Discord or Achievement? Reflections on the Habsburg Empire, 1848–1918

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In late nineteenth-century continental Europe, the Habsburg Empire was the second largest state in size and the third largest in population. It was also a preeminently multiethnic entity composed of eleven main nationalities.1 Thus, it constitutes a privileged field for those who conduct research on empires in relation to nationalism. During the last few decades, but especially since 1980, topics such as the place and role of empire in modern Europe, its longevity and flourishing, its decline and fall, and the multinational synthesis of its population, have attracted the interest of historians and led to intensive debates.2

Drawing on literature, this essay deals with the question whether and to what extent the Habsburg Empire, in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, embodied an obsolete system of authoritarian, suppressive and disintegrating imperial power or ensured an institutional and cultural framework for the relatively peaceful coexistence as well as the economic and political integration of various nationalities, language and confessional groups on their way to nation building. It concentrates on the following issues: a) the contemporary perceptions and post-imperial memories of the empire; b) the extent, the limit and the content of the German/German-Austrian as well as the Magyar predominance of the other nationalities of the empire in political, social and economic terms; c) the factors and mechanisms that ensured the cohesion of the Habsburg Empire. Furthermore, it discusses some of the basic schemes which have been proposed by scholars to interpret the monarchy’s disintegration.
Landmarks

1848, a year of revolution in Europe, was a turning point in the history of the Austrian Empire (Kaisertum Österreich), as the Habsburg Empire or Monarchy was then officially called. The first attempt to build a parliamentary system paved the way for essential political reforms in the eighteen sixties. A series of economic reforms, by which the eighteen fifties were going to be marked, were initiated then. Feudal authorities and feudal rights were abolished and the question of nationalities (Nationalitätenfrage) came to the fore and became crucial. The loss of Lombardy and Venice to Italy in 1859 and 1866 respectively and renewed defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1866 began Austria’s relegation to that of a second class great power which meant it had to abandon its intentions of taking a leading role within a Greater Germany (Grossdeutschland). In 1848, Emperor Franz Josef assumed the throne where he remained for no less than 68 years (until his death in 1916), thus becoming a strong symbol of the empire’s cohesion and legitimacy.

1867 was the second landmark in the history of the Empire during the period under discussion, for two reasons. Firstly, the so-called “Compromise” brought a dual monarchy into life, composed of two governments and two parliaments but with a common head of state, armed forces, foreign policy, currency and customs union. Secondly, within this framework it was first and foremost the Austrian half of the Empire that embarked on a course of democratization, introduced by a liberal constitution. The new federation was officially entitled the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy but better known as Austria-Hungary. The name alone brings the assumed unity of the Empire into question. We should note that even the areas of foreign affairs, defense and public finances were perceived in different ways by Austrian and Magyar officials. The former believed these issues concerned a unitary empire; the latter as issues affecting two constitutional allies. Thus, was the Habsburg Empire one empire or rather two sub-empires within a common diplomatic and military shell?

Contemporary Perceptions and Post-Imperial Memories

In the decades following the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, there were many positive as well as negative myths concerning it, each woven from different threads. These various political and historical approaches (some scholarly, others pseudo-scientific) speak for the lack of a uniform and diachronic narrative on the empire. This deficiency may be attributed to the successive turning points in this particular region, beginning with collapse of 1918, the emergence of new national states in the interwar period, the imposition of national socialism, the division of Europe and the fall of most of Europe’s central and eastern states into the Soviet sphere of influence, and finally, the collapse of these communist regimes between 1989 and 1991. Images and myths of the monarchy have been continually constructed and deconstructed depending on numerous interests and priorities.

During the last months of the First World War, but especially after the war ended, political life and thought was permeated and to a great extent determined by US President Wilson’s policy of self-determination. As a consequence of the defeat of the Central Powers, it was not difficult for the Entente Powers to impose “the liberation of the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary” and
to allow the propagandistic notion of an “Austrian prison of the nations” to dominate the political landscape. In the aftermath of the war, as the foundation myths of the newly-built states in central and central-eastern Europe were being constructed, what scared the leaderships in the new states most was the possible union (Anschluß) of the new Austria with Germany as well as the possible restoration of the empire. It ought to be noted that the empire’s image and reputation in little Austria was no better than in neighboring, former Habsburg, countries.

