


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L' intérêt pour les Juifs de Grèce

by Odette Varon-Vassard

L'intérêt pour les Juifs de Grèce commence à se manifester dans les milieux scientifiques grecs au cours des années '90. Le premier colloque avait pour thème *Les Juifs en Grèce. Questions d'histoire dans la longue durée*, il fut organisé en automne 1991 à Salonique, par l' "Association pour l'étude des Juifs de Grèce", nouvellement fondée à l'époque et avait un caractère expérimental (*Oι Εβραίοι στον ελληνικό χώρο*. *Ζητήματα ιστορίας στη μακρά διάρκεια*, Actes du premier colloque d'histoire, supervision Efi Avdela – Odette Varon-Vassard, éd. Gavriilidis, Athènes 1995). Le Colloque tentait d' embrasser la totalité de la recherche effectuée, la période choisie était donc celle de "la longue durée" depuis l'époque byzantine jusqu' au génocide. Pour la première fois une manifestation de cette importance était organisée autour de ce sujet en Grèce (seize intervenants, parmi lesquels cinq étrangers, dont les communications ont été publiées en anglais ou en français dans les Actes / à noter un article en anglais de Hagen Fleischer sur la déportation des Juifs en Grèce).

Les conférences isolées ou les quelques publications ayant vu le jour jusqu'alors n'étaient en fait que le produit de recherches personnelles ne répondant pas à un questionnement scientifique collectif et ne s'inscrivant pas dans une problématique plus vaste, ce qui en minimisait leur portée.

En avril 1998, un colloque sur le même thème eut lieu à Athènes organisé par la "Société d' Études de l'École Moraïtis", il a suscité un large intérêt (les Actes seront publiés d'ici la fin de l' année 1998). Nous sommes tentés de regarder derrière nous afin de constater que le chemin parcouru pendant ces sept années a été long. En effet, nous pouvons noter: la parution d'un certain nombre de publications, l'organisation de plusieurs Journées d' Étude et de manifestations mais, ce qui apparaît le plus important, est la création pendant cette période d'un climat propice à accueillir et à développer de telles études, de sorte qu'aujourd'hui elles s'inscrivent dans un champ d'intérêt scientifique bien délimité. C'est ainsi que l'historiographie grecque développe sa propre dynamique, participant au débat international autour de questions analogues. À partir des années '90 le champ des études autour des Juifs a donc commencé à se constituer en Grèce.

L' importance de ce fait dépasse les études historiques et s' étend à la société elle-même. La reconnaissance du fait que pendant plusieurs siècles une communauté héterodoxe (de religion juive) ayant, dans le cas des grandes communautés sépharades, sa propre langue (le judéo-espagnol), a coexisté avec la communauté chrétienne orthodoxe hellénophone sur le territoire grec, revêt une importance capitale pour l'historiographie grecque. Cette reconnaissance bat en brèche l'image monolithique d'un État néohellénique (constitué après la libération du joug ottoman) s'appuyant sur une unité religieuse et linguistique.

Il importe, pour notre conscience historique actuelle, de ne pas ignorer que depuis 1492 (date d'expulsion des Juifs de l'Espagne et de leur accueil par l'empire ottoman sur ses propres territoires) jusqu'en 1943-1944 (date de déportation de la majeure partie de la population juive de Grèce et de son extermination dans les

camps de concentration), soit pendant quatre siècles et demi –et je ne me réfère qu'à l'histoire moderne– il y a eu coexistence des deux communautés dans plusieurs villes du territoire qui allait devenir l'État grec –parallèlement avec une troisième communauté: la communauté musulmane. C'est sous cet angle-là qu'il est, à mon avis, important pour l'historiographie grecque de s' ouvrir à ces questions, et non de les considérer exclusivement comme une partie de l'histoire des Juifs. Si cette prise de conscience joue un rôle dans la formation de l'identité nationale d' aujourd' hui, sans être considérée comme une menace pour cette dernière, un pas important serait franchi. D'ailleurs, l'histoire des Juifs en diaspora n'est jamais uniquement l'histoire d'une communauté juive. Sa spécificité est d'être chaque fois l'histoire d'au moins un autre peuple, avec lequel les Juifs coexistaient pacifiquement ou par lequel ils étaient persécutés.

Je vais à présent signaler les étapes les plus significatives de cette évolution. Avant les années 90, un premier foyer d' intérêt est constitué dans l'historiographie néohellénique autour d' Abraam Benaroya, figure de proue de la "Fédération Ouvrière Socialiste de Salonique", appelée couramment *Fédération*. Anghelos Élefantis a établi et présenté des textes d' Abraam Benaroya édités sous le titre *Η πρώτη σταδιοδρομία του ελληνικού προλεταριάτου* (*La première carrière du prolétariat grec*, 1ère éd. Olkos, Athènes 1975, 2ème éd. Kommouna, Athènes 1986). L' historien Antonis Liakos a publié une très intéressante étude sur cette organisation syndicale [*Η Σοσιαλιστική Εργατική Ομοσπονδία Θεσσαλονίκης* (*Φεντερασιόν*).... (*La Fédération Ouvrière Socialiste de Thessalonique (Fédération)*, Ed. Paratiritis, Salonique 1985.)] La recherche des débuts du mouvement ouvrier grec conduisait tout naturellement à ce milieu de Juifs

saloniciens du début du 20e siècle, représentant une première rencontre par la voie de l' histoire de la gauche.

Mais c' est au début des années '90 que les publications commenceront à se multiplier. Le livre *Εβραίοι και Χριστιανοί στα νησιά του νοτιο-ανατολικού Αιγαίου* (*Juifs et Chrétiens dans les îles du sud-est de la mer Égée*, éd. Trochalia, Athènes 1992) par lequel l'auteur, Maria Eftymiou, introduit de nouveaux paramètres concernant la coexistence traditionnelle des différentes communautés sous l'administration ottomane, et brosse un tableau bien plus complexe que l'image d'Épinal communément admise d'une coexistence "idyllique". Cet ouvrage est un des rares qui porte exclusivement sur la longue période de domination ottomane. Un autre ouvrage, également intéressant, publié récemment, porte sur la communauté salonicienne (Alberto Nar, *Κειμένη επί ακτής θαλάσσης* (*Gisant sur le rivage, études sur la communauté juive de Salonique*, éditions Néfeli, Athènes 1997)). Nous pouvons également évoquer la thèse de Réna Molho, soutenue en 1997 à l' Université de Strasbourg, portant notamment sur la communauté juive de Salonique (en attente de publication).

La vie des communautés juives sous domination ottomane est encore un domaine pratiquement inexploré des historiens grecs. Par contre, il convient de signaler l' oeuvre monumentale de Joseph Nehama, *Histoire des Israélites de Salonique* (tomes I à IV édités à Paris en 1935-1936, tome V 1959, tomes VI et VII, édités par la Communauté Israélite de Thessalonique en 1978). Le fait que cette oeuvre de référence reste jusqu' à présent sans traduction grecque est caractéristique du manque d' intérêt qui a sévit sur le sujet. Dans les travaux d' historiens étrangers, il faut signaler l' ouvrage collectif *Salonique 1850-1919, La "ville des Juifs" et le réveil des Balkans* (sous la direction de Gilles

Veinstein, éd. Autrement, collection "Mémoires", Paris 1992) et la récente thèse de Bernard Pierron *Juifs et Chrétiens de la Grèce moderne, Histoire des relations intercommunautaires de 1821 à 1945*, éd. L' Harmattan, Paris 1996, qui pose la question de la situation des Juifs dans une Grèce indépendante.

Il est vrai que l'intérêt pour la communauté juive de Grèce a été presque entièrement monopolisé –et cela se comprend aisément– par des études sur cet événement capital de l'histoire européenne du XXe siècle que constitue "la solution finale", la déportation et le génocide des Juifs par les nazis. Pendant les années 90 une "explosion éditoriale" a rompu le silence qui avait duré presque 45 ans. Dans ce domaine l'apport grec est presque contemporain de la bibliographie étrangère qui marque, en Europe, un retard également de plusieurs décennies sur ce sujet.

Dans ce domaine également quelques rares publications antérieures ont vu le jour. La bibliographie en langue grecque concernant la déportation des Juifs de Grèce a commencé à se constituer en 1976, c'est à dire trente ans après la libération. Ces deux premiers titres ont été des traductions.

Le premier est la traduction en grec, par Georges Zographakis, du livre *In Memoriam* de Michael Molho - Joseph Nehama, publié en 1970 par la Communauté Israélite de Salonique. Cet excellent travail publié initialement en français (1948-1953, 1ère éd.), était le produit de la collaboration entre le rabbin de Salonique Michael Molho et le savant Joseph Nehama. Le livre débute par la description de la communauté juive de Salonique à la veille de la déportation, puis il brosse la chronique détaillée des persécutions subies par cette communauté. Il se réfère brièvement aux zones d'occupation bulgare et italienne (une page et demi environ est consacrée à chaque ville dont la communauté a été déportée: Volos, Larissa,

Trikala, Ioannina, Kastoria, Hirakléion, La Chanée etc...).

Cet ouvrage relève du témoignage, puisqu'il est écrit par des personnes qui ont vécu les événements, mais aussi de l'historiographie, puisqu'il traite avec une méthodologie scientifique cet énorme matériau. Il en était de même du livre de Myriam Novitch, *To πέρασμα των βαρβάρων. Συμβολή στην Ιστορία του Εκτοπισμού και της Αντίστασης των Ελλήνων Εβραίων* (Le passage des barbares. Contribution à l'*Histoire de la Déportation et de la Résistance des Juifs de Grèce*, traduction de Georges Zographakis, éd. de l'Association pour l'amitié gréco-israélienne, Athènes 1985. 1ère éd. en français, Paris 1967, 2ème éd., Paris 1982). L'auteur a rassemblé une très importante masse de données, constituée surtout de témoignages de Juifs grecs ayant survécus aux camps de concentration ou ayant participé à la Résistance. La valeur des informations est de source précieuse mais elle n'a pas celle d'un ouvrage d'historiographie, son contenu n'ayant subi aucun traitement. De fait, le travail de l'auteur consistait justement à recueillir à partir de 1945 des documents et des témoignages dans tous les pays européens pour le compte des archives Lohamei-Hagetaot, en Israël.

Ces deux livres ne prennent pas de distance par rapport aux événements, ce qui leur donne un ton affectivement très chargé (lamentation pour le désastre, colère devant ce qui s'est passé, étonnement et embarras, sentiment de dette morale envers tous ceux qui ne sont pas revenus). Ceci semble tout à fait normal, puisque les auteurs sont des Juifs ayant vécu cette période historique et cherchant par leur récit à conserver la mémoire de ces événements, Myriam Novitch faisant elle-même partie des survivants d'Auschwitz. Ces deux premiers livres constituent une présentation "à chaud" du sujet, ils sont édités par des organismes qui cherchent

à conserver la mémoire de la Shoah. Ils ont longtemps trouvé un caractère confidentiel, concernant uniquement la communauté juive, le premier provenant des publications de la Communauté Israélite, le second d' une Association et non d' un éditeur; ils étaient introuvables en librairie et n' avaient touché aucun autre public.

Pour la publication des témoignages des survivants grecs on devra attendre pratiquement les années 90. En 1981, le premier témoignage, celui de Heinz Kounio, ayant pour titre, *Εζησα το θάνατο* (*J'ai vécu la mort*), sera publié à Salonique (à compte d' auteur). Mais ce n'est qu'à la fin des années 80 et au début des années 90 que nous relevons un accroissement notable des publications de témoignages de Juifs grecs ayant fait l'expérience des camps de concentration. De 1989 à 1998, quinze livres vont paraître, tous sont de très importants témoignages. La communauté juive de Grèce ayant perdu le 87% de sa population –le pourcentage le plus élevé en Europe– aura eu enfin droit à quelques témoignages qui, bien-sûr, ont également valeur de mémoire collective.

Cette série de témoignages sera inaugurée par le livre de Berry Nahmias ayant pour titre *Kραυγή για το αύριο* (*Un cri pour l'avenir*, éditions Kaktos, Athènes 1989). La parution de ce livre dans une maison d'édition athénienne revêt, à mon avis, une importance particulière, car elle marque le passage d'éditions communautaires ou à titre d' auteur au circuit commercial du livre et ouvre donc à la vente en librairie. De plus ce livre présente une importance supplémentaire en raison que Berry Nahmias est originaire de Kastoria et vit actuellement à Athènes. En effet l'histoire de la déportation a très souvent été liée, voire de manière quasi exclusive, à la ville de Salonique, et des témoignages concernant aussi

d' autres villes étaient indispensables. Le seul autre témoignage qui sera édité à Athènes est celui d' Erricos Sevillia, préfacé et annoté par Nicolas Stavroulaki (*Athènes-Auschwitz*, éd. Hestia, Athènes 1995).

La publication de plusieurs témoignages de Salonique est liée au travail de Franguiski Abatzopoulou qui a établi et présenté bon nombre parmi eux. On doit souligner ici le fait que certains d' entre eux ne sont pas le fruit des souvenirs tardifs de leurs auteurs survivants, mais la publication de notes et de cahiers manuscrits qui ont été retrouvés des années après dans les camps. Ces éditions ont été réalisées par la Fondation Ets Ahaim (témoignages de Marcel Natzari et de Marc Nahon, Salonique 1991), par les éditions saloniciennes Paratiritis (les très importantes mémoires de Yomtov Yakoel -cahier de 1941 à 1943 retrouvé- ainsi que le livre de Franguiski Abatzopoulou *To ολοκαύτωμα στις μαρτυρίες των Ελλήνων Εβραίων* (*L'Holocauste dans les témoignages des Juifs de Grèce*), Salonique 1993, synthèse de tous les témoignages publiés jusqu'alors), ou bien par les deux organismes regroupés, La Fondation Ets Ahaim et les éditions Paratiritis, comme ce fut le cas du livre de Jacques Hantali, *Από το Λευκό Πύργο στις πύλες του Αουσβίτς* (*De la Tour Blanche aux portes d' Auschwitz*). Ces mêmes éditeurs viennent de publier un volumineux ouvrage de 600 pages regroupant cette fois-ci les témoignages oraux de 45 Juifs survivants des camps (Erika Kounio-Amarilio /Alberto Nar, *Προφορικές μαρτυρίες των Εβραίων της Θεσσαλονίκης*, *Témoignages oraux des Juifs de Salonique*, Salonique 1998). Le livre est accompagné d' un tableau chronologique et d' un dictionnaire de Franguiski Abatzopoulou du monde concentrationnaire.

J'aimerais également citer brièvement un certain nombre de travaux historiographiques récents traitant de ce sujet. En 1994 le numéro 52-53 de

la revue *Σύγχρονα θέματα* (*Synchrona Themata*) comprenait un dossier important consacré aux Juifs de Grèce et constitué grâce aux soins de l'historienne Efi Avdela; dans ce numéro sont présentés quatre articles traitant du problème des Juifs pendant l'occupation en Grèce. Les principaux axes de ces textes inauguraux dans la problématique de la question juive en Grèce s'appuyaient sur le silence des sources concernant la Résistance (Odette Varon-Vassard et Mark Mazower), des propositions d'approches méthodologiques de la Shoah (Barbara Spengler-Axiopoulou) ainsi que des récits autour de l'Holocauste (Frangiski Abatzopoulou).

