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Empires, Nations and the Question of Territorial Sovereignty in the Greek Archipelago during the Greek Revolution

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Empires, Nations and the Question of Territorial Sovereignty in the Greek Archipelago during the Greek Revolution: The Case of Syros

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In one of his letters, sent in June 1823, to French State Secretary of Foreign Affairs François-René de Chateaubriand concerning the claims of the Latin community of the island of Syros (Syra) to be exempted from the taxation imposed on them by the provisional Greek government, Pierre David, French general consul in Smyrna, stated that the insurgents' arguments "pose a dilemma that is difficult to resolve":

Either Syra is Greek, they say, part of the paternal soil we want to set free, and in that case has to contribute to this enterprise, or Syra is Turkish, so, as an enemy [territory], is exposed to the conquest and the war contributions. What can France do in this respect? Declare that in either case she protects the Catholic faith in Syra and that she will avenge the offences that would be committed against it ... I am well aware that the protection of religion means not only protecting the walls of the church, but also favouring those who gather there, preventing them from being molested for it. But when aggressions have for apparent or real motives political institutions, military expeditions or fiscal measures, can we intervene in favour of our co-religionists and defend them for being persecuted for their faith?¹

This set of questions dealt with the international status of the island after centuries of French protection, since the Capitulations (*ahdname*) of the sixteenth century between the sultan and the *Rex Christianissimus*, conferring extraterritoriality on their subjects residing or trading in the Ottoman lands in the form of exemptions from taxation and legal persecution. The various forms of extraterritoriality sanctioned by the Capitulations with France and the other European powers² added more layers and players in a region which had been a contested domain between the various masters of Istanbul, Venice and the European powers already since the late Byzantine era. Situated at a crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean sea routes, away from the big land fortresses, the isles of the Greek archipelago offer a panorama of forms of shared and extraterritorial sovereignty and an instructive insight into the emergence of the notion of territorial sovereignty in the maritime space.³ If imperial antagonisms and vacuums of sovereignty in the global age of revolutions gave rise to sharp conflicts over jurisdiction, in particular in borderlands and on the sea,⁴

this happened not only in the extra-European world but also in this wide Mediterranean borderland with shifting and uncertain sovereignties. In this respect, the Mediterranean was far from being a *mare clausum* and remained a space where one can observe the effects of shifting sovereignties and the precariousness of maritime dominions.⁵ The question that arises is that of the character and the extent of Ottoman sovereignty in the archipelago. This issue has been of growing interest in historiography, joining more broadly an effort, over the last 20 years or so, to think about and highlight a “maritime identity” of the Ottoman Empire, an aspect considered secondary for a long time. Adopting a critical stance to the *topos* of a continental and land-based nature of the empire, recent research discerns a certain “blindness” in the considerations stemming from nineteenth-century historiography and attempts to restore to the sea its function of an essential connector for the efficient management of the empire. In this sense, situated almost in the centre of the Cyclades, the island of Syros offers a privileged view of the internal transformations, but also of the web of links and connections of Ottoman societies with the world around and the long-standing intensive exchanges between individuals and groups of different ethnic, religious, and social origins.⁶ In order to understand the powers at play and the threads that linked the island with the magnetic field of revolution and counter-revolution in the early nineteenth century, the article focuses on the view “from the hill”, on the side of the traditional inhabitants and protectors of the island, on the basis of the intensive correspondence between the local religious and secular authorities with the Catholic hierarchy in the Ottoman Empire, French diplomatic delegates and the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome. In order to grasp the multiple layers of temporality at play in times of war and revolution, the first section provides a broad overview of the early modern context that highlights the hybridity, liquidity of the frontiers of collective identities but also the various forms of overlapping political or legal jurisdictions in a longer historical perspective. As the only island with a Catholic majority in the region, Syros was the Latin quarter of this multilingual and multicultural dispersed maritime city of the archipelago, the “Pope’s Island”. Its liminal position and the “half Oriental and half European” hybrid identity of its inhabitants, offers a privileged view of the reshuffling of the political and cultural frontier between Europe and the Orient. In this sense, the second section focuses on the half century between the Russian occupation of the Cyclades and the Greek Revolution, a period marked by the retreat of French trade, the demise of Venice and the loosening of the control exerted by the imperial centre, and attempts to situate Syros in the dynamic field of the growing antagonisms between empires (France and Russia, but also Britain and Austria) in the region. The next parts concern the status of the island after the outbreak of the 1821 Revolution. All Catholic communities in the Aegean raised the French flag on their churches soon after the outbreak of the Greek insurgency, invoking their extraterritorial status and French protection. As a result of the ethno-religious distinctiveness of its

Catholic majority, Syros was excluded from the national territory until mid-1823. Its transformation into the most important hub of all sorts of legal and illegal trade in the region and the takeover of the port by Orthodox refugees and settlers, pushed the Greek government to seek its share of the capital accumulated there and to lay claim to the exclusive territorial authority over its territories. The third section focuses on the first contacts and frictions between the Latins of Syros and the Greek insurgents, the pressures exerted by the latter for payment of a tithe and participation in the National Assembly. The question of multiple, shared or conflicting spheres of sovereignty takes the form of a series of conflicts over jurisdiction, involving, among others, official and unofficial representatives of the Greek government, the local secular authorities, the Catholic hierarchy and the representatives of French diplomacy in Smyrna, Istanbul and Rome. The fourth (and last) section examines the alternative legal and political projects for Syros as a potential “Gibraltar” or “San Marino” of the Eastern Mediterranean, devised and circulated among the various representatives of the local and central hierarchy of the Catholic Church, as well as French officers and diplomats who acted as intermediaries in the petitions from the local clergy and population to their government and the Vatican. In guise of a conclusion, the article proposes some working hypotheses for further discussion and research.

