


Historein

Vol 20, No 1 (2021)

1821: What Made it Greek? What Made it Revolutionary?



Imperial Rhetoric and Revolutionary Practice: The Greek 1821

Ada A. Dialla

doi: [10.12681/historein.27480](https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.27480)

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To cite this article:

Dialla, A. A. (2022). Imperial Rhetoric and Revolutionary Practice: The Greek 1821. *Historein*, 20(1). <https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.27480>

Historein

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Dialla, Ada. 2021. "Imperial Rhetoric and Revolutionary Practice: The Greek 1821".
Historein 20 (1).
<https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.27480>.

Imperial Rhetoric and Revolutionary Practice: The Greek 1821

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The 1830 London Protocol recognised the independence and territorial confines of the new state of Greece. For the first time since the Napoleonic Wars, the great powers clearly defined and connected a particular population (and not only a religious community) with sovereign independence, regarded by international society as the representative of the Greek people/nation.

After the establishment of their independent state, the Greeks constructed their own narratives about the 1821 Revolution. A basic component of the narratives generated immediately after the revolution was that the Greeks were the forerunners of the “principle of nationalities”. In the turbulent and revolutionary pan-European 1848 (“Springtime of Nations”), during this crucial moment in the nation-state version of sovereignty over the European continent, the Athenian Russophile newspaper *Aion* wrote that the “principle of nationalities that occupies the whole of Europe stems from Greece, which first applied it and first established it with its blood”.¹

Today, in theory, the principle of nationalities (or nationality principle), as it was called in the course of the nineteenth century, or principle of national self-determination, as it was known in the early twentieth century,² is regarded as the normative dimension of nations and nationalism. Most of nationalists and theorists agreed with Giuseppe Mazzini’s formulation contending that every nation should correspond to a state if it so desires; it can become a nation-state.³

For about 200 years, the practical consequences of this principle is that nations under alien rule can achieve independent statehood (or at least autonomy or the status of a federated state within a federation); nations divided into two or more states can unite into one nation-state; and, more controversially, nation-states can annex neighbouring regions where their ethnic kin reside (irredentism);⁴ and this is, by and large, the story of the Greek state at least until 1922 (until the so-called Asia Minor Disaster).

According to the Greek national narratives, the Greek nation existed before the revolution and waited for the moment of its rebirth, awakening and realisation. However, contrary to what the Greeks have come to believe a posteriori, or as it was elsewhere

propagated through the idiosyncratic and mainly primordial theory of nationality by its adherents in the Age of Revolutions, the idea of a national state (or a nation-state *sensu stricto*), in the sense of the identification of state sovereignty with cultural/national identity, was still in its infancy in the first decades of the nineteenth century, barely hatched by Herder and Fichte, and hardly accepted by politicians and diplomats, with very few exceptions.

In what follows I will focus on the 1821–1830 Greek revolutionary period in order to trace how the seven-year-long bloody struggle of the insurgent Greeks against the Ottomans transformed the concept of ethnicity/nation, from a politically neutral category within an imperial framework, without claims to be the primary component of a people's political identity, to the conceptualisation of the nation as an active political and social force and a subject (or the main agent) of the historical process. Of course, people at the time had long been organised in separate groups/communities and were aware of different identities, especially local or religious ones, and were related to various distinct groups. However, identities were more complex and religious identity was their main form of self-definition, in what was basically a premodern milieu. It was the ideology of nationalism – as a way of constructing the surrounded reality – that engendered the new idea of the nation, as integral and absolute, as something that demands primary and exclusive allegiance, that is, as we nowadays understand the terms nation and national identity. In other words, the idea of the nation could be seen as an answer to the question of how political authority should be created in the modern world.

The Greek nation crystallised as a frame of vision and as a basis for individual and collective action during this revolutionary period. But this development was not evident to contemporaries in advance and its success was hardly inevitable. The agents who developed the idea of the nation-state were men and women who lived in empires, the “gold” standard of state organisation in those times, when empires were at the zenith of their power and influence. So we have to consider the imperial dimension to better understand the complex and constructed nature of identities including national ones. Many of these people had various mental horizons of belonging and about how to act effectively and meaningfully, participate or belong, with fluid identities at a time of great disturbances and revolution across the globe.⁵

The so-called imperial turn in historical studies has revised the traditional research strategy of examining the relations between the metropolis and the imperial peripheries, nations and empires as bipolar opposites and the nation as the “nemesi” of empires.⁶ Researchers have revealed a plethora of policies and practices concerning the mechanisms of authority of the central administration: from tolerance, flexibility, dialogue and conciliation to centralisation and coercion. What emerged was a scale of relations between the hegemonic power of the centre and the peripheries within a spectrum ranging

from accommodation to co-optation to varieties of resistance or violent uprising.⁷

More specifically, for example, Ali Yaycioglu, who has studied the complexity of the imperial Ottoman situation, describes the patterns of political action in the prerevolutionary period and the making and unmaking of political loyalties. In the case of the Peloponnese (known then as the Morea), we can see how notable Greek families who were key agents in Ottoman provincial governance in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were among the founding fathers of modern Greece.⁸

For her part, Christine Phylliou explains how the Christians of the empire were involved in roles related to the collection of taxes or to diplomatic negotiations as Ottoman officials or to other cultural or political issues. This situation was not unique, as it concerned both Muslims and Christians, and was related to the broader phenomenon of the transfer of power from the centre to the peripheral elites. In this sense, Phylliou argues that the Greek Revolution could be understood by the Ottomans as “one of ‘several civil conflicts’ rather than as unique national war of secession”.⁹ Some Phanariotes may have preferred to connect their lives with the new states, whether it was Bessarabia, which enjoyed special autonomy within the Russian Empire (after the Treaty of Bucharest, 1812) or the new Greek state, after its establishment. Other elites, however, took advantage of the conjuncture of 1821–1830 to rethink and reorganise their lives in the Ottoman Empire, which was starting to change, especially during the Tanzimat period (1839–1876).¹⁰ The situation in Syros, examined in this volume by Dimitris Kousouris, is also revealing of this complex imperial situation and multiple loyalties and identities of islanders.

