


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
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Collective Memory and Political Mythologies: Eleftherios Venizelos in Greek Postwar Historiography, 1945–1967

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In recent decades, questions about the role of great personalities in history have returned – but in a whole new fashion. Instead of researching how these personalities acted or advocating for or against their greatness, scholars are more interested in how great men – and rarely women – become great symbols, in how they were commemorated and in how they served as vehicles for various political and social agendas, while they were alive and after their deaths.¹ At the crossroads of social, cultural and political history, this academic trend seems to have originated in sources as diverse as the study of Soviet personality cults during the Cold War, biographies, memory studies, new political and social history, and a mix of historical sociology and political science.² Some accounts in this vein are more sociology-oriented,³ mainly those originating from the United States, while others, mainly those produced in Europe, focus more on the historical aspects of this phenomenon.⁴ Either way, these works seem to have contributed greatly to our understanding of how collective memory and symbolic politics work and are intertwined. In modern Greek historiography, only a few such works have appeared in the context of the rise of cultural history since the 1990s and of the contemporary rise of memory studies.⁵ In these studies, an important factor is how various public narratives about the historical figure in question contributed to the shaping of his or her reputation. These “paper monuments”, as Michael J. Hogan calls them, serve as a vehicle through which various memory agents promote historical reputations and formulate narratives about the past.⁶ This article attempts to describe an extended array of such narratives about one of the most prominent historical figures of twentieth century Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos.

While attempting to examine the whereabouts of a historical figure’s memory, we should take into account the sociological aspect of collective memory studies. According to Wulf Kansteiner’s insightful methodological model, we should consider three factors in understanding collective memory: the intellectual and cultural traditions that frame our representations of the past, the creators of memory, and its consumers.⁷ Moreover, to grasp how the past is commemorated and used, we should examine, on the one hand, the functions of certain modes of historical thinking, and, on the other, the practices through which these representations are produced and disseminated. According to Barry Schwartz, memory is a cultural system, that is, a symbolic system through which societies organise

their experiences and aspirations. In other words, collective memory is effective only if it can be embedded into narratives, institutions, archives, monuments, rituals, etc.⁸ This leads us to the processes of memory work: in a truly multivocal procedure, various memory agents produce different narratives about the past by choosing which of its elements are useful to them, struggling to make their version the prevailing one.⁹ This does not mean that we deal only with arbitrary constructions that just happen to fit to our present needs; there *is* a past, not as a physical object, but as a layered corpus from which we choose what to use and what to interpret. The latter applies to both historiography and public history – it is their goals and practices that differ. However, the past itself sets forth some restrictions to *what* can be interpreted and in *which way*. At the same time, prevalent interpretations of the past usually determine future ones to some extent, forming layers and trajectories for our collective beliefs about events, personalities and other historical landmarks. In other words, the past's malleability is not infinite, and if a narrative about it cannot be plausible, it will not be effective.¹⁰

The Greek case: Eleftherios Venizelos revisited

In his introduction as the editor of an important collective volume, Paschalis Kitromilides argues that there is a “more or less general consensus” about Eleftherios Venizelos (1864–1936) being “the most important statesman in Greek political history and the creator of contemporary Greece”. This “Venizelos cult”, as he calls it, can be traced in politics, public opinion, historiography, literature, monuments, and even in the name of Athens International Airport. This was not always the case; Venizelos seems to have been unanimously recognised as a national symbol only in the past 50 years.¹¹ The purpose of this article – based on my PhD thesis, in which I tried to analyse the posthumous political uses, historiographical accounts and public commemorations concerning Venizelos – is to trace the historical context of this pantheonisation of Venizelos between 1945 and 1967, especially through historiography and public narratives about the past. That is to say, I do not intend to describe every aspect of Venizelos’ postwar perception, but to highlight some key elements of it through a specific historiographical lens.

Although the impact of the Second World War has more or less overshadowed the First World War historically, the latter had a profound effect on almost every country and has been embedded in many national historiographical narratives as a key moment, perceived and commemorated in a variety of ways. In the Greek context, two main factors stand out: on the one hand, the First World War is perceived through the lens of the Greek-Turkish War of 1919–1922, the military defeat of Greece in Asia Minor and the ensuing refugee crisis; on the other hand, this war is framed and understood within a broader period, usually called the “war decade” (1912–1922).¹² Similarly, the Greek interwar period

is considered to have started not in 1919, but in 1922. In the epicentre of all these dramatic events of the early twentieth century, serving as a metonymy through which they were contextualised and understood later, stood one man: Venizelos. The status of Venizelos in Greek historical consciousness is one of a “founding father” – one similar Greek term attributed to him and to only a few others is ethnarch, the “leader of the nation”, and bears an intensely paternalistic subtext, while, at the same time, depoliticising a historical figure – due to his role in the reorganisation of the Greek state, and because of the territorial expansion of the country during his time, which was perceived as a national unification via the liberation of Greek-speaking peoples under foreign rule. This perception of Venizelos positioned him in a pantheon stretching from Alexander the Great to the prominent nineteenth century politician Harilaos Trikoupis, thus creating a long-lasting personality cult.¹³

Trying to understand how the first half of the twentieth century was framed and historicised in Greece after the Second World War, one always stumbles on Venizelos; at the same time, trying to examine how the historical reputation of one of the most important Greek politicians came to be, one cannot avoid the question of how the first half of the twentieth century transformed from a recent past into a crucial part of the Greek national narrative. For this to happen, many political and social actors did their own part; therefore, we need to address the pressing issue of *who* commemorated Venizelos and *why*. The protagonist of this story was, for the most part, the centrist political faction, which emerged right after the end of the Second World War claiming to be the rightful political successor of Venizelism. Their claim was based on the fact that the major political party of this faction was the Liberal Party, which was founded by Venizelos himself in 1910, and the fact that a great part of centrist politicians had been his political partners. In the political spectrum, the centrists, who were strongly anticommunist for the most part, stood between the right – who would have been the successors of the anti-Venizelists, had they claimed so – and the communist left, which originated in the early twentieth century, but whose first considerable impact occurred in the 1940s.¹⁴ To this day, the centrists are considered the “natural” successors of Venizelos, but this assumption has a blind spot: the fact that, although there were many centrists with a Venizelist past, this claim had its own historicity and was constructed over time.¹⁵ In other words, there were other contestants for the position of Venizelos’ successor, but the centrists’ version of the past prevailed – first, because it was they who were most interested in supporting such a claim and, secondly, because they had the political and symbolic resources to do so. This was made possible by a nexus of political, historiographical and other ventures and was framed by the historical context of the early postwar decades. That is to say that historical reputations and historiographical interpretations of the past are not formed in a vacuum; social agents, institutions and cultural products like newspapers and books determine how the past is handled and how political mythologies are shaped and used – in other words, how the historical past is turned into a practical past that helps us understand our present by formulating a narrative for

selected parts of history.¹⁶ In fact, the press and journalism often function as important memory agents, influencing and reflecting public conceptions about the past.¹⁷ After all, almost all kinds of self-representations are based on some primogenitor and on the concept of generations; personal and collective memory are thus amalgamated, and personal mythologies are turned into traditions shared by groups – among which political ones hold a special position.¹⁸ Venizelos' historical reputation and the historisation of the first half of the Greek twentieth century is by definition such a case.

