


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### Establishing the cultural identity of the west in the early Cold War: a conceptual approach

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### *Exploring the semantic field of antitotalitarianism*

“Totalitarianism” was both an influential paradigm in political sciences in the United States in the 1950s and a well-propagated concept. The term entered the political debate back in the 1920s but the early Cold War marked the high point of its presence in western public discourse. Though the Anglo-Saxon or Germanic paradigms had been more influential than those developed in France, Italy or Greece during the period, political lexicons, reflecting various ideological premises, were replete with words and expressions that treated the aforementioned concept. This article does not study the theory of totalitarianism – either in its scholarly or vulgar version – per se; that is to say, as a political theory and a philosophy of history,<sup>1</sup> but as the frame that supported semantically the concepts implicated in an ideological struggle initiated by the emergence of east–west dualism; the new world division between two irreconcilable cultural and ideological entities tied to two distinct economic and political systems.

What it seeks to do is to explore the conceptual features of this new semantic field by attempting to interpret the conceptualisation of the enemy and the self within this field as an important historical moment in the construction of the identity of the west. The text corpora constructed from a variety of Anglo- and Francophone and Greek primary sources (the German and Italian historical experience is drawn from secondary sources) make a conceptual-ideological analysis possible. It not only puts emphasis on units of words but also on units of concepts, on the conceptual interrelationship, as well as on the interdiscursive materiality that is being constructed. The primary material is drawn from

## *Establishing the cultural identity of the west in the early Cold War: A conceptual approach*

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*Encounter*<sup>2</sup> and *Preuves*,<sup>3</sup> magazines associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF),<sup>4</sup> and other publications in France (such as the Gaullist magazine *Liberté de l'Esprit* and the *Cahiers des Amis de la Liberté*) and in Greece. The period examined is the early Cold War until the mid-1960s when the western utopia<sup>5</sup> started to be seriously contested.

The first point to bear in mind is that the new transnational discourse formulated during the period of transition to the postwar era is investigated not as a simple continuity but rather as a semantic innovation. This is due to the fact that the constellations of friend and foe, constituted against the historical horizon of the Second World War, were silenced in the 1950s and were replaced by new categories. These constellations, however, were not something totally new since the antitotalitarian stance could be traced back to another temporal layer; the antibolshevism of the 1920s and the anti-Stalinism of the 1930s. For Tony Judt, the desire to forget the recent past – which prevailed on both sides of the divide – promoted a “future-oriented vocabulary of social harmony and material improvement” and a movement of “trans-national unification tied to the reconstruction and modernisation of the West European economy”,<sup>6</sup> while Benjamin Stora suggests that it is common for societies, after turbulent periods in their history, to develop on the basis of silences, in order to safeguard their continuity.<sup>7</sup> One could argue that what links political to conceptual history is the Cold War as a nonevent, in the sense that the experience of the Second World War did not enter into the conceptualisation of the present during the 1950s. For Judt, the distrust of short-term memory, the oblivion of the recent past, made postwar rebuilding possible.<sup>8</sup>

The second point that deserves greater appreciation for the linkages between political and conceptual history, as well as the culture–politics relationship,<sup>9</sup> is the new element that characterised Cold War discourse in the west: the transfer of concepts from one country to another, from America to Europe and vice versa. This transfer was due mainly to the orchestration of the cultural Cold War by the CCF and to the common political allegiance of many European and American intellectuals to the antitotalitarian ideology. The transnational character of this discourse followed the linear border of the universal ideological division as opposed to the various, often complex, enduring realities of the domestic scene in different countries, the particular cultural zones, or the plurality of national histories. In most cases, during the period under discussion, the conflict between the two was resolved in favour of the common perspective regarding the values of the west.

### ***Cold War culture: between ideology and propaganda***

The third point of particular interest to cultural history relates to the interplay, through political discourse, of identity politics and the construction of “otherness” with the values associated with the west. The cultural historian of the Cold War might be intrigued with the ways in which the core concepts constitute the political language that formed the intellectual east–west divide, whether one interprets visual sources or texts. By pointing out what links a methodology with an historiographical field, I would like to suggest that conceptual history, despite the diversity of the genre, could be partly applied to Cold War cultural studies.

According to Jean-François Sirinelli and Georges-Henri Soutou, editors of the volume *Culture et Guerre froide*, which was the product of a conference held at the Sorbonne and Sciences Po in October 2005, the cultural Cold War stands at the crossroads between cultural history and interna-

tional relations, between the study of cultural transfers and the analysis of cultural diplomacy. Cold War culture is the cultural production created by the east–west divide and not just a domain of the relations between the then world superpowers. The French conference tried to study culture as a constitutive element of historical change.<sup>10</sup>

What is attempted here is the positing of the concept as the object of historical investigation. Concepts are investigated through various words which define and designate their meanings. It follows the German method in regarding the concept as a semantic field and not as a lexical item,<sup>11</sup> though Begriffsgeschichte has been mostly investigated within the limits of national languages and cultures. However, attempts have been made recently to expand the field of conceptual history, as in the case of Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink's study of the conceptual field of the *nation* in France and Germany. In doing so, Lüsebrink develops both a comparative and an intercultural mode of investigation in conceptual history.<sup>12</sup> Cultural historians are able to reconsider faux dilemmas and false dichotomies thanks to Reinhart Koselleck's refined analysis of the temporal layers and the relationship between old and new. Moreover, the morphological analysis proffered by Michael Freeden contributes to the understanding of the conceptual interrelationship, complexity, and identification of the key concepts in a political discourse or an ideology.<sup>13</sup> What therefore needs to be done is to describe the semantic and structural properties of the political discourse constructed in a crucial instance of western political thinking by American and European intelligentsia,<sup>14</sup> during the 1950s and the early 60s.