The traumatic experience of the Third Reich and the disappointment experienced by many in post-Second World War communist-dominated central and eastern Europe led to the construction of a new myth, even before the political changes between 1989 and 1991. The image of the Habsburg Empire as a tough prison was unofficially replaced by an opposite but equally inaccurate image, namely that of a “peaceful family of nations”. The desire for better living standards and for access to the West (which after 1991 meant entering the European Union) resulted in contemporary (mainly Slav) historians regarding the Habsburg Empire as a multinational state which worked towards the peaceful coexistence of its constituent nations.

A hundred and fifty years ago, some eminent Slavs claimed that the empire was an absolute necessity. Resigning as a deputy of the National Assembly in Frankfurt in April 1848, František Palacky, the historian and for many the “father” of the Czech nation, wrote a letter in which he argued for a league of small nations along the Danube which would function as a counterpoise to powerful Russia in the East. In that letter, paraphrasing Voltaire’s famous saying, Palacky wrote: “Honestly, if the Austrian Empire did not exist for so long, we would have to create it quickly in the interest of Europe and in the interest of humanity”. Six months later and in the same spirit, the Croat nationalist and intellectual Banus Jelačić – who at the time was the most distinguished representative along with Palacky of what came to be described as “Austro-Slavism” – is reported to have exclaimed to the Viennese citizens who came out to welcome the generals of the imperial army who entered the Habsburg capital after their victory against Vienna’s revolutionaries that: “Above all, we remain Austrians! If Austria did not exist, we would have to create it now!”

The idea of the necessity of a multinational Danube Monarchy (Donaureich), supported and promoted by eminent non-Germans, became official state ideology during the reign of Emperor Franz Josef. Even after the death of the aged emperor in 1916, when the various national political élites of the empire argued for the creation of independent, or at least autonomous, nation states, the vast majority of subjects remained, formally at least, loyal to the empire and suffered for the latter’s sake for the remainder of the war. In a speech delivered during a ceremony at the University of Prague to mark the emperor’s passing, historian Josef Pekař, one of the most eminent scholars of Czech national history at the time, gave a rather positive account of the Czech nation’s course under the late monarch, claiming that the reign of Franz Josef had coincided with the “greatest development” of the Czech nation and was a period of which “we, a civilized people (Kulturnation), are proud of today”.

While the legendary conflict of nationalities (Nationalitätenstreit) in Austria-Hungary seems at first sight to have been a struggle against the Habsburg state, was it perhaps in part or in total what Karl Renner, the famous Austrian Social Democratic leader, classed as “a struggle of Austrian nationalities around and for the state”?
Nationalities: Rights, Power and Limits

Let us now take a look at the empire’s subjects in order to examine the place and role of nationalities and their political, economic and social power within the empire and in relation to each other. In doing so, it is necessary to ask whether there were dominant collective entities within the empire and, if so, in what sense? At first sight, neither the ethnic composition of the empire’s population nor the distribution of some nationalities throughout the empire guaranteed the predominance of one nationality over the others. As no one nationality made up more than a quarter of the whole population, predominance was not necessarily the consequence of numbers.

In the 1910 imperial census, the empire’s subjects were registered according to the following ethnic categories: German (24 percent), Magyar (20 percent), Czech (12.5 percent), Polish (10 percent), Ruthenian (Ukrainian) (8 percent), Romanian (6.4 percent), Croat (5.3 percent), Slovak (3.8 percent), Serb (3.8 percent), Slovène (2.6 percent), as well as a number of smaller ethnic groups. The census also showed that in Cisleithania, the Austrian half of the empire, Germans made up 35.6 percent of the population, Czechs 23 percent, Poles 17.8 percent, and Ruthenians 12.6 percent, while Slovénens, Serbs, Croats and Italians made up less than 5 percent. In Transleithania, the Hungarian half of the Empire, Magyars amounted to just less than half of the population (48 percent), followed by Romanians (14 percent), Germans (10 percent), Slovaks (9.5 percent), Croats (8.8 percent), Serbs (5.3 percent) and Ruthenians (2.3 percent).

As with all such historical data, these numbers should be treated with some caution. They were products of practical reasoning, manipulated in some cases by the local administrations who conducted the census. Although, or precisely because, people were generally ranked on the basis of the “language they usually used”, some languages, such as Yiddish which was spoken by the vast majority of Jews in the empire, were not taken into account by the census enumerators. In Cisleithania, Jews amounted to no less than 4.5 percent of the population and in 1867 were granted the same civil rights enjoyed by the rest of the emperor’s subjects. However, as their mother tongue Yiddish was not one of the empire’s officially recognized languages, Jews were not classified as an ethnic group but as Germans, Czechs, Poles, etc.

