


## Historein

Vol 5 (2005)

Empire(s)



### Postcolonialism: From Bandung to the Tricontinental

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doi: [10.12681/historein.70](https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.70)

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#### To cite this article:

Young, R. J. C. (2006). Postcolonialism: From Bandung to the Tricontinental. *Historein*, 5, 11–21. <https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.70>

### ***I. The Bandung Conference***

Discussions of postcolonial history routinely emphasise Bandung as the seminal moment in the political formation of postcoloniality. Organised by Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Pakistan and the Philippines, the April 1955 conference in Indonesia was attended by the leaders of twenty-nine formerly colonised, newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, most notably Ahmed Sukarno, President of Indonesia, Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, Zhou Enlai, Premier of China, and Ho Chi Minh, Prime Minister of North Vietnam. Also in attendance was Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of the Gold Coast (Ghana), which in 1957 was to become the first sub-Saharan colony to gain independence. For the first time they came together not as activists and leaders of anti-colonial movements, but as politicians in power. The countries represented at Bandung included almost all of Asia and independent Africa.<sup>1</sup> China was invited (at Nehru's suggestion), but North and South Korea, South Africa and Israel were not. The conference was also attended by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem, New York, and the novelist Richard Wright, who went as observers and whose presence helped to consolidate identifications between African-Americans and Third World nations.<sup>2</sup>

Bandung is generally associated with the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, a bold assertion of a third force within world affairs outside the respective orbits of the Western and Soviet blocs, in which the

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newly decolonised nations sought to establish an international political, economic and ideological identity, distinct from those of the capitalist West and the communist East. After hundreds of years of colonisation and domination by foreign powers, now that they had freed themselves from Western imperialism, most of the participants at Bandung had no desire to line up behind a new master and sign up with the Soviets. As Nehru put it forcefully:

*Has it come to this, that the leaders of thought who have given religions and all kinds of things to the world have to tag on to this kind of group or that and be hangers-on of this party or the other carrying out their wishes and occasionally giving an idea? It is most degrading and humiliating to any self-respecting people or nation. It is an intolerable thought to me that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom only to degrade themselves or humiliate themselves in this way.<sup>3</sup>*

What the Bandung nations wanted was to live free from the control or intervention of either of the world's superpowers. The idea of belonging to a third group, which aligned itself independently, was an intoxicating one. However desirable it may have been, however, things were not to prove so simple.

To credit Bandung with the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement is true in spirit, though not in fact. The Non-Aligned Movement was not actually formally initiated until 1961 in Belgrade. The Prime Minister of Iraq, Mohammed Fadhil Jamali, one of the signatories to the UN Charter, proposed to the Bandung delegates the idea of the formation of a third bloc composed of the smaller nations in order to give them the protection they needed from the predatory power of the Western and Eastern blocs.<sup>4</sup> Nehru, however, flatly rejected the idea, suggesting that they were better protected by staying separate. At the same time, it had been Nehru himself who had proposed the general strategy of non-alignment:

*So far as I am concerned, it does not matter what war takes place; we will not take part in it unless we have to defend ourselves. If I join any of these big groups I lose my identity ... If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would be the result? The inevitable result would be war. Therefore every step that takes place in reducing that area in the world which may be called the unaligned area is a dangerous step and leads to war.<sup>5</sup>*

As Nehru's remarks indicate, the politics of independence was seen very much in terms of the dynamics of the Cold War and the immanent prospect of a global conflict between East and West.

While seeking to establish some form of Asian and African solidarity and mutual cooperation, therefore, the conference was in fact dominated by the primary concern of maintaining peace and independence during the Cold War. Many speakers noted that what all twenty-nine countries had in common was the experience of colonialism. They were therefore supportive of current anti-colonial struggles in countries still under colonial rule. Expressions of support, however, were relatively muted, and confined to statements about French North Africa (with very little reference to Algeria), Palestine, and problems of particular delegates, such as the Yemen's preoccupation with Aden. Anti-colonialism was overshadowed by a strong sense of the recent or impending dangers for vulnerable new nations, and the perceived threat to peace of Great Power rivalry. With memories of the Korean War of 1950–53 still recent, ongoing wars between communist

and government forces in Laos and Malaya, and dangerous tensions between China and the USA over the latter's support for Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, much of the discussion was taken up with the question of how Asian countries could avoid being caught up in the hot battles of the Cold War. It was already obvious to participants that the Cold War was being largely played out through rivalries staged in the colonial and decolonised arenas.