The early modern Ottoman archipelago

The Ottoman conquest of the Aegean Sea illustrates the growing maritime dimension of the Ottoman Empire from the late fifteenth century after the fortification of the Dardanelles and the capture of Constantinople.⁷ However, even after Barbarossa achieved control of the Eastern Mediterranean basin, the integration of those islands into the Ottoman administrative, fiscal and military mechanism was uneven and heterogeneous. The story of the conquest of the Aegean is yet another demonstration of the conservative policies of maintaining local social stability, structures and hierarchies, and the gradual integration of a domain through the allegiance of elites. First, the lords of the Duchy of the Archipelago (Naxos) become a tributary to the sultan; their first successor would be a Jew, Joseph Nasi, then tax-farming Greeks, or Greek-speaking Muslim converts, etc.; the old seigneurial and political titles survived until the turn of the seventeenth century, when they were gradually replaced by the respective Ottoman ones.⁸ In practice, in most islands the Ottoman presence was rather limited to the yearly “volta” of the fleet under the Kapudan Pasha to collect the tribute, usually in the form of a *maktu*, a fixed lump sum. At the same time, the biggest islands like Limnos, Chios, Kos, Evia (Egriboz/Negroponte), that were also closer to the coast and thus important for the security of the sea routes, were occupied, fortified and colonised.⁹ In that sense, between the Ottoman conquest of the mid-sixteenth century until 1715, when Tinos, the last Venetian outpost in the Eastern Mediterranean, came under Ottoman rule, the region remained a contested territory. Given the poor links between

Istanbul and the islands, especially the smaller ones, and in a precarious context where, especially in the summer season, the islanders saw the arrival of merchants of all kinds, pirates, privateers, ships of the Ottoman fleet or, on the contrary, their enemies, the loyalty of the islanders was regularly challenged. Thus, the populations often developed dual allegiances. Practices of syncretism and shared places of cult were commonplace; thus, for example, Jesuit missionaries considered a large part of the insular population as Catholics, based on the fact that they accepted the Jesuits as their confessors, which was a sign of distrust towards the Orthodox clergy rather than of a Catholic spirit.¹⁰ This is an example that leads us to the labyrinths of the dialectics of isolation and opening, connectedness and hybrid identities. In his study of the islands in the period of the transition from Latin to Ottoman rule, Slot identifies a process of gradual hellenisation.¹¹ Indeed, the Patriarchate of Constantinople exploited its privileged position within the Ottoman administration and the antagonisms between the sultan and the doge, in order to gain ground in the former Frankish colonial outposts, in what has been described as an informal but steady and effective Orthodox reconquest.¹² The partial “hellenisation” of Andros in the mid-sixteenth century and the destruction of the Catholics of Chios during the war of the Ottomans with the Holy League in the late seventeenth century are some of the most remarkable cases in a religious rivalry that involved diverse material as well as ideological stakes.¹³ The arrest and execution of the local Catholic Bishop of Syros Andrea Carga in the early seventeenth century was allegedly an early manifestation of the rivalry between the Orthodox and Catholic churches in the Ottoman period.¹⁴ Following Guillaume Calafat’s reading grid, since the mid-sixteenth century Syros belonged to the well-protected domains of the Ottoman White Sea, described as a gradient of maritime sovereignty that extended southwards from the Dardanelles.¹⁵ The region was never fully under Ottoman sovereignty, as Nicolas Vatin affirms, not because the Ottoman government did not care, but in the sense that the sultan himself was aware of the limits of the control he could exercise over certain islands. “Whether in the Cyclades, in the Dodecanese or in the Sporades, the Divan was concerned with keeping order and asserting its sovereignty. But the sea complicated that task.”¹⁶ In this variable geography of a partially territorialised maritime space, Syros was situated south of the Andros–Stancoi [Kos] line that defined the limits of the White Sea region on which the Ottomans had “territorial” claims,¹⁷ at least after the end of the seventeenth century. In the middle of the archipelago, Syros was in the buffer zone where the Porte did collect taxes and occasionally dispatched beys or kadis, but had no pretension of control over the navigation along the crooked and dangerous sea routes. The shared or gradient layers of sovereignty in the maritime space were also visible in the insular territories as “protection” was extended and partially commercialised, and as different jurisdictions applied to members of the same communities.¹⁸ From a linguistic point of view, early modern insular societies were multilingual; Greek, Turkish, Albanian, Italian,

Arabic, Armenian or French were only among the most frequent among a large variety of languages and dialects in use.¹⁹ Along with the linguistic, the religious and ethnic boundaries were also quite permeable, liquid and ambivalent.²⁰ In a context of shared, conflicting or interpenetrating sovereignties, Syros was the only island to be inhabited by an overwhelming majority of Roman Catholics. The origins of the Syros Latin community date back to the time of the Crusades, and constitute an issue still open in historical research. However, the varying range of the protection offered by the Most Christian French kings through the Capitulations agreed with the sultan since the sixteenth century, provided to their own subjects but also Catholic *zimmis* of the sultan, indicates a cultural contact with France that went beyond an external relationship, or a formal protection of the religion. According to Abbot Della Rocca, as a rule, Syriot peasants of his time could understand and communicate in at least four languages: Greek, Turkish, Italian and French.²¹ The language used in the documents of the secular communal council was a dialect of vernacular Greek blended with elements of Italian and French. This was due to the contacts of the local elites with the Levantine communities of Istanbul, Smyrna or Alexandria, as well as to the education provided by two schools created and run by (mainly French) Capuchin monks (since 1644) and Jesuit religious (since 1733).²² The language of instruction, as well as the language used by the Catholic clergy for their internal communication, was Italian. During the eighteenth century, members of the local elite were invested with the office of vice-consul, and French monks followed the reverse path of assimilation with the local culture.

“Cette douce liberté”

The *pax ottomanica*, if there was one, lasted in the maritime space of the Eastern Mediterranean for about half a century after the Treaty of Passarowitz (1718). The Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774 and the Russian naval campaign under Count Orlov added a new player in the de facto state of shared sovereignty in the Aegean. Thus, the conflict was not only marked by Russian occupation of the Cyclades from 1770 to 1774, but also, by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which gave the tsar the status of protector of the Orthodox subjects of the sultan. Thus, the gradual withdrawal of the Serenissima from the Eastern Mediterranean further destabilised the region, bringing new actors and growing antagonisms rather than an Ottoman takeover in the space left vacant.

