


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Sources of Political and Social Unrest in the Peloponnese on the Eve of the Revolution

Dean Kostantaras

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
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Sources of Political and Social Unrest in the Peloponnese on the Eve of the Revolution

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In previous correspondence, the editors requested that the contributors to this edition address a common set of questions pertaining to the cause, nature and effects of the Greek Revolution. Particular interest was expressed for works which sought to reassess the “national” (and, by inference, non-national) qualities of the crisis and, in a related fashion, the factors that “moved and permitted historical actors to make certain choices”. The editors alluded here to the problem of accounting for the (possibly disparate) interests and aims inspiring that remarkably diverse body of people who took part in the event. The Greek Revolution is, of course, not unique in arousing questions of this kind. Many upheavals of the era are indeed similarly viewed as having a composite character in the sense of encompassing a range of social, national and constitutional grievances.¹ In addition to exploring the various sources of unrest that may have served to mobilise large numbers of people throughout the Peloponnese (the principle scene of the drama), this article will offer some general observations regarding how the Greek Revolution may be compared to those which took place in many other parts of Europe during the 1830s and the *annus mirabilis* of 1848.² Although there is no room here to carry out such a comparison in great depth, readers will gain some appreciation for the distinguishing features of 1821, as well as its linkages to the larger constellation of events and crises that gave rise to the so-called Age of Revolution.

As indicated above, if all the revolutions of the period displayed a considerable degree of internal social heterogeneity and a corresponding array of grievances, they might vary significantly from one another in the types of actors involved. Looking ahead, one will note, for example, the conspicuous absence of an urban social element (in the form of a working class) from the Greek Revolution or any notice of the “social question” which played a prominent role in the outbreak of many of the European revolutions of the 1830s and 1840s.³ This is not to discount the importance of the merchant component in the formation of the *Filiki Etaireia* (see below); however, the Greek Revolution does not evoke images of urban demonstrations, street battles and barricades reminiscent of those which took place in Paris and Belgium, or the many cities within the Italian peninsula and German

Bund. This was a struggle that was carried out instead in distinctly rural surroundings, the inhabitants of which (patrician and plebian alike) bore the brunt of its hardships. The Greek case accordingly includes somewhat novel groups of actors, such as klephts, who have no analogous counterpart in the other great crises of the times (or at least those taking place outside of the Ottoman Balkans).⁴ The revolution also appeared to obtain a relatively high degree of support from the peasantry; a factor that led Eric Hobsbawm, far from an uncritical observer of contemporary national movements, to characterise the event as “a genuine people’s insurrection”.⁵ This popular involvement in the crisis no doubt contributed to European appraisals of the “national” pedigree of the event and the conceptualisation of the national problem, more generally.⁶ All hyperbole aside, there is not (at least to my knowledge) a definitive estimate of the number of people from the affected areas who took part in the struggle; but certainly the ability of the revolution to survive the determined and, at times, large-scale Ottoman attempts at suppression suggests a significant degree of popular mobilisation.⁷

The present article focuses on another group of actors who have been a significant and perennial subject of study in the historiography of the Greek Revolution and, indeed, are assumed to have had an important role in the mobilisation of the rural population cited above – namely, the primates. Questions about the motivations and aims of these figures were in fact brought to the fore in the first decades of independence, as witnessed in one important instance by the claims and counterclaims put forward in the contentious memoir literature of the day; a genre to which the primates themselves contributed heavily.⁸ Were the primates genuine patriots (and, if so, of a provincial or national persuasion?), reluctant participants or mere opportunists? Can their actions be linked to larger European movements and events or were they motivated principally by concerns and developments of a strictly Balkan-Ottoman provenance and character? Recent years have seen the publication of several works which take up these questions anew.⁹

Among the more provocative of these recent works on the subject is a comparative piece by Frederick Anscombe on the so-called “Balkan Revolutionary Age”, which appeared in the *Journal of Modern History*.¹⁰ Anscombe seeks to illuminate the largely Ottoman origins and nature of the conflicts which broke out in this part of the continent during the period in question by linking them to the responses of local elites to the empire’s New Order and succeeding reform initiatives. In doing so, he rejects any readings of these events which placed stress on outside events and influences and, especially, those imputed to have had a role in elevating liberal and national sentiments or demands for change. As Anscombe argues, “neither the French Revolution nor Bonaparte’s expansionist schemes touched the Balkans significantly, and the ideological elements celebrated in some accounts of political activism in the era – liberalism, nationalism, and class interest – had little influence in stirring the unrest in the continent’s southeast that prompted Istanbul to

reform.”¹¹ As indicated elsewhere, this perspective on the event is only tenable if one disregards the fact that the actions of the elites in question were conditioned by the involvement of other groups of protagonists with interests and aims of their own – some of which were indeed redolent of the “ideological elements” cited above. For example, Anscombe completely omits from his account the significant organising part played by a group of conspirators (the *Etaireia*), who clearly took inspiration from the international crisis (the *Etaireia* was indeed formed while the Napoleonic Wars were still in progress) and the manner in which the progress of the plot affected, in turn, the actions of the primates. The omission of the *Etaireia* from the narrative is, presumably, intended to facilitate comparison between the Greek Revolution and roughly contemporaneous events in Serbia and Bosnia, where nothing of the kind existed.¹² As indicated elsewhere, the international crises alluded to above did not, finally, pass by the primates unnoticed. And indeed various factions of the same – sometimes in concert with Muslim elites of the province – sought to exploit events in their favour.

To return nevertheless to Anscombe’s account, the Peloponnesian notables and bandit chiefs are depicted as having taken to arms in 1821 in fear for the designs of a newly assertive Ottoman state; one that, like the powers to the West, appeared to have embarked on an ambitious (and potentially violent) centralisation campaign as a means to bolster its capacity to meet the financial and military challenges of the day.¹³ The Greek Revolution may best be understood therefore as a reflection of an Ottoman crisis that also provoked insurrections from displaced or threatened elites in Serbia, Bulgaria and Bosnia.¹⁴ All “were launched,” argues Anscombe, “in self-defense ... against the central government, which seemed intent on rebuilding its power not through reforming itself but by crushing anyone whose loyalty was judged suspect”.¹⁵ The precipitating event, Anscombe claims, was the Porte’s assault on Ali Pasha; a move that abruptly turned the primates towards revolution – their thoughts being that the destruction of Ali was but the first step of a thorough revision (at their expense) of the regional power structure.¹⁶ Anscombe’s narrative evokes, in sum, the picture of a sharp escalation of tensions, leading to a violent eruption:

As Istanbul’s drive against Ali Pasha gathered momentum, the governorship of the Morea passed into the portfolio of appointments held by one of Sultan Mahmud’s trusted servants, Hurşid Pasha, commander of the campaign to capture Ali. Hurşid had been governor of Belgrade when Ottoman rule returned there in 1813 and had not stopped Muslim retaliation against Christian former rebels. A rumor that the Ottomans intended to imprison or execute leading Christians in Hurşid’s new province precipitated the uncoordinated outbreak of revolt.¹⁷

Conspicuously absent from Anscombe’s account, again, is any mention of the Filiki *Etaireia* or contemporaneous revolutions in other parts of Europe; a disposition which coheres with the author’s emphasis on local power structures and the threats posed to the same by internal Ottoman changes of course. The extra-Ottoman factor consists mainly in

the form of the pressure exerted on the empire (one felt too by the European powers) to bolster its internal integrity and acquit itself more capably in the trials to come.