Although the mobilisation of intellectuals during the Cold War was effected against communism and the nonalignment movement, and although evidence has been provided for the intimate relationship of the Congress for Cultural Freedom with the CIA, Cold War culture cannot be reduced to propaganda<sup>15</sup> – a rather technical term appropriate to describe the practice of a specific medium, such as the Soviet and the Hollywood “message films” in the period after the Second World War, or to describe the persuasive devices and techniques exercised by several institutions and departments controlled by public authorities for propaganda purposes.<sup>16</sup> In the case of the Nazi regime, which utilised the radio and the movie industry as influential propaganda devices, George L Mosse raised strong objections to the use of the term for an indepth examination of Nazism. Mosse denies the notion that Nazism was simply the product of mass propaganda and terror; instead, he suggests that it had to be conceived as an immanent tendency with its roots in German sociopolitical development and *völkisch* culture. Claudia Koonz employs a cluster of concepts such as ethos, morality, and political culture, through which she explores the “process by which racial beliefs came to shape the outlook of the ordinary Germans”.<sup>17</sup>

Nevertheless, propaganda is often inextricable from ideology,<sup>18</sup> especially in the case of Cold War rhetoric, both in the west and in the east, and could be read culturally. Contemporaries did not use the term exclusively in a negative sense. The elites that promoted the virtues of freedom of expression and the proponents of antitotalitarianism who subscribed to the common values of the west felt obliged to secure an unlimited spread of their ideology – by all means, including propaganda – aiming mainly at domestic public opinion, especially in countries where the influence of communist parties on the intelligentsia and on society was great. Giles Scott-Smith, in an article on Melvin Lasky and *Der Monat*, highlights Lasky's criticism of the lack of a consist-

ent strategy that could counteract the wrong ideas which prevailed in Germany and in Europe about the United States. This anti-Americanism, evident “in different forms and in varying intensity” in most European countries on both the right and left, often had a strong cultural character, as was the case in Germany<sup>19</sup> and in France. In December 1947, Lasky proposed to the Office of Military Government for Germany US (OMGUS) that the scope of *Der Monat* should be to “stimulate the German-reading intelligentsia of Germany and elsewhere, with the world-views of American writers and thinkers”. An additional task was also to demonstrate that “behind the official representatives of American democracy lies a great and progressive culture, with a richness of achievement in the arts, in literature, in philosophy, in all the aspects of culture which unites the free traditions of Europe and America”.<sup>20</sup> Cultural diplomacy was given much prominence in Germany, a defeated and divided country, whose western part was occupied by the United States and its allies. The official US operation to control its culture peaked in the early 1950s. Despite occasional drawbacks, the “battle for the hearts and minds” of West Germans was for the most part won.<sup>21</sup>

The French monthly review *Les Amis de la Liberté* adopted, in its first issue in November 1950, the phrase with which Karl Jaspers greeted the first assembly of the CCF in Berlin: “Even the innocent needs a lawyer, even the truth needs propaganda.” In its next issue, the review published an extract from a speech by the Swiss writer Denis de Rougemont, director of the CCF’s international secretariat, delivered in Brussels before its international committee and entitled “To make propaganda about freedom is to save our culture”. He said that although in the west people hated propaganda, they recognised that it existed and that they had to employ it sometimes. Propaganda was compared to the “microbes” which Pasteur used for the sake of people’s health. He believed that fanaticism could not be opposed by fanaticism. Nevertheless, in the face of the threat that communism represented for Europe and its culture, he appealed to the awakening of spirits in the west, where people experienced liberty without appreciating it, much as was the case with the air they breathe. In this vein, he encouraged the use of the major media, radio, films and the press for the aforementioned purpose.<sup>22</sup> Isaiah Berlin, on the other hand, believed that the answer to communism should not be a “counter-faith, equally fervent [and] militant”.<sup>23</sup> Almost every paper presented at a CCF conference in Milan was “in one way or another a critique of doctrinairism, of fanaticism, of ideological possession”; in Edward Shils’ opinion, the general feeling characterising the conference was that of self-confidence as most of the conferees made no attempt to justify their beliefs and way of life in response to the communist critique. Shils agreed with the aforementioned view when he argued that westerners had to reconstruct their beliefs “without yielding to the temptation to construct new ideologies, as rigid, as eager for consistency and for universal observance as those which have been now transcended”. Still, he suggested that the nations which considered their domestic policies without regard for the distinction between left and right, socialism and laissez-faire capitalism, have most successfully managed their affairs (Britain, USA, West Germany, the Scandinavian countries and, to lesser extent, Italy and France).<sup>24</sup> The development of Britain in the first half of the 19th century illustrates, according to Michael Polanyi, the “effectiveness of dynamic political action, carried on with little ideological guidance”.<sup>25</sup> So, practical thought and disillusion, economic progress and freedom were highly valued.

### *The antitotalitarian discourse and the tensions in the quest of identity*

On the other side of the divide, the antiwestern Soviet propaganda of the early Cold War, also rooted in the early twentieth century and far beyond, initiated a semantic struggle to redefine ideology. In this respect, the campaign against the “adulation of the west” – which initiated the cultural Cold War on the Soviet side – was integrated to Zhdanovism and the official Soviet perception of the other in the early Cold War (using elements of the xenophobic, hyperpatriotic propaganda initiated in 1942–43) with the alleged purpose of protecting Russian culture against western bourgeois influence.<sup>26</sup> Whereas in the Soviet Union cosmopolitanism and the generic de-ideologisation associated with the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact (a process which was accentuated during the war) were thoroughly castigated and rebuked,<sup>27</sup> in the west a new cultural politics was set in motion to promote western values against the ideological politics of communism. Even before that, however, shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War and as a reaction to the signing of the Nazi–Soviet pact,<sup>28</sup> the ex-communist Franz Borkenau launched the idea that there was an ideological bond between Germany and Russia, and that an ideological war was being waged – “a fight of the liberal powers of Europe against the biggest totalitarian power, Germany” – while at that time the German Reich was cooperating with Russia, “the other big totalitarian power of the world”.<sup>29</sup> Still earlier, in 1936, Luigi Sturzo, the antifascist priest, wrote about the totalitarian states, and the French Christian philosopher Jacques Maritain used the notion of totalitarianism in order to designate “the double face of an atheist (Bolshevism) or pagan (Nazism) modernity”.<sup>30</sup>

The origins of totalitarianism was a point of disagreement. Borkenau traced the origins of the totalitarian revolution, the world revolution against western civilisation,<sup>31</sup> to the industrial system born in Britain and to the authoritarianism of the French Jacobins. The French historian François Furet, writing in the mid-1960s, saw the Terror as the essence of the revolution and as a harbinger of Bolshevism and fascism.<sup>32</sup> Political conservatives such as Michael Polanyi and Robert Nisbet blamed not only the French revolution but also the culture of the Enlightenment, rationalism and Rousseau’s *volonté générale*, for the revolutions of the twentieth century.<sup>33</sup> Replying to Polanyi in *Encounter*, Sidney Hook claimed that the founding fathers of the Enlightenment were not to blame. On the contrary, they were deeply suspicious of all forms of “messianic passion and zeal” and, as he stated, the Rousseauist “glorification of feeling” was alien to the thought of Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Bentham and the “philosophers-statesmen of the American Republic”.<sup>34</sup> Representing the marginal wartime antitotalitarian thought along with Friedrich Hayek (*The Road to Serfdom*, 1944), Karl Popper, in his *Open Society and its Enemies* (1945), affirmed the impact of Plato, Hegel and Marx on twentieth-century totalitarianisms.