Certainly, on the eve of the uprising, the Greeks were a nation in the imagination of foreigners, especially of the philhellenes, a nation imbued with ancient glory. They were the descendants of “the cradle of European civilisation” (in those days seen as world civilisation), derived mainly from Greek antiquity. Despite their misgivings from their personal encounters with many contemporary Greeks, which they tended to attribute to the malign Turkish influence, their overall position ran thus, as put by William Martin Leake, following an extended tour of the region in the early nineteenth century: “There is no nation, as far as history has left us the means of judging, that has so little changed in a long course of ages as the Greeks ... the Greeks bear the most striking resemblance, both in their virtues and defects, to their illustrious ancestors.”¹¹

But as some historians have pointed out, it was an open question whether the Greek-speaking Orthodox, who imagined a separate future from the Ottoman Empire, at a time of revolutions and of Ottoman crisis, had only one aim: the creation, through secession, of a new state (in some cases, this development was not even desirable). Or whether they contemplated other possible alternatives, such as a pan-Balkan state, a federal model, a protectorate, an autonomous state or a principality. Furthermore, not all were in agreement, at least at the beginning, as on whom the struggle was against: the infidel Ottoman or the Turkish tyrant, or both?¹²

Odysseas Androutsos, a prominent chieftain of the revolution, in his address to the

inhabitants of Galaxidi to persuade them to join the revolution (22 March 1821), presented the Greek struggle as part of the plans of divine providence. In this perspective, every “Christian and Greek” had the duty to fight for the liberation from Turkish slavery and from Ottoman rule, which did not guarantee their security, property and life.¹³ Others, such as Dimitrios Ypsilantis, Alexander’s brother, a former Russian officer and now Greek revolutionary, initially commander-in-chief of the revolutionaries after the declaration of Greek independence, issued declarations stating that the Greek struggle was about liberation from all kinds of tyranny and despotism, including a Christian one.¹⁴

At the beginning of 1821, the aims of the revolution were not clear to the insurgents themselves, who, after all, did not comprise a homogeneous compact group and had heterogeneous purposes. The minimum common denominator among the different perspectives of the Greek struggle was the idea of driving out the Ottomans and gaining self-government. Otherwise it was unclear how the fighting Greeks imagined their future state. Did they contemplate an independent state or an entity under the sultan’s protection with the guarantee of the European power? Did they anticipate the rule of monarchy or did they aspire to become a republic?¹⁵ Did they prefer a federal union or a unitary state?¹⁶ Kapodistrias and Ignatius, metropolitan of Hungaro-Wallachia, from the very beginning of the insurrection in the Peloponnese advised building immediately a strong centre concentrated in few hands with “good” governance.¹⁷ Dimitrios Ypsilantis also acted in the same spirit. Within that setting various questions arose as to how create a new unitary region from a former periphery of the Ottoman Empire, and various issues were put forward, such as the control of the population, the existence of multiple centres of authority, the relationship between centre and periphery, the role of ethnicity and citizenship. At a time when the model of the nation-state was not the latest word in fashion in terms of state building, the answers were by no means self-evident.

As we know, the revolutionaries (Christian Orthodox Greeks, Greek-speakers, Albanian-speakers, Vlach-speakers, Bulgarian-speakers and other Slavic-speakers, and even a handful of Serbian-speakers) were not a homogenous group in terms of their origin, social class and aims, and in how they envisaged their political future. Although by and large they used a shared common vocabulary, such as the reference to liberty, equality, human rights (the rights of man to be exact), popular sovereignty and independence, freedom from tyranny, their mental horizons were hardly the same, but quite different. For example, the line which distinguished political freedom / emancipation / independence and national freedom / emancipation / independence was unclear; or put differently, between a “foreign yoke” and a “native tyrant”, to use John Stuart Mill’s wording in a famous essay entitled “A Few Words on Non-Intervention”, written in 1859. Did freedom equate any kind of self-government or specifically envision a republican form?¹⁸

And of course it was an open question whether the insurgents at that time were

equipped with a clear-cut national narrative or whether it was incorporated later after the creation of the new state.¹⁹ Neither the Greek nation's geography nor its populations were clear to the insurgents themselves and to others, be they philhellenes, politicians or public opinion in general, etc. Of course most of them shared Christian Orthodoxy and their religious faith as the common denominator of their identity. Others were simply anti-Ottoman for economic reasons and still others for political reasons, namely due to the "Turkish tyranny" that trampled on human rights as conceived in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution; some others had heard of the importance of antiquity and how crucial it would be to be associated with that revered heritage and (for some others) with the grandeur of the Byzantine Empire. And all these beliefs were perceived as a vital connection to European values and the European international security system. The above elements formed a pool of ideas suitable for an identity under construction under certain conditions.

