


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1821: What Made it Greek? What Made it Revolutionary?



The Capture of the Ship Ayios Ioannis Theologos in the Summer of 1825: An Investigation of Limits

Dimitris Dimitropoulos

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The Capture of the Ship *Ayios Ioannis Theologos* in the Summer of 1825: An Investigation of Limits

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The Greek Revolution of 1821, which aimed at and succeeded in forming a state, rearranged territory, the economy, the authorities and human activity. At the same time, it bestowed new property on people, created different modes of discipline and different realities or resulted in situations that lie in the grey zone that emerged between the new delimitations under configuration. In these new conditions, the basic question, which was related to the revolutionary effort, was the distinction between legal and illegal; this is more so because in cases like the Greek Revolution, which lasted a long nine years, the axis that arranged social coexistence made this demarcation ever shifting, vague and easily permeable.¹

The Greek Revolution, with all that took place during it, created groups of people who lived on the borderline in an unstable environment between the old imperial regime and the new one that was being shaped by the establishment of the Greek nation-state. This geographical and administrative borderline refers to the degree of incorporation of the various regions into the newly founded state, and also has a symbolic dimension pertaining to the role they wished to play in the new era. The island regions experienced this versatile situation with greater intensity; on the one hand, local communities enjoyed relative security provided by their insular nature; yet, on the other, there was also a great degree of fear and insecurity since the sea that surrounded them exposed them to the danger of enemy ships. At the same time, the transportation of people and commodities by sea was a basic component of the function of a forming state, which from its establishment had a coastal and insular character.

The new living conditions that the revolution created are very vividly illustrated by an incident that took place on 16 July 1825 and ended four months later on 9 November. This was not an important or unique event; on the contrary, it was a rather common incident, which, nevertheless, vibrantly illustrates the daily life of the people and for which a great number of documents is available: 41 have been detected so far in various archives and files of the General State Archives of Greece (GAK) in the files of the Ministry of Naval Affairs, in the archives of the executive arm, in a special file of the Naval Court as well as in a manuscript of the Vlachoyannis Collection.² All these documents date approximately to

the same period as the incident, namely 22 July to 17 December 1825. This rather graphic and descriptive material, especially the ship's logbook, the long reports of the protagonists and the interrogation records of those involved, has the rhythm, tension and upheaval of a movie.³ A rough outline and a brief account of the incident are given below.

By the summer of 1825, the Greek Revolution had been established on the political level, having set up the structure and institutions of the new state; on the military level, however, things stood on edge. Ibrahim Pasha had landed on the Peloponnesian coast and, despite the resistance, he occupied forts and settlement centres while devastating the countryside, thus managing to expand his dominance. At the same time, Reşid Mehmed Pasha (Kütahı) intensified his siege of Messolongi while Omer Vrioni surrounded Athens. The occupation of Tripolitsa on June 1825 also signaled, on a symbolic level, the return of the Ottomans to their prerevolutionary administrative centre in the Peloponnese. Yet, this occupation did not finalise the suppression of the revolution since the Greek administration, though at war, continued to function, was respected by the Greek population, and maintained an active multifaceted military confrontation against the Ottoman forces.

On 16 July 1825, the *Ayios Ioannis Theologos*, a maringana under a Russian flag with Apostolis Charalambis as captain, and a crew of Greek seafarers from Koutali, Propontis,⁴ set sail from the port of Mytilini for Constantinople, carrying a cargo of oil and soap purchased on Lesbos, an island with an important olive production oriented towards exports,⁵ and also a soap industry that had experienced considerable growth in the previous years.⁶ On the same day, Dimitris tis Daskalas⁷ (Dimitris, son of the schoolmistress), a raider from Psara, who operated under the authority of the Greek administration, approached the sailboat and boarded it. His aim was to find out whether there was a cargo of Turkish ownership, in which case it would become a good prize, in other words legal booty between combatants according to the orders of the Greek authorities.

The raiders interrogated, beat and tortured the 15-member crew of the *Theologos*. Initially all sailors insisted that the cargo was their property. One of them broke, however, and showed them bills of exchange worth 18,300 kuruş, which the captain would collect upon arrival in Constantinople. Charalambis was forced to admit that two-thirds of the cargo was Turkish, but he claimed that he threw the documentary evidence into the sea in fear. The infuriated raiders took over the navigation of the *Theologos*, leading it into the bay of Tris Boukes in Skyros for further inspection.

There they asked Ioannis Kartalis, the British consul in Skyros, to come on board in order to verify that the cargo was legitimate booty. By means of threats and torture, they extracted a written confession from the captain and the co-owner of the cargo, Nicholas Robinson, that the merchandise was actually Turkish.⁸ On 20 and 21 July, Dimitris tis Daskalas, along with his men, transferred and sold part of the oil and soap cargo of the

Theologos to sailboats that had approached it. In the following days, and while the *Theologos* tried to sail to the port of Chora in Skyros, pirates from Psara, in charge of at least eight different groups, arrived on their small vessels and seized, in consecutive raids, part of the ship's cargo, despite the notification of local dignitaries that the ship was under a European flag. On 26 July, whatever was left of the cargo was transferred for storage in warehouses at Skyros under the supervision of the British consul, apparently due to an absence of a Russian consul in the island and also within the context of collaboration among European consular authorities. Yet raids by various groups of marauding pirates in the region continued, with the result that in the following ten days they seized not only merchandise, fixtures, tools and utensils from the *Theologos*, but even the clothes of those on board.

In the meantime the *Theologos*' captain, Charalambis, had informed (via a passing vessel from Syros) the Austrian consul in Syros about the plundering of this ship. The consul, probably acting as representative of Russian interests on the island, called on Austrian war and cargo ships that happened to be lying in wait at Syros to assist, and notified the regional eparch, who represented the Greek authorities. They swung into action and by 30 July had arrested in Syros two of the pirates that sold booty from the *Theologos*, while they also confiscated whatever merchandise they found. A similar protest to the prefect of Skyros was to no avail, since the latter used various excuses not to act in time and thus the raiders had ample time to flee. The *Theologos* finally managed to sail from Skyros one month after its seizure, on 14 August 1825. However, local revenue collectors levied a 4 percent tax on all merchandise that had been transported for safe storage in the warehouse of the British consul.

The departure of the *Theologos* from Skyros was not the end of the case. In the following three months, there was extensive correspondence between the provisional government, the local authorities, the consuls and all those involved in the incident regarding the fate of the merchandise and the raiders. At the end of August, on the order of the Ministry of the Navy, an investigation by a specially appointed five-member committee, acting as a maritime court, opened at Nafplio. It considered documents, called witnesses to testify and interrogated the arrested pirates. The latter had been transferred to the capital of the provisional government by a ship from Hydra which had been sent to Syros exclusively for this purpose.

