


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Rena Stavridi-Patrikiou

Οι φόβοι ενός αιώνα

[The Fears of a Century]

Athens: Metaixmio, 2008. 310 pp.

by Dimitris Maronitis

Panteion University

I am afraid that I have nothing new to add to Rena Stavridi-Patrikiou's achievement – the recent publication of her book entitled *The Fears of a Century* – beyond what I have already written on it in August 2008 under the title "Stream of Consciousness" and in the following month under the Herodian title "History's inquiry" (*Ιστορίας απόδειξις*) in my column in the *Vima tis Kyriakis* newspaper. There I had contributed in advance a few comments about the catalytic importance of the publication of this book which justifies my conclusion that this is a "work of scientific and didactic maturity; a textbook of historical knowledge and self-knowledge". The outcome of this general predisposition may be followed by this second elaboration of my ideas in the hope that this review will extend what I have already contributed previously as a hypothesis.

The hypothesis was based on the equilibrium of freedom and history, which in one way or another has become, during the previous century, the target of a multifaceted phobic

attack. If the suggested equilibrium is not arbitrary, I suggest that today we divide the two terms between the two bottom corners of a triangle and place fear – in the singular and plural – in the top corner. Thus we are allowed to speak of the fear of freedom and the fear of history simultaneously – after all Stavridi-Patrikiou clearly denotes the latter in the conclusive chapter of her book: "I believe that one of the greatest fears of Greek society during the twentieth century has been the fear of history. This is why society has delayed significantly in accepting these professionals and naming them as historians".

I remind you that I had previously turned to the Homeric *Iliad* – and more specifically to the introduction of the first Iliadic battle which contains the second part of the forth rhapsody – to study the nature, genealogy and twists of fear. There, in anticipation of the forthcoming confrontation between the Achaeans and Trojans, together with the reinforcements, the poet introduces Fear as a demonic presence and puts Fear together with the equally demonic and superior Eris. This demonisation and this linking of Fear with Eris is important: we are at the in-between space of gods and people, where basically irrational powers move and act, which test the perseverance and the resistance of Reason.

The power of this irrational fear is obvious here, under conditions of irritable confrontation, the edge of which is war. That means that demonic fear is sharpened when people quarrel and are led to mutual murder. However, the intervention of the Iliadic fear under war conditions becomes more drastic, because in the Homeric epic fear is of two kinds,

defensive and aggressive: fear which frightens (in the text this fear is called Δείμος (Deimos), with an εἰ – etymologically this is connected with δέος or fear, from which the adjectives δεινός (frightening) and δειλός (coward) are produced – and fear that is afraid of something. Aggressive fear threatens and compels the opponent; while defensive fear often develops into a panic flight.

I want to believe that the demonic irrational element of the Iliadic fear as well as its split nature have become a good interpretative tool in order to understand how phobic mechanisms functioned in Greece during the previous century, revealing: who provoked, tolerated and finally welcomed them as well as where and why. This is a conclusion which emerges systematically from Stavridi-Patrikiou's book, where the main phobic schemes of the previous century are named, described and interpreted, one by one and in comparison. This is the first complementary component that I contribute in this review.

The second component focuses on the equilibrium between freedom and history, who were (and still are) under the state of double fear. The expressive key "the fear of freedom" is the product of E. R. Dodds's interpretative genius: it is the title of the last chapter of his famous book *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951).¹

In this conclusive chapter, the thoughtful Irish Hellenist sets the crucial question why and how rational thought and behaviour (expressed until then in letters, arts and sciences) retreated after the third pre-Christian century in the late Hellenistic world to be replaced and be finally dominated by the irrational way of thinking, with intense features of the absurd, testified by the fanatical turn to magic, apocrypha, astrology, the worship of goddess Fortune, etc.

In that chapter Dodds describes and soberly checks the basic interpretations which were advanced to interpret this total bankruptcy of Greek rationalism, some of which are distinguished for their intellect and their daring. Among them Dodd praises the Marxist analysis of the phenomenon. However, these interpretations are finally considered partial and superficial. Dodds' search for a deeper and more inclusive interpretation drives him to suggest the fear of freedom:

If future historians are to reach a more complete explanation of what happened, I think that, without ignoring either the intellectual or the economic factor, they will have to take account of another sort of motive, less conscious and less tidily rational. I have already suggested that behind the acceptance of astral determinism there lay, among other things, the fear of freedom – the unconscious flight from the heavy burden of individual choice which an open society lays upon its members. If such a motive is accepted as a *vera causa* (and there is pretty strong evidence that it is a *vera causa* today), we may suspect its operation in a good many places. We may suspect it in the hardening of philosophical speculation into quasi-religious dogma which provided the individual with an unchanging rule of life; in the dread of inconvenient research expressed even by a Cleanthes of an Epicurus; later, and on a more popular level in the demand for a prophet or a scripture; and more generally, in the pathetic reverence for the written word, . . . a willingness of people to accept any opinion, because it was written, or was allegedly written in the book . . .²

And Dodds concludes:

What is the meaning of this recoil, this doubt? Is it the hesitation before the jump,

or the beginning of a panic flight? . . . Was it the horse that refused, or the rider? That is really the crucial question. Personally, I believe it was the horse – in other words, those irrational elements in human nature which govern without our knowledge so much of our behaviour . . . [T]he men who created the first European rationalism were never – until the Hellenistic Age – “mere” rationalists: that is to say, they were deeply and imaginatively aware of the power, the wonder, and the peril of the Irrational.³

Dodds bravely conveys the specific dilemma of our times (which coincides in this specific case with the 1950s, when this very important book was published), expressing the restrained hope that a solution may be found, especially after the painful experience of the Second World War. Thus, concluding his parable with the horse and the rider, he writes: “understanding him better, we shall be able by better training to overcome his fears; and that through the overcoming of fear horse and rider will one day take that decisive jump, and take it successfully”.⁴ Too much optimism, perhaps, one might say, though it is better than our retreat without a fight to our continuous and underlying fears that their manipulators deliberately cultivate. That is the lesson that Stavridi-Patrikiou’s book offers, with scientific sobriety and honesty, where history and those who practice it are projected as points of phobic reference. Thus, the second term of the equilibrium about which I spoke earlier is formulated: to the fear of freedom the fear of history is added, with the possibility, if not the certainty, that the two terms are connected tightly, leading to the tendency to identify with one another.

Towards this direction I recall Herodotus again, the father and the founder, as they say,

of history – a word which is initiated in the prefix of his work under the name of the historian. In an initial, general suggestion, which I hope is not totally arbitrary, perhaps we need to define freedom more as a method and history basically as practice, which includes acts and actors. Moreover, on the same general level of analysis, I propose as common denominator of the two terms of the equilibrium the combination of their absolute and relative character, something which initially may seem contradictory. This is because in this specific case the absolute price of freedom and history is a necessary element in order to measure their steady and alternating relative applications. In other words: the absolute character ought to be, at the same time, the previous and the next of each of their applications; otherwise the deliberate and increasing relativity of the two terms (freedom and history) may bring down the whole system, making it subordinate to the intentions of the powers that be who are manipulating them. I hope my suggestion is not taken as flirting with metaphysical idealism.

I now return to the introduction of the Herodian work, which I believe illuminates many of the issues under scrutiny of history and historiography. I recite from the original: *Ηροδότου Αλικαρνασσεός ιστορίας απόδειξις ήδε, ως μήτε τα γενόμενα εξ ανθρώπων τω χρόνω εξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε έργα μεγάλα τε και θωμαστά, τα μιν έλλησι τα δε βαρβάροισι αποδεχθέντα ακλεά γένηται, τά τε άλλα κα διήν αιτίην επολέμησαν αλλήλοισι.* (This is the display of the inquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus so that things done by man not to be forgotten in time, and that great and marvellous deeds, some displayed by Hellenes, some by barbarians, not lose their glory, including among others what was the cause of their waging war on each other.) Here follow five short observations:

- 1 The writing subject (name and origin of the writer: *Herodotus from Halicarnasus*) in italics and in genitive declination is subordinated here to the object of the work which is projected in nominative declination: *inquiry (of history)*. This subordination does not hold true either for the 'previous' Hecataeus or for the 'next' historian Thucydides, where what comes through is the nominative projection for the writing subject and the accusative declination for the object. I believe that this is important for the triptych subject–text–object. Unfortunately I do not have space to further appreciate this crucial difference that I believe Stavridi-Patrikiou takes very seriously into consideration in her book.
- 2 Related to the previous difference is Herodotus' resistance in defining in the introduction *history* as a rival argument. In this fashion his predecessor Hecataeus and successor Thucydides make this point clearly. The first characterises the texts of the previous writer as *ridiculous*, demanding for himself the *truth*. The second does not hesitate to rebuff the work of Herodotus without naming it so as *αγώνισμα ες το παραχρήμα ακούειν* (as a feat for the applause of the moment), while he names his own writing *κτήμα ες αεί* (an everlasting possession). I have the impression that Stavridi-Patrikiou adopts at this point the objective modesty of Herodotus instead of the subjective of Hecataeus and Thucydides. We should note that Thucydides' estimation for the superficial and only for the *applause of the moment* of the work of Herodotus did not prove true: the work of Herodotus remained, as Thucydides's work did, *κτήμα ες αεί* – let alone that his writer won the title of the father of history.
- 3 The subject of the Herodian work *ιστορίης απόδειξις* (history's inquiry) is a rather difficult-to-translate complex of two words, which nevertheless foretells both the method of the work and the field of research and knowledge which is presupposed. More simply: the new word *history* (whose root is the verb *οίδα*, which means: I know as an eyewitness or because I heard something myself), condenses exactly this persistent attachment to knowledge which comes from research; the word *απόδειξις* (inquiry), after all, denotes the transfer of the findings of cognitive research with the appropriate expressive style, which in this case combines writing and listening. From this angle I believe we have the right to talk of a listening, writing and/or listening register. In any case, the scheduled complex of history's inquiry concocts from the start history and historiography, giving priority to the latter. This concoction means that there is no historiography without research that will support knowledge, but it also means that without registering and exposing the findings of the research, both research and knowledge sink into silence. I believe that this Herodotian principle is accepted and supported by Stavridi-Patrikiou, who also stresses that history and historiography are not literature.
- 4 This prohibition measures its validity in the definition of the term *literature*. In the degree to which literature is considered to be the product of imagination, myth-making and the product of the autonomy of writing, literature is by definition distinguished from history and historiography, which, when it does not respect this divisive line, is rightly accused for the illicit appropriation of different methods

and expressions. However, if in the term literature we see the wider meaning of production and the exercise of the artistic written word that covers with accuracy and sufficiency its factual object, than there is no reason to deny to historiography its corresponding literary type.

However, the real material of factual history which Herodotus defines as the *actions of people* resists the attack of its own reproduction; it gives in to a recognizable form of writing by force I would say, which, by remaining under trial and by remaining flexible, it does not blackmail it. This kind of researching writing albeit registering writing is suitable for historiography and composes its own type of literature, which nevertheless depends on the width and the depth of the factual material which is different from one historian to the other. At this crucial point, the founding differences between Herodotus and Thucydides are recognised. Insisting on these differences, I am going to end this review which, I should stress, has been written by a philologist, not a historian.

- 5 Herodotus, as I mentioned, names the factual material of history as the acts of people. So it is about an anthropocentric, anthropological and anthropognostic target, which as a containing cycle accepts in its inner space on equal terms the great and wonderful actions of the Greek- and the barbarian-speaking people, which, as it happens, with the actions of people who are in danger of being distorted and being forgotten. Just at the end of the introduction we can now locate at the centre of the spiral the reason for the war between the Greeks and the barbarians as an inquiry. The enquiry into the causes of war in the depths of time and space now becomes the axis of Herodotus' work. This happens

without meaning that the cycle of people's actions as well as the equivalent reference to great and wonderful actions are ignored. In other words: in the work of Herodotus war is the ultimate but not the only inquiry, as it happens on the contrary in the work of Thucydides, in the introduction of his own work: "Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians." In these terms we should not accuse the Halicarnessian historian for escaping from his war axis because he includes geographical, linguistic, novelistic, cosmological (some horizontal and some vertical) wedges along which the anthropological environment and the grounds for war are investigated.

I have the feeling that Stavridi-Patrikiou's book follows more or less the Herodian method exactly because the phobic syndromes and ideas are developed and incubated in and circulate in the environs and the grounds of warfare, the political and cultural life, and more or less they are myths which require demystification. From this point of view the descriptive and the interpretative value of the book lies in our practice of method, which could be defined as one involving excavation – if we accept Freud, who compares psychoanalytic theory and practice with excavation.

NOTES

- * This review is based on a talk on this book delivered by the reviewer in February 2009. Athina Syriatou translated it from the Greek.
- 1 E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 252.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 254.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 255.

Antonis Liakos

*Πώς το παρελθόν
γίνεται ιστορία
[How the Past
becomes History]*

Athens: Polis, 2007. 306 pp.

by Haris Exertzoglou

University of the Aegean

The book by Antonis Liakos is a welcome addition to the very short list of books, published in Greek, directly tampering with the connection of history and the past in a theoretically informed manner. Greek historians, at least a large number of them, are notoriously anti-theoretical, closely following the venerable positivist and objectivist tradition that sees in the discipline of history a proper tool for reconstructing the past without much consideration for the epistemological and theoretical issues involved in this process. Among the issues that remain largely untouched are the complex relation between history and the past, memory and the uses of the past as well as the trajectories of historical discourse within the dynamics of rapid social and political change.

Liakos addresses these issues following a strategy that involves a discussion of his major themes in relation to different topics in a repetitive manner in each of the book's seven

chapters. The author combines his theoretical perspective with the discussion of particular examples by giving due emphasis to Greek history and, particularly to the cultural wars that recently took place in this country. This is not unexpected since his target audience is the Greek public in general and not historians in particular.

Chapter one sails on familiar waters for most historians as it discusses the old issue of "what is history". Liakos explores the meaning of the word from antiquity to modern times, convincingly presenting its ambivalence, historicity and cultural relevance. History was an empty signifier which different cultures filled in different ways. However, the word did not simply represent the different narratives of different cultures; it was a fundamental cultural asset directly influencing the way these societies thought of themselves. Discussing the place of history in different societies in the past, in ancient Greece, Rome and during early Christianity, but also in China and in pre-Colombian America, the author presents the relation of history to history writing, myths and social organisation. The chapter ends with a brief discussion on history and modernity as well as the emergence of historicism and the novelties associated with it in researching the past through the systematic reading of archives. The reason why Liakos does not extend his discussion to more recent developments in historiography is, I believe, clear. The question of "what is history" is today cast in entirely different forms, which the author attempts to explore in subsequent chapters.

In the next three chapters, the author presents the main body of his arguments about how the past becomes history. This very phrasing of the relation between history and the past points to a situation where the

two, though mutually related, are not identical. This relation is mediated by the societies and their respective cultures that imagine their links with the past and represent it in historical discourses. From this angle, the past is unable to impose a clear-cut meaning by itself; consecutive generations interpret the past from their own perspective, directly influenced by their prerequisites, categories and emotions. The past becomes available through contemporary interpretive frameworks and categories, which means only *ex post facto*. This however, the author claims, is not a completely arbitrary operation. Although the past *per se* is not directly available, except from the few traces that it leaves behind, it is not completely devoid of meaning. What is available to us are the different perceptions of the past that each society has developed for itself by selecting those events and meanings appropriate to its own needs and organising them in specific historical narratives. These successive readings of the past, incompatible as they may be, always mediate the possibility of historical knowledge and constrain what we may or may not think about the past. This approach directly challenges any idea of the autonomy of the past and situates historical knowledge within the social and cultural mechanisms that made it possible in the first place. The tenacious relation between historical knowledge and successive readings of the past generates a complex dynamic regarding the appropriation of the past in the present. Successive readings organise the past in different ways dropping, or forgetting, some portions of the past while emphasising and remembering others. The outlook of the past is thus continuously rearranged; rather than a crystallised and static entity, it becomes an ever-changing signifier that serves as a medium of communication between different eras as well as between historiography and history. Undoubtedly, this approach destabi-

lises any easy relation between history and the past because it challenges the referentiality of the past. Liakos chooses to problematise this crucial issue, exploring it in various sections of the book but without leading the reader to a conclusive answer. The changing nature of history and its relation with the past, he argues, does not render historical knowledge completely impossible but forces us to historicise the categories of historical thinking, and to address the very possibility of constructing the past in particular cultural and social environments. This suggestion redirects attention from naive reconstructionism to the foundations of historiography and history writing, from the past as an essential category of autonomous meaning to the historian who construes it in the first place.

Historical time is the topic of the next chapter. Here the author discusses the different ways which historically were used to organise the understanding of historical time in premodern and modern societies. Cyclical perceptions of time which collapsed past, present and future into a single and repetitive historical time were replaced by a linear perception of time which distinguished between the different time layers and established a time continuum pointing positively to a distant true beginning. Genealogical perceptions of historical time were commensurate to the rise of nationalism and the nation-state which blurred its own modernity in claiming an ancient origin. National revival was the common motto of nationalism, which organised time and integrated past events into a coherent narrative that made the past familiar to a very broad social and cultural audience. Scientific history, another product of nineteenth-century nationalism, established a new positivist historical canon, which in the long run proved unable to withstand new perceptions of time, such as those developed by

the theory of modernisation, the *Annales* or microhistory. Changing perspectives of historical time renewed interest in the forms of historical discourse and provided the ground for the discussions that took place in the last three decades.

Chapter six addresses the issues which modern material culture and museums in particular, as specific sites of remembrance, pose to history. It also discusses the making of memory with the specific use of psychoanalytic terms such as alienation and reconciliation. This strange combination of topics raises the issue of alienation of the past as a precondition of historical knowledge with specific reference to the museum culture and to traumatic experiences. The author argues that despite appearances, objects exhibited in museums do not establish the referentiality of the past to which they refer by their own material substance alone, but, on the contrary, their exhibition within the interpretive framework of the museum rearranges their meaning completely. As material objects, they produce familiar meaning about the condition of their forced removal or alienation from their original position or framework. History involves familiarity and alienation not only in relation with the distant past but also with more recent traumatic experiences, such as genocides or ethnic cleansing. Traumas such as these bring forward the tensions between individual testimonies and historical reconstructions.

The old and much-discussed problem of historical sources and their interpretation is raised in the final chapter of the book along with the issue of cultural heritage, which has not attracted the due attention of historians. Distinguishing between two different types of reading the traces of the past, to interrogate or to listen closely to the sources, Li-

kos presents the turn which the emergence of cultural heritage has established in relation to the past in our postmodern societies. In contrast to other historians who view cultural heritage with suspicion due to its commercial orientation and its 'presentism', Liakos discusses this phenomenon from a different perspective. Cultural heritage, he argues, has brought about a fundamental change in the way our societies reconstruct their relation with the past, not for its own sake but explicitly as part of contemporary culture and identity-making which poses new challenges to the process of collective memory and hence to history itself. Historians therefore are called to examine closely the phenomenon of cultural heritage because its emergence has created a space of memory and remembrance which overlaps to some extent with academic history.

In the preceding pages I have tried to summarise, however incompletely, a rich and extensive discussion which is not always easy to pin down. There must be no misunderstandings about this book. The reader must know that this work does not belong to the genre of the philosophy of history. Should the book be considered part of this genre, then there would be much to be desired since most of the debates in this cognitive field are ignored in the book, and when they appear they simply have a marginal position in the discussion. But I think that the author did not intend to write a book of this sort; he was interested rather in engaging a broader public with the major changes in historical thinking that have brought about a new understanding of how history works in our postmodern times as well as what made these changes possible. The book can be read as a flowing discussion, more in the form of an open and reader-friendly lecture rather than a stiff and presumptuous theoretical presentation. This

choice has advantages and disadvantages, particularly in relation to the organisation of the material and the book's chapters and the possibility of the reader to rethink the main arguments in different configurations.

One major asset of the book is that it addresses the contemporary conjuncture by discussing the cultural wars that have taken place in recent decades in Greece which involved various historical topics in one way or another. This choice is not accidental but political, and from this perspective the book is part of these wars, not simply a reflection of them. Liakos attempts to understand this situation from inside the profession, and with a progressive and anti-nationalist spirit he discusses the options left open to historians. Having fallen from the venerable position that it once held, history now involves contention and antagonism that stretch far beyond the limited circle of professional historians still struggling to preserve their authority intact in the face of constant challenges. Rather than escaping to the ivory tower of 'scientism' and indifference towards the new challenges to historical knowledge, the author addresses these challenges directly in engaging with 'hot' issues of modern Greek history and problematising the complex relations of history with the new – and rival? – reorganisations of the past that one may find in cultural heritage, the museum and historical culture.

On the other hand, this work also poses serious questions to professional historians with respect to history proper, historiography, as well as to the understanding of the ways the past becomes history. If the arguments of the book are accepted, if history is culturally and historically constituted, always following different trajectories, then can we grasp the potentials and constraints which an always already destabilised past brings

to us? Is it still possible to believe in the rational reconstruction of the past only on the grounds of additional research and material? Do we still believe in the referentiality of the historical source and of historical discourse after the mounting poststructuralist critique? What are the tasks of historians in the current and future situation? Of course, questions like these are not new and the answers provided are not easy or self-evident. Liakos distances himself from the naïve objectivist position that the reconstruction of the past 'as it really was' is possible, though he does not completely side with poststructuralist approaches that consider any such attempt vain. But he views history as a discourse in need of reconsideration rather than a self-reassuring discipline which thinks that salvation lies in monastic isolation.

Rika Benveniste

*Από τους βάρβαρους
στους μοντέρνους:
κοινωνική ιστορία και
ιστοριογραφικά προβλήματα
της μεσαιωνικής Δύσης
[From the Barbarians
to the Moderns:
Social History and
Historiographical Problems
of the Medieval West]*

Athens: Polis, 2007. 357 pp.

by Aglaia Kasdagli

University of Crete

A book offering an overview of western European medieval history is undoubtedly a novel and most welcome addition to the relevant meagre bibliography in the Greek language. In Rika Benveniste's own words, her purpose was "to construct a book which would offer what in my view would be a secure scaffold that would support the structure of a narrative from the viewpoint of social history". Such an ambitious venture assumes an admirable breadth and depth of reading and requires the rigorous application of strict criteria to make a selection among the vast wealth of facts, themes and theories, in the knowledge

that the result will be – what else? – highly subjective. The last point also holds true for any review of the work at hand, much more so for the present one, first, because I cannot pretend to have read as widely or systematically as the author and, second, because the set limits of a review will allow only a brief capitulation of the contents and a slight discussion of just a few points that strike me as particularly important and/or about which I feel I have more to say.

As an introduction to her subject, Benveniste traces the evolution of the terms 'Middle Ages' and 'medieval' and the diachronic attitude towards them, an attitude closely associated with ideological trends and political agendas. The terms in question acquired a derogative sense at the moment of their inception in fourteenth-century Italy and the negative connotations took on a new force during the Enlightenment, while the new trends and political needs of the nineteenth century led to further vacillations. All this is interesting, and a more detailed treatment would not go amiss. For example, it would be politically and ideologically instructive to consider the free usage of the term 'medieval' if not globally, at least in present-day Greece: intellectuals with scant knowledge of the era, politicians who have certainly not been influenced by Petrarch, populist journalists who are unlikely to have perused the works of Adam Smith or Voltaire and lay people with a penchant for Hollywood medievalism, all of these and some more are ready to comment on, say, medieval barbarism, medieval working conditions or medieval intellectual darkness. That this shows a total ignorance of such important institutions and aspects of medieval life as the guilds (and the intellectual byproduct of them, the universities), town and village forms of self-administration, or popular organised resistance to many forms

of despotical or state oppression, is perhaps to be excused: in Greek schools medieval history has never formed anything but a minimal part of the history syllabus, inadequate as the latter has always been, and in recent years fragmentary to the point of becoming almost meaningless. What is amazing, however, in the case of the Middle Ages is the blind and ahistorical arrogance with which all kinds of people pontificate about a past 'dark' age, presumably in view of present-day abundant light, the unhindered and transparent working of true democracy, and the reign of equality, incorruptibility, non-exploitation and hope eternal.

It is obvious, then, that in this climate, Benveniste's book may offer not just a solid outline of much-needed knowledge but also some even more urgently needed food for thought. The informative narrative takes us in broadly chronological order, as the title of the book implies, from the 'barbarians' and the fall of the Roman Empire to the 'crises' of the Late Middle Ages and the transition to capitalism and modernity. Of course, a chronological account would not be sufficient in itself, but the present volume is neither one-sided nor simply descriptive.

If a reviewer is supposed to examine a book on its author's own terms, then Benveniste's cogent account of her aims and preoccupations makes the task easier: in her prologue she describes her concern for balance between a conventional chronological narrative and a thematic approach, and her interest in the problem of continuities and discontinuities, in presenting a concise account of the relevant historiographical debates and in making the right choices with regard to the space allotted to each topic, irrespective of personal preferences. How much then has she succeeded in all this?

Following the standard system of periodisation of medieval history,¹ Benveniste covers in ten chapters a wide range of events and themes, placed in the broadest possible context. Landmarks of political history alternate effortlessly with discussions of equally important economic, social and demographic trends: thus, the focus of the first chapter is on the late Roman Empire and the great German migration period, while the following chapter touches briefly on the debate on a complex and important issue – the transition from antiquity to feudalism. This is one of the instances that the reader may question the wisdom (or was it simply an unavoidable necessity?) of restricting the coverage of such breadth to a text of just 343 pages.

Further down in the same chapter the matter of local or tribal variability is rightly stressed, but, as so often happens in non-specialised historical studies, the fundamental distinction between oral and written law is mentioned without further commentary, as if the nature and mechanisms of customary (or oral) law were generally well-known and fully understood. This is not the case, despite Marc Bloch's perceptive discussion on the matter, and a more detailed treatment would not only clarify subsequent references to custom (e.g., 142–143) but would also be particularly relevant to historians dealing with customary law in other contexts, such as societies in early modern and even modern Greece.²

Demography, the economy and land exploitation are the themes of Chapter 3. An interesting topic discussed here concerns changes that contributed to the development of the seigneurial system and the emergence of the ideological scheme of a tripartite society. This theory was advanced by the *bellatores* (fighters, or members of the high nobility) for political reasons (137) and it was tirelessly

propagated by the *oratores* (clergy), whose upper echelons were an integral part of the ruling elite. It continued to underpin medieval society after the accepted end of the era and long after the original three categories – which never corresponded to hard realities anyway – had been transformed beyond recognition.

The issue of feudalism and the controversies or debates around it are first discussed in this chapter, but more thoroughly in the next.³ This section is a feat in that it gives the outline of a great number of theories, different in their parameters and often contradictory. How far a reader that encounters the concepts for the first time will be able to grasp them all and reach his or her own conclusions on the basis of Benveniste's measured presentation I cannot tell. However that may be, we are not left to cope alone with just an alarmingly confused picture of ideas and arguments because we have the author's own use of the term feudalism clearly spelt out.

The remaining chapters unfold in a similar manner a variety of facets of the medieval societies of Western Europe. Religion, Christendom, dogma and ritual are examined as powerful elements of the social scene in Chapter 6 and it is stressed that the meaning these had for the medieval people differed radically from modern perceptions. The church is viewed in its economic, administrative and ideological role, and, in a somewhat breathless pace, we go through monasteries, the Gregorian reform, the conflict between ecclesiastical and secular powers, religious practices, sexuality and marriage, death, heterodoxy and otherness, as well as the Crusades.

Chapter 7 is more straightforward, as it deals with hard economic facts: commerce and trade routes, fairs and markets, currency and banking. Perhaps the discussion of these matters

should have been more closely interwoven with the development of the medieval towns, because these were inextricably interlinked phenomena. This is made quite clear in Chapter 8, where the evolution of the urban phenomenon is treated fully, but still separately.

Chapter 9 deals with the 'crises' of the late Middle Ages. Once more, Benveniste does not just list comprehensively a series of famines, epidemics and social risings but plunges into controversial problems, discussing theories and looking for convincing interpretations. As these questions have not yet been answered incontestably, and undoubtedly they will never be, perhaps it would be churlish to pick up on various interesting side issues that have not been discussed. I will bring only one example, namely the view that one of the factors of anger during the violent rebellion in the Paris region (the *Jacquerie* of 1358) was the feeling experienced by the peasants that their *seigneurs* had betrayed them. In effect, the ravages of the French countryside during the Hundred Years' War could be and apparently were perceived as a breach of the unspoken contract which the ruling classes had advocated for centuries: in other words, since the three orders had supplementary roles, duties and rights, the lords had failed their role as protectors of their tenants.⁴

Appropriately, the last chapter concerns the transition from feudalism to capitalism (another much-debated and still-open question) and the beginnings of the modern state. To start with, Benveniste challenges the concept of a transitional period, because "it does not pose as a problem the issue of 'continuities' and 'discontinuities'", which the author considers of paramount importance. She outlines the fundamental problems tackled in various debates of the last 50 years and goes on to consider the advance of modernity.

We also find a brief account on state-building, kingship and the evolution of representative bodies, which one might have expected earlier in the narrative, as these institutions had an explanatory value for developments already examined.

The two-page Postscript, entitled playfully “Waiting for the Modernists”, takes up my own original doubt about our ‘enlightened’ modern times. Interestingly, to prove her point Benveniste (and the bibliography she chooses) opts not for any ‘major’ or ‘majority’ issue but offers as an example the attitude toward society’s marginal elements, “the structuring of the Jew and the Arab as enemies”. Her concluding reference regards the ways the Middle Ages have been used by contemporary thinkers like Bourdier and Barthes. This may be of interest to theorists, but a brief account of developments in medieval history itself would be more appropriate for students of the period.⁵

It is worth mentioning that each chapter ends with a selected list of English and French works, including classics and recent (up to 2006–2007) studies.⁶ Equally useful is the index, a device that is not yet a universal feature of Greek scholarly publications. It would, however, be much more functional if it included not just names and toponyms but crucial terms as well. After all, readers are more likely to be looking for references to slavery, monasteries or feudal rent than to Picardy or Luca Pacioli.

To conclude by answering the question I posed earlier, I believe that Benveniste has realised successfully the objectives she had set herself. It is my view that her book will be enjoyed by social historians, will challenge beneficially any novice in medieval history and – as it happened in the preceding pages – may open a dialogue with the not-so-novice.

