Serving the Nation: Historiography in the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) After Socialism

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https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.86

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To cite this article:

In 2001, when the Albanian extremist National Liberation Army (UÇK) fought security troops of the Republic of Macedonia, a number of Macedonian historians offered explanations for thebloodshed. They denounced the claims of the Albanian rebels as well as the Albanian political parties by referring to their alleged plans for a Greater Albania, although there is little evidence that this idea was popular among the Albanians of former Yugoslavia. Historians gave interviews to newspapers and wrote editorials stating that Albanian claims for more rights within the state were simply camouflaging their real goal of seceding from Macedonia. They pointed to a presumably long tradition of Albanian nationalism and extremism in the region, expressed, for example, by the annexation of western Macedonia by Albania during World War II. They also deplored the demographic Albanization of parts of Macedonia and described it as a deliberate strategy to push out ethnic Macedonians. By calling upon certain past events perceived as traumatic and mobilizing deep-rooted stereotypes and prejudices against the country’s largest minority, these historians sought to manipulate public opinion and shape political responses to the security crisis. They linked the current security crisis to so-called historical traditions and roots and saw Macedonian national identity jeopardized by Albanian extremists. Events were perceived and explained in such a way that they became part of a mythological narration of victimization. The future of the nation was portrayed as being at stake unless the nation learned the proper lessons from history and lived up to the virtues of its founding fathers.
Anthony D. Smith stresses the role of myths like these for the construction of nations and the essential role of historians in this process. Nations need myths of descent, spatial origin, and ancestry, a heroic or “golden age,” decline, and regeneration. Historians contribute to these myths in various ways. Thanks to its association with nation-building, especially in its early stages, historiography acquires a political dimension because it shares the same rationale as the political and intellectual elite of the (new) nation in its efforts to galvanize support for the national idea and imbue the population with national identity. Macedonian historiography is a case in point: it is part of a relatively recent nation-building effort that became urgent again after 1991 when the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia emerged as an independent state. Academic historiography is of recent vintage as well, and assumes for itself not just a “scientific” but also a national and moral role, which inevitably makes the writing of history a political endeavour. What Stefan Troebst wrote in 1983 may still be said of many Macedonian historians, “Historical research in the SR [Socialist Republic of] Macedonia is not a humanist, civilizing end in itself, but is direct political action.”

In my paper I will focus on the post-1991 period in order to reveal the changes and continuities in Macedonian historiography. I will begin my analysis with the political and institutional context, proceeding to national history as the main historiographic paradigm in Macedonia and to some revisions and controversies during the last decade, finally concluding with the methodological orientation of Macedonian historiography. Since state-funded historiography in Macedonia is almost exclusively ethnic Macedonian in outlook, I concentrate on the work of ethnic Macedonian historians.

Political and institutional context

In September 1991, 95.09 percent of voters voted “yes” in the Macedonian referendum on independence (the turnout was only 71.65 percent because the Albanian minority boycotted the referendum). On November 17, 1991, the Macedonian parliament passed the new constitution, establishing the Republic of Macedonia as an independent sovereign state. Political pluralization had begun even earlier. In late 1990 the first multi-party elections took place, and in June 1991 the parliament deleted the designation “Socialist” from the country’s name. Censorship came to an end, as did the persecution of political opponents and dissidents. The mass media was freed from formal state control. This did not, however, mean complete press freedom, for the largest publishing company (publishing the most widely read newspaper, Nova Makedonija) and the dominant electronic media companies remained state-owned and, thereby, under direct government control. Despite the end of Communist one-party rule and the achievement of independence, there was a great deal of continuity in the political transition. Until 1998, the Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia (Macedonian abbreviation SDSM), which emerged from the former Communist Party, remained the most powerful political force in the country, putting forward the prime minister (Branko Crvenkovski). President Kiro Gligorov, who was head of state until 1999, had been a prominent Macedonian communist holding high office before 1991. Political conti-
nuity was advantageous for the old Yugoslav-Macedonian elite, which kept its government, business, and academic positions. The ideological break with the country’s Yugoslav past was also half-hearted, as most Macedonians still nourished nostalgic feelings about Tito and the Yugoslav welfare system. There even was reluctance in seeking independence.6

The main problems during the country’s first decade of independence were caused less by political instability than economic decline: GNP was reduced by a third and unemployment grew to some 40 percent.7 Under these conditions, financial support of academic study was limited. Between 1991 and 1996 academic funding amounted to between 0.46 and 0.57 percent of the gross national product, with some two thirds coming from the state. In 1996, the humanities received 16.4 percent of all funds provided by the state for academic research.8 History, which was relatively well funded before 1991, had to make do with greatly reduced subsidies. Money for trips abroad was lacking, book exchanges had to be stopped, subscriptions to international journals were cancelled, and the national library was able to purchase publications from abroad only with difficulty.