Although the question of the primates' attitudes towards Mahmud or what they knew of his plans merits further thought and research, one finds an important timing problem with Anscombe's account of primate mobilisation. Specifically, the depiction of a sudden resort to arms neglects the fact that the primates had joined the Etaireia years before the final showdown between sultan and pasha. The decision to revolt was in sum not the impromptu act depicted here, and in fact the dissident primates had long and complicated interactions with the Etaireia in the years preceding the Ottoman state's confrontation with Ali. As indicated below, so rash a move was furthermore not in keeping with their *modus operandi*. The presence of Ottoman forces was certainly a decisive factor in the outbreak of the revolt, but for reasons omitted from Anscombe's account: More precisely, Hurşid Pasha's arrival on the scene with orders from Constantinople (according to Etaireia informants) to violently disabuse the local primates of any revolutionary ideas, gave proof to suspicions that the plot had been discovered, or in the very least, that some form of pre-emptive violence on the part of the Ottoman state was likely.¹⁸ This greatly raised the pressure on the Etaireia leadership in the region, especially the primates, who had only shortly before counselled delay.¹⁹ The inclusion of the Etaireia in the story is not contingent therefore on some claim for the primacy of ideas or their dominant influence on the actions of the people in question; it is critical for explaining, in the very least, the tense state of affairs in the Peloponnese in the early spring of 1821.²⁰

Unfortunately, what happened next remains unclear. Questions persist, for example, regarding whether a precise date had been set for the revolt, and if so, how well this had been communicated to the dispersed members of the Etaireia.²¹ The sources suggest that it was not; and this uncertainty must have greatly troubled the plot's leaders in the Peloponnese, who would have found themselves in an exposed and vulnerable position should the rising suddenly break out in some neighbouring region. Other accounts lay stress on the significance of several seemingly random episodes of violence perpetrated by klephts against Ottoman officials and interests.²² These served, in turn, to provoke a defensive response from the Muslim population and even a series of skirmishes between armed men from each side, the escalation of which left the leaders with no choice but to act or face divided and unprepared the inevitable Ottoman reprisals.²³

If the primate enlistment in the Etaireia predates the march against Ali, they were themselves relative latecomers to the plot. Earlier recruitment efforts had, for example, succeeded in attracting a considerable number of klephts.²⁴ As with virtually every party which took part in the revolution, the motivations which led these "military men" to enter the Etaireia have been subject to diverse interpretations.²⁵ Several scholars lay stress, for example, on the recent hardships suffered by the latter as a result of Ottoman attempts

(with the assistance of Ali Pasha and the Christian primates) to rid the Peloponnese of banditry.²⁶ The klephts were exposed to an especially violent campaign in 1806, which forced many to take refuge in the Ionian Islands.²⁷ From here, several thousand were subsequently recruited for service in the Napoleonic Wars.²⁸ When these came to an end, or so at least Panagiotis Stathis argues in one recent work, many of the now idle fighters saw the dramatic change of affairs envisioned in the plans of the Etaireia as a means to end their exile and resume their former way of life.²⁹ Stathis further notes that some of these same “military men” had previously returned to the mainland as *armatoles* in the employ of Ali Pasha; the sultan’s decision to move against Ali in 1820 thus put them at risk, too.³⁰ Perhaps more pertinent for the present discussion is the question of how much the recruitment of the klephts influenced the primates’ decision to join the plot.³¹ Some have argued that it was critical and indeed that the induction of the “military class” forced the hand of the primates, who may have feared for the consequences of the former’s scheming and perhaps viewed membership of the Etaireia as a means to maintain control over an unruly body of men with whom they had often clashed in the past.³²

These difficult problems notwithstanding, my own research has been directed more towards determining what the revolution meant to the primates from the standpoint of ends. To answer these questions, I sought insights from primate actions in the years preceding the establishment of the Filiki Etaireia, such as their responses to the spread of the Napoleonic Wars and encroachments of Ali Pasha. The documents surrounding these events described remarkable instances of international diplomacy, in which leading primates attempted to shift the Peloponnese from one imperial sphere to another, their status and privileges remaining, of course, intact. The diverse initiatives alluded to above describe a group of elites with a high degree of corporate sentiment; that is to say a consciousness of their rank as members of a standing “political class” and corresponding role as custodians of local affairs (much in the manner of the nobilities found elsewhere in Europe with a similarly elevated view of their “historic rights”).³³ As I observed in a previous work, all participated in the functioning of a system and had numerous dealings with fellow notables, with whom they competed (sometimes violently) for offices or served alongside in provincial bodies.³⁴ Any attempt to reconstruct the political imagination of these same elites must therefore take heavily into account these basic conditions of primate life and the manner in which they influenced their attempts at collective action in the past.

This emphasis on the practical concerns of the primates, their opportunistic, even dexterous, responses to shifts in the balance of power (both within and outside the Ottoman Empire) prompts speculation regarding the possible (for some, likely) disjuncture between the values of the same and the ideals expressed by the founders of the Etaireia regarding the reconstitution of a vaguely imagined Greece.³⁵ That said, not all agree with such a position. One scholar has, for example, recently suggested that the primates’ involvement in the plot provides evidence of their adoption of “modern political ideas and practices” and, above all, their engagement with the national idea.³⁶ It is not my aim to reject such claims

out of hand; the people in question were living through extraordinary times, to say the least, in which ideas such as those cited above were widely circulated and even put into practice. However, such alterations in consciousness are difficult to measure, especially in the absence of ample textual evidence.³⁷ Most of all, the authors of the interpretations noted above do not take into account primate actions in the years immediately preceding their dealings with the Etaireia; dealings which display the same traits and aims, but have little to do with the fate of a larger Hellas. If, as some argue, the primates' involvement in the revolution reflected some degree of awakening or attraction to the national idea, it must nevertheless be taken into account that their proposed arrangements with the Etaireia leadership hewed closely in form to those sought earlier with other potential suitors and allies.

The dealings with foreign powers mentioned above, which became especially pronounced after the French conquest of Venice and occupation of the Ionian Islands (1797), have been discussed at some length in the previously cited work and will be only briefly recounted here. A leading and often independent role in these events was played by the Christian chiefs of the Mani, who were at that time involved in a fierce conflict among themselves for control of the *beylik*.³⁸ French and Greek documents describe, for example, the efforts of Petros Mavromichalis (Petrobey) to form an alliance in which the Mani would become an autonomous province of the growing French Empire.³⁹ Importantly, this very same diplomatic stance, not to mention the urgent request for financial aid, was reprised in Mavromichalis' later dealings with the Etaireia, behind whose activities was thought, again, to be the tsar.⁴⁰ Certainly, one lesson that might be drawn from a review of primate conspiratorial activity in the years preceding 1821 is that they never "go it alone".