En 1996 il y a eu réédition du livre de Polychronis Énépékidis, *To Ολοκαύτωμα των Ελλήνων Εβραίων* (1ère édition en 1969, épuisée de longue date, réédition par les éditions Hestia, Athènes 1996.). Le remplacement dans le titre du terme "persécutions" par celui d' "holocauste" relève de l'intention de l'auteur de rejoindre une problématique et une terminologie contemporaines. Ce livre constitue cependant un cas à part dans l'historiographie grecque: publié en 1969, en pleine dictature, par un auteur vivant à l'étranger et qui avait accès aux archives allemandes a touché un public très restreint. D'une part, sa réédition aujourd'hui par une grande maison d'édition prouve qu'un tel livre peut trouver, aujourd'hui auprès du public, un accueil beaucoup plus favorable, bien que d'autre part il paraisse dépassé pour plusieurs raisons: en premier lieu de par son écriture, c'est à dire la katharevousa rigide des années 60, ensuite et surtout par sa structure et son style narratif, simpliste et journalistique: l'auteur appuie son récit linéaire sur des textes officiels qu'il cite tels quels, traduits simplement en grec. Par ailleurs, c'est cela, justement, qui constitue la valeur de ce livre aujourd'hui: il peut servir de source. Cette deuxième édition contient également une annexe avec des textes officiels concernant le sort des

Juifs de Crète .

Le dernier livre de Frangiski Abatzopoulou, *O άλλος εν διωγμῷ. Η εικόνα του Εβραίου στη λογοτεχνία. Ζητήματα Ιστορίας και Μυθοπλασίας*, (*L'autre persécuté. Le portrait du Juif dans la littérature. Questions d'histoire et de fiction*, éd. Thémélio, Athènes 1998) traite de manière particulièrement pertinente de questions concernant la manière dont le génocide est perçu en littérature, et dans une seconde partie, de l'image du Juif en tant que "Autre" dans la littérature grecque.

Dans deux livres récents, celui de Mark Mazower, *Στην Ελλάδα του Χίτλερ* (*Dans la Grèce de Hitler*, trad. par Kouréménos, Ed. Alexandria, Athènes 1994 / original en anglais) et celui de Hagen Fleischer, *Στέμμα και Σβάστικα* (*Royauté et Svastika*, 2ème vol., éd. Papazissis, Athènes 1995 / original en allemand) nous trouvons deux chapitres sur la déportation des Juifs de Grèce. Il est important que dans ces deux livres traitant de l' Occupation en Grèce la déportation des Juifs trouve sa place dans son contexte historique, et non comme une histoire à part; il y avait précédemment comme un malaise à traiter cette question, et les livres sur l' Occupation ou la Résistance laissaient souvent de côté le sujet, en renouvelant un silence trop connu. Pourtant la déportation et le génocide trouvent leur véritable sens que dans leur contexte historique.

Enfin, il faudrait signaler la très récente parution des Actes du troisième Colloque de l' "Association pour l'étude des Juifs de Grèce", *Oι Εβραίοι της Ελλάδας στην κατοχή* (*Les Juifs de Grèce pendant l'occupation*, supervision Rika Benveniste, éd. Vanias, Salonique 1998). Un autre volume, préparé par l'Association, paraîtra à la rentrée 98, à Athènes. Il s'attache à des sujets plus théoriques sur la mémoire du génocide du point de vue historique et psychanalytique (*Εβραϊκή μνήμη και ιστορία. Histoire et mémoire*

juives, par les éditions Polis, avec des textes de Tzvetan Todorov, de Jacques Hassoun, de Yannis Thanassakos, de Rika Benveniste et d' Odette Varon-Vassard.)

Je voudrais souligner, à propos la contribution de cette Association à l' instauration de ces études en Grèce, l'organisation d'au moins quinze manifestations à Athènes et à Salonique de 1991 à 1998, des Journées d'Etude (telles que "Le génocide des Juifs et la question de responsabilité", Salonique, Février 97), des conférences de chercheurs étrangers, des publications ont réussi à instaurer un dialogue et à maintenir un intérêt vivant afin que de jeunes chercheurs décident de prendre en compte ces sujets, sachant que leurs travaux rencontreront un milieu d'accueil.

Mais au delà des approches scientifiques, d'autres existent, parmi lesquelles des approches littéraires. Je signalerai brièvement quelques ouvrages parus au cours du semestre dernier: Vassilis Boutos, *Η συκοφαντία του αίματος* (Meurtre rituel, roman sur les Juifs de Corfou, éd. Néféli, 1997), E. Nahman, *Γιάννενα, ταξίδι στο παρελθόν* (Iannéna, Voyage dans le passé, Talos Press 1996) et la traduction si attendue de *Θεσσαλονίκη, η περιπόθητη πόλη* (La ville convoitée, Salonique) de Joseph Nehama sous le nom de P.Risal (éd. Nissides, trad. du français de Vassilis Tomanas, Skopelos 1997 / 1ère éd. Paris 1917).

J'aimerais conclure par une constatation optimiste: après 1990 la bibliographie grecque sur ce sujet s'est enrichie de plusieurs publications tant dans le domaine des témoignages que dans celui des ouvrages théoriques; ceci nous permet de dire que la voie s'ouvre pour ce champ d'étude scientifique. Des colloques, des Journées d'étude, des numéros spéciaux de revues, des articles isolés ou bien des livres, forment aujourd'hui une base sérieuse

qu'on n'osait pas même espérer il y a dix ans. Le paysage s'est donc sensiblement modifié et le débat ne pourra que s'élargir dorénavant. Souhaitons donc que le mouvement continue et s'accentue dans le sens d'une recherche institutionnalisée, s'effectuant au sein des universités et des centres de recherches.

**Barbara Harlow,
*After Lives: Legacies of
Revolutionary Writing***

**Verso, London 1996
and**

***Barred: Women,
Writing, and Political
Detention***

**University Press of New
England/Wesleyan University
Press, Hanover NH 1992**

by David Staples

Barbara Harlow's most recent book deals with the subject of the assassinated writer in the singularity of historic revolutionary struggles and resistance movements in Palestine, El Salvador, and South Africa. The character of Harlow's work in general has much to do with both the legacy and memory of revolutionary writing as well as the political and historical legacies of revolution. In *After Lives*, Harlow presents a deeply aporetic analysis of three assassinated writers. Forget for a moment that the Palestinian, Salvadoran and South African revolutionary movements have been linked historically in both fact and fiction;

forget too that the writers Harlow interrogates *in absentia*, Ghassan Kanafani, Roque Dalton, and Ruth First, were subjects of political assassination. Then remember that these struggles have been historically linked, and that Kanafani, Dalton and First were assassinated. Whose memory will serve? In struggle, in historic struggles, Harlow reminds her present and past readers, we feel the absent presence of assassinated revolutionary writers—Harlow here cites Naji al-Ali, Malcolm X, Amilcar Cabral, Steve Biko, Walter Rodney, Bobby Sands, Oscar Romero, Ignacio Ellacuría, Roque Dalton, Ghassan Kanafani, Ruth First—and in terms that remind us as well of the starkness of historical struggles and theories of writing: absolute necessity, absolute contingency, and the social-political movement always and already within and between the terms and turns of struggle. The subject of assassination is remembered here as one, every one, divided in profoundly political struggle. Not homogeneously divided, not in the same struggle, but nonetheless together apart. What links Kanafani's, Dalton's and First's writings more than Harlow's essay on their legacies? Her attempt and those of others to continue the singular writing of these and other combined struggles.

From "resistance literature" to prison writings to what she calls "new geographies of struggle," Harlow has consistently and coherently moved through the critical writings of the present history of revolutionary and resistance movements, all the while describing how such movements (must and do, can't and don't) go on. In contrast to her previous books, *Resistance Literature* and *Barred: Women, Writing, and Political Detention*, which explicitly target U.S. academia for its liberal geo-politics of inclusion of area literatures operating as the exclusion of literatures of resistance, revolution, prison, and political movements—*After Lives* doesn't openly argue for

or against academic politics, for lack of a better politics. The work, the texts, the histories, are written for and to the divergent revolutionary politics of diverse peoples, parties, classes, movements and nations. Mostly for worse, and definitely for better in some cases, the academy doesn't take up such literature and theory. *After Lives* is quiet in this regard, and it's difficult to speculate what this could mean.

On the other hand, in *Barred*, and in the context of an opening polemic against the literary theoretical exclusion of gendered and revolutionary prison and resistance writings, Harlow eloquently links the historically singular and politically contingent aspects of struggles and movements in Northern Ireland, Palestine, South Africa, El Salvador, Argentina, the United States and Puerto Rico with the specific circumstances of the massive incarceration, torture and interrogation of revolutionary and politicised women and men. The historical contingencies and necessities of the struggles are carefully articulated with the physical, intellectual and emotional necessities of ongoing feminist and women's struggles—and of their continuous struggles going on—in prison. *After Lives*, surprisingly, displaces this articulation of gender, resistance and prison writing with the institution and trope of assassination. The results of this theoretical and historiographical move may indeed be the dead ends prefigured by the assassins: profound disarticulation of the movements, self-imposed crisis, and a dismayed revolutionary reactionism typified by the post-Marxist/post-feminist/post-Left in the post-'80s United States of Europe and America.

Where Harlow gets into trouble in *After Lives*, which is fine in any case, is in assigning a unidirectional quality to the chronologies of revolutionary politics, i.e. the historical 'movements' *from* independence *to*

decolonisation and postcoloniality, from armed struggle to 'negotiation,' from interrogation to 'dialogue', from the 'old' writing of resistance literature to the 'new' writing of human rights, etc. All of which, according to Harlow in *After Lives*, is in some other way related to the shift of locus of 'movement' politics from revolutionary parties to NGO's and the apparent end of revolution in our 'new times'. The trouble, which, while a theoretical problem, is also one of historiographical legacies of struggle, is not new. It was, for example, stated and debated in the early 20th century by Lenin and Luxemburg. The problem as a question was, of course, both prior and posterior to the chronological question of revolution, i.e. when the revolution could, would and should come. It was, and remains in different ways, precisely a question of strategy. Dictatorship of the proletariat or mass organisation of the party, war of maneuver or war of position? Absolute necessity or absolute contingency? As it turned out, particularly during and after the '60s, it was rarely a case of either/or, nor would it be in the coming decades, since within the movements and struggles and writings there was already something of both, or neither. For every negotiation, armed struggle was a precedent; equally, if not symmetrically, negotiation was a precedent for every armed struggle. Negotiation became a consequence of armed struggle, armed struggle a consequence of negotiation. You can see the code working itself out in all places at all times, unless you want to see something like closure for a certain moment, such as in the "negotiated solutions," or conditions of cease-fire, or writings of constitutions of the mid-'90s. Harlow writes in *After Lives*: "'Democracy' and 'negotiation,' in other words –and together with such attendant terms as 'election,' 'policing,' 'transitions'– have, in the 1990s, in a most important sense displaced (albeit still controversially) 'armed

struggle' as the focal point of cultural and political debate." (AL 6) So what, when? In piecing together the lives and afterlives of revolutionary writers such as Kanafani, Dalton and First in *After Lives*, Harlow has attempted simultaneously to question what the movements informed by these writers will or would have become after them, and with/out them. What, she asks repeatedly, would these writers say now? Part of Harlow's question is of course to insist on the singularity of the assassinated revolutionary writer. But part is also to suggest the possibility of assassination of the revolutions themselves, or revolution itself. "In other words," she writes, "perhaps not only writers but revolutions as well were martyred in the transition from interrogation and assassination to electoral participation." (112) As a question, this opens onto a closed cycle of historical movement. The problem, as with Harlow's shift since *Barred* from the writings of the imprisoned to those of the assassinated, from the history of the present to the past, is that independence, decolonisation, postcoloniality (as with the freeing of political prisoners and political amnesty) are incomplete movements, much as they get fixed in history and theory; negotiation gives way to armed struggle gives way to negotiation, and so on; electoral struggle necessitates revolution necessitates electoral transitions. Who writes that the revolutions in El Salvador, South Africa and Palestine are finished? More important, who writes that the struggles go on, that revolution, like power, is the name given to a complex situation of strategy in a given society, à la Foucault? Who, following Gramsci (as Stuart Hall, for example), writes that hegemony is never completely made or taken, that it is a historically contingent –and necessary–process of joining social forces together in the pursuit of revolution, and that that revolution always and already takes many historical forms? Who writes, in other words, that

'the movement' and 'the movements' (the international, anti-national and non-national women's movements, for example) never stop? In *Barred*, the testimonies of political prisoners, detainees and survivors of prison rape and torture were represented by Harlow as the very specific political responses of significant facts and figures in ongoing historic movements of resistance and revolution. Only five years later, in *After Lives*, it appears the revolutionary author, and the revolution she authored, are indeed dead.

What would Kanafani, Dalton and First say? And what is this question the difference of? What, for example, did these important writers' imprisoned comrades –in *Barred* Harlow cites Nidia Diaz, Caesarina Makhoe, Guadalupe Martinez, and Leila Khaled to name only a few– say? What is happening in the afterlives of assassinated political writers? And what is this difference from the pre-postlives of the assassinated, i.e. from the prison lives and writings of partisan political subjects and comrades? Harlow may be strategically mistaken to conflate assassination with the (of course, still controversial, still open) end of armed struggle in the respective revolutions. Dissidence in El Salvador, Palestine, and South Africa is nowhere near (and always near) death and is everywhere in the afterlives of assassination, and torture, and disappearance, and imprisonment, and casualty of war. And, yes, *After Lives* begs the question, what if it were not so? And is it so? Would the writings of the politically assassinated, interrogated, tortured and imprisoned so powerfully presented in *Barred* signify anything so historically different as then (ironically, in the periods before, during and after the assassinations analysed in *After Lives*)? The internal fracturing of the FMLN which was both cause and effect in Dalton's trial and execution (but surely not the end of armed struggle more than fifteen years later) by his own revolutionary group, the Ejercito Revolucionario Popular [ERP], is now at another conjuncture, and possibly a

new articulation, following the imprisonment of many of its partisans, thousands of deaths and disappearances, various ceasefires and negotiated settlements, and the electoral success of the FMLN in 1997. The armed struggle, side by side with the cultural struggle of which Kanafani was a most articulate spokesman, goes on in the deoccupied and massively enclosed Palestinian territories, as significantly as in Israeli prisons, a fact and figure Harlow clearly links with the revolutionary writings of political detainees and other movement members, including Kanafani, in *Barred*. On an altogether different scale, the internal fracturing and rearticulation of social, cultural and political movements in South Africa leads many to ask if another, very different revolution is just beginning, as First was one of the first to suggest in her research on the regional geopolitics of Southern Africa, on itinerant mineworkers in *Black Gold*, and on the new and different articulations of race, gender, nation, and labor to which few in the previous movements were held responsible.