Aside from the new economic setting, the institutional structure of Macedonian historiography did not change. The institutional structure of historiographic research is essential for the content and work of historiography because the institutions regulate career opportunities, allocate funds, and provide access to academic discourse. Institutions also apply the regulations established by political decision-makers to the lives of professional historians who, by their actions, modify and manipulate those rules. Macedonian historiography is both highly centralized and has an explicitly national function. Research is dominated by the Institute for National History (Institut za nacionalna istorija) in Skopje, which was established by government decree on July 20, 1948. From the very beginning, its task has been to study the history of the Macedonian nation.9 The institute employs most historians doing research in the country (approximately 35)10 and (since 1958) publishes the main historical journal in the Republic of Macedonia, Glasnik na Institutot za nacionalna istorija. Although the institute is formally part of the University of Skopje, it is almost completely devoted to research, as its members do not have teaching obligations. The institute can, therefore, be compared to the historical institutes in the Academies of Sciences in other socialist countries, where historical research was usually concentrated. The Macedonian Academy of Science (founded in 1967) never acquired a leading role in historiography, though for some time after 1977 it had a department of history.11 The academy’s department of social science publishes a journal, Prilozi, occasionally containing historical papers. The second most important institution for historiography in Macedonia is the history department of the Cyril-and-Methodius University of Skopje, whose members focus on teaching but also do research. The department provides most of the material for Istorija, the country’s second most influential historical journal. Other institutions carrying out at least some marginal historical research are the Institute for Old-Slavonic Culture in Prilep and Skopje and the Archive of Macedonia, which mainly publishes documents.
The main purpose of the Institute of National History, determined by law, is to write history. The institute virtually monopolizes historiography in the country, so historians would damage their careers if they operated outside the national paradigm. The institute’s strong hierarchical organization also impedes deviation. Not only is an historian’s academic career dependent upon the evaluation of (older) peers, but the assumption exists that knowledge grows with biological age. Old historians are thought to know more than young ones, and any challenge of an old historian by a young one would be perceived as a challenge to the institute as a whole. The institute’s personnel has remained unchanged after the end of socialism. The generation of Macedonian historians closely associated with the Yugoslav period of the Macedonian Republic who worked on the pertinent national myths of that time are still largely in charge of the institute. Because of their dominance, the institute’s academic focus concentrates on a relatively small number of topics. The institute’s departmental structure further narrows the focus to a limited range of research subjects by allocating most resources to the period of the 19th and 20th centuries, which is regarded as crucial for Macedonian nation-building. Only one of the six departments has a comparative perspective and it is poorly staffed. Study of the nationalities in Macedonia, by law one of the institute’s responsibilities, is not reflected in its organization. The institute employs only two Albanian historians.

### Institute of National History: Departments and Researchers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departments</th>
<th>Number of Researchers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Study of Ancient and Medieval History (until the end of the 14th c.)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study of the Ottoman-Turkish Period (15th - end of 18th c.)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Liberation Movement of the Rebirth-Period (1800-1919)</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study of the Inter-War Period (1919-1941)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>The War of National Liberation and Contemporary History</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balkan Studies</td>
<td>3</td>
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The institute’s continuing predominance also is caused by the government not providing funds to any other institution for historical research. In addition, there is no private competition because article sixteen of the March 15, 1996 Law on Scientific Research Activities prohibits non-governmental research into “the historical and cultural identity of the Macedonian people and the nationalities that live in the Republic of Macedonia.” Instead, the state is charged with financing research in this area (article seven). The government obviously fears that foreign institutions, in particular those of neighbor states, might support historical research in Macedonia that would propagate their views on the history and national identity of the Macedonians. The law makes it quite clear that politicians in Macedonia care about history, just as historians care about politics.
Creating National Myths

In contrast to the historiographies of socialist Bulgaria and Romania as well as the other Yugoslav Republics, Macedonian historiography did not experience a period after the Communist take-over during which “class” replaced the “nation” as the main subject of the historical master narration. From its very beginning in the late 1940s, Macedonian historiography has had and continues to have an explicitly national perspective. History was seen as an essential means of nation-building in the new Macedonian Republic established within the framework of Tito’s Yugoslavia in 1944. The Macedonian Republic was presumed to be the national state of the Macedonian nation, a nation that first had to be created. Macedonian historians first had to write a myth of descent because, to quote Anthony D. Smith, nationalist historians have to “date the community’s origins, and so locate it in time and in relation to other relevant communities.”

Nations need a concept of their historical genesis and are loath to accept their existence as the result of contingent and ambiguous historical processes and their essentially modern character. Nations present themselves as ancient, continuous, and autochthonous. National historiographies objectify the myth of the nation’s descent to prepare it for dissemination through the educational system and convince “others” of the nation’s existence. Macedonian historiography, however, encountered particular difficulties in this endeavour because it was a latecomer among the national historiographies in the Balkans. All the significant events and personalities of what reasonably could be claimed as “Macedonian history” already were included in the national narratives of the neighbouring countries, which had substantiated their territorial claims on Macedonia by their own interpretations of the region’s history and the ethnic identity of its population. Any Macedonian national narration necessarily was in conflict with these older historiographies, most pointedly so with the Bulgarian view. Bulgaria considered Macedonia and the Slavic Orthodox population there as constitutive elements of its own national past, and this was supported by Bulgarian historians referring to the medieval Bulgarian kingdom as well as the Bulgarian Exarchate after 1870, both of which had included the territory of today’s Macedonia. The pro-Bulgarian views of many Macedonian revolutionaries of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were considered further evidence of the Bulgarian character of the region. The Macedonians, then, had to begin from scratch in their efforts to present an honorable and long history of their nation. The task was entrusted to the Institute for National History, which, according to party directives, was especially instructed to repudiate Bulgarian claims as well as to blunt the influence of the prolific Macedonian Scientific Institute in Sofia, which propagated the Bulgarian view on the Macedonian issue.