Although the plot discussed above was focused on the Mani, Petrobey participated shortly thereafter (1808) in another endeavour intended to draw the entire Peloponnese into the French orbit; this latter initiative had the further distinction of representing a secessionist bid that involved both Christian and Muslim primates of the province. The immediate catalyst for this venture was the appointment of Veli Pasha as Mora Valisi in 1807, a decision which proved controversial to many Christian and Muslim notables of the province who believed that the new governor shared the centralising designs of his father (Ali Pasha).⁴¹ Here again, the conspirators aimed to detach the Peloponnese from the Ottoman Empire and convert it into a semiautonomous French protectorate, its internal affairs to be administered by commissions of local elites.⁴²

The aims of the primates in the conspiracies described above, and in particular the nature of the proposed power-sharing arrangements between themselves and their prospective foreign partners, are, finally, reminiscent of their interactions with the Etaireia. For example, once part of the conspiracy, the primates moved quickly to establish their supremacy over local affairs. Of particular note in this connection is a June 1820 missive,

entitled “Στοχασμοὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ συστήματος” (Thoughts of the Peloponnesians on the good system), which was delivered to the still unknown supreme leader of the conspiracy in Russia.⁴³ As indicated in this document, the product of deliberations between the leading families of the region, the primates requested that several of their number be officially designated as *ἐφοροὶ* of the province. The authors also asked that the leadership proclaim that Etaireia members in the Peloponnese give their complete obedience to the named directors who, furthermore, would have the power to discipline any intransigence. The “Peloponnesians” further requested that all funds contributed to the Etaireia from members in the region remain in the province.⁴⁴ A similar dialogue had taken place slightly earlier between the notables of the Mani and the Etaireia, the results of which are captured in a remarkable document from 1819 which indicates, in sometimes ambiguous prose, the relationship that would henceforth prevail among the chieftains of this region as well as their duties in the coming struggle with respect to Sparta, the Etaireia and their “general patrie Greece”.⁴⁵

The primate responses to the crises cited above indicate, in sum, the manner in which all events were interpreted in light of their consequences for the future of the Peloponnese and its “system”; their involvement in any plot being contingent on an official recognition of the Peloponnese as a distinct territorial unit over which they would continue to exercise dominion. Again, no attempt is made here to dismiss the claims of those who see the primates’ participation in the Etaireia as “testifying” to an “advancing internalisation of modern political structures, networks and power relations” or representing a “retreat from traditionality”.⁴⁶ However, it must also be said that their words and actions displayed assumptions about “political structures, networks and power relations” that were *not* so modern in vintage or represented a revolutionary “break with the past”.⁴⁷

These same conditions and assumptions may help to explain the primates’ success in drawing the rural populace into the war effort.⁴⁸ One of the differences, for example, between the Greek Revolution and other contemporary cases which might be cited, such as the Polish revolutions of 1794 and 1830, was the greater apparent willingness of Greek landed elites to lead the peasantry into revolt; a phenomenon that might be attributed, borrowing a term from Hobsbawm, to the “political immaturity” of the latter.⁴⁹ Documents from the time period in fact indicate the confidence felt by the Greek primates and captains in their power to both mobilise and maintain control over the masses.⁵⁰ The Polish “noble nation” has been traditionally portrayed, in contrast, as much more wary of involving the peasantry in such ventures for fear of the concessions that would have to be extended in return.⁵¹ There was furthermore little evidence of a Jacobin element in Greece or the existence of a sharp division between town and country; factors that appeared to hinder the development of a united movement in Italy.⁵² The task of building a truly mass movement had, to judge at least from the words of Mazzini and other figures, the qualities of a zero-sum game in which appeals to one class imperilled the ability to attract another.⁵³

The political, social and cultural variables that must be taken into account in any

comparison of this kind are of course numerous and there is no room to sufficiently treat them here.⁵⁴ Any attempt to do so would surely also have to consider the degree to which the “mass” action of 1821 was motivated by sheer self-preservation, as the past tended to teach that revolution, even if perpetrated by a few, had consequences for all.⁵⁵ Indeed, “danger was the driving force, the leader, and salvation,” wrote one memoirist, “for the people had no other object but how to save themselves.”⁵⁶

In conclusion, the primate involvement with the Etaireia was contingent on the preservation of their powers and the aid of friendly powers; a course of action that recalls their participation in previous plots dating as far back as the Orlov Revolt. They displayed throughout a healthy sense of *realpolitik* which eschewed any ambitions for outright independence: The Peloponnese would instead move from one imperial sphere into another, the rights of the primates undisturbed and perhaps more securely removed from the threat of encroaching powers or adversaries, whether in the form of rogue pashas or central authorities. This last plot holds nevertheless one important distinction in the sense that the primates did not initiate the scheme but were reacting to it. Their reasons for joining are therefore not so easily ascertained. Did they, for example, come round to see participation in the Etaireia and the revolution as an opportunity to end for good the threat to their status posed by provincial governors or, conversely, what they understood of Mahmud’s centralisation endeavours? As indicated above, any consideration of the motivations behind their entry into the conspiracy must also take into account the pressure likely exerted on them by the Etaireia’s success in bringing other segments of Peloponnesian society into the fold. It may not be the case that the plot was ultimately understood by them as something of a *fait accompli*, to which they were left no choice but to become involved; but could they merely stand aside while it continued to advance forward and passively await the outcome?

Regardless of which of the above scenarios one favours, it is nevertheless clear – contrary to what has been written of late in other venues – that we cannot tell the story of 1821 without the Etaireia, nor, in turn, due consideration of contemporary European events and developments in the realm of ideas. To do so would be to overlook again the composite nature of the revolution; a quality which it shares with other upheavals from the time period. Debate will no doubt continue over questions concerning the political convictions and ultimate aims of all those who took part in the plot.⁵⁷ And indeed the remarkable silence on such matters in surviving documents is perhaps crucial towards explaining the Etaireia’s ability to attract such a diverse body of members, and, especially, the support of powerful social forces that were critical to the formation of a mass movement.⁵⁸ 1821 is certainly notable in that respect. However, as one observes in the case of the other revolutions of the period, it was not very long before the fault lines began to show.