Finally, on 1 October 1825, the Maritime Court ruled that, although the behaviour of the raiders towards the crew of the Russian ship was not appropriate, nevertheless their raid was legal in accordance with the instructions issued by the Greek administration, since at least half of the cargo – according to the manifest found – belonged to Ottomans, who had deposited bills of exchange for its purchase.⁹ The court ordered the confiscation of the cargo and the imposition of a 15 percent levy for the central treasury.¹⁰ The shipowner considered this an unjust decision and since there was no provision for an appeal, he asked for the mediation of a distinguished person of the time, the Austrian consul in Athens Georg

Christian Gropius, since Skyros was under his jurisdiction.¹¹ The latter's intervention was apparently fruitful since on 9 November 1825 the executive body issued an order, that is, a political decision, whereby the *Theologos* was permitted to set sail and Captain Charalambis could take back the bills of exchange that had been confiscated on board.¹²

All the above constitute scenes from a theatre of a world in which travelling, commerce and fighting were conducted in conditions that were constantly on the boundary between legality and illegality, which could bring state authorities into conflict with each another. The individuals involved in the case of the *Theologos* were typical of the people of this era who acted in exactly the same uncertain environment. In what follows, we shall attempt to cast light on their character and actions.




Fig. 1. The capture of the Russian-flagged ship *Theologos*, July 1825
(Map: Michael Festas)

The raiders: Pirates or corsairs?

Did the raiders of the *Theologos* operate legally or illegally? In other words, were they

corsairs acting under the auspices of the Greek administration that was at war, or were they pirates acting for their own benefit?¹³ Does the basic position of the *Theologos*' captain, as repeatedly expressed in the ship's logbook and in his reports, namely that the raid on the ship was actually an act of piracy, disguised as a *corso*, reflect reality?

Firstly the ships that were one of the basic means of waging the revolution that ended up as a war did not fall under the exclusive administration of the provisional government. They belonged to private individuals and constituted a fleet of shipowners, captains and seafarers, a fact that had serious repercussions on the speed of decision-making and on discipline.¹⁴ At the beginning of the revolution, shipowners undertook the funding of the campaign and the payment of the crews.¹⁵ Later on, the cost of the ships' operation was covered by the collection of taxes and levies from the Aegean islands; to this end a special collective administrative body, the *armostes*, was appointed.¹⁶ Delays in the payment of expenses caused the intense reaction of the dignitaries of Hydra, Spetses and Psara.¹⁷ Thus, in March 1822 a naval force was created, consisting of 60 vessels from the three aforementioned islands whereby the provisional government would cover the wages and daily sustenance of the crews.¹⁸ At the same time the government granted permits to armed vessels so as to exercise supervision at sea with the right to proceed to boarding in particular regions; in July 1827 this right was extended to all areas where enemy ships were encountered.¹⁹

The seamen from Psara, especially after the devastation of their island in June 1824, turned to raiding as their means of survival and personal enrichment.²⁰ In June 1825 captains from Psara, after making intense representations, came to an agreement with the provisional government whereby they could officially act as corsairs.²¹ As is evidenced from a relevant document, one of these captains was the raider mentioned above, namely Dimitris tis Daskalas.²² Therefore, when he seized the *Theologos* he was acting in the context of his legal authority, granted by the Greek government, to act as a corsair. The transportation of the *Theologos* to the closest land under Greek sovereignty, the summoning of the local representatives of the Greek administration and also of the consul of a European country (Britain) to be present at the deliberations concerning the fate of the ship and its cargo, were all conducted in the context of legal processes. Moreover, the use of violence against the crew of the *Theologos* in order to force them to reveal the identity of the cargo was also an accepted action for the standards of the period and was widely practiced in the Ottoman environment.²³

However, the action of the small ships from Psara which attacked the *Theologos* while it was impounded in Skyros had different characteristics. The proceedings of the interrogation of two captains of these ships (*misticos*), namely Alexandros Bampalos Tsesmelis and Konstantinos Saltamanikis, who were arrested in Syros on the charge of trading pirate booty, are revealing.²⁴ It appears that they, also, held permits from the Greek administration to engage in raids.²⁵ Yet, they violated the orders from the Ministry of the Navy and the advice of the local authorities in Skyros that prohibited them from seizing the

merchandise of the *Theologos* since, after its capture, the ship was impounded in a port in Greek territory. Their explanation that they could not control their crew when the latter were informed that the cargo of the ship was Turkish, is an indirect confession that they acted as pirates, especially since they did not hand over their booty to the Greek administration, but rather tried to sell it on the market of the neighbouring island of Syros.²⁶

The question arises whether these two corsairs/pirates and the rest of their crew who plundered the *Theologos* acted of their own volition, or – as the captain of the *Theologos* asserted –operated in complicity both with their compatriot Dimitris tis Daskalas, who was a legal corsair, and the local authorities of Skyros. There is no proof either way, yet the manner in which all these persons acted reflects the microcosm of poor seamen who, especially after the devastation of Psara, took shelter in the Sporades and the Cyclades (especially in Skyros, Mykonos and Syros) and got involved in small-range raids that were between piracy and *corso*.

Shipowner, captain, entrepreneur or trader?

Who exactly was Apostolis Charalambis? A captain, shipowner, co-owner, trader, an ordinary seaman that engaged in trade or a disruptor of a naval blockade? As captain of the sailboat he was the most important person on board at that time.²⁷ Unfortunately there are no further documents from this period that might help us identify him. The documents on this particular case refer to him as the captain of the ship, a native of Koutali in Propontis, hence a subject of the Ottoman Empire who, thanks to the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, was under Russian protection as an Orthodox Christian.²⁸ His economic activity took place within the flourishing commercial networks that had developed along the Aegean–Constantinople–Black Sea axis, the control of which the Sublime Porte was also seeking to exercise through a web of prohibitions, market regulations and provision of benefits for Ottoman traders.²⁹ Charalambis, in his report to Gropius, referred to himself as the owner or co-owner of the ship;³⁰ on the other hand, in the correspondence relating to the case, there is no mention of another person who had ownership rights to the *Theologos*.³¹

The only certain thing is that Charalambis, in addition to the navigation of the ship, was also responsible for the cargo, not only as the transporter but also as the administrator of the merchandise. On the basis of the interrogation documents and the court files two possible versions of his activities emerge, which actually correspond to the two basic systems of ship exploitation and financing of commercial trips in use at that time, namely, the *sermaye* (collective capital) and chartering:³²

1. The captain's version³³

Charalambis claimed he travelled from Constantinople to Plomari carrying a cargo of wheat

worth 28,000 kuruş. The merchandise belonged to him and two more people (K. Valsamakis and Nicholas Robinson). He also had on him 75,000 kuruş in cash. While in Lesvos he traded the greatest part of the wheat for oil and sold the rest. Thus he set sail from Mytilini to Russia via Koutali, Propontis, carrying the oil that he had purchased in exchange and also a quantity of oil that he had bought with cash.