As happened in the Morea after the Ottoman reconquest of 1715, the whole eighteenth century qualified as an “age of the Ayans”, characterised by the loosening of the links between the Ottoman imperial centre and the members of the local elites in the provinces. Of course, in the maritime space, the “communes” (*koinotites*) that had managed the administrative, judicial, economic and fiscal affairs of the islands for centuries, generally tended to maintain the internal structure and balance between competing groups and

individuals by absorbing local conflicts and avoiding resort to an external (that is, Ottoman) authority.²³ After 1770, however, the archipelago communities experienced an increase of their degree of autonomy: for example, the volta of the imperial fleet for the collection of tax became intermittent, whereas kadis were dispatched to the islands less frequently than before. The virtual autonomy of the island communities after the Russian occupation was summarised already in 1790 by Abbé Della Rocca, who outlined the position of Syros within the Ottoman and international context thus: “Judging by the form of government established in Syra and almost all the other islands, one would think that they are all small tributary republics. All executive authority resides in the hands of the epitropos.”²⁴ During that period in Syros, a kadi could not summon a member of the clergy to appear in court without the permission of the local Catholic bishop, whose process of appointment illustrates the French claims of sovereignty as an outpost of their informal empire in the Eastern Mediterranean. “It is the French Ambassador in Constantinople who submits to the Porte the berat for the Bishop of Syra. This berat costs 40 piastres for each new Bishop, and the same amount in case of the enthronement of a new sultan, in order to renew it.”²⁵ The bishop of Syros at that time, Giovanni Battista Fonton, was the offspring of a notable Syriot family with a prominent status in the Levantine community of Istanbul as interpreters in the service of the French emperor at the Sublime Porte; his modest stipend was paid jointly by the Vatican and the French Navy. With regard to religion, Syros had become a true centre of Catholicism, orbiting around French officials and institutions. Thus, 40 to 50 clergymen and as many nuns educated in the local schools of the Capuchins and Jesuits, then in Rome or elsewhere, were charged with the education of young boys and girls. At the same time, “in almost all Levantine ports where there [was] a French consul, there [was] also a priest from Syra to serve as chaplain.” The fact that the Syros Latins acted for a long time and in many diverse ways as proxies of the French presence in the Levant was presumably decisive for the formation of the distinct religious and ethnic identity of the Syriots. The relationship of dependence and allegiance forged between the Syriot community and France through the centuries of Ottoman domination eventually made it a commonplace that the “sweet freedom which Syra enjoys, is the fruit of its being under the protection of the King of France.”²⁶ According to many indications, the pressures exerted by the Orthodox Church and the upheavals of the French Revolution were among the factors that contributed to the gradual decline of Catholicism in the archipelago in the late eighteenth century. On 15 May 1819, the Propaganda Fide requested Bishop Francesco Saverio Dracopoli of Chios, the oldest and most renowned Catholic diocese of the region, to conduct an apostolic visit to all the dioceses of the archipelago, on the basis of which he wrote a report ten months later, on 20 March 1820, on “The causes contributing to the decline, diminishing and dissolution of Catholicism in the Islands of the Archipelago”. Among the reasons highlighted by Dracopoli was the animosity and enmity of the “Eastern schismatics”

as well as the pressures exercised by the Orthodox majority. On this subject, Dracopoli emphasised the fact that “the Porte conceded to the Greek schismatics the authority to govern and supervise themselves according to their own laws and customs”.²⁷ Fernand Braudel commented that in the sixteenth-century Mediterranean, to gaze at the mountains from the plains was to look back in time.²⁸ The hill town of Syros demonstrates that the same applies when one looks up from the sea at the rural societies of the insular highlands, even in medium-sized islands. Recent research demonstrates the complex dialectics between internal stability of the local community and the transformation of the overall context in the region. Thus, a rather invariable structure of the local rural community, relatively isolated from its surroundings, went hand in hand with accrued social mobility and the development of a commercial bourgeoisie associated with the Levantine communities of Istanbul and Asia Minor.²⁹ This was probably one of the symptoms of the retreat of French merchants from the Eastern Mediterranean after the outbreak of the revolution and the naval blockade imposed on France by the British. Orthodox merchants and seamen, mainly islanders of Hydra, Spetses and Psara, took over the trade routes left vacant, accumulating significant amounts of wealth in a brief period of time – enough, however, to bring a huge blow on French trade in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a result, the network of French consular agents shrank drastically in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Hence, in the first years after 1815, French policy was focused on an effort to protect and reinforce its existing, and re-establish its recently lost, stopover bases. In that way, the French neutrality between 1821 and 1827 in the Ottoman-Greek conflict would be an active neutrality that would try to take advantage of the new opportunities created by the Greek insurrection, in order to regain its former status in the region.³⁰ The multiple allegiances of the islanders and their secular or religious prelates was thus rather a result of the multiple reshuffles of the border between Christian Europe and the Ottoman East in the Levant since Count Orlov’s first archipelago expedition in 1770, which intensified and accelerated around the turn of the century, with the demise of the Serenissima in 1797, the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna.

“The image of Venice at the time of the Crusades”

The town is by no means so well built as those of some of the other islands less equivocally Greek. Its streets, owing to their situation on the sides of a steep and conical hill, are irregular, narrow, and infamously filthy, – while its little harbour is crowded with vessels of various flags from Hydra, Malta and Marseille, as Syra is now the only neutral port of the empire equally respected by Turk and Greek, and permitted to carry on the trifling remnant of commerce remaining in the Cyclades.³¹

Situated in a buffer zone of shared or contested claims of sovereignty, the integration of Syros into the Ottoman system remained incomplete through time. Since local Christians

or Jews were involved as tax-farmers, frictions about taxation had become somewhat recurrent. Likewise, the first contacts and frictions with the Greek insurgents regarded taxation and representation in the National Assembly. Although the Greek insurgents appealed early on to the islanders in general and the Latins in particular as fellow Christian inhabitants of the Hellenic lands, the representatives of the Catholic communities declared their neutrality and appealed to the French representatives for protection. Reactions against the payment of the tithe in the islands were reported from the very beginning. Various letters sent by the representatives (eparchs) of the Greek insurgent government in the Aegean to the Community of Hydra stated the difficulties in collecting taxes due to reactions of the local governments. Rather than a sign of a confessional conflict, those reactions were an expression of the interests of local landowners, who acted in most cases as primates of the secular community council. Regardless of their religious allegiances, the insular communities of Naxos, Syros and Tinos, but also the ones where the Catholic population was unimportant, like those of Paros and Milos, denied the legitimacy of the Greek claims and opted to procrastinate.³² The insurgent government attempted to incorporate the islands and the native Catholic communities in spring 1822. The first administrative division was implemented with the appointment of *eparchoi* (prefects), charged with establishing an elementary fiscal and administrative apparatus in the Eastern Aegean and all Cycladic islands but Syros. The reticence regarding the only island entirely under the control of a Catholic community is a sign of their awareness of the complications entailed by the neutrality and the distinct identity of the Syriots. Apart from the apparent economic nature of the reactions to the establishment of Greek state authorities, the attempt to implement territorial control over territories defined as “national” represented a break with the political traditions of a region in which sovereignty was for a long time expressed and exerted on persons rather than on territories.