In the 1949 collective volume *The God that Failed* (in which six intellectuals describe their journey into communism and back),<sup>35</sup> Arthur Koestler – the author of *Darkness at Noon*<sup>36</sup> – referred to the revolutionary faith and devotion to pure utopia (which, in his opinion, was the case with the communist creed), and to messianic fanaticism, which was immanent to totalitarianism (although the word did not figure in Koestler’s book and the theory of totalitarianism had not yet been elaborated).<sup>37</sup> In another article published in *Encounter*, Koestler pursued a similar line of argument in discussing the prospects of a nuclear ban:

To abolish the threat of atomic war is certainly desirable, but not in the realm of the possible. Interdiction of atomic weapons can only be effective if both parties agree to international supervision under conditions which include permanent inspection . . . But such a policy runs counter to the *tradition of secrecy and distrust* which Russia and the Asian nations have practised for centuries past; and it also runs counter to the basic principles and political structure of all dictatorial regimes, Communist or others . . . The Chinese Wall and the Iron Curtain are not accidents of history, but massive symbols of national traditions and social régimes whose existence depends on their ability to block the movement of people and ideas.<sup>38</sup>

By the 1950s totalitarianism became a prevailing concept not only in Europe, where it was born, but also – and particularly – in America. According to Abbott Gleason, it was also a “particular generational perspective, a gruesome collection of insights at which people arrived during a particular period, having been through a particular historical experience”.<sup>39</sup> As a concept and an ideology, it obtained a remarkable effectiveness uniting white liberals and conservatives in the United States;<sup>40</sup> cementing a foreign policy consensus in the west, and forging a strong domestic anti-communist front.

A very popular “figure of speech” in the west at that time, the polarity between totalitarianism (communism) and antitotalitarianism (anticommunism) involved asymmetrical counter-concepts,<sup>41</sup> “through a binary conceptualization heavily unilateral and derogatory”.<sup>42</sup> As a term, antitotalitarian/anticommunist could thus appeal collectively to liberals, conservatives, the noncommunist left, ex-communists, and even rightwing extremists, as was the case in Greece. For the radical rightwing organisations of the 1950s, however, communism was associated with gangsterism, in what was pure demonology. In that respect, these groups were distanced from the antitotalitarian discourse, and were rather marginal vis-à-vis the cultural identity of the west. What differentiated them still further was their fervent nationalism which ran counter to Atlanticism and loyalty to the alliances of the western world.<sup>43</sup> In the US, both liberals and conservatives attacked extremist attitudes as hostile to the real spirit of the American political tradition, i.e. the so-called democracy of consensus. For Clinton Rossiter (an “American nationalist” of the distinct postwar group called the new conservatives who made it clear that he didn’t know “whether he was a liberal conservative or a conservative liberal”)<sup>44</sup> there was an American right consisting of antiliberal and antiradical reactionaries, authoritarians and “confessed enemies of constitutional democracy”, who “talked like liberals and acted like Fascists”.<sup>45</sup> Richard Hofstadter, professor of American history at Columbia University, elaborating on the antitotalitarian political vocabulary and referring to the same rightwing tradition a decade later, argued that Goldwater’s nomination as the Republican candidate for the presidency (1964), was a “vital blow at the American political order”, because it relied upon “zealotry rather than negotiation and accommodation”. In that era, characterised by the ascendance of liberal politics and political reform, the basic premises of the consensual ethos of the 1950s were challenged by a recurrence of extremism; an extremism which initiated ideological politics in the US.<sup>46</sup> Another like-minded scholar, the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, author of *Political Man* and *The First New Nation*, had on various occasions characterised the Goldwater phenomenon as “extremist”, “extremist conservatism”, “dogmatic conservatism” and “political reaction”.<sup>47</sup> In the same vein, the antitotalitarian ethos could not be reduced to extremism for the Austrian Manès Sperber, a member of the “brilliant fellowship of exile in postwar Paris”,<sup>48</sup> who refused to side with McCarthy

and his followers against Stalinism, just as he refused to fight alongside the leftists against McCarthy.<sup>49</sup> Similar views were voiced by Albert Camus, who opposed any form of anticommunism that could be assimilated by Franco's regime or neonazis.<sup>50</sup> The outspokenly pro-American Raymond Aron observed that in politics they are only pragmatists, not zealots or extremists, since they have little liking for ideologies.<sup>51</sup> Yet in his book *Le grand schisme* (1948), Aron, referring to the Soviet camp, pointed out categorically: "Against a military and religious sect which strictly applies the principle whoever is not with me is against me, the only honourable attitude is either total agreement or absolute refusal. No half-measure is conceivable."<sup>52</sup> Not to mention that during the inaugural session of the CCF in West Berlin in 1950, he criticised harshly all conceptions of European neutrality, along with James Burnham, who was hostile to all partisans of peace.

Though in France the communists were considered a part of the nation, even though there were deemed to be opposed to its interests, a similar argument to Aron's can be found in a Greek right-wing newspaper two years after the end of the Greek Civil War.<sup>53</sup> In 1951, the editor of the daily *Kathimerini*, George Vlachos, one of the prominent rightwing journalists in the 1940s and 50s, asserted that for the first time in the history of political struggles in Greece, what was at stake was the outcome of the fight between the nation and the antination. At the end of the civil war, the definition of what constituted the enemy of the nation had become clear and definitive for the anticommunists; it was communism or Slavo-communism as a spatial and cultural threat to hellenism and the free world in general. Even after the end of that war, which was depicted in Greece and in the west as part of the international struggle against Soviet and "Slavic totalitarianism", the Greek state maintained that it was faced and continued to face a serious threat from communism inside its borders. The ideology of national-mindedness (the response to the declared "internal enemy" threat), which resulted in the exclusion of communists and fellow travellers from the national body politic, was certainly nourished by prevalent nationalist and anti-Slav, as well as anticommunist, perceptions of the past, but this fact did not make this ideology in any way unsuitable to be considered as an integral part of Cold War anticommunism; by no means though could Greece be considered a model liberal democracy.