2. The version accepted by the court³⁴

The court found that the *Theologos* had set sail from Constantinople with a charter party of Dimitris Terzelis from Lesvos which stipulated the lading of oil in Lesvos and its shipment to Constantinople with a freight of 85 medin per quintal.³⁵ This is proven by the charter party hidden in the ship, although Charalambis asserted it was false and was drafted in order to mislead the Turkish authorities, since they prohibited the export of commodities.

Eight bills of exchange were found on board, worth 18,325 kuruş and payable in Constantinople 11 days after their issue in Mytilini, to the order of various persons, who declared that they received the equivalent amounts from Charalambis;³⁶ among these there were two people with Muslim names.³⁷ In the context of the commercial network in which the ship operated, the bills of exchange would have been paid upon its arrival in Constantinople by agents of the Lesvians that had signed them.³⁸ Are we dealing with a case of lending money to the people referred to on the bills, as Charalambis maintains, making use of the cash he had on him? Or is it the case that the ship was loaded with oil of equal value to be sold in Constantinople, as the court implied? This suspicion is further corroborated by Charalambis' inability to document his assertion that when leaving Constantinople he had 75,000 kuruş in cash. However, the meagre documentation regarding the vessel's cargo, the crew and the cargo was a characteristic trait of Ottoman ships, or ships operating in the Ottoman framework, especially when compared to corresponding documents on board European ones.³⁹

The crew: Seamen, seamen and traders or illicit traders?

The *Theologos* had a 15-member crew consisting of Greek Christians, as can be surmised from their names.⁴⁰ Despite the torture by the raiders, the seamen at first insisted that the cargo was not Turkish. The crew had also loaded on board some merchandise of their own, which, according to the logbook, was looted by the raiders.⁴¹ This was common practice at that time, accepted even by the Ottoman administration;⁴² it was the so-called *portada* or *idiokariko* and gave seamen an opportunity to obtain extra income, which, nevertheless, was subject to all the dangers of transport and trading since seamen partially acted as traders.⁴³

This controversial picture regarding the activities of Charalambis, his crew and his ship is indicative of the role played by Greek merchant shipping in the context of "creative

ambiguity” that intensified due to the existing fluid environment concerning the incorporation of shipping into a state entity. For instance, in the case of the *Theologos* the seamen were Christian Orthodox, of Greek nationality, Ottoman subjects and traveling in a Russian-flagged vessel. This sort of ship, crew and merchandise profile was not unusual; many ships travelling in the Aegean, especially Russian commercial vessels that had taken advantage of the opportunities offered by the Küçük Kaynarca treaty, had similar mixed characteristics.⁴⁴

On the basis of the above, the perception that the properties of shipper and trader formed a single ship-trader entity during the prerevolutionary period are interesting and worth further investigation.⁴⁵ The captain, the shipowners, the crew and the ship itself did not limit their activities to the transport of merchandise, but they also engaged in a variety of economic activities such as the transport of commodities and money, trade and financial activities. All this took place in an environment where networking and the sharing of profits, losses, responsibility and risk among all those involved played a major role. In any case, this practice of local networking, especially in ports that were trading centres, was familiar from the prerevolutionary period and included merchants, Christian and consular authorities, and powerful Ottoman officials.⁴⁶

Local authorities: Caught between conflicting duties and self-interest

The local authorities engaged in the case of the *Theologos* belong to two categories: a) the local authorities representing the locals and b) the *in situ* authorities representing the central administration.

First, there were the local dignitaries of Skyros, where the sailboat ended up being impounded. They continued the traditional function they had under Ottoman rule: they constituted the stable regulatory factor concerning local issues and the members of the community. From formerly mediating with the Ottoman authorities, they then intervened with the Greek. They tried to resolve the emergency issues that arose – as in the case of the *Theologos* – attending to the interest and the security of the community, but also securing their own interests as well.⁴⁷ The booming of piracy in certain island communities and coastal regions increased the role of local authorities because they mediated between pirates and locals while also profiting from the booty trade, as had been the case in the past during similar periods of war conflicts (the Venetian-Turkish wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the Orlov Revolt/Russo-Turkish War, 1770–1775). During the 1821 Revolution, population movements, especially those that were caused by military defeat and the devastation of insular seafaring communities, such as Psara, Kasos and Sfakia in Crete,⁴⁸ were accompanied by a rapid increase and diffusion of piracy; those engaged in piracy were both seamen who sojourned in the islands and also armed

refugees who turned to piracy as a means of subsistence survival. The local islanders found themselves at the epicentre of this problem since the arrival of large population groups who survived on piracy and plunder created conditions of oppression and insecurity; at the same time, however, part of the local population became actively involved in the profitable market for booty.⁴⁹ In this environment, which dictated the coexistence of old residents and refugees, the regulatory and compensating role of local dignitaries acquired a new meaning.⁵⁰

The dignitaries of Ermoupoli constitute a similar case but one with its own characteristics. From the onset, there was no continuity with the Catholic community of Ano Syra that operated during Ottoman rule and was against the outbreak of the Greek Revolution.⁵¹ Rather, this concerned a newly established trading community founded in 1824 comprising refugees from Chios, Psara, Crete, Kasos, Asia Minor and elsewhere. They turned their newly founded city into the greatest trading centre of the Aegean and also a place for the trading of legal and illegal piratic booty.⁵²

The victims of the *Theologos* raid accused the Skyros dignitaries of tipping off the pirates and then allowing them escape, apparently because they had some sort of collaboration with them. This was a common accusation by the victims of piracy raids and it is also a confirmation of the opinion expressed by Mikes Kyparissis, a state official charged with combatting piracy, who, in December 1827, informed the central administration that “the inhabitants who are the receivers of stolen goods actually support the pirates and are the instrument of all evil since, unless they get punished, piracy will not be eradicated.”⁵³

On the other hand, the Ermoupoli dignitaries oversaw the local market where loot was exchanged and tried to strike a balance between the desire to profit from the trade of booty and to gain acceptance by the European powers represented in Syros that theirs was as a free port of transit for their ships that sailed and traded in the eastern Mediterranean.⁵⁴

The same precarious balance holds true for the representatives of the provisional government (eparchs, police chiefs, customs officials). Following the decisions of the National Assemblies, the central administration appointed these officials; locals were excluded to ensure that those in office would be independent of local interests.⁵⁵ In many instances, as in the case of Skyros, the officials who were appointed by the provisional government were Hydriots. Due to its power, Hydra exercised indisputable control over the Aegean. The eparchs and the customs officials that had policing and customs duties sought to enforce the orders of the central administration in an unstable environment since the islanders, due to their insularity, did not directly feel the power of the administration. In cases of piracy and *corso*, these officials tried, as in the instance of the *Theologos*, not to give ground for any protests on the part of ships traveling under a European flag; thus, they would return to the captain any commodities seized by pirates. At the same time, however, they oversaw the payment of taxes on merchandise unloaded on the islands and accepted the sale of all booty that was considered legal in order for the national fund to receive its predetermined share.