The Greek Revolution finally appeared to be a remarkable event and a difficult problem; needs were growing, there was money to be earned, and when that money would run out, loans would have to be made: this consideration ... led to hundreds of ships in Sciros, which poured abundantly into the breadbaskets of the new state enough to feed the army. Attracted by the lure of profit, greedy merchants came to settle on the coast of the port; they built pleasant houses, established connections with the Adriatic ports ... A huge city ... suddenly rose up on arid hillsides ... [T]owards the end of 1825, people were still fighting over a few metres of land to build a small house ... the unfortunate of all classes; the victims of the cruelty of the Turks increased the number of new islanders; Sciros resembled a colony formed by the various inhabitants of the world; it resembled the image of Venice at the time of the Crusades. There were as many as two hundred ships in the port of Sciros, and the Austrian flag was the one most often seen.³³

The “unfortunate of all classes” and “victims of the cruelty of the Turks” that Hubert Lauvergne saw in 1825 were the thousands of refugees from the Ottoman massacres in the islands of Chios (1822), Kassos and Psara (1824), who crowded the port of Syros in search of shelter from the ravages of war and of employment opportunities. Thus between 1822 and 1824 Syros became de facto a free port, a hub for all sorts of legal or illegal trade of cereals, wine, textiles, perfumes, spices and condiments, but also of piracy booties, counterfeit coins and slaves.³⁴ In 1826, Orthodox settlers, who numbered between 20,000 and 30,000, that is, four to six times the number of the native Syriots, founded formally a new city at the port, Ermoupoli, named after the ancient Greek god of trade.³⁵

Towards the end of 1822, the insurgents started claiming their share in political power and capital accumulation in Syros. On Christmas 1822, a military corps under the command of a Kefalonian ship captain Nestor Faziolis under the Ionian flag disembarked at the port of Syros; their attack was stopped by the intervention of a French warship. Faziolis would soon reorganise his forces on the nearby island of Tinos with the support of the Greek prefect. A second invasion in February 1823 was also nipped in the bud by the intervention of the French Navy, after which Faziolis was provisionally taken into custody. Shortly after his incursions, a Hydriot flotilla entered the island's port, forcing the payment of an extraordinary levy. A new administrative division of Greece issued in May 1823 formally incorporated Syros into its territories.³⁶ Faziolis was officially appointed chief of police in Syros under the command of a prefect. His arrival on the island provoked the immediate reaction of French Admiral Henri de Rigny, commander of the French naval forces in the Levant, who arrived on the spot on his frigate *La Médée*, arrested Faziolis, dismantled his unit and addressed a strict warning to the Greek government over its appointment of a bandit (*forban*).³⁷ Until late in the decade, the jurisdiction of the Greek police force established in Syros was constantly called into question by the French consul and the leaders of the Catholic community. Likewise, in the fiscal register of the Greek authorities, the island of Syros would be divided into two communities, that of the local Latins and that of the “merchants of the Port” of Syros.³⁸

Within a new buffer zone, the moving frontier thus went through the island. The “old” and “new” Syros, as they were first named,³⁹ had different sanitary regulations and authorities, distinct police forces and civic authorities. The local council issued a notice to all members of the local community imposing regulations on any contact with the people of the port. Meanwhile, de Rigny and Armand Charles Guilleminot, ambassador in Istanbul, advised the Latins to show moderation towards the Greeks and defined the limits of protection provided to the island Catholics on a basis of respect for national territorial sovereignty and equality before the law.⁴⁰ The local vice-consuls, prominent members of the local community, attempted to take an active role in the negotiations between the local community and the representatives of the insurrectionary government. After the

interference of the local French consul on the question of the taxation of the Syriot Catholics, the Community of Hydra responded with irony:

We have not been notified that His Most Christian Majesty has under His protection the community of Syros, and we find almost incompatible the two roles you assume, that of the consular agent of a Power on one hand and of representative of a people subject to another Power. However, we will forward to our government your letter, since you should have already sent it to them and not to our community, if your sovereign is the actual protector of Syros and you the actual representative of the island.⁴¹

Somewhat later, on 8 August 1823, the Greek prefect responded once more, this time to the objections of the French vice-consul concerning the creation of a police force on the island:

If the Greek government has the right to govern its territory, then no one could prevent the establishment of a police in it. But if you have specific orders to oppose the creation of a Greek police in Greek territory, please be so kind to communicate it explicitly, so that I can inform my government, whose members are obviously ignorant of the fact that their authority should not reach Syros.⁴²

“Where the authority of the Turks has ceased to prevail”⁴³

At the centre of reshuffles of alliances was the power vacuum created in the archipelago all through the 1820s by the Greek insurrection. This kind of situation was not unknown or unfamiliar to the various actors involved. As we have already seen, the French protection occasionally extended to a status of extraterritoriality for the Syros Catholics which, given the increased degree of autonomy of the smaller islands, revealed an informal claim for a French protectorate in the middle of the archipelago. Speaking of the sufferings of the island, Lauvergne underlined that “from time immemorial, the island of Sciros has been placed by our kings under Their benevolent protection”; as for the local Catholics being caught in the crossfire between Greeks and Turks, he commented that they were very compliant. “However, they gave proof of bravery, and as if their tenderness had been predestined for France, it was always in favour of a few French ships pursued by brigands, that they deployed it brilliantly.”⁴⁴ The French naval officer Jean Jourdain, who, according to Lauvergne, should be “listed among the most brave and disinterested Philhellenes”,⁴⁵ commented accordingly:

