Religious Zeal and Political Expediency on the Eve of the French Wars of Religion

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I. Fighting Religious Wars in Sixteenth-century Europe

Early Modern Europe presents historians with a multitude of wars, officially declared and waged as “religious” (or “crusades”, or even in the case of late sixteenth-century France, as “holy wars”). Historians’ attention has particularly been drawn to scriptural justifications for war and some pioneering studies have shed light on the divergent and conflicting “appropriations of the Scriptures” as a rhetoric of legitimisation of warfare.¹

The German historian Konrad Repgen has suggested that the term “religious war” (Religionskrieg) can be approached as a typological concept, used primarily as a legitimisation (but not as a motivation) type for a number of early modern wars, particularly those of the sixteenth century. According to Repgen, a war should only be termed “religious” in so far as “at least one of the belligerents lays claim to “religion”, a religious law, in order to justify his warfare and to substantiate publicly why his use of military force against a political authority should be a bellum justum”.² It follows that war legitimations of this type were “roughly equal in number to the belligerents”:³ Repgen concludes his typological analysis by arguing that in the sixteenth century “the time for crusades against Christians was past” as “war was no longer waged and justified as a crusade but as a Religionskrieg, the military solution to conflicts arising from the protection of confessional possessions or from confessional conquest”.⁴

Following on the steps of Philip Benedict and Denis Crouzet,⁵ among others, this paper...
seeks to question Repgen’s conclusions on two grounds, with reference to the Protestant stand on the eve of the French Wars of Religion: Firstly, “religious war” did not only serve as a legitimation type for warfare, but it actually emerged as motivation in both rival camps, a product of the mutually shared belief that ‘God’s Truth’ was irreconcilable with any other reading of the Gospels and that those ‘chosen by God’ carried a divine mandate to fight a total war against the ‘forces of darkness’. Secondly, the crusading spirit was more than manifest in the French wars of religion and, although construed differently, it motivated decisions and particular types of action in both camps.

II. God’s Truth and the Unity of the Church during the Reformation

The fight for the restoration of the purity of the Gospel ultimately led Luther to a legitimisation of religious war, despite his rejection of the Catholic theological foundations of the crusade idea. Lutheran argumentation in support of religious war was founded on the reformer’s eschatological perception of the struggle against the papacy, as well as on a patriotic zeal, equally expressed by Zwingli.\(^5\)

In Book IV, chapter 2, of Calvin’s Institution de la religion chrétienne, the unity of human society was presented as deriving from the unity of the Church. The latter was conceived as resting exclusively on the unadulterated word of God, on the purity of the Christian faith, which could not be compromised through theological or other concessions. In Calvin’s mind, the attempts at mediation between evangelicals and Catholics, such as those of Sebastian Castellion and François Bauduin, could only result in the corruption of the purity of the faith.\(^6\)

In his refutation of Georg Cassander’s argument that the Catholic and the Evangelical Churches were constitutive parts of the true Church of Christ (with the Anabaptists relegated to the rank of heretics), Calvin stressed that as the papist Church did not share with evangelical Christians the “true essence” of the faith in Christ, it did not constitute part of the true Church. In their deviation from the teachings of the founder of Christian religion, the papists had formed their own tyrannical and demonic Church which ought to be demolished by God’s faithful.\(^7\)

It has been argued that Calvin’s theology could be viewed as a systematic confession of Christian faith, a theological witness and not a philosophical argument.\(^8\) It was Calvin’s declared intention that his theology would present the world with the God’s truth and his entire polemic production was devoted to the defence it against dangerous fallacies. Calvinist theology and polemic production should be viewed as inseparable parts of the same campaign in the service of the purity of the Gospel; moreover, the defence of God’s truth entailed an all-out war against the forces of darkness.\(^9\)

III. Evangelical Zeal and Political Expediency on the Eve of the French Wars of Religion

Proclaimed on 19 April 1561, the royal edict of Fontainebleau expressed the French crown’s newly adopted policy of “civil tolerance” (tolérance civile) of religious polyphony. Aimed at check-
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ing the spiralling religious confrontation, the edict ordered both sides to abstain from all acts of provocation, forbidding the use of insults such as “papist” or “Huguenot”. French Protestants tried to take advantage of the change in climate by refraining from acts of provocation such as public worship gatherings. However, the quest for legitimacy in the consolidation of local Protestant communities was undermined by the apostolic zeal of the movement, pressing for the total eradication of Catholicism in its zones of control.