As we can see, the meaning of the revolution was an issue for the insurgents themselves. It was also a question for foreign commentators, politicians, diplomats and men of letters, be they philhellenes or antihellenes, that is those who, through the power of the pen, were in a position to contribute to the interpretation of these momentous events, who gave to their contemporaries a sense of "a labyrinth of agonising sense of the indefinite", as Alexander Sturdza put it in a personal letter to Ioannis Kapodistrias. After all, defining the situation was the first and necessary step for elaborating the appropriate politics. Thus, it was in the transnational, international, transimperial or even global context that the bloody struggle of the insurgent Greeks turned into the "Greek Revolution", in other words, an upheaval that would lead to a political rupture, to long-term change, and inaugurate a new political regime for the Greek populations. Sovereignty, independence, ethnos/ethnicity and people were the conceptual nodes of a new semantics that gave expression to new realities. They were elements of the political languages of revolution, which gave meaning to those events as a national revolution and the status of the insurgents as *national* Greeks in the revolution.

The Russian matrix of the Greek Revolution

The conceptual nodes mentioned above were common to the revolution's declarations but also to diplomatic and consular documents, pamphlets, treatises and articles in the press. These were texts on "the move". Their mobility was, at the same time, their mobilising force: texts were circulating and had effects on other issues, such as transforming realities while, at the same time, they were themselves translated and modified.²⁰ Translation was very important and helped to transplant transnational ideas. During these years, the declarations, the revolutionaries' appeals to European and generally to the civilised world, the Greek constitutions, brochures, catechisms, romantic poetry and literature (Byron, Rigas' *Thourios*), legal treatises, etc., were translated.

Furthermore, these texts entailed a network of peoples in different countries and places on a transimperial and global scale. The act of writing the revolution during the revolutionary process produced and reproduced its multiple meanings.

Kapodistrias, in his initial role as joint Russian foreign minister, played a crucial role with his European and Russian policy, which was to have a bearing on the way the revolution proceeded, its options, its chances of success and the vocabulary it used. Kapodistrias had an efficient network at his disposal in the Russian foreign ministry and beyond, in Russian-educated society and among European politicians, philhellenes, financiers and intellectuals. During the so-called Restoration era, Kapodistrias, as the tsar's confidant and foreign minister, elaborated, with a network of diplomat-intellectuals, such as D.N. Bludov, D.V. Dashkov, D.P. Severin and P.I. Poletika, plans regarding the "enlargement of Europe" to include in its borders the Balkans and the sultan's Christian subjects such as Serbs and Greeks.²¹ This network also included Alexander Sturdza, Andreas Moustoxydis, Spyridon Destounis, Count Grigory Alexandrovich Stroganov, the ambassador who managed the Russo-Ottoman rift of 1821 following the hanging of Patriarch Grigorios, as well as philhellene intellectuals, such as Sergei Pushkin. Kapodistrias had also links with the imperial court, through, among others, Roxandra Sturdza, and also links with Phanariot politicians, that were to dominate the political scene of the revolutionaries, such as Alexandros Mavrokordatos, churchmen, such as Ignatius, metropolitan of Hungaro-Wallachia, and intellectuals, who were to write the first histories of Greece, such as Iakovos Rizos Neroulos. This whole network, given also its knowledge of the state of play at European level and its influence, was to play a crucial role in the management of the crisis and the meaning it invoked. In this context we can revisit the role of the Russian environment in the course of the Greek Revolution and how it developed, a role that contrary to the British or French one, has been downgraded in Greek historiography.

As I have already mentioned, at the beginning of the Greek Revolution it was too early for the principle of nationalities to be applied, as understood by Herder and Fichte and later by Mazzini, Mill or Renan. Nevertheless, at the Congress of Vienna (1815) some political aspects of this question were broached à propos of the cases of the Poles, Germans, Italians, Serbs and, of course, Greeks.

The Polish Question, for example, was a central theme and the decisions taken were reflected in the Vienna Final Act.²² The Greek case was also addressed, but on the margins of the congress due, first, to the foundation of the Philomuse Society by Kapodistrias and under the protection of Tsar Alexander and, second, due to the presence of the tsar and the Russian imperial family at a service for the Greeks in the Orthodox church of Vienna.²³ However, the Greek case, as well as all the issues concerning the Ottoman Empire (and those of the South American colonies), did not find its way into the final document of the

congress. It is noteworthy that both the Polish and the Greek causes had as protagonists two foreign ministers of the Russian Empire, both very close to the tsar, the Polish aristocrat Adam Czartoryski and the Corfiot aristocrat Ioannis Kapodistrias. Their professional trajectory has several elements in common: both served and led the Russian foreign ministry under Alexander, both had a political plan for the cooperation of the Polish and Greek elite, respectively, with Russia through the adoption of a constitutional charter as the vehicle. Both had European visions and a Balkan policy that would guarantee Russian influence in Ottoman Europe. And both of them acknowledged the existence of two main elements in the Balkan region, the Slavs and the Greeks, and emphasised the common religion of the Slavs and Greeks, even the Catholic Czartoryski.²⁴

Regarding the Serbian issue, Ioannis Kapodistrias, Alexander Sturdza, Alexander Ypsilantis, Roxandra Sturdza and Tsar Alexander himself questioned, in a memorandum on the case they circulated among the representatives, the sultan's legitimacy in the eyes of his Christian subjects, while the religious revival influenced the politics of the congress, including Christian–Muslim relations and their repercussions.²⁵ The Russian anti-Ottoman stance at the congress (demonstrated by its refusal to admit the Ottoman Empire to the confines of “European public law”, that is, international law, which was limited to Christian states only) played a part in legitimising the Greek Revolution because of the othering of the Ottoman Empire from the Christian commonwealth of Europe that was established in Vienna. Alexander's stance was decisive in this regard during the congress. Later on, under the Congress System (1815–1824), Kapodistrias, with his circle of young diplomats and intellectuals, saw the gradual emergence of new Christian nations, not as nation-states or as nations struggling for independence as such, but as a result of intrainperial Russian–Ottoman international arrangements.²⁶ More generally, the spirit of Vienna and the Congress System, as well as the ideas of restoration, legitimacy, rights, banning the slave trade, liberalism, constitution, etc., shaped, to a large extent, certain aspects of the way in which the Greek struggle later would be discussed publicly. In this perspective, the Congress of Vienna and the Congress System could be seen both as an interruption of revolutionary movements and as a moment that produced new ones.²⁷

When the revolution erupted, Kapodistrias, with his network of diplomats, spread through the “Ottoman East”, abandoning his previous misgivings regarding the lack of maturity on the part of Christian subjects of the sultan for self-government, including the Greeks,²⁸ and tried to bring the Greek War of Independence to a successful conclusion.

