και εξορύξεων κατά ποσοστά, 35% για την ENI και την Total, αντίστοιχα, και 30% για την Qatar Energy, επί της ουσίας απορροφώντας το ποσοστό της LPA και ακόμα 10% από τις δύο ακόμη εταιρείες (Stevenson, 2022).

Αναφορικά με το εξίσου φλέγον ζήτημα του κοιτάσματος Karish στην ισραηλινή A.O.Z. (Block 27), σημειώθηκε έντονη συζήτηση, ιδίως από πλευράς του Ισραήλ. Το κοίτασμα Karish αποτελεί στρατηγικό πλεονέκτημα για το Ισραήλ (Harkov, 2022a), διασφαλίζοντας την ενεργειακή ασφάλεια και προσφορά στην ισραηλινή αγορά ενέργειας. Προς επίρρωση τούτου, μία μέρα πριν την επικύρωση της συμφωνίας της 27ης Οκτωβρίου για την οριοθέτησης της A.O.Z. Ισραήλ-Λιβάνου, ο ενεργειακός κολοσσός της Energean, η οποία είναι η διάδοχος εταιρεία της ελληνικής Aegean Energy S.A., ξεκίνησε την εξόρυξη φυσικού αερίου από τον κύριο τομέα 2 του κοιτάσματος (Karish Main-02), ενώ στους τομείς 1 και 3 θα ξεκινήσουν σταδιακά τις προσεχείς εβδομάδες (Siegal & Berman, 2022). Το κοίτασμα Karish θα είναι το 3ο κοίτασμα υπεράκτιας παραγωγής ενέργειας, μετά το Tamar και το Leviathan<sup>11</sup> (βλ. ανωτέρω Χάρτη 1).

Ολοκληρώνοντας, αξιοσημείωτο είναι το γεγονός ότι το Ισραήλ μαζί με την Αίγυπτο υπέγραψαν μνημόνιο αμοιβαίας κατανόησης με την Ε.Ε., την 15η Ιουνίου τ.ε., στο Κάιρο, σύμφωνα με το οποίο το Ισραήλ θα μεταφέρει φυσικό αέριο, το οποίο θα υγροποιείται στις εγκαταστάσεις LNG της Αιγύπτου<sup>12</sup>, στην Ευρώπη (Harkov, 2022b). Ως εκ τούτου, η εκμετάλλευση και η εξόρυξη φυσικού αερίου από το κοίτασμα Karish, θα προσδώσει μεγάλη ευχέρεια στην βραχυπρόθεσμη αύξηση της παροχής ΦΑ στην Ευρώπη, η οποία βρίσκεται σε τροχιά διαφοροποίησης και μείωσης της εξάρτησης της από το ρωσικό φυσικό αέριο της Gazprom στο πλαίσιο του εγχειρήματος REPowerEU. Ασφαλώς, η ουσιαστική αύξηση στην προσφορά ΦΑ στην ευρωπαϊκή αγορά θα χρειαστεί αρκετά χρόνια προκειμένου να καταστεί δυναμική και τελέσφορη, σύμφωνα με τη δήλωση του Γ.Γ. του ισραηλινού Υπουργείου Ενέργειας, Lior Schillat, στη σύνοδο των COP27 (2022) στο Sharm Al Sheikh, στην Αίγυπτο (Harkov, 2022b et Valdamanis, 2022).

## Προτάσεις πολιτικής

Σταχυολογώντας τα όσα εκτέθηκαν ανωτέρω, εξάγονται ορισμένες σκέψεις και προκύπτουν σημαντικές κατευθύνσεις για την επόμενη ημέρα στις σχέσεις του Ισραήλ με το Λίβανο, για το ρόλο της Κύπρου και της Ελλάδος και την ενίσχυση της ενεργειακής ασφάλειας της Ευρώπης μέσα από το ενεργειακό «οπλοστάσιο» της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου. Πρωτίστως, η συμφωνία οριοθέτησης της A.O.Z. του Ισραήλ με το Λίβανο, δημιουργεί την κατάλληλη ευκαιρία για την εξωτερική πολιτική της Κύπρου, ώστε να αποπερατωθεί πλήρως η κύρωση της διμερούς συμφωνίας της με το Λίβανο

<sup>11</sup> Το κοίτασμα Leviathan είναι το μεγαλύτερο στη Μεσόγειο Θάλασσα και υπολογίζεται σε 605 δις κ.εκ (bcm<sup>3</sup>) (NewMed Energy, n.d.), ενώ ακολουθούν το Tamar με εκτιμώμενη ποσότητα 315 δις κ.εκ. (Tamar Petroleum, n.d.) και το Karish με 68 δις κ.εκ (Energean, n.d.).

<sup>12</sup> Διαδικασία, η οποία ήδη ακολουθείται, καθώς το Ισραήλ εξάγει φυσικό αέριο προς την αιγυπτιακή Dolphinus, μέρος του οποίου ήδη παρέχεται στην Ε.Ε. από τον σταθμό υγροποίησης φυσικού αερίου της Damietta, ήδη από το έτος 2019 (Tsakiris, 2019).

για την οριοθέτηση των Α.Ο.Ζ. τους (2007). Η Κύπρος χρήζει να εκμεταλλευθεί την παρούσα διπλωματική συγκυρία, στο πλαίσιο της αναδυόμενης τριμερούς συνεργασίας με την Ελλάδα και το Λίβανο, προκειμένου να επιτύχει τη θέση σε ισχύ της συμφωνίας του 2007, διασφαλίζοντας περαιτέρω τα συμφέροντά της στην περιοχή της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου.

Διοθέντος του γεγονότος της υπογραφής μνημονίου συνεργασίας του Ισραήλ και της Αιγύπτου με την Ε.Ε. για την μεταφορά φυσικού αερίου σε υγροποιημένη μορφή από το Ισραήλ μέσω της Αιγύπτου και την εν γένει προσήλωση της Ε.Ε. στο εγχείρημα του REPowerEU, το Ισραήλ και ο Λίβανος δύνανται να διαδραματίσουν σημαντικό ρόλο στην ενδυνάμωση της ενεργειακής ασφάλειας της Ευρώπης. Η συνεργασία των προαναφερθέντων κρατών στην έρευνα και εξόρυξη των κοιτασμάτων της Qana Prospect (Block 9) και η εξακολούθηση της εξόρυξης από πλευράς Ισραήλ του κοιτάσματος Karish -από κοινού με την εξόρυξη του Leviathan και του Tamar- θα δημιουργήσουν μία ικανή και σημαντική πηγή παροχής φυσικού αερίου, το οποίο θα μεταφέρεται σε υγροποιημένη μορφή LNG, από τους σταθμούς υγροποίησης της Αιγύπτου (Damietta) προς την ευρωπαϊκή αγορά, συνεπικουρώντας στη σταδιακή και φθίνουσα εξάρτησή της από το ρωσικό φυσικό αέριο της Gazprom και την διασφάλιση της ενεργειακής ασφάλειας. Εν κατακλείδι, παρόλο που η επίμαχη συμφωνία της 27ης Οκτωβρίου 2022 επέλυσε ένα ζήτημα περισσότερο τεχνικό, ιδίως ως προς τον αμφισβητούμενο χώρο μεταξύ της Α.Ο.Ζ. του Ισραήλ και του Λιβάνου, εντούτοις δημιούργησε την κατάλληλη συγκυρία, σε διπλωματικό και ενεργειακό πλαίσιο ώστε τα εμπλεκόμενα κράτη να αποτελέσουν σημαντικούς δρώντες στην ενίσχυση των σχέσεων με τα γειτονικά κράτη, όπως η Ελλάδα και η Κύπρος, συνεπικουρώντας στην ενεργειακή αυτονομία της Ανατολικής Μεσόγειου.

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## Topic 6

### Internal and External Affairs of the European Union

# Natural Gas Price Inefficiencies as an Obstacle in Taming EU Inflation<sup>1</sup>

Ioannis Krompas<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

During both the Covid-19 and energy crises, EU member states were forced to dedicate a tremendous amount of financial support to ensure economic survival and recovery, which inadvertently triggered inflation pressures. But as countries opted to switch from targeted measures against high energy prices to horizontal ones due to both political and practical reasons, demand-side inflation began to determine core inflation to an extent equal to that of the supply-side. Given that EU member states cannot withdraw fiscal support at the moment, as natural gas prices remain extraordinarily high, the focus must shift towards addressing the inefficiencies of natural gas pricing in the EU. By correcting those inefficiencies, pricing will reflect actual supply conditions, out of which increased LNG availability is the most important one, thus allowing countries to roll back fiscal support and monetary authorities to address inflation.

**Keywords:** Inflation; TTF; Energy Crisis; European Union; Natural Gas.

## Introduction

The European Union has been facing one crisis after the other over the last few years; From the outbreak of the pandemic to the reopening of the economies and the subsequent inflationary spikes, which have been largely attributed to supply-side factors such as the stress of the supply chain due to the global Covid-19 restrictions and the energy crisis that followed Putin's decision to invade Ukraine. The EU has tried to combat all those crises by deploying historically large fiscal measures: The Next Generation EU package and national policies to support Covid-19 recovery and various measures to ensure energy affordability during the energy prices spike, worth cumulatively c. 2 trillion euros<sup>3</sup> (14% of 2019 EU nominal GDP). But as the narrative that the Russian illiberal regime's choices and rising natural gas prices are to blame for the accelerating inflation prevails, the growing demand side factors' effect generated by those fiscal measures on inflation is overlooked. And while it is politically and morally justified for the EU to cut ties with a murderous regime, this should not act as a scapegoat to which all the blame for the inflation trend and the rising cost of living is attributed. At the center of this crisis is natural gas as it is its high price, which has increased 474% since the reopening of most economies in the first half of 2021 (World Bank, 2022) creates the need

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<sup>2</sup> NBG Economic Research, Greece.

<sup>3</sup> Author's calculations based on the Next Gen EU Budget, IMF (2021) for Covid-19 support and Sgaravatti et al. (2022) estimates for energy crisis support up to October 2022.

for continuous support (both directly for natural gas and indirectly for electricity prices) which in its turn acts as a demand-side inflation booster.

Thus, the purpose of this policy brief is to present the fact that demand-supporting policies such as energy bills subsidizing, while are easy answers both politically and practically, are fueling inflation from the demand side and undermine ECB's (and the rest EU central banks') attempt to tame it, and so only structural changes can help ease these inflationary pressures. This paper is organized as follows: Firstly, the setting of how the EU moved from the pandemic crisis to an inflationary macroeconomic environment is presented, followed by an analysis of how the post-pandemic inflation is generated by both the demand-side and the supply-side of the EU economy, with the former prevailing as months pass. The paper closes with an analysis of how the TTF price index is inefficient as a natural gas pricing benchmark as it does not reflect natural gas demand and supply conditions across the EU followed by how policy efforts must concentrate on reforming natural gas pricing, which will lead to lower energy prices, rendering energy subsidies needless and thus easing inflationary pressures from both sides of the economy.

### **EU inflationary<sup>4</sup> developments from the pandemic onwards**

The pandemic and the imposed lockdowns across Europe in 2020 forced the EU, national governments, and Central Banks to deploy one of the largest financial support schemes in history. To be more specific, the total amount devoted by the EU alone, along with nationally funded programs, amounted to c. 1.5 trillion euros, equal to 10% of the 2019 EU GDP (IMF, 2021). All of these were during a time when, cumulatively, EU real GDP shrunk by 6%. One would expect that under the dogma of “more money chasing fewer goods”, the rapid increase of money in circulation combined with smaller economic activity would result in immediate inflationary pressures. However, it was not until the first half of 2021 that inflation began to accelerate, from 0,2% in December 2020 to 5,3% in December 2021. Inflation during the Covid-19 outbreak was “postponed” by the fact that businesses were closed, and people were either unable or unwilling to spend, which resulted in a significant percentage of the given support ending up being saved. As people adapted to the Covid-19 uncertainties and lockdown measures were beginning to ease, those accumulated savings fueled an increase in overall demand much stronger than that of supply, which at the time was crumpled due to the low-capacity utilization of the previous period, attributed to low demand and Covid-19 restrictions (Dabrowski, 2021). This resulted in rising supply chain pressures globally, as evidenced

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<sup>4</sup> For the purposes of this paper inflation is defined as the YoY percentage change of the Eurostat's All-Items HICP index and price levels are the levels of the same index (with 2015=100), unless indicated otherwise.

by the global supply chain which by the end of 2021 had increased to historically high levels of 4.3 standard deviations higher than the long-term average (FED, 2022); Natural gas prices also started to increase during the same time, something that was attributed to base effects and stronger than expected economic recovery (ECB, 2021). Initially, ECB viewed inflation as transitory, and it was expected that as soon as excess savings were depleted, and supply chain pressures were relieved that prices would stabilize. However, as energy prices kept rising (natural gas rose in the second half of 2021 by 269% compared to the first half of the same year) some member states began to offer financial support. By March 2022 and the invasion of Russia into Ukraine, natural gas prices had increased a further 42% compared to the first half of 2021, which also fueled a similarly large increase in electricity prices. Households and businesses could not absorb such increases on their own thus fiscal support was once again deployed across the EU, which so far is equal to c 0.64 trillion euros<sup>5</sup> (Sgaravatti et al., 2022). This of course draws a direct parallel to the response to the Covid-19 crisis, but with no postponement effect.

## Current situation

With energy prices still much higher than in 2019, national governments have no other option than to keep subsidizing energy consumption to avoid socioeconomic turmoil. However, while European Commission suggested that national governments were to introduce support measures targeting only the most vulnerable (European Commission, 2021), many national governments have opted to legislate horizontal measures that acted as a relief for consumers both of lower and higher incomes for political reasons. Such measures include energy VAT reductions, energy price regulations, and direct subsidies (Sgaravatti et al., 2022). On top of those, other inflation and income-boosting policies are implemented that, while not connected to energy prices per se, have a similar impact (Belgium's automatic wage indexation is an example of such a policy). This non-discretionary approach results in a demand increase, as the share of consumers who could afford unsubsidized energy prices essentially receive an income boost which is spent across products. Evidence of the effect of this income increase across products can be found in analyzing core inflation<sup>6</sup> trends, where in 2022 demand side factors have grown to have about the same impact on core inflation as supply-side factors, which is in contrast with what happened in 2021 when core inflation was mostly supply driven (Goncalves & Koester, 2022).


<sup>5</sup> Estimates are up to October 2022 as at most countries support is ongoing.

<sup>6</sup> Inflation of all products excluding energy and food, as measured by the corresponding HICP index.

For as long as energy prices remain high, national governments will be forced to provide support to households and businesses for both actual and political reasons. This in its turn will not only undermine central banks' attempts to tame prices but will further increase inflationary pressures creating a vicious cycle. Thus, the only way for national governments to be able to withdraw fiscal support and reduce inflation is to address the inefficiencies in natural gas pricing, especially the TTF index, which acts as a natural gas benchmark across the continent.

### Why the TTF index is inefficient

**Figure 1: EU-27 Natural Gas Demand and Supply Conditions**



Source: World Bank and Eurostat

As evidenced in Figure 1 demand and supply quantities in the EU have been broadly the same over the last few years. And despite the fact both demand and supply remain stable, natural gas prices have begun skyrocketing since mid-2021, which was initially reflecting the dynamics described in the previous sections and later the reduced flows from Russia to Europe. This market reaction is normal, but as the Russian flows were to a large extent halted both in Germany through Nord Stream and in some countries neighboring Russia, the fear of the repercussions of the limited gas supply was not realized due to measures undertaken by the EU Commission and member states and, most importantly, by the fact that natural gas supply was restructured with LNG now accounting for 21% of imports compared to 13% in 2021 (Eurostat, 2022). This change in natural gas supply structure seems not to be “taken under consideration” by the TTF index, which seems to only reflect northern pipeline flows, something also admitted by the EU Commission (European Commission, 2022).

One could argue that despite the structuring of supply with the LNG scale-up, prices reflect the global tightness of LNG markets, but such tightness would have global price effects, and prices in other major gas hubs, have increased but the magnitude of this increase is not anywhere near TTF's skyrocketing (203% for Henry Hub's price and 105% for Japan's hub price compared to 2019 average price, with TTF increasing 1131% compared to the same period (World Bank, 2022)).

