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Yannis Stavrakakis

***The Lacanian Left:
Psychoanalysis, Theory,
Politics***

**Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2007. 320 pp.**

by Athena Athanasiou

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Yannis Stavrakakis' *The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics* is an important and innovative exploration of the multiple intersections between Lacanian psychoanalysis and critical political theory of democracy. It is a valuable contribution to current theoretico-political inquiries on how psychoanalytic theory might reinvigorate political praxis today. Stavrakakis is associate professor of Political Science at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Theoretical Studies in the Humanities and the Social Sciences, University of Essex. He is the author of *Lacan and the Political* (1999) and co-editor of *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis* (2000) and *Lacan and Science* (2002).

In this collection of essays, Stavrakakis addresses the ways in which Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, in recent years, has been conversing with political theory and critical analysis. He highlights some of the most emblem-

atic articulations of Lacanian theory with contemporary political analysis and critique of hegemonic discourses and orders: Slavoj Žižek's combination of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marxist tradition, Alain Badiou's reappropriation of Lacan's thought, taking it in the direction of an "ethics of the event", Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's endeavour to formulate a new vision of radical and plural democracy, but also, in the periphery of this circle of Lacan-inspired reorientation of political theorisation, Cornelius Castoriadis and Judith Butler's critical engagements. Through a wide range of critical readings in political philosophy, Stavrakakis traces the convergent and divergent routes through which those theorists read and appropriate Lacanian theory, perceive the politics of the Left, and, most importantly, actively engage in an emerging theoretico-political field that the author aptly calls the "Lacanian Left".

This is a divided, uneven, and heterogeneous locus, however: a horizon – as both an ever-negotiable demarcating limit and an enabling opening of creative possibilities – constituted by (and as) the theoretical encounter between the symbolic and the real, knowledge and experience, the social and the political. It is at this horizon of tension and possibility – or, limitation and promise – that Stavrakakis traces the political implications of (encounters with) the Lacanian real. This is, in fact, the question upon which Stavrakakis' epistemological and theoretical project is crucially premised: how to articulate a political theory based on the recognition of the unrepresentable, incommensurable and irreducible real – in an approach involving the simultaneous awareness that the real (the realm of expe-

rience) can never be mastered by the symbolic (the domain where theory is articulated) but also the recognition that nonetheless one should assume the impossible task of symbolising the real.

By focusing on the “encounter with the real”, to use a Lacanian phrase, Stavrakakis is engaged in the task of reorienting the way we articulate our theories so that the trace of experience – above all, the experience of our failure to symbolically master the real of experience – is not eliminated, foreclosed or mortified once and for all. Therefore, the crucial impetus of this book’s argumentation is to track down the limits that the real of experience poses to signification and representation; those limits are not merely prohibitive but also enabling in the process of continuous (re)articulation of social and political identity. The impetus to register such limits bespeaks a mode of theorising that is indispensable to the emerging Lacanian Left, according to Stavrakakis, and it is in this context that he seeks to encircle the affective limits of discourse analysis while proposing novel approaches to some of the most urgent social and political riddles of our tumultuous times, such as the relationship between politics and emotion, *jouissance* and discourse, representation and enjoyment, ethics and social change, but also phenomena and events related to national identification and nationalism, consumerism, advertising, de-democratisation and European identity.

In its first part, entitled “Dialectics of Disavowal”, the book offers a detailed theoretical study of specific engagements with the multifaceted field of the Lacanian Left, putting special emphasis on the different ways in which particular theorists converse with the negative ontology of Lacanian theory: Castoriadis on the positive and creative (instead of the alienating in Lacan’s perspective of negativity)

dimensions of social constructions and radical imagination, Laclau on the affective limits of discourse and the political implications of lack, Žižek on the paradigmatic appropriation of Antigone in the conceptualisation of political praxis and the “radical act”, and Badiou on the ethical implications of (a positive politics of) the event.

Stavrakakis explores what he perceives as disavowal of the political in Castoriadis’ theoretical apparatus. Linking the Lacanian real with the disruptive moment of the political, he shows how Castoriadis’ vitalist account of the autonomy of an essentialised and self-contained subject, coupled with an idealised conceptualisation of human imagination, is related to the disavowal of negativity. This disavowal of negativity, however, amounts to an ultimate disavowal of the encounter with the political: a moment when the limits of autonomy – limits marked by the always already impossible attempts to capture the real through symbolic means – are exposed. Here, the crucial question is: what could be the future of radical democratic politics in light of the negative, that is, the real, limits of human autonomy and creativity?

The intersection between affect and discourse preoccupies the author in his analysis of Laclau’s discourse theory. The author’s significant starting point here is the acknowledgment that prior theoretical formulations within discourse theory have considerably neglected the dimension of affect and *jouissance*. Laclau and Mouffe’s reorientation of the political theory of the Left towards a “radical and plural democracy”, and Laclau’s later solo work, exhibit suggestive conceptual affinities with Lacanian theory and negative ontology. Stavrakakis acknowledges the productive underpinnings of Laclau’s strategic attempt to employ the category of the real and *jouissance*, and to recon-

ceptualise discourse *with* affect. Remaining critical of the ontological conceptualisation of discourse, when it is presented as an all-encompassing category within which the logic of *jouissance* is subsumed, he shows how Laclau's earlier (over)emphasis on discourse at the expense of *jouissance* and the irruptions that affect manifests in the social field has been changing gradually.

The necessary question here is what conceptual innovation would it take to reflect theoretically on the relation between signification and *jouissance* without neutralising the latter through its absorption into a concept of discourse which remains intact, seamless, self-enclosed and all-inclusive. Affect cannot be reduced to merely an internal moment of discourse. Insofar as we trace the affective limits of discourse through their vestiges within discourse, we explore their constitutive relation. Employing the category of the real and accepting its paradoxes, Stavrakakis argues, enables a fruitful consideration of affect and discourse together, as two distinct and yet interconnected realms. Laclau, on the other hand, sees a double danger in the treatment of affect and discourse as two conceptually distinct orders: first, the essentialisation of language and, second, the essentialisation of the operations of the unconscious. For Stavrakakis, however, taking into account form and force, symbolic structuration and *jouissance*, is not only a matter of theoretical sophistication, but also of theoretico-political strategy.

The avowal of the constitutive dialectics between negative and positive is a crucial stake in the way in which the Lacanian Left conceptualises the act. With respect to Žižek's theoretico-political interventions on the act, Stavrakakis claims that the problem is the opposite of the one associated with discourse theory, namely, overemphasis on negativ-

ity and the negative dimensions of the real. Žižek's theorisation of the act seems to underestimate and bypass lack and finitude in favour of an unlimited positivity of human action. It tends to privilege the moment of the political act as an apocalyptic or miraculous event, which exceeds the discursive limits of the symbolic. Stavrakakis reads Antigone's lure for Žižek as symptomatic of his effective disavowal of the dialectics between negative and positive, his negation of the encounter with contingency and negativity: in appropriating Antigone as a heroic example of a purely positive act, liberated from the bounds of the symbolic order, Žižek transforms the negativity of Antigone's lack and desire to the idealised voluntarist positivity of a glorious, total ethico-political act.

Stavrakakis convincingly shows how Žižek's idealisation of Antigone as a model of radical ethico-political action is in contradiction with his own Lacanian account of the act as a non-subjectivist, non-wilful encounter with the real. The gesture of fetishising the act (in terms of a miraculous event automatically transubstantiating the negative to positive) in the name of some political optimism bypasses the crucial dimension of the lack in the socio-symbolic Other: "Thus, in opposition to Žižek's strict differentiation between the ethics of assuming lack and a politics of acts, why not see the *assumption/institutionalisation of the lack in the Other*, not as a limit but as the condition of possibility, or in any case a crucial resource, in ethically assuming the radical character of an act, of relating ourselves – as divided beings – to events?" (124, author's emphasis).

In the second, more empirically oriented part of the book, entitled "Dialectics of Enjoyment", Stavrakakis moves towards an analytical treatment of specific critical phenomena and

events that mark contemporary social and political reality. Through a comprehensive reading of multiple aspects of the Lacanian Left, the various chapters of this part develop important approaches to representation and affect, signification and enjoyment. Centrally positioned in the inquiries that this part seeks to unravel is the role of affectivity and enjoyment in political life and in political analysis. Within this general context, the author discusses the role of the interplay between the symbolic and the real in identity-formation and power relations. The argumentation put forward in this section is informed by an articulation of the problematic of the real qua *jouissance* (enjoyment) with discourse theory, an articulation that Stavrakakis considers absolutely crucial for the Lacanian Left.

This part starts with a chapter dedicated to an attempt to widen and enrich poststructuralist political theory through addressing the affectivity of the political, and through engaging with the Lacanian insights on the relation between the affective and the discursive. Late capitalist consumer culture, the hegemony of advertising discourse, or, on a different register, the rejection of the European constitutional treaty are phenomena that cannot be adequately explained, Stavrakakis argues, without taking into account the role of desire and *jouissance*. At the same time, the author critically addresses the normative deployments of the affective lure in the service of conservative discourses of political marketing, advertising and nationalism, a strategy that signals what he aptly describes as “the passage from a *society of prohibition* to a *society of commanded enjoyment*” (22, author’s emphasis), and “our interpellation as consumers in the society of commanded enjoyment” (251). A consideration of affect and discourse together, however, needs to emphatically avoid any essentialisation of affect; this is an important point that the

author elaborates on in the context of his critical response to Laclau’s caveat that the treatment of the affective and the linguistic as conceptually distinct leads to an essentialist conception of language.

Stavrakakis dedicates three chapters to a careful examination of the ways in which processes of attachment to symbolic authority reproduce relations of subordination and sustain social order with regard to nationalism, national identification and European identity, but also the capitalist administration of *jouissance* in various contexts of consumerism and advertising. The author traces the longevity of national identifications in the depth that certain national, cultural and religious attachments have historically acquired. “How come nationalism is still the primary locus – together with consumerism – of individual and collective identifications in late modernity?” Stavrakakis asks (191). Although the discursive dimension is certainly important in constituting and sustaining national desire, he claims, the symbolic aspect of national identification is not sufficient. Thus, the dialectics of *jouissance* is employed again as an organising line of explanation. What emerges then as an imperative task is to take into account the affective investments which confer on the nation its *force* (and not merely its *form*) as a pervasively desirable object of identification. In terms of political action, what is at stake is to resist the depoliticisation of politics and its reduction to unaffffective technocratic administration; in other words, what is at stake is to infuse passion into the project of radical democracy instead of letting the politics of affect be monopolised by racist and nationalist aggression.

How can we then reorient the dialectic of affect which is always already implicated in power relations and in processes of social

and political identifications? How can we restore our faith in radical political criticism? These are the questions that Stavrakakis discusses in the concluding chapter. He articulates a Lacanian response to post-democratic trends in late capitalist societies, one that seeks to radicalise and revolutionise democracy by infusing democratic ethics of the political with the passion for transformation (see, for example, Mouffe's recent work on agonism and passions in radical democratic theory) without succumbing to the temptation of a normalisation/reduction of negativity in favour of a humanist essentialism and without slipping into the dystopias of the old Left.

This is an immensely useful book for students and scholars alike. I would like to propose two points for further critical reflection and discussion: first, I think that the acknowledgement and employment of the groundbreaking contributions of feminist theory and postcolonial theory in the theoretico-political horizon of the Lacanian Left (in its wider sense) would have further enriched the exploration of this intellectual landscape in significant and suggestive ways. Especially the contributions of contemporary poststructuralist feminist theory in issues such as the problematic of another (feminine) *jouissance*, or the place of embodiment and enjoyment in the political, or the relation of power to enjoyment, or the constitutive incompleteness of identity, or the identity/difference pair, or the implications of affect in the epistemological transition from paradigms of social constructivism to Foucault-inspired reappropriations of the discursive closure, poststructuralism and theories of gender performativity, would have offered a valuable addition to an already rich and nuanced site of reflection; in such discussions, the author's welcomed references to Judith Butler, Sara Ahmed and Ewa Ziarek could have been more complexly interwoven with the intertextual body of the book.

Second, I would claim that while the role of affectivity in processes of identification and subjectivity has been historically disregarded, downplayed, and/or reduced by theories of social construction, this is not exactly the case with poststructuralist theory, at least not with *all* poststructuralist theory. I think that the epistemological slip underlying this conflation is the rendition of 'poststructuralism' as a homogeneous subsystem reducible to merely an internal moment of the constructionist paradigm. The emergence of poststructuralist theory, especially in its 'third-wave' feminist and postcolonial modalities, is intricately connected with an awareness of the necessity to acknowledge, and reckon with, the limits of constructionism. In such work, the subject is theorised as opaque, contingent, unknown to itself, affectively implicated in the lives of others, and constituted through processes involving loss and melancholia; the ontological certainties underlying the category of the 'human' are suspended; desire necessarily remains unfulfilled. In Butler's Foucauldian and psychoanalytic rendition, for instance, the subject is theorised as a performative, melancholic agent that engages in discursive and affective processes of identification inside (rather than outside) power structures. Affect is identified here as a technology of power *and* a potential site of agency, resignification, disruption and subversion. The melancholic subject, incomplete and other to itself, does not break with the law in pursuit of an ontological emancipation which lies somewhere outside the bounds of discourse; it is rather passionately attached to the law on which it depends and against which it might rebel – in an endless spiral of subjection and subjectivation: Antigone's politics is not one of oppositional purity, Butler argues, but one of the scandalously impure.¹ It is to a reflection of this dialectic, a dialectic without the miraculous and normalising mo-

ment of ultimate synthesis, that the conversation of poststructuralism, psychoanalysis and feminism can crucially contribute.

In all, Yannis Stavrakakis' *The Lacanian Left* is a stimulating book that puts forward insightful analyses of how psychoanalytic theory can help us reconceptualise, redefine and reinvigorate critical political theory and praxis today. The book unravels the ways in which the dislocation by the other is, in fact, the 'common place' of social passion: as emotionality and affect, as motion (*συγ-κίνηση*) and passion (*πάθος*), as passivity and passionate openness to be affected by others. The crucial question that it inspires and explores is how the awareness of lack and of the limits of discourse (the Lacanian negativity qua encounter with the real) can be fruitfully employed in the endeavour to understand and theorise the political and the affective aspects of identification. Indeed, the careful exploration of this potential – its promise and its limitations – through engaging with the role of affect in the discursive constitution of the political is the great merit of this book.

NOTE

- 1 Judith Butler, *Antigone's Claim: Kinship between Life and Death*, New York: Columbia UP, 2000, p. 5.

Athena Athanasiou

*Ζωή στο όριο:
Δοκίμια για το σώμα, το φύλο
και τη βιοπολιτική
[Life at the Limit:
Essays on the Body,
Gender and Biopolitics]*

Athens: Ekkremes, 2007. 320 pp.

by Olga Taxidou

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Athena Athanasiou's recent book, *Zoe sto orio*, sets itself a tall task: no less than to re-define, or to scrupulously examine, the contours of what it means to be human in an age of biopolitics. In a collection of challenging essays, this subject is approached through the critical encounter of social anthropology, postcolonial studies and cultural-literary criticism. As her subtitle indicates, Athanasiou reconfigures these relationships through a particular emphasis on gender and performativity, inflected by post-structuralist feminist philosophy and post-Lacanian psychoanalysis. At the same time, this study is acutely aware of its own geopolitical position; firmly located in southern Europe and the Balkans, it is informed by its specific politics of place and its complex and embattled relationships to international politics, globalisation and cosmopolitics, which is proposed as the book's clos-

ing gesture. Here, the term gesture is used performatively not figuratively as the book is more interested in posing questions, strategies of analysis, critique and activism, rather than in formulating solutions.

From the subtitle onwards, Giorgio Agamben's work features prominently throughout this book. This reading of Agamben, however, is a critical one that at once contextualises his project in relation to Benjamin and Heidegger and points towards some of its limitations. Athanasiou traces the notions of *bios* and *zoe* (crucial for any attempt at defining the limits of the human) through Heidegger's work on technology and Benjamin's on violence, and reframes these through the lens of contemporary feminist philosophy, citing the work of Butler, Braidotti and Kristeva, amongst others. Her reading of Heidegger, in particular, is rigorous and, for this reader, illuminating in the parallels it draws between his writing on technology and his 'metaphorical' use of the death camp, and Agamben's later emblematic application of the same image/event to 'stand in' for the site of modernity, reconfiguring the contours of the human. This contextual and intertextual reading of Agamben sees his work as part of a philosophical tradition, with the effect of deflating the somewhat aphoristic tone of some of his writings. In the same stroke, Athanasiou's discourse also addresses the criticism of negativity (in the quasi-existentialist/nihilist, not the Adornian, sense) that the work elicits. Here her rereading of Agamben through gender is crucial, as her text, both in its themes and narrative, transpires as a proposition on philosophical reflection *and* political activism.

These debates are teased out through a series of essays which, although they initially appear loosely connected, are interlocked in a somewhat contrapuntal manner that refus-

es to be rendered in an overarching narrative, punctuated by a final conclusion. Athanasiou's reading of the human and *zoe* throughout this study delineates a Foucaultian archaeology, with its complex and contradictory governmental strategies of power, rather than an ontological category, where the human, in a vitalist and metaphysical tradition, defines itself against both the 'natural' and the 'technological'. In this sense, Heidegger's reflections on technology appear central as they provide an initial point of reference within the philosophies of modernity, where the categories/limits of the human, mechanical, natural and technological are reconfigured. And, of course, these limits also propose political validation, visibility, rights and exclusions. The violence of these governmental strategies themselves is never absent from this study, informing and haunting the narrative throughout. This becomes particularly apparent as Athanasiou posits the body – gendered, racial, and geopolitically located – at the centre of her concerns. Heidegger's 'philosophy without a body' becomes stubbornly embodied and Athanasiou further elaborates his non-instrumental conception of technology. Indeed, it is seen as crucial in the author's theorising of the relationship between the body and history, which concerns her in the first group of essays in this collection. This biopolitical reading of the human sees as its historical and metaphorical site the concentration camp, which emerges as the 'laboratory' of modern governmentality, to borrow a term from the historical avant-garde (which, in many ways, met its death in the concentration camp). In this way, Athanasiou both expands and deflates an image/event employed by the negative dialectics of Adorno ('the impossibility of poetry') – remnants of which can be seen in Agamben's work – to encompass a vision of humanity that includes the death camp not as aberration but as constitutive el-

ement. Following a philosophical trajectory from Nietzsche through Benjamin, Arendt, Agamben and Gillian Rose, Athanasiou reads the death camp not as the exception (the Enlightenment gone momentarily wrong or the anguished cry of the sublime) but as the rule that occurred not despite our humanity but because of it. The first section of this book ends citing the aphoristic but hopeful slogan of “human, all too human”!

