Original Knowledge and True Enlightenment: Ranke's Kritik in Context

J. D. Braw

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"If Mr Casaubon had read German, he would have saved himself a great deal of trouble," Will says in George Eliot’s *Middlemarch*. "I merely mean," he continues, "that the Germans have taken the lead in historical inquiries, and they laugh at results which are got by groping about in woods with a pocket-compass while they have made good roads."

To this day, this conception survives. The German historians of the early nineteenth century are widely perceived to have invented the historical discipline in the modern sense by establishing a set of rules by which the sources were to be scrutinised and a forum in which source criticism primarily was to take place, the historical seminar. History thus became a scientific and collaborative enterprise, in which there was little room for the extravagances of earlier historians and for amateurs like Mr Casaubon. On the one hand, history as a subject matter thereby lost some of its immediate relevance and attractiveness in this process. On the other, the kind of research practiced by the “critical school” offered a kind of certainty to which earlier historians could not aspire. And, as importantly, it gained a kind of legitimacy and independence in the scientific community that the study of history had never had before.

Leopold von Ranke has become a symbol for this paradigm shift (“the father of history”), and his book *Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker* with its critical appendix *Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtsschreiber* is usually seen as the
breakthrough of scientific history. Yet there are certain anomalies in this story that suggests it might be based on a misunderstanding of the role of historical criticism in Ranke’s work. To begin with, there is the religious aspect of his enterprise, often understood as a search for God. Why would Ranke, one might ask, have thought historical criticism was a good means to this end? There is also the literary aspect and, more specifically, Ranke’s aim to improve the way in which history was written, which, although it has come into focus only relatively recently, was seen as integral to the historical discipline by him and his contemporaries. And there are, lastly, his own descriptions of historical scholarship, downplaying the specificity of his method and never actually providing any specific rules.

These anomalies together suggest not only that the role of criticism in Ranke’s enterprise has been misunderstood but also that there is more both to his enterprise and to the critical school than the textbook version suggests. In the following, I will suggest a different interpretation of Ranke’s famous “critique of modern historians”, suggesting that it was directly related to what he personally wanted to gain from the study of history and that these wishes, in turn, need to be understood in the light of the religious life of the early nineteenth century and, in particular, the changing understanding of vocation.

Studying the sources of knowledge about “the beginnings of modern history” (die Anfänge der neueren Historie), the young Ranke came to the conclusion that they were of little direct use. “They speak to us in a thousand voices, they are as different as they could possibly be, they are dressed in all colours,” he wrote in the preface to Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtsschreiber. Moreover, the authorial intentions behind them were manifold and sometimes distorting. Some of the authors wanted to draw lessons for the future, and used the past as a set of examples. Others wanted primarily to settle old scores, either defending themselves or accusing their enemies. Still others were eyewitnesses, and merely wanted to report what had happened, as distinct from a fourth group of authors who wanted to penetrate to the layer of causes and, more precisely, to the emotional factors of history.

Confronting this confusing diversity of information and intentions, one would, Ranke suggested, have to ask where one could find “original knowledge” and by whom one could be truly enlightened (von wem wir wahrhaft belehrt werden können). And finding the answer to these questions, he continued, was the purpose of his appendix on the criticism of modern historians.

Before turning to this appendix, often seen as a breakthrough for the critical approach to modern history, one might ask why Ranke was interested in original knowledge about modern history at all. It was not a professional requirement: Ranke was a secondary-school teacher at this time, and conducted the research for his first book in his free time. Nor did it grow out of any
longstanding interest in modern history. His education had a strong emphasis on ancient history, and he wrote his doctoral dissertation on Thucydides. Furthermore, though being highly ambitious, he does not seem to have aimed at making a primarily methodological breakthrough with his first publication. Like his contemporaries, he did not attempt any general statement of the principles of historical research. \(^9\) Zur Kritik is a series of detailed analyses of individual historians and their works. “It begins with the history writers,” he wrote.\(^10\)

In order to understand why Ranke nevertheless chose to search for “originale Kenntniss” and true Belehrung in the works of authors such as Guicciardini and Machiavelli, one must consider what these criteria might have meant to him. In his reply to the historian Heinrich Leo’s critical review of Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker, in which his approach and style had been declared fundamentally flawed, he actually offered a kind of key to his motives as a historical researcher. “In the critique of historians,” he wrote, “I have only searched, where originality, individual observation [Anschauung], fullness of life may be.”\(^11\) And in Zur Kritik, he used a similar set of words to describe an ideal historical source: when Pirkheimer begins writing about what he has seen with his own eyes rather than relating what he has heard, his narrative acquires, Ranke wrote, “truth, life and reliability”.\(^12\)