Newspapers and books published between 1945 and 1967 are the ideal sources for this type of research: the Greek press of the time took great interest in politics, it was read by millions, and disseminated news, opinions and narratives to the majority of Greek people.¹⁹ Books circulated less widely, of course, but they served the purpose of cementing beliefs and freezing them in time. It should be stressed that many of the newspaper stories and features that will be discussed in this article were published in books, either later or even at the same time; the latter is of great importance as it shows that the newspaper material was often considered both equally valid to and as timeless as a book – in our case, a history book. This broad public sphere was both of intellectual and political interest to its contemporaries, and the agents who produced these texts had a role that transcended their occupation as journalists, politicians or military officers, as we will discuss below.

This material can be examined through three interconnected axes: first, by genre: texts about Venizelos were either historiographical or autobiographical; second, by political affiliation: these narratives generally reflected their authors' political choices – centrist, leftist or right-wing; third, by format: they were published either as newspaper articles or as books. Of course, these axes are purely methodological; hybrid narratives of both historiographical and autobiographical nature appeared frequently, and the same texts were often published both as articles and books. However, all these publications constituted a nexus with the same goal: to historicise Venizelos and his era during the early postwar decades. I will attempt to examine all three axes at once with certain examples, highlighting important aspects of distinct publications on the Cretan leader.

Eleftherios Venizelos between historiography and politics

Historiographical texts about Venizelos and his era were the core of the nexus described in this article; this corpus had certain general characteristics, which transcended political affiliation and media format. First of all, their period of reference was the first half of the twentieth century, and they all revolved around Venizelos as a metonymy – in other words, almost no one could write about this era without referring to Venizelos; second, they dealt with a period that had hitherto received almost no historiographical attention, so they usually relied on unknown archival sources and autobiographical texts, stressing their

importance and the need to pinpoint their field of study; third, they were frequently used as a foundation for political analogies in their time, and they were closely involved with contemporary politics. Among them, the most influential were those of centrist affiliation, many of which were initially published as newspaper serial articles.

Ever since the interwar period, Greek newspapers were rich in historical material. Although there did exist other genres of historical and commemorative texts about the Cretan leader in the press – such as anniversary and political articles – we will focus on serial historical narratives about Venizelos and his era. These texts were a crucial part of postwar public history in Greece, and they were produced by prominent journalists and intellectuals who conducted in-depth research, citing unpublished documents and keeping in touch with international scholarly literature. Serial narratives were published for long periods of time, stretching from a few weeks to several uninterrupted years, and generating public debates about the past. They are examined as a particular form of historiography with its own conventions and goals, in an attempt to understand how they formed and disseminated a specific array of schemes and interpretations about Venizelos and early twentieth-century Greece, in close connection to the realm of politics. Books, on the other hand, did not have such an explicit topicality, but they were equally important for the formation of the postwar historiography about Venizelos and his era. Between 1945 and 1967, dozens of such books were published, but there is still no full bibliography of them; in an early attempt to paint a picture of this mosaic, I will refer to selected works from specific categories and genres, reflecting different paths within public history and distinct historiographical choices according to respective methodological and political perspectives.

From 1945 to 1967, a total of 37 serial historical narratives concerning Venizelos and his era were published – often in times of great political turmoil, like 1952 and 1962 for instance. A great part of those narratives appeared in centrist newspapers, which indicates this political faction's endeavour to preserve and promote the memory of Venizelos as its own primogenitor. I will focus on three serial historical narratives, which reflect three distinct phases of the formation of this historiographical corpus. The first one is *Greece Between Two Wars, 1923–1940* by journalist Grigorios Dafnis, which is still regarded as one of the most influential works concerning the political history of the Greek interwar period. Dafnis' work was originally serialised in *Eleftheria*, from 4 January 1953 to 22 April 1954, and was then published in two volumes in 1955 by the prominent publishing house Ikaros. George Mavrogordatos stresses the importance of Dafnis' work as the first to reconsider Venizelos' era in a critical manner, picking up the torch from previous important, albeit eulogistic works, like the one by Georgios Ventiris in 1931.²⁰ Dafnis' work appeared at a time of a restructuring of the centrist political faction, due to the gradual domination of Greek politics by right-wing parties – led by Alexandros Papagos and his successor, Konstantinos Karamanlis – that reaped the benefits of the Greek Civil War of 1946–1949. After a peak in historical material about Venizelos in the Greek press during the 1952 election campaign, Dafnis attempted to formulate the first total narrative of the Greek interwar period,

essentially creating a new field of study which he had to frame and explain.²¹ Dafnis divided the interwar period into two subperiods: the domination of the Venizelist faction in the 1920s and the rise of the anti-Venizelists in the 1930s – the former being perceived as an era of relative political stability, and the latter as a political and social crisis. Despite his apparent Venizelist affiliation, Dafnis formulated a complete theory about the presence of Venizelos on the Greek political scene, in which the Cretan leader's latter active decade was regarded critically, since, he argued, Venizelos had become a conservative who had lost his connection to the social forces that supported him.²² Dafnis' work generated a sizeable public discussion that was articulated via letters by both Venizelist and anti-Venizelist ex-ministers and retired military officers, it was – and still is – frequently cited by other historians, and gained him the reputation of an expert in modern Greek political history.²³

The second serial narrative we will focus on is the work of Polychronis Enepekidis, who taught at the University of Vienna. Enepekidis published two major narratives: "The Secret Archives of Vienna", published in *To Vima* from 13 November 1960 to 16 February 1961, and "The Royal Guerrilla War", published in *Ta Nea* from 5 March to 19 April 1962. These two narratives were collected in a book under the title *The Glory and the Schism: From the Secret Archives of Vienna, Berlin and Berne*, published in 1962 in two volumes. Enepekidis presented the "voice of the documents", which were presumed to carry their own truth and did not require any mediation; the author acted as a host, who, using an almost literary prose, brought to light the conspiracies plotted by the anti-Venizelists from 1915 to 1918 against Venizelos, the Greek people and the Entente. In an editorial, *To Vima* explained that these serial narratives were a part of its contribution to modern historiography that aimed for the people to draw useful insights about the past and the present; the ultimate goal was to avoid another schism like the one of 1915.²⁴ The timing was crucial: in the early 1960s, a great clash, called the "Relentless Struggle" – in which the left participated reluctantly – began to arise between a social coalition led by the Centre Union party and Karamanlis' governing right-wing party, the National Radical Union. The contested elections of 1961 were the spark that ignited underlying political and social tensions in the semiauthoritarian Greek state, and Venizelos was an important symbol used to frame the political struggle. The crown's political interventions were a target for the centrists, so the National Schism of 1915 was the appropriate framework for them to use against the government and the "deep state".²⁵ In contrast to the introspective first phase of the mid-1950s, at the turn of the decade a growing historiography and bibliography about Venizelos reflected a volatile political environment, in which the "royal guerrilla" (that is, the fierce political interventions of the crown against democracy and the country itself) was considered an appropriate historiographical term, and the antiroyalist acts of Venizelos in 1916–1917 offered a useful example of this clash.²⁶