NOTES

- 1 In her introduction, the author is careful to acknowledge the shortcomings of conventional periodisation, including its ‘westerncentric’ focus, but in the end she has the realism to admit that the established scheme “offers one of the possibilities to investigate the history of the West in a productive way” (31).
- 2 Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 2 vols, transl. L. A. Manyon, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965, i: 109–120. For a discussion of custom in the medieval context, see, for a start, John Gilissen, *La coutume* (= Typologie des sources des Moyen Age Occidental, fasc. 43), Brepols: Turnhout, 1982.
- 3 For a very recent discussion of such matters, see Chris Wickham, *The Inheritance of Rome: A History of Europe from 400 to 1000* (= The Penguin history of Europe, 2), London: Allen Lane, 2009, esp. chap. 22.
- 4 Variations on this ‘conservative’ theme may also be detected behind other instances of social discontent: Rodney Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 1381*, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 112 ff.
- 5 A good indication of such historiographical developments is to be found in Christopher Dyer, Peter R. Coss and Chris Wickham (eds), *Rodney Hilton’s Middle Ages: An Exploration of Historical Themes*, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
- 6 Naturally, a bibliography has always to be adjusted to linguistic competence, but the inaccessibility to most of us of the rich German and Eastern European historiographical production limits our viewpoint severely and is to be lamented.

Hagen Fleischer

*Οι πόλεμοι της μνήμης.
Ο Β΄ Παγκόσμιος Πόλεμος
στην δημόσια ιστορία
[The Wars of Memory.
The Second World War
in Public History]*

Athens: Nefeli, 2008. 626 pp.

by Thanasis D. Sfikas

How we look at international history is always in some measure a function of where we stand.¹

Writing in 1987 about the Holocaust and German national identity, Charles Maier argued that the past and its memories had already become “one of the most pervasive motifs in the social sciences, fiction and the mass media”.² Since then the trend has grown exponentially and has assumed a standing and a term of its own – public history. In part this has been due to the media habit of packaging the past as educational entertainment and its attendant mode of perceiving the world with scant attention to perspective and in-depth analysis. Yet public history involves more than media versions of the past. It involves the past itself in the form of museums and heritage sites, the endeavours of academic historians to disseminate their findings to wide audiences, and

a diffused awareness of the past which varies from person to person, group to group and country to country. The term is one of convenience, covering diverse forms of history such as documentaries, historical fiction and drama, non-specialist magazines and memorials, all produced for and consumed by mass audiences of non-specialists. The aim may include entertainment and education, but the underpinning is always “the past’s perennial usefulness in the present”.³ In a complementary sense, public history can also serve either as a temporary escape from a banal present and an uncertain future or as a vital building bloc of present identities and collective memories. Multiple meanings suggest that the past often seems to lack any concrete definition and common thread: “an empty space open to colonisation by other, more powerful interests”⁴ or a canopy of fragments and contested narratives fuelled by presentism.

Hagen Fleischer’s contribution to the rich debate on public history is original, engaging, witty and humane. Broad and deep in scope, his book weaves together a vast amount of evidence and information to produce a compelling and judicious interpretation of our recent past and of our times, centring on the most decisive and famous event of the twentieth century – World War II. All the states that emerged from that war framed their postwar legitimacy, role and stakes in world affairs, as well as their domestic orders, on the basis of their actual or alleged stance from 1939 to 1945. The rifts of the Cold War that followed made the particular narratives contested and triggered the wars of memory which, with an ever-shifting focus, continue unabated. “Thus,” writes Fleischer, “an inquiry into the anything but static ‘loci’ of memory and of the stakes in the debate is important for the investigation of the broader public opinion trends and of the strategies for its manipulation” (17).

The author raises a broad range of questions: What is the relationship between history, memory and the myths that are deemed necessary for healing wounds and securing internal social cohesion? How do successive generations construct their memories? Is oblivion wholly negative or is it also a healer? In addressing them, Fleischer's aim is not so much what happened as what did *not* happen. His scope is extensive and detailed, covering Europe (including neutral countries), Asia and the USA, as well as the appeasement strategies of almost all Greek postwar governments towards the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

In the first part, "The Germans and the Others", the Cold War and the attendant rehabilitation of the FRG into the nexus of Western institutions cast an omnipresent shadow into West German accounts of the recent past. Although Cold War priorities took precedence over the task of dealing with it morally, historically and economically, these accounts were not static but ranged between the morally optimum and the politically feasible, in line with the changing international context. The first years of the FRG's postwar life witnessed a resurrection of the anti-Bolshevik and anti-Slav propaganda of Hitler's Germany. In postwar Germany the Nazi Reich was equated with Hitler's persona and clique, with the addendum that crimes had indeed been committed by them in the name of Germany – a euphemism implying that they had been committed by extraterrestrials who had usurped the name of Germany.

The end of Cold War was perceived to have signalled the final defeat of Russia/USSR and bred German conceit vis-à-vis Moscow. Attempts to overcome the past after unification were 'cross-eyed': in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), monuments and memori-

als in former Nazi concentration camps came under attack for being communist propaganda; the distinction between victims and victimisers was blurred; the terror-bombing of German cities by the Allies tended to overshadow the fact that Germans had already practised the same craft in European cities; and the Allies had wilfully caused civilian casualties, while the civilian casualties which had been caused by the Luftwaffe had been 'collateral damage'. What was at stake in these reappraisals was not the indisputable facts that the Allied bombings had flattened German cities and that many Germans had also been victims of the war, but the extent to which these experiences were contextualised, by Germans and others, either to atone for Nazi crimes or to justify the actions of other states.

Equally contested and just as influenced by presentism were the public histories of the war in all other European countries, the USA and Japan. In Eastern Europe, since 1989 new and old skeletons have emerged. Not only territories but also dates were contested; in the Baltics the war was seen to have started in 1940, when they were occupied by Soviet troops, and to have ended in 1991, when they regained their independence. Moreover, for Eastern European countries the events of 1989–1991 had far-reaching repercussions for their foreign policy as well as for their domestic socio-political rearrangements. The switch to capitalism generated a mood where Nazi crimes are perceived as lesser than the crimes committed by the Soviets and the communists. It also turned out that crime sites generated money. Lithuania hosts a Gulag park, "a sort of Disneyland of (Soviet) terror, which attracts far more visitors than the neglected Jewish Holocaust Museum" (177). Elsewhere in Eastern Europe the repackaging of memory merged the national with

the ideological enemy. In Croatia there was a purge of “the ideologically charged monuments of the ‘Serb-communist era’”, while in Slovakia nationalists equate indigenous communism with the Czech element. The repackaging of memory involved not only the tearing down of monuments and the renaming of streets, squares and towns, but also the nostalgic admiration for pre-communist regimes, obscuring the fact that most of them were authoritarian and with varying degrees of fascist and anti-Semitic tendencies. Yet this repackaging also served the aim of former communist countries to be admitted to the EU and NATO – “the organisations of the promised land” (181).

In post-Soviet Russia during the Yeltsin days it looked as if “the Whites had won the last decisive battle of the Russian Civil War” (156), but in Putin’s days Russian patriotism includes a generous amount of nostalgia for the glory days of the Soviet Union, along with a certain amount of fondness for Stalin. It has been so mainly because the Cold War ended in a manner unlike the conflict of 1939–1945. There was no unconditional surrender, no occupation, no attempt to re-educate the minds of the vanquished, and therefore, “no zero-hour conditions for a new beginning” (158).

In Western Europe too, “reality is seldom as shiny as the myth” (228). One pervasive myth in both halves of the continent was that of an immediate and national resistance – a myth that aimed to bolster national pride, cement social cohesion, promote economic and social reconstruction and strengthen national identity. All countries denied repeatedly that any significant part of their population collaborated with the occupiers or in any way benefitted from its crimes, especially with regard to the annihilation of the indigenous Jewish element.

In France the extent of the population’s loyalty to the Vichy regime ensured that the years from 1940 to 1944 were for decades erased from the national memory so that room could be made for the construction of the republic’s founding myth: that the resistance and de Gaulle’s ‘Free French’ had played a decisive contribution in the liberation of France. Holland’s national myth claimed that throughout the German occupation the Dutch had put up an epic resistance. After the mid-1990s it transpired that there was no epic, little resistance and more accommodation (rather than collaboration) with the Germans. In Italy, for almost half a century it was public history that the country had been a wartime enemy and victim of Germany. Italy’s self-image was that of a nation of antifascist peace-lovers, while the myth of the large antifascist majority was equally convenient for the USA in the emerging Cold War, as it secured Italy’s swift rehabilitation. The romantic antifascist picture started to wear out in the violent 1970s, while after 1989/1991 official antifascism appeared vacuous, the party system disintegrated and Silvio Berlusconi’s new, heterogeneous alliance came to power. Under the *cavaliere* the right embarked on a project to undercut the left’s cultural hegemony and erode the anti-fascist narrative of the war. The result compelled Antonio Tabucchi to urge his compatriots “not to confuse the *nazi-fascisti* with ‘Assyrian-Babylonians 4,000 years ago’” (252).

Japan has had similar difficulties in accepting the onus of its own Asian wars which included the whole range from the Nanking massacre of up to 200,000 Chinese in 1937 to the abduction of some 200,000 young women, mainly Chinese and Korean, to offer their services in the military brothels of the Japanese Imperial Army as ‘women of solace’ or ‘recreation’. While Japanese aggression in East Asia cost the lives of 15 to 35 million

people, postwar Japan chose to extol the heroism of the *kamikaze* and the victimisation of the country by US atomic bombs. The Cold War necessitated Japan's rehabilitation, debasing Clio herself into 'a woman of solace' in that public memory of the war allowed no room for Japan's role in bringing it about in the Pacific and for the ruthless repression of local populations.

In the USA the public version of events appears ignorant of the fact that the USA did not enter the war uninvited to save the world from fascism and Nazism. Public and academic debates on the drop of 'Fat Man' and 'Little Boy' on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 continue apace, while victory in the Cold War has allowed Americans more liberties with history – for instance, when they refer to the construction of democratic regimes in the FRG and Japan after 1945 as their model, vindicated by history, for the restructuring of Iraq.

Britain is a different case for a variety of reasons, including the English warrior culture and the older running feuds with the Franks and the 'Huns', at least as perceived by Britons themselves. 'Kraut-bashing' is a national sport among some, while for the more politically correct Britons the cardinal lesson of the Second World War is that it crowns British superiority over others. Also in Britain commemorations of the war took a very idiosyncratic British tint, for in 2004 a monument was erected in London to commemorate the death of the millions of horses, dogs, camels, pigeons and other animals that died in the defence of the realm.

Fleischer is well aware of the tension amongst competing views on the relationship between past and present. The past may change as and when the present does, but

constant attempts to reinterpret it raise the perils of presentism and of the arbitrary denial of indisputable historical facts, Holocaust/*Shoah* denials being the most notorious case in point. The trend continued in 2005, when the sixtieth anniversary of the war's end witnessed more emerging skeletons, ranging from the rehabilitation of 9.5 million Nazis into the fabric of the FRG to Lichtenstein's concessions to Germany and Ireland's admission of some pro-German (though anti-English in origin) sympathies from 1939 to 1945. In the post-Cold War order and mode of thinking, Adolf Hitler has been confirmed as the quintessential secular Satan and a yardstick of evil for all times. Comparing present-day undesirables to Hitler and referring to the cardinal sin of appeasement sanctions the concept of preventive and 'humanitarian' wars in situations where, according to some US media, the only difference between Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler was that the former had a bigger moustache.

Assessing the implications of this mode of thinking, Fleischer argues that historical amnesia and illiteracy, especially among the youth, instead of lessening the appeal of national stereotypes and prejudices, seem to have had the reverse effect. Crimes are popular and highly marketable, provided they are other peoples' crimes. With regard to the Germans, he admits that they are entitled to remember their own victims since the Allies often resorted to mass brutality; but the victimhood of the Germans should not prevent them from remembering that in the first place it had been Germany that had sought a total war which ultimately brought upon it massive, brutal but non-genocidal reprisals. There is clearly a need for convergence among different representations of history, but "the paths that lead there appear narrow and steep, at times they have not as yet been

constructed" (500). Fleischer argues that oversupply and silence are symptoms of the same disease that prevents people(s) from accepting the past, controlling the present and gauging the future. But of the two hazards, he is all too clear about the graver: "the fragile boat of collective memory, doomed to sail in treacherous waters, is in less danger because of oversupply, provided the crew is not carried away and knows what to choose in each case" (491).

Hagen Fleischer has produced a landmark book. The public, which at times is served out-of-date or foul public history, has on this occasion been offered a precious gift which, to judge from the book's successive reprints, has already met its well-deserved public applause. But in the longer term, it should be hailed and cited as the pivotal study which spawned research into the realm where academic and public history meet. To emulate it would be a very tall order; but at the very least it will set new standards and point to new directions, modes and practices for historians who recognise that their trade is essentially a political act which is best served with adherence to the author's strictest tradition of impeccable scholarship, empathy and judiciousness.

NOTES

- 1 Tony Judt, *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century*, London: Vintage, 2009, p. 371.
- 2 Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1988, p. x.
- 3 Ludmilla Jordanova, *History in Practice*, London: Arnold, 2000, p. 147.
- 4 John Tosh, 'Introduction', in J. Tosh (ed.), *Historians on History*, London: Longman, 2000, p. 9.

**Riki van Boeschoten,
Tasoula Vervenioti,
Eftihia Voutira,
Vassilis Dalkavoukis,
Constantina Bada (eds)**

*Μνήμες και λήθη
του ελληνικού
Εμφυλίου Πολέμου*
[*Memories and Oblivion of
the Greek Civil War*]

**Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2008.
448 pp.**

by Stratos N. Dordanas
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From the opening remarks in the foreword to this volume, one is instantly made aware of the complex issues addressed therein. This compelling volume of articles does not provide simply a description of the historical circumstances but delves into a historical inquiry examining in depth the actual processes at work directly following the end of the Greek Civil War, a period whose outcome was to convert the events that took place into either memories or sink them into oblivion, as the case may be. The editors accurately draw our attention to the use of the plural form of the word 'memories', pointing out that it aptly depicts the different versions

of the same events, that is to say, the way the Civil War has been interpreted in the present by both those who lived it and took part in it as well as those who did not witness it directly. The articles regard 'memory' and 'oblivion' as giving a multifaceted perspective, firstly recording the diverse representation of the past and secondly providing discussion and assessment of the research tools and methodology implemented.

Besides providing a very clear picture of the phenomenon's multiplicity, the numerous questions raised in relation to what actually is remembered from and what is forgotten about such a traumatic past denote the interdisciplinary nature of this research. What is broached concerning the sensitive subject of institutional as opposed to personal memory and the channels through which this is promoted, as well as the relationship between memory and oblivion, i.e., the ways and conditions under which we remember or forget in the public and the private spheres, comes down to one question, which in my opinion encapsulates the whole of the issue at hand: What should a society do with such a difficult and traumatic past: Remember? Forget? Or punish the culprits? And by extension, if it must remember or forget, how is this memory or oblivion conveyed institutionally through society and the family to the next generations by those who took part and are still living? Moreover, which memory, or more precisely, which parts of this memory are passed down from generation to generation, and which have been selected to fall into oblivion? As the editors rightly state, the processes of transference of the trauma to the following generations constitute an interesting new field for future research. Here, I would add that the way these traumatic experiences are transferred and, in particular, the accompanying presence or absence of their resolution have determined, and to a large de-

gree continue to determine, society's overall stance in relation to its traumatic past.

The conference on which this publication is based dealt with the persistent traumas and the plurality of the interpretations and narrations of this period, without, however, ignoring the attempts of the political parties to exploit it to their advantage. Even from its planning stage, the conference, organised by the Civil Wars Study Group in Korissos, near Kastoria, came up against silences and denials of the war which pitted Greek against Greek. It appears that for various reasons, some would like this ferocious war to remain in oblivion, or whatever they deem to be oblivion.

On the one hand, the forced relocation of the conference from the city of Kastoria to neighbouring Korissos, despite the visible progress made in the study of social memory (also evident in the related academic literature), seems to confirm that this discussion has still not passed into society at large, at least not to the degree that would have been expected. People do not seem to have acquainted themselves nor come to terms with this most painful past of modern Greek history; this involves the various members of society, whether we are referring to private citizens or institutional bodies. On the other hand, the location of Korissos and the dialogue (with tensions and partial disagreements) that arose between the speakers and the audience at the conference, reveal the state of ferment that continues to exist in the public arena concerning the memory of the Civil War and the need for this memory to be thoroughly documented and researched. To this effect the articles in this volume, apart from addressing the various aspects of the Civil War through a thoroughly interdisciplinary approach, also raise a series of complex issues and pose important questions on the research tools and methodology applied, the approaches taken

and interpretations given of the sources, as well as the use of oral history.

The articles have been divided into thematic units for easy access to various topic combinations. In the first chapter, the article by Elvira Marousa and Philip Kargopoulos discusses the way we remember and forget information from the bulk of human memory. Through examples of daily life and the juxtaposition of research findings from the field of psychology, they advance a set of proposals on the strengths and weaknesses of memory. As might be expected, from the various theories, the Freudian perspective on the denial of traumatic events as an organic element of the unconscious defense mechanism stands out. These findings are useful in helping social scientists understand the phenomenon of collective memory.

The critical issues that arise from a double narration of memory from an historical and anthropological perspective are presented by Polymeris Voglis. In his article on memories of the 1940s, he refers to a divided memory, which determined the implementation of the interpretational context of the past in relation to right and left politics. Based on oral testimonies, written accounts and the questions the historian poses, the interplay between individual and collective memory is emphasised. The author supports the idea that divided memory is transformed within the context of this interaction under the influence of the present, the current chronological-historical conjunction as well as the policies of the construction of identity.

Articles by Tasoula Vervenioti, Constantina Bada, Riki van Boeschoten and Vassilis Dalkavoukis contribute to the discussion on research tools and methodology. Vervenioti applies the notion of memory and oblivion to read between the

lines of official documents and state archives for the 'truths' they mention and those they neglect to mention. Following, she juxtaposes these with other sources, with a political impact, such as the written and oral statements of those who were actively involved in the Civil War. Assessing the objectives and the language used in numerous sources, she focuses on the place and the anthropogeography of the Civil War in order to ascertain the key role played by the countryside in relation to the capital (Athens), and the primacy of the Left in the public memory with the groups which formed the leadership of the Communist Party of Greece (well-educated city dwellers who published their personal experiences) to the detriment of the anonymous members (from the provinces with little or no education who remained silent and unacknowledged even after the fall of the Colonels' junta (*Metapolitefsi*)). Vervenioti has made an important contribution to the study of the period by fully exploiting the Red Cross archives in Geneva, whose data, based on both quantitative and qualitative research characteristics, was compared to the existing memory of women's imprisonment during the Civil War, which has largely been sustained by oral and written accounts.

Bada also focuses on the aspect of the gender dimension: women's identity and memory of the Civil War, pointing out that this area of research for decades remained unexplored as in Greece there was no or very little scientific interest in or demand for this. Archival material of the League for Democracy in Greece in combination with oral and written material represented the sources of Bada's study on women as participants and as vehicles of interpretation and construction of individual and collective identity in the Civil War. This collection of spontaneous and sincere narrations of life-stories came from the residents (both male and female) of Agrinio as part of a wider research programme.

Besides offering a comparative study of individual views, roles, and the extent of their participation, personal narrations of people's lives during the Civil War also provide the opportunity to compare and contrast these accounts with their previous reticence; as is the case with these women who did not talk about their involvement during such extreme periods of non-normalcy. At the same time, they help us better understand the mechanisms and policies of transference of the past to the present and its interpretation. These policies acquire conflicting characteristics when the individual and the collective trauma do not cease to exist with the end of the events but continue to be transferred from generation to generation. A characteristic example of this is the memory of the large-scale transportation of children to Eastern bloc countries as the 'sole truth' and the pressure this continues to bear on the present.

From a substantial number of life testimonies, collected as part of a long-term study conducted in collaboration with Loring Danforth, van Boeschoten pursues the process of transference of traumatic memory (post-memory) from the previous to the next generations. These accounts come from people who as children were taken to former communist countries, as well as from those who as children were placed in the 'children's towns' under the welfare of Queen Frederica. The most significant finding in this study is the fact that these accounts do not confirm the dominant public memory concerning the plight of the Civil War children and the conditions under which their experiences took place. Despite the fact that these adults have different political outlooks and belong to opposing political parties, they seem to share as children many common traumatic experiences. If nothing else, the situation clearly shows the political impact that this hotly debated issue had not only throughout the duration

of the Civil War but also during the Cold War period, chiefly by being used as propaganda by both camps. As with all traumatic experiences, so too with traumatic memory, only by processing it rather than silencing it or letting it fall into oblivion that both the individual and collective participants can be reconciled with the past that produced the trauma of the Civil War for both sides.

Oral life testimonies, consequently, are an invaluable research tool for a full understanding of the past and it goes without question that methodology must take into account every available source, namely through the implementation of an interdisciplinary approach. Dalkavoukis looks at the association of the written material with the oral accounts of the Civil War narrations, and within a theoretical framework presents an enlightening discussion on the relationship between participant and the written word in the course of memory creation. To illustrate this relationship he presents the case study of a former fighter of the communist Democratic Army of Greece who was also a political refugee. The subject agreed to read four specific books on the Civil War and evaluate the differences between the events that refer to his own experiences and those that are written in an academic language and which are difficult to understand. Over time and through the written word the subject appears to critically redefine his stance of events.

The accounts of the Civil War protagonists (whether obscure or esteemed) and their memories cannot but to some extent be biased. Depending directly on the geography of the experiences and on their given community-group expression, they gain specific content. In their articles, Dimitris Papadopoulos, Ioannis Karakatsianis, George Petropoulos, Thanasis Mihailidis and Loring Danforth present significant issues dealing with memory and the mem-

ory of space. Characteristic examples include the Prespes Lakes as location and memory; the left- and right-wing Maniots not only as members of a traditional society but also as bearers of the ideological burden of the Civil War; the memory of the Security Battalions and their legitimacy pertaining to the national threat; the memory of second-generation political refugees; and the formation of collective memory and the identity of the Greek-American community through dominant narrations, such as those by Nicholas Gage.

The exploitation and stereotyping of the events of the 1940s by all the political parties and the transference of that memory can be observed from the post-Civil War years up to the present. The centre parties of the two post-war decades, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) up until the end of the 1980s, and the Popular Orthodox Rally (Laos) since 2000 are mentioned as examples which have at times reverted to the Civil War past not only as a base on which to hinge their party differences, but more so they have used this past to 'interpret' political developments in the present, as well as to give a dimension characteristic of the Civil War to present-day political dissension. Eleni Paschaloudi, Lamprini Rori and Stathis Tsiras consider the respective identities of party administration of the past.

In their treatment of the participants and the locations it is apparent that both the conference organisers and the editors of this volume made a concerted effort to provide an integrated statement about the memory of the Greek Civil War. Not only are the issues of special interest but timely as well. Maria Bodila and Irene Lagani examine such topics as: the trauma of the Civil War as presented in school textbooks; the national myths that arose around it; the gross distortions and biases; the neglect of various camps to mention certain events; as

well as giving us a comparative juxtaposition of the Greek views on the past in terms of the official education policy with other European counterparts (France). The teaching of history in schools has recently been a hotly debated issue in the media; however, for professional historians the questions concerned with methodology-curriculum, including the official objectives regarding the formation of a collective-national memory in schools, are always apropos and, on the whole, constitute a compelling field for research and discussion.

Last but not least, the Civil War seems to have 'permeated' the domains of literature and cinema, where being transformed into words and images it has thus been legitimised in its own way. Maria Nikolopoulou, Lampros Flitouris, Alexandra Ioannidou and Panagiotis Spyropoulos analyse the portrayal of the memories of the Civil War in these art forms.

Without a doubt, it can be said that this publication makes a valuable contribution to the existing literature on the Greek Civil War. All those involved in the 1940s, the Civil War and its legacy recognise that memory plays not only a determining role but is a vital catalyst in bridging the numerous materials and sources for a comprehensive interdisciplinary academic discussion. To sum up, apart from the usefulness of research tools and methodology, I firmly believe that *Memories and Oblivion of the Greek Civil War* reveals the manifold significance and impact of all those who participated in the Civil War, as conveyors of memory and as producers of oblivion in their attempts to understand the past and in so doing become reconciled with it.

**Umut Özkırmılı
and Spyros A. Sofos**
***Tormented by History:
Nationalism in Greece
and Turkey***

London: Hurst, 2008. 220 pp.

by Alexis Heraclides

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The Greek–Turkish conflict is a classic ‘adversarial dyad’, one of handful of ongoing international rivalries with a history of a hundred or perhaps two hundred years.

Until the 1990s, the traditional line of research on the Greek–Turkish antagonism was to trace the vicissitudes of Greek–Ottoman and Greek–Turkish relations historically, in what was basically diplomatic historical approach with a tinge of foreign policy analysis. Necessary and indispensable as this straightforward line may have been, it focused – with few exceptions – only incidentally on the deeper reasons for the ongoing clash. Hence, if one is to unravel the deeper reasons for the Greek–Turkish conflict, a comparative approach is also in order, one that would touch upon the respective nationalisms, national narratives and collective identities *per se*. It is mainly with the pacesetting work of Hercules Millas¹ that this vantage point gained in reso-

nance in what appears to be, with the advent of 21st century,² a new emergent subfield that one could perhaps call ‘comparative Greek–Turkish studies’.

The book under review, by Umut Özkırmılı and Spyros A. Sofos, is the latest book of this kind; it is in many respects a book waiting to be written. It focuses in far greater detail and more systematically than any previous work on the respective national narratives and nationalisms and on the births of the two nation-states in question.

From the outset the two authors reject the primordialist and perennialist approaches to nationalism. As they put it, this book “will cast a critical eye on official narratives and nationalist interpretations which portray the ‘Greek’ or the ‘Turkish’ nation as the reincarnation of a perennial ‘Greek’ and ‘Turkish’ essence, which managed to preserve its character intact despite the vicissitudes of history”; and it is critical of the inevitability of a process leading to the ‘awakening’ of the two as nations (6). They equally reject the ethnosymbolic approach of Anthony D. Smith in general as well as the Greek case in particular (for Smith has argued that if a nation is defined on the basis of ethnicity, vernacular language, religion and ensuing culture, a Greek nation may be said to have existed in the later days of the Byzantine Empire, as well as under Ottoman rule).³ As the authors aptly argue, “ethnosymbolist thinking suffers from what we would call ‘retrospective ethnicisation’; it ethnicises the past, a past that is much more complex, contradictory and ambiguous than we are led to believe” (9). Furthermore, *ethnies* themselves are “social constructs just like nations . . . established over time or invented, and forged together often arbitrarily”. Indeed the whole Özkırmılı–Sofos book can be seen an elaborate and convincing answer as to why the first

two approaches are untenable, while ethno-symbolism, though *prima facie* not utterly implausible, holds little water upon closer scrutiny.

The authors objectives in this book are three-fold: firstly, to provide a comparative analysis of the emergence and development of Greek and Turkish nationalist projects; secondly, to offer a critique of the official myths and narratives of Greek and Turkish nationalisms; and, finally, to relate these two cases to the broader academic debate on nationalism and propose a theoretical account of the processes of nation formation in both countries (5). The book succeeds admirably, particularly in the first two tasks. Their task was made easier by the sheer volume of quality studies of recent decades regarding the respective nationalisms.⁴ The authors place the findings of research on nationalism under five headings: (a) modernity, Enlightenment, Westernisation; (b) culture, identity, difference; (c) past, memory, history; (d) space, territory, homeland; (e) minorities and the politics of homogenisation.

In this study it is made abundantly clear that the Greeks have a clear and concrete grand national narrative (the Paparrigopoulos scheme of the continuity of the 'Greek nation' for three millennia), the 'Helleno-Christian synthesis', which has no rivals (save perhaps the marginal neo-Orthodox line, which for the most part shares the basic tenets of the main narrative, such the linear continuity of the Greeks). The Turks are less clear-cut with three main rival narrations and at least two lesser ones, and as a result tend to be, for the most part, more insecure and defensive about their nationhood and national identity than the Greeks. The three main narrations are the "Turkish history thesis", formulated in the interwar period under instructions from

Kemal Atatürk; the ultra-nationalist Turkist approach, which verges on racism; and what has come to be known as the "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" of the late 1970s and 1980s. The lesser rival narrations are pan-Turkism, whose heyday was in the 1913–1918 period under the political leadership of Enver Pasha; and an all-embracing approach stressing the Anatolian homeland on non-ethnic lines (what Millas has called Anatolianism).

The presentation of the Turkish history thesis in the book is very thorough and full of insight, as is the presentation of Turkism as well as pan-Turkism. The presentation of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis is more rudimentary, covering mainly the activity of its advocates and their influence on the military then in power in Turkey (following the September 1980 coup). A more detailed account of Turkish-Islamic synthesis thinking, for instance with regard to the Ottoman Empire (which the Turkish history thesis had harshly downgraded for reasons of its own), would have been a worthwhile exercise. The proponents of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, such as history professor Ibrahim Kafesoğlu or Muharrem Ergin, present the Ottoman Empire in all its power and glory, as a just and effective state and as a multinational 'paradise of tolerance' for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. It would also have been useful to explore the progenitors of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, not least the celebrated Seljuk and Ottoman historian and one-time foreign minister M. Fuad Köprülü (1890–1966), whom many regard as the forefather or even the actual father of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis thesis. The relationship of Turgut Özal (the Turkish leader who dominated the political scene for ten years, from 1983 until his death) with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis would also have been something worth mentioning,⁵ even though Özal, in his attempt to enhance the

European credentials of Turkey, had come forward ostensibly as a supporter of Anatolianism, in his *Turquie en Europe* (1988), first published in French.

My main criticism of the book does not regard substance or its outlook, but something that seems to be missing: the lack of interaction between the two nationalisms, that is when did an initiative or act by one party motivated by nationalism influence the other side, perhaps spurring the rise of the other's sense of national identity and nationalism, and when did this not occur. In lieu of an example, the Greek War of Independence had negligible influence on the Ottomans, while the war of 1897 and the Macedonian struggle had some effect on the rise of Turkish awareness among some Turks (intellectuals and younger officers), Turkic immigrants from Russia, and particularly the nationalist section of the Young Turk movement. But the decisive act that established Turkish nationalism as never before – and indeed pan-Turkism for a while – was the First Balkan War, which dashed all the hopes of the liberal Young Turks under Prince Sabaheddin (Sultan Abdulhamid's nephew), who were striving to transform the Ottoman state into a liberal, multiethnic and decentralised (semi-federal) state. The Balkan Wars also gave rise to what some authors have called “economic nationalism” against the Greek economic dominance in the empire.⁶ Furthermore, the ghastly violence of the attacking armies in Macedonia against the Muslim population led to violence against the Ottoman Greeks in Istanbul and eastern Asia Minor, perpetuated by many of the refugees, assisted by irregular bands (this came to be known as the “*diogmos*” among the Greeks). Had this ‘ping-pong’ effect been included, the book would have been even livelier and an even greater contribution to understanding the Greek–Turkish conflict.