Syriots are naturally good and human, and one cannot but notice their particular predilection for the French; they have, on the other hand, a strong hatred for the schismatic Greeks, whom they accuse of having offended, plundered and devastated them as a punishment for their attachment to France and to the Catholic religion.⁴⁶

The imperialist views and claims of the French become more evident in Jourdain's involvement in making Syros a parameter of the Holy See's foreign policy. During the autumn of 1822, he travelled to Italy as a representative of the Greek government at the Congress of Verona. Although the Greek delegation was not admitted by the Powers, with the encouragement of Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, Jourdain entered into negotiations with the Order of the Knights Hospitaller for an alliance against the sultan that would be sealed with the concession of Syros to the latter and its transformation into a "bulwark of Christendom" in the Eastern Mediterranean, a "new Gibraltar".⁴⁷

In this new *Venice in the time of Crusades*, a hub of piracy and of any sort of legal and illegal trade, including the slave trade, many networks were activated or created and many actors were involved at once, representing various official and unofficial groups of interests. The activity of the local French vice-consul Natale Vuccino represented not only the concerns of the local community but also of the French merchants in the region. According to the instructions given by the chargé d'affaires of the French Embassy in Istanbul, Count de Beaurepaire, to the general consul in Smyrna, Pierre David, in April 1824, the aim of French diplomacy should be focused on maintaining the quasi-immunity that French ships enjoyed in the ports of the archipelago. For that purpose, and in order to avoid the tensions created here and there, he had requested from the French ministry to act in order to resolve the question of the 3 percent levy imposed on all ships calling at the port of Syros.⁴⁸

If the questions of taxation and port dues were one main reason for the discontent and tension between Greek insurgents and the local vice-consuls of the European powers in the archipelago, the piracy that raged in the Aegean with growing intensity after 1821 was the other. Indeed, after the end of land operations in the Morea and the income from the spoils of war, piracy booties and forced taxation became a vital source of income for the maintain of the insurgent navy and troops.⁴⁹ The Austrians, which had until that point by far the heaviest losses, sent in spring 1826 a squadron under Vice-Admiral Amilcare Paulucci to supervise the routes and protect the ships flying the imperial flag. Paulucci was an Italian with a career of service under various sovereigns. His activities in the archipelago included persecuting Greek ships for piracy but also attacking French philhellenes and arresting a former Greek eparch in Syros in retaliation for an unpaid debt of the insurgents to an Austrian merchant.⁵⁰

The Austrian involvement was also the result of initiatives of local Syriots and the Catholic Church, who were convinced that the protection provided by France was not sufficient. Thus Paulucci got in contact with representatives of the Holy See from the outset of his mission, and remained in regular contact with the Catholic archbishop of Smyrna, Luigi Maria Cardelli, and Vicar Apostolic Vinkentios Coressi in Istanbul, as well the religious and secular authorities of the island Catholics. From their side, the Latins of Syros gradually sought to enhance their links to the Sublime Porte and their traditional patrons (France and

the Vatican). The election of Giovanni Marinello (or Marinelli), a member of a prominent family of the Syriote diaspora in Istanbul as *governatore*⁵¹ (*epitropos*) in 1824 was certainly a choice pointing in that direction. During his period in office, Marinello collaborated closely with the French vice-consul, as well as with the Apostolic Administrator Luigi Maria da Ciriè Blancis, appointed by the Apostolic Vicariate of Constantinople, and repeatedly submitted requests for support and protection from the rapacious aggressions of the Orthodox settlers to the French general consul and the Catholic archbishop of Smyrna as well as the French ambassadors in Istanbul.⁵²

The appointment of Blancis was an expression of a common plan of action of the Holy See in the Levant since the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars to fill critical positions in the hierarchy with priests from Rome or Italy rather than with members of the local clergy. The itinerary and activity of the Apostolic administrator, who would officially become bishop of Syros after the inglorious death of his predecessor in Rome in 1829, summarise the transition and the characteristics of a transition from an extraterritorial to a territorial and from an imperial to a national conception of sovereignty. In early 1826, shortly after he had taken office, in a detailed report he wrote on Syros, Blancis supported its transformation into a free port (*porto franco*) and tributary to the Greek state. The idea of a free port seemed quite evident for two main reasons: first, this status had become common in its various forms in the eighteenth-century Mediterranean and, second, it expressed the then de facto transformation of Syros into a free port – with the advantage of a tax immunity so coveted by western merchants. Interestingly, in his projections about the actual implementation of this project, Blancis stressed the distinct, hybrid identity and the European ancestry of the local Grecolatins or Latino-Hellenes:⁵³ “To reach this point, it would be enough to make the allies understand that these small colonies that are begging for protection ... are not Hellenes, but European Latins, as demonstrated by the family name of each: Grimaldi, Giustiniani, Vitali, Rossi, Freri, Privilegio.”⁵⁴

Protection and recognition of the distinct identity of local Catholics remained an indispensable parameter for the different scenarios promoted by the Catholic Church all through the 1820s. During the negotiations on the borders of Greece, the newspaper *Courrier de Smyrne* published a petition from the clergy and notables of Syros to the Holy See in which they expressed the wish not to become part of the new state.⁵⁵ Although the authenticity of this document was denied by the Syriotes, it nevertheless corresponds to the scenarios discussed and promoted by the Catholic bishops to the French representatives in the region. In one of his later reports to the Propaganda Fide, dated 17 September 1827, Blancis proposed that Syros obtain a status similar to that of the Republic of San Marino, autonomous and directly connected to the Holy See.⁵⁶ Later, in August 1828, Blancis again recounted to the Propaganda Fide prefect, Mauro Cappellari, who would soon become Pope Gregory XVI, the initiatives he had taken jointly with the bishop of Tinos, Giorgio

Gabinelli, to promote, through the intermediary of de Rigny, the plan for a partial resettlement and gathering of all the Catholic populations of the archipelago into one of the four islands with a large Catholic community (Syros, Tinos, Naxos, Santorini), with a special status of French quasi-sovereignty.⁵⁷

Revolution, Sattelzeit and Sattelraum

The changing and conflicting claims for political sovereignty in Syros during the 1820s transformed the Greek archipelago in the southern Aegean into liminal space where boundaries were (and had been for a long time) fuzzy, a space on the margins and between distinct entities – in other words a *Sattelraum*.⁵⁸ The historical events of the 1820s led or (as Braudel would say)⁵⁹ made use of this space of mobility, intense interaction and dynamic interplay between majority and minority cultures that lay in between the boundaries of imperial entities. The multiple threads connecting these insular societies with the world around reveal a multitude not only of spatial perspectives but also of temporalities.