Consuls: End of an era

The British consul in Skyros, Kartalis, appears to have played a basic role in the *Theologos* incident.⁵⁶ In the following phase, the intervention of Gropius, the Austrian consul in Athens, was decisive.⁵⁷ In addition to Austria, Gropius was also the representative of other European powers in neighbouring areas.⁵⁸ Kartalis was summoned upon arrival of the ship in Skyros and essentially undertook negotiations concerning its fate, while Gropius undertook to reclaim the merchandise from the *Theologos* that the raiders had taken to Ermoupoli for sale. Although they were consuls of different European powers, they looked after a Russian-flagged ship. This was common practice in the context of the mutual support among allied European powers.⁵⁹ It is probable that the involvement of the Austrian consul was not only due to his own prestige, but also to the important role that Austria played regarding Russian affairs in the area.

At least as early as the seventeenth century, a dense network of consuls seeking to provide their services to crossing merchant ships had emerged in the Aegean, even on the small and poor islands of the Cyclades.⁶⁰ Taking advantage of the capitulations and other treaties concluded by the Sublime Porte and European powers, the consuls, who usually belonged to local families and bequeathed the office of consul to their offspring, had secured for themselves the *berat*, licenses of protection and exemption from taxes during the period of Ottoman rule.⁶¹ This privileged status was a point of conflict with the Greek provisional government which, evoking the equality of citizens before the law, demanded the abolition of the consuls' privileges. At the same time, however, it took steps so that this issue would not cause a breach with the European states represented by the consuls.⁶² Thus, at the outset of the revolution the consuls reached the apex of their activities since their position allowed them to play an important role in the unclear status that prevailed after the revolution regarding the recognition of the right to trade for European ships. At the same time, however, this ended up being their twilight since their privileged status came into conflict with the constitutional principles of the newly founded state.

Epilogue

The control of the sea trade was a weapon in the hands of the Greek administration, but at the same time it also presented a threat since the safe passage of trade ships through the Ionian and the Aegean seas was a priority of the major European powers. From the beginning, the Greek administration attempted to establish a regulatory framework in an environment accustomed to raids.⁶³ This would bestow a legal character on the attacks against Ottoman ships or ships of third parties that attempted to break the naval blockade that the provisional government had declared, and would also legalise raids on ships that

transported commodities on behalf of the Ottomans. On the other hand, the Greek administration claimed a new role, namely to guarantee the free and safe passage of European sailboats. As a result, the boarding of sailing-by ships and the confiscation of commodities, or even of those ships considered hostile, were acts in the consolidation of the sovereignty of the Greek state. At the same time, the confiscation of goods was also a powerful source of income for an economy that was plagued by a long-lasting war. Thus, administering licenses for raiding merchant or other types of ships served both war and financial purposes. The *bona presa*, that is, the legal booty of corsairs, secured the wages of the crew and also the resources for the national fund, since, according to the law, 15 percent of the auctioned booty went to the state fund.⁶⁴

Parallel to this state-sponsored raid activity, and especially because the turmoil of war constituted the ideal environment for the flourishing of piracy, the Greek seas and coasts were swarming with various groups of pirates, who attempted to seize commodities and goods from merchant ships and their crew. To a great degree, rugged, armed, poor seamen participated in this kind of robbery. They often came from rebellious regions with a maritime tradition, which in the process of the revolution once again came under Ottoman subjugation. These seafarers, depending on the conjuncture of events, alternated between corsairs and pirates; in other words, they are raiders operating both legally and illegally. They themselves lived in the very same contradiction imposed by the nature of their activities. Their growth was possible thanks to the turmoil created by the revolution against Ottoman rule in which they themselves participated. The consolidation of the revolution – and therefore of their own victory – signalled at the same time their definite end since their activities, once useful for the cause of the revolution, were now considered criminal in the law and order context that the newly founded state had to establish.

¹ This ambiguous environment was favoured by legal pluralism, a characteristic of empires, which in the case of the Ottoman Empire was manifested by a variety of forms and sources of law and official sultanic, ecclesiastical, regional and local jurisdictions that were either accepted or tolerated by the Sublime Porte. See Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross, “Jurisdiction Sovereignty and Political Imagination in the Early Modern World,” in *Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500–1850*, ed. Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 1–17. As regards the Ottoman Empire, see Karen Barkey, “Aspects of Legal Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire,” in *ibid.*, 83–107. The same degree of complexity is also characteristic of the legal relations between the Ottoman and other empire or European states, especially as regards trade and seafaring in the seas under Ottoman domination. See Maurits H. van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls, and Beraths in the 18th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Despina Vlami, *Επιχειρηματικότητα και προστασία στο εμπόριο της Ανατολής, 1798–1825: Η βρετανική Levant Company και ένας ελληνικός “Δούρειος Ίππος”* [Entrepreneurship and protection of the trade in the East, 1798–1825: The British Levant Company and a Greek Trojan horse] (Athens: Academy of Athens, 2017), 37–44, 282–84; Will Smiley, *From Slaves to Prisoners of War: The Ottoman Empire, Russia and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 145–48.

² General State Archives (GAK), Historical Archives of Yannis Vlachoyannis (HAYV), II, manuscript catalogue, file 214; GAK, Archives of the Naval Court (War of Independence period) (ANC), files 4 and 29; GAK,

Archives of Ministry of the Navy (AMNA) (War of Independence period), files 25–39; GAK, Archives of Executive Body (War of Independence period), file 130. The narration of the story that follows summarises the events mentioned in these documents.

³ GAK, HAYV, II, file 214.