The first generation of Macedonian historians traced the emergence of the Macedonian nation back to the 19th century. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO), established in 1893, and the Ilinden Rising against Ottoman rule on August 2, 1903 (on St. Elias’s, ilija in Slavic, day) were seen as the first significant political manifestations of Macedonian national consciousness. Later, thanks to the efforts of the Communist Macedonian partisans during World
War II and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, whose role was particularly emphasized by Socialist Macedonian historiography, a Macedonian state, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, eventually was erected within Yugoslavia. A semantic chain was constructed between Ilinden (1903) and the first session of ASNOM, the Antifascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia, which was convened on August 2 (1944) and established the Macedonian republic. These two events were connected by the advancing trajectories of national affirmation and socialist revolution.21 The deterioration of relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria after the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 as well as the increased institutionalization of Macedonian historiography resulted in new efforts to trace the origins of the Macedonian nation further back.22 The vigorous Bulgarian campaign denying the existence of a separate Macedonian language and nation, which began in 1958, intensified the efforts of Macedonian historians to disconnect Macedonian from Bulgarian history. Now the medieval empire of Tsar Samuel and his successors (969-1018), whose capital was Ochrid, was re-evaluated as a Macedonian state although existing scholarship had regarded it as Bulgarian.23

Independence in 1991, difficulties with international recognition, the conflict with Greece about the state’s name and symbols,24 and the refusal by its neighbors to accept Macedonian national identity25 made national issues again central to historical research. Problems of national and ethnic identity dominated public discourse throughout the 1990s, as Slav Macedonians perceived threats to their identity and existence as a nation. Articles published in Glasnik and Istorija show this concern: between 1991 and 1999 ninety-three articles appeared in Glasnik, of which eighty-three (89 percent) dealt with Macedonia. In Istorija, forty-three of forty-six papers published between 1994 and 1999, i.e. 93.5 percent, dealt with Macedonia. Research projects at the Institute for National History also concentrated on Macedonia (in the sense of the geographic region, thereby also including parts of the geographic region now belonging to Bulgaria and Greece). Since 1997, forty-two research projects have been either completed or initiated, forty of them dealing with Macedonian issues. Those projects dealing with other countries usually focus on their relationship with Macedonia.26

The choice of topics for historical research is rather limited, and many publications simply reiterate well-known assessments. Much historiographic energy is still devoted to efforts to prove the “Macedonian” character of certain episodes and personalities in the past to assert the Macedonian national narrative. The jubilee year 1993 (the founding of VMRO in 1893 and the Ilinden Rising of 1903) once again increased historiographic writing on these two events, which hold important positions in the historical imagination of the Macedonian nation.27 Both events are seen as national-Macedonian in nature, although in Ottoman and European sources the Rising of 1903 was usually called “Bulgarian.” Macedonian historians, however, consider this qualification biased. One of them asserts that, “the Ilinden Rising was a Macedonian uprising. It was an uprising of the Macedonian people, regardless of in which church they prayed, in which school they learned, and which (national) name they carried.”28 The fifty-year jubilee of ASNOM (1944-1994)

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and independence in 1991 spurred publications on the history of contemporary Macedonian statehood. Independence was generally described as the logical end product of the Macedonian “national-liberation struggles” throughout the last century. The eminent Macedonian literary historian Blazhe Ristovski’s *History of the Macedonian Nation* describes the “awakening” and formation of the Macedonian nation by various intellectuals in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Ristovski aims to prove the Macedonian nature of writers, poets, and other intellectuals who can be said to have been champions of the Macedonian cause. If these persons declared themselves, at one time or another, “Bulgarians,” then Ristovski goes to great length to point out that they cannot have meant it quite like that. For example, in the case of Krste Misirkov – “the most eminent, most significant and most versatile Macedonian cultural and national worker before liberation” – Ristovski states that Misirkov’s support for the annexation of Macedonia by Bulgaria did not reflect “his genuine beliefs and sentiments” but was “dictated by the conditions of the time.”

Similar claims are present in scholarship on the medieval period when Macedonian historians portray Tsar Samuil’s empire as Macedonian and include Saints Cyril and Methodius in the Macedonian national tradition. Branko Panov, for example, writes that Cyril and Methodius probably were Slavs who regarded Macedonia as their mother country. Blazhe Ristovski even sees a clear anti-Bulgarian tone in the activities of the two brothers, who had been sent out by Bulgaria’s eternal foe, Byzantium, and had never even touched Bulgarian soil. Besides presenting the historical events in the region from a Macedonian perspective, Macedonian historiography also tries to find foreign witnesses for the existence of the Macedonian nation. The few works devoted to foreign countries usually consist of attempts to gather archival documents proving the existence of the Macedonian nation or otherwise dealing with Macedonian issues. Many of these publications are simply collections of documents without providing any context or scrutiny of sources.

The most significant post-Yugoslav change in the myth of descent was the attempt to include the ancient Macedonians in the national narrative. This effort was clearly related to Greek opposition against the name Macedonia for the new state as well as against the use of the 16-pointed sun of Macedonia, associated with Philip II of Macedonia, as the state symbol. Macedonian historians challenged Greece’s exclusive ownership of the symbols and territory of the ancient Macedonians in order to back up their claims to the name and land of Macedonia and to create their own ancient national patrimony. In his introduction to Nade Proeva’s *Studies on the Ancient Macedonians*, Petko Kuzman wrote, “Macedonian history cannot be treated otherwise than as a historical continuity from the creation of the name Macedonia until today.” This discourse is intended to substantiate the Macedonians’ claim to a homeland, to the territory of their ancestors, and to a long national pedigree. The landscape of Macedonia is instilled with ethnic virtues reaching far back into the past that can be mobilized in current disputes over claims to a particular territory. Significantly, the first volume of the revised seven-volume *History of the Macedonian People* devotes more than two hundred pages to ancient Macedonia and the Roman occupation, while the first edition, published in 1969, allocated only some twenty pages to that
The main claim is that the ancient Macedonians were not Greeks but a different, non-Hellenic people who joined in the ethnogenesis of the Macedonian people by melting into the Slavs who had come to the region in the 6th and 7th centuries. Academic historians usually do not go so far as to claim a shared ethnic identity between the ancient and the Slav Macedonians but stress the tradition of statehood established in the region by the ancient Macedonians and handed down to the contemporary nation of this name. Instead of an ethnic, and therefore presumably biological, link between these two peoples, the idea of cultural and institutional affinity is constructed, finding expression in the ability to establish a state. The long periods without an independent Macedonian state are described as times of unceasing struggle for independent statehood. Ivan Katardzhiev, one of the most influential Macedonian historians, speaks of the “permanent struggle for liberation from the suppression of the enslavers and for the creation of an independent state.” In his view, the liberation struggle has entered the collective memory of the Macedonians and unites them wherever they live. Perennial statecraft is perceived as a specific virtue of the Macedonians, compensating for the fact that the Macedonian nation is, as almost any other nation, a modern product.