Another source of price inefficiency for the TTF index is the high churn factor<sup>7</sup> of the corresponding hub, which was c. 97 in 2019 (Heather, 2020). This means that the total number of natural gas trades is nearly 100 times more than those involving physical delivery of the product as many participants in that market are trading in the hub for speculation or hedging. Given that the uncertainty of the situation generated price volatility and thus many trading signals, such participants were highly likely to trade for profit, thus driving prices further up<sup>8</sup>.

### **Moving away from the TTF**

It is evident from the above, that with the current market conditions, the TTF as an index is not serving its role as a benchmark for natural gas pricing across Europe. Indeed, the EU Commission has proposed measures to address this issue mainly by planning to introduce a dynamic price cap on the TTF, but this will only prevent prices from further increasing as it does not provide a way of lowering TTF prices. There is little to no literature as to how to move from TTF to a new natural gas pricing benchmark, but to lower natural gas prices in the near medium to long term, the EU could potentially work on three basic axes:

**1. Introduce a mechanism to phase out speculative trading in energy derivatives in times of crisis:** While somewhat difficult to implement the EU should find a legal way to prevent trading not involving physical delivery or hedging for energy companies. In this way market prices will not be generated by speculative expectations but will reflect actual supply and demand conditions and thus will be more informative as to the actual extent of the emergency. Such a measure was proposed at the beginning of the energy crisis by some EU countries.

**2. Cost of production or hub of origin price indexation:** A similar measure is already proposed for EU gas and electricity production companies which, as they face no change in the cost of production, enjoy excess profits from the high natural gas prices (the latter, because the high natural gas prices

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<sup>7</sup> Churn factor is a measure of a natural gas hubs' liquidity and is defined as the ratio between the volume of traded gas over the volume of actually delivered gas.

<sup>8</sup> This is not to imply that any market manipulation took place, as this was ruled out by the Dutch Financial Markets Authority which is responsible for overseeing the TTF index.

determine electricity prices, but not all electricity, is produced from natural gas). These companies will be taxed with a 90% rate on those excess profits. A similar measure could be applied to non-EU gas suppliers, whose imported gas volumes should at least partially and temporarily be priced based on the production cost of the gas they supply or the hub the gas is from. Such contracts should include only direct physical delivery, to avoid creating arbitrage conditions. This way, the average price of gas will decline, and it will also discourage events reported during this crisis such as long-term contract breaking with developing nations to sell LNG in Europe due to the extremely high prices (Financial Times, 2022), which could create new humanitarian crises or geopolitical tensions. The profit margin in such contracts, however, should be carefully decided so as not to risk the security of the gas supply.

**3. Develop peripheral benchmark prices to better reflect supply conditions across the EU:** The TTF failed because it could not capture the change in supply conditions as northern EU countries where the hub is placed have limited access to LNG. Furthermore, none of the 15 peripheral natural hubs in the EU have a price that acts as a benchmark for long-term contracts (EFET, 2021). By developing the peripheral hubs of the EU to act as benchmarks, their prices will better reflect LNG availability in countries that have the relevant infrastructure. Furthermore, provided that a sufficient degree of pipeline integration (or virtual clearance of gas trading) is achieved in the EU, arbitraging across hubs will ensure both price convergence across EU countries and that natural gas is delivered where it is most needed.

## Conclusions

In this paper, it was examined how the extensive government support across the EU to combat both Covid-19 and the energy crisis has begun generating demand-side inflation across products. As governments are forced to keep subsidizing energy consumption to avoid social turmoil, and with their support being horizontal and not targeted for practical and political reasons, the only way to lower energy prices is to address the inefficient way natural gas is priced. Being able to reduce speculative trading, indexing portions of natural gas deliveries on their production cost or their hub of origin price, and encouraging the development of EU's peripheral natural gas hubs are ways to lower natural gas prices (and therefore electricity prices). In this way governments will be able to roll back fiscal support and allow monetary policy to tame inflation.

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# European Union's Energy Security in the Aftermath of Russia's War in Ukraine: From Dependence to Independence<sup>1</sup>

George Nastos<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

The war in Ukraine and the ensuing consequences for the energy supply of Europe, creates a turning point in external energy relations and the energy policy of the European Union. This turning point forces the revision of the EU relations with Russia and a shift in external energy policy in geopolitical and energy security terms. By examining energy relations with Russia and within the framework of energy security, this article attempts to formulate concise policy proposals in this new emerging environment. These policies are based on 3 axes: a) increasing energy autonomy through energy diversification, b) creating alternative routes of energy supply and c) protecting society from the consequences of the current energy crisis.

**Keywords:** energy security; energy dependence; energy policy; energy crisis; renewable energy sources.

## Introduction

The high dependence on energy imports and the huge gap between energy consumption and energy production capacity makes the European Union (EU) vulnerable to crises in energy markets (Gökgöz and Güvercin, 2018). In 2020, the EU imported 57.5% of its total energy needs, rising to 97% for oil and 84% for natural gas (Eurostat, 2022).


This increased energy dependence has led to high politicisation of the energy issue, particularly in relation to the EU's major supplier, Russia. The mainstream perception in terms of foreign policy sees the EU as a liberal actor in foreign energy policy, while Russia is primarily seen as a geopolitical actor or player driven by Realpolitik (Siddi, 2018). But not all member states are equally dependent on the supply of Russian energy. Vulnerability varies greatly within the EU, a fact which makes it difficult to formulate a common European energy policy.

Through a brief examination of EU–Russia energy relations in terms of energy security, this article attempts to map the new emerging environment following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the rupture in EU–Russia relations, in an effort to formulate concise policy proposals as a basis for discussion on dealing with the energy crisis and increasing the energy security and autonomy of the European Union.

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**Figure 1: Energy dependency rate, EU, 2010-2020 (% of net imports in gross available energy, based on terajoules)**



Despite the difficulties brought about by this new crisis, the EU has the potential to enhance already existing policies for dealing with climate change, by framing them not only in environmental terms but in combination with energy security issues.

### **EU – Russia Energy Relations: Interdependence or Dependence?**

Russia is considered to be the main energy source of Europe. Pipelines are not only a means of transportation for natural gas, but they also play a critical role related to geopolitical and energy security. Russia is the largest exporter of oil, natural gas and coal to the European Union. Russia's share of the EU's natural gas imports (including liquefied natural gas) between 2010 and 2020 increased from 30.6% to 38.2% (Eurostat, 2022), while according to the European Commission in the third quarter of 2021 Russia via pipelines covered 41% of total natural gas imports to the EU (European Commission, 2022). Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, energy dependence on Russia has been highlighted as a major geopolitical risk for Europe as well as a factor that assists the financing of Russian aggression (Wilson, 2022).

**Figure 2: Main origin of primary energy imports, EU, 2010-2020 (% of extra EU imports)**

Main origin of primary energy imports, EU, 2010-2020 (% of EU imports)											
	Hard coal (based on tonnes)										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Russia	22.4	21.9	20.2	23.9	25.1	26.4	28.7	35.4	39.5	43.5	49.1
United States	15.3	16.6	20.7	18.5	17.0	12.4	11.9	14.8	17.3	16.8	15.2
Australia	9.6	8.2	8.0	8.8	7.5	11.1	15.3	10.8	11.0	13.1	13.5
Colombia	15.4	18.6	19.1	16.4	17.0	19.3	18.7	15.9	12.6	7.7	5.4
Canada	1.9	2.3	1.9	2.1	3.1	1.6	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.3
Kazakhstan	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.9	2.1	1.8
South Africa	9.6	8.6	7.4	7.1	9.1	7.7	5.1	4.7	2.7	2.7	1.2
United Kingdom	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.9	0.7	1.0	1.1
Mozambique	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.7	1.2	1.6	1.5	0.8
Others	25.5	23.2	22.2	22.6	20.0	20.3	16.7	13.2	11.2	9.5	9.3
	Crude oil (based on tonnes)										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Russia	34.7	35.1	33.9	34.5	31.4	29.7	32.4	30.7	29.6	26.8	25.7
Norway	7.7	7.2	6.8	8.1	9.2	8.4	7.9	7.7	7.2	6.9	8.7
Kazakhstan	5.6	5.9	5.3	6.0	6.7	6.8	7.0	7.6	7.1	7.3	8.4
United States	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.6	0.9	2.4	5.2	8.1
Saudi Arabia	6.0	8.3	9.1	8.7	9.0	7.9	7.7	6.5	7.4	7.7	7.8
Nigeria	3.8	5.6	7.2	7.2	8.3	7.7	5.2	5.8	7.0	7.8	7.7
Iraq	3.3	3.7	4.3	3.8	4.8	7.8	8.5	8.4	8.6	8.9	6.6
United Kingdom	5.6	4.5	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.1	3.9	4.9	5.6
Azerbaijan	4.5	5.1	4.0	5.0	4.6	5.3	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.6
Others	28.8	24.5	24.9	22.5	21.8	22.4	22.0	23.6	22.4	20.0	16.7
	Natural and liquified natural gas (based on terajoule (gross calorific value - GCV))										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Russia	30.6	32.2	31.9	36.6	33.3	33.6	39.6	38.4	37.9	38.0	38.2
Norway	19.3	19.4	21.1	19.0	21.0	20.7	16.3	16.6	16.1	14.7	18.5
Algeria	13.1	12.2	12.1	11.1	10.5	9.5	12.3	10.5	10.8	7.2	7.5
Qatar	5.4	5.1	3.9	3.4	3.0	3.3	3.0	3.8	4.2	5.0	4.2
United States	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.6	2.9	4.0
United Kingdom	3.3	3.6	2.9	2.5	2.7	3.4	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.5	3.4
Nigeria	3.8	3.8	2.9	1.5	1.3	1.8	2.0	2.5	2.6	3.3	3.0
Libya	2.6	0.6	1.7	1.5	1.9	1.9	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.1
Others	22.0	23.1	23.3	24.4	26.3	25.9	23.0	24.5	24.6	25.1	20.1

Source: Eurostat (online data codes: nrg\_ti\_sff, nrg\_ti\_oil and nrg\_ti\_gas)



*“Russia seeks ways to secure demand presented by the EU market. The EU needs Russian resources for its energy security. There is a clear interdependence”* (European Commission, 2006). For decades, the perception that the EU-Russia energy relationship is not a matter of energy security and that it is essentially a relationship of interdependence rather than dependence has prevailed within the EU. The reasoning behind this notion of supply and demand is that, despite the fact that the EU was dependent on Russia as a supplier for its energy supply, Russia is economically dependent on the EU as the main buyer of its energy resources. Many authors perceived this relationship at worst as an asymmetric interdependence but not as a dependency or an energy security matter, assuming that Russia would not use energy as a weapon against the EU (e.g. Proedrou, 2007; Casier, 2011; Stent, 2008). On the other hand, despite the fact that Russia has been a reliable supplier of energy to Europe for decades, other analysts expressed concern that this is a dependency- relationship through which Russia could use interruptions or the threat of interruption of energy supplies to advance its foreign policy goals (Baran, 2007; Collins, 2017; Smith Stegen, 2011). The ongoing war in Ukraine and the

energy crisis in the EU seem to be shattering the perception of energy interdependence that would prevent Russia from using energy as a weapon.

Energy dependence on Russian energy imports varies significantly among EU member states. Russia's political influence in gas recipient states is linked to its ability to negotiate bilaterally with individual members on gas exports. Russia, following a strategy of divide and conquer through bilateral agreements with member states, deliberately exploited this lack of cohesion to achieve favourable energy deals and increase European dependence on Russian supplies (Baran, 2007). Thus, the use of energy as a weapon by Russia is connected with the EU's fragmented foreign energy policy and the different attitudes of the member states towards it (Harsem & Harald Claes, 2013).

Energy security is broadly defined as the continuous and uninterrupted availability of energy supplies at affordable prices (Deese, 1979; Yergin, 2006; International Energy Agency). As Siddi (2018) notes, Russia's perception of energy security as an energy supplier of fossil fuel exports, is framed around securing demand. On the other hand, the EU approaches external energy policy mainly from a liberal market perspective, which is based on the attractiveness of the large European market and the establishment of legislation to stimulate competition. In recent years, and especially after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, this dominant approach in the EU began to shift to a more geopolitical perspective.

Stegen (2011) mentions four conditions in which a state could use energy supply as a weapon: a) the state must accumulate and control the country's energy resources, b) it must gain control over transit routes, c) when a state has the ability to use the energy resources in an effort to advance its own political goals by punishing or rewarding a targeted client state and d) when it has the ability to use that energy dependence for directing policy formulation or changing policies of the dependent state. In the present Ukrainian war, Russia adheres to the first three conditions, which allows her to use its energy sources as a weapon, but not the fourth. Russian energy supremacy did not determine the attitude of the EU and its member states towards Putin's decision to invade Ukraine, nor did it prevent the imposition of sanctions against Russia by the EU.


### **Energy policy and energy transition**

A common energy policy allows EU member states to have a well-connected market in order to avoid possible supply disruptions. Article 194 TFEU makes certain areas of energy policy a common competence, signalling a move towards a common energy policy. However, each member state retains its right to "*determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between*

*different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply*" (Article 194, paragraph 2). Member States are therefore primarily responsible for ensuring security of supply in their territory.

With the Green Deal (2019) and the European Climate Law (2021), the European Union has taken serious steps both towards a more common energy policy as well as addressing the challenges of climate change and reducing its energy dependence. Climate policies and energy security go hand in hand and coordinated actions to support one will strengthen the other (Wilson, 2022). For economic and environmental reasons, natural gas was considered to be the most suitable energy source to act as a bridge in this energy transition. That made the EU more dependent on natural gas imports over the years.

**Figure 3: Production of primary energy, EU, 2020 (% of total, based on terajoules)**



Renewable Energy Sources (RES) have been developing rapidly in recent years. Cost reductions and the use of advanced technologies have allowed countries to produce some of their energy efficiently and economically. EU targets for 2030 include 32% of energy consumption to come from renewable

sources (European Commission, 2019). RES technologies are an alternative solution for electricity production and the subsequent reduction of energy dependence on supplier countries. However, it is pointed out that there is a considerable distance to be covered in terms of development and commercialization of energy storage technologies regarding renewable energy production (Wilson, 2022).

The debate on energy diversification through the promotion of RES mainly concerns issues of economic development, protection of the environment but focuses less on matters of energy security. The relationship between RES development and energy security within the EU has been documented in studies such as Marques, Fuinhas & Pires Manso, (2010) and Gökgöz & Güvercin (2018). The war in Ukraine and the energy crisis brings to the fore the development of RES not only as a means of cheap and clean energy, but also as a tool of energy security, especially for the more energy-dependent states.

RES combines the elements of the energy transition towards clean forms of energy to address climate change with those of energy security. The replacement of fossil fuels by RES reduces the need of EU countries for energy dependency via imports and increases energy security of both the member states and the EU as a whole (Gökgöz & Güvercin, 2018). However, each EU country has a unique energy regime and implements different RES promotion policies, which have resulted in different RES performance. The transition to renewable energy sources is proceeding at different speeds among EU Member States, a fact that reflects their divergent national energy security interests and leads to different energy policy strategies, affecting the EU's energy relations and energy security (Mata Pérez et al., 2019).

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The ongoing energy crisis does not seem to confirm the view of interdependence in the EU-Russia energy relationship. The belief that this relationship would lead to avoiding major crises and maintaining the status quo, regardless of political and geopolitical aspirations has not been verified. The war in Ukraine and the instrumentalization of energy as a weapon by Russia creates the need to revise the energy policy of the member states and that of the EU as a whole. This new environment reshapes both geopolitical relations and balances as well as policies aiming at the EU's energy independence, policies that go alongside energy diversification and transition to clean energy, in order to address the issue of climate change. RES technologies, besides the economic and environmental advantages they have, can also be included in the framework of energy independence and energy security.

Many times crises present opportunities for policy change that under normal circumstances would not be implemented or would take much longer to implement. The policy strategy for dealing with the energy crisis, the energy autonomy of the EU and the new balances formed after Russia's invasion of Ukraine should be based on 3 axes: a) energy independence, sufficiency and green transition, b) alternative routes of energy supply and c) dealing with the ongoing energy crisis.

The first axis refers to policy proposals for faster transition to renewable energy sources. As pointed out by Yergin (2006), diversification of energy sources remains the fundamental starting principle of energy security. These policies include the need to revise the goals of energy diversification by increasing the share of RES in energy production in the years to come, create more incentives for citizens and businesses to switch to RES and funding research into RES technologies to achieve better energy efficiency.