The constitutional changes of 1867, involving the establishment of a dual monarchy and the parliamentary system (mainly in Austria), gave the recognized nationalities of the empire a chance for political representation and educational development, thus paving the way for their gradual political emancipation. On the whole, however, until its dissolution Germans appear to have remained the most powerful group in the Habsburg Empire, with the Magyars in predominance in their half of the monarchy.

German-Austrian (or Deutsch-Österreicher as the empire’s Germans were usually referred to) predominance of other ethnic groups was never total and indeed it became more and more relative during the last decades of the empire’s existence. Nevertheless, German power was deeply rooted in state mechanisms: it was dominant at all levels of political, economic, social, and cultural life and had been so since the earliest days of the monarchy. In the period under discussion, the vast majority of key positions in the diplomatic corps, the army, the central and regional governments in Cisleithania (the “Austrian Lands of the Crown”) were occupied by Germans. Furthermore, owing to an electoral system that favored them, Germans were dis-
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proportionately represented in the imperial (Reichsrat) as well as in the provincial parliaments (Landtage) and in many municipal councils. The political preponderance of German-Austrians owed much to their direct and indirect hold on economic, social and educational life. Since they fulfilled to a much greater extent the specific requirements of wealth and education, Germans were, until the abolition of intermediate electorates which favored the nobility and the upper middle classes and the introduction of universal male suffrage in the Austrian half of the Empire in 1907 at least, strongly privileged at all levels of political representation.\(^1\)

Generally speaking, the empire’s bourgeois (Bürger) subject par excellence was a German-speaking male, classified as a German or German-Austrian by the state at least (but could be Jewish), with an extensive education in German culture. Such were the high-ranking civil servants, the university teachers, officers, merchants, industrialists, scientists, and members of the free professions.\(^2\) That these people dominated the empire is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that they lived throughout it, in German as well as non-German speaking areas, and particularly in urban centers, such as Trieste and Ljubljana (Laibach), Prague, Brno (Brünn), Kraków (Krakau), Budapest, L’viv (Lemberg) and Chernivtsi (Czernowitz).

This German supremacy did not mean that the other ethnic groups enjoyed an equal but subordinate position. Depending on whether and to what extent political autonomy and authority had been granted or denied to them, some ethnic groups were or became more privileged than others.\(^3\) In Galicia for example, the Poles, and above all the nobility, were granted political autonomy in 1868 and thus constituted a particularly privileged group in comparison to the Galician Ruthenians as well as to Poles living under Prussian or Russian rule on the other side of the border. After the Poles, Czechs became the second politically strongest Slavic group in the Austrian half of the empire, although they did not achieve full autonomy and parity within the framework of a Trial monarchy (alongside the German-Austrians and the Magyars) as they would have wished. Their strength was due in particular to certain institutional regulations, which led to the establishment of a separate Czech School Council in Bohemia and the foundation of a Czech University in Prague (1882) and generally to the successful struggle of the Czechs for parity with the Germans in Bohemia, favored by their demographic dynamism and the country’s large productive capacities. On the other hand, Slovenes and Ruthenians were clearly in a subordinate position.\(^4\)

Although the 1867 Austrian constitution granted and guaranteed in principle the widely-debated national parity, in practice the latter was obviously more a matter of negotiation. Indeed, little changed for a considerable number of Austria’s inhabitants after 1867.\(^5\) In areas where neither consent between nationalities nor agreement on autonomy was achieved, majorities in municipal councils and provincial parliaments pursued their interests at the expense of minorities. The case of Moravia was an exception, however, and in 1905 a viable solution was adopted, according to which Czechs and Germans would be equivalently represented in the region’s administrative and political bodies.\(^6\) In fact, the Austrian administration did very little to implement parity among nationalities, especially in respect to education of minorities and the cultivation of their languages. It should be noted, however, that the Austrian administration clearly followed a more tolerant policy towards nationalities than the Magyar one.