The Greek Revolution as restoration and independence: The dynamics of short-term événements

With the outbreak of events in Jassy (Iași) and the Morea, and the retaliation of the sultan in Constantinople and Smyrna, most onlookers agreed that rebellion had a religious character. Russian diplomatic discourse, which by and large followed the approach of Sturdza, who

was a friend and advisor of Kapodistrias, came out with the following leitmotif from the eruption of the revolution in the Peloponnese onwards: that the Ottoman regime was an occupation and the Ottomans were both occupiers and tyrants. As a result, the Greeks had no other choice but to overthrow Ottoman rule or face perpetual occupation and tyranny, akin to slavery. The Christian insurgents were increasingly presented as “the poor Greek nation”. Even Tsar Alexander, following the hanging of Patriarch Grigorios, switched from his initial assessment that the Greeks were rebels and Carbonari, to the view that the sultan had turned against the Orthodox and the Greek nation. In this spirit the conservative Count Nesselrode, the Russian foreign minister, spoke of the “Greek race” facing the sultan’s “holy war”, while Ambassador Stroganov, in his note to the Porte, stressed that it was poised against the whole Greek race, against the culprits as well as against the majority who were innocent.²⁹ Russian diplomatic documents, which in those days were written in French, the language of diplomacy, used the concepts of race and nation often interchangeably. Even when they refer to all the Grecophone Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire or to the insurgents in the Peloponnese and the islands, they refer to them as a race or nation. Both terms include the concept of people and of a population of its cultural, religious and other distinct characteristics from the Ottomans. The concept of *patrie* is also used for smaller groups or regions.³⁰

The Russian elites interpreted the events through the lens of its historical and political experiences; first of those was their own throwing off of the Muslim Tatar–Mongolian yoke in the mid-fifteenth century and second was the clash between the Russian and Ottoman empires, which had been fighting each other from the days of Peter the Great, when Russia inaugurated its southern expansion. Russian intellectuals interpreted their struggle against the Muslim Tatar–Mongolian yoke not simply as a religious one but as national liberation from a foreign Muslim yoke, which sought the restoration of a lost national freedom, and applied the same meaning to the Greek struggle. In this perspective, the term revolution was used in its original meaning – the one it had before the French Revolution – as a turn / circular motion / reinstatement / restoration of a previous order of things.³¹

For their part, the Russian liberal gentry officers – the future Decembrists, who happened to be among the first nationalists in Russia – gave a different meaning to the events in the spirit of the Enlightenment and future-oriented ideas of historical progress. The Decembrists maintained that the Greek struggle was a shining example that signalled the coming of a new Europe, one based on nations/nation-states. For the liberal-nationalist and future Decembrist Mikhail Fonvizin, the Greek Revolution was part of a broader historical process of the national reconstruction of Europe along with the Russian liberation from the Tatar yoke, the Swedish from the Danish yoke, the Spanish from the Moors and, more recently, from the French.³² The famous general Yermolov, the conqueror of the

Caucasus, always ready to attack the Ottomans, used the metaphor of Greek resurgence from the mythical phoenix to state that his burning heart's desire was "to fly" to save the ancient Greek land.³³

Alexander Ypsilantis, who was a Russian major general at the time, left Kishinev (Chişinău), crossed the River Pruth into Moldavia (on 23 February 1821) and arrived in Jassy, where he delivered a declaration in Enlightenment rhetoric with romantic overtones, calling for a fight for the faith and fatherland. He stressed the "natural right to "freedom" and "happiness", called on the Greeks to imitate the example of European peoples, especially that of the Spaniards, who had already risen up in arms to foster freedom and "happiness" (*εὐδαιμονία*).

Ypsilantis placed his cause in a broader contemporary pan-European context. The declaration made many references to the ancient Greek past and, in particular, to battles in which the Greeks had been victorious against the "barbarian Persians" and to the names of ancient Greeks that had served freedom (*ἐλευθερία*) against tyranny. At the same time, he used religious vocabulary to underline the role of providence. Ypsilantis' declaration, which was immediately translated by the European embassies in Constantinople into various languages, including Ottoman Turkish, English, French and Russian, was Janus-like, incorporating both civic and ethnic meanings of revolution. The spirit of the declaration expressed the complex Russian cultural matrix of the age, which was a combination of Enlightenment and Romanticism, with the incorporation of the ancient Greek civic heritage, the Byzantine Empire with its Orthodoxy and contemporary European values.