The particular contribution that this study makes is in the author’s emphasis on the politics of gender and otherness. In an essay that clearly exhibits her training in anthropology, Athanasiou presents an insightful and rigorous analysis of the so-called ‘demographic problem’ in modern Greece. This she reads in conjunction with discourses of nationhood, kinship and reproduction. The anxiety-ridden and fear-inducing rhetoric of the public sphere (in part political, media and medical discourse) is analysed here in an attempt to scrutinise those governmental mechanisms that define the limits and the rights of the human. Through a close analysis of state policy, party-political discourse and the media, inflected by the interface between psychoanalysis and anthropology, Athanasiou examines the nexus of gender-sexuality-reproduction-kinship relationships as fundamental to delimiting the human, but also central in imposing those limits. Her exposition of this “demographic panic” through this biopolitical reading also points towards the “melancholy of the public sphere”, which introduces the next section of the book.

This section continues the critical interface between anthropology and psychoanalysis in a group of essays that examines Kristeva’s notion of *abjection*, the Oedipus myth and complex, and leads into an inspired study of the encounter between technology and mon-

strosity, fuelled by the work of Rosi Braidotti. Athanasiou’s reading of the Oedipus myth and its appropriation by Freudian psychoanalysis is read here – somewhat counterintuitively but all the more effectively – through the figure of the Sphinx. This figure – gendered and racialised – becomes central to the construction of Oedipus as the first philosopher and to the positing of the myth as the genealogy of Western metaphysics. The exclusion of the Sphinx and the *aporia* she embodies in Freudian psychoanalysis is read by Athanasiou as structural and formative to the notions of subjectivity proposed. Following the critiques of Felman and Caruth, Athanasiou analyses how this Freudian notion of subjectivity is also a gendered one. Athanasiou’s analysis of Oedipus (like Lacan’s references) focuses more on *Oedipus at Colonus* (and not exclusively on *Oedipus the King*), in which the *apolis* Oedipus, like another Sphinx, hovers on the outskirts of the city (this time Athens, for we have moved onto the level of consciousness, knowledge and pain) looking for a place to die. He himself is no longer within the limits of the human; he is a monstrosity, the negative of the original answer he uttered to the Sphinx. Indeed, monstrosity and otherness are seen as central to any Oedipal notion of subjectivity as are the relationships between visual representation and the word, embodiment and writing. Here, Athanasiou writes in a long tradition of philosophical and anthropological reflection that encounters Oedipus as myth, proto-philosophy and proto-anthropology. However, the textual Oedipus that we have inherited is a tragic drama. This reviewer appreciates that it may be beyond the scope of her analysis, but the aesthetic dimension of the Oedipus dramas rarely enters the discussion, and this becomes all the more conspicuous as Athanasiou’s narrative is otherwise very informed and scholarly in tackling issues of represen-

tation, visibility and embodiment: issues that all shape the tragic event and are present in the philosophical/anthropological statements enacted and thematised, but also constitutive of how the text functions as a work of art.

For this reviewer, the most exciting writing in this book appears in the section that traces the history, politics and aesthetics of the antimilitarist, feminist movement Women in Black. Founded in 1988 by a small group of Jewish women from Israel, just one month after the first Palestinian Intifada and with the support of Palestinian women, its first performative event was a march to the West Bank, opposing the politics of domination and aggression. Since then it has spread internationally, with women from Serbia, Croatia, Australia, northern and southern Europe and the USA forming similar groups. The members of Women in Black always protest in silence, their apparel and their civic posture drawing the links between political protest and mourning. Here, Athanasiou's narrative follows through her earlier reference to Butler's "melancholy of the public sphere". The figure of Antigone proves central in tracing a genealogy of this relationship between mourning and the law; Athanasiou reads this through Butler and Rose's recent reconfigurations of the tragic heroine. This perspective she combines with the more philosophical/anthropological work on mourning, citing Derrida, Caruth and Levinas, among others, to weave an account of the Women in Black that contextualises the movement and suggests its political efficacy. On the limits of the political and the aesthetic, this very performative, civic and gendered event brings together all the concerns of the book and emerges as its primary *gestus*. Appropriately, the photographs that accompany this chapter establish links with the images of the concentration camp evoked at the start of the study,

stressing the significance of the visual in the representational economies discussed. The final chapter of the book proposes the category of cosmopolitics as a way of addressing the biopolitical dimension of life at the limits (and suggests further research and reflection). The cover, comprising an image by Palestinian-born/London-based visual artist Mona Hatoum, acts as the perfect frame for Athanasiou's arguments.

This book could double as a companion to Athanasiou's recent edition of an anthology of feminist criticism,¹ which includes an extensive introduction. Either way, it is a welcome contribution to contemporary debates on biopolitics and the human, informed by Athanasiou's rigorous renegotiation of these categories through gender and difference. However, her interdisciplinary approach never makes her narrative reductive as she writes with ease within all the traditions she is referencing. This makes for a very dense but engaging text, one that never loses its urgency or its political immediacy. Some of the essays have appeared elsewhere in English and have been translated for this edition by Giorgos Karabellas and Ioulia Pentazou with clarity and style. Athanasiou gives the last word to the Women in Black, not so much for the answers they provide to the issues she has delineated throughout her book, but for the questions they pose.

NOTE

- 1 Athena Athanasiou (ed.), *Φεμινιστική θεωρία και πολιτισμική κριτική*, Athens: Nissos, 2006.

Yannis Antoniou

***Οι Έλληνες Μηχανικοί.
Θεσμοί και Ιδέες 1900-1940*
[Greek Engineers.
Institutions and Ideas
1900-1940]**

Athens: Bibliorama, 2006. 486 pp.

by Nikos Pantelakis

Historical and Palaeographical Archive,
National Bank of Greece

This exceptionally interesting book about Greek engineers, written by Yiannis Antoniou, presents in detail the economic, social and political factors that shaped the studies and profession of Greek engineers from the early twentieth century until the Second World War. It also examines the currents of ideas they adopted during this time, as well as their influence on the development of Greek society. Greek engineers, those who studied in Greece as well as those who studied abroad, are significantly linked to the eventful course of economic growth and industrialisation in Greece.

The first part of the book provides the general framework of the conditions that prevailed during the period under consideration in the economically developed societies of North America and Western Europe, leading to the emergence of technological determinism and the technocratic movement. The writer

presents, in a concise though enlightening fashion, the ideology of the development of technological determinism and the technocratic movement in the Western world, which influenced decisively the configuration of the engineering profession in America and Europe. The author has deemed this historical presentation necessary as it is well known that the growth of Western societies inspired and shaped the economic, social and political development of Greece, undoubtedly leaving its mark also on the studies and the profession of Greek engineers during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.

The second part offers a thorough presentation of the growth of institutions of technical education in Greece, from the Sunday School of Crafts, established in 1837, up to the foundation, in 1914, of the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA), otherwise known as the Metso-vion. In contrast to the University of Athens and the Hellenic Army Academy (Evelpidon), which from the start were located at the apex of the educational and social hierarchy, the Technical University developed into a high-ranking technological institution progressively, starting out as a part-time vocational school aimed at educating capable master craftsmen for public and private construction works in the Greek capital. As the author stresses, the idea that technology constitutes an application of science formed the basic theoretical tenet of positivism and had a significant effect on the professional awareness of engineers. The gradual advancement of the Technical University can be related to the interpretation of this ideology, which considered scientific and technological progress as a primary objective, either additionally or as an alternative to the official nationalistic one, to produce an 'enhanced' nationalism; an ideology which translated the Greek irredentist *Megali Idea* (Great Idea) into the terms of rationalist, scientific and technical progress for the country.

The benefactors of the Technical University, who were descended from the town of Metsovo, expressed the spirit of this idea in a pioneering fashion. Their business activity developed in Egypt and it appears that they were influenced by the theory of Saint-Simon; due to this kind of ideological kinship, they figure among those who believed in the necessity of technical and economic growth for Greece as well as the rational organisation of state and society.

The author divides the development of engineering as a discipline in Greece into four periods. The first ranges from 1837 to 1862; that is to say, until the Sunday School of Crafts was integrated into the secondary education system. According to its first director, the Bavarian noble Captain Friedrich von Zentner, it was founded to meet the need for the craftsmen necessary for the reconstruction of Athens and other cities of the newly established Greek state. During that early period the school did not issue diplomas but basic certificates. Nevertheless, while it may be characterised as a lower-level vocational school – due to the way it operated, the lack of formal admission requirements, the absence of explicit criteria regarding the formal qualifications of the faculty and the vague duration of studies – it ranked above elementary or even secondary educational institutions, according to the author.

The second period covers the period from 1863 to 1887. Initially, the school centred not so much on the introduction of new techniques or professions as on the promotion of neoclassical aesthetics. Three separate faculties were established: the Sunday School, a one-year course of study for master craftsmen; the Daily School, a three-year course for those who intended to work in the industrial sector; and the Arts School, a five-year course of the so-called beaux arts. In 1867, the Daily School was refashioned as the Handicraft School, comprising three de-

partments: Architecture, Land Surveying (four years of study) and Mechanics (five years of study). These changes, which involved the upgrading of the curriculum and the increase in the formal entry requirements for students, signalled the transformation of the institution.

The third period extended from 1887, with the foundation of the School of Industrial Arts as an institution of higher technical education, to 1914. In the explanatory report on the law establishing the school, it was stressed that the School of Arts had been superseded by events and served neither the objective of promoting the sciences nor the increased technical requirements of the day; thus, reorganisation was essential. It was also noted that the shortage of trained engineers in the country could be addressed through the qualification of personnel who could undertake public construction works, man state technical services and staff the private industrial sector. This could be achieved through the adoption of new study programs of scientific and technical content and through stricter admission requirements. These changes, in conjunction with a reduction in the number of students, justified the transition of the school from the intermediate to the higher education level. In its upgraded form, the institution was comparable to the *écoles des arts industrielles* that were founded in France at the time, which also began as secondary-level schools. The reform addressed the need for technical executives, created by the establishment of the public works department of the Ministry of the Interior as well a professional body for civil engineers in 1878. According to the author, while the school's contribution to the staffing of state services was significant, it had a limited effect on private industry. The particular pattern of education promoted the creation of a professional, meritocratic elite. Under the influence of French *grandes écoles*, this model combined sophisticated training with selfless service to state and society.

During the fourth period, beginning in 1914, the School became the National Technical University (*Ethnikon Metsovion Polytechnion*), upgraded to an academic institution equivalent to the University of Athens. The law founding the Technical University organised it into schools of Civil, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, and Architecture. It also established technical faculties for secondary education with the foundation of schools for land surveyors, mechanics, and foremen for the chemical and metallurgical industries. High school graduates were enrolled following an admission test, as were – without prior selection – secondary school (practical lyceum) graduates. The former had to submit a high-school certificate, while the latter had to present evidence of having progressed from the second to the third year of high school. According to the same law, the National Technical University would be the sole institution in Greece offering degrees in engineering. Moreover, the law required that new professors be drawn from the membership of the Teachers' Association.

The configuration of engineering as a new social and occupational category was closely linked to the growth of Greek economy, which necessitated the undertaking of large-scale public works (in road, rail, and port building, etc.) that were essential for industrialisation.

From 1894 onwards, a number of private vocational schools began functioning, often antagonising the Technical University. The most notable of these were the Commercial and Industrial Academy and two evening schools in Piraeus, one run by the Piraeus Association and the other by the Prometheus Mechanics Society. The Commercial and Industrial Academy educated yeastmakers, winemakers, distillers, vinegar-makers, brewers, oil-industry workers, soap-makers, perfumers, cheesemakers, silkbreeders and beekeepers. In 1899, the Agricultural

School opened, followed, between 1890 and 1905, by the Railways School, the Mining–Metallurgy School and the Commercial Navy School. In November 1905, the Commercial and Industrial Academy was recognised by the state as an institution of higher technical education equivalent to the National Technical University. This decision was revoked a few days later due to the hostile reactions from the students and professors of the National Technical University and from the School of Physics and Mathematics of the University of Athens. Yet, this Academy had been founded owing to the modernising bent of a few industrialists, headed by Othon Rousopoulos. They considered that the practical education provided by the Academy constituted a necessary supplement to the theoretical thrust of the Technical University. In other cases, the industrialists themselves provided on-site practical experience in their factories, as in the case of Theodoros Retsinas. In other cities of Greece there were numerous commercial and agricultural vocational schools. Eventually, the conflict centring on the state recognition of professional studies and diplomas between the qualified engineers and graduates of the National Technical University, on the one hand, and the students of private schools and craftsmen, on the other, ended with in victory for the former.

Until 1878, the state initially assigned the monitoring and management of public works to mechanic graduates of the Hellenic Army Academy. During the Trikoupis premiership, the need to guarantee an administrative framework appropriate for the implementation and control of public works led the state to rearrange its technical services, establishing an independent public works directorate during the 1870s along with the constitution of the body of civil engineers.

The new electricity sector, booming industrial activity, the management and extension of transport infrastructure, land reclamation,

urban planning and water and sewage networks all demanded the services of specially trained personnel.

According to the author, it is obvious that during this period engineers became gradually more prominent in public works, while they remained absent from the Greek industrial enterprises. During the 1890s, the requirements of the industrial sector for specialised technical personnel were covered almost exclusively through the employment of foreign engineers and craftsmen. These persons were usually placed in management positions, assuming responsibility in the factory hierarchy so as to import industrial technology and to educate the Greek craftsmen in the workplace. Human resources in the industrial sector were significantly enriched during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the recruitment of craftsmen trained in the private vocational schools mentioned above.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century new notions of scientific organisation of work emerged as the first generation of academically trained Greek engineers took up positions in the new industrial units. Some of them were graduates of the Technical University, while most had graduated from technical institutions abroad, mainly in Germany and Switzerland. A review of careers of some (Nikolaos Vlangalis, Alexandros Zachariou, Andreas Hatzikyriakou, Leontios Oikonomidis, Nikolaos Kanellopoulos, L. Agrapidis, Kleonymos Stylianidis, etc.) leads us to assume that they formed a distinguishable grouping, not so much as a result of fortuitous personal choices, but because a segment of the Greek bourgeoisie decided to participate in the industrial effort as entrepreneurs under the terms of Western-style capitalism. Based on existing evidence, nevertheless, it can be presumed that most factories continued to function without qualified engineers or production managers.

The third part deals with the inter-war years, when the National Technical University reinforced its position as an elite school. The elements that shaped it were the exceptionally high cognitive requirements for admission and the duration of studies, as well as its extended administrative independence. The consensus among the majority of professors to place academic independence before political preferences deterred any moves to undermine its independence.

The professoriate constituted a closed group possessing the characteristics of a social elite. As persons of eminent social prestige, they also enjoyed high earnings. The entry requirements to this group were exceptionally high. This was a body governed by self-formulated regulations. Beyond their professional and scientific qualifications, the prestige of these professors was also strengthened through their appointment to private enterprises and key government positions related to public works and utilities, as well as the chemical and military industry. Their description as a social elite is based on the statistics regarding family origins. From 1929 to 1937, 71 per cent of the students came from the middle- and upper middle class, their parents being tradesmen, freelance professionals, artisans, civil servants and persons of independent means.

In the early 1930s, the discussions concerning the direction of studies revolved around two axes: the first, centring on professionalism, viewed education as being in the service of the technical needs of the state and the construction sector, while the second believed education should be oriented towards science, technology, research and industrial applications. Notably, the dilemma of whether it should be a vocational school or technical university haunted the nature of *Polytechnion* during the interwar years.

Another important parameter determining the profession was the establishment of profes-

sional representative institutions for engineers, starting in 1899 with the foundation of the Polytechnic Association. In 1918, company executives founded the Association of Technical Executives of Private Enterprises in order to defend their own professional interests. Similar efforts continued up to 1920, when the General Union of Greek Engineers (GEEM) was established in order to offset the fragmentation of professional institutions. Then, in 1923 the Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE) was founded, which succeeded in, finally, incorporating all the relevant professional bodies. It also began, at the invitation of government authorities, a consultation process on technical subjects and technical education, gathering statistical information on the country's technical progress and the compilation of relative registers, functioning as arbiter in technical disputes among members and between members and the state, as well as making an intellectual contribution in the form of publications. The TEE promoted and defended the scientific aspirations and the professional interests of its members, while exercising disciplinary control. According to the author, this institution has been marked by the fact that it vacillated repeatedly in an effort to balance its role as technical adviser to the state and as representative of the professional interests of Greek engineers.

Throughout the interwar years, TEE policy followed aimed at guaranteeing the professional interests of its members. In order to safeguard the 'closed' nature of the profession, it sought to limit the number of students and graduates, as well as the number of foreign engineers, in Greece.

The fourth part contains an extensive list of engineers with their various specialties in their geographic distribution. It appears that Greek engineers were inspired by an ideal of progress that identified the modernisation and Westernisation of the state with scientific, technological and economic development. And

although Greece did not experience Western-style industrialisation to the full extent, it was the extensive shipping and services sector that shaped the Greek engineering profession.

In the fifth part, the author exposes the technocratic reasoning used by Greek engineers. While they initially adopted Saint-Simon's outlook on the role of technocracy, they arrived much later, in 1940, at the technocratic utopia of Nikolaos Kitsikis, who believed that engineers should be acknowledged as a hegemonic social force that would drive forward the modernisation of society.

Throughout, the author provides all the elements that are essential for an understanding of the formative years of the socio-professional group of engineers and their role in the development of Greek economy. An additional asset is the fact that he has drawn on information from the archives of the National Technical University as well as from Kitsikis' papers, located at the Heraklion Technical Vocational School. This wealth of information sheds light on multiple and interesting aspects of the book's theme. The tables presented in the appendix to each chapter that provide statistics drawn from archival sources will also prove useful to other researchers. Were such a plenitude of sources also available as regards the personnel of large industrial enterprises, our understanding of the role of engineers in the industrialisation of Greece would be greatly enriched.

Be that as it may, it is the importance of rescuing archives that emerges most strongly from this adroit presentation of information, a need still not fully grasped by Greek society, despite the efforts that have been undertaken in recent years. After all, until the not so distant past, primary sources were salvaged almost exclusively on the initiative of a few altruistic historians.