The most representative serial narrative of the third historiographical phase is

“Eleftherios Venizelos and his era” by the prominent journalist, author and playwright Georgios Roussos. Roussos’ work, which was also published in *To Vima* newspaper, is the longest of the era, spanning from 19 March 1961 to 11 December 1966; due to the military dictatorship of 1967–1974, it was only published in book form in 1975, as the fifth volume of his *Modern History of the Greek Nation, 1826–1974*. As it was clearly stated by the newspaper, the narrative was closely connected to that of Enepekidis, whose archival research was a major source for Roussos, among others. Using dramatic literary prose, influenced by his playwriting and writing of historical novels, Roussos argued that Venizelos’ feats were constantly stalled and destroyed by evil forces, namely the crown and the anti-Venizelists. Writing during the fiercest phase of the aforementioned clash, which led to the military coup of 1967, Roussos place the responsibility for every negative development of the early twentieth century at the door of Venizelos’ opponents, who were the predecessors of the author’s contemporary *antidrasis* (meaning “reactionary forces”, a common term of the era used by centrists and leftists against the nexus of right-wing parties, the crown, the military and US involvement in Greece). In fact, Roussos argued, the national triumph of the “war decade” was a result of Venizelos’ large-scale internal reforms and of his diplomatic skills, contradicting the widespread assumption that these military victories were an accomplishment of both Venizelos and the monarch.²⁷ Roussos’ narrative often found itself in the political spotlight: in an unusual act, King Paul provided the newspaper with archival material, attempting to participate in the latest historiographical trend concerning a period of great interest to the crown, while Roussos often attacked the royal family for its lavish lifestyle during the First World War and for conspiring with the Germans against Greece.²⁸ During a political clash between the Centre Union and the government about the omission of Venizelos’ name in the 50th commemoration of the Balkan Wars, the arguments of Roussos about King Constantine’s poor military leadership were used by both the Centre Union and the centrist newspapers.²⁹ Moreover, Roussos was in frequent contact with other Venizelist agents, like the retired lieutenant general Dimitrios Vakas, with whom he exchanged historical data and articles about Venizelos.³⁰ Roussos’ narrative holds a key position in the Venizelist and centrist nexus of the era, as it was simultaneously formed in both historiography and politics over two decades.

In the initial postwar decades, a special kind of quasi-historiographical text appeared, aiming specifically at preserving Venizelos’ legacy through the publication of his articles, quotes and archives – either in newspapers or in books. An exceptional example is the work of Stefanos Stefanou, who served as Venizelos’ secretary from 1928 to 1932. He actively promoted the historical reputation of Venizelos through institutions – mainly the Liberal Club, the Liberal Party think tank – and through numerous publications. Although Stefanou wrote some newspaper articles, his most important work of the era was a two-volume book *Eleftherios Venizelos’ Political Testaments*, published in 1965. This work comprised selected texts, articles, speeches and quotes by Venizelos, with a lengthy introduction by journalist and Venizelos’ close partner Potis Tsimpidaros – also an active

reputational entrepreneur of the Cretan leader – and by Stefanou. In this introduction, they tried to pinpoint the state of Venizelos' legacy and reputation; the booming literature about him, they wrote, was a clear sign of this pantheonisation of Venizelos, so they published this book to capture his essence –since he had not written a memoir himself – which would be a valuable guide for contemporary issues.³¹ Using the widespread expression “Venizelos' testament(s)”, Stefanou sought to provide his contemporaries with a collection of almost sacred texts, aiming at the quasireligious reception of Venizelos by his followers, even after his death.

A more official historiographical account serving the same goal was the multivolume *Book of Eleftherios Venizelos*, published in 1964 by Tassos Michalakeas and funded by Centre Union government. This work, which included a foreword by Prime Minister Georgios Papandreu, was actually a lavish collection of texts and illustrations about Venizelos by prominent writers, poets, journalists, politicians and historians, conveying the aforementioned centrist narrative.³² The timing of the publication was not, in fact, arbitrary; the book was an important part of the politics of history that the Centre Union advocated during its incumbency, concerning a heroic version of the Venizelist past: the government celebrated the centennial of Venizelos in 1964–1965 with a vast array of events, rituals, memorial services, lectures, the production of a documentary, radio broadcasts, press features and memorabilia. The political and historical message was clear: the centrist government was celebrating its primogenitor and was placing itself in the grand genealogy of the Venizelist saga.

While becoming an increasingly important element of the Greek national narrative, Venizelos also appeared in mainstream and authoritative sources of knowledge. An interesting example is the *Great Greek Encyclopaedia* – the definitive source of general knowledge at the time: in its 1929 edition, the entry about Venizelos – written by politician and journalist Theodoros Vellianitis – focused only on his diplomatic accomplishments until then, without making any reference to his internal reforms. On the contrary, in the encyclopaedia's addendum of 1956, the respective entry, written by Tsipidaris, narrated Venizelos' career since his beginnings, stressing that much research was still needed on the Cretan leader's work. The crucial difference was the focus on his internal reforms, which were meticulously listed in respective subchapters, and resonating with other attempts to re-evaluate Venizelos' legacy in a more detailed and systematic way.³³

Anti-Venizelist historical texts were not popular in the early postwar period. What was actually popular, though, were positive perceptions of Venizelos by right-wing former anti-Venizelists, such as Papagos and Karamanlis. Such politicians presented themselves as heirs to Venizelos' legacy through a nationalistic lens, focusing on elements like his diplomatic feats and anticommunist policies while distancing themselves from the republican aspects of Venizelism and of Venizelos himself. In other words, in their eyes

Venizelos had to be depoliticised in order to become a much-needed national leader – a phenomenon that can be often observed, as in the case of Napoleon.³⁴ In the historiographical field, the most prominent author of anti-Venizelist descent was Spyros Markezinis, who was also an important right-wing politician. In 1966, Markezinis published his four-volume *Political History of Modern Greece, 1828–1964*. He formulated an interpretation that no other historian had at that time, and that directly reflected his political views: he argued that Venizelos did not become conservative over time, but that he had been a “progressive conservative” all along. His clash with King Constantine was a mere character disagreement, and he should not have been so attached to Britain. In other words, Venizelos was a true conservative who was derailed by foreign influence and by his socialist colleagues. In the end, the Cretan leader lost control due to the assassination attempt against him in 1933, and concluded his career with the wrong decision of organising the failed military coup of 1935.³⁵

Apart from his presence in ambitious historiographical publications, sources of general knowledge and political texts, Venizelos was also a hero who became an inspiration for authors more oriented towards popular culture. Such an example was the right-wing author and playwright Spyros Melas. Melas was essentially a professional writer of all sorts, who used to write about anything popular – it is not surprising, therefore, that he published numerous newspaper articles and a trilogy about Venizelos and his era.³⁶ Melas denied the mainstream scheme of Venizelos as the leader of the emergent Greek bourgeoisie, claiming that, neither in Venizelos’ era nor in his own, had there existed any social classes. The Liberal Party was described as a personal creation of Venizelos, whom the people trusted so much that there was no need for the existence of MPs.³⁷ Melas’ work was a prominent example of mainstream anticommunism and of subtle authoritarianism in the context of national-mindedness – a context in which Venizelos was often perceived as the forefather of Greek anticommunism and as an example of how a semiauthoritarian democracy should work under the rule of one strong leader. This use of great statesmen to glorify charismatic leadership in contrast to the “weakness of parliamentary rule” was common in Europe both before and after the Second World War, as illustrated in the Bismarck case.³⁸

Having examined various views on Venizelos by both Venizelist and anti-Venizelist authors, it is time we focus on the left. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the left – either socialist or communist – had had an intense relationship with Venizelism. The communist left had a fierce enmity towards Venizelos as the leader of the bourgeoisie – after all, he enacted the first Greek anticommunist law in 1929 – but after the failed coup of 1935 an alliance between the Venizelist and leftist masses was formed – pejoratively called “Venizelo-communism” – due to the restoration of monarchy by the anti-Venizelists.³⁹ In spite of these ephemeral alliances, the stance of the communist left towards Venizelos remained negative, and the stance of his heirs towards the left remained ambivalent: in the context of national-mindedness, the centrists clearly differentiated themselves from

communism, but, by the early 1960s, some kind of loose alliance started to form against the right and the crown. One could think that history was repeating itself, but we have to take into consideration that this impression is heavily influenced by the political uses of the past that the subjects of the era themselves used, directly comparing, for example, 1915 to 1965.