On his part, Ignatius, two months after the beginning of the revolution in Peloponnese, claimed "that the Greeks want to throw off the harsh yoke of the Ottoman administration, which had subdued them with the force of arms, had rendered them barbaric, poor, humiliated, and separated them from the body of the other Christian nations". He thus formed his own genealogy of the revolution, which was global in its scope on the basis of the features it invoked. In so doing, he also constructed the *raison d'être* of the Greek desire for independence. As he adroitly put it: "Old and new history has taught us that when a people have known the good of Freedom, and wanted to become free, it remained free, and no obstacle, no power, however great, could overcome it or enslave."³⁴ The depth of time of the history of freedom was impressive, he continued. The Persians against Greece (sic), whose history corresponded to the Russian 1812, with Napoleon in the position of the Persians and the Russians in the situation of the Greeks. The Spaniards against the Arabs, "the wisest race of the world at the time", but also Spanish America against Spain and its gradual independence. And, at the same time, the Spaniards themselves against the French invaders of Napoleon. The Dutch, though a small people, fought against the Spanish tyrants, had been liberated and thrived as a small dynamic European nation. Portugal fought against Spain for its independence. The English colonies of America revolted against the British metropolis and gained their independence. The French revolted in order to change their political system. And most paradoxical of all that

one would hardly believe if it had not taken place in our time, was the freedom of the Blacks of Saint-Domingue, who had been sold and purchased as slaves. Freedom had brought enlightenment and riches.³⁵ Ignatius avoided associating the Greek case with the revolts in Spain or Italy during the 1820s probably for two reasons: firstly, such views associated with the Filiki Etaireia were not popular with the Greeks, as were the Balkan calls of Alexander Ypsilantis. Secondly, he was guided by Kapodistrias, who was fully aware what the great powers abhorred democratic revolts. Ignatius, Mavrokordatos and the Kapodistrias circle made sure to “correct” Ypsilantis’ reference to Italy and Naples: “Let us not compare ourselves with the inhabitants of Naples or the Piedmont, for we will be condemned,” Kapodistrias made sure to inform Mavrokordatos and the Pisa circle in July 1821.³⁶

After Ypsilantis’ failure in Moldavia, even two of his closest associates, the Phanariot Kantakouzinou brothers, before arriving in rebellious Morea, set out the basic rationale of the Greek struggle as a narrative of “a revolution for national liberation from a foreign yoke”, as distinct from the antiregime, proconstitutional revolts in Spain, Portugal, Naples and Sicily, which were organised by secret societies. They were neither massive nor popular, contrary to the Greek case. Thus their definition of the main plan of the cause was as the “revival of the *genos*” (a term interchangeably used with the term *ethnos*). In addition, as the Kantakouzinou brothers underlined, the Greek Revolution was not antiregime because Greeks were under Ottoman occupation and, consequently, aimed to achieve independence from a foreign yoke that treated the Greek population as slaves; hence, on the basis of religion and humanity contemporary Europeans had to embrace the Greek cause.³⁷

The discourse on the Muslim yoke interacted with the discourse on slavery, which had become timely since the deliberations at the Vienna Congress, with the activists for the abolition of slavery being mainly British and also philhellenes. This discourse aimed to delegitimise the authority of the sultan towards his Christian subjects, in the sense that “the Ottomans had transformed the Christians into slaves and that the sovereignty of the Ottomans over the Greeks could not be regarded as legitimate, contrary to, say, the case with the Gauls and the Franks or the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans in their respective states. The Greeks were tributaries, not legitimate subjects of the sultan. Moreover, they had not been put under the jurisdiction of Ottoman laws and courts but were under “the Greek [sic] Church leaders”.³⁸ In that context the paradoxical outcome was that the principle of legitimacy was used not to confront revolutionary ideas about a people’s sovereignty but, on the contrary, to support the revolutionary idea of national sovereign. This idea was based on the identification of the concept of the people with the nation (or nationality) and the people/nation as the subject of sovereignty. In addition, the Greek case was perceived as a national revolution, because all strata of the *nation* participated in this revolution as a united whole and, above all, were not seeking the central authority of the sultan, but

unilateral independence, that is, secession. The concept of a people (*λαός, народ*), a term that had been brought to the fore by the French Revolution and by Romanticism, had been empowered during the Napoleonic Wars. The idea of an all-peoples' struggle was very popular in Russia, in view of the heroic war to oust Napoleon, which had been registered as a people's war by both conservatives and liberals. As Richard Wortman writes, "on September 8 [1812, the tsar] signed a manifesto ... calling upon the Russian people to take up the cause of all peoples united in the struggle against the aggressor. The Russian people, led by the Orthodox Church, were presented for the first time as a force for salvation and liberation."³⁹ The partnership between nation and the Orthodox Church is a pattern also evident in the Greek case and it remains a central theme of the description of events as they evolved. Thereafter Alexander changed his mind, but the idea of the people persisted among the cultural and political elites of that period. And this idea was a useful tool in describing the events in the Greek lands.

The Greek struggle as a mass popular endeavour was also seen as a proof that the Greek case was at the same time revolutionary and national. The revolutionaries were increasingly described as a single body, as a people united with some distinct and cherished characteristics which singled out features that differentiated them from their oppressors – such as religion, antiquity, Europeanism – and made them a distinct community with a common purpose, which was self-determination and the self-government. On the part of the insurgents themselves this was mostly an elite vision cultivated in various diaspora environments from Venice to Paris, St. Petersburg, Odessa, the Danubian Principalities and other European places.

The national character for some foreign observers, such as Sturdza and other philhellenes, was evident thanks to the false idea that all strata of the Greek *genos* – the notables, the clergy and the simple people – were united as a whole against foreign exploitation. Thus the Greek case came to be contrasted to the Spanish or Italian cases, which the press characterised as civil wars (*междоусобная война*). This was a crucial point in the legitimation of the Greek case, for, as David Armitage has demonstrated, the conceptual opposition between revolution and civil war "generated a set of preconceptions, even prejudices that still endure. Civil wars appear sterile and destructive, while revolutions are fertile with innovation and productive possibility. Civil wars hearken back to ancient grievances and deep-dyed divisions, while revolutions point the way toward an open and expansive future."⁴⁰ The whole idea that the Greek case was not a civil war was appreciated by the leading military figure of the revolution, General Theodoros Kolokotronis: "Our revolution is not similar to any of the others that take place today in Europe. Europe's revolutions are against their administrations, civil wars. Our war was the most just, it was the war of a nation against a nation."⁴¹ The revolutionaries who, for their part, had started their own nation-building declared, wishfully thinking, at the National Assembly at Epidavros:

Our struggle against the Turks, far from being based on demagogic principles ... or self-serving goals by part of the whole Greek Nation, is a national war, a war whose only cause is the retrieval of the right to personal freedom for us, our property and honour, which ... the harsh and incomparable Ottoman tyranny has tried to take from us through violence and suffocate us in our breast.