David Edgerton

***The Shock of the Old:
Technology and Global
History since 1900***

**London: Profile Books, 2006.
270 pp.**

by Yiannis Garyfallos

University of Athens and
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There has been a widespread assumption of a 'cultural lag' according to which society is frequently unable to keep up with technology. David Edgerton, Hans Rausing Professor of the History of Science and Technology at Imperial College London, suggests that it is usually the other way round: technology, as he perceives it, has been in many cases unable to keep up with society.

The history of technology has been studied under many theoretical lenses. At the two extremes, we find internalist assumptions about a technical evolution of artefacts and techniques that look for some inherently progressive technical logic, and an externalist historiography of technology which 'black-boxes' technology and cares only for the society around it. They have been supplemented by social constructionism, which argues for the co-construction of the technical and

the social and the corresponding symmetry between technical and social relationships. These differences aside, according to Edgerton, the vast majority of historians of technology have so far focused on the relatively brief and geographically restricted context of the invention and innovation of artefacts. By contrast, his book urges us to turn from the production of technology to the use of technology in extended temporal and spatial contexts.

But which technologies are indeed important? To answer this question, Edgerton rejects the canonical emphasis on invention and innovation and the associated focus of the innovation-centric history of technology. Studying technologies during the period of their invention and their innovation does not help (or, even worse, it misleads) us in our attempt to evaluate them. If we choose to deal only with such cases we are bound to narrow our perception of the technological phenomenon, in ways of both time and place. The correct way to appraise technologies, Edgerton suggests, is to focus on their use (especially on their long-term and extensive use). This allows us to properly comprehend their effect on (and thus significance for) the economy and society in general, not to mention their effect in turn on science and technology. In defence of his proposal, he reviews the historical literature on some of the most "highly esteemed" technologies (Teflon, nuclear power plants, Concorde, the contraceptive pill, malaria control methods), while he also calls for historiographical attention to the existence of historical alternatives to such technologies.

According to a widespread assumption, technology is defined by an ever-progressing and evolving timeline of breakthroughs, successful inventions that step aside the moment "undoubtedly superior" ones appear. And if some elements of "old" techniques persist, they are

just that: old stubborn techniques, out of date and place. In contrast to this view, Edgerton argues that there is a false conception of when and why a technology was widely used and for how long it remained active. Horses and mules were far more extensively active in the twentieth than in the preceding century, both in wartime and peacetime. Huge cities in the so-called third world are being built and continuously expanded through the use of "old-fashioned" and/or second-hand materials: bicycles rather than cars are in motion in vast numbers in large areas of the world. In other words, techniques from the rich part of the world seem to be transported to and remodelled in its poor part. This is what Edgerton refers to as "Creole technologies" (43). Moreover, as Edgerton observes, even in the rich Western world, older techniques that were once considered to be failures frequently reappear and are celebrated as new and innovative.

Edgerton also questions the conventional way in which we view the history of production, which assumes that there has been a dramatic discontinuity during an alleged shift from agriculture to industry (industrial revolution) and from that to services (postmodernism). The author points out that in doing so we have left the household out of the picture. He considers it important to acknowledge the continuity in some of the exemplar tools and machines of household work, like the sewing machine and the spinning wheel. These 'old', 'traditional' artefacts have broadly remained in use over time. They offer prime testimony against the innovation-centric perception of the history of technology. Edgerton moves on to review a literature that shows the persistence of small firms in the age of mass production, an era considered to be defined only by large mass-producing companies. In his view, the main shift has been to efficiency and not to scale.

The book goes on to argue about the importance of the maintenance and repair of technology. They can be thought of as special kinds of "use", which, unlike invention, do not occur only in a few places. They are global and contribute considerably to the emergence of "Creole technologies". The role of maintenance in cars, large-scale industries, airplanes and ships reveals its importance. The author offers some thoughts on the differences (and the similarities) between engineers and repairmen, suggesting that the old notion of the inferiority of the latter in comparison to the former can be disputed. Referring to a very interesting example, he mentions a special kind of state engineer (such as in France, Greece and elsewhere) who ought to be considered as the maintainers of society, concerned with the maintenance of the state (101), and responsible for the smooth operation of their countries.

One of the most popular assumptions has been that technology would help overcome all political and social boundaries, leading consequently to globalisation. What we actually observe when we follow Edgerton's line of thought is the existence of techno-nationalism, an idea that nations must be able to invent and innovate their own technology in order to gain power and respect (in deed as if in opposition to the already globalised world), to gain not only autarky but national identity itself.

In the case of technologies used in war, Edgerton's case studies are, again, impressive. Second World War bombers were used in recent years to launch ultrasonic jet planes (not so innovative after all) into the edges of space, First World War ships were used during the Second World War, and Second World War ships were used during the Gulf Wars. Furthermore, the author contests the as-

sumption that military technologies derive from civilian ones and that the militarists tend to resist innovation. In contrast, he argues that some of the most important civilian technologies were invented because of military research and/or military funding. In addition, the act of killing, be this of humans or animals, was still being performed in the twentieth century largely using "traditional" or "simple" artefacts, such as the poleaxe or machete. The techniques of killing did not seem to help the world become more civilised, and the belief that technology and science will make our society more peaceful and blissful seems to have failed us once again.

In the penultimate chapter, Edgerton doubts some of the common beliefs about inventing. He revises the ratio between academic and non-academic originated innovations, between successful and failed ones, between what changes (and where) and what remains the same and, once again, between technological invention-innovation and the importance of technology use. Edgerton argues that development expenditure has been much larger than research expenditure, contrary to commonly accepted fact. "By the standards of the past", he writes, "the present does not seem radically innovative" (203), which dispels the claim that the rate of invention in the world is ever-increasing.

Among the many virtues of the book is the ability of the author to raise aspects of the history of technology that have been more or less neglected, and thus to redefine what is technology and who deals with it in general. The book is full of "things" and people that would never strike us as being technologically important. For Edgerton, home appliances gain a place as technology worth considering and their users gain the role as protagonists of both technological change and techno-

logical persistence. Women and their association with technology come into the picture and thus the history of technology has much to contribute (and gain from) gender studies. Not only women, but also the non-white population, the poor and the "uneducated" are becoming technologically visible, thus filling "gaps" in the past and present evaluation of not only technology.

By shifting the historiographical emphasis from invention and innovation to technology in its broad use, the history of technology can interact better with social history in order to provide us with a more complete view of the past, actively assisting in the move away from technological determinism and the simplistic technological storytelling about a few brilliant, successful entrepreneurs. "History", writes Edgerton, "is changed when we put into it the technology that counts, not only the spectacular technologies but the low and ubiquitous ones. The historical study of things in use, and the uses of things, matters" (212). What seems to be old is not always surpassed, though it is often forgotten, unseen and/or left out. "Technology," he convincingly suggests, "has not generally been a revolutionary force; it has been responsible for keeping things the same as much as changing them" (212).

Mark Mazower

***Salonica, City of Ghosts:
Christians, Muslims and
Jews, 1430–1950***

**London: HarperCollins, 2004.
525 pp.**

by Antonis Molho

European University Institute

Within months of its original publication, Mark Mazower's *Salonica City of Ghosts* had become a Greek bestseller, its author often celebrated by reviewers as one of the major historians of our times. Hardly had the dust settled when the book's Greek translation was published, an event that transformed this British-born Columbia University professor into a Greek popular icon. Television programmes were now devoted to him; mass-circulation popular magazines printed glossy photographs of him. The author was invited to return to Greece to participate in a new round of celebratory presentations, and his visits were punctuated by interviews he generously granted to representatives of the major press. An observer not quite familiar with contemporary Greece might well wonder how to account for this fuss. As we shall see below, Mazower does not depart much from some older views on Salonica's history. Yet, these are all but unknown to the wider Greek public. Why has Mazower's interpretation gained such wide

acclaim, while the older ones have remained known only to a few specialists in the field of Ottoman and Balkan history? One possible explanation is that Mazower's book appeared about two or three generations following the three key events in the city's twentieth-century history: its incorporation into the Greek state in 1912, the arrival of a very substantial number of Greek Orthodox refugees from Asia Minor in 1922–23, and the extermination of its substantial Jewish population by the Germans in 1943. Its older Muslim population was expelled and effectively eliminated more than 80 years ago. Jews now number a mere 800, a grain of sand in the ocean of the city's 1.5 million inhabitants. Now that, following a series of events of unspeakable violence, Salonica has been Hellenised and Christianised, the media can accept the city's multi-cultured, multi-ethnic past as a colourful, if innocuous, moment of a remote history. *Amarcord* ...

In the midst of this hoopla, important scholars also addressed the book's virtues, Mazower's contribution to Greek historiography, his subtle and elegantly presented challenge to the hegemonic discourse regarding Greece's past and its relationship to the present, and his ability to show by example that a compelling historical account can be written in beautiful, often gripping, prose. Naturally, it would have been surprising if some dissonant notes had not broken through this choral celebration. Interestingly, professional historians were reticent in their criticism. But some politicians were quick to note, and disassociate themselves from what, not unreasonably, they took to be, the book's sceptical stance towards the often stridently nationalist and populist tone that often dominates current political discourse in Thessaloniki (and more generally in Greece). "Unpresentable" was the current mayor's characterisation of the book. Too much attention devoted to the city's Jews, complained a reader in a letter to

his newspaper. A distortion of the city's links with its Macedonian tradition, the book, therefore, is worthless, blurted an angry propagandist from an internet site in Holland. More seriously, a young, Oxford-trained Greek-Cypriot historian challenged Mazower for his allegedly "odious" treatment of the Holocaust.

In addition to the discussion in Greece, the book has attracted major attention in the international (mostly Anglophone) highbrow press. So much has been written about it, one wonders if anything useful can be added to this discussion. In what follows, unconcerned with a systematic coverage of the book's numerous and varied themes, I raise a few points that have so far, perhaps, not been sufficiently discussed.

Perhaps one should first say that in this big and weighty book's Introduction and Aftermath a reader will find a timely and pointed disquisition on the study of the past in Greece. These two sections could usefully be reprinted as a separate essay and brought to the attention of participants in the recent and very angry, even violent, public discussion in Greece about the merits and faults of the proposed new history textbook intended for use by 11-year-old schoolchildren. What animated this discussion was a deep sense that long-accepted historiographic canons are being attacked just as a certain vision of Greek culture seems threatened by the twin processes of Europeanisation and globalisation. A reading of these two relatively short sections of Mazower's book might help to bring this discussion into focus. For Mazower, as fine a diplomat as he is a historian, concerned as he declares himself to be with the "city's endless metamorphoses" (4), faces the challenge of seeing "the experiences of Christians, Jews and Muslims within the terms of a single encompassing experience" (10). This approach runs the risk of alienating simultaneously members of two camps:

most importantly, partisans of a hegemonic Greek historiography which has insisted on the perennially Greek character of the city's history from the time of its foundation in antiquity through the centuries of Ottoman domination; secondarily, a much smaller, less widely known and accepted historiographical tradition, whose members have argued that the city acquired a predominantly Jewish character from the arrival of the Iberian Jews in the late fifteenth century to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations following the Greco-Turkish War in 1922–23.

Greek and Jewish accounts of the city's history have, over the years "passed each other by", each insisting on only one dimension of the city's history (9). Mazower's vision of an urban history *in fieri*, in which the city's story would emerge as "a tale not only of smooth transitions and adaptations, but also of violent endings and new beginnings" (6) represents, it seems to me, a forthright challenge to the established canon of Greek (and, secondarily, of Jewish) historiography. So does Mazower's final reflection that what happened in Salonica suggests a different kind of story than those stories fashioned by historians wedded to the causes of one of the successive waves of arrivals to the city. It is a "saga of turbulence, upheaval, abandonment and recovery in which chance, not destiny, played a greater part" (474). The "myth of eternal Hellenism" (469), the "fundamentally instrumental conception of history" on which Greek and Jewish historians have relied (curiously, Mazower tells us little about Muslim/Turkish conceptions of Thessaloniki's history) render less useful the evocation of "national heroes and villains" (10). Instead, one searches for a history in which the roles of hero and villain are "blurred and confused". If the city's Greek-Byzantine character was violently transformed in 1430, when the Ottoman armies conquered it, it was sub-

sequently transformed, again and again, with the arrival of the Iberian Jews, the later arrival of the Marranos, later still of the Italian Jews, and then, thrice in the twentieth century, it was convulsed with the arrival of perhaps as many as 100,000 Greek Orthodox refugees from Asia Minor in 1922–23, with the deportation and murder of about 50,000 Jews in 1943, and, more recently since the early 1990s, with the settlement of another some 100,000 immigrants from eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Each of these groups (although it is much too soon to know how the most recent immigrants will fare) transformed the city, looked to the past for elements that would render the present more meaningful, and cobbled together a history that was turned into a shield of political and ideological designs.

Salonica and its society thus emerge from the pages of Mazower's book – as they had substantially emerged from the pages of Nehama and Risal's pioneering books – as a palimpsest. Salonica itself, over its long history, has not simply had a Greek, or Jewish, or, even, a Turkish character. In one of the book's most suggestive chapters ("Messiahs, Martyrs and Miracles"), Mazower presents the characteristics of the three major religious groups during the city's little less than five centuries (1430–1912) of Ottoman domination, dwelling upon the tensions that often emerged not so much between Christian, Jews, and Muslims as within followers of each of the three major religions. It is worth quoting him here at some length:

The city found itself at the intersection of many different creeds. Through the Sufi orders it was linked to Iran, Anatolia, Thrace and Egypt; the Marranos bridged the Catholicism of the Iberian peninsula, Antwerp and Papal Italy; the faith of the Sabbatarians was carried by Jewish believers into Poland, Bohemia, Germany and eventu-

ally North America, while the seventeenth-century Metropolitan Athanasios Patellarios came to the city via Venetian Crete and Ottoman Sinai before he moved on to Jassy, Istanbul, Russia and the Ukraine, his final resting-place. Salonica lay in the centre of an Ottoman oikumeni, which was at the same time Muslim, Christian and Jewish. Perhaps only now, since the end of the Cold War and the re-opening of many of these same routes, is it again possible to calculate the impact of such an extensive sacred geography and to see how it underpinned the profusion of faiths which sustained the city's inhabitants. (95)

One has the sense that in this passage (and in the many telling pages that illustrate this point) Mazower got it just right: that the very character of the city's culture during the hundreds of years of Ottoman rule was its opening to the world, its capacity, at once, to host people of very different origin and to send out to the far corners of that *Ottoman oikumeni* ideas that were worked out by the "city's inhabitants".

The city's inhabitants thus emerge as Salonica's real heroes: the individuals who, as members of well-defined communities, for some years or several generations, settled, prospered, or suffered there. The book is populated by dozens of attractive, and curious characters – Christians, Muslims, and Jews – whom Mazower presents with a mixture of sympathetic, if on occasion ironic and condescending, understanding. These were men (and an occasional woman) who lived in that complex world where religious and, secondarily, ethnic identities, theoretically at least, were defined with a fair degree of precision, but who, because of circumstances and unpredictable vagaries, were often inspired (or forced) to smudge the boundaries of the official taxonomies of their age. Mazower thus effectively and

brilliantly undermines official historiographic narratives. How could a certain type of Greek historiography that has, since the middle of the nineteenth century, thrived on the notion of the Turks's systematic destruction of Greek Orthodox institutions and beliefs accommodate in its history of Turkish-dominated Salonica the picture of the Muslim guardians of the relic of Saint Demetrios? And how could much traditional Jewish historiography, nurtured on the notion of the Jews' heroic resistance and defence of their faith, come to terms with the picture of Jews living in Salonica (often rhetorically referred to as "The Mother of Israel") who often, and seemingly effortlessly, changed their faith, and identity, becoming Muslims, even, on occasion, Christians? At one level, Mazower is brilliantly successful in meeting his goal of writing a history in which the roles of hero and villain are "blurred and confused". Page after page one reads with admiration the rich mosaic of social relations constructed with the sure hand of a master narrator.

Yet, at another level, one must wistfully note that this success has been achieved at a price. Especially in the book's first half or more, the cost has been the muting of the voices of Salonica's inhabitants themselves. What I mean is this: as one reads along, carried on by Mazower's fluent prose, one becomes aware of another set of protagonists who hover over his Salonica. In a real sense, they are the ghosts invoked in the book's subtitle. They are individuals, mostly hailing from regions of western Europe, who, at one time or another from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, travelled to the city and left written documentation of their visits. Priests, ministers and missionaries, scholars, and archaeologists, diplomats and soldiers, merchants, sailors and adventurers, they were mostly well travelled, and widely read, curious about the world, and eager to impress their own audiences with their cle-

verness and their acuity of observation. Whatever their success with their contemporary readers, they quite evidently impressed Mazower, who turned them into his principal informants for large periods of Salonica's history (the period that spans the fifteenth to well into the nineteenth centuries). Mazower, who it seems had no access to documents written either in Ottoman Turkish or in Hebrew, relied on these outsider accounts to reconstruct the histories of the city's inhabitants. So, for all its quality in presenting to an international public the history of a fascinatingly complex society such as that of Salonica, the book seems to me to suffer from its author's one-sided angle of vision, a sort of colonialist vision, drawing on the recollections or reports of these visitors for an understanding of what happened there. It is an external angle of vision, in the sense that this historian's informers were themselves outside observers, often unable even to communicate with the natives in their own languages. Regardless of the current insistence that historians construct (and do not reveal) the past, it surely makes a difference if the building blocks of one's constructions are themselves first hand and original, drawn from the experience of the people whose lives are presented in a book's pages.