Leftist intellectuals produced many historical texts in the early postwar decades, both in Greece and abroad – due to the fact that the Communist Party had been outlawed since 1947 – most of which were published directly as books or brochures. Usually, the references to Venizelos were part of broader, Marxist interpretations of Greek history, which were often used as political arguments. For example, Giorgis Lamprinos' book *Monarchy in Greece*, published in 1945 and again 20 years later, was intended as a tool for the people to understand the regime issue, that is, whether Greece should be a monarchy or not – which was trending both in 1945 and in 1965. The author argued that Venizelos betrayed the Goudi coup of 1909, by forming an alliance with the crown, and by promoting only minor reforms. The National Schism was interpreted as an internal conflict of the bourgeoisie, and Venizelos seized all the popular support for himself in the absence of a truly radical political party.⁴⁰ On the contrary, Yanis Kordatos was not so critical of Venizelos; in his *The Interventions of the British in Greece* (1946), he argued that the Cretan leader was initially a progressive and a republican, but he was corrupted by British influence, only to become a servant of the crown.⁴¹ A few years later, Nikos Svoronos published an overview of Greek history in French, in which he argued that Venizelos was the leader of the emerging bourgeoisie, seeking to reorganise the Greek state according to the Western liberal model. However, he did not attempt radical social reform and, by 1922, had already lost his progressive momentum. For Svoronos, this was a symptom of the alliance between the two parts of the bourgeoisie (that is, the “progressive” Venizelist elites and the “conservative” anti-Venizelist ones), which had emerged at the end of the First World War.⁴² The next important historiographical work in our timeline is Kordatos' five-volume *History of Modern Greece*, published in 1957–1958. In this work – the only one of communist descent that Markezinis deemed was worth referring to⁴³ – he cited Ventiris as his primary source, although he argued that the latter was too biased in favour of Venizelos and thus extracted erroneous conclusions. His main scheme was that, although Venizelos and the bourgeoisie initially clashed with conservative forces, they ended up forming an alliance with them due to the rise of the working class.⁴⁴ The only left-wing work specifically about Venizelos was the three-volume *Eleftherios Venizelos: His Life and Work*, published in 1959 by Dimitrios Pournaras, an agrarian socialist, publisher and author who had already written books about Kapodistrias and Trikoupis. His work can be compared to other centre-leftist ones, namely the historical articles of the *Eleftheria* newspaper, and the political and historical discourse of Nikolaos Plastiras' National Progressive Centre Union (EPEK). Pournaras established a

pantheon of defenders of the “democratic idea”, stretching from eighteenth-century revolutionary Rigas Fereos up to Venizelos, who fought against the conservative forces. While this clash of good versus evil is reminiscent of the centrist serial narratives, there is a difference: Pournaras argued that, although Venizelos was a great leader who sought to support the people, he also committed great mistakes, so he was not as great as his followers believed.⁴⁵ Well into the 1960s, and with the aforementioned movement against the right gradually on the rise, left-wing historiography made the appropriate turn: Spyros Linardatos, possibly the most popular journalist-historian of that faction in that decade, published two books seeking to explain how the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936–1941 came to be. Starting from the assumption that “progressive historiography” had not yet touched on modern Greek history, he argued that the early twentieth century could be explained as a clash between the bourgeoisie and the working class. Venizelos, as the leader of the progressive part of the former, took some initiatives towards social reform but did not have the courage to proceed further. Although he was indeed a great personality and the only true leader during the “war decade”, he was overly attached to Britain and his presence decelerated the radicalisation of the masses. Over time, he became more conservative, orienting himself towards fascist Italy. Linardatos cited all major centrist serial narratives and leftist books, and frequently quoted them, mainly Dafnis and Kordatos. In the context of the “anti-right-wing ideology” of the 1960s, Linardatos argued that the domination of the right had begun in 1935, and accused the centrists of compromising on numerous occasions.⁴⁶

A distinct kind of historiography was that of the Greek military. The latter had attempted to establish a historical department in 1914, but it was only after the civil war, in 1954, that the Army History Directorate was founded.⁴⁷ Its founding year and its publications schedule is indicative of the new, more active role of the military in the public sphere in the context of national-mindedness, as perceived by the politically dominant right of Papagos and Karamanlis.⁴⁸ The military sought to write its own history, as many institutions often do, and, at the same time, tried to historicise the “war decade” in terms of military feats, as a constitutive part of the grand national narrative.⁴⁹ While trying to maintain a neutral language, it was clear that in the military’s books King Constantine was considered the one true leader of the army; in fact, in a book about the First World War, the author – citing only books published in the interwar period – argued that the majority of the Greek people did not support Venizelos, who used the Entente’s force for political ends.⁵⁰ The rest of the authors avoided referring to politics,⁵¹ constructing a narrative about the early twentieth century according to which the army had made a major contribution in Greek history and to the formation of the modern Greek state. The official military discourse of the postwar era sought to cement the military’s position of power not only in the recent events of the civil war, but also in its feats during the early twentieth century. Regardless of its crucial role in the National Schism and of its division into two factions during that period, the post-civil war military attempted to depoliticise these events by narrating early twentieth-century

history as a continuum of seamless national triumphs. At the same time, the military disseminated a normalised anticommunist discourse that was rooted, among other aspects, in history; concerning our area of interest, an example of this discourse can be found in an army handbook, in which the author argued that Venizelos essentially cofounded the Greek Socialist Party (sic) in 1918, in order to promote the Greek interests in Macedonia among international left-wing circles. However, as benevolent Venizelos' intentions may have been, communist spies prevailed inside the party.⁵² This narrative indicates that perceptions about Venizelos and his era, for example that he was the forefather of anticommunist policies, were disseminated via different sources, only to serve similar goals.

Vehicles of memory: autobiographical publications on Venizelos

As Luisa Passerini argues, autobiographies are constructions that uncover the cultural environment that produced them.⁵³ Autobiographical publications on Venizelos and his era were very frequent in the early postwar decades. Although they cannot be considered as historiographical texts, they hold a special position within the nexus described; in fact, the authors' personal relationship with Venizelos was an experience that constituted them as Venizelist subjects who had the right to uncover the truth and to preserve their leader's legacy.⁵⁴ Many of them were initially serialised in newspapers, often regarded as being of equal historical value to the historiographical narratives, and they were frequently cited in the latter.