Such speculations, far short of Harlow's detailed historical and conjunctural analysis of the writing and movements surrounding the assassinations of Dalton, Kanafani and First, are intended to support her concise observations on the singularity of assassination of revolutionary writers in *After Lives*, as much to bring her work back through the critical historical and literary trajectories of the cultures of political resistance and imprisonment which she outlines in her previous work. "[T]he assassination of the writer is a historical and political event with very tangible cultural, critical and material consequences for theorising the subsequent participation in and reclamation of the work of intellectual figures who have been instrumental in organic resistance to systems and discourses of domination, and whose life work had been committed to redefining the very 'politics of shed blood'." (26) One might easily and responsibly reinsert "imprisonment" for

'assassination' in the preceding citation. What then? What would they say then? What if, as Harlow so wordlessly takes her readers through the historical and political aporia in and of *After Lives*, they had not been assassinated (or imprisoned)? Not what would they have been had they not been assassinated, but what were they that they were? Behind these questions, much as in *Resistance Literature* and *Barred*, is the insistence that "...assassination takes place for precisely political reasons, a recognition that corpuses as much as corpses were at issue, and have yet to be laid to rest." (145) Their enemies wanted the writers dead as much as their writings and revolutions to end, to be buried in history, and imprisoned in silence.

And yet. In *Barred: Women, Writing, and Political Detention*, Harlow turns and returns to the legacy of women's revolutionary prison literature and prison survival as a key to the revolutionary cell of movement history and theory. The revolutionary writing which survives in the cases and places Harlow documents in *Barred* (e.g., the Northern Ireland hunger strikes, the intifada, sectarians vs. secularists in Egypt, South Africa after the Rivonia Trials, the secret prisons in El Salvador, anti-racist and anti-imperialist struggles in the United States and Puerto Rico, and the sanctuary movement in the U.S.), in particular the legacies of women's resistance, leadership and organisation in the movements and in prison, are *testimonios* critical in the ongoing and necessary historicisation and theorisation of the respective movements and struggles. Or are they? This is clearly not a problem addressed to those in the U.S. and European teaching machines (although it is, too), but to those involved in one way or another in the ongoing struggles in these and other places. Or is it? Whose memory will serve? The writings of survivors of massive prison rape, torture, and interrogation, which Harlow articulates with their movements' histories and strategies in *Barred*, are implicitly at end by the

beginning of *After Lives*. With the exception of her account of Ruth First's imprisonment under the 90 Day Detention Law in 1961, narrated by First in her prison autobiography *117 Days*, Harlow in *After Lives* forsakes much of the analysis which gave a history of the revolutionary present in *Barred* (long after the assassinations of Kanafani, Dalton and First), and asks her readers to consider the demise of the revolutionary political subject as the closing of the subject of revolutionary politics. How could the same question (or, as Gayatri Spivak puts it, the 'question of the same') be posed to those imprisoned (now and then, and again and again) for revolutionary, seditious, conspiratorial, and a host of other political activities –or to the legatees of their writings and struggles?

More to the point, what is happening in the current historical conjuncture to suggest that the supercession of the previous conjunctures by the end of armed struggle and the rise of 'negotiation,' political amnesty, 'dialogue,' elections and a neo-Gramscian war of position in civil society, in some way obliterates, in the mid-1990s, the very same current historical conjuncture marked by Harlow in her previous works? In other words, what of what was subject to change has changed? And what hasn't? And what must still? And whose questions are these? Harlow's critical focus in *After Lives* on human rights reporting in the theoretical context of a vacuum-like postmodernism signals a counterrevolutionary turn via her post-mortem on revolutionary writing. What would Kanafani, Dalton, and First (and their imprisoned, detained, tortured and disappeared others) say now and again? What were they (and are they) fighting for in the first (and last) place? And now? Why? More importantly, why not?

* A longer version of this article appears in a special issue on prison writing of *Pretext* (1998)

**Sande Cohen,
*Academia and the Luster
of Capital***

**Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1993**

by Robert Batchelor

In January of 1997, Hayden White stunned an audience at the New York meeting of the American Historical Association by announcing that he still believed in Marxism as the primary framework for historical analysis. What White meant in terms of a particular method remains obscure, but his remarks bring to mind not only Jacques Derrida's 1993 gesture towards Marx but also the work of a lesser-known author, Sande Cohen. (*Spectres de Marx*. Paris: Editions Galilée, 1993) The promising protégé of Hayden White, Cohen received his dissertation from the University of California, Los Angeles. His 1986 book *Historical Culture: On the Recoding of an Academic Discipline*, while often conflated with White's *Metahistory*, actually critiqued White's attempt to recuperate history through the device of metaphor and an almost transcendental poetics governed by the criteria of academic aesthetic judgment. Cohen's second book *Academia and the Luster of Capital* (1993) received less attention, but it raises the most interesting questions with regard to Hayden White's seemingly incongruous return to Marxism.

Most of Cohen's book stakes out a series of intellectual positions largely defined by the last of the post-World War II French "neo-Marxists," namely Jean Baudrillard, Jean-François Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze. For these theorists, the totalising and energetic character of capitalism

("constant revolutionising of production") made it impossible to ground epistemology on anything solid. ("All that is solid melts into air") As Baudrillard wrote,

It becomes impossible to distinguish (Lyotard) the libidinal economy from the system's economy (that of value). It becomes impossible to distinguish (Deleuze) the capitalist schizzes from the revolutionary schizzes. Because the system is the master: like God, it can bind and unbind energies... In truth, there is nothing left to ground ourselves on. All that is left is theoretical violence. ("Symbolic Exchange and Death", Mark Poster (ed.), *Selected Writings*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988, p. 124.)

Cohen works out of this position, through Nietzsche, and begins his own enterprise of theoretical violence, targeting the discipline of history.

At one level, *Luster* offers a personal illumination of the purging of Cohen and more broadly 'deconstructive' theory from the academic discipline of history. Chapter Two, "The Academic Thing," is the most interesting and most problematic of the book. Unlike the other chapters, which offer relatively conventional theoretical critiques of various historiographic positions, this chapter presents three scenarios taken from Cohen's experience in academia. The University of Minnesota Press chose to delete both individual and institutional names from the manuscript. The resulting text reads oddly like an eighteenth-century satire with blanks replacing the names of aristocrats. Cohen's first example stems from his own experience in 1976-1978 as a prospective candidate for a position at _____ University, which turned him down in favor of an affirmative action hiring. Not only does he argue that public

and private research universities used affirmative action in the 1970s to expand the inflow of grant money from foundations like the Mellon into the humanities, but he also contends that the accompanying bureaucratisation of the hiring process allowed administrators to both mystify and dictate decisions formerly governed by departments.(31) The second example Cohen offers involves the use of bureaucratic and legalistic procedures to enable a politically-based non-renewal of a colleague's position at [California Institute for the Arts?] in 1985-1986. The final example comes from 1987 when Cohen was a lecturer at [UCLA?], and the university pulled funds out of the lecturer program in order to support a number of "star" senior faculty tracks. As he argues in this last case, "It takes no theoretical insight to figure out this power play, which all the political factors—including internationally famous left historians—played to the hilt."(59) In fact, one might wonder why Cohen needs any theory, aside from something like Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of knowledge, to explain what seem to be rather straightforward exertions of economic interest and bureaucratic/corporate power against casual labor (lecturers and post-doctorates).

At a basic level, Cohen's arguments seem symptomatic of the California academic job market since the 1970s. As state universities in California tried to compete with the eastern establishment of the Ivy League, administrations emphasised modes of distinction such as star academics, multicultural programs, and fashionable theoreticians in order to highlight their humanities programs. At one level, this opened up domains and opportunities to a certain number of previously excluded perspectives. At another level, the "politically correct" nature of the hirings disguised the economic and prestige motivations behind these appointments and the strains placed on teaching by the shift in resources. Cohen,

using a classic California trope, characterises the process as a series of "power plays masking as utopian projections." (47)

But, the implications of *Luster* go beyond the particular California "academic thing." In particular, Cohen's book suggests how the historian's status as tenured, tenure-track or lecturer determines the limits of "academic freedom." According to Cohen, the academic writing of the tenured faculty member has an absolutely guaranteed future, even if the audience for such writing equals itself. (36) Such an economy of academic production leads Cohen to the conclusion that, "The 'research' model is undoubtedly a colossal piece of narcissism." (62) Conversely, without the mark of tenure, Cohen's own textual production illegitimately questions the unity/community of the profession. In 1988, the historian Peter Novick in his own critique of the historical profession ambiguously used Cohen as both a critic of the "objectivity" myth and as a whipping boy to help explain "the decline in the [historical] profession's sense of wholeness." (*That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 589).

"Stars" like Peter Novick or the medieval historian Norman Cantor can name names, and their vaguely naughty behaviour receives praise from other prominent historians. Academic freedom works as a function of corporate seniority, a freedom held by an elite carefully selected through the tenure process that confirms and perpetuates the viewpoint of the academy. Rather than a guarantee of free thought, tenure becomes a mode of policing.

This interpretation might seem too extreme, for there remains the possibility of an appeal to the "public" through the variety of academic presses. Yet, the encounter between *Luster* as manuscript

and the University of Minnesota Press also framed the possibilities of critical articulation. Editorial policies are in part responsible for the reductive feeling of the argument, much of which apparently ended up on the cutting room floor. As Cohen explains at an abstract level, "Institutions, including those of the criticism market, require that one learn to pay attention to lengths (time codes), repetitions (structures) and processes (directions), since these forms are directly creative of labour and cultural socialites." (83) Cohen's critique raises the question of "the implications of symbolic 'indifference' toward every type of official culture, institutionalised in the forms of university presses, curatorial texts, the reviewing processes, grants from the National Endowment for the Arts and so on." (145) Even in the case of a supposedly "avant-garde" theory press like Minnesota, edges get blunted, texts get bowdlerised, names get dropped (erased or commodified as the case may be) and theory becomes normalised for academic consumption. The press serves up "spicy" food *para los gringos*.

An even broader frame than tenure or academic presses is the relation of the university to a broader system of capitalist reproduction of society and ideas. The sacred space of the university ("academic freedom") is made possible by a fortress of capital (endowments, government and business grants, production of students, network of alumni, even landed property). Cohen's current employer, Cal Arts, is well known as a feeder institution for the Disney corporation, a long-standing relationship dating from Walt Disney's involvement in the founding of the school. In part, the establishment of the capitalist fortress (the "ivory tower") returns to the issue of tenure. As Cohen explains, "because of this built-in self-perpetuation of professional production, it is hard to see how the university would generate ideas that might interfere with its own privileges."

(24) Moreover, the permeation of the university by capitalism makes the commodification of knowledge an important component of the general production of professional commodity-selves ("stars"), an academic "self-fashioning" explicitly modeled upon the Renaissance courtier (cf. Galileo). As Cohen explains in a more recent article, "Today's historians are skilled as surviving in one of the great laboratories of Capital, which is precisely what 'profession' means in a managerial world: the most contentious realities can be written, extraordinary global changes can be processes in modes of intellect and institution which are themselves unchangeable." ("Reading the Historians' Resistance to Reading: An Essay on Historiographic Schizophrenia", *CLIO*, 26:1(Fall 1996), p. 3).

Cohen faces the problem of somewhat willingly being pulled back into the capitalist academy with its own peculiar brand of knowledge production and its replication of the "cultural 'logic' of management." (101) Despite his use of personal anecdotes (*anekdota*: that which is unpublished), it remains unclear how Cohen's project challenges the general process of academic commodity-self production. Cohen establishes his own "distinction" (in Bourdieu's sense of the word) with a series of theoretical trump cards (Nietzsche, Lyotard, Baudrillard) not very different from those consistently used by avant-gardists of the twentieth century, arguments which seem to have done little to mobilise a politics either inside or outside of the teaching machine let alone to shake the foundations of Capital. Cohen's most recent published work, aside from his forthcoming book, is a sort-of exchange with Kerwin Klein in the journal *CLIO*. Klein comes close to what he calls the "banal irony" of classifying Cohen's work as a reflection of the capitalist culture of the modern academy, "an interest group politics in which one set of white collar professionals (theorists) legitimates itself by attacking another

group of white collar professionals (historians). ("Anti-History: The Meaning of 'Historical Culture,' (Sande Cohen)", *CLIO*, 25:2(Winter 1996), p. 125-144) Cohen responds by accusing Klein (along with a large group of University of California historians) of "professional border-patrolling" and verging "on the hysterical." Is the only politics possible after the collision of theory and academic bureaucracy a form of localised struggle between junior academics over their relations of legitimacy with (Capital "A") Academia?

Academia can be understood solely as a bureaucratic and capitalist structure, reduced to its economic frame as a symptom of omnipresent and omnipotent Capital, yet in such a situation, any politics emerging from academia could only re-institute or negatively mirror a form of bureaucratic capitalism. In such a system, according to Cohen, "The idea of 'history' [has] served as a cultural measure in what was the political control of economic practices." (152) This seems to get at what Cohen means when he talks about "thought systems that hyper-politicise or reduce life," but Cohen resists any coherent social, political or economic formulation. (155) To a certain extent, all critical or political theory written from within the university loops back into this system of academic social reproduction. Revisionism in history and cultural studies, which questions the old objectivist and historicist model of "recreating the real," nevertheless "continues the passage of culture onto the control of bureaucracies of meaning—schools, galleries, museums and so on—whose luxurious reactivity stands out against 'general society' and its skidding toward 'infotainment' and worse." (85) The increasing role of university administrations in controlling departmental hiring since World War II and the growing interference of the state in hiring practices at public universities suggest that the current "downsizing" of the academy is part of a long-term process of corporate bureaucratisation

of American universities. This process is not well documented because the production of socio-economic knowledge in the United States largely remains within the academy. The American university may indeed offer no other options outside of a capitalist reduction of political ideas to professional commodities, an "official becoming" that ceaselessly reduces "life to the reproduction of domestic politics with its precise local power games." (95)

As a strategy or form of resistance, Cohen calls somewhat vaguely for the "debureaucratisation of one's thought-signs." (97) At some points, Cohen seems to suggest a form of madness as strategy that parallels the "theoretical violence" of Baudrillard. "Historicist discourse is something to be feared," writes Cohen, "something to practice a creative paranoia against" [as opposed to Klein's creative "hysteria"?]. (86) In his more recent work (1996), Cohen talks about historians who "wish to remove historical writing from politics, using political rhetoric. In other words, his earlier suspicion of politics seems to derive from the uses to which political rhetoric is currently being put by historians rather than a fundamental and categorical dismissal. Yet, with the collapse of Marxism as a framework of analysis and the lack of an organised international proletarian labour movement what kind of new politics could be imagined, either within or outside of the academy?

The present weighs heavily upon any attempt to develop such a theory of practice. This is evidenced by the difficulty in establishing what frame determines Cohen's own argument—ranging from California universities to global capitalism. Cohen has to contend with the fragmentation and diversity of American academia as opposed to the more centralised French system analysed by Bourdieu. Beyond this, however, the fragmentation of contemporary transnational capitalism makes conceptualisation

**F. Ankersmit and
H. Kellner (eds.),**
***A New Philosophy of
History***
**London: Reaction
Books, 1995.**

by Ageliki Koufou

and critique increasingly difficult, unlike the relatively centralised system of nineteenth-century capitalism organised around a few metropoles in Europe analysed by Marx. Capitalism in the late twentieth century has revolutionised and erased the remnants of its older manifestations. How would one even begin to think about politics from a position within the "teaching machine" that itself has trouble imagining capitalism as something beyond a commodity for use in academic debates?