Nationalism and loyalty to the allies, as the main features of the aforementioned ideology of national-mindedness, coexisted harmoniously for most, though not all, at the time (the most prominent exception being the Cyprus issue in the 1950s). Although the assumption that the Hellenes were the real founders of western culture derives from another, much older experience, its articulation in the new space of experience opened up by the Cold War was of crucial importance for the construction of the new Greek identity at this particular juncture. The argument, as described by Konstantinos Tsatsos, a conservative scholar and politician, runs as follows: Greece was assigned a specific and unique cultural mission: the transmission of the Greek idea of liberty to the rest of the world. At the end of the Middle Ages, "when the European soul was exhausted due to the stagnation of Christianity and the heroic spirit of chivalry, the Greek logos provided the necessary renewal . . . From the depth of the ancient myth, hubris has been synonymous with the violation of the unwritten law of respect for measure which puts limits to all human actions." Indeed, Greekness appeared to be the quintessential expression of western culture, since Greece had given the west all the ideals for which it was now fighting. The antithesis that was constructed here between measure and extremism, position and denial, logos and pathos, in the middle of a political con-

junction marked by the “battle of Athens” between the communists and the British in December 1944, introduced, according to Tsatsos, a universal criterion of differentiation between materialism/communism and Greekness.<sup>54</sup>

In the same vein, André Malraux, in the first issue of the conservative periodical *Liberté de l'Esprit* (February 1949), wrote an appeal to the young intellectuals to use the “language of good faith and measure”, and dialogue “in the place of a systematic incomprehension and outrage”. He added that a historical logic imposed by force was likely to leave every anticommunist open to the accusation that he was nothing more than a *fascist of the right*. The case of the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (Rally of the French People), General de Gaulle’s party, was cited by Malraux, a prominent novelist and also prominent Gaullist, as a typical victim of such campaigns.<sup>55</sup> The expression fascists of the right, however, was also used by the Greek rightwing press in juxtaposition to the fascists of the left in order to suggest that Greece in the 1940s was engaged in a two-front war against Nazism and Slavism/communism.

The best known case of a problematic relationship between nationalism and loyalty to the alliance is France. It was due to the frustrations that this relationship provoked in the context of the decolonisation process, the strong influence of the French Communist Party on political and intellectual life, and the Fourth Republic’s inability to choose clearly between national sovereignty and the concessions necessary for European unification; between neutralist tendencies for strategic autonomy on the one hand<sup>56</sup> and Atlanticism on the other. The difficult relations with the US, which led to serious confrontations on the diplomatic level during the early and mid-1950s,<sup>57</sup> as well as France’s “structural anti-Americanism”<sup>58</sup> and its ambivalent stance, should be understood in this respect.

In addition to these nationalist European frictions, the west had to cope with the different cultural heritage of the new nations in Asia and Africa, at a moment when a “new sensitivity” was forged towards a more universalistic perspective. This perspective implied the crucial issue of the economic and political relations of the new nations with the US and the European countries of the west. Shils chose to distinguish the European/American attitude towards twentieth-century nationalism “as a source of great troubles springing from the passions”, from the sense of nationalism of the African and Asian states in general, a nationalism which was an integral part of their conception of freedom. Shils’ position on this issue was formulated in response to the tension generated by the session on nationalism of the CCF’s Milan conference under the heading of “Threats and Obstacles to a Free Society”.<sup>59</sup>

The French journalist and essayist Thierry Maulnier wrote in *Preuves* in favour of European unification and against the “old patriotism of the Communist Party and the nationalists who encompassed the idea of national grandeur”.<sup>60</sup> *Preuves* also reproduced an article by the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset defending the idea of the construction of a great nation in continental Europe. The crisis over the European Defence Community in the autumn of 1954 and West Germany’s accession to Nato and the Western European Union in 1955, “established the ‘double containment’ (of the USSR thanks to the Western Alliance and of West Germany within that same alliance)”.<sup>61</sup>

On a theoretical level, the old idea that freedom was a “fighting faith” which had to be defended on a worldwide scale, not only echoed Arthur Schlesinger’s *Vital Center* (1949), the standard mainstream liberal reference book, but it was a generally accepted view, as evidenced in an NSC-68, a review of foreign policy challenges, requested by Truman in early 1950. The main argument that sustained this view was that “the assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and . . . a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere”.<sup>62</sup> Within the rhetorical forms used in the context of America’s relationship with the world, the “missionary imperative” is linked to the “conception of global interdependence”.<sup>63</sup>

One can also explore affinities between the ideology of “nationally minded” Greeks and the ideology which John Fousek characterised as “American nationalist globalism”, i.e. an ideology deeply rooted in the historic notions of chosenness, destiny and mission.<sup>64</sup>

The Korean War was viewed as a communist assault either against American or against Greek freedom. Both countries, in their official discourse,<sup>65</sup> embraced a universal role with strong nationalist overtones. According to a Greek rightwing daily, the “spirit of Grammos” (the site of the most important victory of the Greek army against the communists in the Civil War) was “reglorified” in Korea, where the Greeks had the opportunity to “regenerate their sense of nationality”.<sup>66</sup> According to this logic, in the battle against communism, communist aggression in Greece amounted to a crime against humanity, since western civilisation had been born there. Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, a prominent conservative politician who represented Greece at the Berlin conference in 1950, said that he felt proud for Greece as “after ten years of hard struggle, it was not simply a democracy; it was a winning democracy”.<sup>67</sup>

### ***The pairs of concepts***

What is suggested at this point is that the variants of the globalised anticommunist discourse in the west comprise several core components which create a semantic field around the concept of totalitarianism. Along with it, an iconography was created in the west which enabled people to re-evaluate their experiences, and even homogenise a differentiated, multifarious totality, while re-reading their expectations. This categorisation presupposes no essential distinction between erudite and vulgar explorations of anticommunism. In this type of textual analysis, the author’s intentions matter less than his/her *scripta*.<sup>68</sup>

The core conceptual units and the basic political concepts<sup>69</sup> of the antitotalitarian discourse in the west provided a self-definition as well as a number of counter-concepts for characterising the other. These pairs of concepts, which divided the world, were the following:

- Democracy versus totalitarianism or Soviet imperialism/tyranny/slavery/despotism/dictatorship, and oligarchy<sup>70</sup> versus pluralism, moderation, compromise and respect of the interests and the opinions of the people.
- The defence of the values of universal freedom, freedom of the spirit and critical reflection as opposed to totalitarian oppression and the destruction of individuality. To illustrate this

last notion (*destruction de la personne*) cited by Melvyn Lasky,<sup>71</sup> we can refer to Gabriel Marcel, the French “philosopher of existence”, who asserted that in a totalitarian country individual freedom is absent, while the individual loses contact with herself/himself to an extent that s/he denies the acts that s/he has committed and/or accuses herself/himself for things s/he has never done. Stoicism, as a mental attitude, which was based on the belief that the individual had an “inviolable and inviolate refuge against the intrusions of power”, is completely eradicated under oppressive regimes.<sup>72</sup> Freedom of thought under such regimes is abolished and a total ideology is created and imposed forcibly on the individual, controlling all actions, outer expressions, as well as inner emotional life.