For instance, the semantics of the French white royal standard, with or without the Bourbon coat-of-arms, hoisted atop churches and vice-consular residences across the archipelago after the outbreak of the revolution, functioned simultaneously as a reminder of the protection by the *roi très chretien* and also of affinity and allegiance to the political traditions of the monarchy and the ancien régime, but also as a sign of truce and neutrality. From the French perspective, as time went on the cause of Greece/Hellas was one that could be supported by radical liberals, republicans and royalists alike.⁶⁰ On the other end, the destruction of the Ottoman Mediterranean fleet in Navarino by the joint Russian, British and French forces in October 1827 spread confusion and apprehension about possible Ottoman reprisals among the island Catholics and the Levantine communities in Smyrna and Istanbul.⁶¹ When France subsequently openly abandoned neutrality and engaged as a co-guarantor of Greek independence, the various protests and claims of the island Catholics became inevitably the subject of talks and deals with the government of Ioannis Kapodistrias. By the end of the decade, the Syros Catholic community gradually formalised their relationship with the Greek authorities and sent representatives to the National Assembly.

The projects elaborated and promoted by the archipelago bishops through the intermediary of the Vicariate of Constantinople, the Propaganda Fide, de Rigny and various local vice-consuls corresponded to a previous political setting and imperial balance of powers in the Eastern Mediterranean that was already obsolete. Thus, they remained mere paper exercises. The question of their status was finally resolved at the London Conference of 1832, where Catholics were guaranteed full civil equality and religious freedom within the new national state by the newly elected King Otto, a Catholic himself.⁶² Hence, in the

middle of the archipelago and in a saddle-space of contact between cultures of the Mediterranean, where traders, sailors, soldiers, pirates, refugees, insurgents and local populations met and interacted, Syros in the 1820s also presents itself as an Arendtian gap, an interval in time altogether determined by things that are no longer and by things that are not yet.⁶³ In less than ten years, the local Latins saw their long-cherished autonomy withering away and they now had to turn themselves from being subjects of the sultan protected by the French king to being Greek citizens “of the Western Church”. From this perspective, in that *Sattelraum* of intense cultural contact and fluid identities, the process of *territorialisation* of the maritime space was a mark of a broader transition that involved (and was fuelled by) the democratisation of politics and the experience of an unprecedented acceleration of political dynamics, technological progress and social transformation.

¹ Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (AMAE), CCC, (Smyrna), 38, 394–95.

² For an overview of the Capitulations and the question of their implementation for historical research, see Maurits H. van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls and Beratlis in the 18th Century* (Brill: Leiden, 2005).

³ Here we discuss the concept of territorial sovereignty as described by Carl Schmitt in his *Nomos of the Earth* (New York: Telos, 2003). Among the rich historical literature concerning the making of political space and borders, see the synthesis of Charles S. Maier, *Once Within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth and Belonging since 1500* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016). Cf. Stephen Legg, ed., *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos* (London: Routledge, 2011).

⁴ As recent research on imperial law has shown. See Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), and Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross, eds., *Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500–1850* (New York: NYU Press, 2013).

⁵ Guillaume Calafat, *Une mer jalousee: Contribution à l'histoire de la souveraineté (Méditerranée, XVIIe siècle)* (Paris: Seuil, 2019), 310–15.

⁶ Pascal W. Firges and Tobias P. Graf, “Introduction,” in *Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History*, ed. Pascal Firges, Tobias Graf, Christian Roth, and Gülay Tulasoğlu (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 7, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004274686_002. For some of the most influential recent approaches exploring the maritime dimension of the empire, see Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Molly Greene, *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Mediterranean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein, eds., *Insularités ottomanes* (Istanbul: Institut français d'études anatoliennes, 2004).

⁷ Nicolas Vatin, “Îles grecques? Îles ottomanes? L'insertion des îles de l'Égée dans l'Empire ottoman à la fin du XVIe siècle,” in Vatin and Veinstein, *Insularités ottomanes*, 71–89.

⁸ B.J. Slot, *Archipelagus turbatus: Les Cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation ottomane, c. 1500–1718* (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1982), 73–116.

⁹ Vatin, “Îles grecques? Îles ottomanes?”