The printed Calvinist production of 1561 reflected this contradiction in priorities, sometimes demanding from Catherine de Medici and Charles IX considerably more than a simple recognition of the right of religious freedom. The pamphlets, which printed demands and protests of the Huguenots, called on the royal family to follow the lead of the great reforming monarchs of the past, such as the biblical kings Jechu, Ezechias, Josias and the emperors Constantine and Theodosius, and “to restore the Lord’s temple, burning the idols of Baal”. The Protestants presented themselves as God’s chosen, enduring tyranny and oppression but certain of the final outcome of the battle, “in accordance to Christ’s prophecy.”

In June 1561, the Calvinist churches of France formally petitioned the king to grant them freedom of religious conscience, to liberate all their imprisoned brethren and to “restrain” the judiciary from persecuting the faithful. French Protestants equally asked for the right to hold services in their own churches, which could be provided by the crown or built by themselves, as their “grand multitude” could not be contained any more in private religious gatherings that were the norm in accordance with royal edicts.

The need to bridge the religious divide in France led Catherine de Medici and Michel de l’Hospital to convene a theological colloquy between the Calvinists and prelates of the Catholic Church at Poissy in September 1561. In their initiative, they had the support of the King of Navarre, who had previously been the target of systematic pressure on the part of Calvin in order to openly declare himself in favour of the evangelical cause.

What was truly alarming to Geneva, however, were rumours that the convocation of the colloquy had also been approved by the Guise, and that there was a plan to introduce the Lutheran confession of Augsburg, the Augustana, particularly in its original version, the Invariata of 1530, which, to the Calvinists, amounted to a total submission of the evangelicals to the Catholic version of the true symbolic meaning of the Eucharist. Calvin intervened immediately, warning the King of Navarre that the introduction of a “German” confession in France would jeopardise peace and spread discord. He repeated that warning in letters to Beza and Admiral Coligny, who were participating in the colloquy.

At the colloquy itself, the Protestant delegation submitted the Calvinist Confession of Faith adopted by the reformed churches of France in 1559 and also made clear in several printed declarations that they would only participate in the proceedings on their own terms. These were: firstly, that the king or the royal chancellor preside over the conference; secondly, that the delegates of the Roman Church come as participants and not as judges; thirdly, that all doctrinal
differences should be discussed exclusively with reference to the “word of God”, with the use of the Hebrew text for the Old Testament and of the Greek for the New; and finally, that two secretaries be appointed on each side to keep a transcript of the proceedings which should be subsequently approved and signed by both parties.19

The fate of the colloquy had been sealed before its beginning; both sides had come to proselytise and not to converge.20 On the Protestant side, Calvin sought to minimise the chances of a theological compromise with the Catholics by deliberately limiting the mutually accepted ecclesiastical tradition (that would serve as common ground to a possible rapprochement) to the first two centuries of the Church and not to the first five, as had originally been suggested by the moyenners. Leading the Protestant delegation, Beza presented himself not as a dissenter to the creed and the religious practices of the Catholic Church, open to discussion and possibly a compromise, but as the spokesperson of a doctrinally articulate, cohesive and militant Protestantism.21 The Calvinist perception of ecclesiastical unity as well as its Catholic counterpart undermined all mediating proposals; despite their differences in rhetoric, they both presupposed the proselytisation of the other and the total silencing of religious dissent. Calvinist intransigence at the colloquy was further fuelled by the certainty of final victory and the total eradication of papist blasphemy from French soil.

IV. A “Just and Necessary War” (1562–1563)

The mobilisation of Huguenot forces, led by Condé’s attack on Orléans on 2 April 1562,22 was followed by a blaze of apologetic tracts that stressed Protestant obedience to the policy of the crown (with special emphasis put on the edict of Saint-Germain) and continued to lambast the rival “Lorrains”. Condé’s Declaration attempted to sidestep the religious question by focusing on the preservation of legality in the kingdom, with respect to the decisions taken by the king with the assistance of his council.23 At the same time, the chants of war encouraged Condé’s soldiers, presenting them as instruments of divine will and soldiers of a holy alliance, engaged in a “just and necessary war”, provoked by Guise aggression.24

The problematic balancing between the crusading zeal of the Protestants and the pursued legitimacy of their armed mobilisation was manifest in a text written by the Parisian minister Antoine de Chandieu and published in Calvinist Lyon in 1563. Chandieu’s martyrlogy was partly an “internal text” of the movement, in the tradition of Jean Crespin, seeking to encourage the faithful during the first war of religion. But it also addressed moderate Catholics in an effort to broaden the basis of what was being promoted as an anti-Guise alliance. In this direction, Chandieu’s martyrlogy went beyond the classic account of the sufferings of the martyrs and made numerous and direct references to the political level, serving as a detailed account of the events that had led to civil strife.25