It is not surprising that one of the most important memoirs was that of Venizelos' widow, Elena, who was a reputational entrepreneur in the truest sense: she communicated frequently with journalists, authors and researchers about her late husband's legacy, she tended to the publication of Venizelos' translation of Thucydides in English and in modern Greek, she participated in the annual memorial services in Crete via a proxy, and – most interestingly – she published her memoirs titled *In the Shadow of Venizelos* in the prominent centrist *To Vima* newspaper, along with many personal letters she and her late husband had exchanged over the years.⁵⁵ In her memoir, she deliberately positioned herself below her husband, questioning if "a prophet, a God, was in need of a wife" – juxtaposing gender stereotypes with widespread assumptions about Venizelos' special nature.⁵⁶

Another important category of memoirs, given the heavy involvement of the military in politics during the Venizelos era, were those of retired military officers. The first important postwar memoirs were those of retired major general Alexandros Mazarakis-Ainian, which were published posthumously in 1948 (he had passed away in 1943); Mazarakis, a Venizelist, had been writing his memoirs from 1932 until his death, and his work quickly became a standard source for almost anyone writing about the Venizelos era – including

Dafnis, Enepekidis and Roussos. According to the author, Venizelos completely reformed the Greek state, but he made the mistake of trusting King Constantine and his people. Despite his greatness, Venizelos had his own grave flaws: he demanded that his colleagues be blindly loyal and noncritical of him, being very prone to rapid changes of heart about people and political issues.⁵⁷ Published somewhat earlier (1946), but while its author was still alive, were the memoirs of the key anti-Venizelist figure Viktor Dousmanis, who, along with Ioannis Metaxas, was one of the most trusted military and political confidants of King Constantine. Dousmanis' is one of the few anti-Venizelist works that drew considerable attention, in the context of the postwar Venizelist historiographical domination, and it was often cited only to be contradicted. The first chapter of the book was about Venizelos: although Dousmanis acknowledged him as a capable politician, he argued that, in order to have become a truly great leader, Venizelos should not have been driven by passion and selfishness. According to the author, Venizelos was jealous of Constantine's abilities and popularity, so he tried to subdue him. Throughout his career, the Cretan leader's sole purpose was to assume power, undermining everyone in order to achieve his goal. All his accomplishments were, in fact, someone else's working, be it the military, his partners or the Entente.⁵⁸ Unlike Mazarakis and Dousmanis, who died in the 1940s, other military officials actively participated in the postwar political and historiographical field and produced memoirs later on. An important example is Stylianos Gonatas, who was one of the leaders of the Venizelist military coup of 1922, who later cofounded the Security Battalions during the German occupation, and, in 1945, founded the National Liberal Party, claiming to be the true successor of Venizelos. Parts of his memoirs were initially published in the New York-based newspaper *Atlantis* and in the Athenian newspaper *Akropolis* in 1957–1958, and were then published in a book both in English and in Greek in 1958. The main purpose and goal of the book – to establish Gonatas' reputation as the one true successor of Venizelos and to cement his political status – was clear right from the beginning: the book started with a large photo of Venizelos, accompanied by a quote of his praising Gonatas. In the rest of the book, the author narrated his accomplishments in a stark prose, referring to Venizelos mainly in order to establish his point that he was the only one who had the right to evoke the Cretan leader – unlike all the others, who, as he wrote, took advantage of Venizelos' name and legacy. Gonatas' memoirs are an interesting example of the blurred lines between political uses of the past and autobiographical texts, which were really common during this era.⁵⁹

Several retired military officers attempted to blend historiographical and autobiographical texts; among them, an exceptional case is Dimitrios Vakas, who wrote several articles and books about Venizelos. Starting from his own experiences during the 1916–1917 Venizelist National Defence military and political movement, Vakas wrote articles in Greek and in French, aiming to historicise this period, and, as already mentioned, kept contact with other authors. Among his many books, two stand out; the first one, *Greater Greece: Eleftherios Venizelos, a Leader in War* was published in 1949 and again in

1965. His book, part of which was published in the *Ethnos* newspaper in 1948, was widely read and cited; it started with a letter by Venizelos's son and prominent politician Sofoklis praising Vakas' work. The author's main goal in this book was twofold: on the one hand, to argue that the "war decade" of 1912–1922 was equally heroic to the 1821–1830 War of Independence and to the Greek-Italian War of 1940–1941, and, on the other hand, to underline Venizelos' military leadership.⁶⁰ In 1965, Vakas published a book titled *Eleftherios Venizelos: His Life and Work*, in which Venizelos was compared to Themistocles, Pericles, Alexander the Great, Bismarck, Cavour and even Moses.⁶¹ The books' goal was to summarise all the standard schemes about the Cretan leader that had been articulated in the previous years; in order to accomplish that, Vakas chose the format of the cheap, short pocketbook, aspiring to give readers an easy way to approach a dense historiographical corpus spanning at least 20 years.

Conclusions: what is left of the (Venizelist) past?

During the early postwar decades, Eleftherios Venizelos was frequently commemorated by numerous different agents and for various different reasons. He served as the primogenitor of the emerging centrist political faction; he was appointed the forefather of the anticommunist national-mindedness; he was used as a prism through which the history of the first half of the twentieth century was contextualised. His memory gradually transformed from a divisive one, him being the leader of a political faction in a fierce clash, to a widely accepted one, him becoming the "founding father" of the modern Greek state. Those who most successfully claimed to be his heirs – the centrists – produced a corpus of historical narratives, elevating him to an almost divine status – as often happens with national heroes, like Lincoln and Garibaldi.⁶² But they were not the only ones to produce narratives about Venizelos; in a dense field of historical discourse, agents of all sorts wrote about him and "his era", trying to pinpoint a particular past in the context of a brave new present.

In this research, our main question is not who the rightful heir of Eleftherios Venizelos was, but who felt the need to *present* themselves as such and who *claimed to have* the right to do so. Trying to connect the dots, the focus of this article was not on what was written about Venizelos between 1945 and 1967, but on how these publications were interconnected, constituting an interpretative corpus and a network of people and institutions, whose version about a certain past prevailed. This nexus can be located in the space between politics, historiography and public history, in a process through which various agents, after the Second World War, sought to historicise the early twentieth century, creating a corpus of texts and schemes about the leader who served as a metonymy of that period. This aspect of Venizelos as a metonymy is of great importance, and it means that essentially no one in Greece could write about the first half of the

twentieth century without referring to the Cretan leader.

With only few exceptions, this corpus was not an academic one; serial narratives, books, and other publications on Venizelos and the early twentieth century were produced by journalists, retired military officers, politicians and other public intellectuals, many of whom were of Venizelist origin. The latter, on the one hand, sought to historicise their memory, and, on the other, cemented a political genealogy between Venizelos and their contemporary centrist parties according to the historical evolution of this faction during 1945–1967. These narratives circulated within the public sphere, either as newspaper pieces or as books; they constituted a public discourse about the past, in which various agents took part, either promoting Venizelos' historical reputation or examining his period historically. Prominent reputational entrepreneurs like Elena Venizelos and Stefanos Stefanou used resources, institutional positions and specific narratives, ensuring that their version of the past would prevail. In that sense, Elena Venizelos could be compared to Jacqueline Kennedy, who, with Robert Kennedy's aid, had a major role in the selection of what would be published about the late president;⁶³ Stefanou, like Lincoln's secretary John Hay, tried to pass Venizelos' legacy onto his successors.⁶⁴ In other words, memory agents should be considered reputational entrepreneurs only if they actively promote a historical reputation via specific means, and with the clear goal to preserve it from oblivion and to highlight its timeless essence.