According to Oscar Jászi, an American-Hungarian scholar who in 1929 published a book on the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, “it was not an exaggeration when certain Austrian
scholars emphasized the fact that never in the history of the world was the principle of national equality in a great empire and under so different nations carried so far as in former Austria.\textsuperscript{23} This was more true for the Austrian half of the empire and less true for the other half, where a rigid, though only partially successful, policy of Magyarization was adopted in line with the 1868 Hungarian Law on Nationalities.\textsuperscript{24} In the course of the eighteen seventies, the Hungarian elites called upon proto-Hungarian nationalism, making use of a traditional argument, namely the need to save Hungarian ‘race’ from the threat of extinction. The electoral system, which openly discriminated against non-Magyars in favor of Magyar nobles as well as members of the upper middle class, helped preserve and strengthen this policy. This discriminative policy was successful in its aims to some extent and the percentage of Magyars in the Hungarian population appears to have risen from 42.8 percent, according to the 1891 census, to 48.1 percent, according to the 1910 census. According to the latter, 92 percent of Hungary’s teachers, 93 percent of its academics and 96 percent of its civil servants were Magyars. In 1879, 405 out of the 413 seats in the Hungarian parliament were occupied by Magyars; there were only five Romanian and three Slovak deputies. Croatia was an exception, since it had been granted partial autonomy through the establishment of a provincial parliament and other Croatian institutions.\textsuperscript{25} While Romanians and Serbs could at least lean upon the newly established neighboring states of Romania and Serbia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Slovaks and Ruthenians were in the worst position of the minorities of the Hungarian half of the empire.

\textit{Factors of Cohesion}

How did this mosaic of nationalities manage to survive for so long, despite tottering for decades? In what ways were sovereignties and power relations legitimized? Recent historiography and current historical research point to a series of factors and mechanisms. In any case, the Habsburg Monarchy’s longevity is considered by some historians, such as Paul Kennedy, as a remarkable or even extraordinary phenomenon,\textsuperscript{26} whereas others like Charles Tilly stress that this should not be overestimated considering that “empires have been hardy beasts”.\textsuperscript{27}

To begin with the military, the Habsburg army was undoubtedly a crucial imperial institution and one of the largest armies in Europe. Nevertheless, to maintain that it was mainly the army that secured the Empire’s cohesion seems somewhat exaggerated. It should be noted that in the decade before the First World War, the Habsburg Empire spent the lowest percentage of its GNP on defense in comparison with the other European powers. Neither the army’s multinational composition nor the careful distribution of military units across the empire – to ensure that recruits did not serve in their native provinces – encouraged violence against national minorities.\textsuperscript{28} An examination of the possible mechanisms of suppression does not provide all the factors that allowed the Empire to exist and function. Vienna appears to have faced the various claims and separatist trends in more efficient ways. In the spirit of a policy of appeasement, it encouraged the formation of committees to settle problems, reduced taxes, constructed railways and appointed civil servants, even to low paid positions. Indeed, on the eve of the First World War there were three million people working in the public sector.\textsuperscript{29} In the years following the empire’s dissolution, its former subjects would often recall its “well-functioning and impartial administration”.\textsuperscript{30}
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Despite huge inequalities in economic structure and wealth distribution in the course of the nineteenth century, during the last thirty years of the empire, according to David Good, the provinces were incorporated into the imperial economy as consequence of railway construction, the development of the banking and credit system, and due to the high pace of economic growth (one of the highest in Europe) generally. A relatively developed economic space was thus formed, offering enough business and profit opportunities to a cosmopolitan urban elite, which was made up to a significant extent by non-orthodox, primarily German-speaking Jews, who saw that their interest lay in the maintenance of the empire and remained loyal to it.

For its part, the high nobility, which despite some signs of decline retained considerable social, economic and political power, remained loyal to the emperor and to the idea of a united empire. This attitude contributed to the monarchy’s consolidation, especially in the countryside, where aristocrats maintained great landed estates and exerted considerable influence. The examples of high nobles in Bohemia and Galicia are particularly notable in this respect.

In fact, the multinational character of the empire had its own dynamics of cohesion: coexistence and necessary cooperation encouraged the formation of multiple identities, especially for the more mobile and educated town dwellers. The emancipated and assimilated Jews of the empire played a crucial role in this process. Modern historians have pointed to the creation of a “compound cultural language” formed by neighboring cultures parallel to the “national cultures” and expressed by the bilingualism or trilingualism of many Habsburg subjects. Finally, the international position of the empire has also been identified as a factor of cohesion. According to Solomon Wank, “on its own, the Habsburg Empire would not have been able to survive in the competitive world of great powers’ politics, but it was not on its own. Its continued existence was considered a necessity to prevent a power vacuum in East Central Europe which could lead to a war among the Great Powers to fill.”