The second axis is related to the energy sufficiency and security of the European Union in the intermediate stage of this energy transition. Proposed policies here include the search for new energy sources and routes outside Russian territory and influence, such as upgraded energy agreements with current reliable suppliers as well as the acceleration of processes for the exploitation of new gas sources in the south-eastern Mediterranean and the creation of new pipelines, such as the East-Med project. Furthermore, investing in more LNG storage stations within the EU will provide greater energy sufficiency.

The third axis, which is related to dealing with the current energy crisis, includes adopting policies to support society, citizens, vulnerable households and businesses. As in the case of the pandemic, the issue of joint bonds by the EU to finance energy costs and support societies during the energy crisis could be a useful tool for all the member states.

All the above proposals go hand in hand with the need to intensify efforts for a common energy security policy in the EU. Among the goals of this common energy policy should be the creation of well-interconnected European networks for a more integrated internal energy market, a common stance on external relations with energy producers and the reduction of fragmentation now apparent in energy dependence and energy transition between the Member States.

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## **EUROPAMOBIL: A Vehicle for the European Union to Keep Moving<sup>1</sup>**

Michaela Charisi<sup>2</sup>

### **Abstract**

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the necessity to increase the connection the European youth has with the European Union. Education policy might be a responsibility of the Member States, but the EU shall take upon more initiatives in order to bring the young Europeans closer to it. EUROPAMOBIL, is a project that can add educational value to the currently covered areas by the European school curricula, without intervening on national territories and can have a positive impact among the youth, which is an interval part for the continuation of the EU and the achievement of its goals.

**Keywords:** European schools; European education; youth; European identity.

### **Introduction**

Education lays one of the most significant foundations in every society and the European Union is no exception. As the future always depends on the young people, it is of remarkable importance that the education they receive, is able to prepare them with the necessary skills so that they can deal with the challenges of their times. Over the last years some serious steps have been made towards enhancing the European cooperation in this field with the adaptation of the European Education Area and the Bologna Process being among the major accomplishments of the EU (Asderaki, 2017). However, there is yet a wide range of actions that could be taken upon, in order to strengthen the European aspect of education within the Member States.

### **The lack of European-wise educated youth**

The European Union is a unique political formation with more than 440 million inhabitants (Eurostat, 2022a), with more than 15% of them being young people under 29 years old (Eurostat, 2022b), which is a considerably significant percentage. The European Union plays a quite important role in their everyday life, even if it is not that easy to comprehend at a young age, regarding regulations and laws on environment, economy, transportation, energy and so much more domains where the EU holds exclusive or shared competence. However, the Union has much less of an impact concerning the education of the young European citizens as Education is considered to be a supporting competence, in which Member States have the main legislative role, while EU is only there to provide support whenever it is needed (Art.165/TFEU).

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Therefore, Member States and their accountable institutions are all responsible for designing their own educational systems, taking general European guidelines in regard with aims and values into account, with one of the latest common steps being the adaptation of the European Education Area by 2025, agreed in 2018 (Council of the EU, 2018). Even with this important framework, there is no mention of any prospect of adding European-related issues on a regular basis curriculum. Students all around Europe get taught about Mathematics, History, Languages, Geography, but they miss the chance to learn more about the European Union in their school environment as there is no dedicated class in the curricula.

### **The importance of raising awareness of the European reality**

European citizens are entitled to 4 main freedoms that their lives are designated around: the free movement of goods, capital, persons and services as stated in article 26 on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This is a fundamental factor that influences many other aspects of the European way of life and also facilitates the life of the citizens on an everyday basis, if used to its full potential. Nevertheless, to fully take advantage of the benefits deriving from the EU laws, people need to be aware of them. Moreover, education policy's main target is to increase harmony and cooperation within the Union, so that other policies run smoothly as well (Cankaya et al., 2015). And this is where the EU still has a long way to go.

It all starts with having a well-educated youth, aware of its surroundings, neighbors and political reality, not only on a national level but on a European level as well. The truth is that young Europeans are given numerous opportunities, such as the ones mentioned above, by the EU, in the form of legislative protection, youth-dedicated events and platforms or traveling and educational chances that they would not have outside of the Union. However, our European youth does not always have access to the information due to lack of knowledge of the provided tools. The internet has definitely helped increase the access to the opportunities, but still, it cannot solve all the problems by itself if the users do not know what they are looking for. To be more precise, what is missing from European students is gaining knowledge regarding the way the EU operates and its numerous aspects.

European schools' curricula in their majority, do not include educational sections dedicated to European integration, leaving the pupils with a huge gap to fill on their own, except for the Institution of European Schools that are operating throughout Europe. European Schools are "official public educational establishments controlled jointly by the governments of the Member States of the European Union", providing nursery, primary and secondary level of education, especially formed for children of staff of the European Institutions (Schola Europaea, n.d.). These schools, apart from

the usual curriculum, also have classes called “European Hours”, during which pupils get in touch with European expressions of culture, history, traditions, institutions, actuality in general, just like they do for their home countries.

As it is mentioned above, education policy is a national responsibility, in which the EU only gets involved to provide support and assistance. Therefore, the institution of European Schools is a shared responsibility of the Member States, creating expectations and possible trends on a more advanced future cooperation on education policies and common curricula that involve a European angle too.

### **The Need to Act**

It is necessary to understand that the connection the European youth has to the EU, has an immediate effect on the EU as a whole (Asderaki, 2017). Young people are the future of the Union and hold a great responsibility regarding reaching the long-term goals of the Union in many policies. Over the last years, there has been a great increase budget-wise regarding youth, research & development, innovation and education, proving that the EU is ready to invest in its future (Council of the EU, 2021).

Certainly, there are plenty of university departments throughout the continent, concerning European studies, but this is not enough, as higher education is focused only on people who choose it and not open to the public as part of their core education during their mandatory years, leaving the majority of the youth population cut out, since according to the latest Eurostat (2022b) findings, only a 40% of the youth attains higher education in general.

### **How can European identity be enhanced? – Proposal**

In order to be an active member of European society, the youth need firstly to assimilate how the EU works and what it represents. Since this is not knowledge obtained by the established education systems, there is room for the EU to provide the Member States with new proposals towards this aim.

Europamobil is a project that serves exactly this goal and can be utilized by the EU as an official tool for its youth and education policies. This project was established by the Geshangen Institute in Germany in 2009 and is now funded by the Brandenburg state as well as the European Solidarity Corps. Twenty students from all around Europe have annually the chance to create a team that travels to a selected region of Germany, France or Poland for a month-long trip and visits participant - schools, intending to have workshops and discussions around the EU (Stiftung Geshangen, n.d.). This team brings the pupils many steps closer to the Union as they get the chance not only to meet students

from other Member States, but also to have fruitful dialogues and to access information about the opportunities that they, as Europeans, are freely given.

It is suggested that Europamobil should broaden its scope of action and become adopted by the European Youth Capital initiative by being a part of the events and activities organized to support it. Thus, each year pupils from a different region of Europe will have the opportunity to benefit from an interactive way of teaching about their second home, the European Union, instead of the project to solely involve these 3 countries.

### **Legal Basis & Funding**

As the Union strongly declares with the adoption of the EU Youth Strategy as the leading framework for EU youth policy cooperation for 2019-2027 based on the Council Resolution of 26 November 2018, youth participation in democratic life needs to be fostered, social and civic engagement need to be supported and uninterrupted access to the necessary resources to take part in society need to be guaranteed (Council of the EU, 2018).

The aforementioned proposal lies within the responsibilities given to the EU for supporting purposes of the education policy (Art.165/TFEU) along with the youth policy (Art.166/TFEU), as it does not enforce a whole new curriculum to be followed by everyone, it simply assists the Union to achieve its goals towards increasing youth engagement.

As far as the funding of this project is concerned, given that it has been smoothly running for the last 14 years, it has already been worked out and the European Solidarity Corps have already included it in their budget-allocation, meaning that the shift in the Europamobil's working area does not face unprecedented financial obstacles. In addition, there is already established expertise on the functioning of the program, which is a great asset.

Regarding the selection process of the schools participating, the voluntary application of the interested schools at the European Youth Capital area is proposed, for the sake of gatekeeping the freedom of choice and participation.

### **Conclusions**

Bearing in mind that this is solely a simple suggestion for boosting the presence of the European Union at schools, there is yet much space left for enhancing the European youth engagement. Education policy remains a national competence in which the EU only assists, but this does not erase the fact that some mutual steps from the Member States could prove to be strongly beneficial.

Undoubtedly, over the past decade some major initiatives have been adopted, such as the European Education Area (EEA) that is still to be fully established. Even though the actions suggested initially, both regarding the general framework of the EEA and the proposal presented in this document, might seem slightly hesitant, they are in fact imperative for the sake of a smooth transition to an augmented cooperation in education in the following years.

The suggestion made on this paper, steps on concrete achievements of the youth and education policies, such as the approved curriculum of the European Schools Institution while it also attempts to generate fruitful discussions concerning a more organized form of teaching about the European Union in primary and secondary education, apart from higher education.

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# The Influence and Implications of the Ukrainian Crisis on European Regional Security<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

In this analysis, the theoretical framework is examined based on primary and secondary sources of research concerning the foundation of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Subsequently, the existing security environment is extensively analysed, at the international and regional level, while a critical overview of the political-military framework of security at the European level is also examined. Furthermore, an overview of the relations between Russia and Ukraine is attempted in two dimensions, regarding to the geopolitical role of Greece and its role in the European interaction, and the analysis of influence and the effects of the Ukrainian crisis in the field of Energy Policy of the European Union (EU) within its effect on the European defence policy. In this context, the key role of Greece and Cyprus and both mediation for energy sufficiency and Europe's autonomy is thoroughly examined, as a consequence of the geopolitical and geographical factor that may affect the existing dependencies on Russian natural gas based on of the East Med area, hence the potential influence of forming a new field of interdependence at the energy level.

**Keywords:** Russian invasion; Ukrainian crisis; European Union; Exclusive Economic Zone; Common Foreign Policy; European Defence Policy.

## Mapping the introductory and theoretical framework based on the historical structure of Russia-Ukraine relations - the sociological approach

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the relations between Russia and Ukraine have been one of the classic cases of “opposing dyads” and national conflicts, with a long history of confrontation and hostility, as it happens and is theoretically reflected in other cases with a strong national and symbolic shared past. The above relationship is structured and dates much earlier, from the establishment of the Soviet Union, with the culmination of this hostility during the great famine of Ukraine which took place from 1932 to 1933 and was recorded as the greatest national disaster in the history of the Ukrainian nation; leading to the death of almost 12 million people, thus the 1/3 of the total population, while the United Nations in 2003, with a statement signed by 25 states, has estimated the loss of people from 7 up to 10 million. It is important to be mentioned here, that in the consciousness of the Ukrainian people it has been recorded as a “genocide”, while it was officially recorded likewise on

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November 28, 2006 by the Ukrainian Parliament. Also, of course the famine in Ukraine was the consequence of the economic policy followed by the Soviet Union under the Stalinist leadership, in particular the collectivization program which was implemented. Thus, the vast majority of Ukrainians believed that it was an organized extermination plan (Plokhy, 2008). This stance led, during the Second World War, the Ukrainian people to welcome the Germans as liberators. In addition, the conscientious charge of the Ukrainian people strengthened the hostility towards Russia (Rywkin, 2014). Moreover, for devotees of Russian national security policy, Ukraine appears to pose a significant threat, not because of its offensive military capabilities, but because of its intention to join the European Union (EU) and especially NATO. Russia considered the above statements hostile, on the basis of which an “unacceptable” threat to Russian national security is systematically structured, a fact that led to aggressive operations against Ukraine in the past, such as the annexation of Crimea, as well as the intervention in the Donbas war (Kuzio, 2018).

### **Causes and origins of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the field of International Relations**

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked a remarkable debate about its causes (Kathimerini, 2022a). Characteristically, John Mearsheimer clarifies part of the international and geopolitical issues that respond to the ongoing crisis (Mikelis & Troulis, 2015). Nevertheless, in the fall of 2014 and while Moscow had already invaded Ukraine, seizing Crimea and part of Donbas (Kathimerini, 2022b), Mearsheimer published his analysis in *Foreign Affairs* assigning responsibility for the crisis to the West and NATO's enlargement strategy (Wolf, 2022). In addition, he underlined that the enlargement of the EU, as well as the “western” support of the democratic movements in Ukraine, were decisive factors for the Russian military intervention. According to Mearsheimer, the liberal delusions of the West caused Putin's reaction and made it a major issue of international political interest. However, it is appropriate to examine whether the above approach that interprets the Russian attitude, in terms of “political realism”, is also founded historically as an assumption based on which “[...] Moscow in the first post-Cold War decade all it wanted was an agreement with NATO and did not wish to regroup and expand its spheres of influence”. Considering that, it seems that is not in harmony with the basic theoretical starting point of “aggressive realism”; according to this approach, great powers in order to survive evolve into aggressive and violent power maximisers and are not willing to cooperate sufficiently when cooperation increases the power of their competitors (Syrigos, 2016). Based on this contradiction, from the first post-Cold War period and onwards, it is sufficing that Moscow exerted hegemonic pressure on its near abroad. Thus, the majority of the post-Soviet states rushed to the West, so that through synergies with it, any potential relationship with Moscow could be severed in time in order to secure the independence of the states. As a result, in March 1992

Russia mutilated Moldova and formed Transnistria as a de facto state. Further, when Russian forces invaded Abkhazia, about the same period, any discussion of NATO enlargement was absent. It should be mentioned that with the historical weight of the Cold War confrontation and the ideological, but most importantly, the strategic defeat of the USSR, the current leadership in Moscow embraces the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance in terms of threat and encirclement, since the strategic culture of the Russians has been cultivated according to the belief that due to its vast natural borders it is vulnerable to invasions from the East and West. However, it seems that this discussion is pretentiously constructed either as an alibi or as a possible reliable outcome. Moreover, the above analysis is based on a series of reasons and facts: a) the fact that during the Yalta era it was morally reprehensible, but politically unproven to allow the victorious Soviet Union to establish spheres of influence. In 1990, regarding the power relations and geopolitical reality, it was expected for the countries of Eastern Europe to choose to join the winners of the Cold War (Kathimerini, 2022b), b) the prospect of Ukraine's NATO membership will dissipate after 2008, despite Kiev's efforts to revive it, c) the fact that Russia had already invaded and crippled Ukraine since 2014, while maintaining military control over the areas it either annexed, such as Crimea, or "autonomized", such as the case of Donbass, in which the Ukrainian authorities did not exercise any control and the responsibility for non-compliance with the Minsk agreements falls equally on both parties. Further, Russia has faced no real threat because, since the 1990s, the West has supported Russia both financially, with tens of billions of dollars in foreign direct investment programs, and strategically. In this regard, Russia's accession to the WTO, the OECD, the Council of Europe, the G8, the NATO-Russia cooperation and security agreement in 1997, the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 with the signature of Putin established the essential framework of cooperation and consultation. Nevertheless, it seems that the absence of a coordinated plan to block Russia, and potentially the ultimate goal of confrontation, has made Europe dependant on its energy security from Moscow, at least since 2005, when the first energy crisis broke out between Moscow and Kiev. Another important factor is the fact that the military interventions in Iraq 2003 and Libya 2011, as well as the independence of Kosovo in 2008 combined with the "coloured revolutions" that tried to establish pro-American regimes in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004, cultivated Putin's belief that the West is taking advantage of Moscow's weaknesses. Nevertheless, the above factors led to the lack of trust about the good intentions of the western countries and make Putin believe that there is a plan to divide and decrease the influence of the Russian federation in total. However, the set of Western countries' reactions could

be described as balancing and following a peace-mediating role, whereas Russia remains the strongest - given the fact of its potentiality - nuclear power<sup>4</sup>.