Academic historians played almost no part in the historiography of the era about Venizelos; academic journals of the time, like *Balkan Studies*, and university professors produced almost zero research output on the early twentieth century, due to their main focus on previous periods of Greek history at the time.⁶⁵ The bulk of the historiography about Venizelos was produced by journalists and writers. These agents – whether of Venizelist descent or not – created a distinct field of historical study, spanning from 1909 to 1941, and produced a set of historiographical claims which, albeit some first apparitions during the interwar period, were basically cemented in the early postwar decades, thus becoming a trend. Moreover, these interpretations served as historiographical foundations in Greek research about Venizelos and his era after 1974 – for example, the focus on his internal politics paved the way for the extensive discussion during the 1980s on his contribution to the modernisation of Greece. Some of these basic claims were that Venizelos was a great leader; that his period was autonomous, and not part of a broader one; that Venizelos was a product of his time and the leader of a social coalition led by the bourgeoisie; that his career should be divided into subperiods, and that he acted differently during each of those; that his internal reforms were equally important to his external feats. Apart from these foundational interpretations, a large array of schemes appeared in this period, reflecting the need for further research and the political affiliation of the authors: centrist authors' interpretations evolved from an initial attempt to re-evaluate Venizelos' work to his portrayal as a fierce enemy of various conservative forces; leftist historians analysed Venizelos' career in Marxist terms, according to which he was either a

progressive politician led astray by conservative colleagues and foreign agents, or a conservative bourgeois leader who tricked the masses into believing that he was their ally; the few prominent right-wing authors argued that Venizelos was in fact a conservative and a royalist, who relied only on his charisma and who repressed his political opponents. Regardless of the authors' affiliation, almost all agreed on the "dual Venizelos" scheme, according to which the Cretan leader's initial decade of work was superior to his final one.

Apart from reputational endeavours and historiographical attempts, a great part of publications on Venizelos were autobiographical. Albeit constituting a distinct discourse genre, these works were closely connected to other types, as an essential part of the nexus described in this article. In these texts, produced mainly by retired military officers, personal involvement in the narrated past was considered an advantage and an evidence of truth. In fact, the authors' personal relationship with Venizelos was an experience that constituted them as Venizelist subjects who therefore were entitled to uncover the truth and to preserve their leader's legacy. What stood out in these memoirs was the historisation of the early twentieth century as a saga; Venizelos was presented a war leader who greatly contributed to the expansion of Greece. Apart from in memoirs, this view was common both in historiographical works, and in official publications of the Greek Army, constituting a military discourse through which, on the one hand, the "war decade" of 1912–1922 was incorporated in the national narrative, and, on the other, the military cemented its power in the context of national-mindedness by formulating a genealogy of its national feats.

These different genres of narratives about Venizelos and the early twentieth century instigated a specific historical discourse in the early postwar decades. Although their conventions and their focus were different, all these narratives were part of a larger nexus involving distinct groups of agents that converged in a common goal: to historicise the Venizelos era and, in a broader perspective, to contextualise the early twentieth century and its relationship to contemporary post-Second World War Greece. Ventures like both the one described in this article and the separate, to some extent, discourse about the Asia Minor Catastrophe⁶⁶ indicate that after the Second World War there were still open wounds concerning a previous phase of Greek history. A few years after the dramatic events of the Second World War, the Venizelos era was then removed enough not to be contemporary, but it had not lost its currentness, so over time it could – and would – be used as a safe historical analogy for the new postwar era, where new political and social divisions had arisen. While the 1940s, with all their traumatic implications, generated the fiercest public debates about the past,⁶⁷ the first half of the twentieth century could – and did, to some extent, at least until the 1960s, when the centrists systematically used Venizelos as a tool in their political clash with the right – serve as a recent "golden age" in the national narrative for bourgeois political forces. In the context of anticommunist national-mindedness, the Venizelos era was often depicted retroactively as a time when political divisions were mild

and between factions that shared the same national ideals. In order for that to happen, the traumatic aspects of that era – mainly the National Schism and the Asia Minor Catastrophe – needed to be tarnished, and Venizelos needed to be depicted as the primogenitor of all bourgeois political forces, with a particular focus on his anticommunist policies. This aspect of Venizelos was of particular interest to right-wing political forces of anti-Venizelist descent; the latter were in great need of a unifying political symbol that would function complementarily to the crown, and for that reason they tried to detach Venizelos from radical republican perceptions of Venizelism. Consequently, and regardless of their goal, their assessment of the Cretan leader contributed to his overall positive historical reputation during the postwar period. Venizelos was the perfect metonymy for this venture, given his major impact on Greek history and the multiple claims to his legacy. The question of how exactly this happened, to what extent, which social forces promoted it, and what its impact on Greek political culture was, is one for another, broader research project. After all, in the early postwar decades, Venizelos transformed from being a leader of the National Schism to an almost unanimously accepted national symbol, and the corpus of narratives described in this article played a major role in this process – and, in the end, in Greek historical culture as we now know it.

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¹ Such works, pinned under the US term “reputation studies”, are referred in the following important review: Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998): 130.

² An early example of this approach in the context of the cultural Cold War was the following article by prominent American Sovietologist Robert C. Tucker, “The Rise of Stalin’s Personality Cult,” *American Historical Review* 84, no. 2 (1979): 347–66. Some of the first books to approach such phenomena in the realm of memory studies, influencing the next generation of scholars, were Merrill Peterson’s *The Jefferson Image in the American Mind* (1960; Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998) and Thomas L. Connelly’s *The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978). Another important influence was, and still is, the work of Benedict Anderson concerning national heroes, mainly in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

³ Some important US works in this vein, focused mainly in the reputation of influential US presidents, are Barry Schwartz, “Memory as a Cultural System: Abraham Lincoln in World War II,” *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 5 (1996): 908–27; Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era: History and Memory in Late Twentieth-Century America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Merrill D. Peterson, *Lincoln in American Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Gary Allan Fine, “Reputational Entrepreneurs and the Memory of Incompetence: Melting Supporters, Partisan Warriors, and Images of President Harding,” *American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 5 (1996): 1159–93; Fine, *Sticky Reputations: The Politics of Collective Memory in Midcentury America* (New York: Routledge, 2012); Michael J. Hogan, *The Afterlife of John Fitzgerald Kennedy: A Biography* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

⁴ European accounts on the reputation of important statesmen have flourished in the past years. Some examples include Lucy Riall, “Hero, Saint or Revolutionary? Nineteenth-century Politics and the Cult of Garibaldi,” *Modern Italy* 3, no. 2 (1998): 191–204; Riall, *Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero* (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 2007); Silvana Patriarca, “Unmaking the Nation? Uses and Abuses of Garibaldi in Contemporary Italy,” *Modern Italy* 15, no. 4 (2010): 467–83; Robert Gerwarth, *The Bismarck Myth: Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Gerwarth and Riall, “Fathers of the Nation? Bismarck, Garibaldi and the Cult of Memory in Germany and Italy,” *European History Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (2009): 388–413; John Ramsden, *Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and his Legend since 1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Richard Toye, “The Churchill Syndrome: Reputational Entrepreneurship and the Rhetoric of Foreign Policy since 1945,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10, no. 3 (2008): 364–78; Sudhir Hazareesingh, “Memory and Political Imagination: The Legend of Napoleon Revisited,” *French History* 18, no. 4 (2004): 463–83; Hazareesingh, “Napoleonic Memory in Nineteenth-Century France: The Making of a Liberal Legend,” *MLN* 120, no. 4 (2005): 747–73; Hazareesingh, *In the Shadow of the General: Modern France and the Myth of de Gaulle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Another interesting case is the one of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as examined in articles like Cengiz Çandar and David Pryce-Jones, “Atatürk’s Ambiguous Legacy,” *Wilson Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (2000): 88–96.