To counter this situation, many leaders, from Sukarno to Nasser, spoke of their desire to assert an Asian-African voice as a moral force for peace, hoping that, as Anwar Sadat put it two years later, Africa and Asia would become a vast region of tranquillity. In his welcoming address, Sukarno spoke of mobilising "the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace", while Nehru remarked that the

*Honorable Members laid great stress on moral force. It is with military force that we are dealing now, but I submit that moral force counts and the moral force of Asia and Africa must, in spite of the atomic and hydrogen bombs of Russia, the U.S.A. or another country, count ...<sup>6</sup>*

Such an emphasis on the exertion of moral force fitted in very nicely with the general affirmation of the Gandhian method of anti-colonial struggle through non-violence and positive action which many of the delegates espoused. The recent experience of wars in Asia gave renewed urgency to the doctrine of non-violent moral force, though it was to be some time before this encouraged the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement at Belgrade in 1961. The whole emphasis of such a movement was on a non-aligned negative identity, which went along with a politics of neutrality. Differences between an ever-increasing number of member countries (by 2003 there were 112 members) meant that non-alignment was never transformed into a positive, separate political identity. The movement never really countenanced the idea of the formation of a separate third-world identity common to all. Nor, beyond its commitment to peace and co-existence, was there any concerted attempt to develop a common economic or political philosophy distinct from capitalism and socialism, even if the general inclination of most parties in member countries was towards the forms of socialism developed during anti-colonial struggle, in which socialist ideas had been adapted to their own particular contexts. This was never defined, however, as a common position.

The complexity of the political situation in which the Bandung nations found themselves, caught in the midst of Cold War politics, and the extent to which that context determined their own position, is not often acknowledged. After the wars in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet Union and its ally China were widely regarded as a significant threat to other countries in Asia. At the same time, the 1947 Truman Doctrine, proclaiming US military and economic assistance for all countries to maintain their independence, was rapidly giving way to John Foster Dulles' foreign policy of military alliances and aid in order to "roll back" communism. The leaders at Bandung recognised the way that the wind was blowing and wanted, wherever possible, to avoid being caught up in these processes and to assert their own independence. Notwithstanding the presence of Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh (who seems to have been somewhat sidelined in the proceedings), the conference stressed the political and ideological independence of the new nations. The tone of the meeting was even predominantly anti-Soviet, and in discussions of contemporary colonialism, several delegates raised the question of Eastern Europe as a new form of colonialism, an issue

that Nehru promptly ruled out of bounds. However, the establishment of a neutral identity was complicated by the fact that several countries present were, for all practical purposes, already affiliated to the Eastern bloc. It is now often forgotten that China was a major participant at Bandung. Although often addressed to the Chinese delegation, all anti-Soviet feeling was amiably ignored by Zhou Enlai, who successfully engaged on something of a charm offensive, and proved himself unexpectedly flexible on matters of principle such as human rights and peaceful co-existence. For the Chinese, the conference was seen as a means of assuaging Asian anxieties about its perceived military threat, and of cementing alliances in the face of the US policy of containing communism in Asia. At the same time, as in the case of Yugoslavia, Bandung offered a means for China to strengthen alternative affiliations to its relationship to the Soviet Union – from which it was to split definitively six years later. Bandung was itself always part of Cold War games and strategies.

Any new Third World identity at Bandung, therefore, was very much mediated by recent and ongoing wars in Asia. This encouraged the delegates to try to step out of the dynamics of the Cold War that was producing such conflicts into a free space of neutrality. In this context, the Soviet Union was regarded as the most threatening power. By the time of the Tricontinental Conference in Havana eleven years later, the situation had changed dramatically. At Havana, the Soviet Union was regarded as the major ally, and the US characterised as the global imperialist power that had to be resisted at all costs. Non-alignment had changed to alignment, and the political philosophy of non-violence had moved to one of violence.