## Consequences to International Politics

The invasion of 24th of February is generally considered an expansionist war with a strategic background based on which crimes against civilian populations are being committed, while seeking to annex part of Ukraine's territories at the expense of its integrity as a whole. The Russian invasion is entirely responsible for the brutal violation of the fundamental principles of International Law and nullifies rules and values that the international institutional system has tried to preserve in order to maintain and defend global peace. After the Russian invasion, the Western countries appear more concerned, united and determined to improve their security conditions, adopting a new doctrine of deterrence and containment of Moscow, while the timing suggests that the balance of power is overwhelmingly against it, a fact that contradicts the Cold War era, when the USSR enjoyed a relative balance. According to "political realism", the Putin's policy and not the West, emerges as an irrational factor. As Lawrence Freedman pointed out, "Russia cannot win this war no matter how much force it uses" (Freedman, [2009] 2022, von Hauff, 2019). Moreover, in Russia analysts did not believe that Putin's choice would be to start a war given the fact that he already controlled Crimea and some Donbass' territories. However, it was not any kind of essential reason for this risk and uncertainty of war, and although realists believe that war cannot come to an end from the international political arena, they are also claiming that states are incapable of "common understanding". Furthermore, the Russian leadership attempted to transform a trans-regional superpower into a global one, but failed miserably (Freedman, 2022). Consequently, in international politics "the law has value only between equals (in force)" according to Thucydides' thinking. Moreover, the agreements of Budapest's crucial memorandum in 1994, signed by Russia, Ukraine, Great Britain and the USA, according to which Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons to Russia, for the sake of nuclear security, and in return the signatory powers promised that none of them would use force or threats against Ukraine, is a remarkable example that all parties would respect its sovereign rights and existing borders. However, the agreement also stipulated that due such an aggression, the signatories would immediately seek the involvement of the United Nation Security Council in order to support Ukraine. Russia has not respected the agreement, instead it has invaded and is threatening Ukraine with nuclear weapons. Considering the facts, a question arises, whether Ukraine had not handed over its nuclear weapons or

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<sup>4</sup> For the reference, it has more than 6,000 nuclear warheads, advanced ballistic technology, also the possibility of second and third strikes, while its nuclear triad is quite modern. The US, on the other hand, offered many times an agreement that would exclude the Baltic States from installing ballistic missiles.

even a part of them, would Russia have invaded? Such a question to be answered properly needs further research and clarification of the facts, especially in critical periods of limited financial resources, thus an obstacle for successful foreign policy, while it seems that cooperation with neighbouring states and the conclusion of alliances at a tactical and strategic level can be an extremely useful element for promoting national interests effectively (Syrigos & Dokos, 2018).

## **Reviewing the role of the European neighbourhood policy**

The Russian-Ukrainian war highlighted the ongoing prospect of a common European defence policy as a condition for dealing with similar phenomena with geopolitical and financial elements. In this regard, on March 21, 2022, the need of the creation of a European urgent intervention force was agreed upon, hence it was approved by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the EU Member States in the framework of the “Strategic Compass” (Consilium Europa, 2022); such initiative arises as a consequence of the recent developments Europe has to deal with and could be seen as a reinforcement regarding the Greek case, thus due to the special reference to the Eastern Mediterranean and the challenges from unilateral external actions towards the EU Member States. Specifically, extended reference has been contacted regarding the violations of the sovereign rights of Greece and Cyprus and these reports were aiming to highlight the importance of maintaining a stable and secure environment based on the interests of EU Member States and third countries.

### ***i) EU Defence and Security Policy***

The Ukrainian crisis brought back to the fore the eventual realisation of the plan-prospect which has been presented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joseph Borrell Fontelles, in last November. Instead of its opposite reactions, he characteristically mentioned that “Russia's war of aggression constitutes a tectonic change in European history” and “[...] everyone is convinced that Europe is in danger from a neighbour who is determined to wage war” (Kathimerini, 2022c), emphasizing that recent developments and the reinstatement of the EU's defence policy are “a strong message of EU unity”. The “Strategic Compass” includes clear timetables for strengthening the EU's defence capabilities and in order to deal with its “defence gaps”, while average defence spending in the EU should rise significantly from the current 1.5% of GDP. In addition, the unity of the EU is emphasized in the amendment of the “Strategic Compass” project that highlighted the need for immediate and effective action in potential crisis periods. The main objective of this initiative is to strengthen security and defence policies by 2030 due to necessity of the EU to acquire the dynamics of its “self-protection”, on the basis of which it will secure its interests and protect its citizens, while the need to strengthen systematic cooperation with partners, as in the case

of NATO, is also highly underlined. Furthermore, emphasis is placed on the Western Balkans, while on the Eastern Mediterranean, threatening actions are registered as threats and challenges facing the EU. In particular, Joseph Borrell Fontelles states that Ankara must commit to follow the path of cooperation, a consistent de-escalation with regard to the Declaration in March 2021. Nevertheless, within this Declaration, the EU directly requested Turkey to refrain from provocations, unilateral actions, and illegal drilling in violation of International Law; the Declaration reminded that the EU has at its disposal the tools and means to defend the interests of the Member States and shield stability. It should be mentioned here, that according to diplomatic sources of the Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece has long emphasized the need to exempt part of defence spending in order to achieve the agreement effectively. Furthermore, other Member States made a unilateral statement likewise the same achievement. Additionally, it is noted that with the adoption of the “Strategic Compass” project, efforts are being made for European autonomy to be gained within the support of Greece. As far as it concerns the immigration policy, the EU strongly supports Greece regarding the exploitation of refugees and immigrants during the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war and EU has welcomed Ukrainian refugees, allowing them to enter its 27-Member States with visa-free, live and work freely for up to three years. Nevertheless, there is still an unpleasant reality, the Ukrainian refugees who could destabilize the coherence of EU policies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Hosting Ukrainian refugees could cost Member States more than \$30 billion, according to an analysis by the non-profit think tank “Centre for Global Development” (Centre for Global Development, 2022); given the fact that such case could create forthcoming challenges for the European economy which is already under pressure due to high inflation (Viadiplomacy, 2022), among the stability and the formation of the common defence policy due to war invasions, the EU immigration policy gaps (Tzagkarakis, Papadakis & Kritas, 2021) shall be diminished.

***ii) Defence of the EU and the institutional contribution of the European Parliament to strengthen European cooperation***

The contribution of the European Parliament to the EU countries in order to increase their national defence spending to 2% of their GDP, emerges as a catalyst, although it is found that these investments are not enough. The EU loses around €26.4 billion per year to overlapping defence spending (European Parliament, 2022). Nevertheless, the European Parliament is systematically enhancing the Member States to jointly purchase defence resources (European Parliament, 2016), while in the 2016 resolution adopted concerning the European Defence Union, MEPs identify the appropriate ways in which Member States could pool their capabilities, thus to create a common crisis and management plan which will allow the EU to react more quickly and effectively to potential

threats to its security and defence area. Additionally, EU investment in defence research. Although this could be captured as a sample that could be resolved since the European Parliament considers collaborative research projects as an adequate solution, the EU budget cannot replace Member States' internal national defence, but it shall be used to support EU Members that are in cooperation. In order to maximize the production and effectiveness of defence spending, the European Commission presented the European Defence Action Plan and the European Defence Fund in November 2016. The European Parliament accepted such initiatives as a feature of supporting the financing of the capabilities which have been jointly agreed by the Member States. Furthermore, the symbolic value aimed at the enhanced cooperation and security of the EU in all its political and operational structures is sought, thus the cooperation in the foreground of the jointly accepted values and legal principles of European cooperation, should be considered as parameter of high importance for the coherency of the institutional and legal framework. Nevertheless, the role of the European Parliament was decisive and, evaluating the current legal possibilities offered by the Treaty of Lisbon, it ended up in a statement on the common Security and Defence Policy, without ignoring the fact that what has not been achieved at the European level of cooperation is the its political development which presupposes "political will" (European Parliament, 2017). From this perspective, the geopolitical changes in the neighbouring countries of the EU, combined with the energy insecurity resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, point to the necessity for a common policy to deal with the ongoing crisis and, ultimately, every potential crisis. On this basis, the Treaty on EU but also NATO provide intensively the common defence clause. Although both support the "strategic autonomy" at the EU level, according to the European Parliament, a possible European defence union would be a trigger and reinforcing dynamic for the partnership between the EU and NATO.

## Conclusion

The Russian attack on Ukraine laid the foundations for "more Europe", though the origins of this war invasion respond to historical and national features that the international community argues as a peculiar geopolitical condition, thus particular expansionist politics and sovereignty issues. Additionally, the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war have a strictly reflection on the economic and social stability and coherence of the European Member States and international politics raise issues of revision of the existing security and defence policies with particular implications for the systematization of the Energy Policy and Europe's autonomy. Although the mechanisms of coexistence seem to be leading to anchorages for reasons of geopolitical power and economic autonomy, the aim for systematic promotion of EU Defence plan within the restoration of European cohesion based on International Treaties, is apparent. The case examined in this analysis should be

open to further research as it responds to a complex field with multiple crises dealing with the economic and social dimensions at global level. In this analysis, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis as a case study was depicted in a comparative way, in terms of the consequences of the war at the national and European level and as an ongoing policy-task of strengthening European cooperation, following the balancing of Greece's external relations regarding its geopolitical and energy role as well as its perspective as an allied actor of the security and defence policy of the European territory.

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**Topic 7**  
**Health Politics and Policies**

## How Heart Rate Variability Biofeedback Can Improve Police Performance: Public Policy Based on Evidence<sup>1</sup>

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### Abstract<sup>5</sup>

We tested the impact of heart rate variability biofeedback (HRV-BF) on police performance in order to reduce protocol gaps and response time in scenarios that simulate life-threatening situations. The sample gathered fifty-one frontline police officers from the city of Barueri in Brazil who were distributed into two groups: (i) the experimental group (26 officers) which attended a 5-days protocol of HRV-BF training; and (ii) the control group (25 officers) which did not train. The performance of both groups was assessed before and after the HRV-BF training, and the results were compared. The findings show that HRV-BF positively impacted the experimental group's performance by decreasing procedural gaps and timing. In contrast, the performance of the control group remained stable. Based on this evidence, the Secretariat of Urban Security and Social Defense of Barueri decided to make HRV-BF into public policy.

**Keywords:** Police Performance; HRV Biofeedback; Protocols; Time Response; Lethal Force; Public Policy; Brazil.

### Introduction

Shooting or not shooting: it is not a simple decision. Invariably, it must be made in a life-threatening situation, which requires the police officer to be fast and follow procedures to reduce his/her exposure to risk and avoid the misuse of lethal force. In order to improve the performance of its personnel, police organizations have traditionally standardized operating procedures (SOP) and invested in training. However, even well-trained police officers can decrease performance under pressure (Arble et al., 2019; Pinc, 2011; 2007; Nieuwenhuys et al., 2009), and such errors may be costly for society and the government.

The key point of the problem is the spontaneous physiological response to threat, which provokes changes in the body, such as an increase in heart rate that moves blood to the members, and prepares

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<sup>5</sup> The pilot study was supported by the Use of Force Lab and the Secretary of Urban Security and Social Defense of City of Barueri. Use of Force Lab is a research and development center that investigates police performance and develops interdisciplinary strategies to improve the performance of frontline police officers.

it to “fight or flight” (LeDeoux & Damasio, 2014). In other words, the organism triggers the state of defense whose condition does not favor coherent decision-making.

As part of a set of public security policy reforms, the Secretariat of Urban Security and Social Defense of Barueri decided to do a pilot study to test heart rate variability biofeedback (HRV-BF). This study would be done in addition to procedural and technical training to manage the effects of the autonomic body response and improve police performance. Evidence has shown that HRV-BF can promote (i) a direct effect on the nervous system restoring the inner balance or promoting cardiac coherence<sup>6</sup> (McCraty, 2015); and (ii) an indirect effect on the performance decreasing errors in the use of lethal force (Andersen et al., 2018).

### **Pilot Study Design**

In some Brazilian police organizations, such as the Civil Guard of Barueri, a calendar of five days of training a year is usual. According to police managers, a training period longer than that would impact the budget and policing, because it takes place during service hours reducing the personnel in policing. Taking this into account, we introduced an HRV biofeedback protocol in the regular training schedule (Table 1).

**TABLE 1 – Regular Training with HRV Biofeedback Protocol**

Schedule	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Morning	Performance evaluation	HRV-BF P&T	HRV-BF P&T	HRV-BF P&T	Performance evaluation
Afternoon	HRV-BF theory and practice	HRV-BF P&T	HRV-BF P&T	HRV-BF P&T	

P&T, Procedural and Technical Training.

HRV-BF, Heart Rate Variability – Biofeedback.

The pilot study design arranged the regular training schedule to evaluate performance pre and post-intervention, which means, before and after the HRV biofeedback protocol. The study gathered a sample of 51 police officers who were distributed into two groups: (i) the experimental group (26 participants), which received the intervention; and (ii) the control group (25 participants), which did not practice HRV-BF.

<sup>6</sup> Cardiac coherence is a term used to describe the measurement of the order, stability, and harmony in the oscillatory outputs of the body's regulatory systems (Tiller et al., 1996).

The purpose was to compare the performance of the two groups, before and after the intervention, to find out if there was any improvement in the experimental group and if this improvement was greater than that of the control group. In that regard, the activities of the control group training were organized in the same order as the experimental group's training but without the HRV-BF protocol (Table 2).

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TABLE 2 – Regular Training *without* HRV Biofeedback Protocol

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Schedule	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Morning	Performance evaluation	P&T	P&T	P&T	Performance evaluation
Afternoon	P&T	P&T	P&T	P&T	
	P&T, Procedural and Technical Training.				

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The training schedule of the control group took place in the week of August 29 to September 02, 2022 (Table 2), and that of the experimental group, from September 12 to 16, 2022 (Table 1). There was only one week between the training scales of the two groups.

Sample selection was non-random in the reason of the policing shifts. However, the professional characteristics of both groups were very similar: they carried out the same policing activity, in the same area and reported to the same commander. Any existing individual differences remained stable during the pilot study; therefore, we assume that they did not interfere with the results.

## Performance Evaluation

Performance was evaluated in a scenario where participants had to fire ten shots and there were four targets they should shoot and two they should not. Considering that in a life-threatening situation, police officers must follow security rules and make their decision in a short time, the evaluation was based on two criteria: (i) golden rules, which are safe procedures; and (ii) timing. A set of ten golden rules were defined, and the score was either 0 (followed) or 1 (not followed), and there were also penalties that added 10 scores each. A timing scale was established and the shorter the time, the lower the score. In the end, the scores achieved in each criterion were added. Therefore, lower scores are equivalent to better performance.

The analysis presented in this paper did not consider the accuracy of the shots because the purpose was to evaluate what preceded them. However, this measurement will be introduced in future studies.

### **HRV Biofeedback Protocol**

HRV-BF is a non-invasive technique that consists of providing an individual with real-time feedback on instantaneous heart rate and respiration changes while being instructed to breathe at low frequencies (Lehrer & Gevirtz, 2014). The HRV-BF training employs an electronic device with a sensor to monitor the heart rate and a pacer to guide the breath frequency.

The best-known HRV-BF protocols indicate five to ten weeks of training, and they have been used for treating health conditions involving asthma, pain, anxiety, depression, and other psychophysiological disorders (Lehrer et al., 2013; 2000). Studies to improve police performance demonstrated a four-day HRV-BF protocol was successful (Andersen et al., 2018); and one day was insufficient (Di Nota et al., 2021).

Lehrer's protocols seek to improve health, and the protocols of Andersen and Di Nota focus on performance. Both cases show that training schedules can vary; however, HRV-BF protocol for improving performance tends to be shorter because the purpose is to teach police officers how to self-regulate when in the face of critical situations.

The HRV-BF protocol designed for the pilot study was inspired by Andersen's research (2018). It was introduced to the experimental group in the afternoon of day 1 (Monday) through theoretical class followed by practice. Understanding how the body works when facing a threat and how HRV-BF promotes self-regulation was essential knowledge to begin the intervention. From day 2 (Tuesday) to day 4 (Thursday), participants practiced 40 minutes of HRV-BF twice a day before activities of procedural and technical training (Table 1).

The HRV-BF training used the cardioEmotion®, which is made in Brazil. This device is connected to a computer through a USB stick, and its sensor is plugged into the earlobe or finger. The participant chooses one of nine options and starts the biofeedback training, breathing in and out, following the pacer that is displayed on the computer screen. The objective of the training is to keep the pacer in green color as long as possible because it is an indicator of cardiac coherence.

Unlike other protocols that use one biofeedback device per person, this study employed a single device, and the HRV-BF training was made in groups. One participant plugged in the sensor, and the images of the computer were projected onto a big screen to allow all other participants to adjust their breathing to the pacer rate. In each forty-minute session, an average of five participants took turns

training with the device, so that by the end of day 4, everyone had completed both individual and group training.

We used this method for two main reasons: (i) cost, there were not enough resources to buy a device for each participant; and (ii) group coherence, participants work together – four police officers in a patrol car. HRV-BF can promote group coherence, and in a coherent team, there is freedom for the individual members to do their part and thrive while maintaining cohesion and resonance within the group's intent and goals (McCraty, 2015). Police officers responded positively to the intervention, and the training method increased group interaction. The group's interest in biofeedback training exceeded expectations.