⁴ In the case of seafarers the term “Greek” is used for individuals who had Greek names and were Orthodox Christians. For the use of relevant terminology in studies of prerevolutionary seafaring, see Gelina Harlaftis, “Η ναυτιλία των Ελλήνων ως μοχλός ενοποίησης των αγορών: Η μεθοδολογία” [The seafaring of the Greeks as an impetus for the unification of markets: Methodology], in *Η ναυτιλία των Ελλήνων 1700–1821: Ο αιώνας της ακμής της πριν την επανάσταση* [The seafaring of the Greeks, 1700–1821: The century of its acme before the revolution], ed. Gelina Harlaftis and Katerina Papakonstantinou (Athens: Kedros, 2013), 53–55. For the use of the term, see the published proceedings of the conference *Έλλην, Ρωμηός, Γραικός: Συλλογικοί προσδιορισμοί και ταυτότητες* [Hellene, Romios, Greek: Collective designations and identities], ed. Olga Katsiardi-Hering, Anastasia Papadia-Lala, Katerina Nikolaou, Vangelis Karamanolakis (Athens: Eurasia, 2018), especially the introduction by Olga Katsiardi-Hering, “Έλλην, Ρωμηός, Γραικός: Από το πολυεθνικό στο εθνικό” [Hellene, Romios, Greek: from the multinational to the national], 19–36.

⁵ Dimitris N. Karydis and Michael Kiel, *Μυτιλήνης αστυγραφία και Λέσβου χωρογραφία (15ος–19ος αι.)* [Description of the city of Mytilini and regional description of the island of Lesbos, 15th–19th centuries] (Athens: Oikos, 2000), 159–65; Evrydiki Sifneos, “On Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship of the Olive-oil Economy in the Aegean: The Case of Lesbos Island,” *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique* 1 (2004): 247–49; Mehmet Genç, “Olive-oil Production Trends in Mytilene (18th–19th Centuries),” in *Μυτιλήνη και Αϊβαλί (Κυδωνίες): Μια αμφίδρομη σχέση στο βορειοανατολικό Αιγαίο* [Mytilini and Ayvalik: A bilateral historical relationship in the north-eastern Aegean], ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides and Panayiotis D. Michailaris (Athens: Institute for Neohellenic Research/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2007), 229–34; Evangelia Balta, “Ελιά και λάδι στη Μυτιλήνη (16ος–19ος αι.)” [Olive and olive oil in Mytilini (16th–19th centuries)], in *Ελιά και λάδι στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο από την αρχαιότητα στην προβιομηχανική εποχή* [Olive and olive oil in Eastern Mediterranean from antiquity to the preindustrial era], ed. Ilias Anagnostakis and Evangelia Balta (Athens: Piraeus Bank Group Cultural Foundation and Institute of Historical Research/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2020), 439–46.

⁶ Gülden Sarıyıldız, “The Soap Production of Lesbos,” in Kitromilides and Michailaris, *Μυτιλήνη και Αϊβαλί* [Mytilini and Ayvalik], 239–46; Sarıyıldız, “Ο ανεφοδιασμός της Πόλης με σαπούνι και η συντεχνία των σαπωνοποιών” [Supplies of soap to Istanbul and the guild of soap makers], in Anagnostakis and Balta, *Ελιά και λάδι στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο* [Olive and olive oil], 474–75.

⁷ The use of the name or the profession of a female member of the family as surname, though not frequent, does occur in this period. See Spyros I. Asdrachas (in collaboration with Aikaterini Asdracha), “Βαπτιστικά και οικογενειακά ονόματα σε μια νησιωτική κοινωνία: Πάτμος (11th–19th αι.)” [Forenames and family names in an island society: Patmos (11th–19th centuries)], in *Οικονομία και νοοτροπίες* [Economy and mentalities] (Athens: Ermis, 1988), 211–34; and Dimitris Dimitropoulos, “Οικογένεια και φορολογικές κατασπιχίσεις στα νησιά του Αιγαίου κατά την οθωμανική περίοδο” [Family and tax ledgers in the Aegean islands during the Ottoman period], *Ta Istorika* 27 (1997): 349–52.

⁸ It has not been possible to find information concerning the identity of Apostolis Charalambis and Nicholas Robinson. If the latter was a British citizen, then the presence of the English consul would account for his further involvement. It should be pointed out, however, that nowhere in the documents pertaining to the case has there been a mention of an involvement of a British citizen either as member of the crew or as owner of merchandise. During this period there probably was no Russian consul in Skyros. See Lucien J. Frary, “Russian Consuls and the Greek War of Independence (1821–31),” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 28, no. 1 (2013): 58.

⁹ GAK, AMNA, file 34, doc. 6, photo 12; doc. 9, photo 18–19; doc. 11, photo 22 (photograph numbers refer to the files uploaded to Arxeiomnimon (<http://arxeiomnimon.gak.gr/>), the GAK’s digital platform.

¹⁰ Ministry of Justice to Ministry of the Navy, 1 October 1825, Nafplio, GAK, AMNA, file 34, doc. 6, photo 12.