## ***II. From Positive Action to Armed Struggle***

The neutral status that Bandung, and later the Non-Aligned Movement, sought was hard to sustain in practice. In 1955, many countries remained under colonial rule, particularly in Southern Africa. In French North Africa, a one-year-old independence struggle was being waged with increasing fierceness in Algeria. In addition, in Cyprus, the EOKA struggle had also just been initiated. Bandung's emphasis on the political positioning of the independent nations, defining themselves against the West but not identifying with the Eastern bloc, meant that the signatories implicitly hoped that the liberation of the still colonised countries would follow the same course that had already been established in India, Ghana, Zambia and elsewhere, namely through the use of non-violent methods, along with US support and without significant strategic intervention from the Soviet Union. In this scenario, recourse to armed struggle as in Kenya remained the exception rather than the rule.

However, events after Bandung showed that moral force alone proved increasingly difficult to wield effectively. The Bandung signatories may have been able to sustain their non-alignment as independent nations – but this was not an option for others such as Lumumba in the Congo or for those engaged in anti-colonial struggles. The subsequent course of anti-colonial history was to involve a story where the freedom movements encountered intransigent resistance by the colonial powers, as a result of which liberation movements increasingly turned to armed struggle. By the end of the decade, the majority of outstanding colonies in Africa, such as Alge-

ria, Zimbabwe and South Africa, were of the settler variety, where the colonial regime was very much harder to displace, or part of the Portuguese Empire (Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola and Mozambique), whose fascist government depended on its colonies both economically and ideologically. In this situation, where the colonial powers were either directly or indirectly sustained by the Western powers of Britain, France, Portugal, and the USA, and where the major material support for such anti-colonial struggles came from the Eastern bloc of the Soviet Union and Communist China, it became more and more difficult to sustain the connection between independence and non-alignment.

### ***III. The Coalescence of Struggles across the Three Continents***

With the shift to armed struggle, the differences between the anti-colonial movements and other resistance movements became less distinct. Gandhian non-alignment fell away, and almost all anti-colonial organizations became overtly socialist in political identification and communist affiliated in terms of the sources of supplies brought in for their military campaigns. At the same time, the intensification of the US policy of containing communism by installing or supporting compliant dictatorships, particularly in Vietnam and Latin America, meant that the boundaries between anti-colonial and Cold War politics became increasingly blurred. By the same token, those resisting anti-colonial struggles were now able to do so in the name of resisting communism, a move already apparent in the British campaign in Malaya in the nineteen fifties, or in Britain's treatment of Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana in 1953. This strategy was used most effectively by the South African government, who conflated the ANC and local communists (whether Communists or Trotskyites) with the perceived global designs of the Soviet Union. Thereafter apartheid was nicely sustained on an anti-communist ticket, with tacit US and British support. The identification of the anti-colonial struggles with Soviet communism was often as much an ideological strategy of the colonial powers as an accurate indication of political affiliation. One unanticipated result that it achieved was the coalescence of the anti-colonial arena with the hitherto relatively independent movement of resistance to US neo-colonial forces in Asia and Latin America.

Until the late nineteen fifties, it was Asia that had borne the brunt of the US policy of the containment of communism, with Africa secured by the maintenance of repressive colonial regimes such as those of Portugal and South Africa, or the now customary extrajudicial 'decapitation' of leaders perceived as threatening, such as Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. Latin America, most of which gained independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was effectively controlled by the US through its dominance of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and other organisations of Latin American solidarity, which were effectively designed to maintain its hegemony over the region which it had established after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Latin America only experienced anti-colonial struggle in arenas linked to the Caribbean: Belize, the Guianas, and the British and French Antilles. However, the triumph of Fidel Castro's forces over the US-backed Batista regime in Cuba in 1959 dramatically changed this scenario. After the US unwisely cut off its ties with Cuba, imposed its economic blockade, and expelled Cuba from the OAS, effectively pushing the new Cuban government into dependency on the Soviet Union, larger global configurations developed.

The Cuban Revolution had a significant effect in that it brought Latin America for the first time into the same orbit of resistance as Asia and Africa. The Cubans identified themselves fully with other political movements against various US-supported autocratic neo-colonial regimes in Latin America, and Cuba rapidly became the figurehead for resistance across the continent. Elsewhere there was a growing awareness of the forces of neo-colonialism in post-colonial Africa after the murder of Lumumba by the CIA in 1961. (Eisenhower mistakenly saw him as a Congolese Castro).<sup>7</sup> Nkrumah's *Neo-Colonialism*, outlining Ghana's experiences of dependence in independence, dated from 1965.<sup>8</sup> Above all, however, it was the US intervention in Vietnam from 1964 onwards against the army of Ho Chi Minh, who had first declared Vietnamese independence in 1945, which brought Vietnam together with Cuba, and allied their situation with anti-colonial fighters in Palestine, Portuguese Africa, South Africa, all of whose regimes were supported by the US. This produced a general consolidation of resistance to US imperialism across Africa, Asia and Latin America.