Besides the myths of ethnic origin and descent, Macedonian historiography also embraces the myth of victimization. On the one hand, this myth serves to define the “others” against whom ethnic consolidation must be achieved. On the other hand, it seeks to instill into the present generation a feeling of indebtedness to its ancestors, as well as to nurture the virtue of being able to stand alone because, it is said, Macedonians in the past were unable to count on the help of anyone or anything other than their own strength and unity. The division of the region of Macedonia after the Balkan Wars is regarded as a traumatic event in the history of the Macedonian people because it destroyed the “ethnic” and “geographical” unity of the country. The Slavic population is portrayed as the victim of harsh assimilation attempts in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, vividly described by Macedonian historians. According to Katardzhiev, “the Macedonian people had to endure a severe and tragic fate” and became victims of “the first mass ethnic cleansing in the Balkans in the 20th century.” Only in Vardar-Macedonia, i.e., the Serbian/Yugoslav territory, have Macedonians eventually managed to establish their own state, while the Macedonian minorities outside the Macedonian Republic still face discrimination and lack of recognition. Because of the strained relations with Greece after 1991, quite a number of publications criticize the attitude of Greek governments towards the Slavic population in Greek Macedonia, which the Republic of Macedonia considers a Macedonian national minority. The Greek Civil War is included in the Macedonian national narrative, which stresses the participation of Slavic-speakers (“Macedonians”) in the Communist struggle and blames the Greek Communist Party for its lack of support for the Macedonian minority. At least one of these authors is a refugee from Greek Macedonia who personally experienced the brutality of Greek policy towards its Slavic minority, which might help explain his vigor in attacking Greece. The non-recognition of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria (in Pirin-Macedonia) and – as Macedonian historiography sees it – the suppression of its struggle for national affirmation is similarly dealt with. Less attention is paid to the Serbian
assimilation attempts in Vardar-Macedonia between 1912-3 and 1941, which can be explained by still-existing pro-Yugoslav and pro-Serbian sentiments among many Macedonian historians.

In addition to external enemies, Macedonian historiography also constructs an internal adversary in the shape of the Albanian minority. During the Yugoslav period, treatment of the Albanian minority was rare but guided by the principle of “Brotherhood and Unity.” After 1991, when the conflict between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority populations intensified as Albanians gained better political representation and were able to bring forward their claims, Macedonian historiography increasingly converted the Albanians into the “other.” It has to be stressed that the overall number of publications on the history of the Albanian population in Macedonia in no way reflects its real size. In the most important recent projects of Macedonian historiography, the Macedonian Historical Dictionary (Makedonski istoriski rechnik) and the History of the Macedonian Nation (Istorija na Makedonskiot narod), Albanians practically do not figure at all. They are not part of the national narrative except in terms of presenting a danger. Two lines of thought about the Albanians are present in Macedonian historiography, as well as in Macedonian public opinion. According to the first, Albanians traditionally pursue the idea of Greater Albania. Evidence of this assumption is the Albanian occupation of western Macedonia during World War II. The second describes the “demographic expansion” of the Albanians, which is seen as a deliberate strategy. Both stereotypes can also be found in school textbooks portraying the Albanians as strangers and enemies. Macedonian Albanian historians do not participate in the national historical discourse and mainly work outside official institutions. Their writing basically seeks to repudiate ethnic Macedonian assumptions and portray the Albanian minority as autochthonous and suppressed.

Analysis of Macedonian historiography over the last decade reveals the nationalistic character of its main paradigm. Discourse on the nation is determined by a primordialist and essentialist approach that regards national and ethnic identity as something given, not subject to change by social and cultural processes. The young age of the Macedonian nation is compensated for with “retrospective nationalism.” While Macedonian historians almost constantly deal with the nation, they do so from a theoretically hollow position. Recent major works by internationally prominent historians on the construction and essence of nations are not used for the analysis of the Macedonian nation, or are not even known. Eric Hobsbawm’s, Benedict Anderson’s, and Ernest Gellner’s books on the nation have all been translated into Macedonian but have not received attention from historians. It appears that only Jovan Donev, who works at the Institute for National History, has applied modern theories to the study of the emergence of the Macedonian nation. There have not, however, been any responses to his thoughtful article, published in 1996. Macedonian historians are loath to use a modernist or de-constructivist approach because this would show that until World War II the emergence of a separate Macedonian nation was anything but inevitable and that under different political circumstances a different outcome in terms of the national identity of the Slavic Orthodox population of the region would have been
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possible – just as any other nation is the result of contingent and ambiguous social processes under particular circumstances. Foreign literature on the Macedonian question, especially on the emergence of the Macedonian nation, is rarely consulted because most foreign scholars date the creation of the Macedonian nation to after World War II. Loring Danforth’s book has been translated into Macedonian but did not provoke controversy. Barbara Jelavich’s seminal *History of the Balkans* also exists in Macedonian translation, but is largely ignored. Because of its fear of being confronted with opposing views on the sensitive issue of Macedonian national identity, Macedonian historiography has developed a very high level of parochial self-isolation.