- ¹¹ GAK, AMNA, file 37, doc. 176, photos 358–59, and Emmanouil G. Protopsaltis, *Ο Γεώργιος Χριστιανός Gropius και η δράσις αυτού εν Ελλάδι* [George Christian Gropius and his activities in Greece] (Athens: s.n., 1947), 37.
- ¹² GAK, AMNA, file 39, doc. 72, photo 148.
- ¹³ For a reflection on the international practice on this subject, see Lauren Benton, “Sovereignty at Sea: Jurisdiction, Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism,” in *A Search of Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 112–37. For the use of terms in the Muslim and Christian world, see Patricia Risso, “Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region during a Long Eighteenth Century,” *Journal of World History* 12, no. 2 (2001): 293–302.
- ¹⁴ James Emerson, Count Pecchio and W.H. Humphreys, *A Picture of Greece in 1825* (London: Henry Colburn, 1826), 1:176; Anargyros Andreou Chatzianargyrou, *Τα Σπετσιωτικά* [Spetses] (1861; Athens: Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece, 1979), 1:50.
- ¹⁵ Tryfon Konstantinidis, *Καράβια, καπετάνιοι και συντροφοναύται 1800–1830* [Ships, captains and sailors 1800–1830] (Athens: Istoriki Ypiresia Vasilikou Naftikou, 1954), 320.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 321–26; Ioannis Moutzouris, *Η αρμοστεία των νήσων του Αιγαίου πελάγους στα χρόνια της ελληνικής επαναστάσεως* [The commission of the Aegean islands in the years of the Greek Revolution] (Athens: Syllogos pros Diadosin Ophelimon Vivlion, 1984), 15–16, 24–25.
- ¹⁷ Antonios Lignos, ed., *Αρχείον της κοινότητος Ύδρας 1778–1832* [Archives of the municipality of Hydra, 1778–1832] (Piraeus: Sphaira, 1927), 8:79–80, documents of the *prokritoi* (dignitaries) of Mykonos and Chios.
- ¹⁸ GAK, AMNA, file 1, doc. 35, photos 77–78, document of the Ministry of the Navy to the *prokritoi* of Psara, 20 March 1822.
- ¹⁹ Despoina Themeli-Katifori, *Η δίωξις της πειρατείας και το Θαλάσσιον Δικαστήριο κατά την πρώτην Καποδιστριακήν περίοδον 1828–1829* [The prosecution of piracy and the Naval Court during the first period of Kapodistrias’ rule], pt. 1 (Athens: National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 1973), 11–21.
- ²⁰ Nikodimos of Psara gives an account of the raids. See Konstantinos Nikodimos, *Υπόμνημα της νήσου Ψαρών* [Memorandum of the island of Psara] (Athens: D.A. Mavromatis, 1862), 2:333–41.
- ²¹ GAK, AMNA, file 22, unnumbered documents, photos 242–44, 26 June 1825; Nikodimos, *Υπόμνημα* [Memorandum] 1:622–26.
- ²² GAK, AMNA, file 22, unnumbered document, photo 251. He and members of his family appear in contemporary documents from Psara under this name. See Vasilis Sfyroeras, *Αρχείον Ψαρών* [Psara Archives], vol. 1, 1821–1824 (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1974), 581 and 585.
- ²³ See Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), 252–54. The use of force for the extraction of information was common practice among the corsairs. See Peter Earle, *Κουρσάροι της Μάλτας και της Μπαρμπαριάς* [Corsairs of Malta and Barbary], trans. Michalis Kokolakis (Athens: Alexandria 2010), 145–52.
- ²⁴ GAK, ANC, file 4, doc. 176, photos 278 (and copy of ANC, file 29, doc. 152, photos 313–14) and ANC, file 4, doc. 178, photos 273–74 (and copy of ANC, file 29, doc. 151, photos 311–12).
- ²⁵ See for example, GAK, AMNA, file 22, unnumbered document, 26 June 1825, photos 247–53.
- ²⁶ For the role of Syros as a market for pirates, see Apostolos Delis, “A Hub of Piracy in the Aegean: Syros during the Greek War of Independence,” in *Corsairs and Pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean, Fifteenth–Nineteenth Centuries*, ed. Gelina Harlaftis, Dimitris Dimitropoulos and David. J. Starkey (Athens: Sylvania Ioannou Foundation, 2016), 47–54.

- ²⁷ For the post of the captain in the sailboats of the period, see Georges Stephanides, *Aspects du risque maritime aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles* (Athens: Themelio, 1986), 44–50.
- ²⁸ For the use of the Russian flag by Ottoman subjects and the attempt of the Ottoman administration to bring them back under the Ottoman flag, see Salah R. Sonyel, “The Protégé System in the Ottoman Empire,” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 2, no. 1 (1991): 59–61; Gelina Harlaftis and Sophia Laiou, “Ottoman State Policy in Mediterranean Trade and Shipping, c. 1780–c. 1820: The Rise of the Greek-owned Ottoman Merchant Fleet,” in *Networks of Power in Modern Greece: Essays in Honor of John Campbell*, ed. Mark Mazower (London: Hurst, 2008), 17–25; Sophia Laiou, “The Ottoman Greek ‘Merchants of Europe’ at the Beginning of the 19th Century,” in *Festschrift in Honor of Ioannis P. Theodoridis: Studies on the Ottoman Empire and Turkey*, ed. Evangelia Balta, Georgios Salakidis and Theocharis Stavrides (Istanbul: Isis, 2014), 2:313–31.
- ²⁹ Katerina Papakonstantinou, “Αναζητώντας νέες ευκαιρίες: Οι Έλληνες στο εμπόριο της Μαύρης Θάλασσας στα τέλη του 18ου αιώνα” [Searching for new opportunities: The Greeks in the Black Sea trade at the end of the 18th century], in *Οι Έλληνες της Αζοφικής 18ος–αρχές 20ού αιώνα* [The Greeks in the Sea of Azov, 18th–early 20th centuries], ed. Evrydiki Sifneos and Gelina Harlaftis (Athens: Institute of Historical Research/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2015), 287–304; Laiou, “The Ottoman State and the Black Sea Trade, End of the Eighteenth–Beginning of the Nineteenth Century,” in *The Economic and Social Development of the Port-Cities of the Southern Black Sea Coast and Hinterland, Late 18th–Beginning of the 20th Century*, ed. Edhem Eldem, Vangelis Kechriotis and Sophia Laiou (Corfu, 2017), 1–15 (<https://books.blacksea.gr/>).
- ³⁰ GAK, ANC, file 4, doc. 188–89, photo 290–93, 15 September 1825.
- ³¹ The identification of the captain with the shipowner or co-owner was frequent during the period preceding the revolution. See Gelina Harlaftis, “Η ναυτιλία των Ελλήνων” [The seafaring of the Greeks], 55–57. For the ambiguity and the difficulty in the identification of terms, see Giorgos E. Rodolakis, “Από το ναύκληρο στον παραβοκύρη” [From quartermaster to shipmaster], *Epetiris Kentrou Erevnis Istorias Ellinikou Dikaiou* 47 (2017): 188–200.
- ³² For the distinction between the two systems, see Giorgos E. Rodolakis, “Καράβια ‘εις ναύλον’ και καράβια ‘σερμαγελίδικα’ στο Αιγαίο (μέσα 17ου–πρώτο τέταρτο 19ου αιώνα)” [“Chartered” ships and *sermaye* ships in the Aegean (mid-17th–first quarter of the 19th century)], *Epetiris Kentrou Erevnis Istorias Ellinikou Dikaiou* 41 (2008): 207–36. See also Dimitrios Ch. Gofas, “Θαλασσοδάνεια, σερμαγιές, βλησιδία: Τρεις μορφές χρηματοδότησης της θαλάσσιας επιχείρησης στα μεταβυζαντινά χρόνια” [Sea loans, *sermayes*, *vlisidia*: Three means of financing sea operations in the post-Byzantine period], in *Μελέτες ιστορίας του ελληνικού δικαίου των συναλλαγών αρχαίου, βυζαντινού, μεταβυζαντινού* [Studies in the history of the Greek law of exchanges in ancient, Byzantine and post-Byzantine times] (Athens: Archaeological Society at Athens, 1993), 395–413.
- ³³ Charalambis’ version is recorded in documents that he himself had sent to a) the consul in Syros, Ilias Delasoudas, 22 July 1825, Skyros, GAK, AMNA, file 25, unnumbered document, photo 113–16 and GAK, ANC, file 4, doc. 159–60, photo 242–45; b) the Austrian consul Gropius, 15 September 1825, Nafplio, GAK, AMC, file 4, doc. 188–89, photo 290–93; c) the executive, 16 October 1825, Nafplio, GAK, AE, file 130, doc. 60, photo 102; d) the Austrian vice-consul in Syros, 26 November 1825, Syros, GAK, AMNA, file 37, doc. 176, photo 358–59.
- ³⁴ This line of thought is found in the proposal of the public counsel Anastasios Kotzaitis on 24 September 1825 (GAK, ANC file 4, doc. 155, photo 237), which was accepted by the five-member committee that acted as a Maritime Court in Nafplio on 1 October 1825 (GAK, AMNA, file 34, doc. 9, photo 18–19).
- ³⁵ The *medin* was an Egyptian silver coin similar to the *para*. Eftychia Liata, *Φλωρία δεκατέσσερα στένουν γρόσια σαράντα: Η κυκλοφορία των νομισμάτων στον βενετοκρατούμενο και τουρκοκρατούμενο ελληνικό χώρο, 15ος–19ος αι.* [The circulation of money in the Greek regions under Venetian and Turkish rule, 15th–19th centuries] (Athens: Institute for Neohellenic Research/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1996), 101–3, 219.