⁵ Some Greek scholarly works in this vein include Filippos Iliou, *Ιδεολογικές χρήσεις του κοραϊσμού στον 20ό αιώνα* [Ideological uses of Koraism in 20th century] (1989; Athens: Vivliorama, 2003); Christos Loukos, «Οι “τύχες” του Αλέξανδρου Μαυροκορδάτου στη νεοελληνική συνείδηση» [The “fortunes” of Alexandros Mavrokordatos in modern Greek consciousness], in *Η Επανάσταση του 1821: Μελέτες στη μνήμη της Δέσποινας Θεμελή-Κατηφόρη* [The 1821 revolution: studies in memoriam of Despina Themeli-Katiphori] (Athens: Society for the Study of Modern Hellenism, 1994), 93–106; Christina Koulouri and Christos Loukos, *Τα πρόσωπα του Καποδίστρια: Ο πρώτος κυβερνήτης της Ελλάδας και η νεοελληνική ιδεολογία (1831–1996)* [The faces of Kapodistrias: the first governor of Greece and modern Greek ideology (1831–1996)] (1996; Athens: Poreia, 2012); Giorgos Yannoulopoulos, *Διαβάζοντας τον Μακρυγιάννη: Η κατασκευή ενός μύθου από τον Βλαχογιάννη, τον Θεοτοκά, τον Σεφέρη και τον Λορεντζάτο* [Reading Makriyannis: the construction of a legend by Vlachoyannis, Theotokas, Seferis and Loretzatos] (Athens: Polis, 2003); Katerina Dede and Dimitris Dimitropoulos, eds., «*Η ματιά των άλλων*: Προσλήψεις προσώπων που σφράγισαν τρεις αιώνες (18ος–20ός) [The look of others: perceptions of personalities who left their mark over three centuries (18th–20th centuries)] (Athens: National Hellenic Research Institute, 2012); Koulouri, «Ο Καποδίστριας ως εθνικός ήρωας: Οι αντιφάσεις της μνήμης και της ιστορίας» [Kapodistrias as a national hero: the contradictions of memory and history], in *Ο κυβερνήτης Ιωάννης Καποδίστριας: Κριτικές προσεγγίσεις και επιβεβαιώσεις* [Governor Ioannis Kapodistrias: critical approaches and affirmations], ed. Giorgos Georgis (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2015), 88–107.

⁶ Hogan, *Afterlife of John Fitzgerald Kennedy*, 126–27.

⁷ Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” *History and Theory* 41, no. 2 (2002): 180.

⁸ Schwartz, “Memory as a Cultural System,” 912; Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era*, 3.

⁹ Robert S. Jansen, “Resurrection and Appropriation: Reputational Trajectories, Memory Work, and the Political Use of Historical Figures,” *American Journal of Sociology* 112, no. 4 (2007): 959; Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, “Commemorating a Difficult Past: Yitzhak Rabin’s Memorials,” *American Sociological Review* 67, no. 1 (2002): 32.

¹⁰ Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory*, 253; Jansen, “Resurrection and Appropriation,” 960–63.

¹¹ Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “Introduction: Perspectives on a Leader,” in *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*, ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 1.

¹² Emilia Salvanou, “The First World War and the Refugee Crisis: Historiography and Memory in the Greek Context,” *Historein* 16, no. 1–2 (2017): 120, 124, <https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.10027>.

¹³ An analysis of the term “founding father” in a collective memory context can be found in Gerwarth and Riall, “Fathers of the Nation?,” 388–89.

¹⁴ For an overview of postwar Greek history, see Thomas Gallant, *Modern Greece* (London: Hodder Headline, 2001); for an in-depth analysis of the Greek postwar political spectrum, see Ilias Nikolopoulos, *H καχεκτική δημοκρατία: Κόμματα και εκλογές στην Ελλάδα, 1946–1967* [Feeble Republic: parties and elections in Greece, 1946–1967] (Athens: Patakis, 2001); for an analysis of Greek political culture after the Second World War, see Ioannis Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967* (London: Routledge, 2007).

¹⁵ As George Th. Mavrogordatos argues, pro-Venizelist historiography came to be the mainstream narrative about the first half of the twentieth century, Marxist accounts being the only ones that suggested a complete alternative. See *Μετά το 1922: Η παράταση του Διχασμού* [After 1922: the continuation of the schism] (Athens: Patakis, 2017), 16.

¹⁶ For the distinction between historical and practical past, see Hayden White, “The Practical Past,” *Historein* 10 (2011): 10–19, <https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.2>.

¹⁷ For these functions of journalism, see Barbie Zelizer and Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt, eds., *Journalism and Memory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

¹⁸ Luisa Passerini, *Σπαράγματα του 20ού αιώνα* [Fragments of the 20th century] (Athens: Nefeli, 1998), 103.

¹⁹ Eleni Paschaloudi, *Ένας πόλεμος χωρίς τέλος: Η δεκαετία του 1940 στον πολιτικό λόγο, 1950–1967* [A war without end: the 1940s in political discourse, 1950–1967] (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2010), 35–36.

²⁰ Prominent journalist Georgios Ventiris, a fierce pro-Venizelist and a close partner of Venizelos, published *H Ελλάς του 1910–1920*, the first historiographical work about the Cretan leader and his era in 1931. His book was – and still is – cited frequently, and it is considered a pioneering work, despite its clear bias.

²¹ For his methodological introduction, see *Eleftheria*, 27 September 1953.

²² Grigoris Dafnis, *H Ελλάς μεταξύ δύο πολέμων, 1923–1940* [Greece between two wars, 1923–1940] (Athens: Kaktos, 1997), 338, 393, 404–14, 421–22, 697–98, 764–65, 782.

²³ Letters by ex-ministers were published in *Eleftheria*. Some examples include 19 June 1953; 16 July 1953; 11 October 1953; 17 October 1953; 20 December 1953. A review of Dafnis’ later work, *The Greek Political Parties*, in which he was praised for his expertise, was published in *Nea Estia* 825 (15 November 1961), 1574.

²⁴ *To Vima*, 26 February 1961.

²⁵ Polychronis Enepekidis, *Η δόξα και ο διχασμός: Από τα μυστικά αρχεία Βιέννης, Βερολίνου και Βέρνης* [The glory and the schism: from the secret archives of Vienna, Berlin and Berne] (1962; Athens: Zacharopoulos, 1992), 266, 233–34, 352–53, 409, 471, 494, 511–12, 532, 545, 549–55.

²⁶ Christos Triantafyllou, «Συλλογική μνήμη και φόβοι του Διχασμού: Μάρτιος 1962: μια “στιγμή” του “Ανένδοτου Αγώνα”» [Collective memory and fears of a schism: March 1962: a “moment” in the “relentless struggle”], in *Φόβοι και ελπίδες στα νεότερα χρόνια* [Fears and hopes in the modern era], ed. Katerina Dede, Dimitris Dimitropoulos and Tasos Sakellaropoulos (Athens: National Hellenic Research Institute, 2017), 171–83.

²⁷ *To Vima*, 18–21 March 1961, 29 March 1961, 16 April 1961, 21 April 1961.

²⁸ *To Vima*, 21 April 1961, 8 September 1961, 1 March 1962.

²⁹ *To Vima*, 23 September 1962, 12–14 October 1962.

³⁰ The letters were sent in 19 January 1962, 22 July 1962, 2 December 1962. Dimitrios Vakas archive, folder no. 2 (in the collection of the Eleftherios K. Venizelos National Research Foundation, <http://www.venizelosarchives.gr/treeres.asp?mynode=62756&afterroot=~Φάκελος%202>, accessed 1 January 2021).

³¹ Stefanos Stefanou, ed., *Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου πολιτικά υποθήκαι* [Political testaments by Eleftherios Venizelos] (1965; Athens: s.n., 1969), 1: iii–viii, xi–xxix.

³² *Βίβλος Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου* [Bible of Eleftherios Venizelos] (Athens: Istorikai Ekdoseis, 1964), 1:9–12, 54; 3:24, 113, 257–66.