It may of course be churlish to set for Mazower a standard that the vast majority of historians today, this reviewer included, would find it difficult to meet. Yet, it strikes me that this is a serious limit, not simply in a general, theoretical sense, but in the very topics Mazower chose to privilege or to deal with more summarily. Take one example: the treatment of the Marranos. There is no question but that the arrival of substantial numbers of these (originally crypto-) Jews to Salonica represented a turning point in the history of local Judaism. Complex issues of identity and belonging had to be faced, and Salonican rabbis acquired a European-wide reputation because of their learned judg-

ments in settling questions that were at once practical and broadly theological in their implications. Seldom has Euro-American historiography on the Marranos drawn on the substantial corpus of Salonican rabbinic judgements, where one will find discussed, often in graphic detail, a wide range of issues central to Salonica's history. Very little of this literature has been translated and not much more used by 'Western' scholars in their monographic studies. Most probably for this reason, Mazower's treatment of the Marranos is limited to less than two pages. In his breezily efficient style, he placed the Marranos in his rich canvas but really had very little to say about them. Rather, he immediately shifted his attention to the history of Sabbatainism, a more widely studied and better-known subject. There, drawing on the substantial literature spawned on the wake of Gershom Sholem's classic study of Sabbatai Zevi, Mazower examined the history of those Jews, not few in number, who, following the call of the self-proclaimed Messiah Sabbatai Zevi, were converted to Islam. The history of the *Dönme* (turncoats) or, as they called themselves, the *Ma'min* (faithful), is fascinating, having attracted a fair amount of attention both by historians of Judaism and of Salonica. They survived as an important élite minority, and were, unfortunately for the city, expelled from Greece in the Greco-Turkish population exchanges in 1922–23. Yet, for all their importance, nothing justifies the imbalance of Mazower's treatment of Marranos and Dönme – nothing but the nature of the literature available in translation from the Hebrew.

Mazower is evidently more at home in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For him this is familiar territory, and it is especially in his treatment of the last 60 to 70 years of his account (from roughly the 1880s to the immediate post-Second World War years) that his presentation gains an immediacy and fresh-

ness that his treatment of the earlier centuries lacks. His account of the Great Fire (1917) and the chapter ("Preparing for Tango") on the city's changing social customs in the three decades following Salonica's incorporation into the Greek state in 1912 are impressive social tableaux which convey the intensity of radical changes that modernity introduced to Salonica, in coincidence with its passage to the Greek state, World War I and the city's occupation by Allied troops, and the consequences of the huge influx of refugees in the 1920s. Three themes dominate Mazower's presentation here: the changing ethnic/religious geometries of the city's population; the city's Hellenisation and its governance/management by the Greek state; and the place of the Jewish population until its extermination in the early 1940s. Keeping his eye firmly on the political context within which Salonican society had to adjust, and ever sensitive (even in this part of his presentation) to foreign ambassadorial and military reports, Mazower catches some of the key tensions that defined the city's history.

Yet, even here, it strikes me that the images that define Mazower's twentieth-century Salonica often raise questions. His telescopic lens offers an attractive panoramic image. But all too many aspects of the city's internal history (aspects to which foreign observers might not have been especially interested) are missing from this panorama. One has the sense that the imperative of narration, of getting on with the story in a reasonable economy of presentation, forces Mazower not only to paper over details (an obviously necessary rhetorical strategy) but also to overlook aspects that are integral to Salonica's history. Crucially, the city's social structure following both the city's occupation by Allied troops and the arrival of the huge number of Greek Orthodox settlers following the Greco-Turkish exchange of populations receives scant treatment. The

development of a syndicalist movement originally identified with some of the city's Jews is of course mentioned, but its consequences for the growth of a bitter anti-Semitic sentiment not only among the newly arrived refugees but also among the recently formed entrepreneurial classes (and the markedly discriminatory government policies with regard to the large Jewish population) are tucked away in the margins of a narration whose explicit object is to write a history without victors or victims.

There is, also, the question of Mazower's treatment of Greek anti-Semitism. This is an issue that occasionally surfaces in Greek public discourse and which, at last, has attracted the attention of some major historians. Among them, a small number, Yorgos Margaritis, Frangiski Abatzopoulou, Rena Molho and Henriette Benveniste, have opened up new frontiers in the discussion by putting very clearly in focus the extent to which an anti-Semitic discourse was and remains a deeply structural feature of Greek culture. The question assumes a great importance in Salonica's history. After all, in a period of only a few months, from March to August 1943, the German occupiers successfully deported to concentration camps more than 50,000 Jews, the overwhelming majority of whom were murdered there. To be sure, direct responsibility for this barbarism is the Germans', alone. But what of the context in which the Germans carried out their murderous design? Were local Salonicans implicated – directly or not – in the massive roundup and deportation of their Jewish neighbours? If so, can one identify these local residents, can one point to levels of collaboration between the occupiers and groups of locals? Can one raise the question of who gained from the substantial elimination of Salonica's Jewish community? Is there political responsibility to be assigned to local, political, business, ecclesiastical elites? Collaborationism is a delicate and

controversial issue, and very few historians in Greece have broached the subject. To his credit, Mazower does broach it, but there is a reticence in his treatment, a hesitation to examine the issue clearly and to draw the appropriate implications. Throughout, his vision is clouded by a reluctance to say something that might seem offensive. It would be nice to be able to accept his rumination that, at the end of the 1930s, "left to themselves, Greeks and Jews might well have sorted out their differences" (419). But one knows, from what happened from 1922/23 to 1945, that this is merely wishful thinking, an observation through rose-tinted glasses of a sad and sordid situation.

There is no desire here to whitewash the record of many courageous Greek Christians who put their lives and their security on the line to help Jewish compatriots. A huge percentage of those few Jews who lived through the war hidden somewhere in Greece owe their survival to the benevolence and courage of often very modest folk. But the numbers are small, not to say minuscule. An examination of the rest of the picture gives rise to disturbing questions. Two examples: the destruction of the Jewish cemetery, created in the late fifteenth century, one of the oldest and largest in Europe. It is customary to blame the Germans for its destruction in 1943. But responsibility for this act of barbarism goes much beyond, encompassing large segments of the city's political leadership. On the site of the old cemetery stands today the campus of the city's huge university. Sixty-three years following that destruction, there is no mention anywhere in that temple of learning of the fact that generations of Jews had once been buried in that sacred ground. A complicity of silence, born of a collective desire to paper over an embarrassing memory and the city's responsibility for that destruction, needs to be shattered. Mazower raised

the issue, but did much less than he could have done to set off a much needed, if very painful, discussion on the fate of the Jewish cemetery. The second example has to do with Jewish properties. What happened to them after the war? Who profited from the mass extermination of Salonican Jewry? To what extent has post-war prosperity been built on the foundations of property that once belonged to Jews and, through means that we are far from understanding, passed to non-Jewish hands? Here, again and to his credit, Mazower raises the question. But he has very little of substance to say about the subject, even though he was one of the first (if not the very first) historian to have located and studied the records of the state organisation established to oversee the administration of Jewish properties. Evidently, the subject is too controversial; it touches too many interests and sensitivities. It does not lend itself to Mazower's conciliatory and irenic tone.

Mazower seems to me to have missed an opportunity. He wrote a very good book, bringing to the attention of a wide public a past – Salonica's distant past – that, to many of his readers in Anglophone countries, and, certainly, in Greece, must seem like a different country; *they did things differently there*. But anyone vaguely familiar with some older works on Salonica (for example, Leon Sciaky's magnificent memoir, and Risal's *Une ville convoitée*) will not be surprised by the general lines of a picture Mazower drew with impressive and elegant skill. If Mazower wanted to add something new to the historiographic discussion, if he wanted to open up new topics and remove the veil from questions that a conspiracy of silence have kept away from the centre of public discussion, he could have addressed, with greater openness and less concern with the geometric balances of a diplomatic approach, questions such as

that of Greek anti-Semitism and its expression in the Second World War. Robert Paxton (by coincidence, a colleague of Mazower's at Columbia University) when faced with a comparable task in the course of his studies of French collaborationism in World War II, did not shy away from the challenge. For reasons that Mark Mazower alone knows, he proved reluctant to do so. This reticence diminishes the value of an otherwise excellent (and justifiably popular) book of history.

Yannis Yannitsiotis

***Η κοινωνική ιστορία του
Πειραιά. Η συγκρότηση της
αστικής τάξης 1860–1910*
[*The Social History of
Piraeus. The Formation of
the Middle Class
1860–1910*]**

Athens: Nefeli, 2006. 444 pp.

by Paris Papamichos Chronakis

University of Crete

The inappropriateness of class analysis has been, for some time, a common methodological dictum of all the major historical syntheses on nineteenth-century Greece. Several specialised works on philanthropy, first-wave feminism, female education and sports may have implicitly questioned this assumption; however, emanating as they did from the hitherto marginalised field of women's history, they have so far done little to resolutely shake it.

Taking his cue from these pioneering attempts, the work of Yannis Yannitsiotis constitutes the first systematic effort to use class as an analytical tool to explore social relations in nineteenth-century Greece. His book focuses on Piraeus during the period from

1860 to 1910 when it grew spectacularly from a small town of 6,000 inhabitants to become one of the major ports in the eastern Mediterranean. Opting for the study of a *local* middle class, Yannitsiotis highlights the importance of space in historical analysis. The formation of the Piraeus middle class was a historical phenomenon that occurred as much in a given space as in a given time.

Yannitsiotis draws freely from the findings of what has become an extensive historiography on the European middle classes to provide a compellingly balanced conceptualisation of class. Class formation is dependent upon the confluence of a complex set of economic, social, political and cultural changes. However, far from being an objective 'reality' and its unmediated 'experience', it is also a prominent, although not unique, system of signification. The middle-class subjects were the historical outcome of both structural forces and of their own actions. Their inventive practices and representations imbued the changing social relations with novel meanings and, thus, led to the construction, performance and challenging of class identities. Consequently, Yannitsiotis focuses as much on the structural transformations occurring in Piraeus as on the changes in the systems of signification through which its middle-class inhabitants experienced them.

Appositely entitled "In search of the middle class", Part One tackles the problem of how best to identify the middle class of Piraeus. Relying upon historically specific criteria, Yannitsiotis reconstructs the actually existing social hierarchies and identifies the middle-class men of Piraeus as that diverse stratum encompassing those with a certain amount of property, who retained at least one female domestic servant, resided in the central parishes of the city and employed certain

cultural practices of publicity. By the late nineteenth century, changes in the field of labour (such as commercial specialisation, the separation of manual work from management and of the home from the workplace) meant that this stratum was further distinguished by a remarkable professional diversity and novel labour practices.

Its profile is analysed in Part Two, where Yannitsiotis focuses on its geographical origins, social mobility and professional life. He discerns four groups that correspond to an equal number of distinct, generational-cum-migratory waves, each with its own particular professional orientation. Contrary to other Greek cities, the economic growth of Piraeus and the diversity and dynamism of its middle class owed, therefore, much to the arrival of and the coexistence and interaction between these successive groups of migrant entrepreneurs, particularly after 1880. By reconstructing their life stories, Yannitsiotis also shows that when they moved into Piraeus they already bore the necessary economic, social and cultural capital. Thus, he provides the most systematic critique to date of the stereotype of the self-made Greek entrepreneur and convincingly demonstrates that social mobility must be understood as the ever-precarious outcome of a complex interplay between family networks, marital and distribution strategies, economic structures and conjunctures, movement and locality.

A meticulously researched account of middle-class professional life further demonstrates the deep interdependence of family and enterprise. Extending his analysis beyond the (negligible) role of the dowry to include an examination of marital alliances based on the locality and commonality of profession as well as of the gradual proliferation of general partnerships between brothers, Yannitsiotis shows

how family ties strengthened the unity of the enterprise and its position in a multitude of networks. In turn, entrepreneurial growth or failure determined the public image of the family and structured the gender identity of its members. Despite multiple female contributions to the enterprise, only middle-class manliness was linked to independent work, thrift and progress as well as care for the (dependent) family, whereas failure came to be regarded as the major source of its loss.

Part Three shifts the focus of analysis from structures to discourses and explores the importance of a certain configuration of the 'public interest' in the construction of gendered middle-class identities in Piraeus. Yannitsiotis focuses on three distinct, but historically interrelated fields: the construction of urban otherness, the articulations of a local civic identity and the changing significations of leisure.

From the 1880s onwards, the figures of the prostitute, the criminal, the poor and the epidemic victim were incessantly produced through the novel discourses of public morality, public safety and social hygiene. Prostitution, interpersonal violence, drunkenness and epidemic disease were criminalised and attributed to the particular practices of leisure and sociability characterising the popular strata, which were now demonised and marginalised accordingly. This symbolic production of social distinctions fashioned a particular set of core middle-class values under threat as well as novel middle-class subjectivities exemplified in the figure of the philanthropist. Yannitsiotis moves beyond the functionalist explanatory scheme of social control and approaches philanthropy as an essential component of middle-class identity. Philanthropy was associated with a new notion of (liberal) civic duty, a reworked sense of re-

ligiosity as public performance and a strong awareness of national responsibility. It promoted the social status of its practitioner, enforced his political power and forged his public image. Such an individualistic configuration resulted in the predominance of private initiatives. Unlike Athens, subsidised charitable institutions appeared in Piraeus only very late in the nineteenth century.

This production of difference was coupled with the articulation of a particular local civic identity. Being a 'Piraeuote' (i.e., a citizen of Piraeus) gradually crystallised into a classed category which furnished the city's middle class with the necessary coherence. This most innovative chapter follows the metamorphoses of this local identity from its emergence in the late 1860s to its waning in the early 1900s. Piraeus was initially represented as a 'beehive' of laborious, municipality-centred citizens. During the 1880s, urban growth, the discovery of the 'dangerous classes', and the severe, but ultimately overcome, economic crisis resulted in a less homogenised reconfiguration. Local identity was now forged around the axes of opposition to the state, fierce competition with the other port cities of Greece, and the figure of the 'heroic' entrepreneur whose individual male values the city now bore. Finally, by the end of the nineteenth century, Piraeus once again refashioned itself as the European face of Greece, the index of its economic development. Its entrepreneurs now expressed their growing self-confidence and sense of independence through the associational organisation of their business interests and successfully demanded a separate constituency that would represent the city's interests more faithfully. Yet, by the early 1910s, having consolidated their position as leaders in what had finally become a unified national market and confronting rising labour militancy,

they abandoned localism in favour of national, fully class-based forms of institutional organisation. Even leisure, as the final chapter shows, had a role to play in this process. The passage from the early educational associations to the various sports clubs not only signalled the emergence of new fields of social distinction and new concepts of proper male and female middle-class youth; by the early twentieth century leisure, conceived as 'civilisation', became an irreplaceable component of middle-class life and contributed to the formulation of a new ideal of manliness. Yet, adopting leisure-as-civilisation challenged the given identification of Piraeus with male work (which was perceived as 'progress') and therefore undermined any sense of a particular local identity. Hence, by 1910 the Piraeus middle class was by all accounts entering into a wholly different phase of its existence.

This work is a model of meticulous archival research, methodological innovation and sound, ethnographically rich historical reconstruction. Conscious of their discursive character, Yannitsiotis imaginatively approaches hitherto untapped sources as a set of historically specific cultural practices. His careful examination of the particular contexts that imbued them with meaning turns their apparent blind spots into surprising vistas. Thus, the sources become an intrinsic part of the narrative itself with the temporality of wills, the rationale behind the commercial directories, or the 'spatial stories' the press employed, manifesting a particular middle-class worldview.

Being the first systematic exploration of the much-maligned nineteenth-century Greek middle classes, this work also provides some urgently needed correctives to a number of long-standing historiographically received wisdoms. The entrepreneurial strategies of the Piraeus middle class, such as real-es-

tate investment and capital dispersion, are re-evaluated as rational business moves and not as proof of weak entrepreneurship. In the realm of politics, the examination of the many ways this middle class formulated and promoted its interests renders obsolete the dominant paradigm of patronage. The result is the portrait of a dynamic social class and a convincing demonstration of the importance of class analysis for the study of late nineteenth-century Greek society.

Twenty years after the deconstruction of class, this might sound like a methodological anachronism. Yet, Yannitsiotis' work is also important for proposing a reworked concept of class as a valid category of historical analysis. Its sensitivity to both the structural and the discursive, its approach to class as both a social relation and a rhetorical trope may not always result in a seamless analysis, as the abrupt transition from Part Two to Part Three demonstrates; nevertheless, it does present a commendable methodological proposition which comes very close to current historiographical discussions on the possibilities of writing culturally informed and yet still socially grafted histories of society.¹

However, Yannitsiotis' basic methodological assumptions and historical conclusions also raise some critical questions. To begin with, he rightly foregrounds the question of space and the ways class is always spatialised. It is therefore unusual that so little consideration is given to the fact that Piraeus was primarily a port – all the more so since eleven out of the book's 24 illustrations depict its harbour and quay. A more thorough examination of the central role of the port in the lives and minds of the Piraeus middle class would no doubt have resulted in a more historically nuanced and spatially specific account of its formation.

Further on, Yannitsiotis' well-intentioned move beyond the narrative of Greek exceptionalism as 'failed modernisation' means that his analysis implicitly emphasises the commonalities between the Piraeus and other European middle classes. Consequently, the importance of local cultural systems in shaping the distinct outlook of this middle class is overlooked. Thus, Yannitsiotis neglects the impact of Greek Orthodoxy on the values of what he himself considers a "conservative" middle class, whereas the role of nationalism in legitimising 'modern' middle-class practices through their association with 'Greekness' is only marginally dealt with. So too, more generally, is the local appropriation of imported, Western 'bourgeois' values. How such purportedly universal values were read and re-signified in situ is nevertheless of critical importance, particularly since Yannitsiotis rightly insists that class gradually replaced locality as the chief site of identity formation in late nineteenth-century Piraeus.

Likewise, although Yannitsiotis adheres to a relational concept of class and provides admirable analyses of the ways 'difference' was symbolically constructed, he nonetheless pays scant attention to the role of the working class in middle-class formation. The impact of the great strikes of 1903 and 1906 is dealt with only schematically. However, greater attention to those early but pivotal moments of class conflict would no doubt have further strengthened one of the book's most valid arguments, namely the importance of late nineteenth-century (middle-) class politics in understanding the surprisingly fierce class conflicts that dominated Greek politics throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

This brings us to a final observation concerning the question of change. Yannitsiotis provides a detailed mapping of the multiple

transformations that led to the formation of the Piraeus middle class, insisting on each one's specific logic and temporality. However, their causes remain largely obscure. The analytical, expansive narrative strategy employed ultimately downplays the importance of one critical moment, namely the 1880s. Characterised by an acute, protracted economic crisis and a lethal epidemic, this decade seems to have ushered in a whole set of transformations, ranging from changes in the professional hierarchies and entrepreneurial strategies to new marriage patterns, reformulated gender roles and novel perceptions of urban space. Although the 1880s crisis is a recurrent motive of the analysis, it is never comprehensively addressed as a formative moment in the history of the Piraeus middle class. Thus, while Yannitsiotis rightly rejects monocausal explanations, he misses the opportunity to reflect on the importance of the conjuncture in class formation and hence to formulate an even richer methodological proposal and an even more historically distinct portrayal of his subject. Yet, this omission is equally to his credit. This is a virtuosic work employing diverse methodologies and imaginatively examining a dauntingly wide array of different fields. Accordingly, it is also, by default, an open work, and it should therefore be highly praised even for that, for ultimately succeeding in generating among its readers as many questions as it answers.