There is also a lack of reference to the idea of the ‘late medieval origins’ of Greekness (that is what neo-Platonic philosopher Plethon and others were all about), which is a more sophisticated rendition of the Paparrigopoulos scheme, introduced by Svoronos, Vakalopoulos and others in the 1950s and 1960s. This would have tallied very well with the reference that is correctly made in the book about the surfacing of ‘Turkish culture’ and a sense of Turkish identity in the early fifteenth century, particularly during the reign of Murat II, which later disappeared but for the Oghuz myth of the central Asian origins of the Ottomans which remained part of the official lore of the Ottoman dynasty. Another minor point could also be mentioned, the somewhat exaggerated reference to Ion Dragoumis and Athanassios Souliotis-Nicoliades (19–21, 114–16), as if the ‘Ottoman–Greek state’ was their brainchild (apparently the authors have been misled by a paper written by Thanos Veremis).⁷ And a final point, very dear to the heart of this commentator: the assertion that the Cyprus issue never commanded the same enthusiasm as Venizelos's pursuit of the *Megali Idea* (119) is not a correct assertion. The Cyprus issue commanded equal enthusiasm in Greece and, furthermore, contrary to the *Megali Idea*, Cyprus's union with Greece, the famous *Enosis*, was overwhelmingly supported by those directly concerned on the other side, the Greek-Cypriots⁸ (while the Ottoman Greeks were until 1912, the eve of the Balkan wars, split as to whether to endorse union with Greece or remain loyal to the Ottoman Empire as Ottoman citizens). Incidentally, Venizelos may have been historically associated with the pursuit of a Greece of “two continents and five seas” (109), but he also toyed with striking an accommodation with the Ottomans, both before the Balkan Wars and, surprisingly, even after proposing an exchange of populations. (Before becom-

ing prime minister, he was not adverse to the idea of a Greek–Ottoman state.)

All in all, this is a worthwhile and important contribution to the literature on comparative Greek–Turkish studies. Eloquent and convincing, it furthers our understanding of the deeper reasons for the Greek–Turkish antagonism and sheds light on the inability of the two states and their peoples to achieve a lasting reconciliation to this day, in spite of the recent ten-year thaw in their traditional cold war.

NOTES

- 1 Hercules Millas, "History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey", *History Workshop Journal* 31: 1 (1991): 21–33; idem, *Εικόνες Ελλήνων και Τούρκων: Σχολικά βιβλία, ιστοριογραφία, λογοτεχνία και εθνικά στερεότυπα* (Images of Greeks and Turks: school books, historiography, literature and national stereotypes), Athens: Alexandria, 2001; idem, *The Imagined 'Other' as National Identity*, Ankara: Turkish–Greek Civic Dialogue Project, 2005.
- 2 See, for example, Renée Hirschon (ed.), *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Exchange of Populations Between Greece and Turkey*, Oxford: Berghahn, 2003; Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas (eds), *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, London: Routledge, 2005; Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey*, London: Granta, 2006.
- 3 Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Cambridge: Polity, 2001, pp. 105–6.
- 4 On Turkish nationalism, see the following works in English: David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, London: Frank Cass, 1977; Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, London: Hurst, 1995; Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, London: Hurst, 1997. On Greek nationalism see, in particular, Antonis Liakos, «Προς επισκευήν ολομέλειας και Ενότητας. Η δόμηση του εθνικού χρόνου», *Επιστημονική συνάντηση στη μνήμη του Κ. Θ. Δημαρά*, Athens: Centre for Neohellenic Studies, 1994; Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (eds), *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, London/Athens: Sage/Eliamep, 1990.
- 5 For this aspect, see Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent*, pp. 180, 184–5.
- 6 See Ayhan Aktar, "Economic Nationalism in Turkey: The Formative Years, 1912–1925", *Boğaziçi Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies* 10:1–2 (1996): 263–90, here 268–9.
- 7 Thanos Veremis, "From the National State to the Stateless Nation", in Blinkhorn and Veremis (eds), *Modern Greece*, pp. 9–22.
- 8 On this overwhelming enthusiasm bordering on frenzy, see Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. See my review of this book: *Historein* 8 (2008): 205–208.

Yannis Hamilakis

***The Nation and its Ruins:
Antiquity, Archaeology,
and National Imagination
in Greece***

**Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007. 376 pp.**

by Kostas Kotsakis

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The *Nation and its Ruins* is a book on the relationship between nationalism and archaeology, especially classical archaeology, in Greece. As such, it follows a well-established trend in recent scholarship exploring the close relationship between aspects of archaeological discourse and the dominant narrative of national integration. This is a trend that has already contributed considerably to the deeper understanding of archaeology as a social practice, with a respectable number of papers, publications and collective volumes. One may think, therefore, that the aim of the present book is to recapitulate this discussion, presenting it in a new synthesis. This, however, is not the case: the author aims to offer his own vision of this formative relationship, a vision based on selected episodes of Greek archaeology, starting with Andronikos and the finds of Vergina, passing to

the Metaxas dictatorship and its political uses of the past, to the Greek Civil War and the prosecution of the left, ending with the Elgin Marbles and claims for their restitution. Most of these episodes have already attracted the interest of the author in a number of his previous publications, and are here reworked in the light of the main theme of the book. They are all related to the material manifestations of (classical) antiquity, the 'social lives of things', to recall an all too familiar phrase. These are all very frankly explained in the Introduction to the book, where it is clearly stated what this book is not: it is not an anthropology of archaeology, nor an ethnography of heritage, nor even a social history of archaeology (9ff). After all these caveats, it is up to the reader to find out if there is anything of value left to be discussed in the volume.

This is not accidental, however. The main argument, which is intended as the book's principal contribution, is a re-evaluation of the bond between nationalism and archaeology, in the light of recent postcolonial theoretical discourse. Of course Greece was never a colonial country, in the proper sense of the term, but Hamilakis is not alone in thinking that elements of crypto-colonialism are present in the "processes and apparatuses" of the introduction of the new order of modernity. I do not feel competent to assess the value of this assumed connection, although I have the feeling that a colonial understanding of Greece needs a little more than a project of modernisation, which, in any case, still remains open and unfulfilled. Undoubtedly, a generalisation of this order needs a careful definition preferably with some concretely documented evidence before it can be used as anything more than a convenient metaphor. Whatever the strength of the argument, the point is that the book puts the stakes rather high: Greece becomes a case study that aims at a paradigmatic re-

definition of nationalism as an analytical category in modern archaeological theoretical discussion.

I will begin, therefore, with this argument. Hamilakis correctly challenges the practice, common among archaeologists coming from the Western metropolitan centres, of interpreting any local resistance to them as expressions of nationalism. In that sense, nationalism is used as a tool for dismissing local world views, for alienating local peoples from what they perceive as their heritage, for taking control of antiquities from the people who believe they are their rightful custodians. This is definitely a Western colonial legacy in two significant ways: it is a straightforward process of appropriation of a local resource, and it is profoundly essentialist, in the sense that the nationalist 'imagined community' is contrasted to a reality which existed *before* any nationalist falsification. Interestingly, I would add, this last argument has been equally used on the part of Greek nationalism itself, typically oblivious to its own connection to what is usually attributed exclusively to the weaker 'other'. I find it very encouraging, therefore, that Hamilakis chooses to study the phenomenon from a reflexive point of view, exploring all the complexities involved and "being sensitive to the hopes, aspirations and dreams of social agents" (23).

But does he do that? This is a serious point that actually decides the success or failure of the ambitious project of this book. You need a method to fulfil such a demanding task. If not a proper method in the strict sense of the word, you definitely need a rigorous approach that can produce evidence for which your interpretations can be plausible accounts. This has nothing to do with objectivist approaches that seek authenticity and legitimation from their application of method. It merely means

that we need to have a device that generates arguments supported from newly discovered (or perhaps rediscovered) evidence. And, as Hamilakis is aiming at a 'bottom-up' approach, this task can be twice as difficult.

Despite his claims for a methodological *laissez-passer* expressed in the indiscriminately equal use of any form of evidence, such as autobiographical texts, poems, adverts, etc., the author has to make concessions to the historical depth of the phenomena and the social power dynamics of their contexts, while at the same time dealing directly with the materiality of the past. In fact, what he calls, following Marcus, a "multi-sited historical and archaeological ethnography" (23) has to deal directly with these two important aspects. The problem is, even given these concessions, how can one produce out of this heterogeneous material a coherent sequence of evidence, rather than a convenient selection of only those pieces that fit the overall scheme? One cannot help thinking that this opening claim has less value than declared: historical research never underrated any form of evidence, or privileged any single one at the expense of others. It is the *use* of evidence which is the issue, not its nature. And in this context, incidentally, one cannot but remark that archival evidence is not explicitly mentioned in the list of possible 'ethnographic' sources.

There is a clear contradiction here with the statements in the introduction to the book, where a social history of archaeology is expressly excluded. Indeed, how can one study social agents and social power dynamics if a social history is not within one's research horizon? And how can one study these aspects without really addressing the historical depth of these phenomena? I will give two examples to make this argument clearer. The first

refers to Andronikos. Describing Andronikos as a *shaman*, as the book does, might be a nice, even amusing, metaphor that drives home the argument of premodern complexity. It helps us very little, however, to situate Andronikos and his role within Greek archaeology and Greek society, or indeed to grasp the premodernity of Greek archaeology. The broader outlook adopted by this work inhibits the author from dealing with the dynamic details of the formation of these attitudes within the changing Greek society of the twentieth century. Arguably, however, these details have the power to reveal precisely the rich grain of the historical dimension, by carefully and copiously juxtaposing the diverse aspects of evidence. Deprived of this, Andronikos and his archaeology are reduced to historical cartoons suitable to be utilised in any claim laid out by our postmodern, post-colonial fascinations.

It might be argued that this is a price to be paid for making the Greek case an international focus of interest in the contemporary postcolonial discussion. The details of the formation process can be tedious and uninteresting compared to the clear-cut final outcome of our analyses. Aiming at the broader discussion, the book cannot afford to deal with details, which would only make this target unfeasible. In any case, a lot of this detailed work has already been done by other scholars, and the book can only synthesise what has already been researched. I find this argument not particularly persuasive for two reasons: first, it is in strong contrast to the type of multi-sited ethnographic approach adopted by the author, which, as stated in the introduction, is based on selected particularities – sites, fields or experiences, in the author's terms; secondly, and more importantly, because a valid synthesis can only hope to succeed by understanding profound-

ly all the finer detail, weeding out the inessential from the essential. It cannot be done by sketching out what is by definition a complex picture. Whether this book has eventually achieved this level of synthesis is for the reader to decide.

The second example is related to the premodern aspects in contemporary Greek archaeology, an argument which is described on the cover of the book as “ground-breaking”. The fact is that the pre-modern characteristics of Greek modernity have repeatedly been pointed out for some time now, in literature, the arts, in archaeology, and above all in the very constitution of Greek social reality. Every generation in modern Greece since the nineteenth century has fought its own battle between a modernisation project and the heavy burden of historical heritage, in whichever way that heritage was conceived, and this holds true for archaeology too. Although this book does not seem to acknowledge that, this is one of the most well-studied aspects of modern Greek intellectual history, in fact, too well-studied to be omitted, or side-stepped. It may not have happened under the express label of postcolonialism, but that is entirely beside the point. The shades and complexity of these contrasting forces are among the most fascinating aspects of modern Greek social reality, extending to many domains, from literature to Christian Orthodox philosophy, and from politics to arts. This is why, as has already been noted in previous research, the analytical categories of nationalism as they were formed to account for the experience of northern European societies, and partly exported to Greece, are not always suitable for describing accurately or even meaningfully the ambivalence of modern Greek society towards modernity. For its own historical reasons, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this review, this ambivalence was

particularly prominent in archaeology. This book offers some nice examples of this variance, which can have an impact on this discussion. But it is hardly a revelation. Again, as I noted in the Andronikos case, this is no field for simplifications, but rather a field for informed sophistication based on solid research.

Could this reluctance to engage with history with subtlety and precision be connected to some aspects being treated in a summary fashion? For example, a concept of “people” crops up repeatedly in the discussion, for example, in the religious metaphor of Andronikos as a high priest of nationalism. What does this collective subject called the “people” consist of? The very example of Vergina shows that it can consist of different and conflicting agendas, not in the least unselfish or magnanimous; to see this complexity clearly, we don’t even have to touch the great issue of the idealisation of antiquities versus the daily practical concerns of particular parts of this “people” that every practicing archaeologist in Greece knows only too well. So which particular “people” does the author have in mind? Also, is Greek archaeology only classical? What are the relations, tensions and mutual influences and dependencies between prehistoric and classical archaeology? For instance, it is very interesting, as has been already noted, that the main archaeological argument for the antiquity of Macedonia was founded on concepts of culture history modelled on the connection of ethnicity with material culture, as it was established in prehistoric archaeology since the early twentieth century. No such concepts were used in southern Greece, where the ‘classical’ had a completely different content, nor in northern Europe, for that matter, where the concept of the ‘classical’ was initially conceived. Nor were any of these concepts ever used in Me-

dieval (Byzantine) archaeology. Choosing to ignore these subtle yet revealing dimensions of Greek archaeology weakens the argument of the book as a whole. What is more, it almost replaces any sense of a well-stratified history with a plurality of surfaces on which events are simply inscribed.

The final question to be asked is whether this book represents a useful addition to the continuously expanding scholarly output of reflexive archaeology. Frankly, I don’t know if this book is ‘useful’, if that term has any meaning at all. It is easy to read its engaging narrative, full of all the correct words. It is at times irritating in its swift generalisations, especially if you happen to have prior knowledge of the subject discussed. It is original in the choice of particular themes, even though the temporal succession of the chapters does not really compensate for a clear historical perspective. But the book does not aim at offering one, in the first place. It aims at a distinct style of ethnography that tries to replace conventional historical narrative. In this respect, the book represents a notable contribution, one of the first to appear in this domain of the discipline, but the price paid for this choice is perhaps too high, as arguments tend to become personal judgments, occasionally selective, even impressionistic. Whether this personal account is successful, with correct insights, remains to be seen in the future. The book itself, apparently out of choice, offers at times disappointingly little to support the validity of its claims. Nevertheless, it is an interesting book, both for what it includes, which is much, and for what it does not include, which is also much.

Katerina Zacharia (ed.)

***Hellenisms:
Culture, Identity, and
Ethnicity from
Antiquity to Modernity***

**Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.
473 pp.**

by Dimitris Plantzos

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Readings of ethnic and cultural identity have now become standard methodology for the historian as much as for the cultural anthropologist, and *Hellenisms* is striving admirably “to initiate a public dialogue among authoritative and discipline-specific voices, exploring a variety of Hellenisms”, setting out as it does “to present a sense of Hellenism in the construction of a grammar of national ideologies” (1). As I read on, however, I can’t help worrying that this truly “distinguished group of historians, classicists, anthropologists, ethnographers, cultural studies and comparative literature scholars” who have contributed the book’s fourteen chapters have been invited to do so under false pretences.

Certainly, pluralising the term ‘Hellenism’ in the title helps suggest that the editor is after a nuanced, culturally specific and historically sensitive understanding of the term; she

even informs us, from the very beginning, of the different uses of the term by Herodotus, the Biblical *Acts* and so on, before delving into Droysen’s *Hellenismus*. Katerina Zacharia, the book’s editor, is a classicist trained in Athens and London (UCL), now teaching at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. Her grasp of her subject is, indeed, “authoritative” but is this what *this* subject is in need of? The book’s subtitle suggests that we are looking at Hellenism(s) along a wide chronological span (“from Antiquity to Modernity”); is this a “continuity project”, then, despite the editor’s assurances to the contrary? In her Introduction, the editor seems to be concerned with precisely that: continuity with the “Greek” Bronze Age, survivals (but not revivals?) of Hellenism in Ptolemaic Egypt and “Hellenistic” Asia, Hellenism under Rome and so forth. In doing so, Zacharia seems to be paying too much attention to what can be described as continuities whereas in fact what was *discontinued* was often as important – and historically significant – as what was not (if not more so).

I would have hoped for more nuanced readings throughout: although we could admit that “the decipherment of Linear B has revealed . . . that Greek was already being written at the time [i.e., the second millennium BC] and that some features of ancient Greek religion as we know it from the Classical period also already existed then” (4), should we not add that it was in fact *certain sectors* in the Mycenaean society – certain specialists even – who used a *script* (primarily for administrative purposes) that referred to an earlier form of Greek? And how much are we supposed to stake on the widespread use of Greek in the Hellenistic period, especially in the fringes of the Hellenistic kingdoms, after decades of research on documents (*non*-Greek as well as Greek) confirming what one might have sus-

pected all along, that the infamous “Hellenisation” of the East by Alexander & Co. was a matter of rhetoric, well understood within the confines of diplomacy at the time?¹

Terms such as “linguistic-” or “religious continuity” might have been used more sparingly, since, on one hand, they fail to extract historically meaningful results and, on the other, they seem to contradict the book’s main premise: the editor states that “this volume casts a fresh look at the multifaceted expressions of diachronic Hellenisms, offering a re-orientation of the study of Hellenism away from binary perception to approaches giving priority to fluidity, hybridity, and multi-vocality”. She then proceeds to employ schemes such as “Hellenisation” (of the “barbarian East” nonetheless) and “Romanisation” of the Greeks under “Roman rule (31 BC–AD 324)” (6). At the risk of sounding petty, I would like to ask: was 31 BC the *first* encounter any “Greek” had with a “Roman” (given that Rome occupied most of Greece and Macedon by then and had annexed most of what used to be the “Hellenistic East” already by late second century BC)? What is the historical significance of AD 324 in terms of “Greek” vs “Roman”? What did “Roman rule” truly entail and when did it actually end? Who are those “Greeks”, anyway (how “Greek” were, indeed, the Greek-speaking writers of the Second Sophistic, thoroughly Hellenised by most of us, to be frank, on account of their chosen language *de métier*)?

Throughout the book, and despite its many good chapters – on which more below – there emerges a persistent Graeco–Roman bias both in its positions and approaches. In the first part of the book we are treated to a long, and rather unimaginative, succession of historical surveys frightfully close to Pappariopoulos’ ever-present continuity scheme

of Hellenisms in succession: Greece, Macedon, Rome, Byzantium. As it happens, the surveys are good and informative, most of them treading on ground previously covered by works such as Jonathan Hall’s *Hellenicity*,² but the reader is missing a view from elsewhere, away from the traditional Graeco–Roman standpoint. If there was a Roman Hellenism (and *Graecia capta* is deemed worthy of yet another rehearsal) what about views on Hellenism by the Indians and Bactrians under Hellenistic rule (not merely the efforts of the Graeco–Macedonian settlers to maintain their ethnic identity)? What of the Mesopotamians or the Egyptians beyond the confines of Ptolemaic Alexandria? What of the reception of Hellenism by the Arabs? Was there an ‘Ottoman Hellenism’? In the book’s first part, “Hellenism” is given a self-centred and self-assured portrayal, the way the Greeks and their Hellenised friends spoke about themselves, a portrayal every classicist is quite at home with. One suspects that the editor reads the book’s “Hellenisms” as mere historical periods in parade. Indeed, when she speaks of “Hellenism’s travels” along history (22), one feels that this highly romanticised view of her subject – referred to as a singular entity this time – is bound to take Zacharia away from her specified aims of “fluidity, hybridity, and multi-vocality”.

The book’s contributors were “invited to think about the four characteristic features of Hellenism” as listed in a passage by Herodotus, where the Athenians claimed never to have considered siding with the Persians against their fellow-Greek Spartans, with whom they shared the same “blood, language, religion, and customs” (21). This is feeble excuse for such an ambitious book; to be frank, as an initial premise it sounds rather banal. (Simon Hornblower justifiably warns against “facile conclusions” (58) – the book’s sole contribu-

tor to stick to his brief of investigating the validity of Herodotus's four markers.) The editor herself is quick to point out that literary evidence is bound to "be steeped in rhetoric" (24), so what about the anonymous Athenians of the Herodotean passage themselves? They claimed they could not side with the Persians against their "blood", yet both the Athenians and the Spartans were to do precisely that – sign treaties with the Persians against other Greeks – even before the fifth century BC was to expire. Be that as it may, why must we impose – and in such an arbitrary way – a classical Greek definition of sorts onto subsequent historical and cultural developments? By judging all later readings of ethnicity against the classical Greek paradigm (random as it may be), do we not run the risk of silencing all those "voices" we claim we want to hear?

The Classical Greek is not the only reading of Hellenism to have been privileged: there is a gratuitous reference to Constantine Cavafy in the last paragraph of Ronald Mellor's fine and well-researched chapter on what he calls "the confrontation between Greek and Roman identity". Shifting his focus, the author remarks that "both ancient and Byzantine Greeks formed the material for Cavafy's construction of his identity as an Alexandrian, a Greek, a poet, and a homosexual" (125). Regardless of the validity of what Mellor has to say on Cavafy, and its bizarre placement at the end of a long chapter on Roman receptions of Hellenism, the author manages to trigger one's suspicion that we often tend to read *Hellenismus* through the idiosyncratic histories of the long-dead Alexandrian poet. Have we allowed our fascination with Cavafy to formulate our understanding of historical Hellenism? On the other hand, I would have welcomed a more substantial reference to the poet as a modern *reader* of Hellenism somewhere else in the volume. Instead, he

is conspicuously – and rather absurdly – absent from a book of which he seems to have been a not so distant inspiration. (Incidentally, the Index does not list him at all, managing to omit even Mellor's reference to him.)

Parts II and III are decidedly more successful. The editor knew this all along and acknowledges this discrepancy in an early disclaimer warning that although she chose to maintain a "historical scope" for the earlier periods, contributions covering the "modernity" chunk of the book are "more interdisciplinary and more theoretically complex" (4). That is to say that Hellenism is not seen here as a concrete entity, a fleshed-and-blooded ontology travelling through time, a piece of cultural property used and misused or revived and (mis)appropriated at will, but as an extensive and, indeed, fluid network of discourses interacting, often conflicting with one another.

Part II ("Cultural Legacies") sets out to map a series of crucial discourses that seem to have shaped a modern sense of Greekness both in the Greek homeland and abroad. Glenn Most, in a rather under-theorised chapter, attempts to disassociate Classics in Germany (the forceful *Altertumswissenschaft* movement) from German nationalism – in his own words to acquit Humboldt of his "part of the blame for Hitler" (151) – offering a useful view of Hellenism (what he calls, misleadingly, "Philhellenism") from the West. Olga Augustinos discusses the Greek attempts to enlist in the Enlightenment project in an effort to launch a revival of Hellenism (thus leading to the branding of Hellenism as ethnic patrimony and "the foundation stone of an ethnically circumscribed identity" (200)). Antonis Liakos reprises his work on national time and space in a keynote chapter on the "Hellenisation" of modern Greece. Dimitris Livanios concludes Part II (a part persistently, and absurdly, subtitled "Travel-

ling Hellenisms” when no voyage of any sort is implied by any of its chapters) with a paper on the contribution of Orthodox Christianity to Greek identity-forging and nation-building, exploring the intricate developments that led to the merging of two separate, and initially mutually incompatible discourses – *Hellenism* and *Romiosýne* – into “Helleno-Christianity” and its multifarious mutations.

If Part II offers a strongly posited account of Hellenisms in the making, Part III (“Facets of Hellenism”) manages to deliver the novel, interdisciplinary and multi-vocal approaches we had been promised in the book’s Introduction. Charles Stewart writes on the Greek “desire for history” (274) and Hellenism as a treasure dreamed of, while Peter Mackridge discusses the forging of Greece’s cultural image through successive rediscoveries of the country’s Classical and Byzantine past(s). Zacharia herself then takes the stand to present her case for “Greek cinema as a reflection of the struggle of a young nation to work out a coherent national image for local and international consumption” (321). She is right to dwell on Theo Angelopoulos and Michalis Cacoyannis as the two main exponents of a “modernist” as opposed to an “indigenous” reading of Greekness even though, to my mind, they both veer from the esoteric to the cosmopolitan in their oeuvre. The volume then concludes with two very successful essays on the building of “global Hellenisms” as an antidote against cultural loss. Yiorgos Anagnostou and Artemis Leontis dare, each in their own paper, to “enter the unmarked arena of the everyday” of the Greek diaspora in the twentieth century in order to investigate anonymous context-specific practices that help generate and disseminate (facets of) Hellenism thus securing its cultural validity.

Though crippled by its essentialist premise,

the book still has a lot to offer. As they emerge from its fourteen chapters, however, its “Hellenisms” – ranging from approaches to Classics in the eighteenth century to experiences of Greekness in the twentieth, and from post-modern approaches to cultural identity to the idiosyncratic classicism of the Second Sophistic back in the second century AD – are so fundamentally different from one another as to render this project all but futile. If a suitable opportunity presents itself in the future (such as a Greek-language edition of the book), I would strongly urge the editor to omit Part I and reshuffle the papers in the other two into a more coherent, and academically sound, volume. As it is, the book amounts to less than the sum of its parts.

NOTES

- 1 Cf. Amelie Kuhrt and Susan Sherwin-White (eds), *Hellenism in the East: the Interaction of Greek and Non-Greek Civilizations from Syria to Central Asia after Alexander*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, on Seleucid Babylonia, and Susan Sherwin-White and Amelie Kuhrt, *From Samarkhand to Sardis: A New Approach to the Seleucid Empire*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- 2 Jonathan M. Hall, *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

Siriol Davies and Jack L. Davis
(eds)

***Between Venice and Istanbul:
Colonial Landscapes in
Early Modern Greece***

[= *Hesperia Supplement* 40]

**Athens: American School of
Classical Studies at Athens, 2007.**
260 pp.

by Panagiota Tzivara

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As is well-known, from the fall of the Byzantine empire until the end of the eighteenth century many places currently in the Greek nation-state were, for shorter or longer periods, under the suzerainty of western and eastern rulers, the Venetians and the Ottoman Turks. Some of these populations witnessed both suzerainties in succession and to this day the remnants – residential, material and cultural – are evident.

In this 2007 volume, the 40th supplement to *Hesperia*, the journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, authors who have considerable experience in archival and excavational research record the fruit of their tireless work.

One of the first things the volume's editors and contributors noticed is the lack of studies and specific papers focusing on post-Byzantine archaeology in Greece and the "neglect" in the presentation and promotion of Ottoman remnants as oppose to Venetian ones, as well as the lack of exploitation of the archaeological findings and historic-archival sources for the period from 1500 to 1800. This was also a motivation for publishing their studies.

As regards the title of the volume, the terms "colonial" and "early modern Greece" may raise the objections of some researchers. However, in the Introduction the editors explain their use, which was for methodological reasons.

In the Introduction, the editors provide a detailed summary of the studies and an extensive review of the research projects in historical archaeology that are being undertaken on the Greek lands which were under Venetian and Ottoman rule. Calling for an interdisciplinary approach, the editors close the Introduction with the presentation of a case study regarding the island of Kea in the Cyclades that highlights the advantages and the scientific fruits that can be reaped through the parallel exploitation of different records. The case of Kea is approached through archaeological research, archival research such as the study of Ottoman tax registers, as well as through the study of travellers' accounts and maps of the island.

Places in the Greek lands that experienced both conquests, the Venetian and the Ottoman, like the Aegean islands, Crete, Kythera, the Peloponnese and Cyprus, are dealt with concisely in a chapter written by the editors entitled "Greeks, Venice, and the Ottoman Empire".

The volume comprises four parts which are autonomous as regards their content. All

parts are constructed symmetrically since each of them consists of three chapters, authored by experts who at the beginning of each chapter provide a brief introduction on the treated subject. At the end of each chapter are many references that focus on the recent and updated bibliographical basis.

The first part, entitled "Sources for a landscape history of early modern Greece", presents three types of historical sources, of which two are written, tax and notarial registers, and one nontextual, the study of ceramic finds.

Based on the analysis of Ottoman tax registers from the archives of Constantinople, Machiel Kiel, a well-known Ottomanist and architectural and social historian, examines the economy and demography of the Greek islands of the Sporades (after the third Venetian–Turkish War) and of Kythera and the western Cyclades (Sifnos, Kea, Serifos) during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The registers are not only of financial interest but also record information on historical events and incidents of piracy. The information from these registers are presented in a number of tables that show the distribution of the population in the Sporades and the western Cyclades, the development of the population of Kythera since 1470, the agricultural products subject to taxation in Kythera during the brief period of Turkish rule on the island (1715–1718), the value of products in Kea in 1670/1671 and the distribution of producers according to their religion. At the end of the study the author provides in two appendixes a partial transcription of two registers from Kea for the years 1670–1671.

The study of notarial registers as a source for the synthesis of the agrarian history of the Aegean islands and especially of Naxos during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centu-

ries is highlighted by historian Aglaia Kasdagli in the next chapter. The notarial texts, written in Greek, provide a vivid picture of the everyday economic and social life of the people of the islands. The writer, whose doctoral dissertation was based on notarial documents, stresses, however, that the use of notarial acts as historical sources has to be conducted carefully by the researcher, who should also take into consideration the legal system prevalent in each case and compare information from notarial documents to other contemporary sources in order to reach safe conclusions.

The commercial routes from Kütahya to central Greece are traced by Joanita Vroom based on ceramic finds from excavations. The author, who specialises in medieval and post-medieval ceramics in the eastern Mediterranean, provides a general picture of the research that has been carried out on pottery in the post-Byzantine era through excavations in the Aegean, mainland Greece and Cyprus. She mentions characteristic examples from excavation finds in Butrint (where a majolica jug decorated with an image of a lion, the symbol of the Republic of Venice, has been found), and from the so-called bacini ceramics and the excavational finds in the city of Thiva (Thebes) that prove how prosperous the finances of this city were in the sixteenth century. The richly decorated house utensils found in Thebes bear witness to the material wealth of the city during Ottoman rule and help define the commercial routes of the products from Iznik and Kütahya. These observations on commercial activities can be confirmed by sixteenth-century census and Ottoman tax registers transcribed by Kiel and used by the author in her text.

The second part of the volume deals with the ethnicity, mobility and settlement of various population groups in southern Greece and

Cyprus using historical and archaeological-ethnographical research. From the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, there was a notable movement of populations in the eastern Mediterranean. People from Venetian-ruled territories became refugees after the occupation of their homes by the Turks whereas other people from Turkish- or Venetian-ruled territories were attracted by the Venetian invitation to settle in newly conquered areas.