And a little later the first diplomatic document written by the Peloponnesian politician Petrobey Mavromichalis was widely circulated internationally, claiming that a nation, the Greek nation had been reborn and was requesting international recognition.⁴²

This wishful thinking of unity was also aimed at the great powers, for them to recognise Greece's autonomous existence; however, it was hardly justified with two civil wars between the revolutionaries from 1823 until 1825. The case of Mavromichalis is characteristic of the complexity of the revolutionary process. He was an army leader, a scion of the famous Mavromichalis family of Mani (southern Peloponnese), who during the French occupation of the Ionian Islands was associated with Napoleonic policy, to then be appointed governor (bey) of Mani by the Ottomans, later to be initiated into the Filiki Etaireia. In March 1821 he declared the start of the Greek struggle (there were many other declarations as well from various local elites) and set up the Messenian Assembly. He was elected chairman of the legislative body at the Epidavros National Assembly and at the National Assembly at Troizina he accepted the election of Kapodistrias as governor of Greece (in effect president). A few years later his son and his brother assassinated Governor Kapodistrias.

The homogeneous nation-state on the battlefield and in the diplomatic salons

Metropolitan Ignatius had advised the Greeks from the start of the revolution that “we”, meaning Christians, must see the “Turks as compatriots and brothers when they give up their arms ... for this is what our religion, the right policy, the Greek needs and interests call for, and if we do the opposite that would be harmful to us and not to the Turks”.⁴³ Such voices turned out to be a minority view. More “appealing” to the insurgents were urges and exhortations such as “Respect to the Consuls! Help to the Christians! Death to the Turks!”⁴⁴ attributed to the hero of the revolution, Metropolitan Germanos, who, in his declaration of 20 March 1821, called his fellow Christians: “La race impie des Turcs a comblé la mesure des iniquités, l’heure d’en purger la Grèce est arrivée suivant la parole de l’Éternel: *Chasse l’esclave et son fils* (Genèse 21.10). Aimez-vous donc, race hellénique, deux fois illustrée par vos pères; *armez-vous du zèle de Dieu que chacun de vous ceigne le glaive; car il est préférable de mourir les armes à ta main que de voir l’opprobre du sanctuaire-et de la patrie* (Ps 44.4).”⁴⁵

The massacres of Muslims in the Peloponnese were widespread from the very

beginning of the revolution. These massacres and other atrocities, with as many as 15,000 to 20,000 “murdered without mercy or remorse”,⁴⁶ was an early example of what we would now call “ethnic cleansing”⁴⁷ through sheer extermination. The rest of the Muslim inhabitants hurried to the fortresses or towns with walls shielded by the Ottoman army. The Muslim population almost disappeared from the Morea in the first six months of the revolution. And there were also no Jews left.⁴⁸ The Ottoman retaliations were hardly less brutal and extreme. After all, massacres were the rule in those days and hardly the exception, despite the emerging concept of civilised warfare in Europe. What was new was the idea of “cleansing” or “purifying populations”, the term ethnic cleansing may have not existed then, but its meaning and consequences were well understood, aimed at more effective governing (John Stuart Mill would later claim that democratic rule is far more effective in nation-states than in mixed populations, with Lord Acton taking the very opposite line).⁴⁹

The prime example of organised “purification” was clearly formulated a century later and it is the famous “unmixing of peoples”, as Lord Curzon famously put it (adding that it was “thoroughly bad and vicious” but necessary), adopted by the Lausanne Convention of Exchange of Populations (January 1923).⁵⁰

This strategy was also seen previously (since the eighteenth century) in various venues in the Russo-Ottoman borderlands. For example, the Russian acquisition of the Crimea led to the displacement of the Muslim populations and the invitation to Ottoman Christians to populate the newly acquired regions. The first major group of Muslims to suffer displacements were the Crimean Tatars back in the 1770s, and in this venture one of the participants who distinguished himself was Lambros Katsonis and other Greek-speaking “heroes” of the Orlov events in the 1770s, who, in order to avoid Ottoman retaliations, had emigrated to the Russian Empire. Katsonis, previously a notorious pirate, left for the Crimea, in the wake of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), and continued his service to the Russians in the so-called Greek Battalion set up by Catherine the Great, holding various military ranks. The Crimea had just been annexed by the Russian Empire from the Ottoman Empire in 1775, and its Tatar inhabitants took up arms against the Russians. The Greek Battalion took part in the violent suppression of the Tatars. In fact, in his reports Major General Potemkin praised the role of the Greeks in “the cleansing of the mountain regions”.⁵¹ As Ann Laura Stoler has observed in her study *Considerations on Imperial Comparisons*, there existed a “portability of practices and ideas” between empires and within them.⁵²

Catherine the Great ordered the settlement in Crimea with Greek Orthodox Slavs and Greeks from the Ottoman Empire so as to render the incorporation of the region to Russia more thorough.⁵³ Clearly, the Greek-speaking populations that had immigrated to southern Russia after the Orlov events were part of a Russian imperial scheme aimed at Russian expansion at the expense of the Ottomans.