**Revisionism**

Since the end of socialism, Macedonian historiography has been characterized by remarkable continuity in terms of subjects as well as methodology. Nevertheless, there have been changes, revisions, and controversies that have intensified the obsession with national history.

Right after the end of one-party rule, censorship, and official intervention in historiography, Macedonian historians began a debate about the need to revise some of the established truths and fill the blanks that, officially or informally, had been taboo subjects under the previous regime. In 1991, the leading Macedonian newspaper, *Nova Makedonija*, published a series of five articles by eminent Macedonian historians on “Challenges for Historiography.” The authors agreed that under communism Macedonian historiography had not been completely free from political pressure and that, therefore, some re-evaluation was inevitable. Historiography should free itself from any political influence. But these and other Macedonian historians were not in favor of denouncing the whole pre-1991 body of scholarship and still regarded it as a base for further studies after the correction of some distortions. Ivan Katardzhiev, for example, refused to call the entirety of communist Macedonian historiography “official” because this term stemmed from the “arsenal of our neighbors, who seek to negate the Macedonian nation.” On the contrary, Macedonian historiography had reached a high level of objectivity, with some exceptions that could easily be rectified. Only very few historians presented a radical critique of Macedonian historical scholarship before 1991, arguing for a complete re-writing of Macedonian history.

The practical result of the call for revision was the rehabilitation of several Macedonian national activists who had held important posts in the new Macedonian Republic immediately after World War II but had been bypassed by the Yugoslav Communist government because of their anti-Communist and/or too nationalistic leanings. After the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, allegations of proximity to the Soviets sometimes were used to persecute these men. The most prominent individual rehabilitated was Metodija Andonov-Chento (1902-1957), who had been the first president of the Antifascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) and of the Macedonian People’s Assembly, until he was removed from his posts in 1946 and imprisoned (until 1956). Now he was rehabilitated as a representative of the “national-bourgeois orientation” within the Macedonian national liberation movement and as someone who had fought for an independent, united, and non-communist Macedonia. Other Macedonian nationalists persecuted...
after World War II and especially after 1948 were rehabilitated and included in the pantheon of national heroes. The rehabilitation of these politicians occurred unanimously since they perfectly suited the need to find historical legitimation for an independent Macedonian state. As one of the authors wrote, “Bearing in mind what is happening in today’s AVNOJ-Yugoslavia [the former Socialist Federation of the Republics of Yugoslavia], their separatism was legitimate. Today’s sovereign and independent Macedonia proves them right. In history, however, some people are ahead of their time…” In contrast to the communist interpretation of Macedonian history, now more stress was laid on non-communist national activists who had, presumably, fought not for Macedonia as part of the Yugoslav federation but as an independent state that would unite all three parts of Macedonia (Vardar, Pirin, and Aegean Macedonia). Hence the Yugoslav Macedonian national narrative, which emphasized the role played by partisans and communists in establishing a Macedonian republic in the Yugoslav federation, was modified. Despite this gradual departure from the Yugoslav interpretation of Macedonian history, a critical assessment of the Yugoslav period was still not on the agenda, let alone a complete renunciation because this would have destroyed an important link in the chain of Macedonian national history. There were only limited attempts (apart from the rehabilitation of national heroes) to deal with repression under communism. Former political prisoners who had been held on the island of Goli otok published a book on their experiences, but it went unnoticed by historians. In an isolated effort to reassess the consequences of communist transformation after 1944, Violeta Achkoska has critically studied communist agricultural policies (collectivization).

The most controversial revisionist effort concerned the attempt to include the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO) of the inter-war period within the Macedonian national narrative. Previous scholarship had regarded this organization as a reactionary force of Bulgarian expansionism, pointing to its support for conservative circles in Bulgaria, its contacts with the fascist Croatian Ustashe and Nazi Germany, and its display of Bulgarian national identity. The attempt to rehabilitate it was directly linked to efforts by the VMRO-DPMNE party, the main opposition party in the Republic of Macedonia between 1990 and 1998, to declare itself the legitimate successor of the historical VMRO. Party leader Liubcho Georgievski proclaimed that Todor Aleksandrov and Ivan Mihajlov, VMRO leaders of the inter-war period, had fought for an independent Macedonian state regardless of their Bulgarian ethnic consciousness, while the communist Macedonian leaders had stood for the integration of Macedonia into the Yugoslav federation, thus subjecting it to hegemony by Belgrade. Georgievski called his own party the “heir of the ideas of VMRO.” The historian Zoran Todorovski came to his aid and declared in various academic publications as well as newspaper interviews that the inter-war VMRO had been a champion of independent Macedonian statehood and should, therefore, be considered part of the national tradition, despite the grave errors and contradictions of its leaders. “The autonomist VMRO of the inter-war period, with their armed rebels, was the only champion of the rights of the Macedonian people in Vardar-Macedonia fighting for the liberation of Macedonia with revolutionary means.” The rationale of these attempts was to construct a historical rightist tradition, which the
nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party could claim for itself, and to oppose the pro-Yugoslav interpretation of Macedonian history, which, politically, was associated with the post-communist SDSM party. The most prominent Macedonian historians, however, met these attempts with fury and denounced them in newspaper editorials and interviews. They accused Georgievski and his party of exhibiting pro-Bulgarian sentiments, in fact of considering themselves Bulgarians and not Macedonians. Ivan Katardzhiev, for example, accused Georgievski of negating the ethnic continuity of the Macedonian people by hinting at cultural proximity with the Bulgarians. He and others reiterated the standard estimation of Aleksandrov and Mihajlov as agents of the Greater Bulgaria idea, aiming at incorporating Macedonia into Bulgaria and at “Bulgarizing” its population. They also denied any continuity between the VMRO-DPMNE party and the “historical” VMRO, which, in their view, ceased to exist in 1908. The bitterness of the controversy prove that questions of national identity, once they acquire a political dimension – and they almost always do – are very emotional. People who share the view of the perennial existence of the Macedonian nation and deny any relation with the Bulgarian nation accuse critics of this opinion as “bulgar-oman,” “pro-Bulgarian,” and “Bulgarophile.” The revisionists, however, are not seeking to deconstruct the Macedonian nation or propagate Bulgarian ethnic self-identification in claiming some relation between the Bulgarian and Macedonian nations. Instead, they aim to establish an alternative vision of the national past whose glorious aspects are seen to be embodied in the VMRO-DPMNE party. The anti-Yugoslav, anti-communist, and anti-Serbian discourse of the revisionists legitimizes the political agenda of that party and constructs an alternative primary foreign “other” from whom the nation should differentiate itself. The Serbs are designated to take on this role from the Bulgarians, who held it in the Yugoslav-Macedonian national discourse and its contemporary offspring. So history, again, is used as a resource for political competition and in support of present and future political options.