Chandieu refuted the Catholic charges of treason and sedition against the king through references to particular incidents involving the Parisian Calvinist community. As to the charge of
sedition, Chandieu reminded his readers that the Calvinists had previously fought against the Anabaptists and other radical elements and stressed Huguenot loyalty to the crown, as propagated in the public sermons of ministers. At the same time, he stressed that the Huguenots attributed the highest authority to God; freedom of religious conscience for them thus constituted a God-ordained mission. On the other hand, Chandieu invoked the failed meeting of Poissy, where the Catholic side had admitted to a series of doctrinal errors and he condemned “France’s captivity by the papacy” as the source of disaster for the country. In a particularly “revelational” passage, the Parisian minister recited catastrophes and hardships inflicted on France as a result of divine wrath for the persecution of Protestants: the military disaster of Saint-Quentin and the “mysterious death” of two kings, Henry II and Francis II, were presented as miraculous divine intervention on the side of the Huguenots.

The polemical discourse of the Lyonese printed production of the years 1562–1565 revealed the biblical certainty for the triumph of “the soldiers of the Lord” against the “popish forces”. As “the dark night flees before the sharpness of the day ... the word of the Gospel dispersed like a strong wing the fog”. The militant “Church of the Lord” unfolded the “banner of truth”, beat “the drum of His Gospel”; “Jesus Christ had taken arms for the salvation of the French motherland”.

The “community of the inhabitants of Lyon” demanded the immediate convocation of the assembly of the Three Estates for the proper guidance of the juvenile monarch, the cessation of all persecution and the cleansing of French society through the punishment of the “blasphemous”; lastly, the confiscation of the property of “the priests of the Romans” for the “common weal”. Another Lyonese tract of 1563, the *La Défense civile et militaire des innocents et de l’Eglise de Christ*, went even further, by offering scriptural foundations to the Protestant right to armed resistance against the “tyrant” king. The inflammatory content of the tract clearly clashed with the promoted loyalty of the Huguenot armed mobilisation, something that led to its condemnation by a joint session of the ministers and the consistory of Lyon and the public burning of all copies in the city on 12 June 1563. By subjugating worldly reality to the pronouncements of a divinely inspired plan, these texts revealed the radical dynamics of a movement on a course of direct confrontation with the Catholic majority and the monarchy.

Olivier Christin has recently pointed to the obvious paradox of the sixteenth century, when theological meetings organised by secular authorities with the aim of overcoming the religious divide not only ended up in total failure but, furthermore, contributed to a further hardening of theological lines and to the crystallisation of solid doctrines, immune to the possibility of a compromise with the other side. In a way reminiscent of public disputations between Christians and Jews in the late middle Ages organised by Christian authorities as theatrical demonstrations of the superiority of Christian religion, meetings between “professionals of the doctrine”, such as at Poissy, actually served as accelerators of war, by demonstrating to the European elites that this was the only viable solution to the religious impasse.
Confessional wars between Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth century were both viewed and legitimised as religious wars; Charles V's Schmalkaldic War against German Protestants was promoted as a religious war but not as a "crusade", despite its sanctioning by Catholic theologians such as Giovanni del Monte. Yet, the crusading spirit re-emerged triumphant in the French religious wars, fought between "God's warriors" on both camps. Protestant iconoclasm, attacks on the sacraments and ritual of the Catholic Church, as well organised acts of violence against Catholics, were all part of a crusade for the purification of French society from the blasphemies and the tyranny of the Roman Church and for the establishment of a new society of the godly, serving God's truth. On the other hand, Catholic ritualised violence reflected the belief that the heretics not only constituted a mortal threat to the political and moral order, but exposed societies who were willing to tolerate their infectious presence to the wrath of God.

The failure of the Colloquy of Poissy did not constitute the major event that led to the wars of religion in France; it did not even discourage Catherine de Medici from persisting with her doomed policy of forced religious co-existence. Yet, the outbreak of hostilities, as well as the impressive duration of warfare, due to the increasingly obvious inability of the belligerents to permanently resolve the religious question in France, attest to the fact that, politics aside, "the conviction that human armies could literally fight God's war was not to be easily uprooted from the European consciousness".

FOOTNOTES
3 Repgen, "What is a ‘Religious War’?", p. 323.
5 Peter Partner, God of Battles. Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1997, pp. 188–190. Norman Housley reminds us of a particularly strong passage, where the voice of the reformer appears quite reminiscent of Catholic rhetoric: "He who fights and contends against the Gospel necessarily fights simultaneously against God, against Jesus Christ, against the Holy Spirit, against the
precious blood of Christ, against his death, against God’s Word, against all articles of faith ... in brief, against all angels and saints, against heaven and earth and all creatures." “Dr. Martin Luther’s Warning to his Dear German People, 1531”, in Luther’s Works, St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958–67, vol. 47, pp. 3–55; and Housley, Religious Warfare in Europe, pp. 89–90.