This last case of movement is presented in Alexis Malliaris' study, which provides us with a picture of the population exchange and the integration of immigrants in the Peloponnese during the second period of Venetian rule (1687–1715). Based on material from Venetian archives, the author presents the efforts of Venice to settle the abandoned Peloponnese with a population from various areas of Rumelia (Thebes, Livadia, Amfissa (Salona), Nafpaktos (Lepanto) as well as from Athens, Euboia, Chios and Macedonia, Croatia and Dalmatia. This resulted in massive population movements. Malliaris presents the co-existence of various population groups, intermarriage, how immigrants were treated by the native population and the financial and social rise of certain groups (mostly the Athenians). He discusses the phenomenon whereby several immigrants, who had settled mostly in the countryside, returned to their homelands, which were under Ottoman control, due to unfavourable conditions. The example of the Peloponnese, to where there was a move of population in the period from 1689 to 1700 and from there towards Turkish-ruled areas after 1700, is used also by Björn Forsèn to support his view that Venetian- and Turkish-ruled areas were not isolated but that there was constant interaction over the borders.

Hamish Forbes' study refers to a later historical period. Forbes returns to his familiar area

of Methana, where he has conducted extensive ethnographic fieldwork and archaeological research. Having as his main source two nineteenth-century documents, that is a census report of most of the villages in the Methana peninsula from 1879 and a male register from the years 1809–1878, he studies the names and the network of family relations in the area during this period. The author, considering the financial activities of the population during the nineteenth century and the demographic data that he draws from his sources, seeks another approach to the question of mobility among the Greek population. The fluidity of surnames and the tendency of a part of the agricultural population to have, apart from their main residence, another one close to the fields reinforced for many years the belief that the population was more mobile than it may actually have been. The fact that the surnames alternated with nicknames, the author observes, has resulted in a misapprehension as to the existence of many different families. As regards seasonal transfers of the population in the countryside, the author notes that these functioned according to the organisation of relations and to the settlement of a "soi" in nearby houses.

Michael Given in his study looks at population of the mountainous areas of Cyprus (the northern side of Mt Troodos) from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The author, who claims to have overcome the "archaeological phobia about the mountains", combines an analysis of topographical and archaeological data and of tax and census registers compiled by the island's Venetian, Ottoman and British rulers. Furthermore, he records oral testimonies by the local population that have to do with rural churches.

The third part is of particular interest as it presents comparatively the strategies for

land use in the Greek lands by Venetian and Ottoman rulers. The case of Crete, which after 458 years of Venetian rule passed to the Ottomans, is a good example for analysis and this is achieved in Allaire Stallsmith's study on agriculture and cultivation. The author notes that the Cretan landscape changed during the two periods of rule. Both rulers were interested in achieving wheat sufficiency on the island, but the cultivation of grapes during Venetian rule was succeeded by the cultivation of olives during Ottoman rule. This change is linked to changes in the international market, to the reduction of the agrarian population and the lack of grape cultivators, as well as to the policies of the rulers. Venetian policy aimed at supporting commercial interests of the metropolis, whereas the Ottomans aimed at defending the warriors of Islam. The tax system, however, did not undergo any changes and the conquered peasants, either as *villani* or as *reaya*, were always obliged to pay taxes.

A comparative survey of two areas under different rule is presented by Timothy E. Gregory, who chooses the area of eastern Corinthia under Ottoman rule and the northern part of Kythera under Venetian rule. The author, who uses archaeological evidence for historical reconstruction, notes that in Corinthia, where the land is fertile, there were large estates, cultivated with marketable products, whereas in Kythera the cultivated land was segmented and its produce covered the nutritional needs of the local population as well as of the fleet. In the author's opinion, differences in agricultural production had to do not only with the geophysical position of every place and with its climate, but also with the different financial policies of the Venetians and Ottomans.

John Bennet's study is based on three different sources. He covers the matter of the

organisation of the area and the installations of Kythera and Messenia. Relying on archaeological data, written sources (*defters* and *catastici*) and maps, he argues that the composition of *defters* by the Ottomans as well the cartography of the Peloponnese by the Venetians were based on oral testimonies regarding the possession of the land and the distribution of rural areas.

In the fourth part there is a summary of the studies' results and an evaluation of what they offer.

John Bintliff, experienced in research projects in the area of Boeotia during Ottoman rule, summarises the results of his personal research there as well as the results of his cooperation with Machiel Kiel, whose research in Turkish archives is complementary. The author calls for research projects in larger areas, studying water-management systems, inns (*khans*), folk architecture, military architecture and mosques. Björn Forsén adds to the above the study of cobblestone roads (*kalderimia*).

In his own study, Forsén comments on the contributions in the volume regarding population mobility, giving a demographic direction to the study. He highlights the interdisciplinary approach of the subjects by those who collaborated in this volume, the distance they took from previous views which were based on partial studies of the Venetian and Ottoman sources. On the subject of mobility, the author believes that within projects, different areas have to be examined and compared, always with the use of written and nontextual sources. However, he stresses that one should be careful not only as regards the use of Ottoman *defters*, as these are not census but taxation records, but Venetian census records as well.

From the point of view of an archaeologist specialised in prehistory and an ethnoarchaeologist respectively, Curtis Runnels and Priscilla Murray, in the Epilogue, evaluate the realisation of the aims of their collaborators. They note that in the last 25 years there has been great progress in the promotion of a dialogue between historians and archaeologists, ascertaining that co-operation among historians, anthropologists and archaeologists from different universities of various and distant countries is nowadays possible. A prerequisite for fruitful co-operation is that the historians guide archaeologists towards a familiarisation with the archives and that the archaeologists guide the historians towards an exploitation of material culture from the field.

Certain opinions may need a wider presentation and it is possible that certain fixed views can change after the presentation of new facts (such as in the form of new archival information, for example). It is true that the history of many monuments of the Ottoman period may not be so well-known and that "the use of Ottoman documents for writing the history of modern Greece is still uncommon" and that the transcription of them is very tiring, as Kiel observes, but we believe that the situation is not as static as it used to be. The obsession with dating certain monuments to before Ottoman rule, as in the case of the White Tower of Thessaloniki, for example, is not due, in my opinion, that the public would prefer to hear that the tower had western rather than eastern builders, but rather to the lack of bibliographical information that is characteristic even of official Greek state institutions.

Furthermore, there is a belief that although the Venetian and the Ottoman were two different worlds, there was interaction between

them which explains why the transition from one ruler to the other did not impact greatly for the majority of the Orthodox population. But the study of Venetian archival sources at least shows that the Orthodox population was not indifferent to the change of rule. During the second Venetian period of rule in the Peloponnese, the local population often expressed their discontent with Venetian taxation measures, leading to complaints that their Christian Venetian proved to be even more tyrannical than the Turks.

The dialogue between archaeologists and historians in this volume covers specific areas of the Greek lands. The effort must continue for other areas, particularly those which happened to be under Venetian and Ottoman rule for longer periods.

In conclusion, we must stress the importance of this volume for researchers of Greek history of the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. *Hesperia*, apart from being a journal of classical archaeologists, is opening up to other historical periods through its supplements, a process which began with the 34th volume (*A Historical and Economic Geography of Ottoman Greece*, by Fariba Zarinebaf, John Bennet and Jack L. Davis) and one which hopefully will continue.

P.L. Cottrell

***The Ionian Bank:
An Imperial Institution,
1893–1944***

**Athens: Alpha Bank Historical
Archives, 2007. xxv + 411 pp.**

by Martin Daunton

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The genre of business history varies from hagiographic celebration of success at the time of an anniversary (very often soon to be followed by the disappearance of the firm) to scholarly accounts which are nevertheless too internal to the concern; to outstanding studies which use the firm to open up a wider range of questions in economic, political, social and even cultural history. The subgenre of banking history is no exception, and a number of recent volumes easily meet the criteria for the third category – we might think of Niall Ferguson on the Rothschilds, or Richard Roberts on Schroders. Although the Ionian Bank cannot claim to be so important as these leading London merchant banks, this excellent history still crosses the threshold into the third category, and in many ways is more interesting for the very reason that the bank was in the second or third tier of financial institutions about which we know much less. The case study is also particularly interesting

because of the unusual political circumstances of its creation. Alpha Bank, of which the Ionian Bank is now part, is to be congratulated on sponsoring this study and producing a book with such high-quality illustrations, and for allowing Philip Cottrell a free hand in the project. Other volumes will follow.

The present volume covers the foundation of the bank during a period when it was still essentially a British institution, based both in London and in the Ionian Islands. In 1809, the islands were occupied by Britain, becoming a protectorate in 1815; they retained this status until they joined the Greek state in 1864. The Mediterranean phase of British imperialism, with the occupation of Sicily, Malta, Cyprus and the Ionian Islands, is little known and studied, but it can be placed within a general pattern. Chris Bayly has argued that between the loss of the Thirteen Colonies in the 1780s and liberal reforms in the 1830s, British imperialism took on a particular character: “a series of attempts to establish overseas despotisms which mirrored in many ways the politics of neo-absolutism and the Holy Alliance of contemporary Europe. These colonial despotisms were characterised by a form of aristocratic military government supporting a viceregal autocracy” – a polity that relied upon co-operation with local landed elites.¹ The pattern applied not only in India, but equally to the regime of Tom Maitland, Governor of Malta and Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. This lowland Scot – a common trait of many colonial officials – abandoned his earlier radicalism for the smack of firm government. As he put it, “definite power, however extensive, is a lesser evil in any state, than power alike uncontrolled and undefined”, and in 1817 he accordingly imposed a constitution on the Ionian Islands designed to stop the residents from “running wild”. The Legislative Assembly was entirely subservient

to a Primary Council drawn from compliant notables who were tied to Maitland through patronage and honours. The new autocratic constitution was ratified by the Prince Regent in the suitably orientalist fantasy of the Brighton Pavilion.

The constitution was of dubious legality, for Britain did not have authority under the Treaty of Paris, and a later Lord High Commissioner pointed out that the islands were a political anomaly – neither a colony (despite being controlled by the Colonial Office) nor an independent state (despite being treated as such by the British government), and without the advantages of either. Certainly, radicals back in Britain were not content with the recreation in the Mediterranean of despotic rule and patronage which was precisely what they opposed in Britain: the so-called ‘old corruption’ of the court of the Prince Regent was replicated overseas in an even more gross form, with over 50 per cent of government revenue supporting officials whose “sole duty seems to be to loll on our verandas”. Although Bayly argues that this new style of despotic imperialism started to decline in the 1830s, he also claims that it continued largely unchanged in the Ionian Islands until the British left.² Is he right, or is the creation of the Ionian Bank part of the general shift in policy in the 1830s?

Of course, the high level of taxes needed to support British rule was unpopular in the Ionian Islands and elsewhere in the empire, just as in Britain where radicals demanded retrenchment and reform. The situation in the Ionian Islands was made worse by an economic crisis caused by competition in the staple trade of currants with the re-emergence of exports from Greece. A calamitous drop in prices led to revolts in Kefalonia and Zakynthos (Zante) in 1836–7 and 1842 – and the pattern was repeated in many other parts

of the empire as a result of weakening trade privileges in the British market with the introduction of freer trade. Metropolitan consumers benefitted from freer trade in currants which were widely used by workers to mix with suet and flour to make that standby of English cookery, the ‘spotted dick’. On the other hand, colonial producers suffered from falling prices and profits. Revolt (and repression) might be avoided at home but experienced in the empire.³

The reaction of the British rulers in the Ionian Islands was not only repression and the maintenance of despotism: there was also a shift in policy. George Nugent Grenville (Lord Nugent), the Lord High Commissioner in the 1830s, embarked on a programme of reform that was designed to remove restraints on the economy of the islands and to bring them into line with British assumptions about economic modernity. He was a staunch free-trader and he also wished to change the existing tenurial and financial system of *prostichio*. Currants were grown under a system of sharecropping that was common in the Mediterranean: peasants or *coloni* grew currants and fell into debt to their landlords or *signori*. These landlords made advances to their tenants on the security of next year’s crop, and the result was often debt and usurious rates of interest which became particularly serious with the economic crisis of 1832/3. One possible response was to enforce price controls as in the past, something that Nugent was loathe to do. He preferred to weaken the system through harvest loans which would give the *coloni* more power in the market, purging it of abuses and creating something more on the lines of the free market of political economy.

The bank was to become an important element in this attack on usury, as well as discouraging the hoarding of wealth and encour-

aging credit through the issue of notes. The idea of a bank was formally proposed to the Colonial Office at the end of 1835 by Nugent's successor, Sir Howard Douglas. It took another four years before the bank was legally constituted. The government back home pondered the proposal, and Douglas faced difficulties in convincing the Legislative Assembly to charter the bank because his relationship with it was extremely strained. He was no reformer and reverted to despotic rule: he was an expert in gunnery rather than political economy, a firm opponent of slave emancipation and of parliamentary reform at home. In the Ionian Islands, he opposed constitutional change, banned a free press, and on several occasions suspended the Assembly. But despite his opposition to political reform, he still desired economic modernisation and hoped to convince the landowners who dominated the Assembly that it would increase their land values. These debates over the reform of land tenure and the relative claims of peasants and landlords were repeated throughout the empire, and not least in India where the comparative merits of a system based on a strong landed elite or a secure peasantry were fiercely contested. The example of the Ionian Islands should be inserted into this much wider imperial context.

The eventual creation of the bank was the result of the interconnection of two strands: the official policy of Douglas and the commitment of the City of London. The establishment of the Ionian Bank casts light on the social and economic history of the City of London as well as on the politics of the islands. Douglas's representative in London made contact with a network of businesses linked by two men: Oliver Farrer and John Wright. Farrer was a barrister who retired early and inherited a landed estate in the north of England; he continued to be heavily involved in a

wide range of investments, often of a speculative nature, as well as in creating a number of financial institutions. His family remained connected with the law firm in London, which dated from at least 1701 and still exists, counting the royal family amongst its clients. Wright was a private banker in the West End of London, a long-established concern with origins as a goldsmith in 1699. Like other such private banks, his clients were drawn from landed families; unusually, as a result of Wright's own religion, many were Catholics. Wright also indulged in speculation in new issues, though more disastrously than Farrer: he was bankrupted in 1840 and the long-established bank failed.

The Farrer–Wright group was involved in the formation of a number of banks at home and abroad, drawing on the ideas of Thomas Joplin to create banks on the Scottish model where joint-stock branch banking had long been permitted. Their first initiative was the Provincial Bank of Ireland in 1826, a possible link to Wright's religion for the Bank of Ireland excluded Catholics from its court. They then took advantage of the new legislation permitting joint-stock banking in England to create the National Provincial Bank of England in 1833. In the empire, they formed the Bank of Australasia (1834), the Bank of South Africa (1835), the Bank of British North America (1836) and the Bank of Ceylon (1841). They were pioneers of a new form of joint-stock, international banking, and the complex web of interlocking directorships of the Farrer–Wright group formed a "promotional group" (62). Such groups were to be commonplace in the City, bringing together specialists in different areas of the world and with varying expertise whether in mining engineering or railway construction, law, the armed forces, and aristocratic connections with wealthy investors. Few of these networks have been

studied, and Cottrell's analysis of the Farrer–Wright group is of much wider interest.

Cottrell locates the Farrer–Wright group as precocious examples of two phenomena: the free-standing company and 'gentlemanly capitalism'. The former refers to the pattern found in the later nineteenth century in such areas as mining, where there were high risks. A company could be floated to exploit a particular concession, bringing together a number of specialists who issued a prospectus and put up a brass nameplate outside a City office. They did not need a formal managerial hierarchy, and the great success of British enterprise abroad did not rely on such a feature as did American multinationals: it depended on loosely structured, flexible forms, on local connections and knowledge. Some of these free-standing firms were spectacular successes; most were resounding failures.⁴ The Farrer–Wright group provides a good example of this pattern, and Cottrell's study is a fascinating addition to our knowledge of the City of London. Whether it can be taken as an early example of 'gentlemanly capitalism' is more problematic. The concept rests on the belief that landowners and financiers came together to the exclusion of industrialists, a pattern that is supposed to have developed most strongly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when British landowners faced falling rents and looked to new forms of income, including intermarriage with the financial elite.⁵ The proponents of 'gentlemanly capitalism' argue that this social fusion of marriage of shared cultural values dominated economic policy through the Treasury and Bank of England, with industrialists banished to the sidelines. I am not convinced that this is a meaningful reading of British politics⁶ – and in the case of the Farrer–Wright network, what stands out is the linkage between the world of private banking (which was never really

part of the City and the Bank of England) and the legal profession, to which Farrer's family remained intimately connected. Should we think of a new term for financial-legal capitalism? An emphasis on the connection of land and finance seems to me to miss a highly distinctive feature of British society.

The London group insisted that the new bank have an English legal identity, for they were concerned about the Venetian law of the Ionian Islands that had been incorporated into the constitution by Maitland. It did not give sufficient security to loans based on land and strongly favoured the debtor. Despite the initial notion that the bank would provide credit to cover crops, local landowners were eager to raise long-term loans. Would this be safe? One solution was to charter the bank in England through a private act of parliament, which was not obtained until 1844. From that date, the bank had two legal identities – and even more importantly, it was caught between two political identities. Were the Ionian Islands to remain British (in some ambivalent sense) or to be ceded to Greece? Relations with the Ionians remained tense, not least in the aftermath of the revolutions of 1848 and a revolt in Kefalonia. Britain avoided revolution and eschewed draconian measures at home, but in the Ionian Islands as in other parts of the empire, revolts broke out and were put down with severity. Despotism returned or was implemented: the revolt in Kefalonia led to marital law, floggings and hangings. At home, critics wondered if the Lord High Commissioner was any better than General Haynau of Hungary;⁷ in the Ionian Islands, the British seemed no better than the Ottomans. Despite liberal reforms in 1849, nationalism grew with demands for unification with Greece. Meanwhile, the staple trade was hit by natural as well as economic disasters, and the bank faced competition from indigenous

financial institutions in the shape of marine insurance companies that developed banking services.

When the British government decided, at the end of 1862, to cede the islands in Greece, the bank was transformed into an Anglo-Greek institution by the time of the handover in 1864. This transformation involved another network of merchants and financiers: Greek exiles from Chios – families such as the Petrochinos and Rallis – who acted as mediators between the grain trade of the Black Sea and the London market, and between the textile producers of northern England and the Middle East. The notion of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ does not capture these merchants, with their family links throughout the Mediterranean, and their business connections with northern industry. They were not obviously linked with the world of landed elites, and avoided involvement with the Bank of England – rather, their centre was the Baltic Exchange.⁸ How successful these newly constituted bank would be forms the subject of the next volume.

Clearly, Cottrell’s study is no hagiography, and it is not an internal, narrow account of the bank. His book joins the list of major studies of the City of London, where he draws out attention to an important network. I do not entirely agree with his interpretation, but he raises significant issues and provokes debate and argument. He draws our attention to an important element in British imperialism in the second quarter of the nineteenth century – and there are implications for British domestic politics. His study deserves a wide audience far beyond the Ionian Islands.

NOTES

- 1 C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830*, London: Longman, 1989, p. 8; see also pp. 103–4.
- 2 *Ibid.*, pp. 198–9, 201
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 240. He also argues that the reduction of the fiscal–military state at home was at the expense of exporting costs to the empire, see C. A. Bayly, “The British Military–fiscal State and Indigenous Resistance: India, 1750–1820”, in L. Stone (ed.), *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815*, London: Routledge, 1994. The avoidance of repression at home and the use of force in the empire is covered by Miles Taylor, “The 1848 Revolutions and the British Empire”, *Past and Present* 166:1 (2000): 146–80.
- 4 See Mira Wilkins, “The Free-Standing Company, 1870–1914: An Important Type of British Foreign Direct Investment”, *Economic History Review* 41:2 (1988): 259–282; S. D. Chapman, “British Based Investment Groups before 1914”, *Economic History Review* 38:2 (1985): 230–47.
- 5 P. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Overseas Expansion: I, The Old Colonial System, 1688–1850”, *Economic History Review* 39:4 (1986): 501–525, and “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Overseas Expansion, II, New Imperialism, 1850–1945”, *Economic History Review* 40 (1987): 1–26; Y. Cassis, “Bankers and English Society in the late Nineteenth Century”, *Economic History Review* 38:2 (1985): 210–29.
- 6 See M. J. Daunton, “‘Gentlemanly Capitalism’ and British Industry, 1820–1914”, *Past and Present* 122:1 (1989): 119–58.
- 7 See Taylor, “The 1848 Revolutions”, on the experience in other parts of the empire
- 8 See S. D. Chapman, “The International Houses: the Continental Contribution to British Commerce, 1800–1860”, *Journal of European Economic History* 6 (1977): 5–48.

Basil C. Gounaris

***Τα Βαλκάνια των Ελλήνων:
Από τον Διαφωτισμό έως τον
Α΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο***
[*The Balkans of the Greeks:
From the Enlightenment to
the First World War*]

**Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2007.
663 pp.**

by Dimitris Livanios

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It is now a commonplace (but one worth repeating) to argue that the construction of a nation's past and the building of its 'national history' remain one of the most salient features of Europe's 'long nineteenth century'. This observation carries particular weight in the case of the Balkans, not least because in that region the nationalisation of the pre-modern past, the appropriation of heroes and battles, and the delimitation of the 'historical ownership' of the lands that the nation-state now possesses continue to this day to agitate and even to mobilise Balkan societies into political and diplomatic action. The 'invention of the past' in the Balkan states, however, being as it is a multifaceted process, goes hand in hand with the construction of their historical relations with their neighbours, a subject that

often arouses much controversy and frisson as the current vexations of the Macedonian Question clearly demonstrate.

In polite society, it is well known, 'first impressions count', but this is not the case in the historical imagination of the Balkan nations, for in that realm later images and attitudes replace, and conveniently bury, older and long-held perceptions. Modern Greece is, in that respect, a case in point, for the relations between the Greeks and their Slavic (Bulgarian and Serbian) and non-Slavic (Romanian and Albanian) neighbours underwent significant transformations, mirroring to a considerable extent the changes that occurred in the construction of the modern Greek national identity. During the period of the Neohellenic enlightenment (late eighteenth–early nineteenth centuries), for example, and even later, the Slavs, sharing with the Greeks both religion (Orthodoxy) and a Muslim overlord (the Ottomans), were considered by many authors as simple and hard-working peasants and not as menacing predators. True, in the Greek gaze the Slavs were unsophisticated and rather rough in manners, but they were sturdy and brave warriors, and often were depicted as historical allies of the Greeks against the Ottomans. A number of Greek accounts moved even further and considered the Slavs, no less than the Wallachians, the Moldavians and the Christian Albanians, as part of the '*genos*', the pre-modern Orthodox Balkan community that transcended the porous boundaries of language and ethnicity, and created a sense of belonging that rested on Orthodoxy and Byzantine traditions. This is not to imply that hostile, or outright offensive comments about them were absent, but they were mostly based on the perceived cultural inferiority of the Slavs, who did not speak a 'refined' language and lacked a 'glorious' ancient past, but, at any rate, their extent and

power of persuasion were mitigated by many positive depictions.

In the course of the nineteenth century, and especially during its second half, such benevolent images began to unravel as the lingering flames of the 'Byzantine commonwealth' were extinguished by the coming of nationalism in the region and the fight of the nation-states over the spoils that the Ottomans left as they were retreating from the peninsula. The struggle over ethnologically mixed regions (such as Macedonia) that were coveted by both Serb and Bulgarian, and the tactical political alliances of the day prompted Greek nationalism, and the Greek national historiography, to recast the image of the Slavs. The Serbs, whose irredentism did not appear to threaten Greece directly, continued to enjoy some favourable treatment: they were, of course, less 'cultured' than the Greeks, and their foreign policy was occasionally inimical to them, but they had a splendid oral poetry and were formidable fighters. But the Bulgarians, who challenged forcefully the Greeks in Macedonia, became now 'barbarians', and nothing more than a 'shapeless racial mass'. The process of Greece's estrangement from her Balkan neighbourhood was completed in the 1940s, as the spectre of 'Slav communism' raised its head, Bulgaria occupied parts of Greek Macedonia during the Second World War, and Tito entertained plans for a 'united Macedonia' and became actively involved in the Greek Civil War. The image of the 'quiet' and 'simple' Slav peasant of the enlightenment was now completely shattered under the combined force of virulent nationalism and the 'communist threat'.

The fall of communism in the Balkans, however, and the manifold political and ideological challenges that this development brought into the limelight conditioned the rediscovery

of the Balkans by the Greeks under new (and not so new) circumstances. Consequently, Basil Gounaris' *The Balkans of the Greeks* is a timely book. Its subject is the presence of Greece's Balkan neighbours in the nation's historical imagination in the period that stretches from the Neohellenic enlightenment to the First World War. Given that, as has already been noted, the long nineteenth century produced significant transformations of Greek perceptions towards the Balkan peoples, and consolidated a number of stereotypes, Gounaris' close analysis of that critical period goes a long way into producing a fascinating picture of the continuities and changes that marked the Greek perceptions of the Balkan 'other'. Apart from its wide chronological purview that allows for patterns to emerge and comparisons to be drawn, the thematic spectrum of the book is also commendable. And this because Gounaris, in the eight chapters of his book, not only charts the Ovidian metamorphoses of the Greek images concerning Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians and Romanians, according to the dictates of Greek nationalism and foreign policy needs, but also offers detailed sections investigating the ways in which the Greeks discussed their 'nationality' and 'national descent', their languages, political leaders, history, and mode of government. The book is firmly grounded in substantial research that utilised a considerable amount of sources. He consulted historical, geographical and literary works, travellers' accounts, textbooks, popular lithographs, theatrical plays, and plunged deeply into the press, periodicals and imprints of the time. The result is an impressive and massive piece of work that stands aside as the first large-scale synthesis on the subject.

Gounaris considers Greece's relations with the Balkans a "pathological love-hate rela-

tionship” whose parameters change constantly. One of the strengths of his approach is precisely the fact that he does not approach his subject in a static way, but gives full weight not only to the variety of Greek images, but to the functioning of these images as well. This is no easy task, for Greek perceptions not only ranged from admiration of an ‘ally’ (as in the case of Serbia and to some extent Montenegro) to the outright rejection of an ‘enemy’ (as in the case of Bulgaria and occasionally of Romania) but also served many other internal Greek needs. For instance, Gounaris shows persuasively how Greek admiration of the achievements of the Bulgarian state (but not, of course, of the Bulgarian nation) was used extensively as a device for criticising the many shortcomings of the Greek state.

Equally illuminating is the author’s analysis of the sacred cow of Greek foreign policy: the proverbial (and much misunderstood) ‘Greco–Serbian friendship’. He argues that this particular ‘friendship’, although long established, was primarily constructed ‘from above’ and was rarely documented. After all, tension between Greece and Serbia was not infrequent, although it never reached boiling point, something that allowed the Greeks to continue considering the Serbs something like a second best nation in the Balkans. Based primarily on the convenient fact that it was never seriously challenged, the ‘Greco–Serbian friendship’ was the product of politics and diplomacy rather than the spontaneous outcome of ‘common experiences’ as its supporters have held. Interestingly, Gounaris makes a comparison between the ‘Greco–Serbian friendship’ and the ‘Greco–Albanian’ one and notes that the latter had enjoyed more support from arguments based on ethnicity, common experiences, or even ‘blood’: the Greek newspaper *Akropolis*, for example,

wrote in 1912 about “Greek–Albanian blood”, which in its view was “mixed”. However, as Gounaris notes, the determination of the Greeks to preserve their good relations with the Serbs forced them to brush aside the bilateral problems, something that they were not prepared to do with the case of Albania.

The wide circulation of ‘federalist’ ideas in Greece, especially during the second half of the nineteenth century, which advocated the common struggle of the Orthodox Balkan nations against the Ottomans, and the building of close political links between them, have also attracted the author’s attention. Based on a multitude of relevant sources, Gounaris argues that, the federalist schemes, resting on the enduring bonds of common religion, and reinforced by the unsympathetic attitude of the Great Powers towards Greek irredentism, were, in reality, little more than a convenient cover (and vehicle) for the advancement of Greece’s national aims. Although federalism had many supporters, who sincerely advocated a variety of plans for the future of the Balkans, the strength of Greek nationalism proved to be an insurmountable obstacle. As a result, Greek federalism was quickly reduced to an unsuccessful attempt on the part of Greece to find willing allies of Greek expansionism.

Another valuable contribution of the book is the analysis of the ‘complex web’ of those who wrote in Greece about the Balkans. Few knew the region intimately, and even fewer had the requisite languages to do so adequately. Consequently, a large part of the information that the Greeks had on the Balkans came from a network of *heterochthonos*, that is Greeks who were born and had lived outside the borders of the Greek state. Many of them participated in various ‘Macedonian’, ‘Thracian’ or ‘Epirote’ organisations that at-

tempted, on the one hand, to press the Greek governments to support irredentism in those areas, and, on the other, to inform the Greek public about Balkan developments. Naturally, these people had their own axe to grind, something that also coloured their views. It would appear, however, that whenever the political atmosphere in Greece allowed (or even dictated) direct Greek contacts with the Balkan 'other', the perceptions that emerged were not unfavourable. In discussing a visit of 300 Bulgarian students in Athens, in April 1911, in a period of a Greek–Bulgarian *rapprochement*, Gounaris notes that the "atmosphere was friendly". But then, he adds that one of the main reasons for the *bonhomie* that prevailed was the beauty of the Bulgarian female students, and a gargantuan Easter feast in the course of which much wine was drunk, and many lambs consumed, courtesy of the University of Athens.

On the whole, Gounaris' book is a highly competent attempt to analyse an important aspect of the Balkan past. He writes with authority, while his liberal use of extracts from his sources allows the reader to hear the voices of those who had something to say, be they historians, journalists or satirical writers. The amount of research he has put into this book, and his nuanced approach, will ensure that his work will become the standard work of reference on the subject for quite some time.

**Foteini Tsimpiridou
and Dimitris Stamatopoulos**
(eds)

***Οριενταλισμός στα όρια: από
τα οθωμανικά Βαλκάνια στην
σύγχρονη Μέση Ανατολή***
[*Orientalism at 'Oria'*
(*όρια*): *From the*
Ottoman Balkans to the
***Contemporary Middle East*]**

Athens: Kritiki, 2008. 377 pp.

by Vassilis Dalkavoukis

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What are the 'oria' (*όρια*) of Orientalism? The word 'oria' in Greek has a particularly wide range of meaning that may extend from the localisation or limitation of a term, space, or cultural practice, etc., to the definition of the contribution of the above or even the moral determination of what is allowed by an authority or a power, a fact that in some cases identifies the meaning of the term with the word 'extremes' as used by Hobsbawm.¹ Moreover, although in Greek the word 'margin' is not etymologically related to the word 'oria', it is implied semantically. In this context, the selection of the word 'oria' in the title of the present volume is not random but also of eminent accuracy, to

the degree that it implies the polysemous approach² towards Orientalism in the volume's contributions.