To a large extent, this problem stems not only from the nature of American academic culture but late-twentieth-century capitalism generally. What Cohen shows is how French theory, dependent on the ghosts of an old Marxism that posited a unified field of production, crashes J. G. Ballard-style into the bureaucracy of an increasingly corporatist culture of the American academy. His work raises several important questions, two of which seem central to all contemporary academic practice. What radical possibilities does intellectual labor offer in the late twentieth century? Has the development of capital erased all radical potential from the categories of history and politics? Perhaps some of these questions will be answered in Cohen's forthcoming book. The importance of *Luster* is not that Cohen answers such questions but that he in theory raises issues that ultimately cannot be completely incorporated into the academy. The reader is left with the possibility of mapping the wound patterns on the body of theory resulting from the crash with academic bureaucracy in the hope of finding a new realm, analogous to that once called the political, for the twenty-first century.

The book—a collection of essays written by historians, literary critics and philosophers—constitutes an attempt to take stock of the major shifts in historical consciousness over the last twenty years. In his introductory essay, Hans Kellner discusses the nature of this change which involves a redefinition of the concept of history in terms of a different view of the world and its representations. This new approach focuses on historical discourse itself, on the assumption that language is a dense entity to be looked at, not something to look through. The shift of the object of research from a presumably ascertainable historical reality to the medium as creator of knowable reality, referred to as the linguistic turn, became the leading feature of New History. Historians following this approach are less concerned with the ascription of "truth values" to historical statements or with developing sociological models of historical explanation, orienting themselves rather towards the investigation of linguistic and cultural codes of representation. In his bibliographical essay, Frank Ankersmit codifies this reorientation of historical reflection defines at least two of its basic principles: 1) historical texts are dense realities rather than descriptions of an external reality; 2) historical texts are not reconstructions but

constructions of the past. Both Ankersmit and Kellner foreground the aesthetic character of the historical text seen as a "rhetorical practice, a form of discourse" and attempt to trace the origins of this, not entirely new, history.

The book is divided in four parts each dealing with different questions of the redressive procedure of the historical discourse. In the first part, Arthur Danto and Richard Vann follow the trajectory of the linguistic turn, studying the persistence of the old paradigm and the ensuing conflicts between "positivists and narrativists," whereas Nancy Partner gives her own assessment of the reception of this new approach and its influence within the academy, which she considers limited.

The essays of Vann and Danto, although focusing on different aspects, supplement each other, as they each give an account of the process through which New History was imposed. Vann traces the transition from Hempel's covering laws to the rhetoric of History by analysing the relevant debates as they appeared in the *History and Theory* review. He suggests that the linguistic turn is inextricably linked to the rise of speculative philosophy which highlighted the literariness of history, long repressed by the analytical philosophy of history. Although Vann, like most of the contributors to this collection, claims that the narrativist trend in history is not new, he agrees nonetheless with Hayden White that historians like George Macaulay, Trevelyan (*Clio, a Muse*) and Emery Neff (*The Poetry of History*) relied on a philosophically questionable dualism between historical research and historical writing. This resulted in posing the literary nature of history in terms of good writing—at the lexical level—without its philosophical grounding which valorises the artistic character of history. Vann illustrates the debate between the two camps represented by L. Mink, W. B. Gallie, and A. Danto and M. Mandelbaum, R. G. Ely and C. B. Cullagh

respectively. The former attempted to rehabilitate the aesthetic value of history without diminishing its scientific status, whereas the latter criticised the narrativist model on the ground that it introduced relativism. Vann underlines the belated involvement of historians in this debate motivated by philosophers. He also discusses the argumentation of French poststructuralism concerning the literary aspect of history. However, he is critical of R. Barthes for rejecting historical realism, being more positive about the elaborations of J. H. Hexter and Hayden White who defended the cognitive status of narrative in general and the specificity of the historical narrative. He also endorses the efforts of bridging history and literary criticism undertaken by F. Kermode, F. Jameson and, above all, by the pioneering work of Hayden White. Vann skillfully presents White's work—whose importance he readily acknowledges—but is critical of his notion of the "governing metaphor", which in his view implies the dissolution of historical knowledge. In this vein, Vann investigates the limits of the applicability of language theories in the historical text and shows the contradiction between the concepts of event and narrative. His argumentation is imbued with a concern for defending historical realism as a presupposition for the valuation of truth claims. Although Vann acknowledges that a paradigmatic shift has occurred during the last twenty years, he is skeptical about the future of the linguistic turn. However, it is rather difficult to combine a view of the past "wie es eigentlich gewesen" with the rhetorical character of the historical narrative as they represent two different paradigms in historical understanding. Historical writing can still be based on reality without aspiring to reconstruct the past "as it really was."

Arthur Danto's treatment of the paradigmatic shift from positivism to New History follows a different path. According to Danto this shift was due to the

influence not of literary criticism but of philosophy of science, in particular the pioneering work of Thomas Kuhn. Danto's essay is a vehement attack on Karl Hempel's *The Function of General Laws in History* with regard to historical explanation. Although Hempel revised some of these laws, he never abandoned his ahistorical concept of scientific laws, a fact which according to Danto underlines the historicity of logical positivism and of every scientific construction. Danto claims that the declining authority of Hempel's theory of historical explanation is connected to the gradual undermining of the analytical philosophy of history following the challenge of Kuhn's work. Based on Kuhn and Foucault, Danto insists on the historical grounding of scientific theories and presents positivism as a stagnant theory of historical explanation, unable to account for historical change as it subsumes history in the natural sciences. Finally he makes two major points: first, he raises the historian's point of view as a determining factor which relativises the unifying experience of *Verstehen* and defines perception of the world; second, he underlines the relationship between truth and relevance whereby he explains the abandonment of Hempel's theory. Both points illustrate Danto's belief in the historicity of every intellectual operation.

Nancy Partner's commitment to the linguistic turn is, to say the least, tenuous, as she appears to be reluctant to admit its impact on the historical discipline, stating that this turn is like "a revolving door where everyone got around and around and got out exactly where they got in" (p.22). According to Partner, in spite "of the sophistication of the theory-saturated part of the profession, scholars carry on in all essential ways as though nothing had changed since Ranke" (p.22). Although other historians have sustained this argument before (see for example L. Hunt, J. Appleby, M. Jacob, *Telling the Truth about*

History), we should be skeptical about its validity, as no theoretical shift leaves the practice of history entirely untouched. It is pointless to think of such a "destabilising" theory which privileges narratives and challenges factual approaches as having no tangible impact on historical methodology. It should be stressed in this respect that the linguistic turn does not put in question the existence of a certain reality, but the way this reality is linguistically construed and conveyed. This leads to a variety of "realities" whose truth depends on the questioning and the explanatory devices historians employ, as well as on the different aspirations of the social groups to which they belong. Although Partner diminishes the importance of the linguistic turn for historical understanding, she stresses what she deems to be its negative influence on "popular forms of history conveyed by television, journalism and film, where distinctions between history and fiction are purposefully blurred." This postmodern blurring of distinctions Partner condemns as untrustworthy and non-scientific. Tracing the origins of the overlapping of history and fiction she goes back to premodern times when prose and fiction coexisted harmoniously in historical work and when the historian's personal involvement (ethical judgments, convictions, etc.) didn't seem to alter the historical operation. "History is bound to fiction" says Partner because the latter constitutes History's prior analytical category. Partner draws a distinction between fiction as a linguistic creation whereby meaning is conveyed and fiction as an imaginary description of events. Fiction in the first sense is a presupposition for History, as for every linguistic representation. Yet, in its second quality, History is not fiction but a subcategory of "a verisimilar prose through a system of announced limitations and accepted restrictions" (p. 33) based on evidence and verification. In this process of understanding and deciphering history

writing, the role of the form through which information is diffused is of great importance. According to Partner, literary historicity, or in other words, a balanced coexistence between fact/prose and fiction constituted an accepted convention in the writing of history in premodern times, and before the professionalisation of the discipline. The imposition of new disciplinary rules involved a different conception of truth which changed the relationship between fact and fiction and the role of history in society. This shift is the main argument against the comparison between premodern fiction histories and postmodern historical writing. Such a comparison would presuppose the continuity of historical thinking, whereas in our view the linguistic turn, as any other shift in historical understanding, must be perceived in terms of discontinuities with past practices. Another objection against this “balanced system” is related to the clear distinction between fiction and non-fiction in historical narrative defended by Partner. Fiction is mainly the linguistic artifact, the narrative form through which historical thought is articulated, and consequently anything in the historical account is linguistically encoded. Facts are indistinguishable from their linguistic depiction. The point here is not the undermining of historical truth/veracity as a consequence of the incorporation of fiction, but the acknowledgment that no historical raw material can be conceived independently of the narrative form through which it is conveyed.

The essays included in the second part of the book under the title “Voices”, deal with the subject of history, the historical voice long neglected or repressed under the domination of the powerful (historical) object privileged by modernism. Linda Orr raises the problem of subjectivity and the personal site of the historian as a narrative persona in the text, which guarantees a communicative interaction between the writer and the reader. Orr examines French

historiography during the first part of 19th century and before the professionalisation of history set in, when writers like Mme de Staél, Michelet and Tocqueville actively participated in their narratives. Long after the establishment of anonymity in the historical text as a result of the domination of the positivist paradigm in history, the linguistic turn rehabilitates the status of the historian’s personal voice in the text. This approach is shared by all the essays in this part. Philippe Carrard’s study is a thorough investigation of the reasons accounting for the elimination of the historian’s person in the text—in the form of the personal pronoun “I”—focusing on the mode of enunciation in the context of the *Annales* school. Carrard adopts much of the critique of the French poststructuralist literary critics who suggested that the effacing of the enunciator strengthens the powerful reality effect of traditional historiography. In the conception of history advocated by the French positivists, the historical text is presented as a direct, unmediated representation of past events—the facts speak by themselves—whereby, as Roland Barthes puts it, the signified is identified with the referent. Carrard’s apt observation that impersonality is rather superficial and that the enunciator is not fully erased in the historical text contributes to a different assessment of the historian’s active presence in the text. This observation leads to the deconstruction of all claims to objectivity and impartiality. The gradual abandonment of the positivist model did, however, affect the mode of enunciation. Thus, the first generation of the *Annales* school struggled against the emotional involvement of the writer aiming at the attainment of objectivity understood as a “lack of partisanship and not as an independence from a cognitive subject” (p. 111). Using examples from the work of F. Braudel, F. Furet and G. Duby, Carrard shows the explicit presence of the enunciator in the text as

manifested by the use of pronouns as well by the expression of strong individual beliefs and feelings. Carrard also observes a reluctance to use the "I" and a preference towards the "we" (nous) or "on" (structuralist enunciation), the indeterminacy of which conceals the real subject in the text. Avoiding the first person seems also to be the choice of the third generation of Annales historians (R. Chartier, M. Ozouf). Yet, this choice seems to be more of a reaction against the historical authority of their predecessors than an endorsement of the idea of value-free research and objectivity. In spite of the weak presence of "I", their subjectivity is nonetheless overt. Carrard concludes his study claiming that the Annales school relies on a highly involved enunciator, thus inclining to a postmodern concept of the historical enunciation, without, however, being aware of the epistemology that underlies this textual usage. Nevertheless, personal involvement mustn't overstep the limits of historical deontology. The critique of Ladurie's fierce partisanship and undermining of testimony seems to have a point. Ann Rigney foregrounds the importance of the narrative strategies as a model of organising historical information in romantic historiography. Her central argument is that the selection of discursive form shapes historical events and allows communication with the reader. The study of four romantic historians (Thierry, McCaulay, Monteil, Michelet) reveals a rich variety of discursive forms, through which these writers attempted to present historical reality. Rigney claims that this variety proves the lack of congruence between discourse and historical referent, and establishes the superiority of narrative as the constructive matrix of reality.

In the third part, under the title "Arguments", Allan Megill and Robert Berkhoffer deal with issues concerning the historian's profession and identity in the postmodern era. Megill reflects on the modifications and the gradual abandonment of

grand narratives which he considers embedded in the ontological assumption of world unity. He challenges the authoritative role of historiography in understanding the past and argues for interdisciplinary collaboration. Megill designs a typology of four distinct, although coexistent, historiographical attitudes towards history in chronological sequence. The first attitude is based on the tradition of universal history and grounded on the belief that there is one coherent history that can be told or retold in the present. Its origins can be traced in the Patristic period but its secularised version was established by Kant. The second attitude is based on the belief that there is a single history which postpones its narration and corresponds to the emergence of professional historiography in the 19th century. This attitude is exemplified by Ranke who condemns the apriorism of Kant and Hegel without abandoning the notion of totalisation based on the idea of continuity and objectivity. The third attitude seems to dominate the historical profession in the 20th century. The idea of a single history that can never be told locates coherence not in the story but in the discipline itself in the hope of maintaining its purity and autonomy. Megill fosters a fourth attitude which challenges the concept of a single history but embraces the three previous attitudes as different modes of understanding the past. Megill's commitment to disciplinary pluralism in approaching the past takes him beyond the field of historiography in the cultural condition that has come to be identified as "postmodern". Finally, he proposes four ways of practicing science: 1) by rejecting totalisation and turning from history to histories; 2) by crossing disciplinary boundaries and creating hybrid states; 3) by cultivating the literality of historical writing; and 4) by establishing links between history and theory. R. Berkhoffer examines the issue of perspective and point of view in history writing and focuses on the modes

of representation of multivocality and multiperspectivity in historical texts. Berkhoffer brilliantly demonstrates that even though multiculturalism challenges hegemonic viewpoints and defends the coexistence of many perspectives in the historical text, it does not in effect succeed in creating a balanced text of different voices. The multivocality aimed at is mediated through the dominant perspective of the text maker, the great story-teller, and thus undermined. In this way multiculturalism failed to transform the presuppositions of the normal historical paradigm; it merely expanded its field of application to "untraditional subject matters" (p.183). Against the privileged position of the historian/narrator Berkhoffer endorses his/her participation in equal terms in a dialogue involving other voices and viewpoints. Both essays validate the belief in a historical shift towards a postmodern consciousness which is inextricably linked to disciplinary interaction.