#### **IV. Cuba and Vietnam**

The fulcrum of this shift of US policy towards colonised peoples was undoubtedly the increasing American military campaign in Vietnam. It is the history of Cuba, however, that shows the dynamics of how, largely as a response to circumstances, independent countries found it impossible to maintain a non-aligned stance. When the revolutionary forces moved into Havana on 1 January 1959, their leader Fidel Castro was by no means a convinced communist. Initially, the new government formed a broad coalition of anti-Batista forces. After Castro became President, he initiated a programme of nationalisation and land reform that was close in its principles to earlier nationalist programmes such as that of Cardenas in Mexico. It was the outraged American reaction to the new Cuban government's policy of nationalising a number of US companies in Cuba, and to expelling the corrupt US mafiosi who had been in effect in control of much of the country's gambling economy, together with the ideological influence of Che Guevara to whose ideas Castro became increasingly receptive, that led Castro to communism. When the US started to downgrade the Cuban sugar quota, only to abolish it altogether, Cuba, which at that time was a monocultural economy, turned to any nation that was prepared to step in with support: the major offer came from the Soviet Union. It was not long before the Cuban Missile Crisis identified Cuba with the Eastern bloc.

In the face of US aggression, particularly after the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961, Cuba drew strength from that alliance and encouraged its communist identification. However, its form of revolutionary politics was very different from the Stalinized bourgeois politics of the Soviet Union. In the early sixties, as a third-world country oppressed by US imperialism, Cuba began to identify its stance much more with those of the anti-colonial movements round the world, particularly that of Vietnam. Cuba was a country whose revolution had been developed not against the original coloniser, the Spaniards, but a second neo-colonial coloniser, the USA, which, after its victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, had moved in to take surrogate control of the country. While Cuba was given nominal independence, its constitution was obliged to contain the notorious clause which gave the US the right to intervene in its domestic affairs. In addition, Cuba was required to lease the Guantánamo Bay naval base to the US in perpetuity. Increasingly, the island succumbed

to the pressure of US businesses in Cuba, so that US interests largely controlled its domestic regime. In this move from colonial to semi-colonial or neo-colonial status, Cuba's situation was close to that of Vietnam, where the defeat of the French in 1954 had not been followed by independence, but by the enforced division of the country according to which the southern half was controlled by a US puppet government. The Vietnamese struggle against the neo-colonial regime of the US put it in a situation comparable to that of the Cuban struggle against US intervention and then, when that failed, the US blockade. With a common enemy, Cuba and Vietnam found themselves as two brother Davids facing Goliath.

Cuba and Vietnam were thus in a somewhat different position from countries such as Algeria and Kenya that had struggled against a conventional colonial power. Their confrontation with US interests precipitated them into forming immediate alliances with the Soviet Union, together with those movements in Latin America struggling against corrupt and oligarchic regimes sustained by the US.

### ***V. The Rise of US Imperialism***

At the time of Bandung, there were effectively two analogous but separate spheres of subaltern struggle. One was in Africa and Asia, whose inhabitants fought against the old imperial powers of Britain, France, and Portugal, and the early manifestations of the communist containment policy of the US; the other in Latin America, where the Left had been long opposed to the domination of the US and the regimes it supported.

Global perceptions of the US changed with extraordinary speed. In 1945, the Americans had been the liberators, widely perceived as bringing freedom across the world. At Bandung, the Soviet Union had been the villain. Eleven years later, at Havana, it was the US. How did the US lose its advantage so fast? In a few years, it changed from being the champion of democracy, self-determination and decolonisation, to a state so driven by an obsession to contain communism that it would apparently prop up or institute any regime, however corrupt, exploitative and dictatorial, so long as it was opposed to socialism. This represented a complete reconfiguration of the US position since 1945. With its decisive role in the liberation of Europe, the US under Roosevelt had operated a policy, highly awkward for Britain and France, whereby the same principles of liberation for Europe were stated to apply equally to the colonies. At that time, therefore, the US had presented itself as the champion of anti-colonialism. However, with the onset of the Cold War and changes in its own domestic regime, the priority swung to the defence of the West against communism. Since many anti-colonial movements were oriented towards the long-standing anti-colonial and anti-imperial position of communism, whose record had been outstanding in this regard, the US now found itself opposed to many of the liberation movements, and more inclined to prop up conservative regimes at any cost so long as they were anti-communist. For the US the defence of freedom has always been a malleable concept. As the nineteen fifties progressed, it was directed not towards the establishment of national autonomy of people living under colonial regimes, but the defence of the 'free world' against communism, at whatever cost. This brought an assumption that peoples of the Third World had to be defended against communism, even