NOTE

- 1 See, in particular, Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, *The Future of Class in History. What's Left of the Social?* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007 and William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of History. Social Theory and Social Transformation*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Eftyhia D. Liata

***Η Κέρκυρα και η
Ζάκυνθος στον κυκλώνα
του αντισημιτισμού. Η
«συκοφαντία για το αίμα»
του 1891
[Kerkyra and Zakynthos
in the Cyclone of Anti-
Semitism: The “Blood Libel”
of 1891]***

**Athens: Institute for Neohellenic
Research of the National
Hellenic Research Foundation,
2006. 255 pp.**

by Thomas W. Gallant

University of California, San Diego

In the spring of 1891 anti-Semitic riots erupted on the islands of Kerkyra (Corfu) and Zakynthos (Zante). Over a number of weeks, members of the Jewish communities on each island were periodically subjected to coordinated assaults against their persons and property. The significance of these events, moreover, transcended the narrow bounds of these insular communities. The pogroms became a central issue in the local, municipal and the national parliamentary elections,

as well as sparking a debate in Greece and among the Greeks of the Diaspora about Hellenism and anti-Semitism. Across Europe, editorials were published that castigated Greece for allowing such calamitous outrages to occur. So important were the Ionian island anti-Semitic pogroms that even two years later they were the subject of a panel at the Parliament of World Religions. In spite of their significance during the nineteenth century *fin de siècle*, until the publication of Eftyhia Liata's tome, no book-length study of them had been undertaken, and they have been almost completely absent from Greek historiography. On these grounds alone, its publication is to be welcomed. But in addition to presenting us with the most detailed and best discussion of the Ionian island anti-Semitic riots, she also reproduces a number of the key primary sources on which her account is based.

The book is divided into five substantive chapters and an appendix containing a selection of primary sources. Chapter One, "The Kerkyra Events", tells the story of the violence on Kerkyra. On 1 April 1891, eight-year-old Rubina Vita Sarda left her parents' house to play with her elder sister. She was never seen alive again. When she failed to return home, her parents began a search and notified the police. Later that night, three Jews found her body in a bloody sack in the doorway of a house in the Jewish ghetto. Her murder was never solved and never will be. In spite of the fact the victim was herself a Jew, rumours quickly spread among Orthodox Greeks that the Jews had in fact killed a Christian girl in order to collect her blood to make the special bread Jews ate during Passover. The cry of "blood libel" was heard once more. Over the following days and weeks, men, some acting on their own and others in gangs, destroyed Jewish properties and assaulted Jews. Not

only did the police not stop the attacks, they stood by and watched as the pogrom progressed. Eventually, troops and police were deployed and the violence was brought to an end, but only after intense pressure had been brought to bear, including the dispatching of British warships with orders to intervene in order to protect British subjects in the Jewish community. Hundreds of people were wounded and numerous properties destroyed. To this point, the episodes on Kerkyra resemble similar blood libel riots that took place in Europe and the Near East, but relying heavily on the report by the public prosecutor, Theagenis Kefalas, Liata gives the story a very local twist. It appears that the attacks on the Jewish communities were intimately connected to Greek politics, and particularly to the upcoming (June 1891) municipal elections, with the supporters of the Deligiannis party accusing the Trikoupiists of masterminding the riots to drive off the pro-Deligiannis Jewish vote. As she shows, there was more than just Greek anti-Semitism involved in the Kerkyra events. In Chapter Two, she recounts what happened on Zakynthos. Incited by the reports of the Kerkyra pogroms, a gang of Christian men launched attacks on the city's Jewish ghetto. But this time the authorities intervened more quickly. A cohort of 50 soldiers was deployed and stopped the violence. The respite, however, was fleeting. Two days later on Easter Friday (14 April), the procession of the Cross descended into an orgy of violence against the Jews, resulting in five fatalities and numerous casualties before order could be restored. Relying almost exclusively on an account by Frederick Carrer, she shows that events on Zakynthos, while still having a political dimension, were not carbon copies of the events on Kerkyra. One of the most important consequences of the attacks on the Jewish communities was a mass exodus. Thousands of people chose

to leave the islands, especially Kerkyra, to escape further persecution and violence.

In Chapter Three, “The Social and Political Dimension”, she turns to how these events were reported and debated in the press. She divides her discussion into two sections, one devoted to the press and the other to pamphlets and broadsheets. The blood libel violence incited a wave of editorialising in local, national and foreign newspapers. Laid out in the papers were the full range of interpretations and explanations. Some, like the pieces by Iakovos Polyas in his Kerkyran paper, *Rhigas o Feraios*, adopted a very anti-Semitic tone; while others, like the articles published by Ioannis Gennadios in England, admitted that anti-Semitism was at the root of the violence, but glossed it by arguing that among Greeks only the Ionian islanders were anti-Semites. The overall impression one comes away with from Liata’s discussion is that it was political orientation, pro-Trikoupis or pro-Deligiannis, that largely shaped how the press wrote about the blood libel events. Chapter Four examines how Jews were represented in Greek literature. She focuses most of her attention on the writings of Grigorios Xenopoulos and Alexandros Papiadimitis. Xenopoulos, who had grown up on Zakynthos, was an early and vocal critic of the anti-Jewish attacks, and the figure of the Jew was a prominent feature in many of his works. Liata presents an excellent analysis of Xenopoulos’s work. In Chapter Five, “The Historiography of the ‘Jewish Event’ of 1891”, in addition to tracing how the events have been written about since 1891, she also discusses the work that has been done on the Jewish communities on the islands during the nineteenth century. The book ends with a lengthy, 89-page appendix containing a selection of documents, including the detailed report by Theagenis Kefalas (mentioned earlier), a se-

lection of letters, and the diary kept by Antonios Pofantis during the Zakynthos pogrom.

The strength of this book is its presentation and discussion of the primary sources on the Ionian Island blood libel riots. All future scholarship on them will begin with this book, and especially with the primary sources contained in it. The deficiencies of the book are on the analytical side. In spite of the wealth and richness of the primary sources, Liata never provides us with a full narrative of what actually happened. We do not learn, for example, who was attacked, when, and by whom. What were the chronological and spatial dimensions of the attacks? As she notes, there exists complete lists of the victims and the properties destroyed during the violence, but she does nothing with them. We know that the police and military intervened, but what happened when they did? Was there Christian on Christian violence? How many casualties were sustained on each side? In short, the story of the riots is not narrated in this book. Neither does the author explain why they occurred nor how they relate to other episodes of anti-Semitic violence at the time. The problem here is lack of context. The 1891 events were just the latest in the long history of tensions and occasional violence between Jews and Christians on Kerkyra and Zakynthos. The rich source materials contained in the splendid *Ιστορικό Αρχείο της Κέρκυρας* (Historical Archive of Kerkyra) provide us with a massive amount of information that could have been used to place the 1891 episodes into their local, social context. They must also be seen in a broader context as well. Virulent anti-Semitism swept across Europe and the Near East during the nineteenth century and violence against Jewish communities on the pretext of blood libel was becoming increasingly common; episodes of blood libel riots occurred in, among others, Damascus (1840 and 1890), Alexan-

dria (1880), Xanten, Germany (1891), and Polná, Bohemia (1899). How did the events on the Ionian Islands resemble these? How did they differ? How do we explain the similarities and the differences? Why?

In conclusion, Eftyhia Liata is to be congratulated for making people aware of the largely forgotten blood libel riots on Kerkyra and Zakynthos in 1891. Her detailed analysis of how the events were represented and portrayed in Greek press and in literature captures well the cross-currents of the social and political tensions that were tearing at the fabric of Greek society at the *fin-de-siècle*. She does, then, a masterful job of dealing with the sources. Where she falls down is in actually analysing the events themselves and explaining them in their historical context. So, while she has laid the foundation for detailed historical analysis of the 1891 blood libel riots on the Ionian Islands, we still await such a study.

Tonia Kiousopoulou

***Βασιλεύς ή Οικονόμος:
Πολιτική εξουσία και
ιδεολογία πριν την Άλωση
[Emperor or Manager:
Political Power and
Ideology before the Fall of
Constantinople]***

Athens: Ed. Polis, 2007. 282 pp.

by Paris Gounaridis

University of Thessaly

Tonia Kiousopoulou, a specialist in the final period of the Byzantine Empire, has produced a book about the society during the first half of the fifteenth century, before the fall of Constantinople (1453). Her working hypothesis is that Byzantium, in this period, had acquired certain new characteristics that do not correspond with the traditional perception of the empire, and that the holder of political power, the basileus, a member of the Palaiologan dynasty, was no longer the one 'chosen by God' (*theoprobletos*), but simply a manager. What remained of the once powerful empire was transformed into a city-state, similar to the Italian commercial cities (such as Venice and Genoa). Considering the city of Byzantium in its historical development, the author believes that Constantinople, just as the Italian com-

mercial cities, from this point constitutes an element in the development of an economically unified Mediterranean. Thus, she examines the activities of the Byzantine state not as those of an imperial remnant or from the perspective of its subsequent collapse, but as an instrument necessary for its survival.

The study is structured in three parts. The first presents Constantinople not so much as an urban centre but more as an economic environment, with various centres, where the groups that constituted Byzantine society were active. The author clearly traces the changing of the city into a centre of exchange.

The second part deals with the political life of Byzantium, which was characterised by the distinction between the secular officials, on one hand, and the dignitaries of the patriarchate, on the other. Here, the author examines the collective physiognomy of the political personnel, the civilian dignitaries (*archontes*). The organisation of power, which, nominally, remained an imperial responsibility through the granting of offices, is examined in connection with the management of public finances. Besieged or under the continuous threat of conquest, the territory of the 'empire' had been reduced to the city of Constantinople. In this context, the Byzantine emperor, indebted to and dependent economically on the West and also obliged to pay a tribute in tax to the sultan, could not but be a manager of public finances. Byzantine society, in order to survive, broke the bonds with the imperial past and the holder of political power, the emperor, in this new arrangement, was nothing more than the first between equals. The bureaucratic mechanism of administration was no longer needed. The emperor coordinated two collective bodies that took the decisions: the court, which constituted himself and his high dignitaries, and the *politeia*, a body in which

the rich residents of city participated. While the author attempts to frame the latter as a decisive collective institution, a 'municipal' body, this is not supported by the sources, because it was never established as such. The *politeia* was constituted by civilian dignitaries, who held no rank or engaged in other political activity; they were acquainted with each other through their enterprising activities or from the hiring of the right to collect taxes.

In the third part, the author examines the principles of the new political system and the ideological components of political life. She investigates the constitution of collective identities, the attitudes towards and the perceptions of the social transformation, as well as the content that concepts such as homeland and nation acquired. As a result of the turn to political order in the city-state, like the Italian cities, the author considers that the attitude of the Palaiologos dynasty towards the question of the union of Churches (the Byzantine with the Roman Catholic) constituted, apart from an expectation of help from the West in confronting the Turks, the expression of a new political perception of church-state relations. The differentiation of the civilian administration and the patriarchal clergy was caused by the ecclesiastical dignitaries, who, in moving away from the traditional conception of the emperor as being divinely chosen, adopted the more critical perception of him as an administrator of political power. Thus, they disputed his right to regulate ecclesiastical affairs, while the influence of the church decreased in the higher levels of Constantinopolitan society. While the clergy claimed greater autonomy, the differentiation allowed the emperors to promote the policy of Church unity, so as to safeguard their power in the city-state. However, the fall of Constantinople changed the political scene and influenced the choices that were developed.

Kiousopoulou's book is one of exceptional interest because it comes to reverse many of the commonplaces regarding the fall of Constantinople. The author, disputing the decline thesis, presents Constantinopolitan society as a living one that underwent mutation in order to survive. She underlines the dynamics and the political role of its merchants in the transformation of the 'empire' into a modern Mediterranean city-state. Finally, the study dismisses the Church unionist policy of the last Palaiologoi as an expectation of a miracle or help from the West, reinterpreting it as the expression of a conscious political choice.

***Πρακτικά του Επιστημονικού
Συμποσίου «Νεοελληνική
Επιστολογραφία»
(16ος–19ος αι.)
[Proceedings of the
Scientific Symposium
on “Early Modern Greek
Letter Writing” (16th–19th
Centuries)]***

**(= Μεσαιωνικά και Νέα
Ελληνικά 8)**

**Athens: Academy of Athens,
2006. 400 pp.**

by Katerina Papakonstantinou

Ionian University

This volume, containing the proceedings of the symposium held in March 2003 by the Research Centre for Medieval and Modern Hellenism of the Academy of Athens, has as its subject the practice of letter writing in Greek in the early modern period. Participating in the symposium were Greek researchers mainly occupied with the Greek Enlightenment and the activity of Greek scholars of the early modern period. The articles are organised along four themes, entitled “The letter-writing tradition and letter collections”,

"From manuscripts to printed epistolaria", "Correspondence: practice and ideology", "Commercial correspondence and letter distribution". The papers deal with letter writing since the Byzantine period and the tradition that was created in continuation of the ancient period. The majority of the papers focus on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the period called the Greek Enlightenment. Although letter writing was a common practice for all people who wished to communicate for different reasons, the papers focus mainly on the correspondence of scholars, clerics and merchants, even though other corpora of correspondence from the same period have not yet been researched in Greek historiography. Under this restriction some of the papers focus on epistolaria, printed guides for correct letter writing that circulated either as manuscripts since the Byzantine period or in printed form, from the seventeenth to the late eighteenth centuries.

In his paper, Dimitrios Z. Sofianos provides a survey of letter writing since ancient times to the late Byzantine period. He remarks that the correspondence in the ancient period did not share the character of that of the Byzantine period, when a particular form of and strict rules for letter writing were formulated. He continues by saying that letter writing was exercised by highly literate men, scholars and church officials; for the Byzantine period there are no examples of letters written by people who were simply literate, which is not the case for the early modern Ottoman period. During the Byzantine period most scholars wrote many letters since it was part of their scientific work. Some letters served as examples of letter writing and were copied for several centuries. The papers of Niki Papatriantaphyllou-Theodoridi and Chariton Karanasios analyse the corpus of correspondence of two late sixteenth-/early seventeenth-centu-

ry scholarly monks, Evgenios Giannoulis and Anastasios Gordios, who wrote letters to a wide circle of addressees. They research the reasons for the letters, the different forms used in corresponding with various recipients, as well as the vocabulary, the different grammatical forms, the form of the letters, as well as the quotations and the proverbs used in them. They examine the corpus of letters as texts and provide a general description of their content.

Dimitris G. Apostolopoulos investigates the way in which a corpus of letters of Nicolaos Mavrogordatos has been ascribed to Alexandros Mavrogordatos, tracing a series of unlucky coincidences that have led to that mistake. Machi Paizi-Apostolopoulou follows the transformation of a private collection of correspondence into an epistolarion in the eighteenth century, seeking to establish who had the initiative to create the handwritten guide. Pinelopi Stathi, in her contribution, browses the correspondence of the dependency of the Holy Sepulchre in Constantinople where, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the patriarchs of Jerusalem, who resided there for long periods, engaged in correspondence with a variety of people. A significant part of the correspondence comprises of letters received from the dragomans of the Supreme Porte and the rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia, who maintained strong relations with the patriarchs.

From the late seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries, many printed guides on proper letter writing appeared. This reflected, on the one hand, the need and demand of the educated public for such guidelines and, on the other, the need of scholars to contribute epistolaria to bibliographical traffic. Mihalīs Lassithiotakis investigates the relationship between two works of Fragiskos Skoufos,

the *Grammatoforos* and *Techni Ritorikis*, in order to show that the letters contained in the *Grammatoforos* were written mostly as rhetorical exercises and their collection represents more a prolongation of his book on rhetoric. This collection of letters does not serve as an example for correct letter writing but for correct rhetorical texts.

The contributions dealing with the epistolaria research the identity of their compilers, the reasons behind their composition and publication as well as the reasons for their success or failure as publications. From the perspective of their complication, form and types of letters they include, the authors investigate the changes brought about by the epistolaria in society and especially in the reading public since new editions of the epistolaria had to meet these changes and requirements. Here, the authors investigate whether these alterations in the Greek editions followed the changes in other European guides. In her article, Martha Karpouzilou examines in detail the epistolarion of Korydaleus, a seventeenth-century scholar, whose collection of letters, although written in ancient Greek, served as an example for letter writing and teaching for teachers and scholars for many decades after its publication. Triantaphyllos E. Sklavenitis looks at the printed eighteenth-century epistolaria of Venice, where a significant number of them were published. He follows the changes, evident in successive editions of the epistolarion of Spyridon Milias and other epistolaria printed in Venice, that reflect the change in readership from scholars to mostly merchants. The changes are evident in the language used in the books and the letter examples they provide. Maria A. Stassinopoulou, in her article on the epistolarion of Dimitrios Darvaris, focuses on eighteenth-century epistolary printing activity in Vienna, identifying the changing needs of the Greek-speaking

diaspora. New letter types reflecting different needs reflect the emergence of new social perceptions. The author remarks that during that period the letter was something that existed in the public and the private sphere. In many cases, letters were read by more than one person. At the same time, the language they were composed in changed; moving away from formal written style, letter writers now preferred a spontaneous spoken idiom.

The changes in nineteenth-century Greek society can be traced through the epistolarion of Grigorios Palaiologos, presented by Yiannis Papatheodorou in his contribution. The Greek bourgeoisie had new needs, new social realities and new moral standards, which are reflected in the letter types that Palaiologos' epistolarion provided. This also explains the publishing success of the epistolarion during the nineteenth century. Nassia Yakovaki researches the origins of this new social reality and, in particular, the creation of a public sphere through the edited edition of Korais and Vasileiou's early nineteenth-century correspondence. Yakovaki discusses the creation of a public sphere by the Greek-speaking Ottoman and European diaspora reading audience and the formation of new social realities through eighteenth-century epistolography. Emmanuel Franghiskos continues with the focus on Korais' correspondence with his friends and acquaintances and tries to establish to what degree the public and the individual are interwoven in letter writing and reading. Even Korais took different attitudes towards his letters; on the one hand, he knew and accepted the fact that more than one person read them and, on the other, strongly reacted to the publication of letters which he had intended to be private.