- ¹ This same *hybridité* is often cited as a cause for the rapid collapse of many contemporary revolutions or their failure (most famously in 1848) to achieve concrete results. As James Sheehan has written, for example, of the disturbances which occurred throughout Germany in 1830, what may have appeared on the surface as occasions of common action among diverse groups of actors represented no more than “accidental alliances” of the moment, “attenuated by deep distrust”. James J. Sheehan, *German History, 1770–1866* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 606.
- ² Anna Barańska may well, for example, have been speaking for many of her fellow researchers when writing of the challenges of enumerating the motivations of all those – “urbains et ruraux, élites modernes et fractions des classes populaires, modérés et radicaux, génération de 1830 et génération précédente” – who had a role, great or small, in the Polish Revolution of 1830. Anna Barańska, “Pologne: une insurrection sans révolution?” in *La liberté guidant les peuples: les révolutions de 1830 en Europe*, ed. Sylvie Aprile, Jean-Claude Caron and Emmanuel Fureix (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2013), 151–52.
- ³ This term, as François Jarrige writes, was first used in France in the 1830s as a means to describe the conditions arising from “des transformations industrielles”. François Jarrige, “Le travail et la question sociale dans l’Europe de 1830,” in Aprile, Caron and Fureix, *La liberté guidant les peuples*, 272. See also Robert Castel, *Les métamorphoses de la question sociale* (Paris: Fayard, 1995). This same sense of a “social question” (*soziale Frage*) and impending crisis features prominently in accounts of public discourse throughout the Bund in the years preceding the 1848 revolutions. See, for example, Doron Avraham, “The Social and Religious Meaning of Nationalism: The Case of Prussian Conservatism 1815–1871,” *European History Quarterly* 38, no. 4 (2008): 527; James J. Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 12, 30–34; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, “The German Revolutions of 1848–1850 and the Sonderweg of Mecklenburg,” in *The Revolutions in Europe, 1848–1849: From Reform to Reaction*, ed. R.J.W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 106; Wolfram Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848–49*, trans. Christiane Banerji (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 27–28. Note that the sense of the “social problem” discussed here is to be distinguished from famous interpretations of the Greek Revolution (fixed on the merchant involvement) associated with the thought of Yannis Kordatos.
- ⁴ Siniša Malešević writes, for example, of the Serbian revolution as largely waged by “local notables, bandits and some peasants”. Here again the urban element was minimal. Siniša Malešević, “The Mirage of Balkan Piedmont: State Formation and Serbian Nationalisms in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” *Nations and Nationalism* 23, no. 1 (2017): 132.
- ⁵ As he wrote in the *Age of Revolution*, “only one of the 1820–2 revolutions maintained itself, thanks partly to its success in launching a genuine people’s insurrection and partly to a favourable diplomatic situation: the Greek rising of 1821.” “In Greece alone,” he continued, his prose acquiring an almost romantic hue, “did an entire people rise against the oppressor”, and in doing so presented to the world “that unique and awe-inspiring thing, the mass rising of an armed people”. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848* (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1962), 116, 140, 142.
- ⁶ For Joep Leerssen, the revolution and creation of the Hellenic Kingdom served not only to validate the principle of national sovereignty; it abetted too the onset of a developing romantic form of nationalism which retained, in his words, “the ‘vertical’ notion of freedom as the assertion of popular rights, but adds to this a ‘horizontal’ aspect, namely the separateness of the nation amidst its neighbours.” Joep Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 133. See, for example, Pouqueville’s widely read *Histoire de la régénération de la Grèce* (1824). “Following in the footsteps of the father of history (Herodotus),” he begins, “I will show how the Greeks, fallen from their splendour, subdued by the Romans, whom they softened, degraded under the sceptre of their theologian Caesars, conquered by the Turks, whom they could not civilize, silently cast off their chains ... and ascended to the rank of nations.” François Charles Hugues Laurent Pouqueville, *Histoire de la régénération de la Grèce: comprenant le précis des événements depuis 1740 jusqu’en 1824*, 4 vols. (Paris: Didot, 1824), 1:2. See also Augustin Thierry, *Histoire de la conquête de l’Angleterre par les Normands*, vol. 1 (Paris: Furne, 1866).
- ⁷ Accounts of the Italian revolutions of 1848–1849 give compelling evidence, for example, of mass uprisings among the urban populace. However, the participation of the peasantry in such events and their attitude more generally towards issues of “national” import remains difficult to assess. As John Davis and Paul

Ginsborg once observed in this connection, the spirits and enthusiasms aroused within the countryside by the great events of the day might just as rapidly be extinguished or diverted. See, for example, John A. Davis and Paul Ginsborg, eds., *Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento: Essays in Honour of Denis Mack Smith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 21. Many scholars no doubt share Ilaria Porciani's view that the rural populace "had no interest in the cause of independence, let alone unification ... most of all, it was the urban dwellers (including lower-class people) who participated in 1848." Ilaria Porciani, "On the Uses and Abuses of Nationalism from Below: A Few Notes on Italy," in *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*, ed. Maarten Van Genderachter and Marnix Beyen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 81. If, finally, the rural populace in Italy participated less avidly in the movements and events described above, this was by no means exceptional, as Blackbourn notes of contemporaneous events in Germany. According to this author, "the large-scale defection of the peasantry ... their demands for the abolition of feudal privileges met ... granted German princes the great boon of rural quiescence." David Blackbourn, *The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780–1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 170–71. See additional notes on Italian, German and Polish cases below.

⁸ A valuable review of the memoir literature which appeared after the revolution and its uses for addressing the problems cited above can be found in Georgios Nikolaou, "Η Φιλική Εταιρεία στα απομνημονεύματα των αγωνιστών του '21: ένα κορυφαίο γεγονός της νεοελληνικής ιστορίας μέσα από διαμεσολαβημένα κείμενα" [The Filiki Etaireia in the memoirs of the fighters of '21: A leading event in modern Greek history through mediated texts], in *Η Φιλική Εταιρεία: Επαναστατική δράση και μυστικές εταιρείες στη νεότερη Ευρώπη* [The Filiki Etaireia: Revolutionary action and secret societies in modern Europe], ed. Anna Mandilara and Georgios Nikolaou (Athens: Asini, 2017), 275–310.

⁹ Athanasios Photopoulos, *Οι Κοτζαμπάσηδες της Πελοποννήσου κατά τη δεύτερη τουρκοκρατία (1715–1821)* [The kodjabashis of the Peloponnese during the second period of Ottoman rule, 1715–1821] (Athens: Irodotos, 2005); Dean Kostantaras, "Christian Elites of the Peloponnese and the Ottoman State, 1715–1821," *European History Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (2013): 628–56; Frederick F. Anscombe, "The Balkan Revolutionary Age," *Journal of Modern History* 84, no. 3 (2012): 572–606; Martha Pylia, "Les notables moréotes, fin du XVIIIe début du XIXe siècle: fonctions et comportements" (PhD diss., Université de Paris I, 2001), and Pylia, "Conflits politiques et comportements des primats chrétiens en Morée, avant la guerre de l'indépendance," in *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760–1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos and Elias Kolovos (Rethymno: University of Crete, 2003), 137–48; Dimitris Stamatopoulos, "Constantinople in the Peloponnese: The Case of the Dragoman of the Morea Georgios Wallerianos and Some Aspects of the Revolutionary Process," in Anastasopoulos and Kolovos, *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans*, 148–68; Dionysis Tzakis, "Η εφορεία της Φιλικής Εταιρείας στην Πελοπόννησο: Σκέψεις για τη συμμετοχή των τοπικών ηγετικών ομάδων στο εθνικό κίνημα" [The administration of the Filiki Etaireia in the Peloponnese: Thoughts on the participation of local leadership groups in the national movement], *Ionios Logos* 5 (2015): 97–110; Dimitris Bacharas, "Συμμαχίες, αντιμαχίες και τρόποι ένταξης των πελοποννησίων προκρίτων στη Φιλική Εταιρεία" [Alliances, conflicts and methods of integrating the Peloponnesian elites in the Filiki Etaireia], in Mandilara and Nikolaou, *Η Φιλική Εταιρεία* [Filiki Etaireia], 229–46.