³³ *Μεγάλη Ελληνική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια* [Great Greek Encyclopaedia] (Athens: Pyrsos, 1929), 7:49–51; *Μεγάλη Ελληνική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια* [Great Greek Encyclopaedia] (add.) (Athens: Phoenix, 1956), 2:7–11.

³⁴ Hazareesingh, “Napoleonic Memory in Nineteenth-Century France,” 766, 772.

³⁵ Spyridon Markezinis, *Πολιτική ιστορία της νεωτέρας Ελλάδος 1828–1964* [Political history of modern Greece, 1828–1964] (Athens: Papyros, 1966), 1:8–23; 3:98, 118, 285; 4:10, 178, 221, 230, 304, 318.

³⁶ His articles appeared in almost every major newspaper. In October and November 1962, during the political crisis that brought Venizelos’ name back to the daily news, Melas wrote a series of articles about him in *Eleftheria*, focusing on his internal reforms – showing that he closely followed every major intellectual trend, regardless of his own expertise (or lack thereof).

³⁷ Spyros Melas, *Ο γιος του Ψηλορείτη* [The son of Psiloreitis] (Athens: Biris, 1958), 7, 9, 12, 208, 223.

³⁸ Gerwarth, *Bismarck Myth*, 68, 73, 110.

³⁹ George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 345–50.

⁴⁰ Giorgis Lamprinos, *Η μοναρχία στην Ελλάδα* [The monarchy in Greece] (1945; Athens: Politikes kai Logotechnikes Ekdoseis, 1965), 5, 86–88.

⁴¹ Yanis Kordatos, *Οι επεμβάσεις των Αγγλων στην Ελλάδα* [The British interventions in Greece] (Athens: Nea Vivilia, 1946), 48.

⁴² The initial French edition was Nicos Svoronos, *Histoire de la Grèce moderne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952). The edition cited here is the Greek one: Nikos Svoronos, *Επισκόπηση της νεοελληνικής ιστορίας* [Overview of modern Greek history] (Athens: Themelio, 1976), 18–19, 111, 115, 120, 126, 129.

⁴³ Markezinis, *Πολιτική ιστορία της νεωτέρας Ελλάδος*, 1:13.

⁴⁴ Yanis Kordatos, *Ιστορία της νεώτερης Ελλάδας* [History of Modern Greece] (Athens: Ekdoseis 20os Aionas, 1957–1958), 5:14–15, 279, 459, 470, 545, 690.

⁴⁵ Dimitrios Pournaras, *Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος: Η ζωή και το έργον του* [Eleftherios Venizelos: his life and work] (Athens: Eleftheros, 1959), 1:6–10, 13–14; 3:5, 54–55, 99.

⁴⁶ Spyros Linardatos, *Πώς εφτάσαμε στην 4η Αυγούστου* [How did we arrive at the 4th of August] (Athens: Themelio, 1965), 7–10, 187–90.

⁴⁷ For the history of the Army History Directorate, see <https://dis.army.gr/en/content/history>, accessed 30 June 2018.

⁴⁸ For the political role of the Greek military after the Second World War, see Dimitris Charalambis, *Στρατός και πολιτική εξουσία: Η δομή της εξουσίας στη μετεμφυλιακή Ελλάδα* [The military and political power: the power structure in post-civil war Greece] (Athens: Exantas, 1985); Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy* (Montreal: Black Rose, 1997).

⁴⁹ Army History Directorate, *Το ελληνικόν εκστρατευτικόν σώμα εις μεσημβρινήν Ρωσίαν (1919)* [The Greek expeditionary force in Little Russia (1919)] (Athens: Army History Directorate, 1955), ix.

⁵⁰ Army History Directorate, *Ο Ελληνικός Στρατός κατά τον Πρώτον Παγκόσμιον Πόλεμον (1914–1918)* [The Greek military during the First World War (1914–1918)] (Athens: Army History Directorate, 1958), 1:ix, 128–29, 160, 273–74.

⁵¹ Basil C. Gounaris, “Unwanted Legacies: Greece and the Great War,” in *Balkan Legacies of the Great War: The Past is Never Dead*, ed. Othon Anastasakis, David Madden, and Elisabeth Roberts (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 71–72.

⁵² *Στρατιωτικός κανονισμός: Εθνική και ηθική αγωγή του στρατεύματος. Μέρος III, Διαφώτισις* [Army rules: national and ethical edification of the troops, pt. 3, Enlightenment] (Athens: General Army Staff, 1961), 83.

⁵³ Passerini, *Σπαράγματα του 20ού αιώνα*, 161.

⁵⁴ Concerning the issue of how experience constitutes subjects, see Joan Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” *Critical Inquiry* 17, no. 4 (1991): 779–80.

⁵⁵ For Elena Venizelos’ reputational entrepreneurship, see Zoe Mitsotaki, *Η κυρία Έλενα Βενιζέλου: Πορεία μιας ζωής* [Ms Elena Venizelou: Course of a lifetime] (Hania: Eleftherios K. Venizelos National Research Foundation, 2017), 177–80, 208–14. Her memoirs were published from 5 to 21 December, 1954 and her letters from 5 to 18 of December 1954 in *To Vima*.

⁵⁶ Elena Venizelou, *Στη σκιά του Βενιζέλου* [In the shadow of Venizelos], trans. Evi Mela (Athens: Okeanida, 2002), 31, 32, 35, 45.

⁵⁷ Alexandros Mazarakis-Ainian, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs] (Athens: Ikaros, 1948), 95–100, 132, 169, 172–74, 207–8, 211–12, 354, 363.

⁵⁸ Viktor Dousmanis, *Ιστορικά σελίδες τας οποίας έζησα* [Historical pages that I witnessed] (Athens: Petros Dimitrakos, 1946), iii–vii, 3–5, 8.

⁵⁹ Stylianos Gonatas, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs] (Athens, 1958), ix–x, 34–36, 66–68, 230, 307, 382.

⁶⁰ Dimitrios Vakas, *Μεγάλη Ελλάς: Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος, πολεμικός ηγέτης* [Greater Greece: Eleftherios Venizelos, a leader in war] (1949; Athens: Daremas, 1965), 14, 16–19, 64, 75, 105.

⁶¹ Dimitrios Vakas, *Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος: Η ζωή και το έργο του* [Eleftherios Venizelos: his life and work] (Athens: Pechlivanidis, [1965]), 5, 18, 21, 46, 57, 110, 155, 159.

⁶² Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory*, 264; Riall, “Hero, Saint or Revolutionary?,” 197.

⁶³ Hogan, *Afterlife of John Fitzgerald Kennedy*, 102, 104–10.

⁶⁴ Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory*, 127.

⁶⁵ For the historiographical field during the 1950s and 1960s in Greece, see Vangelis Karamanolakis, “Ιστορία και ιδεολογία στη δεκαετία του 1960” [History and ideology during the 1960s], in *Η «σύντομη» δεκαετία του '60: Θεσμικό πλαίσιο, κομματικές στρατηγικές, κοινωνικές συγκρούσεις, πολιτισμικές διεργασίες* [The “short” 1960s: institutional framework, party strategies, social clashes, cultural processes], ed. Alkis Rigos, Serafim Seferiadis, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2008), 84–94.

⁶⁶ Salvanou, “First World War and the Refugee Crisis.”

⁶⁷ Manos Avgeridis, “Debating the Greek 1940s: Histories and Memories of a Conflicting Past since the End of the Second World War,” *Historein* 16, no. 1–2 (2017): 8–46, <https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.9400>.