As both these constructions suggest, life in this context was not identical with either truth or originality, and yet it was somehow related to both. It did not suffice for a historical account or record to be true or to be original; in order to be truly ideal, it had to have “life”. In the light of this requirement, it is paradoxical that Ranke today is sometimes described as a proponent of an “orthodox methodology” that somehow sought to exclude life from history and preferred to deal with abstractions.\(^13\)

Furthermore, the fact that Ranke presented “life” as a key research criterion suggests a crucial difference between him and those historians who use the process of dissection as an image of their research.\(^14\) The search for “naked truth”, he emphasised in his reply to Leo, was not the same as “the nonsensical concept of an anatomical preparation and copying [Präpariren und Copiren]”.\(^15\) In other words, Ranke had clear priorities, interests and antipathies. Rather than dealing with dead materials, historical criticism was a means of discovering and uncovering life. This is why “original knowledge” was so important since it was in the recollections of eyewitnesses that historical life was likely to have been preserved most faithfully.\(^16\) Eyewitness reports were preferable not because they corresponded to general methodological rules but because they were the only way of seeing the past as it actually was. When Pirkheimer’s account began to deal with things he had actually seen, instead of what he had heard from others, the men he described appeared “in their individual nature and uniqueness” (in ihrer besonderen Natur und Eigenthümlichkeit). “That is the difference,” Ranke wrote, “between being an eyewitness and being a mere contemporary.”\(^17\)

Moreover, this is why Ranke paid such close attention to the personalities of the historians whose works he subjected to historical criticism.\(^18\) The historian who wanted to reexperience and reconstruct the life of the past depended on their perceptiveness, honesty and pure intentions.\(^19\)

As the notion of “life” as a criterion legitimately applied to historical sources suggests, Ranke’s
research enterprise was not simply or even primarily a matter of bringing scientific method to bear on modern sources. In fact, the theoretical and philosophical foundation of his approach was comparatively underdeveloped, and contemporary theorists had little difficulty in pointing out its deficiencies. History only exists in so far as it is known in the present, Droysen wrote in the introduction to his Grundriß der Historik. Thus the study of history is not the study of the past per se but of what is left of the past in the present. To imagine the past as a sphere independent of the present would not, in other words, be consistent with the reality of temporality.

Yet this is, it seems, how Ranke perceived the “life” of history, and the nature of history more broadly. His belief in the possibility of objectivity was based on the belief in “the empirical presence of the past.” Writing from the research trips made possible by the success of his first book, he described himself as an explorer in the tradition of Cook and Columbus, an image which implies the existence of fixed but unknown territories of knowledge, and in Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtsschreiber he wrote that he hoped someone would find the remains of the “half-disappeared” world of German history. The imagery of geography, travelling and exploration of unknown territories is also a characteristic feature of his works. This certainly is “historicism as tourism”, not only as a literary technique but also as a reflection of a certain conception of the past and of historical research.

Furthermore, Ranke had a distinct idea of what historical life was like, an idea which decisively shaped his enterprise. Had the past been a territory filled with cruelty, suffering and catastrophes, his famous intention to avoid drawing lessons and making moral judgments would have made little sense. For Ranke, however, “life” was by definition a positive concept. His belief in providence meant, among other things, that there was little room for evil and even less for meaninglessness in his conception of the past. His belief in providence guaranteed that nothing that had happened was devoid of meaning or morality. The belief in providence was thus not a theory to be proven by historical scholarship, and historical research was not a search for God. Rather, it was a precondition, making engaging with history and with the sources of knowledge about the past appear worthwhile. Ranke described the exploration of human virtues, human life and human history contained in the sources as his “principal joy” (Hauptfreude). The belief itself was axiomatic.

And worthwhile it did appear to be. As Bonnie Smith has observed, nineteenth-century historians used a number of different, and yet uniformly masculine, images to describe the experience of archival research. Some historians described their work in terms of mountain climbing or similar “feats of prowess”, suggesting that research was a matter of struggle and conquest. Ranke, however, chose an entirely different language, that of love and beauty. In an 1827 letter, he described a source he was reading at the time as “the object of my love, a beautiful Italian lady”, with whom he had had a glorious time. He hoped, he continued, that together they would bring forth a child prodigy.