The conflict between these two choices of identity arose again soon after publication of the Macedonian Historical Dictionary (Makedonski istoriski rechnik), in particular over the article on Blazhe Koneski. The assertion that Koneski had advocated adoption of the Serbian variant of the Cyrillic script when the orthography of the Macedonian language was being standardized in 1944-45 drew heavy criticism. Although this assertion is substantiated by available documentation, the main editor of the dictionary, Stojan Kiselinovski, was accused of ridiculing a national hero. In several newspaper articles, Kiselinovski was called a pro-Bulgarian who had committed an “impudent crime against humanity” and had acted on the orders of the – then ruling – VMRO-DPMNE party. Kiselinovski, in turn, deposed the “Serbian stamp” on the Macedonian language, for which he made Koneski responsible and which he called an aberration from the “natural and historically normal” path of linguistic development. Like the VMRO-debate, only at first glance was this controversy focussed on the “correct” assessment of a past event. Much more was at stake. Should the current Republic of Macedonia follow the Yugoslav tradition of Macedonian nation-building and, therefore, accept the powerful influence of Serbian culture and language? Should the Macedonian nation be put on another footing that would repel Serbian
influence and, instead, seek a cultural – and political – rapprochement with Bulgaria? History as well as the script and orthography of the Macedonian language are used to back up the contending claims, which also are directly associated with political parties: The (in the eyes of its main rival) “pro-Serb” SDSM and the (according to SDSM and the pro-Yugoslav Macedonian intellectual elite) “pro-Bulgarian” VMRO-DPMNE, which views the former Yugoslavia as a people’s prison. 83 Both positions provide different explanations and solutions for the deep political and social rifts that arose during transformation.84 In the end they are two sides of the same coin in that they both stress the national and ethnic individuality of the Macedonians. They disagree about the extent of Bulgarian or Serb cultural influence. They agree, however, in seeing the Muslim Albanians as the main domestic “other” and threat.

**Methodology**

While Macedonian historians can participate in ferocious controversies about national identity, they usually remain quiet about methodology. In the main historical journals, Glasnik and Istori-ja, no articles dealing with theories and methods of history have been published during the last decade. Even in two collected volumes reflecting the current state of Macedonian historiography, only a few papers deal with methodological issues.85

Macedonian historians regard history as a science (nauka) that must be based on hard facts. Their primary aim, therefore, is to establish the facts by scrutinizing relevant documents. In this effort, however, they encounter the problem that many documents pertaining to Macedonia are kept outside the country, and that Macedonian historians have only limited or no access to archives in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria.86 Macedonian historians believe that the “facts” have not yet been sufficiently established and, therefore, Macedonian historiography is still in the documentation stage and not in a position to ask “philosophical,” “psychological,” or “analytical” questions. The task of putting the facts together is allegedly made even more difficult by the distorted views of the neighboring historiographies about Macedonia. Macedonian historians feel that one of their main duties is to free the facts from foreign manipulation and present them in a true light. Furthermore, in many documents on Macedonia, especially of the late 19th and 20th centuries, the local population is not referred to as “Macedonian.” Macedonian historians – as do their colleagues in Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia – therefore go to great lengths to argue that the Slavic Orthodox population of the region was Macedonian, regardless of what is written in the records. For example, one historian explains that the author of a source saying that the Slavs of Macedonia spoke Bulgarian was “unable to distinguish between the Bulgarian and the Macedonian language.”87