The first of the 'oria' (boundaries)³ is the temporal one, implied in the volume's subtitle, whereby Orientalism becomes a cross-temporal analytical tool, which despite the fact that it comes from the contemporary reflection of a western-orientated 'native' of the 'East',⁴ it is possible to be applied, at least in its contemporary version, to the approach to the recent or remote past, since it describes the stereotypes of the western world towards the 'East'. The outcomes of the later application of such an analytical tool in the approach to the past are of eminent efficiency, at least as it is substantiated through the contributions to the present volume which concern Ottoman history (Eleni Gara, Fokion Kotzagiorgis, Dimitris Stamatopoulos) and the relationship between Greece and Turkey in the context of nation-state modernity (Sia Anagnostopoulou, Hercules Millas).

A second meaning of the term 'oria' (limits)⁵ is the spatial one: What exactly is the 'East' of Orientalism? And how has it been formed historically in modern times? The integration, for example, of the Balkans through the "Ottoman legacy" in the 'East'⁶ would possibly be efficient in the context of a 'continental', 'old', 'east' or 'despotic' empires discourse;⁷ however, as Stamatopoulos presents in his contribution, such an approach includes Orientalism as an aspect, despite the fact that "the debate over empires has advantages . . . for a holistic theoretical approach on the East–West distinction" (241). However, the issue of the spatial limits of the 'East' remains in abeyance due to the lack of other approaches to the Balkans in the present volume, as the reader does not hold relevant empirical material or different viewpoints from contemporary Balkan social sciences.

On the other hand, the debate – in the context of the volume – over the Arabic 'East' is extensive, especially in the contribution of Hasan Badawi, who places the limits of the 'East', on the one hand, at the westernmost limits of Europe, the Iberian Peninsula and northern Africa, and, on the other, in the "Middle East", which "appears to enlarge, formulating a continuous field of confrontation between the western and eastern worlds, binding the latter deeper to the Asian continent" (11). However, such a course is not easy to comprehend, unless we take into account two important factors: the geopolitical processes and the cultural influence of Islam. At this point, the term 'oria' acquires two more dimensions: the cultural, understood as 'frontiers',⁸ and the political, understood as 'extremes'⁹ or 'bounds'.¹⁰

From Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* (sic)¹¹ which is used creatively in Weidner's contribution on the approach to Islam and the West in a 'hard'/essentialist or 'soft'/constructivist way, to the reflective contribution of Foteini Tsimpiridou on the role of anthropology in the study of Islam and its relations to the West after Said's critique of Orientalism, the conclusion is common: "The study of Islam, Arabs and women in the Middle East should be placed not in the context of discrimination, but correlations; through experiences, not representations; through the adoption of interpretative, not objective approaches . . ." (298).

This approach is customised to the requirements of the "Cultural Critique"¹² and the 'paradigm shift' in anthropology, a fact that Geertz had earlier implied,¹³ giving his own definition of civilisation, based on interpretation, not generalisation. A brief but comprehensive narrative of the academic history of this shift, focusing on the critique of Orientalism as a despotic approach of the West towards the 'Islamic East', is successively presented in Abdulrahman Al

Salimi's contribution. Two important contributions of the volume are placed within the same context: those of Yaser I. A. Ellethy and Giorgos Mavromatis, who deal with the role of the Arabic language on the approach to Islam and the special expression of Bektashism (bek-tashi, dervish) in the Balkans respectively. The 'orio' of Orientalism in this case describes the epistemological contrast between the monistic despotic perception of civilisation and the pluralistic *sui generis* nature of cultures.

However, all the contributions of the volume create the impression that the cultural level, within which the critique of Orientalism produces new, enriched assumptions on the 'East', is strongly connected to the political level: the 'soft' or 'hard' canon establishment of Islam and the West, the various versions of Islam itself (Sunni/Shia) and the formulation also of an independent political space (civil society) within the 'East' constitute cultural expressions, used both by the West and 'East' itself in order to produce political outcomes on the approach to the 'East'.

A common ground in three of the contributions that elaborate on the issue is that the 'oria' (definitions)¹⁴ of the Middle East are no longer the same: Dimitris Kerides ascertains that "the end of the Cold War, after 1989, marked the Middle East, often in a dramatic way, as the central arena where the political powers that shape the twenty-first century confront each other" (125), while Angeliki Ziaka notes that "all the things going on today in the Middle East . . . , represent the transition from the 'old' to the 'new' Middle East" (346–47). Finally, as Meriç Özgüneş underlines, "the aspiration of Turkey . . . to integrate into the European Community and European Union . . . subsequently enabled its politicians to shift the problems related to the European Union into domestic policy and, at the same time, offered the

civil associations the opportunity to promote their individual reformative programmes, as the reference to the European dimension of the specific programs would increase their legitimacy" (210).

Thus, the editors of the volume query how the scientific community could encounter the revival of Orientalism and the 'neo-orientalist' discourses that dominate the perception of the Balkans and the Middle East, utilising the productive critique towards the predominant interpretative model of Orientalism of the past 30 years (11).

The present volume constitutes an indirect answer to the particular question. Although the contributions "do not always directly concern Orientalism" – as the editors acknowledge – "they attempt to reflect on the often orientalist prerequisites of the articulation of their epistemological foundations" (12). They constitute, thus, an interdisciplinary set of approaches that illuminates the issue of Orientalism from different viewpoints, denoting at the same time the demand for an interdisciplinary approach, the application of different analytical tools and the pluralistic reality that arises through such collaboration.

Another proposal of the editors relates to the shift of viewpoint which is necessary for the formulation of the epistemological field: the interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of Orientalism underlines the 'oria' (determination)¹⁵ of the ethnocentric model and consequently of the nation-state as 'a unit of study', using a successful methodological phrasing of social anthropology. What the editors clearly state is the need to create and develop in Greece the field of 'area studies', an alternative that is consistently applied in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies of the University of Macedonia, where they serve, and where the

contributions of the volume were first raised during relevant lectures.

Finally, what seems to be the most important contribution of the volume is the fact that it denotes the context within which both the selection of epistemological practice (the interdisciplinary approach) and the formulation of a supranational level of application (Area Studies) should function. "What kind of knowledge for such fields do we produce and wish to promote in the Departments of Area Studies today?" the editors query (13), introducing to the debate a moral parameter in its Aristotelian expression: the position of the academic community towards such issues ought not to be anything other than political.

However, since the political choice within the academic community ought to be empirically substantiated, I conclude with a brilliant, though indirect, point of the editors on the ideological use of the neo-orientalist discourse towards the Balkans: western neo-orientalism uses in an ambiguous – even ironical – manner the meaning of the West, minimising the area to the 'western Balkans' (which, however, are left outside of the western political establishment, the EU, for example), contributing thus to the definition in the negative sense of the former term 'Balkans' (9). In my opinion, the present volume would have been more complete if the above statement was elaborated with contributions of Balkan colleagues, who would analyse it more.

NOTES

- 1 Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991*, London: Michael Joseph, 1994.
- 2 In this sense, the word 'oria' could be equated

with a range of terms such as limits, boundaries, frontiers, borders, bounds, definitions, determinations, extremes, etc. In this review, I try to interpret the specific meaning of the word in the various contexts it is used.

- 3 I prefer the term 'boundaries' here due to the fact that it implies the "limits of an activity or experience" (Michael Rundell and Gwyneth Fox (eds), *Macmillan English Dictionary*, Oxford: Macmillan, 2002, p. 155).
- 4 Edward Said, *Orientalism*, London: Penguin, 1978.
- 5 Defined here as "the outer edge of an area" (*Macmillan English Dictionary*, p. 829).
- 6 Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics", *Slavic Review* 51 (1992): 1–10.
- 7 Dominic Lieven, "Dilemmas of Empire 1850–1918. Power, Territory, Identity", *Journal of Contemporary History* 34:2 (1999): 163–200.
- 8 Defined here as "the most advanced or recent ideas about something" (*Macmillan English Dictionary*, p. 570).
- 9 Defined here as "an opinion or way of behaving is as different from another as it is possible to be" (*Ibid.*, p. 490).
- 10 In the sense that describes the "limits that affect and control what can happen or what people are able to do" (*Ibid.*, p. 155).
- 11 Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York: Free Press, 1998.
- 12 James Clifford and George Marcus (eds), *Writing Culture: the Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986; James Clifford and George Marcus (eds), *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

- 13 Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- 14 I introduce this meaning here because the term 'Middle East' has a serious political significance. Besides, the word 'margin' could be useful, since the contributions mentioned above treat the marginalisation (for example, Palestine) or demarginalisation (civil society groups, Shia, etc.) in certain areas of the 'Middle East'.
- 15 Here defined as "officially deciding or settling something" (*Macmillan English Dictionary*, p. 377). In this sense I mean the determination of disciplinary action by political authorities or nationally affected priorities.

Tasos Kostopoulos

***Πόλεμος και εθνοκάθαρση:
η ξεχασμένη πλευρά μιας
δεκαετούς εθνικής εξόρμησης,
1912-1922***

**[*War and Ethnic Cleansing:
The Forgotten Aspect of
a Decade-long National
Crusade, 1912-1922*]**

Athens: Bibliorama, 2007.

319 pp.

by Hercules Millas

Işık University

Whenever ethnic cleansing has been carried out, it bore euphemistic names associated with some high ideal: a liberation war, war of independence, national struggle, liberation of the homeland, challenging the enemy, repelling the intruder, securing peace, establishing law and order, defending one's people and/or country, a just cause, self defence, saving humanity, spreading a righteous message, to name some. The victims, on the other hand, talked of burned-down villages, rape, murder, massacre, genocide, expulsion and the plight of refugees. In other words, the same act was characterised according to the agent: for the victor it was positive, for the loser negative.

This discrepancy related to ethnic cleansing becomes understandable when nationalism is taken into consideration. Nationalists perceive international relations as a zero-sum game. If one side seeks a gain, the others – and tough luck for them – will have to suffer.

In order to develop a more impartial interpretation of similar events and to address audiences beyond the national frontiers, one has to be detached from the ethnic parties in conflict. Tasos Kostopoulos, in his 320-page study on ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, has accomplished this impartiality by distancing himself from nationalistic strife and expressing empathy for all civilians involved. He starts his book with a passage from a short story by the Greek author Stratis Myrivilis, who narrates how, in 1912 as a Greek soldier and under orders, he shot an old innocent Muslim civilian and how he could never forget the look on his victim's face. This approach, beyond all impartiality, is unique in Greek discourse, too. The terror and violence exercised by Greek nationalists is taboo in Greek historiography. Indeed, the nation-state takes care to educate and raise their citizens to show no remorse or guilt for the deeds of their real or imaginary ancestors. To suggest the contrary, moving against the mainstream, is a courageous political stance.

Kostopoulos reminds us that to narrate the incidents as they really happened is far from welcome in the societies of our era. Some claim that the 'truth' may be used against 'us' by our enemies. According to them, one should not help the opponents to come into possession of arguments against 'us'. Kostopoulos, however, takes his risks and treats history without ethnic bias, from a new perspective of allies and enemies. As the reader is informed about the "forgotten aspect of a decade", s/he sympathises with

the sufferers, irrespective of their ethnicity. Greeks, Turks, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Serbs, Armenians, etc., have their share both in causing immense pain (as enemies) and having atrocities inflicted on them (as allies).

The first chapter deals with the rich population differentiations in the Ottoman Empire: Muslims mistakenly identified all as 'Turks' by the Christians; Christians in conflict and attached to different church authorities; Jews, who were generally ill-treated by the Christians; various ethnic groups and other communities unaware that they were viewed as enemies by other ethnic groups. All the parties engaged in strife manipulated available statistical data in trying to prove that they were in the 'majority'. Constituting a majority meant unprecedented rights over the others. The nation-states in the area tried to widen the borders of their imagined motherland, first by manipulating records and proving they were the 'majority' and then, as shown in the second chapter, through war. In the First Balkan War, Muslims experienced the catastrophe (massacres, deportation) of ethnic cleansing. Some groups underwent conversion, as was the case with the Pomaks of Rodopi who were forced to be baptised. The wording in the documents of the time is revealing: the areas were mostly 'cleansed' after the necessary operations. All these deeds were not accidental or exceptional; they were widespread and planned and executed by the authorities.

The third chapter deals with the fierce ethnic cleansing experienced in Macedonia. The Greeks were the victors, which meant that "out of the 165,000–180,000 Macedonians attached to the [Bulgarian] Exarchate in 1912, only few families remained", as a Greek report states. The fourth chapter deals with fighting among groups such as the Serbs,

Bulgarians, Greeks, Vlachs and Muslims/Turks; this produced victims on all sides but especially among the Muslims. The violence is shocking. The narratives of the time are often cynical and hypocritically euphemistic. With the beginning of the First World War, the Ottoman authorities would initiate similar acts of ethnic cleansing within the empire. This time Christians (Greeks, Armenians) were the victims. During the First World War ethnic cleansing was encouraged by all parties involved, aiming at practical advantages at their borders and within their frontiers. Eventually the forceful population exchange between Bulgaria and Greece and Turkey and Greece completed the 'cleansing' operations, putting an end to the agony of millions of people who had survived the worst fate.

The fifth chapter, the longest, is devoted to the Greek–Turkish War in Anatolia in 1919–1922. During this period endless atrocities were initiated by both sides. There was no limit to barbarism when 'national interests' were at stake. A Greek paper of the time stated that "this is a war of the Greek race against the Turkish nation, a tough war that will last until one of the sides is exterminated" (122). The sadistic actions by both sides are many and the mutual hate abhorrent. The only idyllic and unblemished parts left in this period seem to be the so-called 'national ideal' and the 'sacred intent'. This period has been narrated in a totally opposite way by Greek and Turkish historiography and laymen: each side mentions the violence of the other while ignoring their own. Even the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which in the 1930s condemned ethnic cleansing in the name of 'internationalism', has since silenced its criticism of Greek atrocities (153).

The book includes seventeen tables of population statistics for Macedonia, Thrace and

Asia Minor from different and conflicting sources, duly interpreted and explained. Detailed maps help in tracing the incidents. The 66 photographs included in the book are not all that easy to look at. The ones that portray scenes of nationalist ecstasy – pompous military parades, posters of supposed heroism showing how 'we' killed the Other, political cartoons – are bearable. Some patriotic deeds are harder to face: burning houses, heaps of dead bodies, starving children, prisoner executions, exiled civilians in waste lands, mutilated bodies with tied hands and displaying signs of torture.

More than one-third of the book comprises five appendixes (totalling 120 pages), entitled as follows: "The Cretan model"; "The Armenian genocide: facts and numbers"; "The 'genocide' of the Greeks of Asia Minor?"; "The 'right' of the powerful, of monuments and of graves"; "Starvation and violence in Eastern Macedonia (1916–1918): reports and assessments". The appendixes "The Cretan model" (dealing with the ethnic cleansing of the island's Muslims) and "The 'genocide' of the Greeks" (on the ethnic cleansing of the Greeks in Anatolia) are mirror images of the same project. According to the author, the case of the Greeks and the Armenians, however, are not the same (243). There was no intention of imposing a 'final solution' in the case of the Greeks, who underwent ethnic cleansing. Kostopoulos successfully shows how tragic stories have been exaggerated and clichés invented in the intervening decades.

All the incidents mentioned in the book are well documented. The sources are rich: the unpublished papers of politicians; state archives in Greece and the United Kingdom; the published sources of the Greek army and various organisations and laymen, including Turkish and Bulgarian; treaties, laws and par-

liamentary records; reports from various organisations, Greek and otherwise; memoirs of eyewitnesses; letters and diaries, books and articles, and various Greek newspapers dating from 1897 to 1935. The resulting 18-page bibliography possibly discouraged any hasty criticisms of the book from nationalist Greek circles.

Kostopoulos' study is informative, honest in its impartiality, and shows that some societies have started to face up to their past critically. The incidents narrated in the book were not unknown, but were legendary in a special way: each ethnic side had voiced what the other had done to them, silencing their corresponding deeds. What is new or rare is the self-criticism. It is the recognition of 'our' notorious conduct which is innovative. Some will try to take advantage of this Greek 'confession', but this is the risk and the price of being impartial.

Demetra Tzanaki

***Δούλα και κυρά. Όψεις
εθνικισμού: ρόλοι και
συμπεριφορές στην Ελλάδα
των ρομαντικών χρόνων,
1836–1897.***
**[*Servant and Lady. Aspects
of Nationalism: Roles and
Behaviours in Greece of the
Romantic Years, 1836–1897*]**

Athens: Savvalas, 2007, 490 pp.

by Eleni Fournaraki

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The publication of a massive volume with the inventive title *Servant and Lady: Aspects of Nationalism: Roles and Behaviours in Greece in the Romantic Years, 1836–1897*,¹ with an impressive assemblage of sources and the explicit intention to suggest a new historical narration for the "Romantic years" in Greece through the perspective of gender, is undoubtedly an event which could not pass unnoticed. All the more so, since the English-language version of this book informs an international audience not only about the subject itself but also the state of historiography of gender in Greece.

In the introduction, the writer makes clear that she will depart from a conventional historiography that investigates the process of nationalisation of the masses by focusing exclusively on “official” institutions such as the army, mass education, administrative and political institutions. If one concentrates solely on these institutions, one would risk coming to the simplistic conclusion that women during the nineteenth century were only marginally involved in the processes which transformed men into “citizens” of the modern Greek nation-state. Also one could end up by implicitly identifying the ‘masses’ with men, thus taking men’s experiences as universal. In both cases one would only manage to perpetuate the invisibility of women from the historical narrative and thus reproduce as self-evident the identification of women with the ‘private sphere’ in juxtaposition with a ‘male public sphere’. The writer, criticising these top-down elaborations of the subject, proposes a much broader approach, which will also investigate the ways in which the transmission of national values and consciousness was equally effected through the family, voluntary associations, private education and the press. Such an approach will further permit an examination of the nationalisation process in its “interaction with everyday life” (16–19). That is, it would allow us to detect in which fashion coherent theories of nationalism are transformed into lived experience, and thus identify perceptions of the nation different from the “official” and “dominant” ones.

In essence, the writer announces a *social and cultural history* of Greek nationalism, which will investigate perceptions about the self within the wider national community – the formulation and transmission of social values, stereotypes, roles and behaviors that were thought to be in accordance with an ‘authentic’ Greek ‘character’. According to

Tzanaki’s apt remark, these issues, which obviously involve definitions of public–private and gender relations, usually elude an institutional history; their study consequently calls for a different reading of the existing sources. Thus, the writer expresses the intention to investigate the construction of the nation as a cultural phenomenon, using *gender* as her main analytical tool. More specifically, she intends to study the construction of “Greek-minded” (*ελληνοφρεπής*, i.e., “faithful to the principles of *Hellenismos*”)² gendered models of behaviour, that is the construction of codes of ethics and *respectability* (George Mosse’s term) through which versions of the ‘proper’ national culture and identity have been historically expressed (20). Ultimately, the writer’s intention is to investigate these cultural constructions of nationalism within the dynamics of “everyday life” as a process of shaping “consciousnesses” and “experiences”.

The structure of the book reflects the writer’s attempt to examine her subject in relation to the changing perceptions of the national question. These are investigated through the press (mainly periodicals) and are linked to the effects and dynamics of different ‘national crises’, that is, successive eruptions of the Eastern Question from the Crimean War (1853–1856) to the Greco–Turkish War of 1897. These changing perceptions of the national question are associated with the evolution of public discourses about women’s position within the newly founded nation-state. The focus of the book thus lies on “the relationship between gender and national ideology”.

However, the book focuses exclusively on women. Its main argument concerns the critical importance attributed to the morality and “respectability” of middle-class women within the process of defining Greek culture, history and identity. According to Tzanaki,

during the nineteenth century, Greek national ideology was largely determined by irredentism and the 'Great Idea': the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire and the civilizing mission that a 'model' Christian kingdom would assume in the Near East. This resulted in perceiving the small and weak Greek *state* as a temporary territorial convention with limited legitimisation in people's consciousness. Thus, *nation* was perceived rather in cultural terms: as a unity of culture and history but also as the "sum total" of Greek families everywhere in the world. It was this perception of the nation that long perpetuated a tension between a political delineation of the nation – that is the Greek nation-state – and its broader definition as an "apolitical unity" which "should retain all the values of the Greek race (γένος) beyond whatever politics and state borders" (23). It was within the context of this latter definition that the special 'mission' of women in the national community was intensely valorised and considered to be part of the national question, not without challenging the equilibrium of the traditional gender order. After the Crimean crisis, female education emerged as a vital public issue within intellectual circles and the public sphere at large. Since then and within the context of redefining national and irredentist aspirations, the shaping of 'Greek-minded' woman became critical. For the first time the "public significance" of the private 'sphere' and of women's duties, roles and behaviours within it was pushed forward. This process offered to women a new field of self identification, despite the fact that it also imposed new limitations on their lives. This book aims to investigate this particular field, that is how the idea of the nation allowed women of the middle and upper social strata to conceive of themselves as co-moulders of national prosperity and simultaneously to form a "new consciousness" as members of a "women's

sisterhood" and "envison an autonomous formulation of the strategy" which would help them improve their lives as wives, mothers and householders (24–25).

This is a promising, original and interesting endeavour to provide a non-conventional reading of nation-building in nineteenth-century Greece. In particular, its adoption of the concept of "respectability" is a welcome contribution to the study of Greek national ideology. However, it should be noticed that during the last three decades Greek historiography has changed to a degree that Tzanaki does not sufficiently acknowledge. Modern Greek historiography on the nineteenth century is no longer dominated by parochial approaches focusing on "dates, political parties and international treaties" (17–18) as she implies but has successfully produced sound studies employing up-to-date methodologies. Moreover, during the last twenty years, the Greek historiographical production on women and gender has demonstrated the importance of gender in understanding nationalism. But let us examine to what extent Tzanaki's promise to offer an original, renewed, non-conventional reading of her subject is actually fulfilled.

As it becomes obvious from the Introduction, the relation between gender and nation is not analysed by studying social behaviours *per se* but by examining pedagogical and moral discourses. In other words, Tzanaki examines *normative discourses*, which attempt to model female education and consequently Greek women's social and national "roles". The sources she most systematically studies are literary, family and women's magazines, treatises on education, household manuals and various publications of benevolent and educational foundations and voluntary associations (i.e., annual accounts, published speeches on education, etc.). Moreover, this

kind of normative discourse is mostly investigated within the prominent socio-intellectual milieus of the major centres of 'Hellenism', Athens and the Greek Orthodox communities of Constantinople and Smyrna. The discourse concerning the national question is equally drawn from the press of these centres, from journals and particularly from important periodicals of those times. Thus, while not departing from the established priorities of the existing historiography, Tzanaki also slips into the conventional periodisation of political history in her otherwise interesting attempt to relate the discourses about the woman's question to successive national crises.

All these categories of sources are among the most widely researched in Greek historiography when it comes to the study of national ideology and in particular its relation to gender. Moreover, these sources can hardly be considered as the most appropriate ones for tracing the dynamics of nationalism in everyday life. To do so one would need proper theoretical and methodological equipment in order to make use of them as well as to combine their analysis with that of other kinds of documents. Testimonies of private life such as diaries and personal correspondence would be more suitable to approach phenomena such as social behaviours, questions of consciousness, subjectivity and internalised roles. However, the writer scarcely takes advantage of such sources, which anyway are rare in the Greek case. Furthermore, she treats all kinds of normative discourse at equal value in the investigation of collective stereotypes. But this should not be so. The study of school textbooks for instance is preferable to that of the articles of intellectuals, which are usually less standardised and uniform. In this study, nevertheless, all sources are used as an undifferentiated sum of evidence with more or less the same

value in exploring social perceptions. Nor does the writer discuss methodological issues which concern either her sources or the terms she uses such as everyday life, experience, behaviours, stereotype and sentiments.

The outcome of such a treatment of sources is that the author does not sufficiently distinguish the ideological and symbolic function of the normative discourse from its already limited ability to reveal social practices and sentiments. This is the case, for example, of the way she sometimes treats the criticism of many intellectuals of the 'dangerous excesses' of 'Western trends' adopted by middle-class women, and their 'harmful' consequences for the nation. Although the author initially approaches this moralistic criticism as a disciplinary discourse which condemns specific behaviours (i.e., the expression of excessive sensibility or of conspicuous consumption) as being completely incompatible with the "Greek-minded" woman, at the same time she does not avoid taking at face value this criticism as a reaction to widespread behaviours when she claims, for instance, that "neurosis and melancholia had become part of the everyday life of Greek women of the upper social strata" (139) or that "this was an era where wealth and luxury had no limit" (300). Although this dominant criticism of the 'Westernisation' of Greek women does indirectly indicate new kinds of sociability adopted by the urban middle strata, its simultaneous treatment as an immediate reflection of 'reality' is obviously methodologically problematic. Most of all, this treatment does not permit the writer to point out sufficiently how this criticism constitutes a power discourse. It does not allow a demonstration of how this discourse creates, for instance, *counter-types* of women (another of George Mosse's terms), which have various meanings within national ideology and the gendered power

relations that sustain it. Such weaknesses in bringing out the ideological functions of normative discourse are reinforced by the writer's tendency to focus on the discourse's content through a descriptive account of the texts instead of analysing these texts' argumentation, values and rhetorical strategies.

Another example of the methodological problems of this study is the fact that the writer uncritically adopts in her analysis the tendency of the sources to imagine the nation as a broader anthropological-cultural community with intellectuals at its head. As a result, she often treats the texts of intellectuals as the most 'authentic' expression of the collective imaginary of the "Greeks". This becomes evident from the frequency with which the author in her narration interchangeably uses the already problematic homogenising category of "the intellectuals" with that of "the Greeks".

The writer seems to believe that there is an ineffective state to which an active and worthy civil society is contrasted. Intellectuals embody this civil society and are seen as taking action to amend all the wrongs of the state. However, this line of analysis leads to simplifications which at times almost amount to historical inaccuracy. It is this problematic tendency of Tzanaki's to juxtapose the intellectuals' concerns with the inefficiency of state policies which probably leads her to claim persistently that the Greek state excluded women from "mass education". Yet, the historical evidence she uses clearly demonstrates that compulsory primary education for boys and girls was introduced in the first decade of the Greek independent state (1834). It is well known, of course, that the unequal treatment of female education by the state manifested itself in Greece, as elsewhere, in other ways: by abandoning, for example, the secondary education of women as well as

that of female teachers to private agents or by prohibiting the establishment of mixed primary municipal schools which resulted in the creation of fewer primary schools for girls.

The writer considers the various texts which appear in the press of different urban milieus as if they compose a single text which furthermore expresses the deepest essence of national desires, beliefs and consciousness. The specific socio-cultural and historical conditions under which these texts appeared are not discussed. Assessments such as the following summing up of different opinions published in different urban settings (Athens and Smyrna as we can see in the footnotes) are very characteristic of this tendency: "Up until the 1870s *Greeks had learned to accept their fate and destiny with religious pioussness. Outlining their nation through a special tragic historical perception . . . the acceptance of a special fate became, in light of the "Great Idea", a divine gift . . . This was a time when the whole world was perceived through the prism of history and of the changes each society was going through. Each nation lived its own changes in specific periods, and the determinism of historical evolution was becoming in the minds of these people a given . . . Greek intellectuals thus concluded – a conclusion they had already reached in 1836 – that they were chosen by God, history and nature to become humanity's saviours . . . By painting the Greek nation in colours which granted its existence a special dimension, the Greeks continued to console themselves by idealising and prettifying the future instead of attempting to understand the difficulties of the present"* (261–63, my italics).

Thus, these generalisations and simplifications do not often allow the multiplicity of diverse and sometimes contradictory meanings of the 'nation' and the 'national idea' to emerge

from the different historical circumstances which Tzanaki examines. These simplifications also result from her tendency to look for a linear scheme of successive redefinitions of the national idea, according to which each period is presented as being dominated by one single definition. In this manner, Tzanaki herself falls into contradictions or makes assertions that underestimate the historical data and their complexity. One could, for example, cite her treatment of the term “Helleno-Christian civilisation”. Initially, the writer informs us that this was a term introduced in the mid-nineteenth century (43). However, further down “Hellenic-Christian civilisation” appears as a given (i.e., dominant) component of Greek national ideology already since the 1830s (83–84). In the same vein, there is almost no discussion (apart from a passing footnote reference) of the views of those intellectuals who rejected the inclusion of Byzantium within the national historical narrative. The resistance against the inclusion of Byzantium in the national past did indeed diminish during the course of the nineteenth century. However it did persist until the end of it. These problems are further exacerbated by the absence of a theoretical discussion on nationalism. Tzanaki does not seem to be sufficiently familiar with recent approaches to the national phenomenon in the social sciences. Nor does she follow the latest developments in Greek historiography – her references actually stop in the mid-1990s.

Given such a problematic use of the sources, we are not to be surprised by the writer’s ease in claiming to reveal the ‘everyday life’, ‘consciousnesses’, ‘sentiments’, ‘behaviours’, etc. Undoubtedly, the notion of ‘everyday life’ loses a considerable part of its analytical weight in the case of this study. Despite the rhetoric of a history of everyday life and the vivacity of the narration, what this study really examines is the relationship be-

tween gender and nationalism in quite familiar fields for Greek historical research, such as ideology, discourses, education, women’s writing or (to a lesser extent) women’s collective activities.

In the last twenty years many studies and monographs on women’s and gender history in Greece have appeared, dealing in one way or another with the issues that Tzanaki tackles. The well-known work of Eleni Varika is the closest example of a study with a similar subject concerning the same historical period: *Η Εξέγερση των Κυριών. Γένεση μιας φεμινιστικής συνείδησης στην Ελλάδα τον 19^ο*.³ However, Tzanaki does not really discuss the arguments of this path-breaking study. Neither does she adequately refer to many other equally relevant and important monographs and articles. Although she frequently cites part of this historiographical production in order to extract factual, historical or bibliographical information, she does not refer to the analyses and interpretations of the historical data these works suggest. This is especially the case with well-known books published in Greece in the 1980s and the early 1990s: studies on different aspects of nineteenth-century women’s education, such as those of Sidiroula Ziogou-Karastergiou, Eleni Fournaraki, Alexandra Bakalaki and Eleni Elegmitou; Maria Korasidou’s book on women and philanthropy in the nineteenth century; Efi Avdela and Angelika Psara’s book on feminism in the interwar period (in this latter case, although Tzanaki refers to women’s demands during the interwar period, she scarcely cites the book), etc. Other publications are completely absent from Tzanaki’s references or bibliography. This is chiefly the case with certain early articles and essays on women’s press and a considerable number of the most recent historical production touching on women, gender and nation-building in nineteenth-century Greece.