- Open society versus fanaticism, dogmatism and evil. It is worth noting in this respect that even Arthur Schlesinger Jr, the liberal Harvard historian who usually adopted a more nuanced approach in his writings, insisted in *Encounter* in January 1960 that, despite the changes which had taken place since the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union remained a “theological society run by a collection of true believers”. The heart of Soviet dogmatism was the principle of infallibility, applied to the leader, the party and to a particular theory of history.<sup>73</sup> The gist of his argument was that in a totalitarian society, children were subjected to systematic indoctrination that turned them into “the most orthodox, rigid, and hopeless group in that society”.<sup>74</sup> Students of antitotalitarianism can find this assertion not only in Schlesinger but also in an April 1950 article in *Foreign Affairs* by the German anti-Nazi journalist Marion Dönhoff entitled “Germany puts freedom before unity”. Dönhoff, later on an outspoken advocate of German reunification, sought in that article to highlight the similarities between the youth organisation under Nazism and the communist youth organisation in East Germany.

Reference to the theme of the indoctrination of children can also be found in Greek anticommunist discourse, on the occasion of the forcible “gathering of village children” in territories controlled by the communist Democratic Army during the civil war, and their removal northwards to Eastern bloc countries. The nationally minded characterised the “abduction” of Greek children as a great crime against the Greek race, and Stratis Myrivilis, a well-known Greek novelist, drew a parallel with the abduction of Greek children by the Ottomans to serve in the Janissary corps; in both cases, the alleged aim was for Greek children to lose their Christian and “national conscience”.

The corollary to this was that the Greek children would be turned into monolithic communists who, according to the same Greek author, were members of another “inferior race” whose strength was “hatred and mercilessness”, “persons who cheat, lie, rape and violate”.<sup>75</sup> This notion of the “new type of man” is linked to patterns of racial prejudice, clothed in anthropological terms. In his influential *Sociologie du communisme*, the French sociologist Jules Monnerot also sees parallels, this time, between communism and Islam. In his opinion, the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt and the Safavid in Persia, both Shiite, forged a historical myth intended to fanaticise the people and make them hostile towards their own society. In a similar fashion, Soviet Russia and Islam share one common characteristic: the confusion of politics with religion.<sup>76</sup> Monnerot, the German-born American philosopher Eric Voegelin and Aron, employed – among others – the concept of secular religion in analysing communism.<sup>77</sup>

Thus, communism is antithetical to Christianity, family and traditions.<sup>78</sup> *Homo sovieticus* has no pity for either his parents or his brothers and sisters and was turned into a robot.<sup>79</sup> The new religion created by totalitarian regimes purports to serve the race or the history and the class. The bottom line was that totalitarianism destroys all community, all shared experience, the elites<sup>80</sup> and all shared understanding.

One further theme juxtaposed the welfare democracies of the west with the poverty and exploitation which reigned in the “totalitarian empire”. Edward Stettinius, in the *State Department Bulletin* (22 April 1945), and President Truman in his speech before Congress, known as the Truman doctrine (12 March 1947), associated economic misery and distress, on the one hand, with the repressive political regimes of the Soviet empire and the emergence of totalitarianism, on the other, in a clearly causal relation. This line of argument, taken up by US public officials for obvious reasons, could be linked to the old argument that fascism and Nazism were – a contrario – political authoritarianisms created in response to economic crisis. The aforementioned themes can be gleaned from several anticommunist periodicals of that time, which presumably played a rather significant role in the formation of mass culture. Purporting to engage in investigative journalism, these periodicals sought to publicise widely the eastern experience to the west, through an intensive treatment of “way of living” issues in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc.<sup>81</sup>

### **Conclusion**

To sum up, the proposed semasiological analysis is just one way of bringing into focus the patterns of thought, the values and the mentalities that ascribed meaning to a divided world. The aforementioned discourse, which expresses the uniformity of the global against the plurality of the particular, is intercultural both in the sense that various political traditions (liberal and conservative) cooperated in its formulation and in that various anticommunist political cultures were represented in it. It is also intertextual – to use a term associated with structuralism and poststructuralism – in the sense that it puts the writer in the position of a participant in a “community of discourse” that creates its own collective meaning.<sup>82</sup>

Finally, this new discourse – which created a global community of readers since theorists and laymen alike had (partly) common references drawn from their readings – represented a major instance of the “great certainties” in western political thought. It could also draw further strength from the universalistic character that the west attributed to their ideology,<sup>83</sup> an ideology which reduced communist experience to a fundamental property.<sup>84</sup> For intellectuals such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, however, the recognition of the fact that there was oppression in the USSR did not mean that it should be targeted as the enemy number one (and sometimes as the only enemy), because to adopt such a stance, oppression in the non-Soviet world (colonialism, unemployment, Spanish prisoners and deportees in Greece) was left undiscussed.<sup>85</sup>

Communism was reduced to an idea, a utopia based on a totalising ideological system. Its only aspect as a lived experience<sup>86</sup> – in the pages of the CCF periodicals – was the defection from it,<sup>87</sup> and this defection was generously illustrated by the testimonies of ex-communists, intellectual exiles and émigré writers, such as David Rousset, Michel Koriakoff, Victor Kravchenko, Czesław Miłosz,<sup>88</sup> Ignazio Silone, Kot Jeleński and Arthur Koestler.<sup>89</sup> These testimonies had, no doubt, in-

tellectual and moral significance for the antitotalitarian movement, especially in countries that had developed a civic culture. Karl Jaspers and Ignazio Silone, presenting the work of Rousset and Mitosz, congratulated them for making public their mature experience concerning the complexity of human life and for their courage to speak the truth.<sup>90</sup> At a time when more and more evidence for the Holocaust was forthcoming and widely publicised,<sup>91</sup> the testimony of émigrés regarding their predicament in the “Soviet camp” grew on an already cultivated ground, formed by audiences who were prepared to listen, and were highly valued. The world fame which they achieved, due not only to the support of CCF periodicals but also to the literary merits in presenting their “experience of totalitarianism”, ensured their books circulated well. Rousset’s *L’Univers concentrationnaire* served, according to *Preuves*, as a key concept of the consciousness of the free world, while the works of Aron, Rousset, Monnerot, Camus, and others, and the concepts that they employed, created “a common fund of knowledge and provided a working basis which would be retained”.<sup>92</sup>