The obsession with establishing the “facts” and the focus on national liberation quite naturally has led to the dominance of political history and chronological approaches. Of all the articles published in Glasnik between 1991 and 1999, 73 percent deal with political history and most of the others also follow the chronological paradigm. Thirty of the Institute for National History’s
forty-four research projects (1997-2002) focus on the political history of Macedonia. Even studies of cultural history mainly consist of chronologically organised “facts” designed to prove the existence of the Macedonian nation. The focus on political history, events, and facts is continually maintained as the older generation of positivist historians still dominates teaching, and the institutional and age hierarchy at the Institute for National History obstructs methodological innovation. The dominant paradigm is only rarely challenged by historians arguing for the inclusion of interdisciplinary methods, the use of other than written sources, the study of human life in its totality, the adoption of international theoretical trends — such as the French Annales school — for comparisons and generalizations and theoretical discussions. These challenges are little reflected in historiographic practice. Only one historian displays a consistent interest in social history: Violeta Achkoska has studied the agricultural transformations of the late 1940s and early 1950s, dealing with popular reactions and strategies as well as institutional change. Occasionally, a few other social history texts have been published. Women’s history is confined to some political aspects of the situation and role of women in Macedonia. The only societal topic more thoroughly studied by historians is the change in Macedonia’s ethnic and demographic composition, but most of these works are devoted to the “Albanian question.” Only Ottoman history concentrates less on political history, both because not many events of national significance occurred during the Ottoman period and because of the nature of the sources (tax registers, etc). A number of publications dealing with social and economic aspects of the past have been published by specialists on the Ottoman period. But, as they struggle for survival without even a handful of specialists, Ottoman studies are incapable of triggering innovation in Macedonian historiography. Other interesting studies on social and economic history, such as the history of the village in Macedonia during the interwar period, the situation of the Macedonian working class during the same period, or the material situation of the population in the Prilep region 1870-1940, have come from outside the discipline. A secondary school teacher in Bitola has written an exhaustive history of the Jewish community in that southern Macedonian town, in which he extensively quotes from the recollections of Jews who were deported in 1943 but survived the Nazi concentration camps. In contrast, academic historiography, other than in some demographic issues, is largely unconcerned with the history of the many minorities in Macedonia. Also lacking are studies on everyday life, oral history, attitudes, and historical anthropology — apparently these topics are not considered worth investigation, in part because there are strong reservations about using non-documentary evidence and interviews.

Conclusion
Despite the dramatic political and economic changes of the early 1990s, Macedonian historiography is characterized more by continuity than by change. Neither the methodological paradigm nor the institutional structure of Macedonian historiography has altered. There is almost no room for diverging approaches, first because of economic limitations and, second, because (young) historians who dare to tread new paths put their academic careers at risk. The monopolistic and
highly centralized structure of Macedonian historiography prevents defections and innovation. Both institutional control and social control of historians is strong, for most colleagues work under the same roof (and those who do not are at the University of Skopje, a mere two hundred metres away). Even established historians trying to arrive at new interpretations risk being accused of treason.

Macedonian historians, as do other national historians, write myths of descent, of a “golden age” of heroic deeds and virtues, of decadence and regeneration in order to transfer national values to the present generation and show the way to the future. This is how Macedonian historians understand *historia magistra vitae*. They regard it as their patriotic duty to deal with national issues. But this also brings them close to politics, as questions of national identity and history are highly politicized in the Republic of Macedonia and political parties assert their particular views with the help of academic historians. The politicization of history and all national concerns show that Macedonian nation-building has not yet been accomplished. Furthermore, the negative stance the country’s neighbours have taken towards the Macedonian nation has given most of the people in the Republic of Macedonia a deep sense of insecurity, compensated for by the preoccupation of public discourse with issues of national identity. Historians reinforce, and to some extent even produce, this preoccupation through their professional concentration on national history. Finally, we should not forget that Macedonian historiography is only some fifty years old – it is characteristic of young historiographies to be obsessed with national issues since creating the national past is one of the first rationales of modern historiography.  

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Abbreviations:
INI = Institut za natsionalna istorija [Institute for National History]
MANU = Makedonska Akademija na Naukite i Umetnostite [Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts]
Glasnik = Glasnik na Institut za natsionalna istorija [Review of the Institute for National History]
Prilozi = Prilozi na Makedonska Akademija na Naukite i Umetnostite [Contributions of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts]

* The research work for this paper was supported by the Austrian federal Ministry of Education, Science and Culture (BMBWK) through its research grant “Historiography in Southeastern Europe” (2001-2003). I am grateful to Karin Taylor for her comments and linguistic support.


6 The question posed in the referendum on independence was indicative: “Are you for a sovereign and autonomous Macedonian state that has the right to join a future union of sovereign Yugoslav states?” (Tsane T. Mojanoski, Letopis na makedonskata demokratija, Skopje: Pakung, 2000, p. 31).

7 The country’s economic problems are not only the result of the difficult industrial restructuring process and the non-competitiveness of many Macedonian enterprises, but also of foreign pressure: the Greek embargo (1994-1995), the UN-embargo against Yugoslavia, Macedonia’s most important trade partner (1992-1996, 1998-2000), and the consequences of the Kosovo War (1999) when more than 350,000 refugees from Kosovo fled to Macedonia and trade with Yugoslavia was again seriously disrupted.


9 Institutes similar to the Institute of National History and with a similar nationalist agenda were established in the fields of ethnography and language: “Marko Cepenkov Institute for Folklore” (est. 1950) and “Krste Misirkov Institute for the Macedonian Language” (est. 1953).

10 Because of budgetary constraints, staff has been reduced through retirement in recent years. In 1998 the institute still employed 43 historians. Aleksandar Trajanovski et al. (eds.), 50 godini Institut za natsionalna istorija, Skopje: INI, 1988, p. 15.

11 Cf. Troebst, Die bulgarisch-jugoslawische Kontroverse um Makedonien, p. 52.

12 Keith Brown, “A Rising to Count On: Ilinden Between Politics and History in Post-Yugoslav Macedonia,”

13 Sluzheben vesnik na Republika Makedonija, 52:13, 15 March 1996.

14 Stefan Troebst once wrote that in Macedonia not only is history politicized, but politics historicized. Troebst, Die bulgarisch-jugoslawische Kontroverse, p. 20.