The homogeneity of the populations “achieved” on the battlefield was reflected in the

discussions of foreign diplomats and at times finds its expression in the wording of international treaties which appealed to the principles of religion, law and humanity. For example, article 3 of the Protocol of Saint Petersburg (4 April 1826), signed between Russia and Britain, stipulated that all the Turks were to be removed from Greek territory and the Greeks were to buy their properties. The tripartite London Treaty (6 July 1827) among Britain, Russia and France, which also addressed this issue, stipulated that Muslims were to sell their lands to Greeks and leave the principality.

In order to effect a complete separation between the individuals of the two nations, and to prevent the collisions which would be the inevitable consequence of so protracted a struggle, the Greeks shall become possessors of all Turkish Property situated either upon the Continent, or in the Islands of Greece, on condition of indemnifying the former proprietors, either by an annual sum to be added to the tribute which they shall pay to the Porte, or by some other arrangement of the same nature.⁵⁴

In 1828 at the Conference of Poros, at which the borders between Greece and the Ottoman Empire were discussed, the argument of the “natural frontier” became prominent among diplomats. In the ensuing discussion, this natural frontier, as understood by international diplomacy, meant including in the new state the main regions in which the inhabitants had taken up arms against the Ottomans to liberate themselves. Moreover, on the insistence of Kapodistrias, when charting the Volos–Arta borderland for the new state, he insisted on a complete separation of the Greek and the Muslim population.⁵⁵

Concluding remarks

The Greek nation as we understand it today did not in fact exist in 1821 as a clear-cut political subject in quest of its rebirth or liberation. It came about as a result of a broad range of discourses, politics and practices and through the vocabulary of nationalism which, in the Greek case, included both civic and ethnic aspects in the course of revolutionary period and the way of nation and state building.

The Greek struggle, strictly speaking, started as a secessionist war and different actors promoted different political ideas about the future of political organisation. An independent state with the formation of a central political authority was one of them. Dimitrios Ypsilantis and his rival, the Phanariot and liberal Alexandros Mavrokordatos, in close collaboration with the radicals of the Filiki Etaireia, such as Anagnostaras, Dimitrios Dikaïos and Panayotis Anagnostopoulos, supported political plans which aimed to create a unitary political revolutionary space. These political plans enforced and reinforced the unitary tendency in the Greek struggle not only against Ottoman authority but also against the Christian Peloponnesian leaders in order to resist their regionalism.⁵⁶ Thus the

Phanariot princes and radical Filiki members, all of them with Russian, Balkan and Ottoman experiences, found themselves pushed and pulled by rival trends in the course of the revolution and its various phases: the regional, the national and even the imperial.

During the many years of bloody war, the idea of a nation in arms crystallised as an active historical actor. Kapodistrias, at the start of the revolution, ascertained that the uprising was justified “for every person who took up arms in Greece has a tomb, a home, a generation to defend”.⁵⁷ Petrobey Mavromichalis, in his appeal to the European courts, assured them all that the internal clashes “that had been a product of tyranny had been rejected”. But two years later Lord Byron, upon arriving in Messolongi, expressed his disappointment to the Greeks: “I had come to Greece not to join a faction but a nation.”⁵⁸

Nevertheless, the revolutionaries became a nation also as a result of the crucial decisions made by three of the five great powers, which had to deal with a regional uprising that was soon to become an international problem with a world audience.

Russia’s role was central in the development not only of its religious rendition, but also of its national one. Even the Ottomans could describe the events in Wallachia and Peloponnese with national connotations. As Yusuf Ziya Karabiçak has demonstrated, the term millet, as used in Ottoman documents during the Greek War of Independence, included both the oecumene of the Orthodox Church, covering all the Orthodox populations in the empire, and the more modern meaning of nation.⁵⁹ So, the millet had multiple layers of meaning, with old and modern connotations: on one hand, it meant “nation” in the spirit of Alexander Ypsilantis’ declaration and, on the other, millet was a religiously defined community of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman elites and bureaucrats gradually transformed their terminology about the revolutionaries. They departed from the term “Rum” and “Rum millet”, which referred to the Greek Orthodox community. The term “Yunan” was at times used as equivalent to the term “Hellene”. Obviously they had to distinguish between the Orthodox Greek-speakers that remained in the Ottoman Empire from the inhabitants of the new state.

The Greeks also became a nation by the acts and statements of the protagonists themselves, who sought the recognition of their struggle by achieving independence as a people becoming a sovereign nation. The main characteristics of the political and public discourse of that period were that the Greek Revolution had come about in order to overthrow a religious and foreign yoke, and this was the specificity of the Greek Revolution, which was not a civil war, as was the case with the other contemporary European revolts in southern Europe.

Moreover, the purity of the “Greek race” (ἑλληνικόν γένος) (meaning “nation” in nineteenth-century parlance) was incorporated in mythological and historiographical discourses, by, at times, using conflicting stratagems. The Greeks had unilaterally, just as the North Americans and Latin Americans had done, declared independence, drafted a constitution and declared “the nation” (τὸ ἔθνος) as the source of sovereignty, and thus they promulgated the concept of the nation as the proper unit of state organisation and state

legitimacy in the modern world.

The Greek revolutionaries were among the pioneers in discovering and using the notion of the “nation” as a political discourse, as a political force in order to change their world. The importance of this “discovery” was considerable (not only for the moment of the Greek struggle, but for the last 200 years), for the language of the nation nationalised the revolutionary events, the time and the space, constructed interpretative frames and narratives, marginalised some aspects such as for example those of Rigas, which combined the idea of the nation with an ecumenicity in a federation or Christian empire, revolution/Jacobinism and Orthodox tradition; or the initial Balkan dimension as seen by Alexander Ypsilantis’ initiative in Moldavia.