## Outcomes

Following protocols and acting in a short time are requirements to reduce errors in the use of lethal force. Therefore, the methodology intended to create a measure to reveal the performance gaps regarding protocols and response time. According to this methodology, the best score would be 0 (zero). However, Table 3 shows that the lowest score was 19,9 from a participant in the experimental group in the post-intervention. The findings suggest that it is possible to reduce the gaps but not eliminate them. In other words, there is no perfect police performance in a life-threatening situation.

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
**TABLE 3.** Performance Measurement

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Group	Pre-intervention		Post-intervention	
	Score Range	Mean Score	Score Range	Mean Score
Control	28,0–80,4	52,5	28,0–80,4	52,5
Experimental	22,1–100,7	52,5	19,9–68,6	41,4

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However, we want to know the impact of HRV biofeedback on police performance in scenarios that simulate a life-threatening situation. To this end, we selected the mean score to compare before and after biofeedback training results within and between groups.



**Figure 1.** Mean performance of the groups before and after HRV-BF training. The control group's performance remained stable, and there was an improvement in the performance of the experimental group after the intervention.

The findings represented in Figure 1 show the performance of both groups is similar in pre-intervention<sup>7</sup>. The score of the control group did not vary from pre- to post-intervention, the experimental group improved its performance by diminishing the score, which means, reducing the gaps in protocol and time of response. After HRV-BF training, the performance of the experimental group improved by 21.2% (11.1) compared to the control group. The findings show HRF-BF provided a positive impact on police performance.

## Towards Public Policy

Based on the evidence from the pilot study, the Secretariat of Urban Security and Social Defense of Barueri decided to implement HRV-BF training as public policy. The next steps are to arrange a schedule to train the police officers who integrated the control group, and to introduce the 5-day HRV-BF protocol into regular training in the year 2023.

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## The Mental Health Policies in Western Countries<sup>1</sup>

Stamatina Douki<sup>2</sup> & Martha Kelesi-Stavropoulou<sup>3</sup>

### Abstract

Although mental health is difficult to be defined interculturally, nevertheless, it is related not just to the absence of a disease but to the ability of the individual to be functional and satisfied. Mental diseases are usually chronic and they bring about a significant degree of disability while they require high treatment costs. The aim of this study is to investigate and present mental health management policies in western countries. The methodology followed includes literature review of relevant publications collected through Google Scholar, Pubmed online databases, as well as through articles, journals and doctoral theses. From the thorough analysis of the international and Greek literature it appears that there is a revision of the way of care/management of the mental care, the development of a Network of Mental Health Services in the Community, the creation of a Network to defend the rights of the mentally ill, a definitive abolition of large psychiatric hospitals in several countries in the west, as well as a reconstruction of buildings and significant reduction of beds in large psychiatric hospitals. The study of the international literature makes it clear that mental health reform efforts are necessary internationally and in Greece but need to be redefined in times of socioeconomic upheaval.

**Keywords:** mental care policy; health policy; mental care reform.

## Οι Πολιτικές για τη Ψυχική Υγεία στις Χώρες της Δύσης

Σταματίνα Δούκη<sup>4</sup> & Μάρθα Κελέση-Σταυροπούλου<sup>5</sup>

### Περίληψη

Η ψυχική υγεία παρόλο που είναι δύσκολο να οριστεί διαπολιτισμικά, εντούτοις αποτελεί κοινό τόπο ότι δεν αφορά απλώς την απουσία νόσου, αλλά τη δυνατότητα να είναι κανείς λειτουργικός και να λαμβάνει ικανοποίηση από αυτό. Τα ψυχικά νοσήματα συνήθως είναι χρόνια, επιφέρουν σημαντικού βαθμού ανικανότητα και απαιτούν υψηλό κόστος θεραπείας. Η παρούσα ερευνητική μελέτη στοχεύει στη διερεύνηση και παρουσίαση των πολιτικών διαχείρισης της ψυχικής υγείας στις χώρες της Δύσης. Η μεθοδολογία που ακολουθήθηκε περιλαμβάνει την αναζήτηση και τη σύνθεση της σχετικής βιβλιογραφίας και των δεδομένων, τα οποία συλλέγονται μέσα από τις ηλεκτρονικές βάσεις δεδομένων Google Scholar, Pubmed, μέσα από άρθρα, περιοδικά και διδακτορικές διατριβές. Από την ενδελεχή μελέτη της διεθνούς και ελληνικής βιβλιογραφίας, φαίνεται ότι προκύπτει αναθεώρηση του τρόπου περιθαλψης και διαχείρισης των ψυχικά ασθενών, ανάπτυξη Δικτύου Υπηρεσιών Ψυχικής Υγείας στην Κοινότητα, δημιουργία Δικτύου για την προάσπιση των δικαιωμάτων των ψυχικά ασθενών, οριστική κατάργηση των μεγάλων ψυχιατρείων

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σε αρκετές χώρες στη Δύση, ανακατασκευή κτιριακών εγκαταστάσεων και σημαντική μείωση κλινών στα μεγάλα ψυχιατρεία, στις χώρες που παρέμειναν, όπως η χώρα μας. Η μελέτη της διεθνούς βιβλιογραφίας, καθιστά ξεκάθαρο ότι οι μεταρρυθμιστικές προσπάθειες για τη ψυχική υγεία, διεθνώς και στη χώρα μας, είναι αναγκαίες αλλά χρήζουν επαναπροσδιορισμού σε περιόδους κοινωνικοοικονομικών ανακατατάξεων.

**Keywords:** ψυχική υγεία, πολιτικές υγείας, ψυχιατρική μεταρρύθμιση.

## Εισαγωγή

Κατά τις προηγούμενες δεκαετίες, η υιοθέτηση από τον Παγκόσμιο Οργανισμό Υγείας (ΠΟΥ) του στρατηγικού στόχου «Υγεία για όλους μέχρι το 2000», η αναγκαιότητα ανάπτυξης της Πρωτοβάθμιας Φροντίδας Υγείας (Π.Φ.Υ) με τη Διακήρυξη της Alma-Ata και ο «Χάρτης της Οτάβα», συνέβαλλαν στην τροποποίηση του βιοϊατρικού μοντέλου και εισήγαγαν τη σημαντικότητα της επίδρασης των περιβαλλοντικών και κοινωνικών παραγόντων, στο σχεδιασμό της υγειονομικής φροντίδας. Μεταγενέστερα, ο επαναπροσδιορισμός του στρατηγικού σχεδιασμού του ΠΟΥ για τον 21ο αιώνα, με τη συνθήκη του Άμστερνταμ, άρθρο 153, επικεντρώθηκε στην έννοια της προαγωγής υγείας, συμπεριλαμβάνοντας και την προαγωγή ψυχικής υγείας, στο πλαίσιο μίας ολιστικής προσέγγισης (Zisi & Stylianidis, 2004).

Αναμφίβολα, τις τελευταίες δεκαετίες, σε παγκόσμιο κοινωνικοοικονομικό επίπεδο, πραγματοποιήθηκαν ριζοσπαστικές ενέργειες με σκοπό τη μετάβαση από το ιδρυματικό μοντέλο περίθαλψης των ψυχικά ασθενών στο ανοιχτό κοινοτικό μοντέλο φροντίδας. Έτσι, πολλές αναπτυγμένες χώρες της Δύσης προέβησαν στο κλείσιμο των μεγάλων ψυχιατρικών νοσοκομείων/ασύλων (Skapinakis & Mavreas, 2001).

## Ψυχική υγεία και ψυχικά νοσήματα

Η ψυχική υγεία παρόλο που είναι δύσκολο να οριστεί διαπολιτισμικά, εντούτοις αποτελεί κοινό τόπο ότι δεν αφορά απλώς την απουσία νόσου, αλλά τη δυνατότητα να είναι κανείς λειτουργικός, αυτόνομος, να εξελίσσεται πνευματικά και συναισθηματικά και να λαμβάνει ικανοποίηση. Τα ψυχικά νοσήματα συνήθως είναι χρόνια, επιφέρουν σημαντικού βαθμού ανικανότητα, απαιτούν υψηλό κόστος θεραπείας και επιβαρύνουν σημαντικά τη Δημόσια Υγεία. Σύμφωνα με το “Global Burden Disease” η βαρύτητά τους είναι ισοδύναμη με τις καρδιοπάθειες, ενώ είναι σημαντικότερα από το σακχαρώδη διαβήτη και τις αναπνευστικές παθήσεις, αναφορικά με το βαθμό αναπηρίας (Murray & Lopez, 1997). Ως εκ τούτου, προέκυψε επιτακτικά η ανάγκη εφαρμογής μεταρρυθμιστικών πολιτικών διαχείρισης των ψυχικών νοσημάτων στις χώρες της Δύσης.

## Ψυχιατρική Μεταρρύθμιση

Η μετάβαση από την ασυλικού τύπου ψυχιατρική φροντίδα (που περιλάμβανε: κλειστά ψυχιατρεία αποκομένα από την κοινωνία και συγνά και από την ίδια τη ζωή), στην Κοινωνική-Κοινοτική Ψυχιατρική και στην Ψυχοκοινωνική Αποκατάσταση με την ανάπτυξη Δικτύου Υπηρεσιών Ψυχικής Υγείας στην Κοινότητα, για την ολιστική αντιμετώπιση των ψυχικά ασθενών, ορίζεται ως «Ψυχιατρική Μεταρρύθμιση» (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social Solidarity, 2011).

Ο όρος «Αποασυλοποίηση», αναφέρεται στο σημαντικότερο στάδιο της Ψυχιατρικής Μεταρρύθμισης και βασίζεται σε 3 σημαντικούς άξονες: α) στην εμφάνιση του κινήματος προάσπισης των δικαιωμάτων των ψυχικά ασθενών β) στην ανακάλυψη του νευροληπτικού φαρμάκου χλωροπρομαζίνη και γ) στην αύξηση του κόστους για την παροχή στέγασης, διατροφής και φροντίδας των χρόνιων ψυχικά ασθενών (Novella, 2008). Ο Brown επισημαίνει ότι η «Αποασυλοποίηση» είναι ένα κίνημα διαμαρτυρίας με πολεμική δυναμική και οφείλει να στοχεύει στην πρόληψη των ακατάλληλων εισαγωγών στα ψυχιατρικά νοσοκομεία (Bennett & Isobel, 1982). Ο Bachrach προσθέτει δύο βασικές αρχές που πρέπει να διέπουν την «Αποασυλοποίηση»: α) την αποχή από τη χρήση παραδοσιακών ιδρυμάτων για τη φροντίδα των ψυχικά ασθενών και β) την ταυτόχρονη επέκταση της ψυχιατρικής φροντίδας στην κοινότητα (Bachrach, 1986).

Τα τελευταία χρόνια όταν αναφερόμαστε στη Ψυχιατρική Μεταρρύθμιση, εννοούμε το σύνολο των παρεμβάσεων που πραγματοποιούνται για την αντιμετώπιση των ψυχικών νοσημάτων, διατηρώντας το άτομο την αυτονομία του, την κοινωνική του ένταξη και τη δραστηριοποίησή του εντός και εκτός του οικογενειακού περιβάλλοντος (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social Solidarity, 2011).

## Η Ψυχιατρική Μεταρρύθμιση στις χώρες της Δύσης

Τον 19ο αιώνα η ψυχιατρική περιθαλψη συνδέεται στενά με τη δημιουργία μεγάλων ψυχιατρείων/ασύλων, κυρίως έξω από τις Βιομηχανικές πόλεις, επηρεασμένη από το κίνημα κοινωνικής πρόνοιας που απαιτεί από τα κράτη να παρέχουν «φροντίδα» στα ψυχικά ασθενή άτομα μιας κοινωνίας. Παράλληλα με το κίνημα κοινωνικής πρόνοιας, η αύξηση της αστικοποίησης, η εσωτερική μετανάστευση, η μείωση του επιπέδου προστασίας και φροντίδας των οικογενειών, τόσο στις αστικές όσο και στις αγροτικές περιοχές, επιτάσσει την ανάγκη δημιουργίας ιδρυμάτων για την παροχή στέγασης, διατροφής και βασικής φροντίδας στους χρόνιους ψυχικά ασθενείς (Fakhoury & Priebe, 2007).

Το πρώτο τέταρτο του 20ου αιώνα, ο αριθμός των ασύλων εντός των συνόρων των πόλεων, συνεχίζει να αυξάνεται δραματικά. Ωστόσο, οι οικονομικοί πόροι εντός αυτών μειώνονται σημαντικά, εξαιτίας των οικονομικών δυσκολιών και των καταστροφικών πολέμων. Έτσι, σταδιακά το άσυλο

συσχετίζεται με ανήθικες ιατρικές θεραπείες, έλλειψη υγιεινής, ανθυγιεινές συνθήκες διαβίωσης, συνωστισμό και υποσιτισμό. Επιπροσθέτως, η διαφορετική προσέγγιση της ψυχικής ασθένειας και η εξέλιξη της ιατρικής επιστήμης (έρευνα, θεραπείες), συμβάλλουν στο θεσμικό μετασχηματισμό των παρεχόμενων ψυχιατρικών υπηρεσιών και στην ανάπτυξη της φιλοσοφίας της «Αποασυλοποίησης» (Novella, 2008).

Κατά τη δεκαετία του 1950, οι φορείς υγείας, παγκόσμια, επικεντρώνονται στη χάραξη διαφορετικών πολιτικών για τον τρόπο περίθαλψης των ψυχικά ασθενών, με αποτέλεσμα τη θέσπιση καινούργιων νόμων και τη χρηματοδότηση νέων μοντέλων φροντίδας των ψυχικά ασθενών, από τις κυβερνήσεις. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, οι μεταρρυθμίσεις αναφορικά με τον τρόπο παροχής ψυχιατρικής φροντίδας, ξεκινούν από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και τη Μ. Βρετανία και στη συνέχεια επεκτείνονται στις Σκανδιναβικές Χώρες, στην Κεντρική και Νότια Ευρώπη (Novella, 2008).

Παράλληλα, η κοινωνία γενικότερα και τα Μέσα Μαζικής Ενημέρωσης (ΜΜΕ), αρχίζουν να ενδιαφέρονται για τους ψυχικά ασθενείς, να συζητούν για τις διακρίσεις και το στίγμα και να εστιάζουν στην ανεπάρκεια της ασυλικής ψυχιατρικής θεραπείας. Το 1969 με τη δημοσίευση του βιβλίου "Mental Health and Social Policy", πρωτοποριακό για τα κοινωνικά δεδομένα της χρονικής περιόδου, αναφέρεται ότι: «Η ιδεολογία της κοινοτικής φροντίδας των ψυχικά ασθενών, δημιουργείται μέσα από την συνειδητοποίηση ότι ο τρόπος παροχής περίθαλψης των μεγάλων ψυχιατρείων/ασύλων, συμβάλλει στην κοινωνική απομόνωση των ασθενών, στην υπονόμευση του κινήτρου για επιστροφή στην κοινότητα, στην αναστολή ανάπτυξης δεξιοτήτων και στην πρόκληση αναπηρίας, σε βαθμό μεγαλύτερο από αυτό που προκαλεί η ψυχική νόσος» (Tuntiyya, 2003).

Η Ιταλία, με νόμο που ψηφίζει το 1978, απαγορεύει τις εισαγωγές στα ψυχιατρικά νοσοκομεία και δημιουργεί κοινοτικές δομές φροντίδας. Στη Μ. Βρετανία, η διαδικασία της «Αποασυλοποίησης» θεωρείται επιτυχής, καθότι τα μεγάλα ψυχιατρεία καταργούνται σταδιακά, με αποτέλεσμα πάνω από 45 μεγάλα ψυχιατρεία/ιδρύματα να κλείσουν οριστικά (Leff, 1997). Η Γερμανία στα μέσα της δεκαετίας του '70 στρέφεται σε ένα κοινοτικό σύστημα φροντίδας, με την ενσωμάτωση της ψυχιατρικής φροντίδας στα γενικά νοσοκομεία και τη δημιουργία εξωνοσοκομειακών και ενδονοσοκομειακών υπηρεσιών, ενώ μειώνει κατά το ήμισυ τις ψυχιατρικές κλίνες (Bauer et al., 2001). Η Ισπανία με το Νόμο του 1986, εισάγει ένα νέο μοντέλο στη ψυχική υγεία, αναμορφώνοντας τις ψυχιατρικές υπηρεσίες, αλλά χωρίς να καταφέρει τη δημιουργία ενδιάμεσων κοινοτικών δομών στέγασης και ψυχοκοινωνικής αποκατάστασης (Vázquez-Barquero & Garcia, 1999). Στις ΗΠΑ, ο Νόμος του 1963, περί Κοινοτικής Ψυχιατρικής, επιφέρει την έξοδο από τα ψυχιατρεία μεγάλου αριθμού ασθενών, παρά την έλλειψη δημιουργίας εναλλακτικών κοινοτικών δομών. Έτσι, ο αριθμός των χρόνιων ασθενών στα κρατικά ψυχιατρεία μειώνεται κατά 90% (Bachrach, 1986).