when they had themselves elected a communist government as in Chile. As a result, defending 'freedom' took on the paternalistic role of the US knowing what such countries really wanted better than the people themselves – a classic colonial attitude.

These convictions led the US to support anti-communist forces in Vietnam, Korea, colonial autocracies such as the apartheid government in South Africa, as well as a range of neo-colonial regimes in Latin America. Thus in Latin America, in Guatemala, the leftist President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán was overthrown with US help in 1954 after he had nationalised the US-owned United Fruit Company; in Brazil, President João Goulart was overthrown by a military coup in January 1964 and his successor initiated a campaign of persecution of 'communists'; in Bolivia, the government of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) was overthrown in November 1964 by the military, with US support. In Asia, in 1955 the US organised the deposition of Bao Dai, South Vietnamese head of state, and his replacement by the dictator Ngo Dinh Diem, who was himself then disposed of in a military coup in 1963, which heralded direct US military intervention. In the Middle East, in 1956 US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles withdrew US promised financial aid to Egypt for the building of the Aswan Dam on account of his distrust of Nasser's policies of Arab socialism. Nasser responded by nationalising the Suez Canal, and turned to the Russians for assistance. Egypt soon found itself being invaded by Israel, followed by Britain and France. When the British and French were forced to withdraw, Nasser immediately achieved huge international prestige amongst Third World countries throughout the world. The identification of Third World independence, anti-colonial struggle, and Soviet Union aid, against the axis of the US, Britain, France and Israel was firmly set thereafter.

The two struggles, which we might term the anticolonial and the anti-imperial, therefore developed under separate, if interrelated, dynamics. However, the American attempt to contain communism in South East Asia, its blockade of Cuba and insistence on controlling the politics of Latin America, together with its support of Israel and South Africa, which actively supported the Salazar regime in neighbouring Angola and Mozambique, meant that after 1955 the remaining anti-colonial struggles merged with resistance to US imperialism. All these different movements were formally brought together at the Havana Tricontinental Conference in 1966.

## ***VI. The Tricontinental***

The articulation of the anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements was consolidated at the first Conference of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, held in Havana from 3 to 16 January 1966. As has been suggested, the work of the Tricontinental has tended to be overshadowed by the earlier Bandung Conference of 1955, which has, no doubt for ideological reasons, acquired greater symbolic capital in the West. The Tricontinental, however, represented a decisive further development. In the first place, it brought together all three continents of the South, uniting them and their interests in a common perspective and position vis-à-vis the overdeveloped world. In the second place, while those engaged in anti-colonial struggles had established alliances across colonial-national boundaries, and developed ideological formations such as pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism to counter the fragmentations of colonial rule, and while

the Comintern of the Third International Congresses of the nineteen twenties had developed an international organisation to promote resistance to colonial rule, there had never been an international organisation dedicated to the resistance of colonialism and imperialism throughout the world based in and organised from the Third World itself. The Tricontinental brought together the anticolonial struggles of Africa and Asia with the radical movements of Latin America, and marked the initiation of a global alliance of the three continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America against imperialism. This conjunction was mediated at that time by the worldwide fight against imperialism represented by the American intervention in Vietnam, where an anti-colonial liberation struggle against the French had itself been superseded by and merged into an anti-imperial war against the US.