¹⁰ Anscombe, "Balkan Revolutionary Age."

¹¹ As Anscombe further claims: "The causes and setting of uprisings in the Balkans were specifically Ottoman, and most strove for a more secure, predictable future still within the Ottoman system." *Ibid.*, 573. A contending view is nevertheless expressed by Nassia Yakovaki, who writes in one recent work that if the Napoleonic Wars and subsequent political manoeuvring did not directly affect the areas in question, those who led the revolution "were indeed organizing themselves against a Restoration power – part of the European equilibrium: the Ottoman status quo." Nassia Yakovaki, "The Philiki Etaireia Revisited: In Search of Contexts, National and International," *Historical Review/Revue Historique* 11 (2014): 187. A still more ambitious attempt to place 1821 in the company of the European upheavals of the day is undertaken by Richard Stites in *The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 275. Difficulties regarding the merits of characterising the Greek Revolution in this fashion are discussed below and in Dean Kostantaras, *Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763–1848* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 109–14. That said, some Greek documents from the period do in fact give the impression that certain protagonists, including Alexandros Ypsilantis, viewed, or at least sought to represent, their cause in those terms. In addition therefore to articulating a sense of the "revolutionism" that Stites (like Hobsbawm before him) described as permeating the era, Ypsilantis appeared

also to link the Greek Revolution to the other liberal revolutions of the period. In an 1820 encyclical addressed to all the leaders of “the nation”, Ypsilantis declared that “in the present critical circumstances, when all the nations of Europe are struggling to acquire their national rights and limit the power of tyrants”, the time had finally arrived for the Greeks too to act. *Αρχείο Εμμανουήλ Ξάνθου* [Emmanouil Xanthos archive], vol. 2 (Athens: Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece, 2000), 181. For the concept of “revolutionism”, see, for example, Stites, *Four Horsemen*, 275. As Hobsbawm once wrote of the period 1789–1848, “Never in European history and rarely anywhere else has revolutionism been so endemic, so general, so likely to spread by spontaneous contagion as well as by deliberate propaganda.” Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution*, 138. A still earlier use of the term can be found in Thomas Carlyle, “The Hero as King: Cromwell, Napoleon: Modern Revolutionism,” *The Works of Thomas Carlyle* (New York: Collier, 1897), 12:421.

¹² To be sure, 1821 represents one of the very few occasions during the period (the Polish revolutions of 1830 and 1846 may also be included in this company) where a “national” revolution was planned in advance and set in motion by a group of conspirators.

¹³ “Of all the foreign wars the Ottoman Empire fought in this period (1768–74, 1787–92, 1798–1801, 1806–12, 1821–23, 1828–29), only two did not end in decisive and costly defeat.” Anscombe, “Balkan Revolutionary Age,” 577.

¹⁴ Kostas Kostis, to cite a prominent contemporary Greek historian, has also recently argued that attention should be properly directed towards the circumstances and aims of those Etaireia members who composed the “military” and “political” classes of the Peloponnese. These latter represent for Kostis a “marginalised elite” who turned to revolution as a means to either recover their former powers or prevent a further erosion of status. Kostas Kostis, *Τα κακομαθημένα παιδιά της ιστορίας: Η διαμόρφωση του νεοελληνικού κράτους 18ος–21ος αιώνας* [*History’s Spoiled Children: The Formation of the Modern Greek State*] (Athens: Polis, 2013), 177. A similar argument has been made in connection with the enlistment of Phanariots such as Mavrokordatos. This latter figure, who played a significant political role in the revolution and the subsequent Greek Kingdom, has nevertheless been held to represent another example of a marginalised elite who saw the creation of an independent Greek state, consciously or not, as a route to political relevance – the Mavrokordatos family being recently named among those barred from becoming hospodars by the Ottoman authorities. This argument made notably by Georgios Theodoridis in *Αλέξανδρος Μαυροκορδάτος: Ένας φιλελεύθερος στα χρόνια του εικοσιένα* [Alexandros Mavrokordatos: A liberal in the era of 1821] (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2012).

¹⁵ Anscombe, “Balkan Revolutionary Age,” 574.

¹⁶ The author refers to initiatives planned or undertaken by Selim III’s successor, Mahmud II, the former having been deposed and executed in the course of the preceding power struggles. As Anscombe writes of Mahmud’s vision: “In essence, the New Order returned, but now with an overriding emphasis upon perceived loyalty to the sultan.” Anscombe, “Balkan Revolutionary Age,” 589.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 592. In sum, “Serbian Christians took up arms in aid of the restoration of sultanic justice, but the Christians of Greece revolted in apprehension that Ottoman reform meant only continuation, if not intensification, of oppression.” *Ibid.*, 589.

¹⁸ See, for example, Thomas W. Gallant, *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1768 to 1913* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 97; Photopoulos, *Οι Κοτζαμπάσηδες* [Kodjabashis], 278–79. Tensions were further elevated by Hurşid Pasa’s ultimatum of February 1821 in which he ordered the major primates and clerics to report to Tripoli, those failing to do so to be declared outlaws. Gallant, *Edinburgh History of the Greeks*, 72. Germanos recounts the ways in which some sought to avoid complying without provoking the suspicions of Ottoman authorities. Germanos, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs] (Athens: Spyros Tsangaris, 1900), 23.

¹⁹ The text refers to the Vostitsa meeting of late January 1821, at which any imminent action was ruled out on the grounds that preparations for war were incomplete, not enough was known about the dispositions of the tsar, and more information was needed about conditions in other parts of Greece. See, for example, among many other sources, Spyridon Trikoupi, *Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επανάστασης* [History of the Greek Revolution] (London: Taylor and Francis, 1860–1862), 1:31; Germanos, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], 24; Photopoulos, *Οι Κοτζαμπάσηδες* [Kodjabashis], 289–91; Nikolaou, “Η Φιλική Εταιρεία στα απομνημονεύματα των αγωνιστών” [Filiki Etaireia in the memoirs of the fighters], 291–92.