Μεταγενέστερα, το κίνημα επαναπροσδιορισμού πολιτικών ψυχικής υγείας υποστηρίζεται από τον ΠΟΥ και την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΕΕ) (The European Union, 2015). Ειδικότερα, ο ΠΟΥ στις εκθέσεις του επισημαίνει ότι: «Η φροντίδα ψυχικής υγείας πρέπει να παρέχεται μέσω των γενικών υπηρεσιών υγείας και των κοινοτικών δομών, ενώ τα μεγάλα ψυχιατρεία/ιδρύματα πρέπει να αντικατασταθούν από καταλληλότερες υπηρεσίες ψυχικής υγείας» (WHO, 2003). Τη δεκαετία του 1990, η Ψυχιατρική Μεταρρύθμιση εφαρμόζεται στις περισσότερες χώρες της Δύσης (ΗΠΑ, Καναδάς, Δυτική και Νότια Ευρώπη, Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο Σκανδιναβικές χώρες), οπότε εισάγουν μακροπρόθεσμες αλλαγές στα συστήματα υγείας τους και υιοθετούν την παροχή ψυχιατρικής φροντίδας σε κοινοτικές δομές με διαβαθμίσεις, ανάλογα με τη βαρύτητα των ψυχικά ασθενών (Hudson & Cox., 1991).

Ωστόσο, παρατηρούνται σημαντικές διαφορές μεταξύ των δυτικών χωρών σε σχέση με τη μεταρρυθμιστική τους πολιτική στη ψυχική υγεία. Ας σημειωθεί, ότι οι μεταρρυθμιστικές προσπάθειες στις οικονομικά ανεπτυγμένες δυτικές χώρες (ΗΠΑ, Μ. Βρετανία) συνεχίζονται αδιάλειπτα, στην Ιταλία παρακμάζουν κατά τη διάρκεια της δεκαετίας του'80, ενώ στις λιγότερο οικονομικά ανεπτυγμένες χώρες, Ελλάδα, Ισπανία και Πολωνία ξεκινούν καθυστερημένα (Balicki et al., 2000; Burti & Benson, 1996; Madianos & Christodoulou, 2007; Tuntiya, 2003; Vázquez-Barquero & Garcia, 1999).

Παρά τις διαφορές στις μεταρρυθμιστικές αλλαγές, μεταξύ των χωρών του δυτικού κόσμου, υπάρχει κοινός παρονομαστής στην αξιολόγηση των αποτελεσμάτων των μεταρρυθμιστικών προγραμμάτων, όπου διαφαίνονται κενά στην παροχή ψυχιατρικών υπηρεσιών, όσον αφορά τους χρόνιους ψυχικά ασθενείς. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, φάνηκε η ψυχιατρική φροντίδα βαριά πασχόντων να παρέχεται από μη παραδοσιακά ιδρύματα στην κοινότητα (ιδιωτικές κλινικές, γηροκομεία κ.ά), που συχνά οι συνθήκες τους προσομοιάζουν με τον παραδοσιακό τρόπο (Hudson & Cox, 1991).

## Η Ψυχιατρική Μεταρρύθμιση στην Ελλάδα

Στη χώρα η ριζοσπαστική μεταρρύθμιση που πραγματοποιείται στο χώρο της υγείας και ειδικότερα στη ψυχική υγεία, επιτυγχάνεται με τη ψήφιση του Νόμου για το Εθνικό Σύστημα Υγείας (Ν.1397/83). Η διαδικασία της «Αποασυλοποίησης» ενεργοποιείται μετά την έκτατη χρηματοδότηση από την Ευρωπαϊκή Οικονομική Κοινότητα (ΕΟΚ), Κανονισμός 815/84, για τη βελτίωση των συνθηκών νοσηλείας των ψυχικά ασθενών μέσα στα ιδρύματα και τη σταδιακή μετάβασή τους σε προστατευμένες ή ημι-αυτόνομες κοινοτικές δομές. Η Ψυχιατρική Μεταρρύθμιση διευρύνεται με το Ν.2071/92 και εδραιώνεται το 1999, οπότε ψηφίζεται ο Ν.2716/99 για την «Ανάπτυξη και τον εκσυγχρονισμό των υπηρεσιών ψυχικής υγείας», ο οποίος της προσδίδει μία νέα δυναμική. Η χώρα

διαιρείται σε Τομείς Ψυχικής Υγείας, όπου ο κάθε νομός αποτελεί και ένα Τομέα, με εξαίρεση τους μικρούς νομούς πληθυσμιακά, καθώς και τους νομούς Αττικής και Θεσσαλονίκης που διαιρούνται σε περισσότερους του ενός Τομείς (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social Solidarity, 2011).

Το ιδρυματικό μοντέλο ψυχιατρικής περίθαλψης αποδυναμώνεται σημαντικά τη δεκαετία του '90, αρχικά με την εφαρμογή των προγραμμάτων Ψυχιατρικής Μεταρρύθμισης στην «αποικία ψυχοπαθών Λέρου» και τη δημιουργία εναλλακτικών μορφών φροντίδας, προκειμένου να διασφαλιστούν τα δικαιώματα των ψυχικά ασθενών και να παρασχεθούν αξιοπρεπείς συνθήκες νοσηλείας (Strutti & Rauber, 1994).

Στα τέλη του 1995, μετά την Ευρωπαϊκή οικονομική ενίσχυση, το Υπουργείο Υγείας εκπονεί ένα μακροπρόθεσμο σχέδιο με την κωδική ονομασία «Ψυχαργώς», με το οποίο μετατοπίζεται το βάρος παροχής υπηρεσιών ψυχικής υγείας από τα ιδρυματοποιημένα πλαίσια σε εξειδικευμένες δομές θεραπείας στην κοινότητα. Το πρόγραμμα «Ψυχαργώς» είναι ένα πρόγραμμα δράσεων με δεκαετή χρονικό ορίζοντα, που στοχεύει να καλύψει σταδιακά όλες τις ανάγκες σε εθνικό επίπεδο, στον τομέα της Ψυχικής Υγείας. Η κωδική του ονομασία προέρχεται από τη μυθολογική «Αργώ» και την επιστροφή του χρυσόμαλλου δέρατος. Ο συμβολισμός παραπέμπει στην «επιστροφή» των ψυχικά ασθενών στην κοινότητα που επιφέρει η Ψυχιατρική Μεταρρύθμιση. Το πρόγραμμα διαμορφώνεται το 1997 για την περίοδο 1997–2006 και αναθεωρείται το 2001 για την περίοδο 2001–2010. Η Α' φάση του προγράμματος, περίοδος 2000-2001, επικεντρώνεται στον αποδρυματισμό των ασθενών που νοσηλεύονταν στα μεγάλα δημόσια ψυχιατρεία. Η Β' φάση του προγράμματος, περίοδος 2002–2009, αποτελεί τη συνέχιση της ψυχιατρικής μεταρρύθμισης, εστιάζοντας σε συγκεκριμένα πεδία παρέμβασης στη ψυχική υγεία. Τέλος, η Γ' φάση του προγράμματος, περίοδος 2010-2020, στοχεύει στην ανάπτυξη δομών στην κοινότητα για την κάλυψη των αναγκών ψυχικής υγείας σε περιφερειακή βάση καθώς και στην προαγωγή της ψυχικής υγείας του γενικού πληθυσμού (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social Solidarity, 2011).

Μετά από μία μεγάλη μεταρρυθμιστική προσπάθεια η «Αποασυλοποίηση» και η καθιέρωση πολυάριθμων υπηρεσιών ψυχικής υγείας στην κοινότητα επιτυγχάνεται σε μεγάλο βαθμό. Ωστόσο, εμφανίζονται ελλείψεις στην ανάπτυξη πολιτικών πρωτοβάθμιας περίθαλψης στη ψυχική υγεία, στη διασύνδεση των υπηρεσιών, στην παροχή φροντίδας σε παιδιά, εφήβους, ηλικιωμένους, άτομα με αυτισμό, με νοητική υστέρηση, με διατροφικές διαταραχές, καθώς και σε ιατροδικαστικές ψυχιατρικές υπηρεσίες, που αναδεικνύονται ιδιαίτερα κατά τη δεκαετή οικονομική κρίση (Christodoulou et al., 2012). Επιπροσθέτως, οι δομές παροχής ψυχιατρικών υπηρεσιών χαρακτηρίζονται από ανομοιόμορφη ανάπτυξη στην κοινότητα. Εμφανίζονται σημαντικές διαφορές στα μοντέλα παροχής υπηρεσιών ψυχικής υγείας, ανά περιοχή (Madianos & Christodoulou, 2007).

Επιτακτική φαίνεται να είναι και η θεσμική κατοχύρωση της διαδικασίας αξιολόγησης και εξυγίανσης των ψυχιατρικών υπηρεσιών, καθώς και η βελτίωση της δημόσιας πολιτικής προς όφελος των ψυχικά πασχόντων (Sakelis, 2009).

## Αποτελέσματα

Από την ενδελεχή μελέτη της διεθνούς και ελληνικής βιβλιογραφίας, σχετικά με την εφαρμογή μεταρρυθμιστικών πολιτικών στη ψυχική υγεία, φαίνεται ότι προκύπτει:

- Αναθεώρηση του τρόπου περίθαλψης και διαχείρισης των ψυχικά ασθενών
- Ανάπτυξη Δικτύου Υπηρεσιών Ψυχικής Υγείας και Δομών Ψυχοκοινωνικής Αποκατάστασης στην Κοινότητα
- Δημιουργία Δικτύου για την προάσπιση των δικαιωμάτων των ψυχικά ασθενών
- Οριστική κατάργηση των μεγάλων ψυχιατρείων, σε αρκετές χώρες
- Ανακατασκευή κτιριακών εγκαταστάσεων και σημαντική μείωση κλινών των μεγάλων ψυχιατρείων, στις χώρες που παρέμειναν, όπως η χώρα μας

## Συμπεράσματα

Η βελτίωση και η προαγωγή της ψυχικής υγείας αποτελεί ένα περίπλοκο έργο. Η οικονομική κρίση, η πανδημία covid-19 και η ενεργειακή κρίση έχουν σοβαρές επιπτώσεις στο πληθυσμό παγκόσμια και ιδιαίτερα στις ευάλωτες ομάδες, όπως τα άτομα με ψυχιατρικές διαταραχές. Ο επαναπροσδιορισμός των πολιτικών ψυχικής υγείας, διεθνώς και στην Ελλάδα, με ρεαλιστικούς στόχους, προσανατολισμένους στα νέα δεδομένα θεωρείται επιβεβλημένος, ιδιαίτερα σε περιόδους κοινωνικοοικονομικών ανακατατάξεων.

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## Towards a Stronger EU Health Governance: Threats in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic<sup>1</sup>

Nikos Deredakis<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

COVID-19, a disease caused by the new coronavirus known as SARS-CoV-2, emerged in late 2019 in a Wuhan market in China and spread rapidly around the world, including Europe and the US, reaching pandemic proportions. In Europe, despite the initial surprise, the European Union (EU) as an important supranational actor managed, in a relatively short period of time, to react by activating its institutions and trying to cope with the new grim reality. The present study aims to analyse the policies followed at EU level in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to highlight the consequences in terms of prevention and protection and the need for European coordination in order to effectively deal with similar future crises.

**Keywords:** COVID-19; pandemic; European Union; health.

## Προς μια Ισχυρότερη Διακυβέρνηση της ΕΕ για την Υγεία: Απειλές μετά την Πανδημία COVID-19

Νίκος Δερεδάκης

### Περίληψη

Η COVID-19, μια ασθένεια που προκαλείται από έναν νέο κορωνοϊό γνωστό ως SARS-CoV-2, εμφανίστηκε στα τέλη του 2019 σε αγορά της Γουχάν στην Κίνα και εξαπλώθηκε γρήγορα σε όλο τον κόσμο, συμπεριλαμβανομένων της Ευρώπης και των ΗΠΑ, λαμβάνοντας πανδημικές διαστάσεις. Στην Ευρώπη, παρά τον αρχικό αιφνιδιασμό, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΕΕ) ως σημαντικός υπερεθνικός θεσμός κατάφερε, σε σχετικά σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα, να αντιδράσει ενεργοποιώντας τα θεσμικά της όργανα και προσπαθώντας να ανταπεξέλθει στη νέα ζοφερή πραγματικότητα. Η παρούσα μελέτη στοχεύει στην ανάλυση των πολιτικών που ακολουθήθηκαν σε επίπεδο ΕΕ για την αντιμετώπιση της πανδημίας της COVID-19, ώστε να αναδειχθούν οι συνέπειες σε επίπεδο πρόληψης και προστασίας αλλά και η αναγκαιότητα ευρωπαϊκού συντονισμού για την αποτελεσματική αντιμετώπιση παρόμοιων μελλοντικών κρίσεων.

**Λέξεις-Κλειδιά:** COVID-19, πανδημία, Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, υγεία.

### Εισαγωγή

Σε λίγους μόνο μήνες, η COVID-19, μια ασθένεια που προκαλείται από έναν νέο κορωνοϊό γνωστό ως SARS-CoV-2, εμφανίστηκε στα τέλη του 2019 σε αγορά της Γουχάν στην Κίνα και εξαπλώθηκε

<sup>1</sup> To cite this paper in APA style: Deredakis, N. (2022). Towards a Stronger EU Health Governance: Threats in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic. *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series*, 3(2), 191-202. <https://doi.org/10.12681/hapsbps.33802>

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γρήγορα σε όλο τον κόσμο, συμπεριλαμβανομένων της Ευρώπης και των ΗΠΑ. Με τα επιβεβαιωμένα κρούσματα, σε παγκόσμιο επίπεδο, να ξεπερνούν τα 1,2 εκατομμύρια και τους θανάτους να πλησιάζουν τους 70.000, ήδη μέχρι τις αρχές Απριλίου του 2020 και με τις προβλέψεις να είναι δραματικές για τους επόμενους μήνες, πολλές κυβερνήσεις ανά τον κόσμο προχώρησαν σε επιλογές, όπως η επιβολή σκληρών κανόνων περιορισμού και καραντίνας, ενώ λίγες υιοθέτησαν την «ανοσία της αγέλης», αφήνοντας τον ιό να εξαπλωθεί ευρέως, στρατηγική που εγκαταλείφθηκε σε σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα. Σε πολλές χώρες οι εργαζόμενοι στον τομέα της υγείας, στην πρωτοφανή αυτή κατάσταση, αναγκάστηκαν να περιοριστούν στη σκληρή επιλογή ποιους ασθενείς να σώσουν και ποιους να αφήσουν να πεθάνουν, ενώ οι Οργανισμοί Υγείας κλήθηκαν να εκδώσουν οδηγίες για αυτές τις δύσκολες στιγμές (Renda & Castro, 2020). Ένας σημαντικός παράγοντας διαφοροποίησης ως προς την ικανότητα πρόληψης και θεραπείας της COVID-19, ήταν αυτός μεταξύ φτωχών και πλούσιων χωρών ή άλλως, αναπτυσσόμενων και αναπτυγμένων χωρών. Οι ήδη επισφαλείς οικονομίες των αναπτυσσόμενων χωρών υπέστησαν σοβαρά οικονομικά πλήγματα από τα περιοριστικά μέτρα, καθώς οι κυβερνήσεις προσπαθούσαν να περιορίσουν την πανδημία (Tzagkarakis, Pappas & Kritas, 2020; Τζαγκαράκης, Μελίδης & Κρήτας, 2022).