- ³⁶ For the wide use of bills of exchange instead of cash in Mediterranean trade, especially with Constantinople, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Edhem Eldem, “La circulation de la lettre de change entre la France et Constantinople au XVIII^e siècle,” in *L’Empire Ottoman, République de Turquie et la France*, ed. Hamid Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (Istanbul: Isis, 1986), 87–97; Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 113–43; Katsumi Fukasawa, “Les lettres de change et le commerce du Levant au XVIII^e siècle,” in *Négoce, ports et océans, XVI^e–XX^e siècles*, ed. Silvia Marzagalli and Hubert Bonin (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2000), 61–79; Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 83–84; Spyros I. Asdrachas, *Ελληνική οικονομική ιστορία ΙΕ΄–ΙΘ΄ αιώνας* [Greek economic history, 15th–19th centuries] (Athens: Piraeus Bank Group Cultural Foundation, 2003), 1:332–333, 625.
- ³⁷ It has been noted that most Ottoman Muslims restricted themselves to regional trade in the eastern Mediterranean, while Muslims chose to invest in ship shares or commodities. Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 86–130.
- ³⁸ For an approach concerning the use of personal networks on the part of Greek tradesmen, see Maria Christina Chatzioannou, “Introduction,” in *On Merchants’ Agency and Capitalism in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1774–1914* (Istanbul: Isis, 2017), 7–18.
- ³⁹ Especially as regards the seventeenth century, see, for example, Molly Greene, *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Mediterranean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 182–86.
- ⁴⁰ They all sign in the ship’s “*giornale*” (GAK, HAYV, II, file 214, f. 11). Among them is a scribe, Konstantinos Rombakis, as well as Nicholas Robinson, who participates in the trip as co-owner of the cargo. Only the professional skills of the boatswain and the scribe of the ship are mentioned, while all the other members of the crew simply sign as “*marinaro*” (sailors). The boatswain, Michailos Charalambos, was the captain’s brother.
- ⁴¹ GAK, HAYV, II, file. 214, fol. 11; GAK, HAYV, II, file 214, f.11.
- ⁴² A document from the kapudan pasha addressing the Hydriot *procrits* (local dignitaries) in 1793 recognised that these commodities were not subject to customs taxes: Antonios Lignos, ed., *Αρχείον της Κοινότητος Ύδρας 1778–1832* [Archives of the municipality of Hydra, 1778–1832] (Piraeus: Sphaira, 1921), 1:31.
- ⁴³ This sort of income is described by Nikolaos Kefalas, *Θαλάσσιος νομοθεσία* [Sea law] (Vienna, s.n., 1817), 33. See also Ioannis P. Maniatopoulos, *Το ναυτικόν δίκαιον της Ύδρας (1757–1821)* [The maritime law of Hydra (1757–1821)] (Athens: Kallergis, 1939), 73–75; Konstantinidis, *Καράβια* [Ships], 86–87; Evangelos Athinaios, *Το δίκαιον της προεπαναστατικής ναυτιλίας των Ελλήνων* [Greek prerevolutionary maritime law] (Athens: Naftika Chronika, 1973), 53–54.
- ⁴⁴ For similar cases with Russian ships, see Theophilus C. Prousis, “Risky Business: Russian Trade in the Ottoman Empire in the Early Nineteenth Century,” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 20, no. 2 (2005): 201–26.
- ⁴⁵ Vassilis Kremmydas, “Προεπαναστατικές πραγματικότητες: Η οικονομική κρίση και η πορεία προς το Εικοσιένα” [Prerevolutionary realities: The financial crisis and the course towards the 1821 Revolution], *Mnimon* 24 (2002): 72–74.
- ⁴⁶ For a typical case, see Sophia Laiou, “Economic Networks in Eastern Mediterranean: Kâtiboğlu Mehmed Efendi of Izmir and his Christian Partner,” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 34, no. 2 (2019): 181–94.
- ⁴⁷ For the way in which the local community of Skyros operated under Ottoman rule, see Xenophon Antoniadis, *Η Σκύρος στην Τουρκοκρατία: Κοινωνία – διοίκηση – δικαιοσύνη* [Skyros under Turkish rule: Society–administration–justice] (Athens: Etaireia Evoikon Spoudon, 1997), 79–144.
- ⁴⁸ For a review on this, see Apostolos Vacalopoulos, *Πρόσφυγες και προσφυγικό ζήτημα κατά την επανάσταση του 1821* [Refugees and the refugee issue during the 1821 revolution] (Thessaloniki: s.n., 1939), esp. 47–85; Kostas Komis, “Population Movements in Greece during the War of Independence,” in *Πολιτικοστρατιωτικές αναταραχές και πληθυσμιακές μετακινήσεις: Ο ελληνικός 19ος αιώνας και το 1821*

[Political and military turmoil and population movements: The Greek 19th century and the 1821 revolution] (Athens: Papazisis, 2014), 15–48.