In the fourth part, entitled "Images", Stephen Bann moves beyond the textual approach to the contested subject of historical representation which he understands as a double procedure of historical construction involving the represented object and the process through which it is represented. This binary approach constitutes what Bann calls double vision, which he deems characteristic of modern historical consciousness since the beginning of the 19th century. Such an approach, according to Bann, cannot but be ironic as it is directed not towards the comfortable notion of "the" past but towards a plurality of different co-existing pasts. This double vision, or stereoscopy, allows the representation of history in a historical site (*locus*) [e.g. Eglise Toussaint in Angers] as a procedure of establishing perceptible differences and creating a palimpsest of pasts rejecting the unmediated contrast between past and present. Frank Ankersmit develops a pictorial approach to

the historical text that challenges the literariness-thesis fostered mainly by Hayden White—on the ground that it undermines historical truth and reliability. Ankersmit argues in favour of the analogy between historical text and image on the ground that the former is seen in its entirety and not as a set of separated statements. This resemblance has its origins in the semiological approach of the picture introduced by E. Gombrich and elaborated by N. Goodman. Ankersmit extends the pertinence of qualities such as density and repleteness and the inseparability between subject and predicate—which, according to Goodman, differentiate a picture from a word or statement—to the historical text: the historical text should be approached comprehensively as the historiographical equivalent of the pictorial sign. Exploring in depth the relationship between picture and historical text, Ankersmit distinguishes between the qualities and the aspects of a picture, stressing that aspects always relate to the qualities of the picture itself and not to the depicted object. This leads to a distinction at the level of representation between pictures representing that and other [pictures] representing something, by virtue of which Ankersmit classifies the historical text in the second category. Nevertheless, he discerns a co-existence of the nominalistic and the realistic interpretation in the historical text in the sense that the qualities correspond to the text itself (picture), without precluding its agreement with historical reality (depicted). The point could be made that this distinction involves a serious contradiction as it rejects the opacity of the picture as a permanent quality and opts for its occasional transparency. Is it possible to perceive, in our (postmodern) times, the picture as a transparent medium, as "an open window" to reality? According to the linguistic approach, the historical text, constituted as it is through linguistic procedures, has a narrative form which

we can not attribute to reality. Even if Ankersmit displays an analogy between picture and the historical text, visual arts as another powerful language create and impose a reality rather than imitating an external one. Although Ankersmit criticises the naive resemblance theory in art, he accepts one of its variants as applicable both to art and the historical study. The absence of representative schemes and codes for the whole historical text leads Ankersmit to a comparison not between the past and its textual reconstitution but between the content and the form of the text, concluding on a certain agreement between them. This agreement is based on a relative independence because, according to him, historical form is not fixed and doesn't function as a representational code to which the content must be adapted. Even if Ankersmit seems to follow Hayden White and P. Ricoeur with regard to the uniqueness of the form and its analogy to the content, he tends to distinguish the two, where(as) White sees an inextricable unity established through the organising force of the form. The independence from one another guarantees, according to Ankersmit, the truth and the objectivity of the text. Without underestimating the originality of Ankersmit's conception of historical text as resembling the picture, the extent to which, it moves towards better understanding of historical text and its functions is rather limited.

The essays in this volume touch upon a number of serious transformations of historical consciousness in the postmodern era without fostering a rigid professional authorship. Although they endorse the linguistic turn, they articulate an autocritical discourse which constitutes a reflection on the future of what we call New History.

**Jan Pakulski and
Malcolm Waters,
The Death of Class
London: SAGE
Publications, 1996**

by Yannis Yannitsiotis

The Death of Class by Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters announces the end of social classes in today's postmodern societies in a somewhat triumphant manner. The authors' certainty, accompanied by a provocative language, as for example the preface's first paragraph—"this book is an admission of hypocrisy. We have written a book about class while being committed to the view that books about class should no longer be written"—comes from the changes that have occurred in the last decade in Europe: the withdrawal of Marxism, the dissolution of communist regimes, the fact that class ideology no longer affects Western Europe. The more developed countries have ceased to be class societies, particularly after the second half of the century, while class maintains its strength in the less developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In particular, the authors indicate that modern Western societies are characterised by "a wide redistribution of property; the proliferation of indirect and small ownership; the credentialisation of skills and the professionalisation of occupations; the multiple segmentation and globalisation of markets; and an increasing role for consumption as a status and lifestyle generator" (p.4).

In order to give a meaning to the concept of "class," the authors choose a particular view based on a combination of Marxian and Weberian views. Class is thus linked to property and market

relations. This reductionist approach characterises the overall study here attempted.

The authors mention that social class is a historical phenomenon that appears in the 19th century. In the beginning of the 20th century, factors such as the state and political parties changed the nature of class relations, resulting in class losing its validity. The birth and death of class is historically determined, as suggested by the authors, in the following way, dividing history into three periods. The first period refers to the "economic-class society" characterised by relationships of power and conflict amongst groups of interest, which appear in the economic domain. The dominant class holds control of the state, whereas the laboring classes develop a revolutionary identity. The second period refers to the "organised-class society," which is dominated by politics and the state. The state is guided by a political-bureaucratic elite that includes party leaders and organised interests. The masses are equally organised, in national-political groups. The third period is characterised by the "status-conventional society" in which social framing is determined by culture. The welfare state has weakened to such a degree that it is unable to support collective benefits, while the economic dimension of class gives way to mobile, biographically self-composing individuals.

In the first chapter, the authors give a description of class theory as established by Marx, and of class analysis as described in some empirical studies of Goldthorpe, Marshall and Wright. The following two chapters analyse the basic works of sociology. On the one hand they center their attention on distinguishing categories other than class such as ethnicity, gender, race, power, culture, professional authority and others, which have played a catalytic role in contemporary societies as points of social differentiation. On the

other hand, they redetermine social class in today's societies, so as to prove that class theory cannot constitute an epistemological subject, simultaneously showing the essential importance of status as a notion in the forming of social scales. The fourth and fifth chapters allow a more systematic approach to the three historical levels of class. The fifth chapter is particularly revealing of the authors' notion that individuals are freer in making their choices and establishing their positions than they were in the past. The sixth chapter concentrates on the issues of culture and identity, as well as their manifestations, such as knowledge, customs, and aesthetics, and suggests that the theory (true to the first historical period) holding culture as the reflection of class is problematic. The seventh chapter emphasises the existing disjunction between contemporary politics and class. The authors borrow the expression "imagined communities" from Benedict Anderson, and speak of classes that are being created, like nations, as imagined communities, i.e. abstract totalities which exist on a symbolic level rather than a realistic one, as in the first period mentioned above. They thus ascertain that political practices, wider political groups and political expression reveal a huge differentiation that doesn't correspond to specific political classes as in the second period.

This particular book could represent a useful contribution to the field of sociology regarding the issue of social class. It includes enough information on empirical studies of class analysis, and distinguishes many social class manifestations. The discussion that is here attempted with an angle on theoretical problems closes quickly because the authors are tied to empirical studies, and give particular weight to an image of modern society which they construe as the end of an era. It is not, however, evident how much they believe in the end of the great narratives (Socialism, civil democracy) or in "the

end of the history," as F. Fukuyama put it. There is indeed an exaggerated certainty, constant throughout the book, about the death, as they say, of class.

I believe there are two unfortunate choices that give this book its stigma: the schematic and even simplistic use of history, and the confined perception of social class that leads to reductionism, something the authors themselves denounce.

The authors choose as a point of reference E.P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Class* (pp. 9-10), which is analysed in such a way as to disorient the reader, since they don't refer at all to Thompson's belief that class is, first and foremost, a matter of relation. Most important is that the choice of Thompson is made so that members of sociological communities who undertake to "subject their theories of class to intersubjective argument and their empirical descriptions to validation" can be differentiated from those who hold to "historical and philosophical interpretations" in which class "exists almost by virtue of the observation that it exists, made by the ideological experts who are committed to its existence." Here, Thompson seems to be categorised for the fact that he puts too much emphasis on the cultural character of class and its complexity. This observation is surprising to the reader, for his work is loaded with examples and "pragmatic" events, as the authors claim. It is maybe superfluous to mention that in the field of history, thirty years after its first publication, this classical book has been revised many times by later historians. In the 1980s it was perceived as socially reductionist, for Thompson's analysis of the relationship between experiences and class consciousness was problematic. Furthermore, the authors should make reference to the very rich historiographical production on social class in the last two

decades, which includes revisions of economical and social redefinitions of class, as well as opens major areas of discussion of the relationship between "reality" and discursive practices, and the importance of representation and symbolism, elements that played a fundamental role in the making of social class both in the 19th and 20th centuries. The authors' choice of Thompson to prove their critique is unsuccessful, because the epistemological paradigm within the field of historiography has changed, and surely, the particular sociological perception doesn't allow the slightest interdisciplinary communication with history, anthropology or literary criticism.

This book is particularly relevant in its on account of social classes as they are historically rendered, and in the manner in which it conceives the historical character of a phenomenon such as class. History, for the authors, is identified with the past, and characteristics of oblivion are attributed to it with unfortunate metaphors such as "... dispatch patriarchy to follow class in the trash can of history where, they both belong" (p.112), or expressions like "History has proved unkind to this expectation" (p. 61) (in relation to the belief that classes achieve the highest point of their articulation under conditions of conflict and struggle). At this stage, the past and the discourse on it, as determined by the discipline of history, is not a fixed point nor the objective judge of human actions. Therefore, the historian, or anyone else speaking of the past, doesn't deal with an immobilised time maintaining the safe distances established by objectivity. S/he is interested in and speaks of historical time and its various important moments as they are formulated in relation to social and cultural occurrences. S/he attempts to understand linguistic and intellectual engagements of social reality that transform historical time into conventional time, i.e. into past, present and future. The authors' belief that "class is a

historical phenomenon" is positive in that it doesn't give class an ontological aspect. At the same time, however, it doesn't bring to light class's cultural character, its historicity. As far as I understand, the question posed is not whether the existence of social class can be proved, but in what ways it is redefined by individuals themselves, bearers of social action and theoreticians, so that social inequality may be interpreted. Class is therefore determined by empirical terms, and in fact through economic reductionism. Historical studies that question socio-economical grounds as explanatory methods of understanding social class have proved the importance of language in class formation and the role of symbolic meaningfulness, together with which individuals research and assume their identities. *The Death of Class* doesn't take into consideration this long tradition. It holds a marginal position in the construction of identity, the role of power and its relation to knowledge. Foucault's now classical advice is thus missing. Believing in this from beginning to end, the authors recognise the past through the trilateral format of a certain kind of functionalism. The absence of crisis on all levels of the evolutive social structure is obvious. They propose a status-conventional theory primarily based on culturalism (symbolic dimension of individual and collective life), fragmentation (infinite overlapping of associations and identifications that are shifting and unstable), autonomisation (self-referential individual rather than externally constrained) and finally on resignification (continuous regeneration of individual preferences) (pp. 152-8).

This book is disappointing not so much because it is centered on the empirical studies of sociology and on the significant absence of a theoretical treatment of social class—this in fact could be one of the many ways of narration—but because it isn't convincing that class, in our era,

has died. The authors do recognise today's social inequalities, although they don't define them and make no reference to the reasons that instigate, sustain and reproduce them. The choices around which the authors articulate their thought are obvious: they idealise the post-fordist-taylorist model, recognise the supremacy of liberalism, confine the classist character of social structure to developing countries and not to the capitalist West, etc. Therefore, neither the destruction of communist regimes and character of social structures developing in Eastern Europe, nor today's reality of twenty million and even more unemployed in the European Union allow us to distance ourselves from the concept of class. But in the event we agree that the collective notion of "class" as a pragmatic and cultural category is no use in understanding social problems and social change, then the fields of communication, labor, social protests, and individual rights form links between class and other categories of individual and collective identity in which we can also detect the ways power and social inequality are structured. Here, the scope of research has not been exhausted yet; on the contrary, it is only beginning ...

The death of terms and concepts such as class is, after all, an issue of communication among people, of self-determination as members of groups or wider collectives, of discussing and deciding upon their actions. The Internet, the communication means of postmodernity par excellence, constitutes the renegotiation, and not the rejection, of notions of reality such as class, by now defined with the structure rather than the production of information. If, thus, the importance of human relations, of which class is part and parcel, acquires meaning and interpretation in a particular time and context, then it seems useless to persist with formats that comply with modes and thoughts of modernity on the issues of birth, evolution and death.

Classes don't "die" in the streets of the city. They first "die" in the thought and language of people. Paraphrasing Norbert Elias, I would say that "the loneliness of dying classes" intensifies rather than relieves the agony of the death of class. Social classes, apart from being tools for analysing and theorising, were glorified as individual and collective identities, while they also expressed social inequality and power structures. Power relations and inequality themselves don't die in the contemporary megalopolis of neo-liberalism and of the "Asian Tigers," nor have they disappeared from people's daily experiences, sense and language.

exploration of the legal apparatus, penal institutions and practices of the nineteenth century, and although young criminals were conspicuous in criminal justice and in the discourses of contemporaries, they are still invisible in historical narratives. Benveniste recognises law as an important source of historical knowledge. She points out that legal discourse produces symbols and norms, while recognising law as a product of social transformations and as a force for the crystallisation or transformation of social relations. Benveniste's book contributes to an understanding of the administration and control of juvenile criminality by placing it in the intellectual and social context of nineteenth-century Greece.

The aim of Benveniste's study is to trace the positioning of juveniles in legal discourse and institutions as well as to examine the ways in which the judiciary and the penitentiary dealt with and envisaged young criminals in nineteenth century Greece. Furthermore, it seeks to illuminate the relationship between social structures, ideology and repressive institutions. Benveniste adopts the term criminality instead of delinquency for it was the term used by contemporaries when referring to the antisocial behaviour of the young. In this way she avoids a dogmatic conceptualisation of juvenile antisocial behaviour, while allowing for an understanding of penal law as a cultural element that reflects and crystallises cultural change. Moreover, the term delinquency itself reflects encoded socio-psychological criteria used by specialists after the Second World War.

Benveniste deals in fact with two projects. First, using a quantitative approach she tries to trace the presence of children and young people in criminal statistics and to examine how an age category, namely youth, was defined by penal justice. This involved inquiring whether juveniles

**Rica Benveniste,
Ποινική καταστολή
της νεανικής
εγκληματικότητας
του 19ο αιώνα (1833-1911)**

**[Penal Repression
of Juvenile Criminality
in Nineteenth Century Greece
(1833-1911)]**

**Athens-Komotini:
Sakkoulas Publications, 1994**

by Pothiti Hantzaroula

Rica Benveniste's book can be located in the field of the social history of juvenile criminality. Until now, apart from a few exceptions, Greek historiography has not paid attention to the

were treated differently than other offenders, the kind of crimes they committed and the punishment applied, whether their crimes were interpreted less seriously and punished less severely. For Benveniste, statistics, rather than revealing the reality of juvenile criminality and measuring criminality, speak more about the practices and the stereotypes that a particular society constructed, as well as about the vision of reality the categories conveyed and the model of social structure embedded in these categories.

From the analysis of crime figures, Benveniste elaborates three hypotheses. First, the high proportion of juvenile delinquents in the first decades after the establishment of the Greek state has to be related to demographic factors as well as to the social structure of the society. Greek society in the second half of the nineteenth century was a society of youths. Moreover, by defining youth as the category of people under 21, Benveniste argues that juvenile criminals were not actually so "young" since they started their working and marital lives early. Second, concerning the structure of juvenile criminality, it seems that the punishment of youths for crimes considered "dangerous" to society, such as banditry, did not differ from that of adults, while the jury showed less severity towards young people for crimes considered minor in the general climate and trend of illegality. Third, it seems that the weakening of banditry and the increased effectiveness of the state apparatus led to a redefinition in the conceptualisation of the penal responsibility towards youths, which led in turn to a decrease in the proportion of youths who were punished.

The second project deals with the position and the image of young delinquents in the penitentiary, as well as with the doctrines and interpretations produced by nineteenth century legal scholars. Examining the role of the prison in

19th century legal thinking, Benveniste points out that all the attempts to establish the modern penal system operated around the idea that punishment should involve not only the protection of society but the betterment, the normalisation and the education of the incarcerated. Trying to trace the gap between stated intention and actual outcomes, Benveniste explores the organisation of prisons, the models of penitentiary and the techniques applied in institutions in the framework of the discourses and the practices that dealt with the above issues.