- ¹⁰ Elisabetta Borromeo, “Les Cyclades à l’époque ottomane: L’insularité vue par les missionnaires jésuites (1625–1644),” in Vatin and Veinstein, *Insularités ottomanes*, 123–44; See also Slot, *Archipelagus turbatus*, 180.
- ¹¹ Slot, *Archipelagus turbatus*, 13–16, 63–65.
- ¹² Peter Sugar, in his classical synthesis *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804*, describes the position of the Orthodox Church as that of a state within the state. See also Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3–5; Elias Kolovos, “Insularity and Island Society in the Ottoman Context: The Case of the Aegean Island of Andros (Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries),” *Turcica* 39 (2007): 49–122, <https://doi.org/10.2143/TURC.39.0.2033058>.
- ¹³ Vatin, “Îles grecques? Îles ottomanes?,” 72–73; Philip P. Argenti, *The Religious Minorities of Chios: Jews and Roman Catholics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
- ¹⁴ Slot mentions the events, *Archipelagus turbatus*, 131. The local historian Andreas Drakakis alleged the involvement of members of the local Orthodox clergy in an intrigue against Carga, emanating from the antagonisms between Venice, Naples and Istanbul for the control of the trade routes of the Eastern Mediterranean: *Η Σύρος επί Τουρκοκρατίας* [Syros during Turkish rule], vol. 1 (Ermoupoli: Tharros, 1948), 20–29.
- ¹⁵ “Sovereignty” in the sense of the effective exercise of a state power, an imperium: Calafat, *Une mer jalousée*, 285.
- ¹⁶ Nicolas Vatin, “Îles grecques? Îles ottomanes?,” 86.
- ¹⁷ That is a claim to control not only the security of the coast and coastal navigation, but also corsairing and privateering against foreign ships beyond the canon shot range.
- ¹⁸ See Christian Roth, “Aspects of Juridical Integration of Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire: Observations in the Eighteenth-Century Urban and Rural Aegean,” in Firges et al., *Well-Connected Domains*, 150–63, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004274686_010.
- ¹⁹ Eric R. Dursteler, “Speaking in Tongues: Language and Communication in the Early Modern Mediterranean,” *Past & Present* 217, no. 1 (2012): 47–77, <https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gts023>.
- ²⁰ Tijana Krstić, *Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
- ²¹ Abbé Della Rocca, *Traité complet sur les abeilles, avec une méthode nouvelle de les gouverner, telle qu’elle se pratique à Syra, île de l’Archipel* (Paris: Bleuët, 1790), 133.
- ²² Elpida Printezi-Kambeli, “Η ιστορία της εκπαίδευσης στην Άνω Σύρο (17ος–19ος αι.)” [History of education in Ano Syros] (PhD diss., University of Athens, 2012), <https://doi.org/10.12681/eadd/31684>; Concerning the language of religious instruction, see Fr. Markos Foskolos, “Frangkochiotika: A Linguistic Idiom with an ‘Ethnic’ Religious Character,” in *Between Religion and Language: Turkish-Speaking Christians, Jews and Greek-Speaking Muslims and Catholics in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Evangelia Balta and Mehmet Ölmez (Istanbul: Eren, 2011), 377–96.
- ²³ On the function of insular communal councils in the early modern Aegean, see Spyros Asdrachas, “Νησιώτικες κοινότητες: οι φορολογικές λειτουργίες,” pt. 1, *Ta Istorika* 5, no. 8 (1988): 3–36, and pt. 2, 5, no. 9 (1988): 229–58; Eleni Koukkou, *Οι κοινοτικοί θεσμοί στις Κυκλάδες κατά την Τουρκοκρατία* [The communal institutions in the Cyclades during Turkish rule] (Athens: OEDB, 1984).
- ²⁴ Della Rocca, *Traité complet*, 76–77.

²⁵ Ibid., 86.

²⁶ Ibid., 86–89.

²⁷ The other reasons: (a) the rigidity and incapacity of the clergy, low competence in spreading the faith and keeping the flock together; (b) bad local political (secular) governments; (c) barbarism of the Turkish sovereign. Archivio Storico di Propaganda Fide (Propaganda Fide Historical Archives; APF), Scritture riferite nei Congress (SC) Arcipelago, vol. 34, f. 170.

²⁸ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age Of Philip II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 1:25.

²⁹ On the stability of family and property structures in Syros compared to the other islands of the Archipelago, see Dimitris Dimitropoulos, “Ένα συριανό κτηματολόγιο του 19ου αιώνα” [A 19th-century Syrian land register], in *Σύρος και Ερμούπολη: Συμβολές στην ιστορία του νησιού, 15ος–20ός αι.* [Syros and Ermoupoli: Contributions on the history of the island, 15th–20th centuries], ed. Christina Agriantoni and Dimitris Dimitropoulos (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2008), 55–76. On the Syriot communities among the Ottoman Levantine communities, see Ioannis Karachristos, “Μετανάστευση Συριανών στην Κωνσταντινούπολη (1759–1818)” [Migration of Syrians to Constantinople (1759–1818)], in *Η Ελλάδα των νησιών από τη Φραγκοκρατία ως σήμερα*, ed. Asterios Asteriou (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2004), 161–71; Oliver Jens Schmitt, *Levantiner: Lebenswelten und Identitäten einer ethnokonfessionellen Gruppe im Osmanischen Reich im “langen 19. Jahrhundert”* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005).

³⁰ Alexandre Massé, *Un empire informel en Méditerranée: Les consuls de France en Grèce et dans l'Empire ottoman: images, ingérences, colonisation (1815–1856)* (Paris: Garnier, 2019), 189–252.

³¹ James Emerson Tennent, *Letters from the Ægean* (London: Colburn, 1829), 11.

³² On the tensions between Hydra and the Aegean insular communities in 1821–1822, see Andreas Lignos, ed., *Αρχείο της κοινότητας Ύδρας 1778–1832* [Archives of the municipality of Hydra, 1778–1832], vol. 8 (Piraeus: Zanneio Orfanotrofeio, 1927), 325–26, 371–72, 392–93, 416–17, 425–26, 435–37, 462–64.

³³ Hubert Lauvergne, *Souvenirs de la Grèce pendant la campagne de 1825* (Paris: De Gastel, 1826), 150–51. The author prefers the ancient Greek name, spelling it Sciros in French: “L’île de Syra, ou mieux, de Sciros, patrie de Phérécide, maître du grand Pythagore, va nous arrêter,” *ibid.*, 145.

³⁴ See Apostolos Delis, “A Hub of Piracy in the Aegean: Syros during the Greek War of Independence,” in *Corsairs and Pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean, Fifteenth–Nineteenth Centuries*, ed. Gelina Harlaftis, Dimitris Dimitropoulos and David. J. Starkey (Athens: Sylvia Ioannou Foundation, 2016), 41–54.

³⁵ See Andreas Drakakis, *Ιστορία του οικισμού της Ερμούπολεως (Σύρας)* [History of the settlement of Ermoupolis (Syros)], vol. 1, 1821–1825 (Athens: s.n., 1979) and Vassilis Kardasis, *Σύρος, 1832–1857: Σταυροδρόμι της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου* [Syros, 1832–1857: Crossroads of the eastern Mediterranean] (Athens: National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, 2003).

³⁶ Georgios D. Dimakopoulos, *Η διοικητική οργάνωσις κατά την Ελληνική Επανάσταση 1821–1827: Συμβολή εις την ιστορίαν της ελληνικής διοικήσεως* [The administrative organisation during the Greek war of independence] (Athens: s.n., 1966), 154–57.