In brief, whenever established studies relevant to Tzanaki's research are not completely ignored (as the writer does not even refer to them in her Introduction), they are only used for extracting information. Tzanaki does not present and juxtapose their analyses with her own. The only exception concerns works which deal with issues peripheral to her analysis, such as women's work.

Yet, some of the arguments already formulated by this body of Greek historiography on women and gender are indeed to be found scattered all over Tzanaki's book. The problem is not that the writer incorporates these arguments, even if partially, but that she does so without making clear their original appearance in other studies. Because she treats these studies as an archive from which to extract information, she does not engage in a creative dialogue with them. In other words, Tzanaki avoids the dialogue without completely bypassing the studies themselves. This silencing of previous contributions becomes particularly evident when she refers to historical issues or phenomena largely analysed by Greek feminist historiography, such as women's protest, for the understanding of which *specific interpretations, concepts and terms have also been successfully introduced*. Even in these cases Tzanaki does not recognise these contributions and usually refers exclusively to non-Greek feminist historiography. A characteristic example is the term *gender consciousness*, initially used for the Greek case by Varika: Tzanaki partially reproduces Varika's definition of the content of 'gender consciousness' (152–153), yet she avoids using the term itself and consequently avoids citing Varika. Thus the writer essentially appropriates not the term itself, since she does not literally refer to it, but elements of its definition. The term *equality in difference* is also treated in a similar way.

This term was employed by Varika and consequently by other historians to define the ideology of *The Ladies' Journal* and its editor Kallirroë Parren, the most systematically studied nineteenth-century Greek feminist. In the last chapter of the book, Tzanaki's analysis situates Parren's texts within the framework of *equality in difference*. However, she does not use the term itself nor does she discuss the way other historians have interpreted these texts.

Through such a treatment of previous studies, Tzanaki often selectively appropriates parts of the elaborations of existing Greek historiography on women and gender. Thus, she gives the false impression of being a pioneer in delineating and interpreting issues relevant to this historiography. This is not just a matter of academic integrity. By not committing herself to a dialogue with other works, the writer undermines scientific dialogue itself and consequently does not do justice to her own work since one cannot discern the originality of her own contribution, be that factual or analytical.

This stance also betrays a true difficulty of the author to communicate with the concerns of Greek historiography on women and gender. The empirical and descriptive style of her writing does not promote the dialogue with works which have proposed similar or different readings of the same sources. More importantly, any attempted new interpretation of the sources is not sufficiently sustained by an adequate knowledge of the most recent theoretical elaborations on gender. In the writer's narrative *gender* actually refers to 'women', whereas when attempting to define this term she adopts its most parochial functionalist version, that of the *social roles of the two sexes*. This is, however, a rather problematic approach, which has been largely

criticised for its limited analytical capacity and its inability to break from any kind of biological determinism. In fact, the notion of *gender role* presupposes a *presocial*, that is, a *natural* gender condition on which society comes to inscribe roles and models of behaviour for each of the two sexes. Consequently, this kind of interpretation tends to be descriptive and fails to comprehend the complexity of gender inequality. Most of all, it fails to see biological determinism as a *historically determined conception of gender order*, which legitimises male dominance within modern Western civilisation. The writer's difficulty in clarifying the argumentation and the social dynamics of this new ideological legitimisation of gender order becomes, I think, obvious when she analyses the debate concerning the place of women in the making of modern Greek bourgeois society. She continuously combines "religious" with "biological" explanations of the gender hierarchy, attributing both of them to "traditional" beliefs on the "inferiority" of women. At the same time she claims that biological explanations tend to be "annihilated" by the new perception of *complementarity* ("parity" is the author's word) of the gender 'roles' (24, 30, 91–93, 139–42, 152–53, 231, 271).

A number of historical studies have pointed out how, since the mid-nineteenth century, Greek discourses on women began to re-define gender inequality on the basis of the modern discourse on biological determinism and how, despite their inner differentiations, these discourses were mainly legitimised by the equally modern notion of 'woman's nature'. This notion does not necessarily imply the idea of inferiority but rather that of *incommensurability* (Thomas Laqueur's term) of 'man' and 'woman' as two radically different biological and social beings. However, Tzanaki does not seem to be familiar with these works, nor with the non-Greek his-

toriography which has extensively analysed these issues with regard to the Western paradigm. This betrays a more general deficit of Tzanaki's analysis. This is not adequately sustained by a sound theoretical and historical understanding of the changes in gender relations and their hierarchical content during the transition to modernity. Because of this weakness, Tzanaki does not ultimately avoid a kind of reductionism. There is a broad tendency to treat the much wider and complex question of gender hierarchy as a symptom of nationalist development, almost cut off from other social processes. This emerges from the way she builds her argument in various parts of the book but is also part of her theoretical presuppositions. If gender, according to the definition of Gerda Lerner that the author follows, is the "tight dress" that men and women wear to perform an "unequal dance", for Tzanaki this "tight dress" was woven by none other than nationalism (23–24).

Despite the interesting and original initial intentions of this book, and despite its contribution to historical evidence, it does not ultimately achieve its initial premise to radically renew our historical knowledge on the subject it deals with. Instead, it rather makes obvious the absence of synthetical works providing overviews of nineteenth-century Greek history from the perspective of gender. By conversing with existing knowledge, they would critically transcend it to set out new questions.

NOTES

- 1 The English version of this book, which was initially a PhD thesis, was published in May 2009 by Palgrave, in its St. Antony's Series, under the title *Women and Nationalism in the Making of Modern Greece: The Founding of the Kingdom to the Greco-Turkish War*. This review

concerns only the Greek version.

- 2 This is the definition Tzanaki herself gives in the Introduction of her book in English: Tzanaki, *Women and Nationalism*, p. 9.
- 3 Eleni Varika, *Η Εξέγερση των Κυριών. Γένεση μιας φεμινιστικής συνείδησης στην Ελλάδα τον 19ο αιώνα (Ladies' Revolt. The Birth of a Feminist Consciousness in Nineteenth-century Greece)*, Athens: Institute for Research and Education of Emporiki Bank, 1987.

Fedra Koutsoukou

***Die deutsche Kulturpolitik
in Griechenland in der Zeit
des Nationalsozialismus
(1933–1944)
[German Cultural Policy
in Greece during the Nazi
Period, 1933–1944]***

Berlin: Metropol, 2008. 294 pp.

by Nikos Papanastasiou

Historian

German or German-educated scholars have covered almost every aspect of the interstate relations between Greece and Germany in the twentieth century. Even though the period of the Third Reich (1933–1945) has been very thoroughly researched internationally, the established hierarchy of Greek historiography, which rests on political and diplomatic history, left many “grey areas” that need to be researched. This is the first detailed account of German cultural policy in Greece after Hitler seized power in 1933. Apart from some attempts to focus on ideology affinity, cultural propaganda and national stereotypes in Greece and Germany, Fedra Koutsoukou’s multifaceted approach focuses on the intentions and priorities of the Nazi regime, reflecting the renewed interest in reshaping

the levers needed to widen political and economic influence on Greece and elsewhere. Given the fact that during the Nazi era politics and culture became interconnected in order to promote Berlin's limitless ambitions, this study focuses on the period from 1933 to 1944, when cultural export policy became "institutionalised" and "intensified" (11).

In part one, Koutsoukou analyses the German *modus operandi* and outlines the tendencies, orientations and inclination of the Nazis' cultural apparatus towards superpower status. As the new regime was eager to consolidate itself, it was not until 1937 that Hitler, in a speech to a party cultural congress in Nuremberg, signalled a turning point towards a more aggressive German cultural policy abroad, calling on Germans to activate all scientific and cultural forces, referring to the example of the French and the British.

This was a clear sign that Germany would be less bound to the moderate Weimar tradition of promoting German interest, for which the cultural department of the foreign ministry was responsible.

This study provides the reader with the opportunity to follow a mapping of bureaucracy and the interconnection of several newborn institutions (i.e., the ministries of propaganda, and science and education) which challenged the foreign ministry's specific weight and autonomy in the international field. Despite the different approaches, the notorious 'organised chaos' of the German bureaucracy was no obstacle to catching up with its competitors and to taking revenge for the double defeat, on the battlefield during the First World War and at a cultural level. Koutsoukou vividly describes how the German cultural apparatus was extended to include several Nazi party institutions (*Amt Rosenberg, Dienststelle*

Ribbentrop) and traditional cultural export vehicles like the German schools abroad, the German Archaeological Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service (*Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst*), and the German Academy (the predecessor of the Goethe Institut) in order to promote the triangle of language, science and art.

According to Koutsoukou's findings, the coordination and the key role of foreign cultural policy remained with the foreign ministry as, in 1938, the minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, was called upon to intensify the efforts for the expansion of cultural export and the development of new concepts. She is therefore portraying him as an imitator of the aggressive French and Italian cultural export policy, which was interwoven with power politics and, as such, proved of great value in influencing foreign nations.

The second part contains a short analysis of the origins of the cultural liaison between Greece and Germany that goes back to the foundation of the modern Greek State. Although the outcome of the First World War ensured that France emerged victorious from the Franco-German rivalry over cultural hegemony in Greece that dated back to the nineteenth century, Berlin renewed its traditionally close cultural influence in the interwar period.

Within this context, the author describes how Germany's ever-growing political and economic influence in the 1930s renewed the dynamics and the content of its cultural penetration in Greece, beyond the traditional ways it had promoted its interests. In the competition for cultural primacy in Greece between the Great Powers (Britain, Germany and France), the main German vehicles were the German Academy, founded in 1925,

and the German Archaeological Institute. The establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship in Greece is not described as a landmark. Neither Greece nor Germany were interested in a special relation that went beyond its close intertrade relations, and indeed Greece revived its “British connection” (1935–36) under the dictatorship. Koutsoukou’s argumentation points to the fact that Germany’s renewed interest in Greek antiquity must be seen as a springboard to facilitate the former’s role as an economic superpower in southeastern Europe. The Nazis proved to be masters of propaganda by initiating the lighting of the Olympic flame at ancient Olympia and its transfer to Berlin in 1936, which is now at the core of every opening ceremony in the modern-day Olympics. At the same time they announced the resumption of the excavations in Olympia which were financed by the ‘Führer’ himself from the royalties from his manifesto, *Mein Kampf*. In order to match the steadily increasing political power and his designs for a ‘New Europe’ with a ‘cultural’ superpower status, German propaganda in Greece gradually expanded its activities to encompass “scholarship programmes, inviting and dispatching men of letters and sciences, holding concerts and exhibitions, financing film shows and theatrical performances”.¹

In this context Koutsoukou reveals how the Nazis lost interest in using the long presence of the archaeological institute in Greece to highlight the constant German achievements in order to gain legitimacy and sympathy for the Nazi regime. Hitler’s demonstration of his great interest in Greek antiquity did not go very far as the excavation at Olympia remained the last major German archaeological engagement in Greece during the Nazi period. Throughout, the book explains that despite the fact that the Nazis’ claim for German cultural leadership was reiterated during the

Nazi occupation of Europe, the Germans emphasised consolidating the Nazi ‘New Order’ through repression rather than collaboration. The Nazi terror and the mass executions that resulted from the application of the doctrine of collective responsibility of the local population left no space for delusions on the goals Germany could attain. During the occupation of Greece, even the moderate and vague cultural goals the Nazis pursued were merely focused on the Greek elites (academics, politicians, businessmen) and remained without any chance of success as every effort was interpreted as Nazi propaganda. To that effect, former prime minister’s Konstantinos Mitsotakis’ account of breaking off all relations with the Germans is a typical one (263). The circumstances worsened as Greece was viewed by Italy as part of its sphere of influence in the Mediterranean, and as the Nazis attempted to integrate ancient Greek history and culture into the grandeur of Nazi Germany, leading to a revival of Fallmerayer’s theories and the presentation of the Germans as the original and only successors to the ancient Greeks.

One of the most interesting findings in this book is that the Metaxas period marked a climax in German cultural engagement in Greece and that Germany had successes compared to other countries, despite the fact that the two countries did not agree on any formal cultural agreement. Besides, the profound Greek interest in German culture did not equate with sympathy for the Nazis. As Germany was seen as a synonym for scientific and technological progress but also for world-renowned poets and thinkers, during the Nazi period Berlin promoted its contacts in music and theatre. There is a record in this book of such close contacts which were consummated by the tours of numerous Greek artists to Germany (the Greek Royal Theatre with Alexis Minotis, Katina Paxinou, Aimil-

ios Veakis) during Kostas Bastias' reign as Metaxas' right-hand man in matters cultural. During the German occupation these contacts were no longer bilateral and only German artists were invited to Greece, while Greek theatres came under pressure to stage German plays only.

The most impressive part of this book is its account of the battle over the propagation of the German language between the Great Powers in Greece. In the interwar period this reached a new climax, as Germany for the first time made a systematic attempt to promote the German language. The main target was the Greek bourgeoisie, which remained traditionally closely connected to France. As Greece became a German economic stronghold, Berlin had now the opportunity to gain ground through promoting university studies in Germany and to broaden its appeal for foreign-language students by offering the prospect of a better job. Initially coordinated through the German Academy, German-language teaching gradually reached new heights, as the number of 13 branches in every major Greek city demonstrates. During the Nazi occupation their number was halved, leaving the main burden for teaching the language on the shoulders of the few German schools in Greece and the German courses offered in universities. However, from 1941/42 onwards, German was introduced as an obligatory subject in Greek gymnasiums. As for the motives of the students learning German, interest in which remained high throughout the occupation, little can be said. They had probably mixed motives such as the prospect of better professional advancement in the tobacco business of Macedonia and obtaining a scholarship place at a German university. As for the German teaching staff, either by coincidence or because 'backward' Athens was the right place for those

who opposed Nazism or had been excluded on the basis of the race laws (although not all were anti-Nazis), most were "bridge builders" to the Greeks, trying to earn their confidence through an "apolitical-scientific" approach.

The book's great contribution is that it transcends the traditional interests of Greek historiography. This study creates the space for a methodologically and theoretically broader engagement with the interconnection of politics and culture during the Nazi era and its influence on Berlin's policy in Greece. Koutsoukou states that no definitive conclusions can be made about the policy of the Greek administration or on the role of the elite and the masses in Greece due to the very poor availability of Greek sources. This book is very thoroughly researched, based on relevant public and private archives in Germany, Greece and Britain, numerous interviews with the protagonists and their descendants. Overall, the effort here is to describe how cultural policy was applied in the Greek case under the cloak of national socialism rather than the policy of exporting of national socialism.

NOTE

- 1 Hagen Fleischer, «Στρατηγικές πολιτισμικής διείσδυσης των μεγάλων δυνάμεων και ελληνικές αντιδράσεις, 1930–1960», in Hagen Fleischer (ed.), *Η Ελλάδα '36–'49. Από τη Δικτατορία στον Εμφύλιο. Τομές και συνέχειες* [Greece 1936–1949: From dictatorship to civil war], Athens: Kastaniotis, 2003, p. 94.

Eugenios Matthiopoulos

*Η τέχνη περοφνεί εν οδύνη:
Η πρόσληψη του νεο-
ρομαντισμού στην Ελλάδα*
[*Art Growing its Wings in
Pain: The Reception of Neo-
romanticism in Greece*]

Athens: Potamos, 2005. 700 pp.

by Aris Sarafianos

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The dissemination in Greece of a series of art-related trends subsumed under the term “symbolism” (Pre-Raphaelitism, neo-idealism, aestheticism, synthetism, Rose+Croix, Nabis, etc.), and allied ideas in late nineteenth-century philosophy, aesthetics and science called “Neo-romanticism” (mysticism, theosophism, spiritualism and esotericism) is the subject of a hefty volume by one of the leading art historians in Greece today, Eugenios Matthiopoulos. Since Nietzsche, arguably the most perceptive student and critic of different variants of European ‘decadence’, the resurgence of all kinds of transcendentalisms and redemptive idealisms in this period has attracted consistent critical attention. From the early 1990s in particular, this intricate web of artistic innovation and reaction has increasingly tested the skills (and pa-

tiences) of ‘new’ art historians, literary theorists, cultural critics and literary historians in Europe and the USA, who have come to see it as key to a more dynamic understanding of modernism.¹ The study of symbolism in its Greek contexts is an even more taxing project: as Matthiopoulos’ book masterfully shows over 19 sections and 700 pages, symbolism in fact coincides with a formative period in the genealogy of Greek intellectual life, and provides a unique point of entry into a plethora of crucial themes in the historiography of Greek culture.²

In a fine example of professional history, Matthiopoulos first explores the social identity of those intellectuals who played a leading role in the introduction of symbolist trends to Greece. From his meticulous analysis a sense of regularity emerges: this was a lower middle-class and disaffected group of educated individuals who had come to Athens from provincial towns and who led largely precarious professional and social lives. A string of related phenomena is also exhaustively studied: the intimate alliance between art criticism and the literary profession, the group’s self-perception as a forward-looking cultural elite, as well as the curious occupational objective of this self-appointed intelligentsia, i.e., to predict and translate for Greeks the next *dominant* European trend. These traffickers of ideas and forecasters of European cultural weather are a special case of relay-modernisers operating explicitly under the sign of derivative modernisation. Symbolism is also the platform from which Matthiopoulos surveys a whole range of epistemological and aesthetic shifts in Europe and Greece. These include the progress of spiritualism and theosophism, with their frequently ludicrous critiques of positivist reason, the energising switch from allegory to symbol and the interdisciplinary interface between art and psychi-

etry. The sections particularly devoted to the leading voices of symbolist art theory and criticism in Greece, from the eloquently renamed Pavlos Nirvanas (Petros Apostolides) to Kostas Palamas and Nikolaos Episkopopoulos, reveal the aesthetic makeup of this group, shaped predominantly by an indigenous adaptation of mysticism and polite aestheticism that mingled in Greece with low-intensity sensory regimes, already popularised by neo-classical art theory. This affective spectrum was limited to elite (and regressive) forms of fine sensibility, epitomised in Nirvanas' quietist bio-economy of sensation (with its Buddhist principles of tranquillity, homeostasis and joyful bliss), or in Palamas' leading role in the diffusion of aestheticism in Greece (i.e., of patrician states of repose and rarefied sensations which, in a typically elite fashion, he pitted against the plebeian sensibilities of 'grocers' which he detested). Other aspects of Palamas' rather volatile views on aesthetics include his intense attraction to contradictions (a passion which he must have contracted from Nietzsche). Nietzsche's considerable influence on Greek symbolists led the author to a rightly lengthy chapter which, I suspect, will not be the final word on the topic. Matthiopoulos' study of symbolism's intellectual history is completed with a section on the socialist-anarchist as well as the scientific and Darwinian leanings of some of the movement's future leaders, while revealing the chronological alignment of their conversion to symbolism with parallel intellectual shifts in France. This section on symbolism's genealogy closes with an examination of the socio-historical factors that conditioned the turn to symbolist repertoires in Greece: symbolism is thus closely linked to the synchronous collapse of the Greek economy (1893) and other national calamities, which exacerbated the kind of navel-gazing that in symbolist parlance took the form of soul-probing.

A critical characteristic of Greek symbolism is the intense traffic between art, literature, poetry and music. The basis of this commerce between the arts was predicated on a full-blown synaestheticism, which Matthiopoulos associates with theosophism and other transcendentalist trends rather than, more plausibly, with their rightful origins in biomedical and materialist themes from the 'radical Enlightenment' which enjoyed a strong revival in this period. The author's approach, however, shows very effectively that such synaesthetic models played in Greece the deeply regressive role of consolidating the power of literary men and their techniques (theme-based readings of pictures and general psychological descriptions) over the field of art criticism. Ultimately, this discursive issue interfaces with questions of professional history: the synaesthetic 'confederation of the arts' was praised by literary men to the extent that it guaranteed their supremacy over the artistic field, a supremacy that ultimately limited the reception of more medium-specific forms of modernist art emerging elsewhere in Europe. This decidedly literary orientation of Greek art criticism blocked the evolution of more sophisticated types of visual analysis and delayed the professionalisation of art history in Greece (a topic which Matthiopoulos has magisterially analysed elsewhere). It also explains the particular resilience of old regimes of figuration and naturalist imitation in this country. But Matthiopoulos has even stronger cards up his sleeve in his critique of naturalism, drawing attention to the curious way in which visual naturalism became the stylistic vehicle par excellence for the representation of supernatural phenomena. One of the central paradoxes of spiritualism's drive towards immaterial phenomena was its fixation with material types of empirical evidence as proof of their existence: spiritualism was fundamentally dependent on the testimony

of the senses as well as existing scientific models (which it otherwise attacked). In the hands of literary symbolists, who knew that the abstractness of their own literary media was particularly misaligned to their aspirations, the visual arts were seen as unique tools for the material concretisation, sensory verification and optical stabilisation of the otherwise elusive immaterial phenomena which they pursued. But the double bind this involved has not evaded Matthiopoulos' critical acuity: in artistic symbolism, the pictorial materialisation of immateriality was offset by the derealisation of the visual field: reality-effects were allowed but references to reality forbidden. Literary symbolists may have used painting to add materiality to a world of sensory phantoms and conceptual idealities, but in the process the visual arts lost their relation to the world.

The story of the decline of symbolism is equally fascinating. Again this story reminds us how the symbolist eruption in modern Greece served as a focal point for a series of struggles about cultural identity, political power, modernisation and artistic modernism. There were three main fronts leading the assault against symbolism: conservatives, Hellenocentrics and nativist intellectuals and socialists. The analysis of the agenda of each of these camps introduces new insights into the nature of Greek symbolism. Matthiopoulos' study of the use of Max Nordau's theory of degeneration by conservative critics as well as his examination of the complex responses of symbolist intellectuals to his reactionary materialism signals the introduction to Greek art history of a rich body of biomedical literature, which will hopefully assist younger generations of art historians to reinsert art-related phenomena into much richer interdisciplinary environments. Compared to Nordau's Greek disciples, howev-

er, native forms of Hellenocentrism offered a far more exuberant and honest foil to European symbolism, which found its epitome in the work of Pericles Giannopoulos – a feisty figure, whose outrageous yet ingenious remarks embellish what is perhaps the most entertaining section of the book. Here Matthiopoulos uses indigenous and other critiques of the shallow cosmopolitanism of symbolists as a way of unravelling the drama (or should I say tragicomedy) of cultural modernisation in Greece. Contemporary postcolonial theorists frequently prefer to overlook the uncreative and didactic types of cosmopolitanism that pushed the transplantation of modern culture from countries of the centre to those of the periphery. In contrast, Matthiopoulos' book provides unflinching insights into those sterile forms of mimeticism and 'second-handedness' which archsymbolists like Paul Bourget and his Greek followers unembarrassingly promoted in their belief that they were ideally adapted to the needs of the arts in peripheral countries like Greece. Similarly, Hellenocentrists, then *and* now, frequently prefer to forget that antisymbolist nativism in some of its cleverest forms was largely not a native phenomenon at all. As Matthiopoulos' study of the antisymbolist backlash shows, such nativist fictions were imported by members of the affluent and highly influential Greek diaspora, which resided permanently outside Greece, in the world's metropolitan centres of globalisation, from London or Liverpool to Paris and central Europe. Ironically, more than any other oppositional sector, it was a firmly positivist version of imported nativism (represented by the Parisian philologist Giannis Psycharis) that finally won the battle against symbolism in Greece. In this, they were aided by a section of socialist Marxist thinkers (from Ioannis Zervos to Konstantinos Chatzopoulos) who had by the beginning of the twenti-

eth century denounced their earlier symbolist shenanigans. Although aestheticism in countries like Britain had served as the basis for a (frequently tense) symbiosis of “art for art’s sake” programmes (Swinburne) with socialist and anarchist utopias (from William Morris’ models to more moderate agendas in Vernon Lee’s and Walter Crane’s work), this revolt from within the symbolist system underlines the singularity of Greek symbolism as a political field, which eventually aggravated rather than assimilated radical divisions.

But the ultimate aim of Matthiopoulos’ fascinating chronicle of the fall of symbolism is to demonstrate that the symbolists’ model of modernisation lost the cultural war because of a deeper combination of internal limitations *and* macroscopic necessities. Among the broader symbolist failures, the author lists the following: the inability of critics to extract themselves from the dominant canon of resemblance and naturalist paradigms of imitation; the utter ineptness at developing self-reflexive models of artistic autonomy and medium-specific languages of visual analysis; and ultimately, the failure to follow the affective and expressionist logic of some of the most radical currents within symbolism. In a series of well-argued case studies, Matthiopoulos demonstrates the impossible assimilation in Greece of impressionist and postimpressionist trends (from pointillism to Cézanne), the assaults on expressionists like Van Gogh, and the highly selective reception of symbolism. Indeed, if Greek symbolists endorsed the work of Boecklin, they still rejected that of Nabis, Gauguin, Klimt and Ensor. Even worse, the visual work of such European symbolist heroes as Segantini, Hodler or even Rodin were only accepted by Greeks in a heavily truncated, piecemeal form. In all of these cases, critics privileged evaluations of veracity, and iconographic, psychological and

moral descriptions at the expense of stylistic and technical novelties. These are all limitations characterising the symbolist upheaval across many European cultures, both central and peripheral. But in Greece the situation was exacerbated by the dominance of literary discourses in art criticism, the total reliance on reproductions, and the absence of any indigenous modernist art that would have made some of these sensory and emotional breakthroughs that propelled modernism in Europe more tangible to Greek critics and viewers alike. Eventually, Matthiopoulos agrees with the archpriest of European mysticism, Josephine Peladan, who at the end of his celebrity visit to Athens stated about the Greeks: “vous êtes intelligents, mais point mystiques!” Greeks were too rational, too devoted to the mind and too absorbed in culture, imitation and book learning for the kind of affective intensity that in Europe finally led to the transmutation of regressive symbolism and decadence into their *modernist* opposites.

This, perhaps, will prove to be the most seminal of Matthiopoulos’ arguments. The author not only highlights the deep roots of abstract art and expressionism in mysticism, transcendentalism and synaesthetic experience. He actually considers modernism’s turn away from the real world (privileged by realism and naturalism) and towards an autonomous ideal of pictoriality to be predicated on the symbolists’ belief that art’s business is to represent not the appearance of an object but the emotions that it gives rise to in the artist/viewer. (The question looms large: could the modernist revolution brought about by the application of such crucial philosophical principles of artistic practice as self-reflection or self-referentiality be also rooted in similar *affective involutions* – a kind of implosion of the symbolist sensorium?) Very interestingly,

Matthiopoulos himself seems to suggest that the failure of Greek symbolism to be modernist – to cut its ties from visual naturalism and branch out into the subjectivism of abstraction and expressionism as its European counterpart did – is the result of a failure of indigenous regimes of emotions; (or, in other words, I would add, of a whole biopolitical organisation of modern subjectivity, which was missing in Greece). For Matthiopoulos, this failure is ultimately economical: the temperate rules of affect espoused by Greek intellectuals were ultimately unable to fuel the paroxysmic and inverted types of energy necessary to dissolve the imitative bonds between subject, object and representation in Europe.

Matthiopoulos' book performs efficiently its historiographical task to disrupt two of the most established reflexes in national scholarship: the tendency to view the history of modern art in Greece as a continuous reflection of economic or political modernisation, and consequently the temptation to model it according to the canonical narratives of European modernism. For Matthiopoulos, the dominant scholarly topos that Greek modernism was a replication of international modernism in its canonical form – only slightly delayed by two or three decades – is a normative and oversimplifying apparatus designed to iron out the discontinuities of the Greek paradigm, and to serve as an uncritical apology for modernism's supposed progressiveness against conservative reactionaries. The history of symbolism, as Matthiopoulos rewrites it, disrupts this paradigm with a fine set of paradoxes. Firstly, the failure in Greece of symbolism was a failure to be truly symbolist, i.e., to transform itself as it did in Europe from a reaction to modernity into a reinforcement of modernism. Secondly, the local structure of cosmopolitan modernisation – too dependent on foreign mechanisms of approval and legit-

imation – blocked the advances of modernism in art. Once European modernism started thriving within heterodox and specialist subcultures of dubious respectability in the eyes of Greek cultural modernisers, the channels of communication were broken. And this leads to the final paradox: in Greece, modernity and modernism were actually far more efficiently blocked by the advocates of modernisation than by their conservative rivals.

In all of these ways, the virtue of Matthiopoulos' approach is clearly its polemical determination, which leads him steadily to a series of rigorously argued, far-reaching and highly original propositions. Yet this polemic angle presents its own drawbacks. For example, there is a certain sense of one-sidedness in Matthiopoulos' perception of Greek backwardness: his rhetoric of "inability" and "failure" reads at times rather heavy-handed, or over-determined by his decision to look for lags and delays rather than highlight alternative plots of novelty, local mutations, forward-looking possibilities or lost opportunities, which some of his abundant quotations frequently seem to suggest. Similarly, the use of the wholesale notions of "symbolism" or "Neoromanticism" at times prevents more concrete engagements with the discontinuities between the numerous artistic trends covered by these terms. Perhaps the diversified vocabularies developed to discuss these trends in literary studies (already adopted by art historians in the Anglo-Saxon world for the independent micro-analysis of pre-Raphaelitism, decadence or aestheticism) could also reveal in the Greek case useful subplots, nuances and tensions that would otherwise remain lost. Furthermore, Matthiopoulos' dismissive tone towards narrative, figuration and synaesthetic embodiment occasionally appears to be overreliant on the very modernist orthodoxies whose Greek equivalents

he set out to disrupt (canonical models ranging from Greenberg to his Benjaminian foes in current sectors of 'critical postmodernism' with their own mantras of self-referentiality and medium-specificity).³

Finally, the epistemological framework and polarised model of Matthiopoulos' view of science in this period seems to be out of tune with current approaches to the history of nineteenth-century science and medicine. The overarching opposition between rationalism and anti-rationalism, materialism and immateriality or science and 'anti-scientific' metaphysics is at times rather heavy. Although I am sure that Matthiopoulos takes a constructivist view of scientific discourses, in agreement with current convictions that there is no such thing as 'presuppositionless science', his critique of spiritualists' absurdities is at times so caustic as to blot out the many aesthetic, moral and social presuppositions also intrinsic in the worldview of their scientific enemies. Recent revaluations of rationality, positivism and objectivity have adequately shown, on the one hand, the fictions, ascetic ideals and socio-professional aspirations embedded in positivist science,⁴ and, on the other, the opposite aesthetic drives towards the splendour, excess and re-enchantment of the world unleashed by alternative programmes of realist science such as Darwinism.⁵ In either case, the picture that is revealed underlines the messy, frequently paradoxical but immensely productive synergy of hot feeling and severe intellect in the production of scientific knowledge, without, however, falling into the traps of facile relativism.⁶ Similarly, flexible frameworks can enrich our perceptions of the historical place and function of artistic symbolism/Neoromanticism without necessarily treating it as foundationally divorced from naturalist agendas. In the end, such angles may show that this conflict between ide-

alism and realism in art and in science took place on a shared field of materiality and materialisation, where competing ways of feeling and knowing lay their different biopolitical stakes on life and the senses.