Given that this supposedly was an age in which historians “impartially and rationally constructed a scientific account of past reality” on the basis of facts and evidence, Ranke’s choice of language is as remarkable as it is telling. The encounter with the past as contained in the archi-
val records, it suggests, was an intensely emotional experience, perceived as an encounter with living human beings. The search for life also determined the choice of period to research. Describing what he hoped to learn by studying modern history, Ranke emphasised the “new life” characterising the period in question.

Despite the centrality of “life” in Ranke’s approach to history, he never gave a definition. Judging from his works, including Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker, historical life meant such things as dynamism, continuity, change, energy, forces, colour, creativity and struggle. He detected life where others had only seen structures. The state, for instance, was a kind of living being, “a product of creative genius”, originating in the “energy of the human spirit”. Above all, however, historical life meant concrete human beings in concrete situations. “The main thing”, he wrote in the preface to Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker, “is, as Jakobi says, humanity as it is . . .”

To be sure, these interests do not amount to a philosophy of history, and the attempts to construct a coherent system of these parts have resulted in conceptions of history which bear little similarity to Ranke’s. They do amount, however, to a kind of vision of history, and it was a vision that motivated both an energetic research effort and an attempt to write history in a new way. Where this vision came from is an unavoidably speculative question. More interesting, for the purposes of the history of historiography, is how the vision was transformed into a research interest, a historiographical ideal and an approach to sources. Again, it does not suffice to consider only strictly scientific factors. Judging from Ranke’s correspondence, the study of history was, rather, an answer to a set of existential questions and an endeavour which included his entire personality. From today’s perspective, the attempt to combine scientific detachment with personal and religious involvement might seem incoherent. Likewise, the emotional language used by Ranke to describe his work fits in badly with the common perception of the professionalisation of history, which has been described as a “separation of head from heart”. Yet for Ranke and his students, it seemed on the contrary that personal involvement was not only legitimate but also necessary. One of his students, Hartwig Floto, went as far as saying that successful source criticism was impossible without emotional involvement: “Pectus facit historicum!” he proclaimed.

Most likely, Ranke’s interest in “life” is a reflection of changing attitudes both to work and to religion at the time. With regard to the latter, he clearly expected it to mean more than merely living in a Christian society and observing its customs and traditions. Religion should also, both his correspondence and his works suggest, be an individual matter, allowing for individual beliefs and answering individual questions and needs. Although his autobiographical account partly presents him as an opponent of theological rationalism, he essentially remained within the Enlightenment tradition, understanding religion primarily as an anthropological phenomenon. Against this background, it is perhaps not surprising that he abandoned his theology studies at the University of Leipzig, and that ordination never was an option.

Nonetheless, his religious concerns remained, and were deeply connected with his concerns about his future. The question of vocation was, one might say, the existential question in this
The young Ranke’s poetry reflects, among other things, the search for a vocation, an area in which he could do justice to his own talents and interests. As a student, he primarily read what he happened to be personally interested in, and, from the very beginning, he sought a career that would correspond to his inclinations rather than one that would reflect the expectations and wishes of others. His ethos, both as a teacher and as a historian, was never one of service and duty. Nor was it a matter of integrating oneself into existing structures.

Work, in this conception, was a matter of choice, a way of developing and realising one’s potential and personality, and thus to a significant extent the answer to the question of the meaning of one’s existence. This is also relevant in the context of the development of source criticism. Without taking into account the expectation that work would provide experiences of joy and happiness that, in turn, would constitute an assurance of having found a vocation, one might say, it is impossible to understand the energy which Ranke invested in his historical enterprise. Ranke’s claim that he could not live without the opportunity to travel and to read manuscript sources might seem exaggerated, but it too was entirely in line with the notion of work as the meaning of life.

In this sense, he belonged to the mainstream of pedagogical thought at the time, so-called neohumanism. Moreover, he had adopted its boldest claims and images, that of education and development as a kind of religion – Bildungsreligion. In a poem written in 1814, he described his secondary-school teachers as priests and the school itself, Schulpforta, as a temple, and his oft-quoted parallel between historians and priests is a further example of the belief that acquiring and disseminating knowledge was existentially significant. Thus when Ranke approached modern history and its sources, it was in the expectation of the meaningfulness of studies and knowledge as it was understood in neohumanist pedagogy.