Benveniste argues that in practice there were more similarities than differences in the way adults and juveniles were handled in the penitentiary system. The segregation of the inmates by age was implemented through the establishment of a sector for young people in Siggrou prison and the foundation of Averof prison, and this came in response to the demands of a group of scholars who were concerned with the organisation of prisons and theories about punishment. She illustrates two reasons. First, the nineteenth-century conceptualisation of the prison was inextricably linked with the function of the prison as a mechanism to measure, assess and categorise individuals in order to facilitate control and moralisation of them. Her second point is that in nineteenth-century Greek society, the child comes to the center of public interest. What follows is an embryonic discussion of the representations of children in literature and art and the ideas of childhood these representations conveyed. More explicitly, what comes out of these representations as well as from pedagogic and medical discourses is the idea of childhood as a separate stage of human development and a romantic idealisation of children as innocent, which influenced legal discourse and defined the ideas of scholars about a different treatment of children in correctional institutions. Moreover, the

failure to apply in the penitentiary system the techniques that were considered suitable for young people as well as to provide a different etiology of juvenile criminality from those which existed is attributed by Benveniste to the idealistic and sentimental conceptualisation of childhood and to the ideological function of these ideas, which served to close off social and political issues. Yet, I believe, one should bear in mind that the middle-class vision of childhood which is reflected in the representations of children in literature and painting was not a universal value, in the same way that the experience of being a child was not universal in the 19th century. Besides, there were many contradictions and ambivalences in the conceptualisation of childhood conveyed in the discourses of philanthropists and legal scholars. It might have been the case that the romantic idea of childhood served as a framework for state and philanthropic action. Yet, poor children (the children which legal as well as philanthropic institutions mainly dealt with) were not provided with the same experience of childhood, nor were they entitled to the same ideal of what a child should be as were middle class children.

Trying to explain state inertia towards the treatment of children in institutions, Benveniste establishes a link between public policies toward children and the role that children played in the economic and social life of communities. By applying a Foucauldian analysis, she traces the technologies of power of a disciplinary society and connects the disciplinary techniques of penal institutions to those of schooling. Thus she argues that the disciplinary techniques applied to children in schools as well as the importance of the economic contribution of children account for a treatment of children in the penitentiary that was not different from that of adults. Yet, the explanation of state inertia has to be related to philanthropic discourses and action that

blossomed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. There are many instances of philanthropic discourses that appear in Benveniste's book and cut across legal discourses and practices, that unfortunately remain unexplored: tensions between philanthropists and state employees over expertise and scientific knowledge; the attempts of specialists to promote their own status through state policy and the elaboration of the discussion in gendered terms; the takeover of functions of social control carried out by private groups by police bodies; and, at the same time, the coexistence and complementarity of the forces of law and philanthropy. I believe that the examination of these interlocking discourses would more clearly illuminate state policies directed at juvenile criminality.

Overall I would like to make three points. First, the quantitative analysis that explores the handling of juveniles by the courts and the ideological analysis of the penal apparatus constitute two projects that run in parallel, as Benveniste does not attempt to develop a dialectical relationship between the two methods and does not bring together the results of each analysis. Second, it remains unclear why the research is confined to the period between 1833 and 1911. It was in the early twentieth century and especially in the inter-war period that the child became the object of legislative action and normalisation by the state. Besides, there was an increasing number of studies, criminological, pedagogical, medical and psychological, that dealt with juvenile crime and extensive discussion and action on the establishment of the institution of juvenile courts and the transformation of the penitentiary apparatus. For these reasons, it would have been beneficial if the work took a longer view of juvenile criminality. Finally, Benveniste raises important questions concerning the interconnection between penal repression of

juvenile criminality and social structures, but we need more work that examines children as social beings as well as the ideologies and practices of other institutions.

**Bettina Dausien,
*Biographie und
Geschlecht.*
*Zur biographischen
Konstruktion sozialer
Wirklichkeit in
Frauenlebens-
geschichten*
Bremen:Donat, 1996**

by Sabine Schweitzer

A common statement made by so-called oral historians is that there are differences between constructing and re-constructing biographies in terms of gender. However, until recently this assumption has never been investigated. It was based on the impressions of the interviewers. With the publication of *Biographie und Geschlecht* Bettina Dausien has changed this situation. Investigating the aforementioned differences by means of comparing the life accounts of married couples, the German sociologist defines a theory of the social construction of gender. For this, the book is an important and stimulating work.

The author bases her approach on the tradition of "Biographieforschung" (research on biography). Since this approach is crucial to understanding the book, it shall be presented in detail. Following this approach, individuals are neither totally determined by given social supra-individual structures – such as culture, legal system, etc. – nor are they completely independent of them. In other words, they are by no means free and cannot 'tinker' with their biographies, nor are they constrained to a simple reproduction of social structures. Individual and collective subjects are enclosed in given structures yet at the same time they reproduce and transform them by acting. They are oriented towards given norms, without simply reproducing them. Furthermore, being agents, they construct social conditions and, within them, they construct their own biographies. Subjects are acting daily and thus producing reality, becoming active constructors of their social reality. In other words, "Lebenswelten" (life-worlds) are biographically constituted. Within this construction process, individuals have more possibilities than they can ever realise. They have to make choices. Even if the subjects are not always conscious of other possibilities they are exceptional resources for the formation process; we, as agents, have the possibility of realising the surplus of meanings of our life experiences and of using it for conscious transformation of references to ourselves and to the world. There consists limited potential for modernisation, which is part of our 'practical consciousness'. This moment of autonomy is an essential part of each biography. Summarising, biographies are active attempts at construction by agents: they are 'made' by concrete individuals in concrete situations, with concrete reasons, and moreover, fulfill individual or collective functions. This process of constructing by means of acting has to be mirrored in the investigation of us as

researchers. The claim is to re-construct the principles of the life constructions of individuals by means not of analysing not only the observer's perspective from the outside. Rather, the perspectives of the subjects themselves have to be investigated and discovered. In order to do so, we need the biographical self-presentation of the agents which is explicitly done in their telling of their life stories. The life accounts used by Dausien are conducted in the form of the so-called narrative autobiographies, which allows the interviewees to tell their life stories in the way they themselves consider to be right. In addition, this specific method of conducting interviews also allows researchers to focus on the interactions and experiences of individuals, including not only the consciously experienced and intentionally addressed aspects; but also the social conditions of biographical acting. The autobiographical narratives enable the reconstruction of the everyday, as well as the social world of individuals. Reference to one's past life is influenced by the individual's 'positioning' in social space as well as in time (Giddens 1984). Autobiographical narratives are in their origin related to the moment of their production, which influences the retrospective view of the past. Furthermore, they are directed to the outlook of the biographer towards the future, his/her life plans, hopes and expectations. Since the content of the narrations represents the complex construction of the past as well as expectations of the future, they mirror the social as well as the experienced reality of the individual. In this process, changing of references to oneself and transformations of life construction are included. The theorisation of these transformations is the strong point of the concept of biography. Biographical constructions are the complex and individual achievements of the subjects. Each life story recounts a special history and is related to

a special life. At the same time both aspects are related to social relationships and structures, in short, to the "Handlungwelten" ("action's immediate environments").

This concept of "Biography" has been presented in all its details because it is the starting point for a comparison with the concept of gender. Dausien underlines the similarities between the social construction of biography and the one of gender: As "biography" is constructed by single individuals through their acting, so too is "gender". In this perspective, sex is not only analysed as a social institution, but also in terms of human acting. "Gender" as the social "sex" is acting: it involves dealing with given norms, referring to actions which are considered to be appropriate for one's gender category. Gendered day-to-day acting is a result of social belonging to a sex and at the same time reinforces the basis of this belonging. In short, in addition to social structures, gender concepts too can be reproduced as well as transformed by the subjects. This theory is exemplified by means of analysing life accounts of working class couples. The interpretation method as well as the main hypothesis are developed by presenting the first and crucial case, the life account of Mrs. Witte, and in comparison to it, her husband's life story. In the next phase the results of this case are compared to life accounts of other married couples. As a result, Dausien claims similarities in female life constructions. The author argues that not only everyday situations of women but also their biographical constructions—e.g. life plans and retrospective judgments, experiences and expectations, self constructions and modalities of relationship—are structurally characterised by the conflict of the "doppelte Vergesellschaftung" (double socialisation). They consist mainly in the difficulties of bringing

together work and caring for a family. Moreover, women's life accounts are often characterised by a dependency on structural conditions which are outside of acting subjects.

A valid and, moreover, crucial category for analysing differences in the life constructing process in terms of gender is seen to be the category of "relationship". First, how women and men refer to relationships within their own life constructions and second, the way they place themselves in relation to other individuals. As regards the first, women tend to reconstruct their lives by means of constructing a net of relationships. Men, on the other hand, reconstruct their lives mainly according to results, by referring to actions and events - a listing of data and facts - without referring to other individuals. Furthermore, women tend to place themselves in relation to biographically relevant agents of interaction; sometimes they even "disappear" behind the collective "we" in their life accounts. Whereas men present themselves more often as autonomous, active individuals. Finally, men tend to differentiate more clearly between their individual biography and the situation of others, while women try to coordinate and to link spheres of life.

Whilst biographical constructions are individual acts with single, individual results, they are by no means the result of isolated individuals. People do their biographical work, not as isolated subjects, but in relation to others. In other words, agents constitute themselves in social relationships. Therefore, interactions between biographies are seen as another crucial category of analysis. In this approach similarities of wives' and husbands' biographies are described. They "fit" together, showing parallels in terms of thematic field and content. Investigating the logic of construction of biographies by the individuals, the author claims

that a "biographical process of synchronisation" of the partners exists. Dausien differentiates three types of "relationship": first, a "together" or shared commonality by means of sharing a common collective life-world. Second, the type of "one against the other" relationship, and finally, the "one for another". The last type, which includes the special form of delegation of one's own viewpoint to others is a main characteristic of female biographies, especially in relation to members of their families. These types of "relationship" are not chosen "freely". They are related to the concrete life story as well as to social structural conditions and furthermore, as Dausien's results show, to the dimension of gender.

By analysing these differences between men's and women's life accounts, Dausien does not want to attribute 'specific' female or male characteristics or claim their empirical distribution. Rather, she is skeptical about constructing a dichotomy male-female. The only possibility for defining a typology is in terms of strategies for coping with, on the one hand, structures and, on the other hand, individual life plans. From this perspective, the strategies are significantly but not selectively distributed to the sexes. The existence of differences between sexes can only be explained by the gender dominated, differentiated structures of the concrete action environments: men and women are in their everyday lives confronted with specific experiences and expectations. By dealing with experiences and expectations, individuals are learning specific strategies of action. Those strategies are influenced by dimensions such as generation, regions, cultural milieus, in short, by "social space". Moreover, they unequivocally show structures differentiated by means of gender. And finally, they also determine the self - and world - construction of the single - male or

female - individual. However, those structures are selectively acquired and in a unique way biographically combined by the individuals. Especially in the principles of constructing a "biography", differences between the sexes are evident. In other words, individuals construct themselves as women or men by constructing themselves as biographers. Concluding, Dausien argues that with this the social construction of biography cannot be divided from the social construction of gender. Moreover, subjects do not only construct their individual, gendered biographies with reciprocal reference. At the same time they are also (re)producing prototypes of male and/or female biographies. This act of constructing individual, gendered biographies - which is done by all individuals all the time - based on social and subjective structures, also includes the possibility of practical transformation. If we - as subjects of our own biographies - are the constructors of these prototypes of male and/or female biographies, we are also able to change them.

Ioannis Koliopoulos,

Λεηλασία φρονημάτων.

A': To Μακεδονικό ζήτημα
στην κατεχόμενη
Δυτική Μακεδονία,
1941-1944.

B': To Μακεδονικό ζήτημα
στην περίοδο
του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου,
1945-1949.

[**The Plundering**
of Allegations:
vol. I

The Macedonian Question
in Occupied West Macedonia
(1941-1944), vol. II

The Macedonian Question in the
Period of the Civil War
(1945-1949)
in West Macedonia]

Thessaloniki: Vanias, 1994-5

by Angelos Vlachos

It is rather a commonplace to repeat that the Macedonian Question, in its different versions, constitutes a chief area of political conflict as much as an arena of academic dispute. Within the context of Balkan studies, the Macedonian Question is precisely the privileged field in which analytical categories and mental tools are being tested. From this perspective the analysis of aspects and different moments of the

Macedonian history of the last centuries continues to be of extreme topicality. The rise of nationalist movements in the contemporary Balkans is not unrelated to these developments. The modern national 'realities' require modern approaches or re-evaluation, a fact linked with the case in review.

The unequal and various difficulties involved in any such attempt originate in the nature of the research, the accessibility of the available material, and the identity of the author, as much as the intellectual environment he or she works in. In the first volume of the present work, there is an attempt to explore the fundamental components which define the admittedly rough and in many ways obscure subject, i.e. the history of an area-mosaic of ethno-cultural groups for at least the first half of our century. The second volume focuses on the developments of the civil war, a clash which was tragically felt in this part of Greek territory, as well as on the detailed narration of the careers of leading figures and armed groups and the politics influencing them.

What makes this book stand out is the exemplary pattern it follows, highlighting the borderline where the discipline converges with subjectivity. This matter is stressed by the author in his lengthy introductions [vol. I, pp. xvii, xx, especially xxii]. This noteworthy aspect motivated me to comment on this very important study. Although written according to every academic standard, it carries in full the prejudices, sympathies and experiences of the author. The personal experience of the historian/narrator sheds light on his double identity, rendering him not only the subject but also a participant, even if an inconspicuous one, in the history he is dealing with. This, it seems to me, is what the presence of the evaluative discourse predominant in the narrative (and highlighted as much by present

developments as the wider 'public discourse') should be attributed to.

The introductory notes of this work are of particular interest and are rather revealing to the degree that they reflect the fluid intellectual climate of the period in which the book was written as well as describe aspects of the politics of the day. The enthusiastic award of a prize to this work by the Academy of Athens (special session of 24/3/1994) surely belongs in this context. I am under the impression that the immense dimensions the Macedonian issue took on in the conjecture of 1991-1995 in Greece, and the susceptibility of a large part of Greek intellectuals to what was widely experienced as a national threat, are genuinely reflected in the demand for such a work being written in addition to and alongside its very context. After all, what else might have intervened in the period between March 1994 (vol. I, p.xii) and October 1995 (vol. II, p. xv), such that the initially explicitly chosen term "Slavophone Greeks" was replaced by the term "Slavomacedonians"? Interestingly enough, this contradiction has been effaced in the second edition of the study in question.

The ethnic dimensions of the double conflict in Greece during the critical decade of 1940 (occupation and civil war) are central to this study. Despite the plethora of subsidiary material, the study does not achieve – perhaps it does not even attempt – to articulate a novel argument on the issue, other than discussing designs against Greek Macedonia by neighboring countries with and through the participation of Greek subjects.

The core of the legitimising claims of historiographies in the Balkans (in the form of 'national narratives') concerning the greater area of Macedonia is centered around the traditional point of view of the creation of the state by the nation. In the study under consideration, there is an oxymoron. Although it indirectly accepts – i.e.

theoretically accepts – the modern problematic on the 'creation of the nation' (which includes a wide range of disparate contributions, from E. Hobsbawm to B. Anderson), it has not come to the position of accepting their conclusions. Much less, it must not be considered accidental that the first – and last – reference to terms, such as the above-mentioned one, is done in the last endnote of volume I (p. 268), in a work which treats par excellence the dynamics of concepts such as 'allegation'.