Constantin Lappas uses the corpus of the correspondence of Constantinos Oikono-

mos to describe the social hierarchies that emerge from them. He compares his letter writing with that of previous and subsequent letter writers and tries to establish their differences and their meaning. Demetrios I. Polemis mines the correspondence of Theophilos Kairis for his religious beliefs and ideology; the letters in this case are combined with other evidence such as Kairis' apology in court. Within the same framework, Vassilis Panayotopoulos seeks the cultural aspects of the lives of rulers and the ruled as well as the communicative practices in the administrative papers of the archive of Ali Paşa of Ioannina. He investigates the private contained in the public content of an administrative archive. He raises questions on the use of the Greek language in the official papers of the Ottoman province and tries to explain the cultural bilingualism of the letter writers and recipients. Spyros I. Asdrachas utilises, for the same purpose, the letters sent to the Venetian authorities of Lefkada and Preveza at the end of the eighteenth century by different people from central Greece. He remarks while the language is Greek, it is not ancient Greek or the language of educated people; rather, it is more the demotic of the different groups living in the area of western Epirus and Acarnania. Asdrachas uses the letters to examine the relationship of the letter writers to time, the issues they mention and the narrative methods used to express their opinion.

Eftyhia D. Liata and Vassilis Kremmydas, in their contributions, use a corpus of commercial correspondence to explore the use of letter writing by people who required it most, the merchants of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They investigate the external characteristics of the letters, how they were dated and addressed, the use of letters to order goods, the frequency at which letters were sent and their use in building net-

works. Anna Mandilara uses the letters of another nineteenth-century merchant, Dimitrios Petrokokkinos, in order to investigate the mentality and the principles of a merchant living in Smyrna and Marseille. Helen Angelomatis-Tsougarakis investigates the transmission of correspondence around the eastern Mediterranean from the fourteenth to the early nineteenth centuries as well as the organisation of post offices in the Venetian and the Ottoman areas of administration.

The contributions to this collective volume use, more or less, early modern Greek epistolography as evidence for ideology and a changing social environment. The authors have used the letters as remnants of a specific social and political environment that they wished to research. The language of the letters and the examples of letters contained in epistolaria can be used as evidence of a certain political reality. As some of the authors of the book admit, it is a process that has not been yet been undertaken by Greek historiography. From that point of view, the volume is a first step in that direction.

**Antonis Anastasopoulos and
Elias Kolovos (eds)**

***Ottoman Rule and the
Balkans, 1760–1850:
Conflict, Transformation,
Adaptation***

**Rethymno: Department of
History and Archaeology,
University of Crete, 2007. 263 pp.**

by Eleni Gara

University of the Aegean

Research on the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Balkans has been rather neglected by Ottomanists, who until recently have focused mainly on the era of Ottoman expansion and sultanic power. The opposite is true for Balkan historians, not least because the developments that were crucial to the emergence of nation-states can be traced back to this very period. Although it has often resulted in insightful and thought-provoking studies that have furthered our understanding of the Ottoman Balkans, much of Balkanist research, however, does not integrate the imperial perspective but treats the Christian populations as separate societies. The volume under review is, therefore, a welcome addition to the bibliography. Not only does it bring into dialogue the two historiographical

traditions, the Ottomanist and the Balkanist, but it also includes some papers that belong to a new and very promising kind of Ottomanist scholarship, one that challenges 'ancient wisdoms', takes into consideration informal as well as formal discourses and is informed by Balkan scholarship.

The 16 papers included in the volume have their origins in papers presented to a conference organised by the Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Crete in December 2003.¹ They are arranged thematically in four parts ("The Ottoman Balkans around 1800", "The Case of the Peloponnese", "The Greek Revolution", "Epilogue") and mostly explore three major issues: the extent and impact of decentralisation, which contributed, on the one hand, to the empowering of local elites and, on the other, to the delegitimisation of imperial rule; the 'Ottoman context' of the Greek Revolution, an event that has been studied mainly through the prism of national historiography; and the intricate relationship between sources, historical realities and historiographical narratives. In what follows, I will try to summarise, not necessarily in the order in which their papers appear in the volume, the most important points made by individual authors.

By the mid-eighteenth century, the involvement of local elites in provincial administration, taxation and military recruitment, the results of a long-term development that can be traced back to the seventeenth century, had led to a thorough transformation of the relationship between the imperial centre and the provinces. As Gergana Georgieva shows, at times this resulted in the isolation of governors sent from the centre, or even in open clashes between them and powerful notables. According to Georgieva, the position of the governors was further destabilised by widespread disorder due to fights between

notables over the control of territories and to roving bands of defectors from the irregular troops which operated in the Balkans. Eventually the governor's residence was moved from Sofia to the more secure and centrally placed Manastir (Bitola). In the eighteenth-century Morea, according to Anna Vlachopoulou, political instability and disorder resulted in the emergence of "mafia-like substructures" among the military, which became engaged in extortion, kidnapping, torture and murder.

The career of Tepedelenli Ali Paşa, son of an Albanian military leader, who became pasha of Yanya (Ioannina), then governor of Rumelia, and ultimately a threat to the imperial power, is indicative of the changed relationship between the imperial centre and its Balkan provinces. Dimitris Dimitropoulos shows that, between 1788 and 1822, Ali Paşa managed to expand his rule and increase his revenue not only through the use of force but also by building up an extensive network of patrons and clients and by cultivating personal relations with the local Christian notables. One of the results of Ali Paşa's efforts in furthering the interests of his household and clients was to alienate Muslim timariots and landowners and to enhance the position of Christian elites in his territories.

Christian notables also participated formally in the administration of the Morea, a province that was to become the centre of the Greek Revolution in 1821. According to Martha Pylia, during the 1808–12 governorship of Veli Paşa, Ali Paşa's son, Christian notables, although they grew in power, were estranged by Veli's taxation policy, leading some of them eventually to turn against him. The last year of Veli's tenure witnessed the division of notables into two factions, one supporting and the other opposing the governor, both of which forged alliances with Muslim notables.

Provincial notables built extensive networks that linked them to the imperial centre, and their power struggles were partly fought out in Istanbul. As Demetrios Stamatopoulos shows, the Dragoman of the Morea, the governor's Christian interpreter who was appointed by the central authorities and participated in the provincial council alongside senior Ottoman administrative officials, played a key role in the outcome of such struggles. Thus, the rival factions of notables tried to control his appointment. On the eve of the Greek Revolution, the fierce and bloody conflict between the Christian notables of the Morea had led to the marginalisation of some powerful families, which enabled the latter's political reorientation towards disengagement from Ottoman rule.

In the northern borders of the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, military defeats at the hands of the Russians led to a renegotiation of the juridical and political status of Wallachia and Moldavia. As Viorel Panaite shows, after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, the two tributary principalities became "buffer-protectorates" between the two empires, while the invented tradition of ancient "capitulations" accorded to local aristocracy by the Ottoman sultans was used to legitimise the aristocracy's enhanced autonomous status.

The 1790s witnessed the introduction of the reform programme of Nizam-ı Cedid and the spread among Ottoman Christians of the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, both of which, as Antonis Anastasopoulos argues, represented in a way a "new Western-oriented spirit" that was vehemently opposed by "traditionalists". According to Anastasopoulos, both developments have unfortunately left very faint traces in the provincial judicial registers, the most important Ottoman source for regional history; in his

view, only a closer interaction between Ottomanist and national Balkan historiographies can further our understanding of the matter.

Rebellion and secession in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries could be stirred by both 'traditionalists' and 'revolutionaries'. In a paper discussing the elements of the potential 'alliance' present in – as well as absent from – Rhigas Velestinlis' *Thourios*, Rossitsa Gradeva argues that while Rhigas considered the rebel military leader Osman Pazvantoğlu a potential ally, the two had conflicting agendas: Pazvantoğlu sought to legitimise his rebellion against Ottoman rule by pleading the necessity to overturn the Nizam-ı Cedid in order to restore the former glory of the empire, while Rhigas was inspired by the French Revolution. It is not certain whether the two rebels were in direct contact, which Gradeva doubts but does not rule out; in any case, they were closely connected in the minds of their contemporaries, not only within but also outside the Ottoman Empire. As Rachida Tlili Sellaouti shows, France was supportive of Pazvantoğlu's rebellion, seeing it not only as a means to strengthen its position in the eastern Mediterranean, but also because it considered it an opportunity for the political integration of Ottoman Muslims into the sphere of republican values.

The Greek Revolution of 1821 was undoubtedly affected by the spread of revolutionary ideas. Nevertheless, according to Christine Phylliou, the extent to which it was "Greek" or even a "Revolution" is debatable. Phylliou questions the usefulness of these two terms, because they ignore Ottoman social realities and do not help explain individual decisions on whether or not to take part on the "Greek" side. Phanariots like Stephanos Vogoridis did not participate in the Revolution; in the following decades he even managed to embark on a

successful career in the Ottoman state service. As Phylliou argues, the concept of "ambition" is particularly useful for the analysis of the political attitudes of Ottoman Christian elites both before and after 1821.

Panagiotis Stathis also challenges the national narrative as it concerns the Greek Revolution. Stathis argues that the armed Christian groups of klephts and *armatoloi* did not take part in the Revolution because of any "national sentiments"; their participation was the result of a "dual crisis" induced, on the one hand, by their persecution by the central and local authorities in the preceding decades and, on the other, by the political and financial crisis in their areas caused by the conflict between the imperial centre and Ali Paşa in 1820–21. In the same vein, Christos Loukos is explicit in his plea for the integration of the imperial perspective into the study of the Greek Revolution. He argues that Greek historians should concern themselves more with the Muslim populations as well as with official and popular reactions to the revolution in Istanbul and the provinces.

The Greek Revolution had unforeseen ramifications. In Crete, as shown by Vassilis Dimitriadis, the local Muslims took over the properties confiscated from insurrectionists and effectively opposed any efforts of the central government to register and dispose of them in a manner profitable to the imperial treasury. In Albania, on the contrary, argues Hakan Erdem, the Greek Revolution eventually resulted in tighter Ottoman control. In the preceding decades Ottoman rule in the province had been tenuous, and imperial administrators distrusted the Albanian military. The refusal of Albanian leaders to fight when the contracted payment for their troops was not forthcoming as well as reports that some of them were in secret correspondence or col-

laboration with the Greek revolutionaries, led the Sultan and his Grand Vizier to believe that they were on the verge of rebellion. The relations between centrally appointed commanders and Albanian leaders, whose troops made up the bulk of the imperial forces sent against the insurrectionists, remained strained and tainted by mutual distrust throughout the revolution, cementing imperial resolve to exert tighter control over Albania.

Lastly, two papers pertain to the period after the Serbian and Greek Revolutions. Čedomir Antić shows that the organisation and ideology of the early Serbian state was heavily influenced by Ottoman traditions and argues that, between 1838 and 1858, the Principality of Serbia passed through a phase of re-Ottomanisation. Cengiz Kırli explores spy reports from the period 1840–45, which contain opinions and rumours about contemporary events and social and political issues, and gives an account of the popular attitudes to the Tanzimat Reforms, the Crete Rebellion of 1841 and the 1843 Coup in Greece.

In short, *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans* is a very interesting volume that furthers our understanding of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Ottoman political life, secessionist and revolutionary movements. Furthermore, the fruitful combination of Ottomanist and Balkanist historiographical perspectives paves the way for new interpretations and appropriations of the past.

**Méropi Anastassiadou-Dumont
and Paul Dumont**

***Οι Ρωμιοί της Πόλης,
τραύματα και προσδοκίες
[The Greek Orthodox of the
City: Wounds and Prospects]***

Athens: Hestia, 2007. 331 pp.

Dilek Güven

***Εθνικισμός, Κοινωνικές
Μεταβολές και Μειονότητες:
τα επεισόδια εναντίον των μη
μουσουλμάνων της Τουρκίας
(6/7 Σεπτεμβρίου 1955)
[Nationalism, Social
Change and Minorities:
The Incidents against Non-
Muslims in Turkey, 6–7
September 1955]***

Athens: Hestia, 2006. 387 pp.

by Vangelis Kechriotis

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NOTE

- 1 "The Ottoman Empire and the Rise of Balkan Nationalisms, 1789–1832: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation", *Rethymno*, 13–14 December 2003.

It is a commonplace that over the last decade, Turkish society has undergone a significant transformation. Apart from the reforms

that have been implemented in a variety of social fields, this new era has paved the way for a reconsideration of controversial aspects of the past. Thus, it has become largely acknowledged that in order to develop a more sensitive social and human consciousness, it is important for Turkish society to reflect on a series of violent incidents that have marked the nation-building process during the last century. This has become the mission of Turkish and also foreign scholars and intellectuals who have taken it upon themselves to challenge taboos and bring into public debate issues that the state apparatus but also a large part of society consider a threat to public order and national unity. All these endeavours have been met with a fervent reaction by certain circles among the bureaucracy and the military as well as nationalist nebulae that are intimately connected to these circles. The infamous article 301 was inserted into the penal code, presumably as part of the reform process; in reality, however, it opened a Pandora's box, allowing several hot-headed judges to sue authors, journalists and artists who have been accused of 'insulting Turkishness'. The most prominent and tragic case was that of the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, who was convicted and subjected to threats and humiliation for stressing the necessity for Turkish society to address one of the darkest chapters of its history, the Armenian Genocide. Dink's assassination, on 19 January 2007, delivered a huge blow to the reform efforts and people's hopes for a democratic society based on the respect for difference and individual freedoms.

Not surprisingly, one of the most sensitive fields to have attracted attention has been that of minorities and the way the state has treated them in the process of the homogenisation of Turkish society. Within this context, conferences, articles and publications that seek to reassess the trajectory, including the hardships experienced but also the future prospects of the Greek Or-

thodox minority in Istanbul, have multiplied. The books under review here have been published in Greek and bear many things in common. It is not a coincidence that the authors participated at the summer 2005 conference entitled "Meeting in Istanbul: Today and Tomorrow", which was organised by the alumni association of the city's Zografeion Gymnasium-Lyceum with the involvement of scholars and local journalists.

The authors of the first book, *The Greek Orthodox of the City*, are Paul Dumont and Méropi Anastassiadou-Dumont, well-known Ottomanists who spent four years in Istanbul when the former was the director of the Institut Français d'Études Anatoliennes. Initially, and as part of their activity in the Institute, they published, in French, their observations and the preliminary results of their research. The Greek version is much larger and it is written in a language that addresses a broader public. This is actually one of its merits. As the author of this review happened to live in Istanbul during the same years and became acquainted with its Greek Orthodox community through similar channels, it was not difficult to realise that the great majority of the people in Greece had little idea either of the recent past and the calamities that the latter had gone through or of the present, specific and very urgent issues that it faced. This was the case despite the endless declarations of solidarity on the part of the Greek state and the general consensus regarding the importance of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodoxy as well as the emotional reactions against the violations of its rights. Istanbul, or Constantinople for the Greeks, constitutes a place of pilgrimage for those Greek tourists who participate in package tours, the two major stops of which are the Patriarchate and the Grand Bazaar (*Kapalı Çarşı*). As the authors argue, this pilgrimage is inspired by a series of historical and religious references: the Constantinople of the Byzantine emperors and the Istanbul of the sultans, the cradle of Or-

thodoxy and Ottomanness. For those who have their roots here, it represents also a personal need to reconcile with their lost youth (228). All those pilgrims, though, hardly realise that there are real people here who bear the burden of a precious, albeit controversial, heritage and a very complex identity. Therefore, the purpose of the book is to introduce this audience with this population of 2,000 or, according to a recent demographic report, probably double that number. The titles of the chapters are indicative: "Demographic Collapse", "The Greek Orthodox Diaspora", "Education", "Under the Shadow of the Patriarchate", "Social Bonds and Communication", "Life with the 'Local' Population", "The Heritage of Monuments".

The major argument put forth by the authors is that eventually the total elimination of the community, which used to number 100,000 people only 50 years ago, seems inevitable unless certain external factors contribute to its regeneration. While describing the historical context as it emerged in the 1990s, they remind us that the collapse of communism enabled several national churches to come into closer contact with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, as well as contributing to migration from Romania, Moldavia and Georgia of Orthodox people seeking a better future. On the other hand, the demographic and cultural profile of the Greek minority had already been affected by the Arab-speaking population from Hatay Province, with its capital Antakya (ancient Antioch), a region annexed by the Turkish Republic in 1939. This community is also of Greek Orthodox confession and had started to migrate in the 1960s to Istanbul where its members could easily find jobs as caretakers of the churches and other public buildings abandoned by the Greek-speakers who were forced to leave. To all the above, one should add the recent rapprochement between Greece and Turkey that, through certain reforms, has improved living conditions

for the minority but has also brought to Turkey hundreds of Greeks from Greece, mainly businessmen, but also journalists and academics. Last but not least, the prospect, however distant, of Turkey's accession to the European Union, has reinforced the legal framework covering the protection of minority rights as well as conditions of stability within Turkish society (18).

This remains very abstract, however, and one should not exaggerate the extent to which it can be translated into a real change of attitudes towards the Greek Orthodox at an individual level. This is not the place to elaborate on the image of the *Rum* in Turkish society, an image burdened with several negative stereotypes related to war memories, social antagonism, but also to political manipulation. What has happened during the last decade is a clear shift in these perceptions. At the level of high politics, the shift is related to the certainty that proving that Greeks and Turks peacefully coexisted in the plural framework of the Ottoman Empire can be a strong card in the effort to convince the European public. At the level of scholars and intellectuals, it is related to a sense of shame for past crimes and the sincere realisation that the consolidation of democracy must ensure recognition and compensation for these crimes. At a more popular level, finally, the resurfacing of suppressed social memories has led either to the disclosure of well-hidden secrets or the manipulation of identities. There are people who are not afraid now to talk about their *Rum* (or, even more frequently, their Armenian grandmother), whereas there are others who have invented one in the hope of some benefit (214).

It is only through the happy coincidence of all these new factors that the community might survive, but then, the authors claim, there is a difficult choice to be made. This choice is related to identity. "The Greek Orthodox can no longer base their strategy of survival on the glori-

fication of their Hellenic identity" (18). In other words, only if the community decides to invest and develop along the lines of a truly ecumenical Orthodoxy, which can include both Arab speakers and Romanians on an equal basis. Instead of trying to forcibly Hellenise them, can it look to the future with optimism. The role of the Patriarchate in this transformation is of immense importance. The authors, very accurately, point out that, despite the process of secularisation or laicisation during the final decades of the Ottoman Empire, the Patriarchate, even though it is not recognised as an institution with a distinct legal personality by the Turkish state, is at the forefront of any claim made by the Greek Orthodox in Turkey and tends to represent the community not only symbolically but also politically. The Patriarch is the first person to come to anyone's mind, both in Greece and in Turkey, when there is a discussion on the minority (20). The minority itself has never ceased to consider the Patriarchate as its historical and political centre. So much so that while lay leaders had tried in the past to challenge its authority, in recent decades nobody has dared, out of fear that he or she might be accused of spreading the seeds of disunity. The minority should stand united. It cannot afford to disagree (182–184). After all, this is typical minority behaviour.