- ²⁰ The Etaireia's anxieties were especially elevated by the arrest and execution of the society's emissary to Obrenović in January 1821. Stefanos Papadopoulos, "Το 'Σχέδιον Γενικόν' της Φιλικής Εταιρείας και οι επαφές με τους Σέρβους" [The "General Plan" of the Filiki Etaireia and the contacts with the Serbs], *Makedonika* 17, no. 1 (1977): 52.
- ²¹ 25 March is nevertheless celebrated as Independence Day in Greece in commemoration of actions attributed to Bishop Germanos, who is said to have first raised the standard of revolt. See, for example, Leften S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 283. For the dissenting view, see Gallant, *Edinburgh History of the Greeks*, 72. Germanos himself makes no mention of the event in his memoirs.
- ²² Trikoupis, *Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως* [History of the Greek Revolution], 1:59; Germanos, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], 29.
- ²³ The memory of past events such as the Orlov Revolt no doubt contributed greatly to heightening the "security dilemmas" of all parties, to borrow a term used by Stuart Kaufman when analysing the onset of more recent outbreaks of intercommunal violence. See, for example, references to the trauma of the Orlov years in Yannis Makriyannis, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], ed. Spyros I. Asdrachas (Athens: A. Karavias, 1970), 23, and Trikoupis, *Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως* [History of the Greek Revolution], 1:54. For additional background on Kaufman's terminology and analysis, see Stuart J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
- ²⁴ Surviving records suggest that the klephts began to join the conspiracy in 1817. See, for example, Ioannis Filimon, *Δοκίμιον ιστορικόν περί της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως* [Historical essay on the Greek Revolution] (Athens: Soutsas and Ktenas, 1859), 1:387–416.
- ²⁵ Kostas Kostis, to cite a prominent contemporary Greek historian, also argues that attention should be directed towards the circumstances and aims of those Etaireia members who composed the "military" and "political" classes of the Peloponnese (the leaders of Christian militia and bandit bands and large landholders, respectively) and played a major role in mobilising the manpower needed to sustain the revolution. These latter represent for Kostis a "marginalised elite" who turned to revolution as a means to either recover their former powers or prevent a further erosion of status. Kostis, *"Τα κακομαθημένα παιδιά της ιστορίας"* [History's Spoiled Children], 177.
- ²⁶ For additional context see Ali Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016); Panagiotis Stathis, "From Klephts and Armatoloi to Revolutionaries," in Anastasopoulos and Kolovos, *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans*, 167–80; John Alexander, *Brigandage and Public Order in the Morea, 1685–1806* (Athens: Imago, 1985), 89–90.
- ²⁷ As Stathis writes, "following a sultanic decree (which ordered the wiping out of bandits) and the excommunication of the klephts by the Patriarch, the Ottoman authorities of the Morea, in collaboration with the local notables and, moreover, with manifest popular support, eliminated several klephts (among whom were the most powerful klephts of the Morea, such as Zacharias and many of the Kolokotronis family), and forced the rest to take refuge in the Ionian Islands." Stathis, "From Klephts and Armatoloi," 171.
- ²⁸ Stathis writes that approximately 6,000 klephts took part in the Napoleonic Wars. *Ibid.*, 174. Note that this account of the onslaught against the klephts does not depart significantly from Kolokotronis' own retelling of the story. He went on to claim that the enlistment of the klephts into foreign – especially Russian – service greatly disturbed the Ottomans, who feared that they might in the future turn against the sultan. Theodoros Kolokotronis, *Διήγησις συμβάντων της ελληνικής φυλής από τα 1770 έως τα 1836* [Narration of the events of the Greek race since 1770 to 1836] (Athens: Nikolaidis Philadelphus, 1846), 16.
- ²⁹ Stathis, "From Klephts and Armatoloi," 176. Stathis concludes his essay by stressing that "the overwhelming majority of the klephts and armatoles did not seek changes in the social structure through their participation in the revolution." He appears to argue here against an interpretation of events that places too much emphasis on ideology or imputes to the actions of the klephts an attachment to the ideals and aims associated with other actors.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Although there is no room here to revisit the question at length, these laid stress on the fact that the primates joined the conspiracy relatively late (1818–1820) and en masse; a phenomenon which appeared to suggest a measure of concerted action. Photopoulos, *Οι Κοτζαμπάσηδες* [Kodjabashis], 260. Stathis writes, for example, citing a passage from volume 5 of Vacalopoulos' earlier *Ιστορία του νέου Ελληνισμού* [Modern Greek history], that "in many areas where the notables were hesitant to enter the war, as in the Peloponnese, for example, former klephts were those who initiated armed attacks against the Ottomans, and as a result compelled the notables to join the Revolution." Stathis, "From Klephts and Armatoloi," 168.

³² See, for example, Nicholas Kaltchas, *Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), and Bacharas, "Συμμαχίες, αντιμαχίες και τρόποι ένταξης" [Alliances, conflicts and methods of integrating], 229–46. Such charges were indeed bitterly acknowledged by the primate Kanellos Deliyannis (1780–1862) in his memoirs; he spoke at length about the "blasphemies" he and his peers were made to endure from those who claimed that the revolution came from the people and that "the primates only joined the plot when they recognised they could not stop it and consequently obtained a premier place in the Etaireia ... However, every wise Hellene knows that the people, the mob, is not preoccupied with or thinks of freedom, nor does it have any sense of patriotism. In all ages and epochs it is always the more distinguished and learned, those having property, wealth and other advantages, who have influence and move the people, and these always follow." The primates joined the plot, Deliyannis continued, in order to persuade men of second- and third-class wealth to become members. Kanellos Deliyannis, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs] (Athens: Tsoukalas, 1957), 1:97, 99. Deliyannis appears to be responding here to Nikolaos Spiliadis (1785–1867), whose own memoirs were published in 1851. Nikolaos Spiliadis, *Απομνημονεύματα διά να χρησιμεύσωσιν εις την νέαν ελληνικήν ιστορίαν (1821–1843)* [Memoirs to serve modern Greek history, 1821–1843] (1851; Athens: Karavias, 1972), 1:10–11. A valuable review of the memoir literature which appeared after the revolution and its uses for addressing the problems cited above can be found in Nikolaou, "Η Φιλική Εταιρεία στα απομνημονεύματα των αγωνιστών" [Filiki Etaireia in the memoirs of the fighters].

³³ The corporate sentiments accruing from membership in this "political class," as the leading notables identified themselves, were further bolstered by the notion of a distinct Peloponnesian constitution and political history, represented by events such as the Venetian conquest of the province in 1684, the Turkish reconquest in 1715, and the Orlov Revolt of 1770. For a fuller picture of the Peloponnesian administrative "system", see Tasos Gritsopoulos, *Τα Ορλωφικά: Η εν Πελοποννήσω επανάστασις του 1770 και τα επακόλουθα αυτής* [The Orlov events: The 1770 revolution in the Peloponnese and its consequences] (Athens: Society for Historical Studies on Modern Hellenism, 1967), 7–11; Mikail V. Sakellariou, *Η Πελοπόννησος κατά την δευτέραν τουρκοκρατίαν (1715–1821)* [The Peloponnese during the second period of Turkish rule, 1715–1821] (Athens: Verlag der Byzantinisch-Neugriechischen Jahrbücher, 1939); Anastasia Kyrkini-Koutoula, *Η οθωμανική διοίκηση στην Ελλάδα: Η περίπτωση της Πελοποννήσου (1715–1821)* [The Ottoman administration in Greece: The case of the Peloponnese, 1715–1821] (Athens: Arsenidis, 1996).