- ⁴⁹ For the importance of booty during the war of independence and its effects on local economies, see Despoina Katifori, “Καταδρομή και πειρατεία κατά την επανάσταση του 1821: Φαινόμενα οικονομικών και κοινωνικών μετασχηματισμών” [Raids and piracy during the 1821 revolution: issues of economic and social transformations], *Parousia* 5 (1985): 244–54.
- ⁵⁰ See Despoina Themeli-Katifori, *Η δίωξις της πειρατείας και το Θαλάσσιον Δικαστήριο* [The prosecution of piracy and the Naval Court], 21–22; Dimitris Dimitropoulos, “Pirates During Revolution: The Many Faces of Piracy and the Reaction of Local Communities,” in Harlaftis, Dimitropoulos and Starkey, *Corsairs and Pirates*, 29–40; Dimitropoulos, “Πειρατές στη στεριά; Πρόσφυγες, καταδρομείς και καθημερινότητα των παράκτιων οικισμών στα χρόνια του Αγώνα” [Pirates on land? Refugees, raiders and daily life in coastal settlements in the years of the war of independence], in *Όψεις της Επανάστασης του 1821: Πρακτικά συνεδρίου* [Aspects of the 1821 Revolution: Conference Proceedings], ed. Dimitris Dimitropoulos, Christos Loukos and Panayiotis Michailaris (Athens: Piraeus Bank Group Cultural Foundation, 2018), 87–105.
- ⁵¹ See Konstantinos I. Manikas, “Σχέσεις Ορθοδοξίας και Ρωμαιοκαθολικισμού στην Ελλάδα κατά τη διάρκεια της Επανάστασης (1821–1827)” [Relations between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism] (PhD diss., National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2001), 179 ff.
- ⁵² Andreas Drakakis, *Ιστορία του οικισμού της Ερμουπόλεως (Σύρας)* [History of the settlement of Ermoupolis (Syros)], vol. 1, 1821–1825 (Athens: s.n., 1979), 110–21, 173–84.
- ⁵³ GAK, AMNA, file 66, doc. 44, photos 72–73, 18 December 1827. He maintained the same position in a previous letter, 27 November 1827, GAK, AMNA, file 64, doc. 84, photos 133–35.
- ⁵⁴ Apostolos Delis, *Mediterranean Wooden Shipbuilding: Economy, Technology and Institutions in Syros in the Nineteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 6–17.
- ⁵⁵ Anastasios Polyzoidis, *Προσωρινόν πολίτευμα της Ελλάδος και σχέδιον οργανισμού των επαρχιών αυτής αμφότερα επιδιορθωμένα και επικυρωμένα υπό της Δευτέρας Εθνικής Νομοθετικής των Ελλήνων Συνελεύσεως εν Αστρει* [Provisional polity of Greece and draft of the organisation of provinces, both edited and ratified by the Second National Legislative Assembly of the Greeks at Astros] (Messolongi: D. Mestheneas, 1824), 25.
- ⁵⁶ The Kartalis family participated in the administration of the community of Skyros. During the prerevolutionary period Georgios Kartalis was a *dimogerontas* of the community. See Antoniadis, *Η Σκύρος* [Skyros], 115–16; Antoniadis, *Αρχείο εγγράφων Σκύρου* [Archive of Skyros documents] (Athens: s.n., 1990), 240–41.
- ⁵⁷ For Gropius, see Protopsaltis, *Ο Γεώργιος Χριστιανός Gropius* [George Christian Gropius], 29–91; Christian Callmer, *Georg Christian Gropius als Agent, Konsul und Archäologe in Griechenland 1803–1850* (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1982).
- ⁵⁸ Protopsaltis, *Ο Γεώργιος Χριστιανός Gropius* [George Christian Gropius], 39 and 93–94; Vlami, *Trading with the Ottomans*, 168–69; Callmer, *Georg Christian Gropius*, 9.
- ⁵⁹ Frary, “Russian Consuls,” 56–57.
- ⁶⁰ George Koutzakiotis, “Le réseau consulaire français dans l’Archipel (1679–1718),” *Études Balkaniques* 22 (2017–2018): 23–47. For the changes following the French Revolution of 1789 in the way the French consuls operated, see Amaury Faivre d’Arcier, “Le service consulaire au Levant à la fin du XVIIIe siècle et son évolution sur la Révolution,” in *La fonction consulaire à l’époque moderne: L’affirmation d’une institution économique et politique (1500–1800)*, ed. Jörg Ulbert and Gérard de Bouedec (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006), 175–88. For Russian consuls, see Theophilus C. Prousis, “Archival Gleanings on Russian Trade and Consulates in the Near East,” *Balkanistica* 17 (2004): 67–78. For the equivalent British network from the end of the eighteenth century, see Despina Vlami, *Trading with the Ottomans: The Levant Company in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 160–76.

- ⁶¹ Pantelis Kontoyannis, “Οι προστατευόμενοι” [The dependants], *Athina* 29 (1917): 1–160; Van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System*, 63–115; Georgios V. Nikolaou, “La question de la protection des Français et de leurs protégés (beratlis) dans l’Empire Ottoman: le cas du Péloponnèse (début XIXe siècle),” *Études Balkaniques* 22 (2017–2018): 66–91.
- ⁶² For pertinent documents, see Andreas Drakakis, “Άγγλοι πρόξενοι εις τας Κυκλάδας κατά την Επανάστασιν του 1821” [British consuls in the Cyclades during the 1821 Revolution], *Epetiris Etaireias Kykladikon Meleton* 4 (1964): 115–42; Zapheirios Vaos, “Σελίδες του 1821 από την Μήλον και τας Κυκλάδας” [Pages from the 1821 Revolution from Milos and the Cyclades], *Etaireia Kykladikon Meleton* 9 (1971–1973): 181–469.
- ⁶³ On the legal framework and the changes in the characteristics of raiding in the Mediterranean during this period, see Gonçal López Nadal, “Mediterranean Privateering Between the Treaties of Utrecht and Paris, 1715–1856: First Reflections,” in *Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War of Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, ed. David J. Starkey, Elisabeth Susanna van Eyck van Heslinga and Jaap A. De Moor (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 106–25.
- ⁶⁴ *Αρχεία Ελληνικής Παλιγγενεσίας μέχρι της εγκαταστάσεως της Βασιλείας* [Archives of the Greek rebirth until the establishment of the kingdom] (Athens: Library of the Parliament of Greece, 1973), 7:250, proceedings of the Assembly (Vouleutikon), 20 May 1825; see also documents dating to the same period and referring especially to raiders from Psara (GAK, AMNA, file 22, unnumbered documents, photo 188–89, 231–32, 243–44). Later on the Vice-Governing Commission (Antikyvernititi Epitropi) passed a law (Law νε´ [55] of 28 August 1827) whereby it increased the percentage to 25 percent. See Themeli-Katifori, *Η δίωξις της πειρατείας* [The prosecution of piracy], 9–10.