Σε ό,τι αφορά στην Ευρώπη, η προσοχή εστιάστηκε στις στο δυτικό μέρος, ενώ λιγότερη υγειονομική έμφαση δόθηκε στην κεντρική και ανατολική Ευρώπη. Αυτή η περιοχή είναι μεγάλη, πολιτικά ποικιλόμορφη και ιστορικά πολύπλοκη, που εκτείνεται σε χώρες μέλη της ΕΕ όπως η Τσεχία, η Βουλγαρία, τα κράτη της Βαλτικής, τα Δυτικά Βαλκάνια εκτός ΕΕ και η Ουκρανία ανατολικότερα. Δεν είναι σαφές πώς ορισμένες από αυτές τις χώρες κατάφεραν να κρατήσουν χαμηλά κρούσματα κατά το πρώτο μέρος του 2020. Μάλιστα, είναι χαρακτηριστικό ότι μέχρι τα μέσα Μαρτίου 2021, έξι από τις δέκα πρώτες χώρες παγκοσμίως με τα υψηλότερα ποσοστά θνησιμότητας ανά 100.000 άτομα ήταν στην Κεντρική και Ανατολική Ευρώπη (The Lancet, 2021). Η Λομβαρδία, η επαρχία της Ιταλίας, γνωστή για τις εξαιρετικές υγειονομικές υπηρεσίες της, παραλίγο να καταρρεύσει λόγω της έλλειψη κλινών εντατικής θεραπείας, αφήνοντας πολλούς ασθενείς χωρίς επίβλεψη, ενώ παράλληλα πολλοί θάνατοι εμφανίστηκαν στο σπίτι και όχι στα νοσοκομεία (Renda & Castro, 2020). Παρά τον αρχικό αιφνιδιασμό, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ως θεσμός κατάφερε, σε σχετικά σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα, να αντιδράσει ενεργοποιώντας τα θεσμικά της όργανα και προσπαθώντας να ανταπεξέλθει στη νέα ζιφερή πραγματικότητα.

### **Η ανταπόκριση της ΕΕ στην πανδημία κατά τη διάρκειά της**

Η Ούρσουλα Φον Ντερ Λάιεν, Πρόεδρος της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής χαρακτηριστικά ανέφερε στην παγκόσμια Σύνοδο για την Υγεία το 2020: «Δεν μπορούμε να περιμένουμε το τέλος της πανδημίας για

να ανασυνταχθούμε και να προετοιμαστούμε για το μέλλον. Θα θέσουμε τα θεμέλια μιας ισχυρότερης Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στην οποία 27 χώρες συνεργάζονται για τον εντοπισμό, την προετοιμασία και τη συλλογική αντίδραση» (Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή-Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση Υγείας, 2022).

Με αυτή τη δήλωση η Πρόεδρος έδωσε το στίγμα για τις προθέσεις αντίδρασης της ΕΕ ενάντια στην COVID-19. Βέβαια, από το 2003 η ΕΕ είχε ιδρύσει το Ευρωπαϊκό Κέντρο Πρόληψης και Ελέγχου Νοσημάτων (ECDC), έναν οργανισμό που λειτούργησε το 2005, σε μια προσπάθεια να ενισχύσει την ικανότητα ανταπόκρισης της Ευρώπης και να παρέχει τεχνική υποστήριξη στα κράτη μέλη. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο αξίζει να αναφερθεί ότι το ECDC είναι υπεύθυνο για την επιτήρηση, ανίχνευση και εκτίμηση κινδύνου απειλών και την επιδημιολογική επιτήρηση στις χώρες της ΕΕ. Εντούτοις, θα πρέπει να ότι από την αρχή ήταν υποπροϋπολογισμένο και υποστελεχωμένο, ενώ τροχοπέδη στη λειτουργία του στάθηκε η έλλειψη επαρκούς συνεργασίας με τα κράτη μέλη, ιδίως στο Σύστημα Επιδημικών Πληροφοριών (EPIS) και το Ευρωπαϊκό Σύστημα Εποπτείας (TESSy), μια κατάσταση που επιδεινώθηκε από την επιπτώσεις του Brexit (Renda & Castro, 2020).

Είναι αλήθεια ότι από το 2003 είχαν υλοποιηθεί τρία προγράμματα από την ΕΕ, με στόχο την υγεία. Το 1ο πρόγραμμα, είχε διάρκεια από το 2003 έως το 2007, το 2ο, από το 2008 έως το 2013 και το 3ο από το 2014 έως το 2020. Και από τα τρία αυτά προγράμματα αντλήθηκαν γνώσεις και στοιχεία που χρησιμεύουν ως βάση για τεκμηριωμένη χάραξη πολιτικής για περαιτέρω έρευνα. Τα στοιχεία αυτά περιλαμβάνουν βέλτιστες πρακτικές, εργαλεία και μεθόδους που απέφεραν οφέλη, τόσο στους αρμόδιους φορείς για τη δημόσια υγεία, όσο και απευθείας στους πολίτες (Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, 2022a).


Ένα άλλο μεγάλο πρόβλημα που είχε να αντιμετωπίσει η ΕΕ ήταν το μεγάλο χάσμα κοινωνικής ευαλωτότητας, τόσο ανάμεσα στα κράτη μέλη, όσο και σε κοινωνικές ομάδες στους κόλπους των ίδιων των κρατών μελών. Άλλωστε, μελέτες έχουν δείξει στο παρελθόν ότι τα άτομα που είναι ευάλωτα κινδυνεύουν πολύ περισσότερο να βιώσουν τον κίνδυνο και να απειληθούν από αυτόν, μέχρι του σταδίου της ολικής καταστροφής ή του θανάτου σε περίπτωση μιας γενικευμένης κρίσης, οποιασδήποτε μορφής (Melidis & Tzagkarakis, 2022). Συνεπώς, όπως κατέδειξαν σχετικές έρευνες σε παγκόσμιο επίπεδο και στην περίπτωση της νέας πανδημίας, τα επίπεδα της νοσηρότητας και της θνητότητας από την COVID-19 ήταν υψηλότερα για τις πιο ευάλωτες κοινωνικοοικονομικές ομάδες, όπως οι μετανάστες, οι φτωχοί, οι ηλικιωμένοι και οι άνθρωποι με χαμηλό εκπαιδευτικό επίπεδο (Τζαγκαράκης, Παππάς & Κρήτας, 2021). Το ανισομερές βάρος της πανδημίας στις κοινωνικά ευάλωτες ομάδες εξηγείται σε ένα σημαντικό βαθμό από τις υφιστάμενες ανισότητες σε κοινωνικούς δείκτες, όπως το εισόδημα, η εκπαίδευση, η απασχόληση και η φροντίδα υγείας, που διαμορφώνουν ένα χαμηλό επίπεδο υγείας (Τζαγκαράκης, Παππάς & Κρήτας, 2021).

Στο πλαίσιο της έκτακτης αντίδρασης της ΕΕ στην πανδημία του κορονοϊού το πεδίο εφαρμογής του Ταμείου Αλληλεγγύης της ΕΕ επεκτάθηκε τον Μάρτιο του 2020 για να καλύψει σοβαρές καταστάσεις έκτακτης ανάγκης στον τομέα της δημόσιας υγείας (Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, 2022). Παράλληλα, το ίδιο χρονικό διάστημα, εν μέσω πανδημίας COVID-19, συμφωνήθηκε ένα πρόσθετο «ταμείο αποκατάστασης» έκτακτης ανάγκης, το NextGenerationEU (NGEU), ύψους 750 δις ευρώ παράλληλα με το Πολυετές Δημοσιονομικό Πλαίσιο (ΠΔΠ) που καλύπτει τα έτη 2021-2027. Το NGEU σχεδιάστηκε για να βοηθήσει στην αντιμετώπιση των βραχυπρόθεσμων και μεσοπρόθεσμων επιπτώσεων της πανδημίας έως το 2024, με έμφαση στην ψηφιακή και στην πράσινη μετάβαση. Συνολικά, ο πολυετής προϋπολογισμός και το ταμείο ανάκαμψης ανέρχονται σε 1.074,3 δις. ευρώ. Μαζί με τα ήδη υπάρχοντα κονδύλια για τα τρία δίχτυα ασφαλείας (εργαζομένους-επιχειρήσεις-κράτη μέλη) η συνολική δέσμη μέτρων για την ανάκαμψη της ΕΕ ανέρχεται σε 2.364,3 δις. ευρώ. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική τράπεζα παρέχει 1.350 δις. ευρώ επιπλέον, στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος αγοράς ομολόγων προκειμένου να στηρίξει τις κυβερνήσεις κατά τη διάρκεια της κρίσης (Χρηματοδότηση της ΕΕ, 2022, Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, 2022). Τον Μάρτιο του 2021 η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή πρότεινε συνολική δέσμη σχεδόν 530 εκ. ευρώ για χρηματοδοτική στήριξη στο πλαίσιο του Ταμείου Αλληλεγγύης της ΕΕ, ως πρόσθετη χρηματοδοτική συνεισφορά σε δεκαεπτά κράτη μέλη και τρεις υπό ένταξη χώρες, στο πλαίσιο των προσπαθειών τους για την καταπολέμηση της πανδημίας. Στις 20 Μαΐου 2021 το Συμβούλιο και το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο ενέκριναν την κινητοποίηση του Ταμείου Αλληλεγγύης της ΕΕ σύμφωνα με την πρόταση της Επιτροπής. Στις 19 Ιανουαρίου 2022 η Επιτροπή ολοκλήρωσε την καταβολή της συνδρομής του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινωνικού Ταμείου, στα κράτη μέλη, συνολικού ποσού 385,49 εκ. ευρώ. Το ποσό αυτό προστίθεται στα 132,7 εκ. ευρώ που καταβλήθηκαν στα κράτη μέλη που ζήτησαν προκαταβολή από το Ταμείο Αλληλεγγύης της ΕΕ το 2020 (Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, 2022b).

Επιπροσθέτως, εκτός από την αμιγώς οικονομική στήριξη προς τα κράτη μέλη, η ΕΕ προχώρησε σε μια σειρά πρωτοβουλιών, σε συνεργασία με τα κράτη μέλη, για την καταπολέμηση της COVID-19 και υπέρ της ανάκαμψης που βίαια είχε ανακοπεί. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο τα Κράτη-Μέλη της ΕΕ θέσπισαν κοινό πλαίσιο ταξιδιωτικών μέτρων ώστε να διαφυλάξουν την ελευθερία μετακίνησης στο εσωτερικό της Ένωσης κατά τη διάρκεια της πανδημίας. Κατά τον σχεδιασμό των μέτρων θα λαμβάνονταν υπόψη κοινά κριτήρια και καθόρισαν από κοινού τις ζώνες κινδύνου. Κάθε Πέμπτη το Ευρωπαϊκό Κέντρο Πρόληψης και Ελέγχου Νόσων (ECDC) δημοσίευε έναν χρωματικά κωδικοποιημένο χάρτη της ΕΕ με βάση τα στοιχεία που παρείχαν τα κράτη μέλη. Δίνοντας τη δυνατότητα στις χώρες της ΕΕ να παίρνουν αποφάσεις σύμφωνα με την επιδημιολογική κατάσταση ανά περιοχή. Για όλες τις ταξιδιωτικές πληροφορίες που αφορούσαν τις ασφαλείς μετακινήσεις, η

ΕΕ εγκαινίασε τον ιστοχώρο «Re-open EU» που είναι διαθέσιμος και στις 24 γλώσσες της ΕΕ (Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, 2022).

### Σχήμα 1: Κατανομές στο Πολυνετές Δημοσιονομικό Πλαίσιο και στο Next Generation EU



Data source: EPRS, based on European Commission data.


Πηγή: D'Alfonso, A., Delivoria, A., Milotary, N. & Spała, M. (2021). Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2021. EPoS. PE 670.062, pp. 20.

Για να περιοριστεί η μετάδοση της COVID-19 εντός και εκτός Ευρώπης, οι χώρες της ΕΕ περιόρισαν προσωρινά τα μη αναγκαία ταξίδια προς την ΕΕ. Οι ταξιδιωτικοί περιορισμοί για τους κατοίκους ορισμένων τρίτων χωρών καταργήθηκαν σταδιακά από της 1η Ιουλίου 2020. Ο κατάλογος των χωρών για τις οποίες ισχύουν ταξιδιωτικοί περιορισμοί, επανεξετάζεται σε τακτά χρονικά διαστήματα και αναπροσαρμόζεται με κριτήρια την επιδημιολογική κατάσταση, και τα μέτρα ανάσχεσης, καθώς και με οικονομικές και κοινωνικές παραμέτρους (Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, 2022).

Συνεχίζοντας τη σκιαγράφηση των βασικών πρωτοβουλιών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, θα πρέπει να αναφερθεί ότι στις 27 Δεκεμβρίου 2020 ξεκίνησε ο εμβολιασμός στα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ, αφού ήδη είχαν εγκριθεί τέσσερα εμβόλια κατά της COVID-19. Μέχρι σήμερα η ΕΕ έχει υπογράψει οκτώ συμφωνίες με παρασκευάστριες εταιρίες εμβολίων, για να εξασφαλίσει ευρεία γκάμα εμβολίων για

τις χώρες της. Συνολικά έχουν εξασφαλιστεί έως 4,6 δισεκατομμύρια δόσεις εμβολίων (Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, 2022), ενώ η Επιτροπή εξασφάλισε το δικαίωμα αγοράς συγκεκριμένου αριθμού δόσεων εμβολίων σε δεδομένο χρόνο και τιμή.

### Σχήμα 2: Κατανομή εμβολίων που εγκρίθηκαν στην ΕΕ κατά της COVID-19



Πηγή: European Council (2022). Stronger together: The incredible journey of COVID-19 vaccines. European Council. Διαθέσιμο στο: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/covid-vaccine-journey/> (Ανακτήθηκε: 19/12/2022).

Συνεπώς, η Επιτροπή χρηματοδότησε μέρος του αρχικού κόστους με το ποσό των 2.7 δις ευρώ, ως προκαταβολή για τα εμβόλια που αγόρασαν τα κράτη μέλη. Η ΕΕ από την αρχή είχε θέσει ξεκάθαρους στόχους για τα εμβόλια, όπως την εγγύηση της ποιότητας, της ασφάλειας και της αποτελεσματικότητας και τη διασφάλιση έγκαιρης, ισότιμης και οικονομικά προσιτής πρόσβασης σε ένα προσιτό εμβόλιο για όλους στην ΕΕ. Αρχικά, η έμφαση δόθηκε στη μείωση του ποσοστού θανάτων και της επιβάρυνσης των βασικών υγειονομικών υπηρεσιών. Δόθηκε προτεραιότητα σε ομάδες πληθυσμού, όπως οι ηλικιωμένοι, οι εργαζόμενοι στους τομείς υγείας και σε άτομα των οποίων η κατάσταση της υγείας τους συνεπάγεται ιδιαίτερο κίνδυνο. Έως τα μέσα Ιουλίου 2021 η Ευρώπη διέθετε επαρκείς δόσεις εμβολίων για τον εμβολιασμό του 70% του ενήλικου πληθυσμού της ΕΕ. Μέχρι σήμερα οκτώ ασφαλή και αποτελεσματικά εμβόλια κατά της COVID-19 έχουν εγκριθεί, σταδιακά, από την Επιτροπή για χρήση στην ΕΕ, μετά από θετικές επιστημονικές συστάσεις του Ευρωπαϊκού Οργανισμού Φαρμάκων (Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, 2022b).

Η ΕΕ έχει εξασφαλίσει τη διαχείριση της κρίσης και τον συντονισμό καθ' όλη τη διάρκεια της πανδημίας COVID-19 μέσω των συνεχών επαφών μεταξύ κρατών μελών και οργάνων της ΕΕ. Επίσης, η ΕΕ έχει φροντίσει για τη διάθεση ιατρικού εξοπλισμού, δημιουργώντας ένα κοινό ευρωπαϊκό απόθεμα εξοπλισμού ατομικής προστασίας και αναπνευστήρων στο πλαίσιο του RescEU (Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, 2022). Για να στηρίξει τους εργαζομένους, ώστε να μην χάσουν τις εργασίες τους κατά την κρίση, η ΕΕ θέσπισε ένα μέσο προσωρινής στήριξης για τον περιορισμό των κινδύνων ανεργίας σε κατάσταση έκτακτης ανάγκης (SURE). Το πρόγραμμα, που ξεκίνησε το φθινόπωρο του 2020, παρείχε έως και 100 δις ευρώ σε δάνεια που χορηγήθηκαν στα κράτη μέλη με ευνοϊκούς όρους για να καλύψουν το κόστος εθνικών συστημάτων μειωμένου ωραρίου (Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, 2022).