In addition to the many rewarding insights that could be gleaned from Matthiopoulos' presentation, it is in its agonistic function that I consider his book to be a landmark in the history of art in Greece. This is one of these rare works that serve their purpose best by fixing the parameters of a field and simultaneously opening it up to future responses.

NOTES

- 1 David Weir, *Decadence and the Making of Modernism*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995.
- 2 Another study in which the significance of this intellectual milieu for the study of Greek art is shown is Lia Yoka's wide-ranging contextualisation of the work of an important symbolist, Gerasimos Vokos: *The Art Journal Καλλιτέχνης, Gerasimos Vokos, and Aspects of the Culture of Intellectuals in Early-Twentieth Century Athens*, PhD, University of East Anglia, 1998.
- 3 For an outstanding critique of these enduring concepts of artistic practice, see Caroline Jones, *Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg's Modernism and the Bureaucratisation of the Senses*, Chicago: Chicago UP, 2005.
- 4 See the work of such leading figures of 'externalist' history of science today as Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison's *Objectivity*, New York: MIT Press, 2007.
- 5 George Lewis Levine, *Darwin Loves You: Natural Selection and the Re-enchantment of the World*, Princeton/Oxford: Princeton UP, 2006. For a more popularised version of the rigor-

ous and enriching continuum between science, materialist aesthetics, art and literature in this period (combined with an informative review of similar tendencies in cutting-edge neurology and psychology today), see Jonah Lehrer's oddly titled *Proust was a Neuroscientist*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007.

- 6 My book in progress *Sublime Realism: Medical Men and Art Professionals in Britain, 1757–1824* underlines the productivity of similar confluences in the visual and epistemic cultures of the long eighteenth century.

Dimitris Papanikolaou

***Singing Poets.
Literature and Popular
Music in France and Greece***

Oxford: Legenda, 2007. 179 pp.

by Kostis Kornetis

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In contrast to other academic environments where cultural studies and cultural history have established themselves for quite some time, the cultural analysis of the recent past is a field that is by and large under-researched in Greece. By embarking on the courageous journey of applying some of the theoretical understandings and achievements of this discipline to a Greek subject matter, Dimitris Papanikolaou fills an enormous void. His study, based on the author's doctoral dissertation at University College London, extends in fact beyond the Greek case as it is comparative, or rather transnational, in nature, juxtaposing the French with the Greek cultural contexts of the post-1945 period. Papanikolaou manages to bring two different contexts of 'high popular' music together by analysing the special characteristics of several emblematic exponents of that genre: Georges Brassens, Léo Ferré, Jacques Brel, Manos Hadjidakis, Mikis Theodorakis and Dionysis Savvopoulos.

But what is the common denominator between artists as disparate as these? It is, as the title suggests, the notion of the 'singing poet' as the exponent of the literary-poetic song. The almost obsessive connection between literary traditions and poetry and the fact that, as the author says, any cultural product that is important ends up being considered as a form of literature, provide a connecting thread between the two countries. Apart from a meticulous study of a vast number of music albums, the author uses an array of journals, ephemera and paraphernalia of the time, together with personal interviews and memoirs as primary material for this study. Additionally, a great number of key theoreticians, including Fredric Jameson, Roland Barthes, Slavoj Žižek and Homi Bhabha are applied in a sophisticated reading of the French and Greek cultural contexts of the post-Second World War years.

Starting from the French paradigm, Papanikolaou tries to show the complex ways in which high and low cultural registers communicate. Always attentive to the historical context, he argues that it was the wartime resistance that annulled the 'red line' between high literature and popular culture, through the promotion of poetry that was simple and appealing to the masses. Later on, the French *chanson* provided the ideal balance between commercialism and avant-garde music. In this initial part, the author introduces some of the terms that permeate the entire book, including the famous notion of the *auteur*, the artist who was responsible for all the stages of artistic creation and production, marking the 'intellectualisation' of the genre and cementing the idea of the 'singing poet'.

The key umbrella term that encapsulates this tendency and describes best the French protagonists of the book is *auteurs-com-*

positeurs-interprètes or singer-songwriters. Papanikolaou takes us to the cellars of the Rive Gauche, emblematic spaces of Parisian subculture that bred bohemian, existentialist and engagé intellectuality, which later on provided the raw material for a booming counterculture. Brassens is a key figure here, as the pioneer in undermining the supposed lag between 'low popular' and 'authentic folk', canonised as 'oral poetry'. By mingling folk-song themes with popular-song modalities, Brassens created a hybrid genre – and it is the very concept of hybridity that marks the most interesting parts of this book. Folklore and popular culture, old and new, rural and urban, switched from binary oppositions to a fusion.

The author also eloquently reveals how the Brassens myth was constructed through the media and how it became 'literary canonised'. Brassens' fame was due not only to his own talent but also to the influence of literary institutions in France and the idealised view of orality as the quintessential expression of Frenchness since medieval times. Papanikolaou skillfully demonstrates how anti-conformist, anarchical and bohemian figures such as Brassens, but also Ferré later on, were from very early on promoted by the cultural industry itself, despite their iconoclastic attitude. Their personas were artfully constructed by the system and served its purpose: the creation of the 'high-popular' and the inclusion of songs in the poetic canon. Papanikolaou further shows how performativity could outplay lyrics in importance, as in the case of Jacques Brel. In other words, the 'aura' created by the artist on stage could dictate the literary canonisation of his repertoire, thus rendering the process of inclusion extremely flexible.

Accordingly, even 'alternative' forms of culture do not break away but are controlled by

the cultural industry. At the same time, however, Papanikolaou underlines the fact that identity is not a stable entity but is characterised by fragmentation and flux, and audience identifications can be diverse and even antagonistic (33). The author's powerful idea here is that even though some people can be canonised and commodified, they might still generate unexpected responses. At this point, we encounter yet another key concept in this book, that of fluidity. Throughout *Singing Poets* we see how receptions and reconstructions are always open to multiple versions and reinterpretations, often having a more disruptive and subversive potential than is envisaged by various production values.

Despite some differences, the above also applies to Greece. Papanikolaou in many ways manages to tear down the supposed barriers that differentiate the closed Greek 'exceptionalist' space and the outside world, or the southern versus the western European paradigm. The figure of the 'singing poet', for example, emerged out of the need to create a counterweight to the appropriation of rural folk by the Vichy regime, in exactly the same way in which in Greece more than 25 years later the rediscovery of traditional music acted as a means of undermining the Colonels' own instrumentalisation of the past. A major feature of the singing poet that the author identifies both in France and Greece is the idea of the literary-minded intellectual-musician who can sing poetry: in the case of France this means bringing a thirteenth-century poem or the verses of Apollinaire, Baudelaire, Aragon and Verlaine to the people. As Ferré himself claimed, "what is important is that the public is hooked by these texts even if they don't know the authors" (37). In the case of Greece these were texts written by poets Nikos Gatsos, Yannis Ritsos, George Seferis and Odysseus Elytis, and the general

idea was that of popularising Greek modernism. Here the interesting conclusion is that in both countries there was a conscious "move to intellectualise a type of popular music, with the further aim of giving it clear national characteristics" (70). Moreover, Papanikolaou skillfully shows the extreme interconnectedness between promotional strategies, individual myths, production tactics and technical novelties. Jacques Canetti, for example, a producer with a foresight in discovering new talent and promoting trends, launched Brassens in the same way in which Alekos Patsifas promoted Savvopoulos and the New Wave (*Neo Kyma*) of Greek song some years later in Greece.

Papanikolaou proceeds in analysing various Greek artists' distinct cultural politics. He traces the emergence of the art-popular (*entechno laiko*), one of the most resistant genres in Greek music up to the present. Here Papanikolaou shows how tradition is used and mobilised, being extremely precise in terms of all the classifications and taxonomies of the time that differentiated between popular and folk music. He further analyses the ways in which the two most influential Greek composers used the *rembetiko* genre and transformed it from a supposedly low-culture entertainment item into a high-popular model, albeit for different purposes. Hadjidakis' preoccupation with the fusion of popular music and literary modernism was part, according to the author, of the utopian project of reviving popular culture while at the same time refining it. Theodorakis, on the other hand, appears as the national-popular guru par excellence: the "composer-as-national-leader" (88). For him music did not have only an artistic but also, and maybe primarily, an educational and a political function with a 'popular front' potential. Here Papanikolaou presents Theodorakis as the carri-

er of Antonio Gramsci's idea of the "national popular", the incarnation of the "organic intellectual" who envisages a direct access to the masses by rejecting *en masse* the high-low divide. Gramsci's idea that there is a continuum between folk and popular, despite their different poetics, as they both fall into the category 'of the people', was adopted by Theodorakis, who saw a link between the old *demotika* and *rembetiko*. Moreover, in his mind, people's poetry and people's songs should be "intellectualised", to use Roderick Beaton's phrase,¹ and given 'back' to the people. He further rejected the dominant light song (*elafro*) of the 1950s as inauthentic, manipulative and Western inspired, thus introducing his own individual taxonomy. The antidote, Papanikolaou argues, was the construction of a national-popular culture whereby *melo-poiemene poise* (a poetry genre set to music) and bouzouki went hand-in-hand.

Papanikolaou then proceeds to the most impressive part of the book, the one that covers the *poète chansonnier* Dionysis Savvopoulos. This is the lengthiest and most elaborate chapter of the entire work, whereby the quality of the analysis is catapulted to extraordinary heights. As the author skillfully shows in previous chapters, the cultural climate until the imposition of the Greek dictatorship (1967–74) was consumed by internal affairs and a quest for the popular which did not allow for the integration of the cultural opening that was taking place outside Greece's borders. Papanikolaou rightly observes that there is a rift after 1967, often seen as the end of the cultural 'Spring'. In contrast to the general assumption, however – and herein lies the contradiction – it was the dictatorship itself that created, unwillingly, the conceptual space for renewal and change. The emergence of two antithetical spheres of folk music, the one promoted by the regime itself,

and the other embraced by alternative artists, became a major form of cultural antagonism spearheaded by Savvopoulos, despite his anti-heroic persona. In the latter's iconic music production during the dictatorship years, Papanikolaou reads an eruption of the *jouissance* that radicalised artistic subjectivity.

The key concepts in analysing Savvopoulos' repertoire and conceptual baggage are for Papanikolaou dislocation and "strategic mimicry". The author quotes Homi Bhabha's postcolonial critique from the field of subaltern studies, according to which mimicry mocks the power of the original model, effectively destabilising and undermining it. Accordingly, "mimicry always engages in a poetics of the surplus; it produces itself as an imitation, introducing the original as arranged, split, negotiated, and, in the end, not original at all" (113). In many respects, the way Papanikolaou uses Bhabha's argument is complementary to the theory on the 'hidden transcripts' that are used by oppressed people against the hegemonic discourse of the ruling elites.² Deception, deference and mockery are part of this ideological resistance of subordinate groups, whereby ambiguity reigns supreme. One of the mimicries evolves around the 1960s and the Greek youth's re-enactment of the countercultural behavior of their Western counterparts. But the basic "mi-mi-cry" is about Savvopoulos himself, who managed to constantly re-invent himself, his repertoire and his message.

This practice became the trademark of Savvopoulos' career. In contrast to Theodorakis, who castigated 'cultural mimeticism' as a dangerous byproduct of Western capitalism, "Savvopoulos' originality is based on the fact that he is not original," as Papanikolaou notes with manifest irony. He absorbs Greek folk, *rembetiko*, Brassens, Dylan and rock and even seems to reverberate people's moods,

just recording what is already out there. In his songs and general discourse there is a constant “tension between the political and the personal, the progressive and the utopian”, producing what the author brilliantly calls “blissful undecidability” (121). This volatile artist turned everything on its head, undermining traditional left-wing politics, the mellow lyricism of the *Neo Kyma*, the supposed unpolitical poetics of yé-yé and rock music, the ‘revolutionary’ potential of tradition and the importance of the high-popular, introducing confusion to a superlative level. Here, Papanikolaou seems to share this conclusion with Karen Van Dyck’s seminal *Kassandra and the Censors*,³ even though he rejects her idea of the homeopathic and the paralogical as integral elements of Savvopoulos’ work during the dictatorship. In any case, a complete transformation of subjectivity, a bouleversement of the personal and a “restaging and reactivating [of] the revolutionary” (128) characterise his repertoire.

Hybridity, confusion, subversiveness and subterraneity are the notions that dominate this part of the book. Complex Lacanian readings of Savvopoulos’ *jouissance* and a scrutiny of his early 1970s albums through the lenses of Žižek’s critique of Terry Gilliam’s dystopian masterpiece *Brazil* allow Papanikolaou to expose all the multiple resignifications in his work. In contrast to other readings of Savvopoulos as the absolute tradition-seeker, here tradition is seen as turned into a void, shaken to its foundations and being almost totally reconfigured. This is reminiscent of Guffey’s definition of ‘retro’ as a self-reflexive tendency that ironically reinterprets ‘high’ and ‘low’ art, while disregarding traditional boundaries that separate them.⁴ Additionally, Papanikolaou’s work offers useful insights into the reasons why Savvopoulos managed to offer “a musical variant of critical social

theory”⁵ to an entire generation of youth in the late 1960s/early 1970s, with references to urbanisation, mass culture and even Che Guevara. Savvopoulos encapsulated but also fed the hybrid identity of the so-called ‘Polytechnic generation’ that is normally associated with the epic cultural politics and national-popular poetics of Theodorakis’ *Songs of the Struggle* or Yannis Markopoulos’ *Rizitika*. This standard reading disregards the fusion that took place between the political and the counter-cultural, yé-yé and ideology, high and low culture, cynicism and political engagement. Savvopoulos personified this tendency as the lawless “subversive Other” to both oppressive politics and high cultural forms.

What is missing from the Greek bibliography was a book that would cover the artistic but also the cultural-political angle of the ‘long Sixties’. The close reading of the songs in both a musical and literary key but also in terms of their semantics and their poetics provide useful insights into the entire system of music production. Papanikolaou does not fall into easy conclusions in terms of the use and abuse of mass culture by the system. Even though he admits that there is a contradiction in terms of these ‘alternative’ artists and the commercial character of the music industry they were involved in, he nevertheless argues that they did not fall prey to a one-dimensional appropriation. Moreover, he masterfully combines a close reading of the artifacts, without disregarding the context. For Papanikolaou, historicising artistic production is as important as a close reading of texts, signifiers and poetics. As he himself mentions, “literary, political, and social parameters played a determining role” (62), and often he strategically introduces factors such as political developments and social trends such as urbanisation and commercialisation in order to provide the general framework.

The French component sets the parameters for the discussion and serves as a compelling alter ego, a point of reference, a powerful influence or just a case to weigh against the Greek one. One of the few weaknesses of the study, however, is that the Greek case emerges as more elaborate, even though the author warns us from the outset that this is not a 50–50 study. Furthermore, there is a discrepancy between the two: Papanikolaou positions Hadjidakis and Theodorakis alongside Brassens and Ferré despite considerable artistic differences such as the fact that the former rarely performed their own music solo, or structural ones such as the fact that there is a time lag in music developments between the two countries. The rearrangement of popular music as a national system that took place in Greece according to Papanikolaou did so ten years after the French ACI, as did all the technological advances in terms of the music industry itself, including new disc formats.

Additionally, Papanikolaou believes that it was no coincidence that Theodorakis came back from France with a clear idea of setting poetry to popular music. This and the emergence of the hybrid genre of *enthehno laiko* are seen as indirect products of the influence of the *chanson* of the ACI. Here, however, it is crucial that the author demonstrates that despite the French impact, there was a Greek avant-garde that produced its own distinct cultural products, even in cases of a direct ‘transfer’ like the *Neo Kyma*. Mimicry in this sense is not seen as aping or as the ‘à la greca’ flat version of what was going on abroad, as is often claimed for anything that is remotely close to international trends. Instead, it is a dynamic process, producing its own local realities rather than sheer surrogates. Even more importantly, cultural transfers did not remain a story of French hegemony,

as both Hadjidakis and Theodorakis, and to a lesser extent Savvopoulos with his hit song *Dirlada*, produced cultural products that became influential in France of the long 1960s, breaking the strict centre–periphery hierarchy.

More problematic, however, is the fact that even though the book reveals similarities between the music production of those ‘singing poets’ with their French counterparts, it unwillingly exposes the enormous distance that exists between the two countries in terms of critical theory. Half of the impressive theoretical arsenal that Papanikolaou employs in order to analyse his cases is French, mostly produced at the same time in which the narrative takes place, by Ronald Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva. This fact renders the distance between the two countries, the theoretical richness of the one and the paucity of the other, strikingly evident and to some extent problematic. This extends to the literary institutions and practices which operated in entirely different ways. In Greece, for example, there was no sophisticated platform equivalent to Pierre Seghers and his series, the famous *Poètes d’aujourd’hui* that promoted specific ‘troubadours’ as poets for intellectual reasons, as the first chapter of the books illustrates.

On a different level, what is at times missing from this study, apparently lying outside the direct scope of the author, is reception. How did the French and the Greeks react to these musical stimuli, who consumed these songs, and what was their social background? Even though we get occasional glimpses into the public acceptance of these artists and the emerging sub- and countercultures, this is often treated as a matter of secondary importance. Finally, it is noteworthy that an important figure who would also fall neatly un-

der the category of the appropriation of tradition and the introduction of semantic confusion, Yannis Markopoulos, is absent and only mentioned in a footnote. It is clear, nevertheless, that Papanikolaou consciously chose to focus on specific exponents of 'singing poetry' and not to exhaust the entire music scene, a fact that would compromise the depth of his study.

In conclusion, Papanikolaou has achieved one of the most complex and well-researched applications of cultural studies on a Greek subject matter with a comparative twist, demonstrating that literary analysis and popular culture theory can work hand in hand. The crasis between poetry and music, fusions between the cultural and the political, new taxonomies and reconfigurations, and the relation between high and low, popular and folk, are major issues that emerge. All this renders this book not only an excellent contribution to the cultural understanding of the postwar era in the two countries, but a point of reference for future studies on any related field.

NOTES

- 1 Roderick Beaton, "Intellectualizing the Popular", *Times Literary Supplement* (24 July 1981).
- 2 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*, New Haven: Yale UP, 1992.
- 3 Karen Van Dyck, *Kassandra and the Censors: Greek Poetry since 1967*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1998.
- 4 Elizabeth Guffey, *Retro: The Cultural of Revival*, London: Reaktion Books, 2006, p. 28.
- 5 Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, *Music and Social Movements. Mobilizing Traditions in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998, p. 124.

Sofia Vidali

*Έλεγχος του εγκλήματος
και δημόσια αστυνομία.
Τομές και συνέχειες στην
αντεγκληματοική πολιτική*
[*Crime Control and State
Police. Ruptures and
Continuities
in Crime Policy*]

Athens/Komotini:
A. N. Sakkoulas, 2007.
2 vols, 1054 pp.

by Effi Lambropoulou

Panteion University

This magnum opus of Sofia Vidali, composed of two volumes, numbering 1054 pages in total, refers to general issues of security in the Western world and its measures against crime from the Middle Ages to the constitution of nation-states. This is preceded by a comparison of criminality and policies for its control in Europe and the USA, types of policing as well as the influence of scientific philosophy of positivism on establishing a certain view of criminality and its control. Modern criminal groups and the relevant crime policies which have been developed to deal with them are examined too.

The biggest part of the book (seven of ten chapters) is devoted to Greece. The development of the political system in respect to security and control issues is examined from the establishment of the Greek state (1829) to the outbreak of World War II. In addition, the outlaws and the underworld of the time are described, together with the organisation of the crime-control mechanisms and policing methods; all these in relation to the power structure of the political system and the economic situation of the population ('social' and 'crime' subject matter). One of the most interesting parts of the book is where the author analyses the urban development of the country's capital city with reference to the social stratification of the inhabitants from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries (338 ff.), focusing on the underworld and socially marginalised.

The book covers the tumultuous period from 1940 to 1974, namely from the outbreak of World War II, the Nazi occupation, the civil war and the era up to the fall of the Colonels' junta. This is followed by an examination of policing following the restoration of democracy to the present, the development of criminality per crime type and crime policy measures, as well as the formal reaction to modern types of criminal activities. Its scope includes the reforms in the Greek police, new policing practices and forms of police cooperation between the police forces of the EU member states (terrorism, organised crime, Schengen agreement). Vidali also examines the sensible issues of educating and establishing a democratic ethos in the police force, the inspection and audit institutions of the police (service/internal affairs division) and the use of police violence.

As the author herself notices (xxxi), the present work is her second systematic at-

tempt at analysing "the crime problem and its control on the basis of the *different development* and, in specific, the *anomalous development* of the country's political system" (reviewer's emphasis), in relation to the political and economic system under which Western societies have developed.

Therefore, the study begins by looking at the differences and not at the similarities with other countries in Western Europe, having as its premise the peculiarities under which the modern Greek state was formed after the war of liberation from the Ottoman Empire, as well as its forms of social control. The starting point of analysis constitutes a significant element in the semantic construction of reality necessary to describe a situation, because it gives meaning to the issues under examination. We understand one thing when we are looking for similarities and another when we are looking for differences, and especially when we regard the differences as given and prevalent. The various policing methods have different meanings if we consider them as a product of change in power relations, and different in the context of the amount of economic surplus, the extent of private property and the complexity of social structure. Consequently, the different diagnoses ensure different evaluation and assessment methods.

Vidali's voluminous work is the product of hard and systematic work. It is worthy not only because it contains a huge amount of material but for its manifold analysis too. Furthermore, it is an ambitious effort, covering various subjects, such as police, policing, crime trends and crime control, as well as institutionalised, non-institutionalised and state violence in Greece and in other Western countries over the centuries. Because of this and also because a monograph is different from a manual, the focal point of the re-

search must be always clear, as should the main filter of the information and its arguments, since these delineate the theoretical framework to be followed.

The study is characterised by inspired chapter and paragraph titles which, together with the studious language it adopts, makes the volume particularly attractive for readers. It would have been useful, nonetheless, for such an extended study to have at least an index of terms, if not of names.

Moreover, some subject issues which belong to the research topic cannot be treated as given if they are neither empirically examined nor bibliographically documented or if they are analysed primarily in references (for example, Greek criminal law and 'middle class values and attitudes' (640); police subculture and its impact (647); clientism as the product of 'informal mechanism of income and power re-allocation', corruption, white-collar crime, 'operations of the economic and political system' and 'organised criminal enterprises in the power mechanism' (780–1)).

Finally, the work refers briefly to the 2004 Olympics, although it would be a good case for analysis: specifically, the friendly and supportive presence of the Greek police during, as well as its non-bureaucratic response to the demands of, the games.

The theoretical preference of the author for her interpretation is explicit; she gives particular importance to the left-realist approach of the British version of critical or radical criminology, which is mainly the product of the Anglo-Saxon realist tradition and Marxist influences. As regards the labelling approach, from which some keywords and ideas are used in the book, it is known that the discourse on social construction and charac-

terisation of an act, namely the ascription of a certain meaning to activities, persons and situations, was employed by radical criminology more or less as a cause of deviance, which is an approach the author also seems to follow. However, the phenomenological background (151, 155) of the labelling approach does not correspond to the ontology of neo-Marxist and radical views.

In the study, stress is often placed on clientelist relations, political clientelism and party mechanisms in Greece. Although the author refers to historical events, she does not however connect them to the political organisation and functions of the state mechanism during its development, which lacked a rational and general redistribution mechanism of social wealth, welfare benefits and social protection (779–81).

Such viewpoints often serve to contrast the countries of the south with those of the north, though clientelist relationships exist to some degree and in various forms in all modern societies: for example, comparing practices which are institutionalised in developed countries (high-level appointments are reviewed or approved by the legislature, and they are seen as a tool for rewarding and enforcing loyalty) with the 'clientistic' practices that are followed in the others.

The same applies for the organisation of political parties. The period since the last dictatorship (1974–) has been significant for Greece because for the first time since the institution of the parliamentary system, at the end of the nineteenth century, the political and social role of political parties increased, during which executive parties became the agents of representation of social interests and the implementation of state policies. Major changes took place during this period in the 'clientelist'–ideological character of the old pre-

dictatorship parties. The Greek party system was stabilised and the parties evolved into mass social organisations of political life of the country. This was characterised by an increase in party membership; the introduction of collective procedures; the establishment of local, prefectural and central party executives; and the establishment of party-political trade unions in the public sector, etc.). The most representative case was the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok). An example of the efforts for political modernisation was the establishment of the Group for the Modernisation of our Society (Opek) in 1991. Among its founding members was a subsequent prime minister Kostas Simitis. The author promotes a different view, however; she is categorical that political clientelism has remained in place and unchanged, apart from the fact that its beneficiaries have changed: people once excluded now benefit from it and support the relevant governments (778–81).

To strengthen her argument, the author refers (in general) to scandals during the last two decades, but in specific to the Bank of Crete and Koskotas cases (1989) that brought down the Pasok government in 1989 (838–43), and the ‘reshaping of clientelistic relations’ which blurred “the lines between political favouritism, merging of interests and organised crime” (777–80). No doubt these are extremely sensitive issues not only for Greece, developing countries or totalitarian regimes, but also for modern Western democracies. We may recall, among others, the case of Willy Claes, Belgian foreign minister and Nato general secretary; the Santer case in the European Commission (‘Santergate’); the Andreotti and Enel cases in Italy; the Elf case in France; the Kohl (Kanter and Pfahls), Volkswagen, Infineon and Siemens cases in Germany, etc. Taking into account some of these cases along with the Greek ones to

which the author refers would eventually broaden her perspective. As regards the connection of political clientelism with organised crime, the author does not offer any supporting evidence, despite its seriousness.

Finally, throughout her analysis, Vidali considers the degree of social acceptance of the Greek police to be extremely low. This is true up to the late 1970s for the reasons which the author described, but since the 1980s the situation has changed. According to European (European Social Survey Round 1 and 2) and Greek research (*Ta Nea*, 10 October 2002), the Greek police, along with the Church and the European Union, seems to enjoy high acceptance among Greek citizens, in spite of the fact that other research has shown that the force enjoys one of the lowest efficiency ratings in the EU.⁵ We must take into account though that the quality of the measurement instruments, the time period and the design of the research are significant factors in determining the reliability of these results.

Concerning the involvement of other interests (such as politics and the prosecution service) in police work, there are plenty of such cases in the developed countries all over the world. Indeed, committees of inquiry have been constituted to investigate them. Given all of the above and without bypassing the significance of the situation, the relentless criticism by the other of the Greek police along with the political and party system has not helped them very much. For Greece the attainment of greater transparency, efficiency and the strengthening of social institutions are much more crucial.

As Vidali’s study diligently shows, the Greek police have experienced both local and governmental involvement. This disrupted the force’s ethos, while governments used the

police for their own plans. For its part, the police took as much advantage as it could. For decades it has been operating as the 'long arm' of a party-political and not of a citizen state, pushing the force into the margins of social interaction.

The police develop their relation with the public through their level of involvement in social life. For a long time, the Greek police have worked to expand their power instead of promoting their influence with citizens, local authorities, etc., which could help them to confront the increasingly complex circumstances of the modern world (747ff). In recent years, the force tried to set up new patterns of cooperation with the public, but again political interference hampered this (i.e., after the 2004 Olympics).

The police have some characteristics that do not correspond to the friendly image they want to present and the book clearly highlights these. They have a monopoly over the use of violence and the threat to employ it. Public order policing, to which the author mainly refers, and police have come to symbolise the power of the state and governmental interests, not only in weak democracies like Greece for over 150 years, but even in stable liberal democracies. What's more, public order policing is "the example *par excellence*", it is "*not* the maintenance of order, but the maintenance of a *particular order*", that of the state.

In any case, the police have a responsibility to provide diverse assistance 24 hours a day, which implies an extended field of reaction. The size of the reaction and the different levels of performance produce a 'drift' in the organisation. The expectations and demands of the public are, in some cases, contradictory. On the one hand, they ask for order and strict

enforcement of the law and, on the other, for support, understanding, mediation, problem-solving, as well as leniency and respect for human rights regarding offenders. The development of characteristics such as absenteeism, cynicism ('blue curtain culture', cop-culture) and attempts to present over-effectiveness with various methods are some forms used by the police to adjust to the 'drift' (830–38, 919–25). The same applies for the demands of governments. Political intervention can strengthen those feelings and promote such characteristics. Nevertheless, in practice, the police enjoy a high degree of freedom and they develop their own attitudes to adapt to the environment. Since they have to satisfy numerous demands and expectations effectively, they pick and choose according to the situation, thus shaping their accountability. But the social reality, which at first seems quite controllable, is much more complex. Therefore, they often become ensnared by the system that they have constructed in order to be regarded as successful. This is evident in public order policing where they may 'win the battle' but lose the war if their actions are widely perceived as excessive.

The author connects, furthermore, (police) violence to politics and power relations. Nonetheless, we should not conceive violence as an expression of power. Violence is used either when power is missing or in danger.

Power cannot be obtained and maintained through exclusion, surveillance, repression and control, but through participation and, specifically, participation in communication. Only simple systems use violence and coercion. Power loses its prestige and effectiveness through the use of extreme force.

Vidali's work focuses more on the socio-political context of policing than the development

of the police force and as such should be highly regarded. It is an engaging, innovative and informative book for scholars and practitioners. It belongs to an increasingly popular area of study in Greece; it is pioneering in its faithful support of critical criminology and can be used as a basis for further theoretical development and empirical research.