To a certain extent, Ranke’s first work was an iconoclastic critique of authors that for a long time had been considered authoritative. He was able to show how they had borrowed from others and added innovations of their own, and how their diverse intentions had made them misrepresent the past in various ways. Yet, as the publication of Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtschreiber as an appendix suggests, this was never the main point of the exercise or the main message that Ranke wanted to convey. In the preface to Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker, he clearly stated that the reason for his intervention in the historical discipline was his Ansicht of the unity of the Latin and Germanic nations. Only thereafter did the question of where one could find new and reliable information emerge. The search itself, however, was not allowed to interfere with the narrative. Elaborating his approach and describing his “critical results” in a separate book was a way of making sure that the historical account remained readable. His critical reading of modern historians primarily served a positive purpose, the reconstruction of the life of the past.

As it turned out, the modern historians Ranke read turned out not to be particularly useful for this purpose, and he soon moved on to new and different sources, in some cases breaking new
But again, this was more than a matter of a pedantic assertion of factual claims for the good of the collective. From Ranke’s perspective, it was the answer to the question posed by the expectation that work should be directly meaningful and provide existential satisfaction. The letters from his first research trip reflect the feeling of finally having found a vocation. “I know that I was born to do what I am doing now, and that my life has no other purpose,” he wrote from his research trip to Rome in 1830. “I have been happier here than I have ever been before.” And looking back, he remembered the writing of the book as a period of “innocent joy in the event.”

The religious background helps to explain why Ranke intervened in the historical discipline. This goes some way towards explaining the energy with which he carried out his own research, and also helps to explain the emergence and meaning of the “critical school” in the historical discipline. The “good roads” of source criticism were built for the purpose of opening the way to a past that appeared far more attractive and appealing than earlier historians had imagined it to be, and the professionalisation of history went hand in hand with the notion that studying the past could be an existentially meaningful endeavour and a vocation in its own right. Source criticism was a means of expanding one’s reality. The novelty of the so-called critical school, Hartwig Floto said in the 1850s, was that it transformed criticism, which in itself always had been practiced by historians, into a creative approach. “Sie ist nicht etwas nur Zersetzendes, sondern etwas unmittelbar Schaffendes; sie stellt dem Historiker, der sie richtig faßt und anwendet . . . den Leib der Zeit vor Augen” (It is not exclusively a matter of taking things apart; it is a creative activity. The historian who understands it properly and knows how to use it is also able to visualise the past).

In conclusion, historical criticism was not a matter of method, nor was it a means of ensuring the scientific legitimacy of the study of history. Rather, it aimed at restoring the fullness of life of the past for the purpose of expanding and intensifying life in the present. Paradoxically, the Verwissenschaftlichung of the study of history went hand in hand with the expectation that historical research could answer existential questions such as, in Ranke’s case, that of vocation.
NOTES


2 As Horst Walter Blanke, among others, has observed, the Verwissenschaftlichung and striving towards institutional autonomy began already in the eighteenth century. Nineteenth-century “historicism” only led to “eine weitere Steigerung der wissenschaftlichen Rationalität”. Horst Walter Blanke, *Historiographiegeschichte als Historik*, Bad Cannstatt: Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1991, 189; see also 205.


6 Ibid., iv.

7 Ibid., v.


14 See, for example, Floto, *Ueber historische Kritik*, 13.


16 Ranke, *Zur Kritik*, 8–9. See also 138: “Wo ihn seine Augen unternichteten, erst da wird er wahr.”

17 Ibid., 137.

18 See, for example, ibid., 54, 78, 164–65.

19 See, for example, ibid., 48–49.

20 Hans Schleier, "Geschichtstheorie und Geschichtsschreibung bei Leopold von Ranke", in Wolfgang J.


22 Schleier, "Geschichtstheorie", 122.


27 This is most probably also how his references to divine providence were understood by his readers. See Lucian Hölscher, *Geschichte der protestantischen Frömmigkeit in Deutschland*, Munich: Beck, 2005, 299–300.

28 Ranke, *Das Briefwerk*, 121–22. See also 128.


35 See Carl Hinrichs, *Ranke und die Geschichtstheologie der Goethezeit*, Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1954,
108–160.


37 Southgate, History, 53.

38 Floto, Ueber historische Kritik, 19. See also 13.


41 See Ranke, Das Briefwerk, 103.


43 Fuchs, "Der junge Ranke", 62; Ranke, Briefwechsel, 124, 126.

44 Ranke, Das Briefwerk, 140.


48 See, for example, Ranke, Zur Kritik, 9–15, 20–27.

49 Ranke, Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker, v. vii.


51 See Ranke, Briefwechsel, 547–50. See also Ranke, Zur Kritik, 173–81.

52 See Ranke, Briefwechsel, 211.

53 Ranke, Das Briefwerk, 206.

54 Ibid., 157–58.

55 Floto, Ueber historische Kritik, 9.