These concepts of antitotalitarianism – characterised by their claim to universality – embodied in the work of those who perceived themselves as members of an intellectual partnership, produced patterns of thought, and also an image of the otherness, which went beyond different national experiences and particularities. The emergence of the “cultural other” had been made possible by this conceptualisation of the enemy. The impact of antitotalitarian ideology on national imaginaries and political cultures was worldwide, especially in the core countries of the west. It was however heterogeneous: different nations and peoples continued to experience historical events, such as for example the Hungarian insurrection or the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia later on, in a similar-yet-particular manner. In other words, it was an experience based on the aforementioned common fund, the common working basis, tempered or enforced by the particularities of each country, arising from its past historical experience in all its variants.

## NOTES

- 1 On the political and intellectual legitimacy of the comparison between Nazism and Stalinism (or communism), see Henry Rousso, *Stalinisme et nazisme: histoire et mémoire comparées* (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1999), 14; Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin, *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997); Michael Geyer and Shelia Fitzpatrick, eds., *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009), 1–37 (introduction and passim).
- 2 “Launched in London in 1953 under the joint editorship of Stephen Spender and the young New York intellectual Irving Kristol, *Encounter* rapidly established a reputation as the foremost journal of serious political opinion and cultural expression in the English language, securing contributions from a remarkably wide cross-section of the British intelligentsia.” See Hugh Wilford, *The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?* (London: Frank Cass: 2003), 34.
- 3 The first issue was published in 1951 (Pierre Grémion, *Preuves: Une Revue Européenne à Paris* (Paris: Julliard, 1989)). Associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) in Europe was also *Der Monat* and *Forum* in Germany, and *Tempo Presente* in Italy. The Italian publication was considered to be the leftwing of the CCF. Its editors, Ignazio Silone, a former socialist, and Nicola Chiaromonte, took part in the decision-making process of the council, but at the same time they insisted on their editorial independence. See Pierre Grémion, *Intelligence de l’anticommunisme: Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris (1950–1975)* (Paris: Fayard, 1995), 398–409. Along with the aforementioned magazines,

the highly influential literary journal *Kultura*, founded by Polish émigré Jerzy Giedroyc in Paris in 1947, was often advertised in *Preuves*, while there were sometimes references to the London journal *Twentieth Century* (1951). See Grémion, *Intelligence*, 25, 457.

- 4 The CCF was initiated at a conference held in Berlin (26–29 June 1950) and, after it was revealed in 1967 that the CIA funded it, it was renamed the International Association for Cultural Freedom. It ceased to exist in 1979. See Giles Scott-Smith, “‘A Radical Political Offensive’: Melvin J. Lasky, *Der Monat*, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 25/2 (2000): 3.
- 5 On the theme of the “mutual otherness of history and utopia”, see Jörn Rüsen, “Introduction: History and Utopia,” *Historein* 7 (2007): 5–10.
- 6 Tony Judt, “The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,” in *Memory and Power in Post-war Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), 157–183.
- 7 Benjamin Stora, preface to *Les guerres de mémoires. La France et son histoire*, eds. Pascal Blanchard and Isabelle Veyrat-Masson (Paris: La Découverte, 2008).
- 8 Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 61.
- 9 Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith, “Introduction: Boundaries to Freedom” to *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960*, eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 1–9.
- 10 Jean-François Sirinelli, introduction *Culture et Guerre froide*, eds. Jean-François Sirinelli and Georges-Henri Soutou (Paris: Presses de l’Université Paris Sorbonne, 2008), 7–8.
- 11 In this sense, Herbert Marcuse’s use of the word totalitarianism and the critique of the New Left to neo-capitalism cannot be studied as a part of the antitotalitarian consensus.
- 12 Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, “Conceptual History and Conceptual Transfer: the Case of ‘Nation’ in Revolutionary France and Germany,” in *History of Concepts. Comparative Perspectives*, eds. Ian Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans and Frank van Vree (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998), 115–128.
- 13 Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
- 14 On the concept of intelligentsia, see Isaiah Berlin, “A Marvellous Decade. 1838–48: The Birth of Russian Intelligentsia,” *Encounter* 4/6 (1955): 27–39.
- 15 For the constant tendency “to find a Cold War ‘smoking gun’ behind all cultural activity”, see David Caute, foreword to *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–1960*, eds. Scott-Smith and Krabbendam, 2–3.
- 16 On the relation of propaganda to ideology, see Tony Shaw, *Hollywood’s Cold War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2007), 2–3.
- 17 Claudia Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003), 13.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 2.
- 19 For the atmosphere which contributed to the transferring of anti-American images from the Nazi period to the Federal Republic, see Dan Diner, *America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996), 111.
- 20 Scott-Smith, “‘A Radical Political Offensive’,” 268.
- 21 Alexander Stephan, “A Special German Case of Cultural Americanization,” in *The Americanization of*

- Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945* (New York: Berghahn, 2007), 69–88.
- 22 The association Les Amis de la Liberté, set up after the CCF congress in Berlin, began its activities in the autumn 1950. Its supporters included the physician Louis de Broglie and the writers François Mauriac, André Malraux, Jean Schlumberger, Jean Guéhenno, Jacques Maritain and Rémy Roure. See *Les Amis de la Liberté* (Dec 1950–Jan 1951): 2.
  - 23 Michael Ignatieff, *Isaiah Berlin: A Life* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1998), 200, as cited in Scott-Smith, “A Radical Political Offensive,” 278.
  - 24 Edward Shils, “The End of Ideology? Letter from Milan,” *Encounter* 5/5 (1955): 52–58.
  - 25 Michael Polanyi, “Beyond Nihilism,” *Encounter* 14/3 (1960): 38.
  - 26 François Thom, “La campagne contre ‘l’adulation de l’Occident’,” in *Culture et Guerre froide*, eds. Jean-François Sirinelli and Georges-Henri Sotou (Paris: Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2008), 11–26. For the resolutions of August 1946 that the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted against the literary magazines *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* for publishing works by Anna Akhmatova and Mikhail Zoshchenko, see 18.
  - 27 *Ibid.*, 13. See also Susan Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000), 8, where she argues that “never was the Soviet Union more integrated into the Western discourse of nation-states than as a wartime ally against Hitler’s military aggression”.
  - 28 On George Orwell’s reaction to this pact, see *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Vol. 1, *An Age Like This, 1920–1940* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), 591, as cited in Jean-Claude Michéa, *Orwell, anarchiste Tory* (Paris: Climats, 2008), 26.
  - 29 Franz Borkenau, *The Totalitarian Enemy* (London: Faber, 1939), 11. The reference to seminal writings on totalitarianism is not exhaustive.
  - 30 Enzo Traverso, *Le Totalitarisme. Le XXe siècle en débat* (Paris: Seuil, 2000), 30–35.
  - 31 Borkenau, *The Totalitarian Enemy*, 17.
  - 32 Gary Kates, ed., *The French Revolution: Recent Debates and New Controversies* (London: Routledge, 1998), 11. For the historiography of this particular approach, see also the notion of *totalitarian democracy* used by the Israeli historian Jacob L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1952).
  - 33 Thierry Maulnier, *La Face de Méduse du “Communisme”* (Paris: Gallimard, 1959), 63.
  - 34 Polanyi, “Beyond Nihilism,” 34–43 and Sidney Hook, “Enlightenment and Radicalism,” *Encounter* 17/2 (1961): 44–50. See also Robert Nisbet, “Rousseau and Totalitarianism,” *The Journal of Politics* 5/2 (1943): 93–114. For a synthesis of the discussions and the issues raised by Polanyi’s intervention during the tenth anniversary of the Berlin conference (1960), see Grémion, *Intelligence de l’anticommunisme*, 330–338. The controversy between conservatives and liberals on this matter has usually been interpreted as a re-evaluation of the French revolution and Europe’s revolutionary past in the context of the antitotalitarian wartime and Cold War-era theories introduced by leftwing, liberal and conservative intellectuals. Also, for the deep pessimism of the legacy of Enlightenment shared by conservatives in interwar Germany and by members of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research and the New Left of the 1960s, see Wilfried Mausbach, “Burn, warehouse, burn! Modernity, Counterculture, and the Vietnam War in West Germany,” in *Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960–1980*, eds. Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried (New York: Berghahn, 2005), 175–202.

- 35 Richard Crossman, Introduction to *The God that Failed*, eds. Richard Crossman, Arthur Koestler et al. (New York: Bantam Books, 1965), 1–10.
- 36 It was – according to Judt – the most enduring book and his most influential contribution to the century. In France alone it sold 420,000 copies in the first decade after the war. See Tony Judt, *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 25–43.
- 37 On the evolution of the concept of totalitarianism, see Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner Story of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), 3–12 passim and Anders Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of the Cold War,” H-Diplo, accessed 19 October 2014. <http://h-diplo.org/essays/PDF/stephanson-14notes.pdf>.
- 38 Arthur Koestler, “The Trail of the Dinosaur,” *Encounter* 4/5 (1955), 5–14. My emphasis.
- 39 Gleason, *Totalitarianism*, 146.
- 40 For criticism of the Truman doctrine and America’s hegemonic role in the world from African Americans, who underlined the existence of racial injustice in the US and colonialism abroad, by civil rights movement and by progressives who opposed vital centre liberalism, see John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 130–161.
- 41 On what Reinhart Koselleck terms “asymmetrical concepts”, see Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Kenneth Tribe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 159–197.
- 42 Javiér Fernández Sebastian and Juan Francisco Fuentes, “Conceptual History, Memory and Identity: An Interview with Reinhart Koselleck,” *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 2/1 (2006): 125.
- 43 For the ideology of John Birch Society, see Revilo P. Oliver, “The Nature of the Beast,” *American Opinion*, Jan 1962, 9–36. For the liberal critique, see Richard R. Rovere, “The Last Days of Joe McCarthy,” *Encounter* 11/6 (1958): 45–55 and Brian Crozier, “Down Among the Rightists (Report from America),” *Encounter* 18/3 (1962): 51–58.
- 44 Charles Barker, “Conservatism in America by Clinton Rossiter,” *Indiana Law Journal* 31/1 (1955): 165.
- 45 Clinton Rossiter, “The Anatomy of American Conservatism,” *Encounter* 4/3 (1955): 47–53.
- 46 Richard Hofstadter, “Goldwater & His Party,” *Encounter* 23/4 (1964): 3–13, esp. 3.
- 47 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Beyond the Backlash,” *Encounter* 23/5 (1964): 11–24.
- 48 Judt, *Reappraisals*, 64.
- 49 Manès Sperber, “Idéologie et Société,” *Preuves* (Apr–May 1953): 25–37.
- 50 *Preuves* (Jan 1952): 1–2.
- 51 Raymond Aron, *Démocratie et totalitarisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), 217.
- 52 Jean-François Sirinelli, *Deux Intellectuels dans le siècle, Sartre et Aron* (Paris: Fayard, 1995), 261.
- 53 Raymond Aron, “Les intellectuels français et l’utopie,” *Preuves* (Apr 1955): 5–14, esp. 9.
- 54 Konstantinos Tsatsos, *Ελληνική πορεία. Πολιτικά δοκίμια* [Greek course: political essays], 2nd ed., Athens: Hestia, n.d., , 15–26.
- 55 *Liberté de l’Esprit* (Feb 1949): 2–3.
- 56 Frédéric Bozo, “France, ‘Gaullisme’, and the Cold War,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol.