So, at the same time that "the national communities are and have been imagined communities, self-defined and differentiated...on the grounds of national myths, historical rights and other such arbitrary criteria" (vol. I, p. 209), the viewpoints of "journalists and anthropologists dealing with Macedonia," including – rather flatly – scholars such as L. Danforth and A. Karakasidou – said to regard the 'Macedonian' ethnic identity of the Slavomacedonians of Greece as "given, self-proved and indisputable" (vol. II, p. 278) – are scornfully denounced.

By extension, the contribution of anthropological thought to the highlighting of processes in microscale is rejected, whereas the importance of cultural (being in a position to remain particular) and economic (land disputes) factors in the final formatting and choice of conviction, is underestimated. It is impressive, however, that there is no allusion to, or discrimination between, the terms 'ethnic' and 'national' identity, in this otherwise extremely rich collection of relevant material; whereas, the further quest of evidence revealing the preferences of the Greek Slavophones beyond those described by the author is considered 'vain' (vol. I, p. 209).

At this point, the following inconsistency may be noted. It is rather obvious that primary written sources (acclaimed to be the fetishes of academic historiography) do not usually give

direct answers to a number of critical questions, often being self-evident to their authors. However, despite the importance of the character of orality in rural societies like the ones described, nothing is stated by the author regarding the pattern of their incorporation in the text, other than the *a priori* declared deviation from these sources (vol. I, p. xvii).

In my opinion, the claim of the historian to be distanced from his subject is disrupted in this work. The balance and clarity which Koliopoulos has exhibited in the past with remarkable consistency is lost here. This can be observed as much in the polarising characterisations attributed to the subjects of his study as in the explanatory framework he uses; the dichotomy between the "few traitors" and the "ones who sided with the Persians" (as he calls the Slavomacedonian activists) and the wider mass of non-participants in the various autonomist attempts, no longer constitutes an adequate interpretative form for the facts.

On the other hand, if, as Mark Mazower claims "wars and guerilla struggles, civil wars and police repression in peacetime constitute the most obvious dangers for polarising the local politics," West Macedonia lived with these for at least half a century (1900-1950) and with obvious results. However, what is interesting in Koliopoulos' study is the composition of an elegantly written narrative, which in a predetermined manner attempts *a posteriori* to embrace the explosive and eventful course of developments in the area.

In this direction, the importance of the structure of the argument as well as the use of archive and secondary sources are decisive. As far as the first element is concerned, the invocation –unfortunate, according to my view– of examples from the 19th century (e.g. exile as a method of dealing with banditry, with reference to the band of T. Arvanitakes) and its indirect leveling

(characterising it in the 'traditional' and 'familiar' ways) of the systematic methods of repression which were practiced at Makronisos (the primary site of mass confinement in post-war Europe of a whole section of Greeks who constituted during the war one of the most massive resistance movements against the Axis).

Regarding the second element, the indisputable knowledge and methodical coverage of the sources by the author are moderated by the way these sources are being used. This occurs due to the often inconsiderate (or imbalanced) acceptance of sources friendly to the government (e.g. the newspaper *Hellenikon Aima*) or of doubtful reliability (Ath. Chrisochou), for crucial issues such as the issue of the effect of EAM on the rural population. The implications of more recent works, like the one by D. Close and Th. Sfikas, for issues like the causes of the outbreak of the Civil War of 1946-1949, remain unexploited by Koliopoulos, thus diminishing noticeably the range of his conclusions. We have gone a long way since the 'Dekembriana' were simply considered a "communist-driven mutiny" stemming merely from the "repudiation of liberal democracy by the communists."

In conclusion, one wonders if in statements which emphasise "the liberation from stereotypes promoted by winners and losers of Civil War" with reference "to scientific ethics and its standards" practiced by new scientists (vol I, p. xix) there lies a perception of 'an ideologically pure science. It could be noted here that the sources, contrary to what follows from the whole work (see also vol. II, p. xiii), do not speak by themselves; they give answers to the questions one poses. And it is the questions one poses to his material that will determine the final – all but naive – answers.

Cris Shore and Susan Wright (eds.),
Anthropology of Policy, Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power,
London: Routledge, 1997

by Manos Spyridakis

If anthropology as scientific discipline and practice has emerged via a colonialist necessity, a norm continued up to nowadays under the guise of ethnocentrism, then this volume offers an impressive opportunity for a "role reversal." Namely, it attempts to suggest a new way of analysing the relationship between policies, citizens and society through the notion of policy.

Policy is used as an analytical tool, an exploratory idea for the unfolding of formation processes through which powerful centers have the potential to shape behaviours, knowledge and ideologies. In other words the study of policy which is being produced and spread throughout society lies at the heart of the new character anthropological thinking seeks for itself, i.e., the study of the relation between norms and institutions, of ideology and power, of global and local processes, of meaning and interpretation.

The concept of policy, in the editors' view, is inextricably linked to that of governance. The latter occupies a special centrality as regards the methodological armory of the book, for it refers to complex procedures through which policies affect people's decisions and norms of conduct. It is about handling, guiding, modifying and thus,

"correcting" people's representations of themselves and society according to the dominant model. Hence, systems of governance create realities and structure the basis for their acceptance. The relational question, then, which intensively imposes its uneasy essence is why—and the means by which—"citizens are becoming alienated from an increasingly remote and commercialised policy-making process."

Up to now the notion of policy and its consequences were taken for granted and treated by social scientists as unchallenged facts existing "out there". What is missing according to the editors is an anthropology for the analysis of complex power systems in Western or Westernised societies.

In that sense the sporadically made accounts in the field of so-called political anthropology did not pay full attention to the analysis of modern power systems. This is due to the fact either that they did not explicitly lay claim to their character, i.e. as political, or they simply considered policy as a given reality, in each case thus involved, unwittingly or not, in a predetermined game of domination.

The understanding of policies as political and administrative processes by anthropology leads directly to the fact that the former are inherently anthropological phenomena. In this light policies are themselves nothing but a moving reality, a process under constant making and in dialectical relationship with the subjects they influence. This is so because policies encapsulate ethics, values and conceptions created in the midst of socio-culturally defined processes.

Consequently, policies have the potential to be studied in a number of ways. That is, as systems of meanings, as dominant symbols, as narratives keeping up with existing cultural models, as taxonomic categories defining the modern

present or the traditional past, as devices of inclusion and exclusion, as mechanisms of forging identities and separating others. In that sense then a policy-making process incorporates the historically meaningful code of the society that formed it.

Policies may also be analysed as examples of what Turner named "dominant symbols", i.e., as analytical keys to grasping a whole cultural system. Thus, the anti-Communist ethic based on McCarthyism as well as the respective version of anti-Americanism in the former Soviet Union during the Cold War are realities indicative of the issues challenged by this analytical framework. Both, apart from their political meanings, diffused and imposed ethical and cultural meanings as well: being either communist or capitalist was associated with contagious diseases in both countries, and on a different level it constituted the boundaries for the respective national identities.

The effectiveness of imposing certain political and cultural ethics, in the authors' view depends on the masking of modern power under the cloak of political neutrality. Thus, actual political technologies impose definitional realities incorporated by individuals. The latter constitute themselves by relying on a given model that enables them to internalise the norms through which they are governed. It follows that a political anthropology has to be concerned with the analysis of the art of government. That is the way political governmentality serves its legitimising function, by objectifying and universalising political decision-making, by creating representational scapegoats, by defining the politically correct behaviours or by giving exemplary types of conduct following the "proper order of things." In that sense, according to the authors, political anthropology is given a new impetus since: a) policy language and discourse

provide a key to analysing the architecture of modern power relations; b) the analysis of the relation between governance, policy and subjectivity provides an insight in the ways in which new subjects of power are constituted; and c) the theoretical reserves of political anthropology concerned with micro and macro processes, as these have been formed since the 1970s (Bailey, Barth, Schwartz and Turner, Marxist Anthropologists, Nash, Taussig, Scott, deCerteau, to mention but a few), constitute a renewed continuity in this new analytical framework.

The analysis of political technologies, apart from constituting a powerful conceptual tool for the exploration of governmental policies, gives new impetus to the reconceptualisation of the notion of anthropological field. Societies are neither remote 'islands of history' nor autonomously created formations. The powerful contribution that this book makes is that it puts forward a contextual logic concerning relations of power and systems of governance. It follows that the traditional methodology of participant observation acquires new meaning as the hot point is not simply to follow an informant's life and writing up notes about it, but to situate the actors among the interactive levels through which the policy process is diffused. In this way, ethnography brings together different organisational and everyday worlds across time and space. The historical background, actual power structure, intended individual strategy, official documents both contemporary and historical, thus, can be studied through and in the process of seeking the power webs and relational activities between actors. This is of great importance for the methodological renewal of anthropology, since the actors are not in danger of being caught in the web of an anthropologically constructed exoticism. By consequence, the differential status of social groups as regards their place in the

societal hierarchical nexus can be grasped and analysed more easily. To achieve an adequate understanding of the blurred structures created by the political technologies, a Foucauldian method of analysis is suggested based on: a) the examination of "the historically conditioned emergence of new fields of experience" and b) the "re-problematisation", that is an endeavor to distance the self from his/her starting point and to reposition oneself far enough from norms and taxonomies which are considered to be the given orthodoxy of his/her own cultural and social background. The suggested redefinition of the "field", although difficult, gives the opportunity to examine how the anthropological discipline is positioned within the hierarchical structure of modern power. From this point of view, anthropology has the potential to be the epistemological paradigm for other social sciences as well.

The volume begins with an introductory chapter written by both editors where the basic frameworks of the *Anthropology of Policy* are located. The contributors' articles are situated in four parts:

The first part is concerned with "Policy as Language: Discourse and Power". Discourse in the authors' view is a configuration of ideas, which provide the threads out-of which ideologies are woven. Thus language is socially constructed and not an autonomous field of inquiry. It follows that an interpretative science is concerned with who has the power to define. All three chapters aim to develop an approach which shows the different sources that political actors rely upon in order to make their discourse the dominant one. Thus, R.Apthorpe is interested in the writing style of policy documents where language is used more to please than describe the truth. G.Seidel and L.Vidal are concerned with the definition of discourse as such and the way it is used in order

to legitimise dominant modes of thinking by excluding other ones. Their paradigm is based on the discourses ("medico-moral" and "culturalist") about HIV and AIDS in Africa. H.P.Hansen concerns himself with highlighting conflicting interpretations of doctors, patients and nurses about a hospital's policy on the definition and treatment of the sick body.

The second part refers to "Policy as Cultural Agent". All chapters explore the attempt made by the state to formulate and impose a certain national identity in different ethnographic settings: Canada, Sweden, and the E.U. E.Mackey shows how the Canadian government tries to disguise its own involvement in supposedly authentic initiatives celebrating Canadian identity. Likewise, A.Rabo shows how the Swedish government, by using keywords like gender equality or a *laissez-faire* model of society, disguises internal contradictions and inequalities. C.Shore, analysing the European Commission's directive about "Television Without Frontiers", shows how political elites use policy as an instrument for the constitution of large-scale identities.

The third part refers to "Policy as Political Technology: Governmentality and Subjectivity". This section examines more deeply the use of policy as a Trojan Horse for the imposition of neo-liberal orthodoxy of governance, as well as how new forms of behaviour are internalised and adopted by actors. H.Vike is concerned with recasting a political issue in the neutral terminology of science as regards policy for elderly care in the Norwegian context. B.Hyatt examines the housing policies of British conservative governments and how this represents a shift towards a more individual model of social organisation, a "technology of the self". E.Martin analyses the way rationalities of governance encapsulate representational pictures of how actors are related to each other, with

government and themselves.

The final part of the book written by H.Donnan and G.Macfarlane is the concluding remark of this new conceptual approach by representing and criticising the contribution of anthropology to policy research in the ethnographic location of N. Ireland.

The new ideas deposited in this book might prove a useful analytical device for interpretational anthropology. By concretely linking several levels of actions affecting and, most of all, shaping organisational views and universes, the exploration of the political technologies employed by centers of power, manages in great part to avoid the slippery path of anthropological self criticism, namely, scientific introversion. Moreover, it gives great impetus to renewing the methodological steps of the discipline by simultaneously incorporating an inter-scientific approach towards the "object" of inquiry, proving both the scientific flexibility and the methodological dynamics of the discipline this attempt comes from.

**Patrick H. Hutton,
*History as an Art of
Memory***
Hanover, N.H.:University Press
of New England (for the
University of Vermont), 1993

by Effi Gazi

Patrick Hutton's book is a meditation on history and memory and on their interaction. Frances Yates' classic work *The Art of Memory* (first published in 1966) provided the source of inspiration for a research towards the relation of memory to history and *vice versa*. Yates' definition of the Renaissance practice of mnemonic skills not as a mere technical enterprise but as a deep philosophical trend that framed knowledge and understanding of the world is, to a great extent, Hutton's standpoint in his attempt to provide, *grosso modo*, an intellectual history of the concept of memory in Europe.

The volume is made up of eight essays, each discussing different thinkers and their conceptualisation of the memory/history problem. Giambattista Vico, William Wordsworth, Sigmund Freud, Maurice Halbwachs, Philippe Ariès, and Michel Foucault are the dominant figures. Through their work, the author identifies and examines eight paths between history and memory: mnemonic, rhetorical, autobiographical, psychological, sociological, rhetorical, archaeological, historiographical.

Important issues are raised and discussed extensively in this work that focuses on one of the most engaging debates within (and outside) the historical profession. For Hutton, history stands

as an art of memory in its effort to combine repetition and recollection with regard to the past. His discussion of the importance of the transition from oral to literate cultures and its impact on representations of the past is original and convincing. This is particularly so for the argument that refers to the textualisation of culture and its impact on the historicisation of –collective memory – especially since the Enlightenment, as the past acquired an ontological status and a primary importance for philosophical debates. His analysis of the function of historiography as a bearer of collective memory, especially after the 18th century, is also interesting and to the point. The way Hutton incorporates psychoanalytic aspects of the memory issue (and their role in autobiographical narratives) in the historiographical debate is innovative. The interaction between the conscious and the unconscious sides of the psyche within a process that turns each person into a "memory to himself/herself" is a crucial theme that is treated perceptively in the discussion. Hutton's interest in commemorative practices, in discursive schemes, in the social frameworks of commemorative traditions reveal an insightful meditation on some of the most crucial issues in the field (especially with regard to the constructed nature of commemorative traditions and to the impact of present discourses on the images of the past).

Less convincing, however, is his insistence on the function of history as an exclusive art of memory, as a way of remembering that seems to minimalise –if not exclude– its critical role and the possibility of political intervention. The second part of Hutton's work is somehow less sophisticated than the first. It attempts to offer an account of postmodern historiography and its relationship to memory. Since, according to the author, postmodernism analyses ways of remembering rather than remembering itself, it

seems to deny the concept of memory (especially the dimension of sympathetic recollection) on the whole. The romanticisation of memory that seems to underlie the argumentation, makes very difficult any critical thinking about the uses of memories and of the "past".