Before 1821 the Greek nation did not exist as a clear-cut category, or Greece as a precise space (even though the term Greece was used by many early philhellenes prior to 1821, such as François Pouqueville, William Martin Leake and Lord Byron). For example, for Alexander Ypsilantis Greece consisted of the Morea (Peloponnese), Epirus, Thessaly, Serbia, Bulgaria and the Aegean Islands. For Petrobey Mavromichalis Greece was mainly the Morea. It did not exist also as a clear category of time. A cohesive conception of Greece in terms of space and time was elaborated. Thereafter the nation-state could construct its national myths and construct the Greek nation cum national history. There was disagreement on various aspects of this nation, its identity and history. However, these differences were gradually, by the mid-century, smoothed out, and various irredentist political projects aimed at expansion saw the light of day, by the 1850s in the famous Great Idea (*Μεγάλη Ίδέα*), which was to become the *idée fixe* of the Kingdom of Greece until as late as 1922.⁶⁰ Some of these projects were extreme, claiming faraway regions, such as the so-called area of the four patriarchates of the East, rendering the irredentist political projects appear as projects of imperial conquest. Religion, which in the course of the revolution had become nationalised when this was needed, as supranational and ecumenical, could be used in a different direction: to devise small or large imperial – mainly cultural – projects. And this was a trajectory aimed at rethinking the view that nationalism is by definition the nemesis of empire.

* Many thanks to friends and colleagues who read and commented on earlier versions of this article: Nikolaos Chrissidis, Yanni Kotsonis, Antonis Liakos and Alexis Heraclides.

¹ “Ο Διπλωμάτης” [The diplomat], *Aion*, 15 September 1848, 1.

² “Self-determination” derives from the German concept *Selbstbestimmungsrecht*, which was used by German radicals from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. See Alexis Heraclides, “Self-determination and Secession: The Normative Discourse Yesterday and Today,” in *Perspectives on Secession: Theory and Case Studies*, ed. Martin Riegl and Bohumil Doboš (Cham: Springer, 2020), 7.

³ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

- ⁴ Heraclides, “Self-determination and Secession,” 7.
- ⁵ Yanni Kotsonis, *Η Ελληνική Επανάσταση και οι αυτοκρατορίες: Η Γαλλία και οι Έλληνες, 1797–1830* [The Greek Revolution and the Empires: France and the Greeks, 1797–1830 (Athens: Alexandria, 2020)].
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- ⁷ Ada Dialla, “Between Nation and Empire: Revisiting the Russian Past Twenty Years Later,” *Historiein* 13 (2013): 18–38.
- ⁸ Ali Yaycioglu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).
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- ¹¹ William Martin Leake, *An Historical Outline of the Greek Revolution* (London: John Murray, 1826), 1 and 17.
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- ¹³ “Επιστολαί Ανέκδοται” [Unpublished letters], *Pandora*, 15 September 1864, 348.
- ¹⁴ Alexandros Svolos, *Τα Ελληνικά Συντάγματα 1822–1975* [The Greek constitutions, 1822–1975] (Athens: Stochastis, 1998); Dimitrios Ypsilantis’ declaration of 6 October 1821.
- ¹⁵ Pizanias, “Introduction,” 50–53.
- ¹⁶ Nicholas Kaltsas, *Introduction to the History of Modern Greece* (New York: AMS, 1970), chap. 2.
- ¹⁷ “Ιγνάτιος προς Αλέξανδρο Μαυροκορδάτο, 5/17 Δεκεμβρίου 1823” [Ignatius to Alexandros Mavrokordatos, 5/17 December 1823, in *Ιγνάτιος Μητροπολίτης Ουγγρο-Βλαχίας (1766–1828)* [Ignatius, metropolitan of Hungaro-Wallachia (1766–1828)], ed. Emmanouil Protopsaltis (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1961), 167.
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- ²³ Roxandra Stourdza, *Mémoires de la Comtesse Edling (née Stourdza) demoiselle d’honneur de sa Majesté l’impératrice Élisabeth Alexéevna* (Moscow: Impr. du St Synode, 1888), 44.
- ²⁴ Piotr Źurek, “Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski and the Plan of the Balkan Federation (1804–1806),” *Povijesni prilozi* 21, no. 22 (2002): 159–65.
- ²⁵ Brian E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Ada Dialla, “The Congress of Vienna, the Russian Empire and the Greek Revolution: Rethinking Legitimacy,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 39, no. 1 (2021): 27–48.
- ²⁶ Kapodistrias, prior to the outburst of the 1821 Uprising, had been against it because first he believed that the Greek were premature and, second, he believed that the reorganisation of the Ottoman space would be the outcome of the handling on the part of the great powers and especially of Russia, and could not come from below, by the people on their own who lived there.
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- ²⁸ Theophilus Prousis, “Aleksandr Sturdza: A Russian Conservative Response to the Greek Revolution,” *East European Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (1992): 318.
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- ⁴¹ Georgios Tertsetis, *Τετρασέτη Απαντα* (Athens: Giovanis, 1966), 3:149–50.
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- ⁴³ Protopsaltis, *Ιγνάτιος* [Ignatius], 153.
- ⁴⁴ *Southern Recorder*, 24 July 1821.
- ⁴⁵ *Le Constitutionnel*, 6 June 1821. Reproduced in Nektarios Mamalougos, “Μαρτυρία ἐνάργεως τῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως τοῦ 1821: Διακήρυξις τοῦ Παλαιῶν Πατρῶν Γερμανοῦ,” http://users.uoa.gr/~nektar/history/3contemporary/constitution_hermanus_1821.htm, accessed 29 November 2021.
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