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- II, *Crises and Détente*, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 164.
- 57 Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 22.
- 58 Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli, *La France d'un siècle à l'autre, 1914–2000* (Paris: Hachette, 1999), 579. On the anti-Americanism of French intellectuals, see *Preuves* (Apr 1955), 5–14, esp. 9.
- 59 Shils, "The End of Ideology?" 55–56.
- 60 Thierry Maulnier, "La crise du nationalisme français," *Preuves* (Aug 1954): 3–8.
- 61 Bozo, "France, 'Gaullisme', and the Cold War," 158–178.
- 62 John Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1994* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1995), 16–17. This general schema of worldwide ideological borders was for the first time made specific by the Truman doctrine of March 1947, which committed the US to the military defence of Greece and Turkey. The political rationale for this move was, according to Graebner, that the Soviet Union should not be appeased and that the bitter experience of the appeasement policy towards Hitler in Munich should not be repeated. (See Norman A. Graebner, "Myth and Reality. America's Rhetorical Cold War," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, eds. Martin J Medhurst and HW Brands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 20–37.
- 63 For this concept and for the role of the "global guardian" which the US should have adopted for the sake of its own security and welfare, see Robert J. McMahon, "'By Helping Others, We Help Ourselves.' The Cold War Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, 233–246.
- 64 Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, 7.
- 65 On the critical stance of Richard Hofstadter, along with DW Brogan and some other commentators, to the "illusion of American omnipotence", see Hofstadter, "Goldwater & His Party," 11.
- 66 *Akropolis*, 23 Oct 1952.
- 67 Voice of America, 27 June 1950 and Radio Free Europe. See also the Greek newspapers *Embros*, 27 Jul 1950 and *Fos*, 28 Jun 1950, as well as the periodical *Diethnis Zoi* [International Life].
- 68 Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text," *Social Research* 38 (1971): 534–5.
- 69 On this concept employed by Koselleck, see Melvin Richter, "More than a Two-Way Traffic: Analyzing, Translating, and Comparing Political Concepts from Other Cultures," *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 1/1 (2005): 9.
- 70 On the theory of oriental despotism, see Aron, *Démocratie et totalitarisme*, 309–316.
- 71 *Preuves* (Mar–Dec 1951): 12.
- 72 *Preuves* (Apr 1951): 6–8.
- 73 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Varieties of Communist Experience," *Encounter* 14/1 (1960): 46–58.
- 74 *Ibid.*, 55.
- 75 Stratis Myrivilis, *Ο Κομμουνισμός και το Παιδομάζωμα* [Communism and child-gathering] (Kalamata: Laiki Vivliothiki, 1948).
- 76 Jules Monnerot, *Sociologie du Communisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), 21–25.

- 77 On Arendt's critique of this notion, see her article, "Religion and Politics," *Confluences. An International Forum* 2/3 (1953) and for Monnerot's answer see *Confluences* 2/4 (1953). *Confluences* was founded in Lyon by René Tavernier, a leftist Gaullist.
- 78 Stanislas Fumet, "Le totalitarisme devant la conscience chrétienne," *Les Amis de la Liberté* (Aug–Oct 1952). On the "openly proclaimed scorn" of communism and Nazism "for traditional morality, religion and law" and totalitarianism's culturalist interpretation, see Martin Malia, *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), 329–330.
- 79 Michel Koriakoff, *Moscou ne croit pas aux larmes*, trans. Korine Roma (Paris: Monde Nouveau, 1951), 255–259.
- 80 On the "methodical extermination of the elites" in the Soviet Union, see *Preuves* (Jan 1952): 12–13.
- 81 On "the low wages of the Soviet worker and the miserable housing conditions" provided for him, see Centre International de lutte contre le communisme (CILACC), *Documentation sur le Communisme* 12/230 (1949) and CILACC, *Service de Presse* 209 (1952). The CILACC was founded in the interwar years and published a monthly bulletin.
- 82 James E. Porter, "Intertextuality and the Discourse Community," *Rhetoric Review* 5/1 (1986): 34–36.
- 83 On the common features of Soviet and American ideologies: universalism, messianism and determinism, see David C. Engerman, "Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), 31.
- 84 Bernard Pudal et al., Introduction to *Le siècle des communismes*, eds. Michel Dreyfus et al. (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier/Éditions ouvrières, 2004), 9.
- 85 *Les Temps Modernes* 51 (1950): 1168. For Greece in particular see the article by the French Progressive Union (Union Progressiste) member Louis de Villefosse, "Makronissos, laboratoire politique," *Les Temps Modernes* 51 (1950): 1287–1299. The political oppression in Greece was also denounced by Claude Bourdet in the French newspaper *Combat*.
- 86 For the assertion that there was no real society or autonomous economy in the Soviet Russia, see Martin Malia, *Histoire des Révolutions*, trans. Laurent Bury (Paris: Tallandier, 2008), 14. For the interpretation of communism based on the ideological and illusory character of communist rule, from Merleau-Ponty in the 1950s to François Furet and Martin Malia in the 1990s, see Claude Lefort, *La complication. Retour sur le communisme* (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 132–137.
- 87 On the eastern bloc defector and the prominence the character achieved in the west and especially in the American audiences, see Susan L. Carruthers, "Between Camps: Eastern Bloc 'Escapees' and Cold War Borderlands," *American Quarterly* 57/3 (2005): 911–942.
- 88 Rousset was the recipient of the French literary award Prix Renaudot for his *L'univers concentrationnaire* (1946) and Miłosz of the European literary award for his influential book *La prise du pouvoir*, written in Polish and translated in French (1953). For the trials in Paris over Miłosz's book and over the accusations against Rousset raised by the communist publication *Les Lettres Françaises*, see Emile Copsfemann, *David Rousset. Une vie dans le siècle* (Paris: Plon, 1991), 113–114, 123–130; David Rousset, Théo Bernard and Gérard Rosenthal, *Pour la vérité sur les camps concentrationnaires. Un procès antistalinien à Paris* (Paris: Edition Ramsay, 1990).
- 89 Koestler and others devoted much of their energy to the Fund for Intellectual Freedom (Fonds de Solidarité des Intellectuels), donating a percentage of their royalties to émigré writers. See Wilford, *The CIA*, 118, n. 103 and *Les Amis de la Liberté* (Dec 1950–Jan 1951): 13.

- 90 On this see *Preuves* (Apr 1953) and Czesław Miłosz, *La pensée captive. Essai sur les logocraties populaires*, trans. André Prudhommeaux, foreword Karl Jaspers (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), 11.
- 91 Founded in 1951 by Rousset, the International Commission against the Concentration Camp Practices (Commission Internationale contre le Régime Concentrationnaire) was an organisation which tried to provide information about concentration and detention camps in Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia and the USSR. The CICRC published also a report on the Algerian camps (*Le Monde*, 15 May 1957). On its goals, see “La résistance européenne contre le régime concentrationnaire,” *Preuves* (Apr 1951): 24–25.
- 92 *Preuves* (Mar 1952): 45–47.