Interpreting Dissolution

Despite these factors of cohesion, the Habsburg Empire was dissolved at the end of 1918 after its defeat in the First World War. No more than a decade after the war ended, Oscar Jászi searched for the factors which undermined the Habsburg Empire and which ultimately led to its collapse. In this regard, among other factors, he identified the growing national consciousness of those nations which could not be satisfied in the Habsburg state (in his words, these nations “realized more and more clearly that their hope for the rebuilding of Habsburg Empire and for their reasonable national independence was a fallacious one”), the irredentist propaganda of those surrounding countries which harbored a claim for their co-nationals living under Habsburg “oppression”, and finally “the disintegrating influence of the World War, which made the latent hatred of the nations burst into flame.”

Since the late nineteen sixties, historians of the Habsburg Monarchy have been dealing largely with the issue of its decline and fall, or, according to some scholars, its sudden fall, since there had been no real preceding process of decline. In Emil Brix’s view, general statements on empire such as those made recently by Eric Hobsbawm – who has claimed that the Ottoman,
Habsburg and Romanov empires may be viewed at the same level since they all represented past political entities during the time of nation building and, in addition, had no alternative to offer – do not really help in interpreting the dissolution of the empire.\(^{38}\)

Within a non-dogmatic, Marxist framework of thought, the Czech historian Jiří Kořalka has argued that the empire’s dismantling was due less to nationalism than to the monarchy’s failure to support a national scheme of its own, in line with the dynamic growth of modern industrial society.\(^{39}\) Solomon Wank seems to imply the lack of such a national scheme, when, drawing on the statements of the contemporary Austrian foreign minister Baron (later Count) Friedrich Beust, he stresses that the inferiority of most nationalities of the empire was implicit in the compromise of 1867, which favored above all the Germans and the Magyars.\(^{40}\) For his part, Arnold Suppan, an Austrian historian notably of Croat origin, has argued that the reason Austria-Hungary did not survive was because it did not identify itself with one sovereign nation and also because there were no real ties between the central and the provincial elites. According to Suppan, both qualities are indispensable to a modern empire, as has been shown by the cases of France, Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union.\(^{41}\)

As “the same factors that can bring empire into existence” or ensure its survival “can also end it”,\(^{42}\) international policy too played a decisive role in the Monarchy’s dismemberment. István Deák assumes that the decision of the political leaders of Austria-Hungary’s many ethnic groups in October 1918 to dissolve the monarchy was quite wrenching, since for throughout the war, they had all pledged their loyalty to the ancient Habsburg realm. Since the Entente Powers pressed them to desert their monarch, however, the reasons for dissolution were compelling.\(^{43}\) Stressing the role of the war, Deák’s interpretation comes rather close to Alan Sked’s older claim that on the eve of the First World War, the Habsburg Empire was not in decline and that its dissolution was due to the devastating consequences of the war. His views have proved particularly stimulating and fuelled an intensive debate between historians. Sked concludes that, despite problems and crises, the empire constituted a viable political entity until 1914, adding that no serious claims in favor of dismemberment had been made up to then and it was not until the summer of 1918 that dissolution appeared inevitable.\(^{44}\) He also warns of the dangers inherent in the idea of a linear, inevitable decline and fall trajectory of empire, an idea followed both by traditional liberal and socialist historiographical trends. Along the lines of the former, which distinguishes the empires in eastern Europe from the developing democracies in western Europe, the political scientist Alexander Motyl claims that as empires need to exert control on their subjects in an authoritarian way, the laxity of this control leads fatally to decline and fall.\(^{45}\)

In regard to the Habsburg Empire, however, should such an interpretation not take into account the constitutional, political, social, economic, cultural developments in the Danube Monarchy during its final decades? Was the relatively peaceful coexistence of so many nationalities at a time of extreme nationalism and bloody ethnic conflicts (to recall the Balkans) not an achievement, despite serious tensions since the late nineteenth century? And, if so, did this not function as a significant legacy in the relations between the so-called successor states?
Beyond the Empire