Hutton is concerned about the fading of collective memories in a postmodern age. The argument itself sounds rather paradoxical in a century that is largely characterised by the construction of a "memory industry." Hutton almost axiomatically argues that "we need the past and must maintain our living connections with it." By implication, he sets his work within a critical project that will intervene in "postmodern" historiography and that will make it possible to "represent the past in a way that the truth of its deep memory will not be forgotten by posterity" (p. 72). The idealisation of the issue of memory cannot really stand as a counter-argument to postmodernism; especially because postmodernism does not deny the past itself, but rather an idealist ontology of it.

The author's deep attachment to commemoration (the fact that he grew up in Princeton, an enchanted landscape as he points out [p. xi], has possibly played a role in that) has produced an interesting and perceptive piece of work on the nature of subjective and collective memory and on its close relation to historiographical practices. It is not quite clear however, whose past and whose memory he refers to, what uses a certain past and a certain memory may have and in which ways history (and memory) might sometimes not be an art but almost a burden.

Elli Skopetea,

Η Δύση της Ανατολής.

Εικόνες από το τέλος της

Οθωμανικής

Αυτοκρατορίας.

[Orient's West:

Last Images of the Ottoman

Empire]

Athens:Gnossi, 1992.

and

Maria Todorova,

Imagining the Balkans

New York and Oxford:Oxford

University Press, 1997.

by Ioulia Pentazou

The starting point of Elli Skopetea's book, *Orient's West: Last Images of the Ottoman Empire*, is the representation of the Ottoman Empire on the eve of its decline. In her attempt she had to "confront what one confronts by trying to represent a fragmented subject, a subject that is definitely fragmented: neither to restore a non-existent unity nor to depict an non-existent discordance." The relation between the "East"—i.e. the Ottoman Empire—and the "West" is the axis around which her argument operates. Within this perspective, the book's title takes its twofold meaning, which derives from the ambiguity of the Greek word *Δύση* (West): the narration of the decline of a system in relation to the West—the main factor of its dissolution.

In *Imagining the Balkans*, Maria Todorova observes that "the spectrum of the Balkans is haunting Western culture" and tries to explain "how could a geographical appellation [the Balkans] be transformed into one of the most powerful pejorative designations in history, international relations, political science and nowadays, general intellectual discourse." She argues that the handling of Balkanism revolves around the terms "difference" and "Orientalism". The title situates the book in an ampler discussion around constructing, inventing or imagining communities and identities.

The two books are focused on the relation between East and West: Skopetea's East is the Ottoman Empire and Todorova's the Balkans. Although the two historians choose a different name as a starting point, the two *topoi* converge. According to Maria Todorova, "the Balkans are the Ottoman legacy" due to the strong impact that the Ottoman past had in the postwar Balkans compared to other legacies in the area. The different naming—which I find indicative of the complex character of the region, not just in the particular case of the two studies—is related to the initial question and scope of each book: Skopetea raises questions about the 19th c., while Todorova's range is the 20th c. The emerging contradictions and convergence of the two books around a quite similar subject-analysis represent an interesting and stimulating comparison.

Said's analysis of Orientalism as an institutionalised discourse on the Orient empowered the analytical categories of "West", "East" or "Orient" and created a new hermeneutic framework for the interpretation of a variety of thematicas in several intellectual and academic fields. In the framework of Orientalism, a plethora of research concerning the Middle East, India, China, and Iran has taken place. Recently, Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden's "Orientalist

Variations on the Theme "Balkans": Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics" [*Slavic Review* (v. 51, Spring 1992, 1-15)], opened the discussion of the Balkans. In their article, the authors claim that Orientalism, as defined by Said, can effectively describe the Balkans in relation to the West. Such an analysis presents Balkanism as a variation of Orientalism.

There is a crucial point which differentiates Skopetea's and Todorova's approaches from Said's analysis, as well as the Haydens': the former use the categories of East and West and their variants in a historical perspective, avoiding in this way the trap of creating a continuity from antiquity to nowadays. The two historians are far—though each in a different way—from the normative and oversimplified approaches that use the analytic category not as a tool but as an explanatory model. Such approaches reproduce a normative discourse through a tautology in which the initial observations are identified with their interpretations. I think Milica Bakic-Hayden's article, "Nesting Orientalisms: The case of former Yugoslavia" [*Slavic Review*, Winter 1995] constitutes a characteristic example of the above approach. Following the argumentation of her previous work, Bakic-Hayden claims that "Balkanism can indeed be seen as a 'variation on the orientalist theme'" and that "it would be difficult to understand it outside the overall orientalist context, since it shares an underlying logic and rhetoric with orientalism." However, as Todorova rightly observes, these rhetorical similarities could be traced in every discourse of power, such as the rhetoric of racism, modernisation, etc. On the contrary, Skopetea's and Todorova's approaches search equally for diversity and similarity. They both avoid generalisations and—what I find most important—their analysis of each particular case is far from creating models of interpretation, or a unified theory. In their interpretations, analytical

categories such as East and West remain in a historical context without being transformed into normative categories.

Todorova attempts to make a distinction between Balkanism and Orientalism by stressing the specific characteristics of the two topoi in Western discourses. Thus, dealing with a particularly rich textual material, Todorova explores the "self-designation" of the Balkans and their "discovery" by Western travellers. Declaring that before World War II there was not a unified European identity, she focuses on the analysis of specific societies, taking 19th century British society as a case study for exploring the representations of the Balkans; in this analysis, she accurately points out that "there was no common Western stereotype of the Balkans" as "there was no common West." Exploring this kind of critical question, she shows off the particular "in-betweenness" of the Balkans as a concrete historical space in comparison to the vague notion of the 'Orient'. However, she develops her arguments in a continuous dialogue to Said's Orientalism. The treatment of the notion of the Balkans and the 'West' as a constant and rigid dichotomy –an analysis similar to the methodological preconditions of Said, among others–highlights her methodological approach and positions her within this critical intellectual framework.

This is not the only dichotomous approach in Todorova's study. Western discourses about Balkanism are interpreted as the counterpart of an existing Balkan ontology. She recognises as an essential difference between Balkanism and Orientalism the different geo-cultural entities that the two notions represent: the "historical and geographic concreteness of the Balkans as opposed to the intangible nature of the Orient." Thus, in her study, Balkans as a discourse is clearly distinguished from the Balkans as a

reality. The starting point of her final chapter is the question: "qu'est-ce qu'il y a de hors text?" –a paraphrase of Derrida's phrase, "il n'y a pas de hors text"; in this chapter, claiming that discourses on the Balkans are distorted – a statement based on her previous analysis – she attempts to understand "what, then, are the Balkans?" I am not interested in this review to trace the implications of this approach in the intellectual framework of the linguistic turn in history. What I want to stress is the supposed incompatibility and the scholarly distinction of the two areas – discourse and historical reality – and their treatment as being concrete and different *topoi*.

On the other hand, Skopetea explores the East and West focusing on their relations and their interaction. In order to reveal the "mutual images" of East and West, the author investigates the junctures of the two systems: the Western figures through which the East learns from the West (travellers, missionaries, journalists, committees, the Western—at last—discourse on cultural aspects of the East); the Eastern figures through which the West learns from the East (students in European universities, immigrants from Ottoman territories, the Greek diaspora, Western literature about the East, the Western scientific discourse on the East). Skopetea is not interested in the autonomous investigation of these figures, but rather in their perception by the "other" system. In this perspective, East and West are not perceived as isolated cultural formations, but as continuously interconnected entities. This constantly redefined interaction does not allow any system to remain self-sufficient: aspects of the East appear to the West, and *vice versa*.

Recognising that the West does not need to preserve any kind of reciprocal communication (i.e. dialogue), Skopetea argues that on the contrary, the East is obliged to develop dialogue

with the West. This process is inevitable and Eastern identity is constructed in relation to it. This question is lodged in the space of the East, and its multiple—Christian and Muslim, Westerner and non-Westerner—subjects. Within the Ottoman Empire, in spite of the physical absence of the West, the dialogue concerning Western models was always present; participation in that dialogue constituted the inevitable precondition for the existence of the East itself. Even in this question, Skopetea focuses on the interaction among the different elements. This is not a matter of interpretation but rather of methodology. Seeking the relation between two continuously involved systems, Skopetea creates a broader framework which is defined and can be described by the coexistent and interrelated categories of East and West.

The strategies of writing constitute another interesting point of comparison between the two books. Two completely different narratives are embedded in a different way in the same intellectual field, after all. Todorova clearly states the hermeneutical and methodological premises that inform her textual analysis. Todorova's text is always open to contemporary literature and her theoretical perspective is very clearly outlined. The effect of this strategy is finally a very rich text open to multiple readings and mainly addressed to experts. The author involves the reader in her problematic using keywords such as imagining, discovery, discourse, Orientalism, in order to reveal her particular point of entry. Todorova's emplotment exemplifies in an excellent way the current trends of a radical professional historical writing, which constitute the wider arena of communication within the academic field.

Skopetea's narration is articulated in a completely different way. The title of her book itself indicates the main characteristic of her choice: the allusion. What is striking in her textual analysis is the lack

of any reference to contemporary literature, even in those cases where it is obvious that her arguments constitute an indirect response to some relevant theory. In addition, the author does not analyse her theoretical and methodological premises. Her emplotment is based on strong narrative forms characterised by the catalytic use of the "I" and the stylistic modes of "true literature". The form of narrativity constitutes the framework within which interpretation is produced. This kind of emplotment creates a coherent textual analysis which is characterised by abstraction in the selective use of a very rich material and of allusion which is chosen as a communicative practice. Thus, this strategy imposes a dynamic participation on the reader in order to decode the message, while discouraging the expert from a "professional" (i.e. diagonal) reading.

If both historians remain critical in their use of Orientalism, there is a crucial difference in their methodology, which finally creates a completely different hermeneutic framework within which different interpretations are produced. Their distinct methodologies are relevant to their initial differences: a more academic approach *versus* a more political one; an introvert text *versus* a clearly extrovert one; Balkan origin but different geo-cultural area of production; and, at last, distinct audiences. Finally, the comparative reading of the two books, which in quite different ways are inscribed and differentiated in a common intellectual field, is a very stimulating example for the possibility of broadening a common dialogue based on the fruitful coexistence of both interpretative and narrative differences.

**Jacques Derrida,
*Mal d'Archive***
Paris: Éd. Galilée, 1995

by Yannis Papatheodorou

"These fragments I have shored against
my ruins"
T.S. Eliot

The new resources created by archives, during the last years, offer historical research new perspectives as well as wider historiographical fields. The access to new informative sources has brought the formation of memory back into the centre of historical thought, and special consideration has been given to the significant acts of classification, use, evaluation and interpretation of information. From this point of view, Jacques Derrida's book is an intriguing approach to the concept of the archive, as it positions the subject in an interdisciplinary dialogue concerning memory.

Derrida's argument is based on two fundamental principles. The privileged relation of psychoanalysis and the dominant functions of the archive's techniques (impression, repression, suppression) turns the Freudian text into an exemplary model of understanding the structure of the archive. The intertextual references to the work of the American historian of Jewish memory, Yerusalmi, enrich the dialogue with an additional matter; insofar as psychoanalysis is recorded in Jewish identity, the accomplished and non-accomplished Judaism constitutes the metonymic enunciation of memory.

Derrida declares that since the dominant power of the archive derives from the economy of

knowledge, it also provides the institutional responsibility of the interpretation. The localisation of the information transforms the inscription, provided by the function of the archive, into the impression of a memory's trace, conscious or unconscious. The Freudian reading of the archive relies on its similarity to the psychical mechanism. The analytic categories of the impulses give to the archive the sense of the duplicity between the construction and the deconstruction of memory. Freud's archive enables us to realise the way he dealt with his inscription in the archive of the Jewish memory. The circumcision represents the symbolic return of the body to the imagined community.

Yerusalmi's point of view gives new dimensions to the issue. The mechanism of repression is indicative of the way an archive activates a future historical temporality, while it deliberates itself from its violent origins. The archive of the "potent(i)al" inaugurates a new form of history's reception. What was impossible for the historical approach to conceive has now become the main subject of psychoanalysis. Derrida agrees that psychoanalysis remains a Jewish science, only under the assumption that Jewishness/Judaism is a constant idea of a promising future: a future that does not create just a self-referential memory but the infinite memory of the Other.

The unconscious can preserve the archive's memory, given that the concept of the archive is a mortgage on/to the future, an affirmation of the future. The semantic shifting and repetition of the archive's concept opens for psychoanalysis as well as for history the road to a "future memory". Opening the future, believing in the spectral promise of a memory placed upon the trauma of its suppression, is somehow what Derrida calls "mal d'archive".

The conceptualisation of the archive by Jacques Derrida claims a historical formation which is

different than the usual. Considered in various contexts, the concept of an archive brings out the multiplicity of its significance. The archive becomes a plural substantiation of historical knowledge, open to all future interpretations. Consequently, the concept of the archive relates to the classical terms and foundational rhetorical types of Jewish thought; the "experience of the promise", the "sacred secret", forms a new orientation for Jewish history.

Derrida traces the genealogy of the archive's deconstruction back to Freud. Even though psychoanalysis has described the psychical functions of the conscious and the unconscious proportional to the functions of the archive, the epistemological metaphor of the model is inadequate for understanding the social structure of the archive. Archives are not just textual fabrications. They serve the political and cultural plan of organising information within a society. Their use is related to and therefore influenced by a series of institutional disciplines which certify the relations of power.

The preservation of memory, the access to information, the "resources" of the sources and the working environment are not just the representation of a future memory. They are active practices and discourses that create hierarchies and exclusions. The archives are the languages of the past, activated however dialogically, and according to scientific and social demands. The content of our choice is marked by the way we are seeking information. Far from being an abstract principle, our choice is an ideologically oriented negotiation closely related to the politics of interpretation.

The chronotope of social memory is a meaningful field of history's palimpsest. The archive is a part of the respective series of memory; its voice sounds only to articulate the diversity of our questions' temporality. The heterogeneous

representations of the past are a narration of cultural experience in a complex and contradictory historical era. The archive is not to be seen as the liberatory possibility of a future memory but as a countermonument of the social conflicts around memory's evaluations. What we call archival memory is a special materiality of the temporal traces situated in the intermediate space and time between the distant past and distant future. This chronotope of the distances provides a multi-leveled hierarchy of memory's practices and discourses which illustrates the socio-cultural interactions of making or inventing the past. The archive is a "territorial" sign of memory that could be both a promise of a liberation and a domination of historical understanding. The potential liberation of archival memory, according to the "Jewish example" of Derrida, does not avoid constituting a new domination: the heritage of the "sacred word" which is to be read by the "historians of the promise" engages the archive's concept with an authoritative discourse.

Archival space and time should not just provoke a historical focus on the future meaning of cultural repressions; on the contrary, the function of the archive should be an indicative dialogical unity of the cultural negotiation of memory. Rewriting history and rethinking the concept of the archive is not only a celebration of the ironic deconstruction of the past; it is also a commitment to an alternative way of producing historical meaning which is plural but not infinitely postponable. As Derrida used to mention :"Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in the difference between the Jew and the Greek, which is perhaps the unity of what is called history." The fertile collaboration of history and psychoanalysis should not ignore the political and cultural determinations of archival formations. Otherwise, the promised land of memory must re-remember the violence of metaphysics.