³⁴ Kostantaras, "Christian Elites of the Peloponnese," 630.

³⁵ As Mandilara and Nikolaou note, it remains common to present the original merchant element as comprising the radical and revolutionary "wing" of the Etaireia, the powers of which were subsequently curbed by the induction of the notables. Anna Mandilara and Georgios Nikolaou, "Το εφικτό και το ανέφικτο της ιστορίας και της ιστοριογραφίας: η Φιλική Εταιρεία" [The possible and the impossible of history and historiography: The Filiki Etaireia], in Mandilara and Nikolaou, *Η Φιλική Εταιρεία* [Filiki Etaireia], 27.

³⁶ Tzakis, "Η εφορεία" [Administration], 99. Another suggests, more generally, that all who "met each other through the revolution" and took part in its various administrative bodies "were connected by ideological principles; or, more accurately, through their alliance to the national idea, the modern political ideology in accordance with which the Greek national movement had been created and organised in previous years." Nikos Rotzokos, "The Nation as a Political Subject: Comments on the Greek National Movement," in *The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event*, ed. Petros Pizaniyas (Istanbul: Isis, 2011), 153–54; Padelis E. Lekas, "The Greek War of Independence from the Perspective of Historical Sociology," *Historical Review 2* (2005): 175.

- ³⁷ Note, for example, the relative absence of the primates from the Greek Enlightenment. Kostantaras, “Christian Elites of the Peloponnese,” 629.
- ³⁸ Alexander, *Brigandage and Public Order*, 66–67. Note also that the Mani had been established as a special administrative unit in 1776.
- ³⁹ Jean Savant, “Napoléon et la libération de la Grèce,” *L'hellénisme contemporain* 6 (1952): 106–9. French–Peloponnesian intrigues are described also in Demetrio Stephanopoli, *Voyage de Dimo et Nicolo Stephanopoli en Grèce pendant les années V et VI* (Paris: Guilleminet, 1800).
- ⁴⁰ It is notable that the recruiting agent (the indomitable Christoforos Perraivos), made his rounds in the dress of a Russian Army officer. Petrobey sought confirmation of the tsar’s support from other sources and sent two letters through an emissary to Kapodistrias in Saint Petersburg. Although lost, these letters (dated November 1818 and August 1819) were apparently read by Kapodistrias, who, in consultation with the tsar, strenuously sought to dissuade Mavromichalis from embarking on the proposed course of action. Konstantinos Zisiou, ed., *Οι Μαυρομιχάλοι: συλλογή των περί αυτών γραφέντων* [The Mavromichalis family: a collection of what has been written about them] (Athens: Konstantinidis, 1903), 52. Note that Kapodistrias’ response never reached Petrobey, its carrier having been murdered en route. See, for example, Christopher M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria: The Founder of Greek Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 219–21. The letter is dated February 1819. Zisiou, *Οι Μαυρομιχάλοι* [Mavromichalis family], 53–6.
- ⁴¹ For additional context, see Anastasia Kyrkini-Koutoula, *Η οθωμανική διοίκηση* [Ottoman administration], 107–14; Pylia, “Les notables moréotes,” 351–52, and Pylia, “Conflits politiques,” 138–39.
- ⁴² Portrayals of the event found in: Deliyannis, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], 1: 47–51, 64; Kolokotronis, *Διήγησις συμβάντων* [Narration of the events], 38; Anagnostis Kontakis, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs] (Athens: Vivliothiki, 1957), 23; Fotios Chrysanthopoulos (Fotakos), *Απομνημονεύματα περί της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως* [Memoirs of the Greek Revolution] (Athens: s.n., 1960), 41; Panagiotis Papatsonis, *Απομνημονεύματα από των χρόνων της Τουρκοκρατίας μέχρι της βασιλείας Γεωργίου Α΄* [Memoirs from the years of Ottoman rule to the reign of George I] (Athens: National Publishing House, 1960), 40. Earlier Greek historians who cite the event include: Ioannis Filimon, *Δοκίμιον ιστορικόν περί της Φιλικής Εταιρείας* [Historical essay on the Filiki Etaireia] (Nafplio: Kontaxis and Loulakis, 1834), 110–12; Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους* [History of the Greek nation], vol. 5 (Athens: Konstantinidou, 1887), 687–88. Note that Paparrigopoulos largely repeated Kolokotronis’ account of the plot word for word, adding that it was uncertain how many French and Muslim collaborators were sincerely committed to the scheme. Paparrigopoulos also includes Kolokotronis’ remarks concerning his secret intent (“μυστικός μου σκοπός”) of later evicting the Muslim inhabitants from the liberated areas should the opportunity present itself. See Kolokotronis, *Διήγησις συμβάντων* [Narration of the events], 38. Later Greek and French works that discuss the event include: Pylia, “Les notables moréotes,” 54, 352, and Pylia, “Conflits politiques,” 139–40; Kyrkini-Koutoula, *Η οθωμανική διοίκηση* [Ottoman administration], 117–18; Photopoulos, *Οι Κοτζαμπάσηδες* [Kodjabashis], 226; Savant, “Napoléon et la libération,” 475–78. According to Savant, French officials were more cautious about the project than they may have let on and concerned about the confederates’ ability to survive an early test of strength with Ali Pasha.
- ⁴³ Filimon, *Δοκίμιον ιστορικόν περί της Φιλικής Εταιρείας* [Historical essay on the Filiki Etaireia], 1:336.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 336–37. The notables received an answer in the autumn of 1820 via a letter from Ypsilantis, who, in addition to identifying himself as the leader of the Etaireia, consented to the request for the appointment of local directors and the retention of funds; further decreeing that every member of the Etaireia in the Peloponnese must give the aforementioned directors respect and obedience. He was nevertheless keen to add that the *έφοροι* must themselves obey the orders of the general director and not put in motion any action on the part of the Etaireia without obtaining “our opinion”. *Ibid.*, 340. For Photopoulos, Ypsilantis had thus “recognised the superiority of the primate element in the political affairs of the Peloponnese ... however, as if fearing the undertaking of initiatives that might escape his oversight, [the letter] specified that [the Etaireia leadership] would have the last word on every initiative.” Photopoulos, *Οι Κοτζαμπάσηδες* [Kodjabashis], 278.