While Latin America had, for the most part, fought its anti-colonial battles in the nineteenth century, by the same token it was first to encounter the postcolonial reality of neo-colonialism, of the imperialism by indirect rule that began with the Monroe Doctrine. It was the Tricontinental which brought together not only the three continents of the South, but also the two different time-schemes of the postcolonial world: the newly liberated and the about-to-be-liberated, with the long-time liberated nations which were struggling for the second liberation of establishing true national sovereignty and autonomy. The Tricontinental focused exclusively on current anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles across the world, initiated an overall framework for globalised struggle, and stood for the positive form of globalisation of which Fidel Castro had more recently spoken. This involved a real "proletarian internationalism", a globalisation of solidarity between the human family, working for "a world that is really for all, without hunger or poverty, without oppression or exploitation, without humiliations or contempt, without injustice or inequalities, where everyone might live in full moral and material dignity, in true liberty".<sup>9</sup> In affirming these values, the Tricontinental positioned itself firmly against those forces in the world that sought to impose forms of domination and exploitation on the poorer peoples of the earth.

The particular sentiments of the 1966 Tricontinental, and its commitment to wars of liberation, were developed in the context of the world of Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon and of Ho Chi Minh. Although the mode of violent revolution as the mode of liberation necessary for that era has passed with them, the condition of global imperialism of which Che spoke in his famous 'Message to the Tricontinental' of April 1967 seems today more contemporary than ever. Che wrote: "Everything seems to indicate that peace ... is again in danger of being broken by some irreversible and unacceptable step taken by the United States."<sup>10</sup> In fact, the US in the first years of the twenty-first century seems more and more to be repeating the role which it played in the nineteen sixties. While the widespread hostility to the US in the nineteen sixties seemed in recent years to have become somewhat dated, in the twenty first century, as the US has once again re-asserted its role as global imperial superpower, the politics of the Tricontinental have become more relevant than ever. It is true that the primacy of armed struggle encapsulated in Che's dramatic "Message to the Continental" was, in retrospect, predicated on a global balance of power that no longer exists. This suggests, however, that there may be all the more point in redeveloping the earlier alternative, subaltern forms of resistance against colonialism that have been the focus of much work in the postcolonial field. The Marxist argument that postcolonialism has been mistaken in its emphasis on colonialism when what it is dealing with is simply one part of the wider process of capitalist modernity seems now less relevant when the form of that capitalist modernity has become encapsulated in one imperial power.<sup>11</sup>

In 1967, Che Guevara remarked: "In focusing on the destruction of imperialism, it is necessary to identify its head, which is none other than the United States of North America."<sup>12</sup> Today, in the United States itself, a different argument has been proposed, even on the left. In their recent book, *Empire*, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri claim that: "The United States does not, and indeed no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project. Imperialism is over."<sup>13</sup> The book has become a bestseller in the US. No doubt it has been comforting for people there to believe that their government has only been defending the interests of the whole world, not those of the US alone. Hardt and Negri would never have made that claim, however, if they had lived in Cuba. History may be over for Fukayama, imperialism for Hardt and Negri, but if one stands in Cuba looking towards the prisoners from Afghanistan and other countries at the US Guantánamo naval base, held without reference to international law or the Geneva Conventions governing the treatment of prisoners of war, if one looks towards the skies in Baghdad, if one stands in Kabul or in Palestine, one will see the continuing history of the same imperialism against which Che fought being played out before one's eyes. In fact, today, Guevara's focus on the US as the world superpower insisting on the irreversible dominance of its point of view, on a concept of freedom that seems to mean that the world should be free, just so long as it thinks exactly like the US, seems more prescient than ever. That is why it is now time for us to return, with Che, to the Tricontinental.

## FOOTNOTES

- 1 The Asian countries attending were Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China (People's Republic), India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, North and South Vietnam, and Yemen; the African countries were Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, and the Sudan.
- 2 For his analysis of the conference, see Richard Wright, *The Colour Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference*, London: Dobson, 1956.
- 3 George McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955*, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1956, p. 67.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 24.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 66.
- 6 *Ibid.*, pp. 66–7.
- 7 Stephen R. Weissman, "Opening the Secret Files on Lumumba's Murder", *Washington Post*, 21 July 2002, p. B03, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35560-2002Jul20> (last visited 2 September 2005).

- 8 Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, London: Heinemann, 1965.
- 9 Julio García Luis (ed.), *Cuban Revolution Reader. A Documentary History of 40 Key Moments of the Cuban Revolution*, Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2001, p. 289.
- 10 Quoted in David Deutschmann (ed.), *Che Guevara Reader: Writings on Guerrilla Strategy, Politics and Revolution*, Melbourne: Ocean Press, p. 317.
- 11 Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*, London: Verso, 1992; Arif Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura. Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.
- 12 Quoted in Deutschmann, p. 324.
- 13 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000, pp. xiii–xiv.