9 “Since a good part of the world is not only contrary [to the Gospel] but bitterly fights against it, we cannot serve Christ without conflict and without attracting the hate of many. So Christ warns his disciples to prepare themselves for battle: since it is necessary to fight to give witness to the truth”, Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels, cited in Francis Higman, “I came not to send peace, but a sword”, in Neuser et al. (eds), Calvinus Sincerosi Religionis Vindex, pp. 123 and 134–5. See also Philip Benedict, Christ Churches Purely Reformed. A Social History of Calvinism, New Haven: Yale UP, 2002, pp. 85–6.


11 The publicisation of the Calvinist movement did not help the new policy of keeping a “low profile”. Angry Catholic crowds attempted to disrupt two large Protestant public gatherings in well-known buildings in the city. In a scuffle in the quarter of Pré-aux-Clercs at the end of April 1561, seven or eight Catholics died when besieged Protestants opened fire. A similar attack by a Catholic crowd on a building by the city walls near the gate of Saint-Antoine on 5 May was foiled by the appearance of twenty fully armed Calvinist nobles on horseback. The public singing of the Psalms, the large open gatherings and possession of the French edition of the Bible amounted to the three major causes of arrest, as pointed by the minister Antoine de Chandieu in the introduction to his martyrology Histoire des persecutions et martyrs de l’église de Paris, depuis l’an 1557. jusque au temps du Roy Charles Neufuiesme, Lyon, 1563, pp. 48–52. For the incidents in Paris, see also “Lettre de Jean Fernagu, procureur syndic de la ville de Caen”, pp. 510–511.

12 The contradictory priorities set by the Calvinist expansion were openly expressed in the regular correspondence of the églises dressées with Calvin and the Genevan centre. In their reports for the year 1561, the communities of Montauban and Montpelier believed that refraining from provocative acts was
the sole means of relaxing the persecution, while the eglises dressées of Saintes, Mâcon and Poitiers called for their immediate reinforcement with new ministers from Geneva for the intensification of their catechetical work; the community of Millaud reported the total suppression of the Catholic Mass in the town. “La Réforme en France. Lettres de diverses églises à Calvin, 1561–1562”, BSHPF 14 (1865), pp. 320–8. In areas with Catholic majorities, the Calvinists continued their regular secret gatherings in private houses of the community. Henri Hauser, “Un prêche à Dijon en 1561”, BSHPF 55 (1906), pp. 29–30. On the Calvinist campaign for the “purification” of France from the false creed and blasphemous rituals of the Catholic Church, see Philip Benedict, “Un roi, une loi, deux fois”, p. 85.


14 “As you can see from the blood shed by some of our brethren which will serve as the seed to give birth to a hundred, indeed thousands of others; and as St Luke says, the persecutions offer the faithful a stairway to heaven. And there is nothing which assures us most that our religion is the real one, than to see it oppressed …”, Complainte Apologique (author’s translation).


16 Donald Kelley, François Hotman. A Revolutionary’s Ordeal, New Jersey, Princeton UP, 1973, pp. 132–5. Hotman was informed of the royal decision to hold a theological colloquy in August 1561. The Augstana had been promoted by Duke Christoph of Württemberg and other German Lutheran princes as a basis for a political alliance with Antoine de Navarre. Robert Stupperich, “La confession d’Augsburg au Colloque de Poissy”, Actes du Colloque. L’amiral de Coligny et son temps, p. 120.

17 “The Augsburg Confession is, and you know it, the torch of your delirium … it will set the whole of France ablaze”, Calvin to Beza, 10 September 1561, citation taken from Stupperich, “La confession d’Augsburg au Colloque de Poissy”, p. 125 (author’s translation). Fourteen days later, Calvin warned Coligny: “I beg of you, Sir, to make sure that the Augsburg Confession does not come out into the open … it will be the torch which will light the fire of discord”, cited in Turchetti, “Calvin face aux tenants de la concorde”, p. 55 (author’s translation).


Histoire des persecutions, pp. 39, 40–43, 46–47. Chandieu points to the incident in 1557 at the Rue Saint-Jacques as a clear example of the disruptive role of Catholic preaching.

Histoire des persecutions, p. 40.

See the preface of Histoire des persecutions, pp. 40, 65–8. For a detailed account of the tumult of Amboise as a “political endeavour” for the preservation of national integrity, see pp. 431–42.


Histoire des Triomphes de l’Église Lyonnoise Avec la Prinse de Montbrison, Lyon, 1562.


34 It is this essentially destabilizing dynamic of the Calvinist assault from 1562 to 1563 which Philip Benedict examines in “The Dynamics of Protestant Militancy”, pp. 49–50.


38 Housley, Religious Warfare in Europe, p. 205.