- ⁴⁵ “Whatever order the Kingdom [an apparent reference to the Russian court] or our Race presents to us,” the signees go on to declare, “which aims for the benefit of the common patrie, will be viewed and acted upon eagerly and energetically by us, provided however we do not dishonour any of the esteemed of our patrie, in other words the aforementioned captains, but towards the honour and virtue of all we will proceed, without any self-interest.” The all-important question of who would exercise power over local affairs was in turn clarified in an ensuing passage: “Just as it wishes *only upon us to have the entire burden of our patrie’s good government placed*, similarly every other command our Race makes of us we accept and will put into effect as an indispensable duty without any hesitation and resistance” (emphasis added). Filimon, *Δοκίμιον ιστορικών περί της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως* [Historical essay on the Greek Revolution], 1:158–61.
- ⁴⁶ Tzakis, “Η εφορεία” [Administration], 106; Lekas, “Greek War of Independence,” 66.
- ⁴⁷ Lekas, “Greek War of Independence,” 75.
- ⁴⁸ For Kanellos Deliyannis, to cite one protagonist, it was simply a case of the people following their natural leaders. See for example, Deliyannis, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], 2:13.
- ⁴⁹ Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution*, 126. Note, however, that Hobsbawm uses the term in a somewhat different way than employed here: He refers, for example, to the *absence* of the peasantry from other European struggles, which he largely attributes to their immunity to the ideas and claims of the nationalists (as well as the reluctance on the part of elites to make the concessions necessary to motivate them). The “political immaturity” of the Greek peasants may rather be likened to their apparent willingness to take part in the revolution without any promise of political or material rewards.
- ⁵⁰ See, for example, John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel* (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 15–17. This assumed embodiment of the popular will in the figure of the territorial elite is conveyed in Deliyannis’ ridicule of the leadership capacities and qualifications of Dimitrios Ypsilantis: “Not having a patria,” wrote Deliyannis of his rival, “he had thus not a single soldier to follow him into war.” Deliyannis, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], 2:13. Gallant further suggests that the severe hardships suffered by the peasantry, especially on account of steep rises in taxation, may have been a critical factor in inducing them to participate in the revolution. Gallant, *Edinburgh History of the Greeks*, 65. For Lekas, the participation of the peasantry in the revolution may be attributed in some part “to the supra-class rhetoric of Greek nationalism, and to the consequent plasticity and interchangeability between the concepts of *nation* and *people*.” Lekas, “Greek War of Independence,” 179.
- ⁵¹ These divisions are discussed, for example, in Peter Brock, *Polish Revolutionary Populism* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1977), 5–24. It may be asked whether the politicisation of gentry and non-noble relations in Poland may have been encouraged by the existence (contra the Greek case) of a Polish state in which interests of this kind could develop and obtain a formal hearing, as illustrated most famously in the debates over the constitution of 3 May 1791.
- ⁵² Greek leaders strove at least to ensure that the revolution could not be characterised on these grounds. See, for example, Koliopoulos and Veremis, *Greece*, 23. Kolokotronis’ address to a band of bellicose soldiers (the latter intent on murdering a gathering of primates for their treatment of Dimitrios Ypsilantis) is especially notable: The Europeans have taken notice of our struggle, declared Kolokotronis, because they heard that it was a rising of the “Greeks against the Turks” in the cause of liberty, “but if we kill the primates the kings will say that we did not rise up for freedom and that we are bad men and carbonari and they will help the Turks and we’ll wear the yoke more heavily than ever before.” Kolokotronis, *Διήγησις συμβάντων* [Narration of the events], 75.
- ⁵³ If too radically pitched, a programme of attaining national unification “from below” would “terrify” the middle classes and drive them to reaction. As one scholar has explained, “there were severe problems about putting Mazzini’s conception of a ‘people’s war’ into effect ... A guerilla war could not succeed without the support of the peasants. Mazzini saw this ... but he had no convincing practical programme for bringing it about. The Italian republicans were never successful in overcoming the cultural gap between town and country.” Adrian Lyttelton, “The National Question in Italy,” in *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context*, ed. Mikuláš Teich and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 84.
- ⁵⁴ Previous studies have, for example, laid stress on the fact that the combatants were also starkly separated along Christian–Muslim lines, a factor that served to reinforce (or at least was wielded in this manner) the

social and political antipathies of the belligerents. This could not be said again of the Italian national movement whose enemies, whether local or foreign, were nevertheless all Christian and indeed mainly Catholic. Note, however, that the position of the Catholic Church on the national question (frequently recorded as hostile), has been qualified of late by Risorgimento scholars. As Manuel Borutta, for example, writes “there was a powerful, liberal Catholic movement in the Italian Church” and “many members of the clergy supported the project of national unification.” Manuel Borutta, “Anti-Catholicism and the Culture War in Risorgimento Italy,” in *The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy*, ed. Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 192. Similar points are made in Maurizio Isabella, “Religion, Revolution, and Popular Mobilization,” in *Re-Imagining Democracy in the Mediterranean, 1780–1860*, ed. Joanna Innes and Mark Philp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 241–46, and Lucy Riall, “Martyr Cults in Nineteenth-Century Italy,” *Journal of Modern History* 82, no. 2 (2010): 255–87.

⁵⁵ Few had the luxury of remaining neutral. Kolokotronis, for one, declared that he would “bring fire to any village that failed to heed the voice of the patria.” Kolokotronis, *Διήγησις συμβάντων* [Narration of the events], 55.

⁵⁶ Kontakis, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs], 33. These fears did appear to quell thoughts of rebellion in some parts of the region, as indicated in the accounts of emissaries from the Peloponnese, who found the population in the Aegean Islands traumatised by what had happened to the inhabitants of Chios. See Konstantinos Metaxas, *Απομνημονεύματα* [Memoirs] (Athens: Vasiki Vivliothiki, 1956), 50–51.

⁵⁷ Induction into the Etaireia was again not dependent on any outward profession of political orientation or affiliation. Richard Stites, for example, strove to depict the Spanish, Greek and Decembrist revolutions of the 1820s as examples of the sometimes-violent liberal challenges to the Restoration status quo. Some Etaireia members, including one of its founders, Emmanouil Xanthos, were in fact involved with other European secret societies such as the Freemasons, with leanings of this kind. Stites nevertheless goes on to say that “unlike those of Spain and Naples, the Greek political catechism served as a questionnaire about personal reliability, not ideas.” Stites, *Four Horsemen*, 194. As George Frangos similarly wrote, Etaireia documents display “an apparent absence of any developed political position ... [They] did not once clearly propose the political form a Modern Greek state might adopt.” George D. Frangos, “The Philike Etairia, 1814–21: A Social and Historical Analysis” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1971), 79. This same silence has been noted again more recently in Mandilara and Nikolaou, “Το εφικτό και το ανέφικτο της ιστορίας και της ιστοριογραφίας” [The possible and the impossible of history and historiography], 23.

⁵⁸ Note that some, like Stites, attribute at least part of this official Etaireia silence on practical concerns. For example, “Ypsilantis could voice a suggestively radical view in private correspondence that he could not in public utterances since he hoped to gain support from other states.” Stites, *Four Horsemen*, 198. Hobsbawm meanwhile notes that these diffuse ideological trappings were typical of movements from the “great age of the brotherhoods”; an era, he surmises, which came to an end with the 1830 revolutions. Subsequent plots “may have partly retained the original Carbonarist pattern, but the rise of nationally and socially specialized groupings weakened their cohesion.” Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), 167. See also Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution*, 114–15.