Christos Fragkonikolopoulos

***Ο παγκόσμιος ρόλος των μη
κυβερνητικών οργανώσεων:
δυναμική και αδυναμίες στην
παγκόσμια διακυβέρνηση
[The Global Role of
Non-Governmental
Organisations: Potential
and Weaknesses in Global
Governance]***

Athens: I. Sidiris, 2007. 404 pp.

by Marilena Simiti

University of Piraeus

International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and their impact on global governance have been extensively studied in foreign literature. The relevant bibliography poses a series of questions concerning the changes that have been induced in a political order predicated on state sovereignty by the INGO phenomenon. Have INGOs and new global spaces generated a 'global civil society', changing thereby the behaviour of state actors or do the notions of 'global civil society' and 'global governance' overestimate their actual power? The book is the only book in the Greek literature that tackles these questions, introducing thereby the former debate to the Greek context. The book examines the

contemporary role of INGOs, focusing on the political challenges of globalisation and the rise of new structures of global governance. The book's emphasis on grounding empirically the activities of INGOs by presenting a broad range of case studies contributes to the successful clarification of issues, which in the relevant literature often remain obscure, and familiarises the reader with the complexity and heterogeneity that prevails in the INGO community.

The book begins with a presentation of the historical emergence and evolution of INGOs, focusing especially on the 1990s, when the multiplication and empowerment of INGOs during this decade exceeded any previous historical period. Next the author discusses the multiple definitions of INGOs in order to pin down their unique characteristics. Having described and defined INGOs, the author proceeds to the main argument of the book, namely that INGOs can only be understood and analysed in the new environment generated by globalisation (global governance, global spaces and, finally, global consciousness and identity). Hence, an analysis that still focuses on states as the dominant actors in international politics fails to recognise that today international decision-making entails a multiplicity of actors (states, transnational organisations, INGOs) engaged in a variety of global networks. According to Christos Fragkonikolopoulos, only a transnational analysis can grasp the gradual shift that has taken place from governments and states to multilateral global governance and the end of territorialism.

Concerning the reasons that have led to the growth of INGOs, the author states that instead of debating whether INGOs are the outcome of a bottom-up process (enhanced political activity by citizens) or inversely a top-

down process (new political opportunities generated by the structural and institutional changes concerning nation-states and transnational organisations), it would be wiser to synthesise these approaches and interpret INGOs as the outcome of interrelated processes.

The second chapter of the book dwells more upon the theoretical debate on global public policy networks and the existing relations of INGOs with international institutions. Initially the traditional state-centred perspective is elaborated. According to this perspective, the role of INGOs is highly exaggerated in the literature on global governance since the influence of INGOs is unevenly distributed in the different policy domains (for example, INGOs play a significant role in regard to the environment, human rights and development, but remain marginal in the sphere of 'high politics' such as security). Furthermore, the influence of INGOs remains dependent on the interests and financing of states and transnational organisations. Both actors encourage and finance the activities of INGOs, which further their interests, increase their political legitimacy and supplement their actions. Hence, the higher prominence of INGOs in global politics does not necessarily mean the demise of the power of nation-states. On the contrary, it is a process that is still framed and regulated by nation-states and transnational organisations. Fragkonikolopoulos is highly critical of this argumentation. He underlines that state-centred analyses overlook the complexity of contemporary global politics. The distinction between 'high politics' and 'low politics', he argues, is no longer valid, and states neither possess the necessary flexibility nor the knowledge to react successfully to the new nature of global challenges. Therefore, states are increasingly forced to share the governance of global issues with other non-state actors by exchanging resources. In the case of

INGOs, states exchange their economic and political resources for the expertise, political legitimacy and access to special social groups provided by INGOs. Fragkonikolopoulos emphasises that even though states and transnational organisations do not transfer powers unless they decide to do so, the contemporary rise of global public policy networks has led to the establishment of new institutional rules that set limits to the global role of states and increase the transparency and democratisation of the structures of international decision-making. Hence, the author takes a clear stand in favour of a de-centred perspective of contemporary global politics, which focuses on interdependency instead of sovereignty.

The third chapter illustrates, via a variety of case studies, the gradual construction of a global public sphere. The chapter focuses on the rise of global modes of: solidarity (for example, campaigns by Friends of the Earth, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Oxfam International, Africa Alive, Shack/Slum Dwellers International); mobilisation and organisation (for example, activities by Association for Progressive Communication, CorpWatch, Global Resistance), and finally the formation of alternative spaces of global politics (for example, parallel summits, the World Social Forum, the anti-globalisation movement). The case studies in this chapter highlight that a clear-cut division between INGOs and social movements is not always valid since on the global scale mobilisation and organisation is facilitated via complex social networks that often include INGOs as well as social movements.

The fourth chapter summarises the main strategies of INGOs. According to Fragkonikolopoulos, INGOs detect new global issues, diffuse global values and norms, repre-

sent the weak and voiceless, put pressure on transnational organisations and participate in global policy-making. This chapter presents multiple successful campaigns of INGOs, which illustrate clearly and persuasively that even though the success of INGOs may depend on a multiplicity of factors (political alliances, political opportunities, existing networks, resources, policy domain, etc.), their potential to bring about social change is not negligible. By providing historical facts and data which specify the channels INGOs use to modify public policies as well as the final impact of their campaigns, this chapter relates the previous academic debate to concrete facts and outcomes. Hence, many issues which in the relevant literature often remain vague are successfully clarified. Furthermore, the chapter delineates the complex relation of INGOs with states and transnational organisations since, in some of the cases presented, INGOs act as their challengers, while in others they form alliances with them.

The fifth chapter analyses the weaknesses of INGOs, focusing on their organisational structure, transparency, accountability and finally their co-optation by the international decision-making structures. Fragkonikolopoulos argues that the hierarchical and non-democratic structures of some INGOs together with multiple incidents involving a lack of transparency and accountability have led to the increased criticism of the INGO community. Another significant weakness of the INGO community is the unequal power distribution that privileges northern NGOs over southern NGOs. The author also underlines that the rise of the influence of INGOs has been coupled with a significant increase in donations by states and transnational organisations. This has led in some cases to the formation of new clientelistic relations, where INGOs are increasingly oriented towards sat-

isfying the needs of their donors at the expense of their original mission. Increased donations have also increased the competition among INGOs, which are forced to become more 'professional' in order to succeed in receiving new donations. Thus, many INGOs have introduced professional management and market principles, setting aside their initial political identity. This chapter contributes to the debate on INGO accountability by illustrating that there are two types: upward and downward accountability. The former refers to accountability vis-à-vis donors or governments, leading usually to increased professionalisation, centralisation of management, dominance of short-term priorities and finally depoliticisation. The latter refers to accountability vis-à-vis the organisations' members and the people affected. In this last case, the quality of an NGO's work is primarily determined by the quality of the relationship with its intended beneficiaries.

The final chapter analyses the main challenges the INGO community is facing today. According to the author, INGOs must resolve the tension in their relation to social movements, build bridges with existing diaspora networks in order to assist developing countries, face the negative impact of the 'fight against terrorism' on their autonomy, deal with the increasingly blurred distinction between political/military activity and humanitarian/developmental assistance and, finally, react successfully to the neo-conservative accusations of inadequate legitimacy and accountability. Fragkonikolopoulos emphasises, however, that the most crucial challenge INGOs face is the need to clarify the political ambiguity of their identity. He argues that only if INGOs distance themselves from institutional donors, increase their autonomy, transparency and accountability, enhance the participation of NGOs from the developing countries

in the INGO community, improve their mutual cooperation and reorient their action towards promoting global justice and human rights will they successfully meet this challenge. The author, in this chapter, clearly encourages INGOs to act as transformative agents promoting global change. However, the limits imposed by the existing structural environment on the potential of INGOs remain vague. For instance, is it possible for INGOs to construct a global public sphere autonomous from states and markets? To what degree is global political activism mediated by national political structures? Is the diffusion of global governance mechanisms connected to the spread of neoliberalism in the international community?

Fragkonikolopoulos examines INGOs in the broader context of international relation theory. His aim is to question the traditional state-centred perspective, which focuses predominantly on power and interests. The book is very successful in providing persuasive counter-arguments. However, by focusing on the inadequacy of the traditional state-centred perspective, the book sometimes overemphasises the normative dimension of INGOs and understates the impact of contemporary structural changes, especially in the field of the economy. The literature, of course, on globalisation, global governance and INGOs is enormous, and the book not only succeeds in introducing the reader to the contemporary debate but also in grounding this broad bibliography on concrete historical facts and outcomes.

Kostas Foundanopoulos
*Εργασία και εργατικό
 κίνημα στη Θεσσαλονίκη
 1908-1936: ηθική οικονομία
 και συλλογική δράση
 στο μεσοπόλεμο*
 [*Work and the Labour
 Movement of Thessaloniki
 1908-1936: Morals,
 Economy and Collective
 Action in the Interwar
 Period*]

Athens: Nefeli, 2005. 411 pp.

by **Shai Srougo**

University of Haifa

The trade union movement and the socialist movement in their various appearances were one of the major public movements in Thessaloniki from the time of the Young Turk revolution (1908) and the incorporation of the city into the Greek nation-state (1912) onwards. Both frameworks had significant influence on and presence in economic, social and political life, first at the local city level and later even in the nationwide sphere of Greece.

Their dominance has drawn the attention of many researchers, and as a result many

studies about Thessaloniki's labour movement, from the very beginning onwards, have been written in various languages, including important ones by Greek writers.¹ One outstanding study published recently in Greek is that of historian Kostas Foundanopoulos.

The author describes the history of Thessaloniki's labour movement according to the discipline of social history that centres upon the working class: Faithful to the 'total' approach of social history writing, that is a profound and lengthy observation of the event under examination, Foundanopoulos deals with the continuous history of the working class and the labour movement of Thessaloniki throughout the period of the political-democratic regime that prevailed in the city between the summer of 1908 (the Young Turk Revolution) and the summer of 1936 (the Regime of August 4),² after which democracy was suspended for a considerable time. The book contains three parts, with the first two being the more central ones, to which we shall specifically refer.

The first part is about the economic aspects of the period and their influence on the development of the working class. From the beginning of the twentieth century, two different economic methods functioned side by side: a pre-industrial economy that depended on physical labour and an economy based on various levels of mechanised industry. The author first presents the foundations of the new economy by using highly important and fascinating material that is not available to every researcher such as reports with the Greek economics ministry written during the 1920s and 1930s. They include lists of factories in the city and classify their manpower according to gender: the tobacco workers are considered to be one of the most militant working groups in Thessaloniki, due to the high number of workers in this industry.

This assumption, which was true of the initial stages of industrialisation in Thessaloniki (which lasted from the late nineteenth to the end of the second decade of the twentieth centuries), does not apply to the second part of the period under discussion (1920s–1930s). In the tobacco industry the employers had reduced manpower and its composition: men were replaced by women and the total number of workers was reduced. This process led to savings in manpower cost and the moderation of trade union power. A reliable indicator for the weakening of worker power in the tobacco industry is the lesser number of strikes precisely in this period when the tobacco trade was in a state of economic recession, from the mid-1920s onwards.

Foundanopoulos characterises the traditional and non-mechanised economy, using primary source material that previously had not been examined intensively: the constitutions of trade unions. From the contents of these documents the author deduces the forms of work organisation and the social character of the labourers in the pre-industrial economy, such as in the labour market of the city's port. At the beginning of the 1920s the stevedores and the porters still maintained the major traditional principles of the guild systems; the cargo handling was allocated between many groups of porters, each of which was responsible for the loading and unloading of certain merchandise. Each group of workers avoided competition for employment with its fellow associations. Collegial identity was based on family or ethnic relationships, and the work was conducted according to standards of excellence.

A main test of power that history gave to the trade union movement was in the period between the two world wars in general, and in particular after the Asia Minor Catastrophe

(1922) and the settlement of thousands of Greek refugees from Anatolia in Thessaloniki.

In this city, as in other central cities all over Greece, the rapid demographical changes in the urban population were not accompanied by a similar expansion of employment opportunities since the economy was in a state of decline. The gap between the high number of job seekers and the limited job offers led to increasing competition over positions and reduced the wage level. The change for the worse in the wage level was not the sole 'fault' of the refugees, but the outcome of additional processes, as is made clear in the research of Antonis Liakos.³

Liakos was the first to investigate thoroughly the changes that occurred in the composition of the worker population and its characteristics in the labour market in various Greek cities, and one of his conclusions was that veteran manpower had considerable influence in downgrading wage levels.

The fact that the local Greek worker had received no professional training and was usually illiterate severely reduced the level of his wages.⁴

The entry of the Asia Minor refugees into the labour market of greater Greece significantly 'varied' the quality of its manpower, and Liakos described the strategies adopted by veteran workers to protect their work positions and their social benefits.⁵

The course of events presented in Liakos' book and his conclusions retain their validity even with regard to the characteristics of the labour market of Thessaloniki, as demonstrated in Foundanopoulos' book, which was published a dozen years after Liakos'. At the

beginning of the 1920s, the labour market of Thessaloniki was divided according to origins: local workers (Greeks and Jews) in opposition to workers from the migrant population (Asia Minor refugees). The organised workers adopted defensive methods and did not allow new members into their ranks. They refused to share their professional knowledge with those outside the organisation, and distributed all the work among themselves. While the employers tried to recruit cheap and unprofessional workers from among the Anatolian refugees, the organised workers gave emphasis to the importance of knowledge and quality of service. An analysis of the work relations 'from the bottom', i.e., describing the history of the working class, broadens the knowledge about the lesser-known methods of activity (besides strikes) that the organised workers adopted in trying to gain control over the labour process.

In the second part of Foundanopoulos' book, the centre of gravity moves to the sphere of the social class polarisation and the consolidation of workers from different ethnic groups (local Greeks and Jews) as an autonomous and independent social class. The main stage for popular mobilisation, the process of unionisation and class solidarity, occurred during the strike phenomenon. In March 1919, two professional associations in the shoemaking industry went on economic strike: The Union of Shoemaking Workers of Thessaloniki (Σύνδεσμος εργατών υποδηματοραπτών Θεσσαλονίκης), which included both Jews and Greeks, and the International Shoeworker Syndicate of Thessaloniki (Διεθνές συνδικάτον υποδηματεργατών Θεσσαλονίκης), which was composed entirely of Jewish workers. Before the strike, these two trade unions were not confederated and each was subject to the influence of a different socialist centre. It was the work dispute

that generated the momentum for unification between the workers and their organisations as a social class. The space assigned to the description of the professional class of shoemakers, a marginal group in economic life and in the trade union movement, broadens the range of the discussion on labour history and exposes lesser-known relationships between Jews and Greeks inside the labour movement. The deep-rooted stereotypes of complete dichotomy between these groups is re-examined in Foundanopoulos' book, and it appears that in distinctive situations ethnic borders were being crossed and professional cooperation was being created.

Foundanopoulos also presents the system of relations at the organisational-institutional level in the local workers' confederations of Thessaloniki. In 1917, the Worker Centre of Thessaloniki (Εργατικό Κέντρο της Θεσσαλονίκης, EKT) was founded, which was followed, a year later, by the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (Γενική Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Ελλάδος, GSEE). The process of unification in the national sphere would not last very long. The GSEE underwent long periods of serious internal ideological struggles and rifts between the main camps: the trade unions that were under communist influence, on the one hand, and the trade unions of the social democrats or the conservatives, on the other.⁶ This divisive tendency repeated itself again in Thessaloniki, and finds some expression in an article by Georgios Anastasiadis, in which he presents important information about the local leaders and the trade unions that joined the EKT.⁷ At the same time, there is an almost complete disregard for the associations that were not included in it, while Anastasiadis mentions almost casually the rifts that opened up in class unity.⁸ The impression is thus given that the EKT was the main and unrivalled representative organ of

trade unions in Thessaloniki. Foundanopoulos does historical justice by amending this description. He is the first to systematically examine the breakup of the organisational collective in the EKT and the establishment of alternative labour confederations. The dispute over work relations and the political sphere between the communists, on the one hand, and the socialist and conservative circles, on the other, broke up the class unity that had been unstable from the very start and led to the establishment of an alternative and rival organisation, the All-Worker Centre of Thessaloniki (Το Πανεργατικό Κέντρο της Θεσσαλονίκης). The new confederation was established in the summer of 1926 and was part of the anti-communist trend. At the beginning of the 1930s, additional rifts began to open in each of the worker centres in the city, and new associations were formed. The focus on the trade union centres within the skeletal structure of the Greek labour movement mainly exposes the limitations of power and the weaknesses of the working class in the local sphere of Thessaloniki as a result of the internal widespread rifts and divisions.

To sum up, basing himself on unfamiliar and rare primary sources of the period, Foundanopoulos has conducted systematic research, which has enabled the presentation, for the first time, of the fascinating grassroots mosaic of the Thessaloniki labour movement from a wide range of aspects, such as employment, labour relations, social stratification, and ethnic and class identity.

In view of the great interest that the labour movement in Thessaloniki has aroused in the international research community, it is a pity that the book has appeared in the Greek language only, which greatly limits its potential readership.

NOTES

- 1 See the list of publications presented in the bibliography of Foundanopoulos' book.
- 2 For instance, the years of National Schism between Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists caused the Greek state to deteriorate into a political crisis and continuous series of coup d'états, mainly between the autumn of 1922 and the autumn of 1928.
- 3 Antonis Liakos, *Εργασία και πολιτική στην Ελλάδα του μεσοπολέμου: το Διεθνές Γραφείο Εργασίας και η ανάδυση των κοινωνικών θεσμών (Work and politics in Greece during the interwar period: the International Labour Organisation and the emergence of social institutions)*, Athens: Foundation for Research and Education of Emporiki Bank, 1993
- 4 *Ibid.*, pp. 60–61.
- 5 On the monopolistic strategy used in the labour market, see *Ibid.*, pp. 400–403.
- 6 The organisational split inside the trade union movement had causes beyond ideology. For example, some of the trade unions decided in favour of a struggle to improve work relations and against a political struggle against the capitalist economy in view of the repressive measures by the Greek government. See *Ibid.*, pp. 96–118, especially 108–118.
- 7 Georgios Anastasiadis, «Από τη Φεντερασión ως τον Μάη του '36, 1908–1940» ("From the Federation to May '36, 1908–1940"), in Georgios Anastasiadis (ed.), *Το Εργατικό–Συνδικαλιστικό Κίνημα της Θεσσαλονίκης: η Ιστορική Φυσιογνωμία του (The trade union movement of Thessaloniki: its historical character)*, Thessaloniki: Worker Centre of Thessaloniki, 1997.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

Alison Bashford (ed.)

***Medicine at the Border:
Disease, Globalisation and
Security, 1850 to the Present***

**Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
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Alison Bashford's edited collection belongs to a broader scholarly turn that emerged in the late 1990s within the context of cultural history and promoted a remarkable production of research and literature on the history and historiography of world health management and the governmentality of border medical control. Taken together, this body of work seeks to explore how issues of health/immigration security are overwhelmingly about which subjects and collectivities are to be excluded from or included in the body politic, as biopreparedness and biosecurity play a central role in the histories of colonialism, nationalism and internationalism throughout the modern era. Bashford's work occupies a prominent place in this proliferating scholarship.

A medical historian based at the University of Sydney, Bashford has published extensively and brilliantly on the history of public health in the context of imperial hygiene, gender and

embodiment in Victorian medicine, the question of world population and the international politics of eugenics. This collection is a valuable addition to an already rich and important literature. The volume as a whole unravels how colonial, postcolonial, national, international and global contingencies have been historically involved in the politics of public health, and, more specifically, in the politics of infectious disease control. Bringing together papers from a 2004 conference on the topic "Medicine at the Border", and drawing on various suggestive examples of health emergencies such as smallpox, yellow fever, tuberculosis, HIV/Aids and Sars, this wide-ranging book effectively illustrates how different societies have been dealing historically with concerns, anxieties, conundrums and asymmetries related to the threat of epidemic disease. The volume traces the shift from the minimal boundaries of nineteenth-century colonialism to the exclusionary force of twentieth-century national boundaries. As the editor puts it: "Medicine at the national border, indeed, is not really being 'brought back', it is spreading and deepening from places where it never went away" (14).

Medicine at the Border explores the relationship between biosecurity and border control in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries, in the era that Hardt and Negri have called the "age of universal contagion".¹ This is, indeed, the title of the editor's introductory chapter: "The age of universal contagion: History, disease and globalisation". In this resourceful introductory chapter, Bashford maps out the thematic and epistemological connections that bring together leading scholars on the history and politics of world health. In the first chapter, written by Bashford, the linkage between border surveillance and disease control is squarely contextualised within the geopolitical history of a divided world. The author shows convincingly

that disease prevention and geopolitics are not merely related as they used to be, but, most importantly, the former has recently become a vehicle for the production of the latter. Bashford argues that such connections should be rethought and rehistoricised within the framework of current enactments of defensive nationalism, national health and security management, on the one hand, and supranational surveillance technologies and administration of world pandemics, on the other. What is at stake in this pursuit is the place of border disease control in multiple political, cultural, legal and commercial histories of national and international governance through which “world health” is invented as a political/epistemic problem and as an imagined space for regulation.

The collection has a broad interdisciplinary scope – history, anthropology, geography, sociology, law, history of science and medicine – and is divided into three sections. Part I, “World health: Colonial and national histories”, illustrates the connections between colonial and national histories in the systems and structures of disease – especially epidemic – management. The focus is on the emergence of “medical internationalism” and its relationship with genealogies of colonial hygiene and national medical security. In different contexts of quarantine, “sanitary” international conferences and medicalised monitoring of migrants and travellers, the threat of microbial diffusion is deployed to legitimise both formal and informal processes of border regulation.

In the first chapter of this section (“Civilising the state: Borders, weak states and international health in modern Europe”), Patrick Zylberman unravels the central place of cholera outbreaks and the Mecca pilgrimage in the international health forums and agreements on infectious disease, but also in heralding Europe-

an powers’ sanitary interventions in Ottoman-ruled territories. The Ottoman Empire’s failure to contain disease led to its European portrayal as a defective or “weak state”, detrimental to European public health. Through a discourse that cast “civilisation” in sanitary terms, an ambivalent politics of pre-emptive intervention on the grounds of public health defence was justified and implemented. The crucial issue in this examination of the health border between the Ottoman Empire and the rest of Europe in the late nineteenth century is how sovereignty and security come to be refigured in light of epidemiological emergencies. The author expands his examination to two more contexts where states were depicted as weak by the hygienic “standard of civilisation”: the consolidation of health borders in Yugoslavia during the 1920s through the implementation of the quarantine model, and the League of Nations attempts to internationalise the health border between Poland and Russia in 1921–1923. Zylberman uses these examples in order to discuss the rise and fall of the Westphalian system of international public health governance (the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states as established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648).

In her chapter, “Yellow fever crusade: US colonialism, tropical medicine, and the international politics of mosquito control, 1900–1920”, Alexandra Minna Stern draws attention to the medical history of US military colonialism. She specifically examines the racial underpinnings of the military and sanitary US campaigns in Central and South America (1900–1920), through which the United States sought to secure a place in the field of early twentieth-century tropical medicine. In exploring the constitutive role of racial stereotypes about the hygienic inferiority of blacks in militaristic surveillance and philanthropic interventions, the author shows how yellow fever eradication and

other such projects of tropical medicine and colonial medicine involved simultaneously US national security, colonisation and new perceptions of international public health.

In “WHO-led or WHO-managed? Re-assessing the smallpox eradication programme in India, 1960–1980”, Sanjoy Battacharya turns to another, famous historical example of international health management, the eradication of smallpox in India (1960–1980), in order to address the multiple and complex tensions between local, national and international agencies involved in the eradication programme. Through a detailed examination of the role of World Health Organisation (WHO), the Indian health ministries, foreign aid and charitable institutions in the successful outcome of the smallpox eradication programme, the chapter re-assesses and shifts the received over-simplified depiction of the programme as a vertically-organised campaign that was monolithically imposed on India by powerful international agencies.

In the last chapter of this section, “The World Health Organisation and the transition from ‘international’ to ‘global’ health”, Theodore Brown, Marcos Cueto and Elizabeth Fee focus on the politics of the WHO, in order to illustrate the conceptual, discursive and institutional transition from “international” to “global” health. Whereas “international” health in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries referred to an emphasis on the control of epidemics across international borders, “global” health signifies the transnational coordination of health services and policies beyond any distinctions among nation-states. The authors provide a historicisation and critical analysis of the terminology of “global health” – its emergence and its signification – as well as the role the WHO played in the development of a new paradigm of global health politics. Al-

though the WHO did not invent the transition to “global health”, the organisation contributed significantly in the dissemination of the new lexicon in the context of its own project of institutional repositioning and survival.

The second section of the volume, “National security: Migration, territory and border regulation”, addresses the spatial and territorial dimensions of health regulation, especially in relation to human movement and national border control. In an article written by geographer Ian Covey, health historian John Welshman and Alison Bashford herself (“Where is the border?: Screening for tuberculosis in the United Kingdom and Australia, 1950–2000”), a comparative historical study of TB screening in Australia and the UK prompts probing questions regarding the links between otherness, borders, microbes and their management vis-à-vis anxieties about human flow, the differing definitions of non-citizens as undesirable citizens, the changing perceptions of disease, the literal and symbolic location of the border and the different implications of the changing placement of geopolitical borders. The chapter juxtaposes Australia’s long histories of rigid and exclusionary external health border management and migration regulation with the UK’s past practices of dispersed border control and current shift towards an approach to medico-legal border control, which places the emphasis on the national border and politicises border security and border crossings. The authors historicise these (until recently) different models and contextualise them in their specific colonial histories and histories of racialised nation-formation.

In her chapter, “Medical humanitarianism in and beyond France: Breaking down or patrolling borders?”, social anthropologist Miriam Ticktin turns to French exceptionalism regarding historical concerns with republican

principles of universalism. Grounded in such perceptions of the “universal” and the “human”, medical humanitarianism is refigured here in the context of France’s interventionist colonial history. The author focuses on the humanitarian “illness clause” legally instituted in 1998, which permits undocumented immigrants to receive treatment in France, if they declare inability to receive proper treatment in their home countries. Although Ticktin applauds the fact that sickness endows the right to stay in or to travel to France, the problem arises, in her perspective, when this right is afforded to people *only* by virtue of their status as sick and suffering bodies. In discussing the medical humanitarian groups – i.e., Médecins Sans Frontières – that helped institute the illness clause, the author explores the ways in which universal ideals are linked to national and colonial histories, and more specifically, to the French colonial “civilising mission”.

In “Screening out diseased bodies: Immigration, mandatory HIV testing and the making of a healthy Canada”, Renisa Mawani examines territorial policing in the context of the recently enacted provision for the mandatory HIV/Aids screening for prospective immigrants to Canada. Racialised accounts of undesirable immigrants from the “Third World” threatening to drain the Canadian economy through their excessive demands on the health care system work to justify the policing of the national border against lurking, unhealthy and risky bodies. The author demonstrates how perceptions of race, although obscured in deliberations about the health screening policies for HIV/Aids, have implicitly organised and underpinned such raceless, liberal rhetoric of medical inadmissibility.

In their article, “Passports and pestilence: Migration, security and contemporary bor-

der control of infectious diseases”, epidemiologist Richard Coker and geographer Alan Ingram discuss the links between disease, security, sovereignty, and migration regulation in the EU and UK. Addressing the necessity of studying the politics of management of chronic infectious diseases – HIV/Aids, TB and malaria – the authors explore the ambivalent role that medical humanitarianism plays in both foreign policy and domestic health policy. The chapter illustrates the paradox at the heart of such policies of protecting domestic populations – as emblematised in the image of the nation at risk from threatening outsiders: an overemphasis on border control ultimately undermines protection from infectious chronic disease.

Chapters in the book’s final section, “Globalisation: Deterritorialised health?”, place these histories of interwoven disease management and border regulation in the present, by dealing with new formations of biosecurity and supranational, network-oriented technologies of global epidemic surveillance. Taken together, these chapters study disease management as a crucial and constitutive part of the historical processes of globalisation. The section is opened with Claire Hooker’s chapter “Drawing the lines: Danger and risk in the age of Sars”. The author illustrates how in the context of the outbreak of Sars in 2003, public health authorities deployed both older public health strategies based on the logic of “dangerousness” (i.e., quarantine, sanitation, isolation of the “dangerous”) and newer models based on the management of risk and “at risk” groups. Hooker argues that the experience of the Sars epidemic in Toronto spawned a “new normal”, referring particularly to instrumentalities of biosecurity and biopreparedness.

David Fidler, in “Biosecurity: Friend or foe for public health governance?”, argues that pub-

lic health and “homeland” security are increasingly intertwined in the geo-epidemiological context of the Sars outbreak, which signifies the rise of “biosecurity” and thus occupies an emblematic position in the history of public health as an endeavour of governance nationally and globally. Perceptions of fear and security in the Sars context are explored also in Carolyn Strange’s chapter “Postcard from plaguetown: Sars and the exoticisation of Toronto”. The author studies the impact of Sars as an “exotic” disease on Toronto, and, more specifically, on its well-established reputation as a vibrant modern, multicultural city of the West. She details the city’s attempts to rebuild and refigure its celebrated representation as a clean and safe city, but, most significantly, she illustrates the role of exoticism – i.e., images of Toronto as an exotic plaguetown – in this process of discursive refiguration. This re-imaging and re-imagining of the city, the author argues, makes sense only in the context of reinstated racial perceptions that conflate disease with an Asian source. As in Hooker’s cultural account of biopreparedness in the context of the construction of Sars as an epidemic of fear, Strange also highlights the persistence of the national and the local in the perceptions of security and risk emerging in an ambivalently globalising world.

In the book’s final chapter, “The geopolitics of global public health surveillance in the twenty-first century”, Lorna Weir and Eric Mykhailovskiy explore the changing geopolitical borders of infectious disease surveillance and offer an account of the emergence of the Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN): an early-warning alert system for global public health events and disease outbreaks, which detects, collects, classifies, translates and distributes online news information rather than official country epidemiological notifications and reports. GPHIN is a real-time global in-

formation and knowledge technology beyond national control, which enables the WHO and other health organisations to have timely and up-to-date notification of local outbreaks. In positioning the case study of GPHIN in the history of global public health surveillance and governance in the second half of the twentieth century, the authors show how, in the context of this deterritorialised global public health surveillance technique, the nation, national territorial security and national health systems are endowed with new roles of authority and authorisation vis-à-vis the political management of international health emergencies.

Overall, *Medicine at the Border* is an insightful, well-researched and -documented book, an excellent contribution to the scholarship – historical but also anthropological, legal and geopolitical – of the polyvalent connections between security, borders, citizenship and public health management. The collection valuably extends and enriches the literature that explores the ways in which the health of populations has historically emerged and developed as a crucial technology of governmentality and as a device of managing national borders, global boundaries and racial demarcations. Most importantly, the book draws attention to the various historically specific ways in which the geopolitics of disease management goes about regulating the bodies, movements, crossings and lives of people, most crucially of people considered to be *out of place*, in multiple contexts of shifting and intertwining colonial, national, post-colonial and transnational politics of hygiene.

NOTE

- 1 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001, p. 136.