On the other hand, this also being very typical, within the framework of the Lausanne treaty that keeps the minorities captive of both states, the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul are accustomed to consider Greece their second motherland. Is there a chance that the Patriarchate can take a more radical step and, since it can afford the necessary symbolic capital, move to open up to the world, promoting an Orthodox identity which is not necessarily related to Hellenism? This seems a rhetorical question when one considers the very tight identification of the Patriarchate, already since Ottoman times, with a version of Hellenism which has been described as

ecumenical Hellenism. It has been argued that, as opposed to the state-oriented and therefore parochial nationalism endorsed by Greek society, this all-inclusive Hellenism rests on the noblest elements of Hellenic culture which is, of course, identified with Orthodoxy. Unavoidably, however, since at its core there is always a claim to preserve and reproduce this particular culture, it does not cease hegemonising other cultural expressions of the same confession.

One of the areas where this predicament is very visible is education. The authors claim that the community schools have been serving the same purposes for the last 150 years, namely preserving the connecting bonds among the community especially at the bottom of the social hierarchy. When the lay population prospered, the schools flourished. Now that the demographic composition has been irrevocably altered and the community is on the brink of extinction, adaptation to the new circumstances is unavoidable (134). To give only one example, more than half the pupils attending the few remaining Greek Orthodox schools of Istanbul are Arab-speaking, which has created a great discrepancy between them and Greek-speaking pupils. The problem cannot be resolved by segregating the two, which would lead to a kind of apartheid. Instead, next to Greek and Turkish, Arabic as an elective course could be introduced. Such a measure, though, may be described as a violation of the Hellenic character of education.

Dilek Güven, on the other hand, has a different starting point, the 'September events' of 1955 in Istanbul. Her book in Greek is actually a translation of her PhD dissertation submitted to the Ruhr University Bochum, where she was a student of the well-known German-Turkish Ottomanist Fikret Adanır. The first three chapters of the study focus on the event itself and its aftermath, whereas the fourth chapter is an interesting overview of the trajectory of Turkish nation-

alism from before the foundation of the Republic until the outbreak of the Cyprus question, which presumably sparked the violence. Let us recall the events themselves. In a period of mounting tensions due to the violence on Cyprus and while an important conference was taking place in London, the *Istanbul Ekspres* newspaper published the information that a bomb had exploded at the birthplace of Atatürk in Salonica, a building which housed the Turkish consulate there. The news offered the long-expected excuse for the launching of a pogrom against the Greek Orthodox minority of Istanbul. Within a few hours, thousands of houses were looted, hundreds of churches were destroyed, several people were attacked and women raped, while a number of people were killed (31–44). The extent of the violence and the destruction shocked everyone, including the government, which bore part of the responsibility (45–48).

This study has also been published in Turkish under the title *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları Bağlamında 6–7 Eylül Olayları* (The Events of 6–7 September and Minority Politics in the Republican Era). The publication coincided with the 50th anniversary of the events, when Turkey was full of hope for its EU prospects and the atmosphere of resentment for the suppressed dark pages of the past was quite prominent. The author and her book, which was published by a very respectable publication house (Tarih Vakfı), were at the core of the relevant debates.

Güven has three main arguments. Firstly, the riots not only targeted the Greek Orthodox but also the Armenians, the Jews and anyone whose name did not sound Turkish enough. In other words, despite the fact that the bulk of the properties that were destroyed belonged to Greeks, the pogrom targeted all non-Muslims equally. Secondly, and more importantly, the attacks should not be considered as a

unique moment, related only to the mounting tension around the Cyprus question. Cyprus might have been the excuse, but actually these events should be seen as another instance in the long-term process of Turkish nation-building that was initiated with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 and, I would add, has not yet been completed (153–162). A paramount aspect of this process is the ethnic homogenisation of the population and, therefore, the elimination of ethnoreligious minorities. This is a very typical example of the methods and practices used by the nation-state to implement its own legitimacy, with the important difference that in the Turkish case, the process is flavoured by the hangover of the imperial hegemony that collapsed presumably due to the undermining efforts of these same minorities, thus attributing them with the responsibility for all evils.

Behind this argument, however, lies the assumption that has been already sustained by scholars such as Ayhan Aktar¹ that nationalist fervour among particular social groups but also the implementation of discrimination policies on the part of the state is actually related to the appropriation of property and the conviction that any profit made by non-Muslims, who in this respect are described as non-Turks, is not only achieved at the expense of the Turkish population, but is also a potential threat for national security and unity (163–174). This policy, whether or not it was violently implemented, was always at the background to state policies. “From a legal point of view, all citizens of the state had the same rights and the same obligations, but in everyday life, state politics regarding identity relied on whether someone belonged to the Turkish nation or not” (162). At the same time, Turkification policies also included the suppression of educational or cultural institutions, while it occasionally took the form of demographic engineering. What needs to be stressed here is the fact that the main criterion of discrimination was not

religion but rather ethnicity. The most telling example is provided by the Kurds. A report written by the Turkish Ministry of Interior Affairs in 1925 under the striking title "Kurdistan should be run by a general governor, like the colonies" depicts very well the detestation of the Kemalist elites for the unruly, troublesome, ethnically distinct population, and their determination to use every means to assimilate it, which has had very poor results as we may now assess (178–188). Several incidents like the pogrom against the Jewish population in Edirne and other towns in Thrace in 1934 (188–199), the forced migration of the remaining Armenian population from Anatolia (199–204), the drafting of non-Muslims into the army in 1941 (204–208), and the wealth tax (*varlık vergisi*) in 1942 (208–226) form a sequence in the process of homogenisation of Turkish society. This last measure, in particular, was imposed almost exclusively on non-Muslims, shaking their trust in the Turkish state and the hope that, after the introduction of democracy, non-Muslims would be accepted as citizens with equal rights faded away (226). Güven's assumption that these principles are, in the long run, significantly more important as the real causes of ethnically oriented violence in Turkey can be supported by a quick look at the parliamentary debates regarding the "Bill on Pious Foundations", in February 2008, a period less promising than 2005, when the Turkish version of this study was first published. Here, opposition parties openly claimed that any facilitation of institutional activity of the minorities constituted a violation of the Lausanne treaty and was therefore high treason.

The third argument, which is, of course, a logical outcome of the other two, focuses on the spontaneous character of the events. Initially, the Democratic Party led by Adnan Menderes followed a much more tolerant policy towards minorities. This was due partly to the electoral support the latter had offered but also to the liberalisation of society in the multi-party context

(227–253). This initial euphoria would not last for long, though. The mounting tension over the Cyprus question changed things rapidly. British, German and American diplomatic correspondence as well as the newspapers that the author has used leave no doubt that the government was at least aware of the activities of nationalist associations, not to say that it facilitated their activity, thus preparing the ground for the extreme violence that followed. Student organisations that had been set up in support of the Turkish Cypriots, the most prominent being *Kıbrıs Türk-tür Cemiyeti* (*Cyprus is Turkish Association*), had been either founded by government supporters or were openly supported by the state. Güven gives a very detailed account of this connection with the state or with state-controlled trade unions before the events (113–121) and also the measures taken, including persecution, imprisonment and trials, after the events (122–137). The fact that the violence got out of control and eventually severely harmed the prestige of the country internationally led the government to crackdown on the perpetrators. The witch-hunt, though, against the communists who presumably organised the events in order to destabilise society did nothing but add the absurdity. Nevertheless, alongside the communists, many of the actual instigators faced trial but were eventually acquitted. Very telling was the opinion of a public prosecutor in one of the trials: "Cyprus, from a historical point of view, is a Turkish island and is at a distance of only a few miles from the motherland. The reason for the sad events was the hostile propaganda in Greece and Cyprus" (137).

An important aspect of this study lies in the effort to solidly contextualise the events. The anti-communist hysteria in the atmosphere of the Cold War and the attachment to the US chariot and the economic stalemate that the grandiose liberal politics of the Democratic Party had instigated help us better comprehend the social tension that led to the violence (289–303). The govern-

ment wished, on the one hand, to send a strong message to the international community, especially the delegations convening in London, while on the other hand, it used the opportunity to manipulate public opinion by shifting the focus away from its failed policies and towards the communists. Overwhelmed by the disaster, it also expressed its sympathy to the victims, promised and paid compensation, although in no case did this actually cover the cost of the real damage. Indicative of the mentality of minorities, however, is the following narration of one of the Armenian victims: "The real aim of these instalments was their international impact. They wished to claim: 'See, we compensated for the injustice.' But, still, we should be satisfied, because, even though it did not really mean it, the state expressed its sorrow. People tend to expect such things; they feel better. It is a typical minority reaction. To this very day, there was no official apology, but all pains fade away after some time" (95).

The aftermath of the September events triggered a wave of migration from Istanbul. Despite measures by both Turkey and Greece to reverse this trend, the damage the events incurred on the confidence of the non-Muslims to their state was irreparable (263–289). The expulsion of thousands of Greek passport holders from Istanbul in 1964 only to be followed by many others in 1974 following the Turkish invasion in Cyprus were the last acts of a long process thoroughly described by this Turkish scholar. Whatever the particularities of the Greek experience, in 2008, it is clear that all Turkish citizens, both Muslim and the remaining non-Muslim, are on board the same boat. They will stand or fall together.

NOTE

- 1 Ayhan Aktar, *Türk milliyetçiliği, gayri müslimler ve ekonomik dönüşüm*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.

**Nikos Theotokas
and Nikos Kotaridis**

*Η οικονομία της βίας.
Παραδοσιακές και νεωτερικές
εξουσίες στην Ελλάδα του
19ου αιώνα*
[*The Economy of Violence:
Traditional and Modern
Authority in Nineteenth-
Century Greece*]

Athens: Vivliorama, 2006. 409 pp.

by Stathis N. Kalyvas

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This book blends the history of political ideas with historical sociology to probe the nature of power and authority in Greece during the early nineteenth century. As a preliminary remark, it would be fair to say that its disjointed structure does not work to its advantage. Out of the book's five chapters, one is co-authored while the rest are single-authored by either Nikos Theotokas (two chapters) or Nikos Kotaridis (one chapter). At first sight, such a distribution may appear lopsided, as Kotaridis ends up being the author of one chapter and Theotokas of three. As it turns out, however, the book is indeed lopsided, but in the exact opposite direction: the

book's core and bulk is made up of Kotaridis' contribution, which focuses on the complex process of state-building in Greece after the War of Independence, during the 1830s and 1840s. A one-page introduction does not even attempt to tie the five chapters together while a conclusion is missing (along with an index). All in all, the general feel is that this book was hastily put together, a pity given the high quality of some of its chapters. This rather unusual structure calls for a chapter-by-chapter discussion.

The first chapter, by Theotokas, endeavours to capture how the traditional society that was pre-revolutionary Ottoman Greece received and comprehended the political messages of the revolutionaries. The central argument is that the revolution was, in fact, a creative combination of traditional and modern ideas, especially insofar as it simultaneously fulfilled the eschatological desire of religious liberation along with the modernist goal of national independent statehood. At the same time, however, these two strands did not melt into a single overarching ideology. This chapter implies that the revolution meant different things to different constituencies, though the method used is primarily one of intellectual interpretation rather than sociological analysis.

The second chapter, co-authored by Theotokas and Kotaridis, is practically an introduction to what follows next: it examines the practice of amnesty provision during the first years of Greek independence (1833 to 1848). The focus shifts from pre-revolutionary intellectual history to the sociology of armed agitation in the periphery – the topic that constitutes the core of the book (and the third chapter). The traditionalist Ottoman practice of, implicitly if not explicitly, recognising the right of a variety of armed actors in the periphery of

the Empire to act quasi-autonomously stood in stark contrast to the ambition of the new state to establish direct and unequivocal central control over its periphery. Put otherwise, the tradition of indirect rule clashed with novel ambitions of direct rule. In this context, the judicial practice of amnesty was used by the Greek state as a way of managing these conflicts. After all, Greece was an ambitious, modernising state which, while stronger vis-à-vis its peripheral competitors, was still not strong enough to be able to deal with these challenges effectively and unequivocally. By 1850, however, it had succeeded in building considerable capacity and was self-confident enough to limit armed challenges by peripheral actors whose legal status, as well as popular perception, was now downgraded to that of outlaws and bandits. Modernisation marched on.

The third chapter, by Kotaridis, could have easily been a self-standing book – and should have. It is both the most substantial chapter in terms of size and the most comprehensive and ambitious in terms of substance. As a historical sociology of the armed uprisings that took place in the periphery of the newly independent Greek state, it is a masterful analysis of the complex ways in which various political and social actors dealt with the opportunities and constraints of this new age so as to advance their interests in an institutional setting characterised by considerable fluidity, but also by inexorably rising state capacity. About 20 armed uprisings took place during that period, in two major waves: a first in the mid-1830s, during the so-called Bavarian rule, and a second in 1847–48, during the constitutional monarchy. Kotaridis shows how local armed actors gradually lost their autonomy of action, even when they seemed to exercise it fully through their ability to credibly challenge the state: initially, they had to partake in the broader, national-level strat-

egies of opposition political networks; in the end, those who did not compromise ended up as marginalised bandits.

In my view, Kotaridis' primary contribution is methodological. To begin with, the micro-sociological analysis of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period (and more generally, of armed conflict in Greece) has been neglected. Kotaridis is at his best when he manages to puncture big holes in the prevailing historical interpretations of these uprisings that view them as either oppositional movements to the Bavarian regency or simple aggregations of "primitive rebels". He also debunks the romantic image of the "starving and abandoned heroes of the Greek Revolution" that emerged after the revolution only to be picked up by generations of more or less naïve historians. Kotaridis strives to unearth the discourse of the actors who participated in these uprisings through several original documents, such as petitions and letters, and shows how they themselves understood their identity and actions, but also how they instrumentally manipulated them to fit evolving political contexts. He provides an extensive sociological analysis of the local networks of armed men that were active during this period and relies on an in-depth focus on a single individual, Thanasis Malisovas, to illustrate how these actors operated in multiple registers at once: peaceful and violent; legal and illegal; in opposition to and on the side of the central state; at the local and the central scene; in Greece and in the Ottoman Empire; in the past and the present.

Throughout this expansive chapter, particular care is given to the interpretation of sources and narratives; the goal is to figure out whether they tell us more about the context in which they were originally drafted and less about the events they purport to de-

scribe. The key theme here is the effort to historicise the post-revolutionary period and to expose the simple dichotomies that have dominated scholarly historical research and, through it, the popular understanding of the period: 'state vs. rebels', 'traditionalists vs. modernists', 'local society vs. centralising state'. The key take-away lesson is the necessity of abandoning a single-minded focus on the 'central political scene' as the main reference point and information source, and to probe deeper by taking local actors and contexts seriously.

Because this chapter is a stand-alone effort, the last two chapters come a bit as a let-down. Authored by Theotokas, they depart from the main theme of the book and focus on the writings of Makriyannis. In fact, the last chapter has already been published as a book review of the pathbreaking book of Giorgos Giannouloupoulos on the same topic.¹ Overall, I felt that these rather extraneous chapters add little to the book; if anything, they rather distract from its central theme.

To conclude, a reader who decides to concentrate on the second and third chapters will encounter a major contribution to our understanding of not just post-revolutionary Greece but also the complex ways in which the periphery interacted with the centre in a crucial historical period. In their careful attention to the sources, their creative deconstruction of conventional truths, their serious engagement at the local level, and their imaginative elucidation of a complex historical reality, these chapters offer a nuanced and intriguing, as well as a revisionist, interpretation of a crucial period in modern Greek history. Readers more inclined towards comparative approaches will also find these chapters to be a major source of insight into the messy, yet fascinating, processes of state-building in

new states, as well as the complex modalities of internal armed conflict.

NOTE

- 1 Review of Giorgos Giannouloupoulos, *Διαβάζοντας τον Μακρυγιάννη: Η κατασκευή ενός μύθου από τον Βλαχογιάννη, τον Θεοτοκά, τον Σεφέρη και τον Λορενζάτο*, Athens: Polis, 2003.

Despina I. Papadimitriou

*Από τον βλαό των
νομιμοφρόνων στο έθνος
των εθνικοφρόνων. Η
συντηρητική σκέψη στην
Ελλάδα 1922–1967*
[*From Loyalists to
Nationally Minded Citizens:
Conservative Thought in
Greece, 1922–1967*]

Athens: Savvalas, 2006. 328 pp.

by Stratos N. Dordanas

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The twentieth century was undoubtedly a period of great intensity; political conflict resulting in the formation of different ideologies climaxed during the two world wars. As geographical borders were being re-established during this period, radical changes occurred bringing about various political power alliances. After the juxtaposition of the parliamentary system and fascism, the West was then confronted with socialism and the communist totalitarian regimes of the post-war years. How did the Greeks, in regards to their own situation, perceive all of these particular changes as they were used to form a mass ideology and to legalise political power? In other words,

what were the conditions that led to the transition of a people who were once loyalists to become nationally minded and, as a result, determine the formation and development of Greek conservative thought? Despina Papadimitriou, in her present work, observes the course taken by right-wing politics in relation to international socio-political changes. Her analysis begins with the period when Greek politics disassociated itself from the *Megali Idea* ("Great Idea"), following the Asia Minor disaster, and ends in 1967, which marks the beginning of the military dictatorship.

Papadimitriou's main source is the Athenian (daily and periodical) press during this time. She discusses the nation and its people during the interwar period, the formation of the nationalist state during the post-war years and investigates the conditions under which this ideology was founded. She discerns the later changes which took place concerning Greek conservative thought, basing it on the crucial turning point of the 1940s. After the presentation of her methodology, whereby the press is used as a narrative-historical source in reconstructing the activity and thought of the time, the book is then divided into two sections, looking at: firstly, the anti-Venizelist movement during the interwar period and, secondly, the anti-communist movement comprised of nationally minded citizens who determined conservative ideology and who shaped both the converging and diverging views within this ideology.