In the newly founded states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (or Yugoslavia from 1929), Poland and Romania the numerous well-trained administrators, judges, officers, members of the free professions, businessmen, shopkeepers and skilled workers – honest, efficient, laborious and in any case on a par with their counterparts in Western Europe – were definitely a crucial part of the Habsburg legacy. The same is true for the public buildings, houses of parliament, city halls, theatres, opera houses, museums, hospitals, schools, military barracks, bridges, parks, railway stations and railway networks surrounding the citizens of the new states, above all the town dwellers, and shaping their (public) lives. As Deák notes “all those accomplishments owed much, to be sure, to the dedication, hard work, and talent of the local inhabitants; yet it is also fair to say that their achievements would have been far less spectacular without the Pax Austriaca imposed more or less successfully by the ancient House of Austria over several centuries”.

At the same time, however, tensions between the new national states were anything but uncommon during the interwar period. There were plenty of minorities left within the newly drawn national borders, and, time and again, repressive policies were adopted by the new national governments. Indeed, there are scholars, like Oscar Jászy, who recognize certain continuities in policies and their implementation between the highly centralized and in many aspects authoritarian Habsburg Empire and the states that succeeded it.

Apart from this authoritarianism and repression, there remains a crucial question, haunting historical research and researchers: how could the monarchy’s policy of appeasement and consent be compatible with the unprecedented atrocities committed against the Jews of Central and East Central Europe not very long after the Empire’s dissolution? Could the refusal to recognize a Jewish national group on the basis of a native language have somehow pointed to the dark future?

In any case, since the early nineteen eighties, intellectuals in some of the former imperial lands have expressed nostalgic feelings towards a unitary Central European space. The idea of a “New Central Europe” (as opposed to the old one which has been discredited by the Nazi regime), meant as a cultural rather than political entity, in certain aspects reminding – though by no means replicating – the ideal of the unitary, peaceful Empire, has been proclaimed. But since there is barely a reference to “Eastern Europe” in this scheme and since Russia is not included, the political significance of the concept seems quite obvious: to underline the existence of a gap between Central Europe and Russia and thus create (at least in public discourse and, thus, in people’s minds) an intermediate space between Russia and the West. Time will show whether this “utopia” of Central Europe, as some scholars call it, can be realized.
FOOTNOTES


3 However, in a letter to a friend in 1887, Mayor Ulrich Klepsch, a Habsburg officer, “found it very worrisome that loyalty to the old emperor, to the extent that it existed, was to him personally and not part of larger loyalty to a Habsburg or Austrian state”. Quoted in Solomon Wank, “The Habsburg Empire”, in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 45–57 (46).


6 Adam Wandruszka, “‘Notwendiger Völkerverein’ oder ‘Völkerkerker’?”, in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. xiii–xviii (xvi).


8 Ibid.


11 It is not a coincidence that the Austrian historian Adam Wandruszka includes the views expressed by Slav intellectuals in his preface to a comprehensive collective volume on the monarchy’s nations. Adam Wandruszka, *op. cit.*, pp. xiii–xviii.

12 Quoted in ibid., pp. xv–xvi.

13 Raymond Pearson, *op. cit.*, pp. 46, 62, 64.


15 Ibid., p. 284.


19 Raymond Pearson, op. cit., p. 45.


22 Ibid., p. 1203.


27 Ibid., pp. 213, 219.

28 Ibid., p. 280.


30 Klaus Koch, "The End of Empire", p. 182.


32 Paul Kennedy, op. cit., p. 213.


35 Solomon Wank, op. cit., p. 53.

36 How else can we explain the fact that despite the restraints imposed by political or diplomatic reali-


41 Arnold Suppan, "Foreign Policy and Nationalities Problems: Habsburg Empire, Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire", in Emil Brix et. al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 45–53.


44 Alan Sked, "The European Empires: a Case of Fall without Decline?", in Emil Brix et. al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 149–173 (149–151).


47 Ibid., pp. 132–133.


49 See the following contributions in George Schöpflin and Nancy Wood (eds.), *In Search of Central Europe*, Totowa: Barnes and Noble, 1989: George Schöpflin, "Central Europe: Definitions Old and New", pp. 7–29 (7, 27); Peter Hának, "Central Europe: A Historical Region in Modern Times", pp. 57–69; Egon Schwarz, "Central Europe – What it is and What It is not", pp. 143–156 (143, 153, 155); and Timothy Garton Ash, "Does Central Europe exist?", pp. 191–215.