Η ΕΕ στήριξε οικονομικά τα κράτη μέλη της στην αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης, διαθέτοντας στα κράτη μέλη της περίπου 37 δις ευρώ από τα διαρθρωτικά ταμεία της. Στόχος ήταν να στηριχθούν τα εθνικά συστήματα υγείας και οι επιχειρήσεις, ώστε να προστατευθεί η απασχόληση κατά τη διάρκεια της υγειονομικής κρίσης. Επίσης, η ΕΕ χαλάρωσε τους κανόνες κρατικών ενισχύσεων, ώστε οι κυβερνήσεις να μπορούν να παράσχουν ρευστότητα στην οικονομία, προκειμένου να στηρίξουν πολίτες και επιχειρήσεις διασώζοντας θέσεις εργασίας (Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, 2022).

Η ΕΕ διευκόλυνε την αποστολή ιατρικών ομάδων μέσω του ιατρικού σώματος της ΕΕ, ώστε ομάδες από διάφορα κράτη μέλη να μπορούν να στηρίξουν εθνικά συστήματα υγείας που υπέστησαν το μεγαλύτερο πλήγμα από την κρίση. Η Αυστρία, η Γερμανία και το Λουξεμβούργο άνοιξαν τις μονάδες εντατικής θεραπείας σε Βέλγους, Ολλανδούς, Γάλλους και Ιταλούς ασθενείς που βρίσκονταν σε κρίσιμη κατάσταση. Ακόμα, η Πολωνία, η Ρουμανία και η Γερμανία έστειλαν ομάδες γιατρών για να βοηθήσουν στη θεραπεία ασθενών σε νοσοκομεία ης Ιταλίας, που πρώτη είχε πληγεί από την COVID-19. Η Ουγγαρία και οι Κάτω Χώρες έστειλαν αναπνευστήρες στην Τσεχία, ενώ η Γαλλία μοιράστηκε δόσεις εμβολίου με την Τσεχία και τη Σλοβακία. Η ΕΕ, επίσης, θέσπισε νέους νόμους βάσει των οποίων τα κράτη μέλη μπορούσαν να ζητήσουν χρηματοδοτική συνδρομή από το Ταμείο Αλληλεγγύης της ΕΕ για να καλύψουν έκτακτες υγειονομικές ανάγκες (Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, 2022).

Για να προστατευθεί η αλυσίδα εφοδιασμού τροφίμων και να αποφευχθεί η έλλειψή τους, η ΕΕ θέσπισε έκτακτα μέτρα προκειμένου να στηρίξει τον γεωργικό και αλιευτικό τομέα, που υπέστησαν απώλειες λόγω της πανδημίας, με μεγαλύτερη ευελιξία χρηματοδότησης από την ΕΕ. Ακόμα, θεσπίστηκαν έκτακτα μέτρα αγοράς για να στηριχθούν οι παραγωγοί οίνου και οπωροκηπευτικών της ΕΕ. Επιπλέον, η ΕΕ θέσπισε «πράσινες λωρίδες» για να μπορούν να κυκλοφορούν τα προϊόντα

διατροφής σε όλη την Ευρώπη και αναγνώρισε τους εποχιακούς εργαζόμενους ως «εργαζόμενους κρίσιμης σημασίας» (Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, 2022).

Επιπροσθέτως, θα πρέπει να αναφερθεί ότι προς τις πρωτοβουλίες που ανέλαβε η ΕΕ, διαφαίνεται ότι κατανόησε πως η πανδημία COVID-19 είναι παγκόσμιο πρόβλημα που απαιτεί παγκόσμιες λύσεις, στήριξε και συνεχίζει να στηρίζει χώρες που έχουν ανάγκη. Η συνολική προσπάθεια της Team Europe ανέρχεται σε 46 δις ευρώ, ενώ παράλληλα έχει ενεργοποιήσει ανθρωπιστική αερογέφυρα για να παρέχει βιόθεια στις χώρες που έχουν ανάγκη. Η ΕΕ είναι παγκόσμιος ηγέτης στις εξαγωγές και δωρεές εμβολίων, ώστε να εξασφαλιστεί η πρόσβαση στα εμβόλια ενάντια στην COVID-19 και για τις χώρες χαμηλού εισοδήματος σε όλον τον κόσμο. Γι αυτόν τον λόγο η ΕΕ υποστήριξε την παγκόσμια πρωτοβουλία για τα εμβόλια COVAX (Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, 2022).

### **Ο σχεδιασμός της ΕΕ για την αντιμετώπιση των προκλήσεων στο μέλλον**

Μόλις τελειώσει η τρέχουσα έκτακτη ανάγκη, και ίσως ακόμη και πριν από τότε, τα θεσμικά όργανα της ΕΕ θα πρέπει να εργαστούν προς την κατεύθυνση της ενίσχυσης της διακυβέρνησης της ΕΕ με διάφορους τρόπους. Υπάρχει ανάγκη ενίσχυσης της ανθεκτικότητας και της βιωσιμότητας των συστημάτων υγειονομικής περίθαλψης. Η υγεία έχει διαπιστωθεί ότι αποτελεί βασικό μέλημα για τους ευρωπαίους πολίτες και μια περιοχή για την οποία ζητήθηκε από την ΕΕ να διευρύνει τις αρμοδιότητες και τις εξουσίες της. Εκτός από τη δημιουργία σημαντικών αποδόσεων για την κοινωνία στο σύνολό της, επενδύσεις στην υγειονομική περίθαλψη των κρατών μελών θα πρέπει να ενθαρρυνθούν ως ένας τρόπος για να αυξηθεί τόσο η ανθεκτικότητα όσο και η βιωσιμότητά τους στις οικονομίες των κρατών μελών, επιτρέποντας τη μετάβαση σε μέτρα που προστατεύουν, προετοιμάζουν και μετασχηματίζουν την οικονομία και την κοινωνία (Renda & Castro, 2020).

Πέρα από την ανθεκτικότητα, χρειάζεται περισσότερη συγκέντρωση στη διακυβέρνηση της υγειονομικής περίθαλψης, ειδικά για την αντιμετώπιση έκτακτων περιστατικών υγείας. Η πρόσφατη αξιολόγηση του ΕΠΙΣ εντός το ECDC έχει επισημάνει σημαντικά ελαττώματα, κυρίως από την πλευρά των κρατών μελών. Για παράδειγμα, η έλλειψη ιατροτεχνολογικών προϊόντων και φαρμάκων, ένα ήδη υπάρχον πρόβλημα στην ΕΕ, έγινε πιο εμφανής και κρίσιμη στην τρέχουσα έκτακτη ανάγκη: προβλήματα στην προμήθεια αναπνευστήρες, προστατευτικές μάσκες και φάρμακα έχουν δείξει υπάρχοντα κενά και έχουν αποκαλυφθεί ευκαιρίες για την Ευρώπη να ενεργήσει πιο αποτελεσματικά (Renda & Castro, 2020).

Αποδεικνύεται, λοιπόν, ότι η διεθνής συνεργασία για την αντιμετώπιση των υγειονομικών προκλήσεων είναι παραπάνω από απαραίτητη στο πλαίσιο του ολοένα πιο αλληλοεξαρτόμενου κόσμου, μέσα στον οποίο ζούμε. Καμιά χώρα δεν μπορεί μόνη της να αντιμετωπίσει τις τεράστιες

και απρόβλεπτες προκλήσεις στον τομέα της υγείας, καθώς ο σύγχρονος αλληλοσυνδεόμενος κόσμος ενέχει τον κίνδυνο για πιο συχνή μετάδοση μεταδοτικών ασθενειών (Τζαγκαράκης, Μελίδης & Κρήτας, 2022).

Το πρόγραμμα EU4Health εγκρίθηκε και θεσπίστηκε στις 24 Μαρτίου 2021, με τον κανονισμό (ΕΕ)2021/522, για την αντιμετώπιση της πανδημίας COVID-19 και για την ενίσχυση της ετοιμότητας για την αντιμετώπιση κρίσεων στην ΕΕ, αφού η πανδημία ανέδειξε τον εύθραυστο χαρακτήρα των εθνικών συστημάτων υγείας. Το EU4Health, με προϋπολογισμό 5,3 δις ευρώ για την περίοδο 2021-2027, είναι ένα σαφές μήνυμα ότι η δημόσια υγεία αποτελεί προτεραιότητα για την ΕΕ, καθώς και ένα από τα κύρια μέσα με το οποίο θα ανοίξει ο δρόμος για μια Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση Υγείας. Το EU4Health αποφέρει ενωσιακή προστιθέμενη αξία και συμπληρώνει τις πολιτικές των κρατών μελών για την επιδίωξη τεσσάρων γενικών στόχων, που αποτελούν τις φιλοδοξίες του προγράμματος και δέκα ειδικών στόχων, που αποτελούν τους τομείς παρέμβασης (Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή-Public Health, 2022):

### **I. Βελτίωση και ενίσχυση της υγείας**

- Προώθηση της υγείας και πρόληψη των ασθενειών, ιδίως του καρκίνου.
- Διεθνείς πρωτοβουλίες και συνεργασία στον τομέα της υγείας.

### **II. Προστασία των ανθρώπων**

- Πρόληψη, ετοιμότητα και αντιμετώπιση διασυνοριακών απειλών κατά της υγείας.
- Συμπλήρωση της εθνικής αποθεματοποίησης βασικών προϊόντων, αναγκαίων για την αντιμετώπιση των κρίσεων.
- Δημιουργία αποθέματος ιατρικού, υγειονομικού και υποστηρικτικού προσωπικού.

### **III. Πρόσβαση σε φάρμακα, σε ιατροτεχνολογικά προϊόντα και σε αναγκαία για την αντιμετώπιση κρίσεων προϊόντα.**

- Διασφάλιση της πρόσβασης, της διαθεσιμότητας και της οικονομικής προσιτότητας αυτών των προϊόντων.

### **IV. Ενίσχυση των συστημάτων υγείας.**

- -Ενίσχυση των δεδομένων υγείας, των ψηφιακών εργαλείων και υπηρεσιών και του ψηφιακού μετασχηματισμού της υγειονομικής περίθαλψης.
- -Ενίσχυση της πρόσβασης σε υγειονομική περίθαλψη.
- -Ανάπτυξη και εφαρμογή της ενωσιακής νομοθεσίας για την υγεία και λήψη τεκμηριωμένων αποφάσεων.

- -Ολοκληρωμένη συνεργασία μεταξύ των εθνικών συστημάτων υγείας.

Το EU4Health θα ανοίξει τον δρόμο για μια Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση Υγείας, επενδύοντας σε επείγουσες προτεραιότητες στον τομέα της υγείας, όπως, την αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης της COVID-19 και ενίσχυση της ανθεκτικότητας της ΕΕ έναντι διασυνοριακών απειλών κατά της υγείας, ευρωπαϊκό σχέδιο για την καταπολέμηση του καρκίνου και φαρμακευτική στρατηγική για την Ευρώπη. Επίσης, θα ενισχυθούν τομείς, όπως η ψηφιοποίηση των εθνικών συστημάτων υγείας και θα γίνουν προσπάθειες μείωσης του αριθμού των λοιμώξεων που είναι ανθεκτικές στα αντιμικροβιακά, καθώς και βελτίωσης των ποσοστών εμβολιασμού.

Το πρόγραμμα, που έχει τεθεί υπό την αιγίδα του Ευρωπαϊκού Εκτελεστικού Οργανισμού για την Υγεία και τον Ψηφιακό Τομέα, (HaDEA), που είναι υπεύθυνος για την υλοποίησή του, παρέχει χρηματοδότηση σε επιλέξιμες οντότητες, οργανώσεις υγείας και ΜΚΟ από χώρες της ΕΕ ή τρίτες χώρες συνδεδεμένες με το πρόγραμμα. Έτσι, στα μέσα του 2022 πραγματοποιήθηκε στοχευμένη διαβούλευση και στη συνέχεια ανάλογη εκδήλωση με τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη.

Για την υλοποίηση του EU4Health, προβλέπεται μια σύνθετη διαδικασίας, στην οποία εμπλέκονται διάφοροι φορείς, ευρωπαϊκοί και εθνικοί. Αρχικά, πραγματοποιείται διαβούλευση με τις χώρες της ΕΕ, σχετικά με τις προτεραιότητες και τους στρατηγικούς προσανατολισμούς του προγράμματος και στη συνέχεια οι χώρες της ΕΕ συνεργάζονται με την Επιτροπή στο πλαίσιο της «συντονιστικής ομάδας του EU4Health», για να διασφαλιστεί η συνοχή και η συμπληρωματικότητα με τις εθνικές πολιτικές υγείας. Οι χώρες γνωμοδοτούν στην επιτροπή του προγράμματος EU4Health πριν από την έγκριση των ετήσιων προγραμμάτων εργασίας. Τρίτες χώρες, εκτός ΕΕ, συνδεμένες με το πρόγραμμα EU4Health, επωφελούνται από τη χρηματοδότησή του και συμμετέχουν στη διαδικασία διαβούλευσης και παρακολουθούν τις εργασίες της συντονιστικής ομάδας και της επιτροπής του προγράμματος. Τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη, συμπεριλαμβανομένων εκπροσώπων της κοινωνίας των πολιτών και ενώσεων ασθενών, πανεπιστημιακών και οργανώσεων επαγγελματιών του τομέα της υγείας, παρέχουν στοιχεία σχετικά με τις προτεραιότητες και τους στρατηγικούς προσανατολισμούς, καθώς και σχετικά με τις ανάγκες που πρέπει να καλυφθούν μέσω του ετήσιου προγράμματος εργασίας. Στη συνέχεια το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο ενημερώνεται σχετικά με την πρόοδο των προπαρασκευαστικών εργασιών και των δραστηριοτήτων προβολής με τα ενδιαφερόμενα μέρη (Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή-Public Health, 2022).

Τέλος, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή καταρτίζει, εγκρίνει και υλοποιεί τα ετήσια προγράμματα εργασίας, παρακολουθώντας ταυτόχρονα την επίτευξη των στόχων του προγράμματος, υποβάλλοντας εκθέσεις σχετικά με την πρόοδο του. Επιπρόσθετα, η Επιτροπή, για τεχνικά ή επιστημονικά θέματα που έχουν

σημασία για την υλοποίηση του προγράμματος, μπορεί να ζητήσει τη γνώμη σχετικών αποκεντρωμένων οργανισμών και ανεξάρτητων εμπειρογνωμόνων στον τομέα της υγείας. (Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, 2022a).

## Συμπεράσματα

Η ασθένεια της COVID-19 βρήκε απροετοίμαστη και υγειονομικά ανοχύρωτη όλη την παγκόσμια κοινότητα, καθώς και την Ευρώπη. Ειδικά στην Ευρώπη, η χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση οδήγησε πολλά κράτη μέλη να επιβάλουν δραστικές περικοπές δαπανών για την υγειονομική περίθαλψη. Η παγκόσμια διακυβέρνηση των πανδημιών και της ΕΕ εμφανίστηκαν τόσο κατακερματισμένες όσο και ανεπαρκώς συντονισμένες. Οι περισσότερες χώρες βρέθηκαν απροετοίμαστες και οι υπάρχοντες μηχανισμοί συντονισμού φάνηκαν πολύ αδύναμοι για να αποτρέψουν μιας τέτοιας έκτασης υγειονομική κρίση (Renda & Castro, 2020).

Η πανδημία της COVID-19 ανέδειξε τις καταστροφικές συνέπειες των εύθραυστων συστημάτων κοινωνικής ασφάλειας, τόσο σε παγκόσμιο επίπεδο όσο και εντός της ΕΕ, θέτοντας επί τάπητος το ζήτημα της αναγκαιότητας του κοινωνικού κράτους, το οποίο αντιμετωπίστηκε ως ο μεγάλος ασθενής κατά τη διάρκεια της οικονομικής κρίσης που προηγήθηκε της πανδημίας. Τα στοιχεία ανέδειξαν ότι όσο πιο ανεπτυγμένο είναι ένα κοινωνικό κράτος και οι μηχανισμοί του, τόσο πιο πιθανότερο είναι να αντιμετωπιστούν αποτελεσματικότερα πανδημικά προβλήματα υγείας. Συνεπώς, αυτή η πανδημία μπορεί να αποτελέσει ευκαιρία τόσο για τα κοινωνικά κράτη, όσο και για τους διεθνείς οργανισμούς για να δράσουν προς την καταπολέμηση και τη μείωση των ανισοτήτων (Τζαγκαράκης, Μελίδης & Κρήτας, 2022). Όπως είπε κάποτε ο John F. Kennedy, η ώρα να διορθωθεί μία στέγη είναι όταν λάμπει ο ήλιος (Renda & Castro, 2020).

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