16 Ibid., p. 55.

17 Smith, Myths and Memories, p. 63.

18 Macedonian nation building was targeted against Bulgaria not only in the field of history, but more generally because the cultural proximity to the Bulgarian nation was obvious. Moreover, the Macedonian leadership wanted once and for all to eradicate the consequences of Bulgarization made by the Bulgarian occupying forces and the Bulgarian civil administration during World War II. The Macedonian leadership, therefore, stressed differences with the Bulgarians, for example, by basing the new Macedonian standard language on a dialect that was as different as possible from the Bulgarian standard language. Bulgaria, however, refused to acknowledge the existence of the Macedonian language and referred to it as an artificial idiom created by administrative fiat and as a language that was essentially a western Bulgarian dialect distorted by politically motivated loanwords from Serbian. In addition, the Macedonians did not adopt the Bulgarian variant of the Cyrillic script but developed some distinct letters, while also adopting some typically Serb ones. On the promotion of Macedonian culture as part of the Macedonian nation-building effort, cf. Robert E. Palmer/Stephen R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, Hamden: Archon Books, 1971, p. 153ff.

19 Palmer/King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, pp. 160-1.


23 Cf. Palmer/King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, 162; Troebst, IMRO + 100, p. 63. Macedonian historians did not answer the question why the Byzantine emperor Basil II, who defeated Samuel’s troops in 1014, earned the name “Bulgar slayer.”

24 Greece accused Macedonia of pursuing an irredentist agenda by harboring claims on Greek-Macedonia. One of the contested issues was the name of the new state, for Greece rejected the name “Republic of Macedonia.” Greek opposition delayed UN membership until April 1993 and recognition of Macedonia by European Community countries until late 1993. Internationally, the state is recognized under the name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM).

25 As already mentioned, Greece did not recognize the constitutional name of the country and seems to have reservations about the existence of a separate Macedonian nation. Bulgaria does not accept the existence of a Macedonian language and nation. The Serb Orthodox Church does not recognise the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which declared its autocephaly in 1967. All essential elements of national ideology – language, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, name, territory – are not recognised by the neighbouring states. Cf. Duncan Perry, “Crisis in the Making? Macedonia and its Neighbours,” Südosteuropa 43:1-2 (1994), pp. 31-58; Kyril

26 For example, “Macedonia in the Politics of USA Towards the Balkans After the End of the Cold War” or “The Soviet Diplomacy and Macedonia in the Course of World War Two, 1939-1945.”


28 Bitovski, Kontinuitetot na makedskskte natsionalosloboditelni borbi, p. 374.


31 Ristovski, The National Thought, p. 129.

32 Ibid. p. 137.


34 Panov, Makedonija niz istorijata, p. 55.

35 Ristovski, Makedonija: prashanja od istorijata i kulturata, p. 12.


43 Cf. Smith, *Myths and Memories*, p. 58: “Descent is traced, not through family pedigrees, but through the persistence of certain kinds of ‘virtue’ or other distinctive cultural qualities, be it of language, customs, religion, institutions, or more general personal attributes.”


45 Ibid. 5 and 20. Of course, the author fails to mention the mass expulsion and killing of Muslims in Macedonia after Ottoman rule over the region was brought to an end.


53 Nikola Jordanovski, “Between the Necessity and the Impossibility of a ‘National History,’” *Clio in the*


56 One of the most important books on Yugoslav Macedonia, Palmer/King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question, seems to be widely unknown among Macedonian historians. At least they do not refer to it in their work.


58 Loring Danforth, Makedonskiot konflikt: Etnichkiot natsionalizam vo transnatsionalniot svet, Skopje: Makedonska kniga, 1996.


63 Ibid.


68 Petar Piruze-Majski, p. 173.


73 After World War I, the VMRO established a state-in-the-state in southwestern Bulgaria, where it even collected taxes from the population. From this base it staged raids and a number of terrorist attacks in Yugoslavia-controlled Macedonia to fight Serb control of that region, until it was suppressed by the Bulgarian authorities in 1934.


75 Todorovski deplored the contempt established scholars had for right-wing attitudes in the Macedonian national movement. Todorovski, Vnatreshna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizatsija, p. 9 passim; cf. Todorovski, “Makedonskata istoriografija i politikata,” p. 61.


78 Blazhe Koneski (1921-1993) was one of the most important intellectuals in the Macedonian Republic and instrumental in establishing the Macedonian language norm.

79 Kiselinovski et al., Makedonski istoriski rechnik, p. 245.


83 The role of language in this dispute can be illustrated by two examples. 1) In 1996, Prime Minister Georgievski (then still opposition leader) changed his given name from the orthographically correct Macedonian “Ljupcho” to the Bulgarian variant “Ljubcho” (Voss, “Sprach- und Geschichtsrevision,” p. 958ff.). 2) After VMRO-DPMNE took power in 1998, state television began to broadcast a daily program right after the main news at 7:00 P.M. called “Speak Macedonian” (Govorete makedonski), which teaches the use of correct Macedonian expressions, mainly instead of popular Serbian loanwords.

84 For such ruptures in national myths cf. Smith, Myths and Memories, p. 86.


86 During the Yugoslav period an agreement existed between the archives in Belgrade and Skopje according to which copies of documents on Macedonia from the inter-war period were transferred to the Archive of Macedonia in Skopje. With the break-up of Yugoslavia, this agreement was rendered invalid.
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89 Achkosaka, Zadrugarstvoto i agrarnata politika; ibid., Zadolzhitelniot otkup; ibid. Agrarno-sopstvenichkite odnosi, promeni i protsesi vo Makedonija.


97 Cf. Smith, Myths and Memories, pp. 63-7.