³⁷ See Hydra Community Archive (HCA), vol. 9, 260; see the report of the events by Pierre David, the French consul in Smyrna: AMAE, CCC, Smyrne, 39 (juillet–décembre 1823), 28–29.

³⁸ For the incursions of Faziolis and what followed, see the report of Pierre David, French consul in Smyrna: AMAE, CCC, Smyrne, 39 (juillet–décembre 1823), 28–29. See also Drakakis, *Ιστορία του οικισμού*, 51–75 and “Ένας Έλληνας κοντοτιέρος στην επανάσταση,” *Kykladika* (1958): 5–21 and 93–108.

- ³⁹ “La population de cette île augmentait tous les jours; et tandis que la haute et ancienne ville, administrée par ses primats, était réduite à une nullité complète, la cité littorale formée d’éléments hétérogènes était la nouvelle Sciros, dont la renommée remplissait la Grèce,” Lauvergne, *Souvenirs de la Grèce*, 159.
- ⁴⁰ See on this subject de Rigny’s letter to the community of Hydra, HCA, vol. 9, 428, and the letter of Count Guilleminot to Archbishop Cardelli, APF, vol. 35, f. 952r–v.
- ⁴¹ HCA, vol. 9, 4.
- ⁴² HCA, vol. 9, 341–42.
- ⁴³ AMAE, CCC, Smyrne, 40, 182: Letter of Count de Beaurepaire, adjoint of the ambassador in Istanbul, to the Smyrna consul, 24 April 1824.
- ⁴⁴ Lauvergne, *Souvenirs de la Grèce*, 147.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 157.
- ⁴⁶ Jean Philippe Jourdain, *Mémoires historiques et militaires sur les événements de la Grèce depuis 1822 jusqu’au combat de Navarin* (Paris, Brissot-Thivars, 1828), 2:91.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 1:215–17. See also Apostolos Daskalakis, *Κείμενα–πηγαί της ιστορίας της Ελληνικής Επανάστασεως* [Articles–sources of history on the Greek Revolution] (Athens: Kleisiounis, 1967), 2:298–351.
- ⁴⁸ AMAE, CCC, Smyrne, 40, 182.
- ⁴⁹ Drakakis, *Ιστορία του οικισμού*, 36–43. See also Simos Bozidakis, *Ελληνική επανάσταση και δημόσια οικονομία: Η συγκρότηση του ελληνικού εθνικού κράτους 1821–1832* [The Greek revolution and the public economy: The formation of the Greek national state] (Athens: Asini, 2020).
- ⁵⁰ According to Thomas Gordon, Paulucci “conducted himself like a bully in the Egean sea” against the Greeks, mainly, but without great success whatsoever. *History of the Greek Revolution* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1832), 2:327.
- ⁵¹ Marinello introduces himself translating *epitropos* as *governatore* already in his first letter to the Propaganda Fide dated 29 January 1824: APF, SC Arcipelago, vol. 35, f. 698r–v.
- ⁵² A pivotal role belonged mainly to Archbishop Luigi-Maria Cardelli of Smyrna, the Apostolic Visitor between 1821 and 1825 during the absence of Russin, the nominal bishop of Syros. Vinkentios Coressi, Vicar Apostolic in Constantinople, and Andrea Veggetti, Archbishop of Naxos, were the other main nodes in the ecclesiastic network of the Catholic Church in Ottoman lands.
- ⁵³ Adamantios Korais, *Αλληλογραφία* [Correspondence], vol. 4, 1817–1822 (Athens: Omilos Meletis Neollinikou Diafotismou, 1982), 407; HCA, vol. 9, 354.
- ⁵⁴ Georg Hofmann, *Vescovadi Cattolici della Grecia*, vol. 3, Syros (Rome: Pontificum Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1937), 178.
- ⁵⁵ *Courier de Smyrne*, no. 57, 22 March 1829.
- ⁵⁶ APF, SC Arcipelago, vol. 36, f. 579–80.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 37, f. 88–89. For the concept of quasi-sovereignty, see Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*, 222–78.
- ⁵⁸ Analogous to the term *Sattelzeit*, saddle-spaces on the spatial plane can identify liminal spaces and fuzzy boundaries. See Simone Lässig and Miriam Rürup, “Introduction: What Made a Space ‘Jewish’?”

Reconsidering a Category of Modern German History,” in *Space and Spatiality in Modern German-Jewish History*, ed. Simone Lässig and Miriam Rürup (New York: Berghahn, 2017), 1–20.

⁵⁹ Braudel, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, 1:154.

⁶⁰ Some French royalists, for instance, saw an excellent opportunity for the union of the Greek Church with Rome: “The Holy Alliance has committed, in our opinion, a political mistake, and Rome a religious one, by not taking over the protectorate of the Greeks and by giving up to liberalism the role that they should have filled ... In fear of giving victory to the revolution, religious and monarchical Europe simply stayed put ... The feelings of the court of Rome were suppressed and the impulse of the Catholic clergy, which, if it had given, according to its interests and inclination, such a strong support to the Greeks, would have been able to hasten the much desired union of the two Churches, despite Russia. And perhaps it would have been drawn into the great movement by which Christendom would have become entirely Catholic again.” *Le Drapeau blanc*, 20 April 1826, 1a–2a. Cited in Frédérique Tabaki-Iona, “Philhellénisme religieux et mobilisation des Français pendant la révolution grecque de 1821–1827,” *Mots: Les langages du politique* 79 (2005): 47–59, <https://doi.org/10.4000/mots.1348>.

⁶¹ APF, SR, Romania C/polii, vol. 26, f. 1185–86; SC Arcipelago. vol. 36, f. 599–600.

⁶² Ioannis Asimakis, *Η πορεία των σχέσεων Ελλάδας Αγίας Έδρας (1820–1980)* [The evolution of relationships between Greece and Holy See (1820-1980)] (Thessaloniki: Apostolic Vicariate of Thessaloniki, 2007); Dimitrios Salachas, “Η νομική θέση της καθολικής εκκλησίας εν τη ελληνική επικρατεία” [The legal status of the Catholic Church in Greece] (PhD diss., University of Athens, 1978), 55–71, <https://doi.org/10.12681/eadd/5510>.

⁶³ Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Viking Press, 1961), 9.