The author begins with the fact that all political systems, with the exception of theocratic states, need the support of the people in order to legitimise their power. From the start, however, she points out the difficulty encountered in defining the term "populism" (*λαϊκισμός*) and assigning it to any specific form of government due to the fact that a variety of definitions have been attached to it, thus rendering its analyti-

cal application difficult. In this particular case, the author believes it is necessary to analyse and define the terms "populism" and "populist" (*λαϊκιστής*) in order to understand their multiformity in both the time and the space which they are used. She explains that "populist" does not necessarily determine the content of the politics at the time, nor the form of government. Thus the term "populism" in modern Greece refers to a specific political reality and is ascribed to a range of phenomena which took place during the period between the two world wars, where it mainly represented the grassroots. In fact, the term populism represented the working classes more than the left actually did, taking into account that the left was still in its infant stage, albeit an up-and-coming power. In general, the masses constituted a new reality in Greece at the time and tried to manoeuvre themselves within the political system, which had been established after 1922. It represented the people who felt excluded from political power at the time. The bridging of the lower classes with the ruling class in the socio-political pyramid was achieved through the support of certain popular demands relating mainly to the common people which had to do with the need to maintain the social order. During the interwar period, it was the lower classes in Greece that united to form an alliance in order to protect the inviolable values of the nation and conservative thought. As regards the Greek version of popular conservatism, and before it became middle class, we can observe that it was those citizens intent on upholding the constitution and traditions who laid the foundations for the subsequent right-wing movement. It was these same people who identified with the anti-Venizelist movement both as an ideology and as a political stance.

This popular anti-Venizelist movement, as coined by Papadimitriou, did not in fact dif-

fer from that of the anti-communist movement during the Civil War as regards the cohesion within each organisation. In both cases we may observe that the foreign enemy who aroused one's national sensitivity united the people. Furthermore, those who were supporters of the anti-Venizelist and anti-communist movements were protected by the nation and given privileges. The bone of contention between the Venizelist and anti-Venizelist movements was thus the system of government to be implemented. Owing to this factor, it was the anti-Venizelist supporters who had to defend their interests, which did not differ from the interests of the monarchy. Thus, the idea of a democracy without the king, according to the anti-Venizelist press at the time, was unconstitutional and represented a system of government that did not originate from the people, nor did it represent them. This anti-constitutional idea was attributed to the co-operation of the supporters of Venizelos with foreign powers. It was these foreign powers that were a perpetual threat to the nation as well as Venizelos party members (known as the *Φιλελεύθεροι* or Liberals), who had been accused of parliamentary misconduct since the Great War. The anti-Venizelist supporters opposed these "agitators" who threatened the socio-political order as well as social and political values. They presented themselves as the defenders of the law and the constitution, regarding themselves as law-abiding citizens and thus defenders of the freedom of the people, which only the king could legally enforce.

Papadimitriou carries out an in-depth analysis of not only the anti-Venizelist press, but also the wider nationalist one, of the interwar period, presenting us with a comprehensive work concerning the reasoning behind the populist anti-Venizelist movement and its argumentation concerning "anti-populism"

and "anti-patriotic" interests. Even at times when there was growing support from the various political factions in support of a constitutional deviation, which was presented as the only way to combat anarchy, the decline in morality and the rise in communism (this last factor succeeded in the dissolution of all prior inter-party conflicts), the loyalists played a central role in influencing the political philosophy of their particular parties and leaders. In the case of communism, it was those citizens intent on upholding the constitution who obstructed it on ideological grounds in an appeal to save the nation: they even resorted to extraordinary measures such as deviating from the constitution. The conservative lower classes held a similarly influential position regarding the political proposals in favour of an "alternative solution"; this was due to the need to overcome the long-standing political conflict and to support a rebirth of the nation where morality would be enforced at many levels, thus forming a "new" nation founded on the axis of nation–religion–family.

As we approach the end of the interwar period, Papadimitriou conveys to us that the popular anti-Venizelist press gradually focused its interest on the threat of social upheaval, the subversive element here being communism. Yet at no point did they omit to mention that the main internal enemy remained the Venizelist movement and republicans. Despite the fact that it seems somewhat premature to state that the anti-communist movement bridged and united the middle classes, it was indeed the middle class during the interwar period that formed the front opposing those who were anti-status quo. The only opposition to Bolshevism was the established, middle-class order within the capitalist system, whose foundation stone was paid labour. The author makes an interesting point concerning the particular charac-

teristics of the anti-communist and anti-Venizelist movements, namely that, during the interwar period, communism did not pose a major threat to Greek society but was associated with the anti-Venizelist movement and, as such, was perceived as being hostile, especially during times when national matters were at stake. Nevertheless, one can detect, at this early stage, all those elements which became the cornerstone of argumentation as regards the events that took place during the Civil War and in the post-Civil War state, i.e., a contradistinction was made between a communist and a Greek; communism was pronounced unethical and its ideology rejected. In addition, the conservative press emphasised the spread of socialist theories in the workplace, attributing this infiltration to the weakness of the middle-class parties to alleviate economic and social hardship by failing to help those who had been hit hardest. Furthermore, the conservative press states that the middle-class parties had to first identify and then stop the bleeding wounds from which the 'germs' of subversion and social anarchy spread.

It is at this point that the author presents the first attempts that were made to eradicate the schism between the anti- and pro-Venizelist movements for the sake of unifying the nation. Both those within the conservative political realm as well as those who were outside it engaged in these attempts; these significant factions being made up of loyalists and patriots whose supporters derived from the middle classes. The need for unification stemmed from the fear of social upheaval and gave rise to national-mindedness in the interwar period, which did not divide the community but went beyond party politics and strived to protect the nation itself. This need for unification was even proposed before the crucial referendum of 1935 over the monarchy, at which

time there was a deep-rooted division in the political world. Papadimitriou attempts to analyse the power that this dialogue, which took place within the political sphere of conservative thinking, had on the people. This sphere contained proponents of traditional conservatism and what the author refers to as "neo-conservatives", who supported a reformed conservatism, not to mention moderates and ardent defenders of reconciliation. The author states that the above situation cannot be fully comprehended outside of its historical context and adds that we must take into consideration the beginnings of "action and reaction" which took place in the political arena at the time. "Action and reaction" correspond to two different worlds, one which looked towards the future and envisaged it through its "right-wing sensitivity", while the other was obsessed with the polarised past. These two worlds reached their zenith in 1936 and disappeared with the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship, after which followed a radical realignment caused by the Occupation and the Civil War.

It is indeed a fact that the transition from the traumatic years of the National Schism to the Fourth of August regime brought to the forefront the concept of unity as simple historical documentation, unlike in other periods where 'unification' still meant an open wound that had not yet healed. On the other hand, the conservative values of nation-religion-family took on a new meaning during the Metaxas regime which saw a need to protect the nation from its internal enemies. This was when the communists first embodied hostility; they were perceived as a threat to anything that was Greek, as enemies of Greek tradition, the nation and its virtues. At this same period, the author highlights the formation of a political ideology upon which the concept of national-mindedness was built as a form of political exclusion,

expressed by the right-wing movement which had become the autonomous declaration of Greek conservative thought.

The 1940s undoubtedly witnessed a turning point as the interwar concept of national-mindedness was now redefined as it was transferred into the national and international scenes. Papadimitriou, first, investigates this phenomenon in relation to the American reality during the Cold War, conveying the factors of anti-communist sentiment, which were fuelled by internal politics and based on fear, insecurity and the feeling that communist totalitarian regimes represented a perpetual threat and growing danger for Western civilisation. If, on the one hand, America now represented the protector of the values of the free world in opposition to totalitarianism (as first declared in the Truman Doctrine), Greece, where European civilisation had been founded, was the first representative example of a conflict between these two ideologies in which the Communist Party of Greece sought a direct alliance with the Soviet Union.

One of the author's most interesting points refers to the antinomy of nationalism and especially that of the double identity between the nationalist and the nationally minded, the common denominator of both being the nation. This antinomy was formed during the Civil War and post-Civil War years. During the Civil War, the concept of an enemy who was motivated by foreign powers and the concept of the "other" were bridged in part; the two versions (nationalism and national-mindedness), especially during the war, referred to the whole nation through the use of racial-ethnic terms. After the end of the war, nationalism was gradually incorporated into national-mindedness, the latter being inscribed in the collective consciousness as a stable and secure system for the nation as a

part of the Western world, despite the disappointment, felt up to that time, that the country's demands had not been met.

During the first post-war decade, the right's identity was cohesive, but it also interchanged with the concept of national-mindedness, and it expressed itself primarily through the Greek Rally party (*Ελληνικός Συναγερμός*, ES). In spite of different proposals being put forward and the political games being played out within the parties themselves, the right came together as a whole to oppose their common enemy, communism. This union of the right was encouraged further by the democracy-monarchy dilemma. The right, as a consequence, used anti-communist rhetoric in order to obstruct the anticipated return of the communist forces, which would endanger the integrity of the nation. The United Democratic Left (*Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά*, EDA) was one such target. Papagos was a politician who went beyond party politics, who sought the revival of political life and who agreed to forget the past. He was a visionary who believed in a better future and, in this respect, projected himself as a socialist; but he was first and foremost a nationally minded right-winger, who advocated security and protection against those who were the enemies of the state and were directed by foreign powers. The National Radical Union (*Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωση*, ERE), set up by Constantine Karamanlis, also adopted the same characteristics, projecting a more grassroots image of the right and, as a consequence, its more popular origins. Another common area where the right-wing parties drew their anti-communist slogans from during the 1950s and 1960s was the past, in particular the period during the German Occupation and the 'Bandit War' (*συμμοριτοπόλεμος*). In this political climate, George Papandreou's Centre Union (*Ένωση Κέντρου*, EK) chose to

keep its distance from both the right and the communists, choosing instead to interpret the past in its own way.

The 1956 elections and the collaboration of George Papandreou's party with the EDA, in the Democratic Union (*Δημοκρατική Ένωση*), played a determining factor in the way the right viewed him. The right-wing press perceived it as a rebuilding of the communist bloc within Greece and its invasion of Greece's public life. In other words, there was a showdown, which was based on the political experiences of the Civil War, where the nation as one had been confronted by 'a gang of *σλαβόδουλων* [Slavic slaves] and insurgents'.

Therefore, there was a revival of Civil War phraseology, and, as a consequence, the voters were in a quandary about who to support. On the one hand, the ERE represented the only patriotic and moral party which remained firm in its beliefs while, on the other hand, there was the Democratic Union, a political coalition whose leaders were willing to sacrifice the nation to the petty interests of party politics by breaking away from the hitherto staunch nationally minded front. Later, the right-wing movement continued to criticise the Centre Union on two distinct areas: one was their tolerance of the EDA and the other was its surreptitious involvement in communist activity which stood in contrast to the professed national-mindedness they claimed to support. The EDA, on the other hand, was seen by its opponents as moving steadily beyond the national framework while secretly preparing itself for a 'fourth round' in the fight between revolutionary communism and the legitimate state. For the right, there were no shades of grey; there were only two 'worlds'. One was the world of the patriotic forces and the other was that of traitors. It was thus another nationalist party, the

Centre Union, that formed a contrast within the nationalist camp, which Papadimitriou believes enabled the right to reconcile itself with its past and to find its identity, an identity that was based on the victories of the Civil War and the subsequent building of a nationally minded state, not to mention the legacy of interwar Greek conservatism.

In an addendum, the author goes beyond the book's timeframe, going beyond 1967 so as to investigate the survival of right-wing ideology and national-mindedness in general, as well as its breaking away from those involved in the 21 April 1967 coup. She shows that the two camps clashed, with the Colonels distancing themselves from the ethics of traditional politics by going beyond party politics. The junta also distanced itself from the notion of 'memory', which had been an integral part of the political life of nationally minded supporters. The Colonels justified the coup simply as being "a revolution which saved the nation", thus rendering it legal.

In conclusion, Papadimitriou's book is a work that one can refer to in order to understand the boundaries within which Greek conservatism was formed and developed during the greater part of the twentieth century. In addition, it represents a comprehensive study which conveys a more general interpretation of the dramatic events that marked modern Greek history.

**Jerzy W. Borejsza and
Klaus Ziemer (eds)**

***Totalitarian and
Authoritarian Regimes
in Europe. Legacies and
Lessons from the
Twentieth Century***

**New York and Oxford: Berghahn,
2006, 607 pp.**

by Polymeris Voglis

University of Thessaly

In 1956, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski published their influential study *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. It was an attempt to compare Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as examples of totalitarian political systems. Totalitarianism, according to Friedrich and Brzezinski, was characterised by an official ideology, the absence of parliamentarism, one-party rule, police terror, party control of the armed forces and the economy, as well as a monopoly of the mass media. This study and others that appeared in the 1950s, such as Hanna Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), provided a theoretical framework for the use of the term "totalitarianism" as it was embedded in the ideological context of the Cold War. The term "totalitarianism" was heavily criticised because it

equated the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany, assumed that Soviet society (and the societies in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe) was in fact under the complete control of the state and the party, maintained that the system was based exclusively on terror and propaganda and neglected the tremendous social changes that took place in them. In the 1990s the term was reintroduced, especially in political science, and the present volume gives us the chance to once again discuss its heuristic value. The volume is based on papers presented to a conference held in September 2000 in Warsaw, organised by the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the German Historical Institute, Warsaw. The volume is indeed impressive because of its scope: scholars from several European countries examine the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in a number of countries (such as, among others, Austria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Romania, Poland and the Soviet Union), with a view to analysing their historiographies, state policies, legal systems and politics of memory.

The very term "totalitarianism" originates from the inter-war period when the Italian Fascist, Soviet and, later, Nazi regimes captured the attention of many European scholars. Marek Kornat, in his informative chapter, examines the discussions among Polish lawyers and sociologists regarding what they called "totalism". In the various concepts they employed in order to describe the new forms of political power (such as the monopolistic state or the bureaucratic-plebiscitary state) the state played a prominent role. They saw an anti-liberal revolution in which the state takes control of all the areas of human life, reducing society to an atomised and amorphous mass. Although, as Klaus Ziemer reminds us in his chapter, the first to use the term was Giovanni Amendola

in 1923 to criticise the Italian Fascist Party, it is most commonly associated with Mussolini, who in 1925 referred to the *stato totalitario* in an often-quoted phrase: "Everything for the state, nothing external to the state, nothing against the state." It is necessary to bear in mind that Mussolini described the totalitarian state as a goal, not as an accomplishment, of the Fascists. On the other hand, Friedrich and Brzezinski believed the totalitarian state was a fact in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. So the question is whether there were totalitarian states in twentieth-century Europe? Jerzy Borejsza, in his introduction, outlines some similarities between Italian Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism, such as terror, propaganda, utopian ideology and mass support. Borejsza's approach is differentiated from older conceptualisations of totalitarianism in a number of ways. Following more recent attempts of comparison between Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union,¹ he incorporates in his analysis, among others, the historicisation of the Soviet regime, the differences between ideologies and regimes even when the similarities seem evident (as in the case of terror) and the reactions of society. This is not to say that a comparison cannot be fruitful, and Dietrich Beyrau's chapter on the intellectual professions under Stalinism and Nazism is a case in point. The question concerns the term "totalitarianism" as a theoretical framework for comparison. While Borejsza finds that its "usefulness is limited" (5), some authors of the present volume do not seem to agree with him. However, they do not share a common definition of what a totalitarian state is, at times using the terms totalitarianism and authoritarianism interchangeably. Jože Pirjevec, in his chapter, analyses the pre-war dictatorship of King Alexander of Yugoslavia, the Ustaše regime of Ante Pavelić and Tito's regime as three experiments in totalitarianism. In a similar vein, Andrea Feld-

man sees the history of Croatia as a succession of totalitarian and/or authoritarian regimes. Eckhard Jesse maintains that both Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) committed crimes (!) and, therefore, "a comparison of the crimes of the Third Reich and of those of the GDR needs to be legitimate" (456). Marc Lazar extends the definition of totalitarianism in order to include not just states but also movements. He uses as an example of a totalitarian movement the French Communist Party because of the problematic relations it had with liberal democracy and its strong anti-capitalism. He classifies French communism as a case of "failed totalitarianism" which foundered due to the reaction of anti-communism and the resistance of the democratic system.

The authors who avoid the term totalitarianism or who use it critically provide more nuanced analyses. Marcello Flores points out that "totalitarianism" as a paradigm (according to Ernst Nolte) failed to move beyond the juxtaposition of historical aspects of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and, thus, rendered a genuine comparison difficult. Moreover, in Nazi Germany state policies were very coherent, whereas the Soviet Union was marked by changes and developments. It is not a coincidence that the "totalitarian" character of the Soviet Union is generally discussed with reference to Stalin's rule and less to that of Khrushchev or Brezhnev. The socialist countries were not "frozen" and the developments or changes in them through the decades are highlighted in the chapters by Christoph Boyer and Andrzej Friszke. Boyer demonstrates the ability of socialist regimes to overcome the challenge of inherent instability through adjustments and control arrangements. He focuses on the GDR in the 1960s and 1970s and argues that economic reforms in combination with social policy and

an improvement in living standards produced the “loyalty” of the populace and the legitimisation of the regime. Friszke examines the different phases in socialist Poland between 1956 and 1989. He shows that Polish society oscillated between adaptation and resistance to the regime and points out the dynamic factors (the Church and the intellectuals) that led the process of the liberation of society from the dominance of the socialist regime – at least until the coup of December 1981.

Some other cases clearly do not fit the totalitarian paradigm. Olivier Wieviorka dismisses any definition of the Vichy regime as either “fascist” or “totalitarian”. Instead, he considers it a “French phenomenon rooted in national tradition” (385), arguing that, despite the destruction of Petain’s structures after the end of the war, the memory of Vichy remained very much alive because it epitomises all French political debates since 1789, debates that have shaped French identity. Another case is the Greek military dictatorship (1967–1974). Hagen Fleischer incorporates the dictatorship into the larger context of post-war political developments in Greece to show that the silence about the 1940s (occupation, resistance and civil war) produced a Manichean view of the past, whereas the passage of the military dictatorship into oblivion caused a certain kind of social amnesia that is reflected in the rather positive image of the dictatorship in public opinion polls. Gerhard Botz studies the Austrian myth of being Hitler’s first “victim” in order to show that it allowed for an incomplete denazification after the war while, at the same time, resulting in nation-building based on social partnership and the avoidance of any political conflict that might endanger Austrian democracy.

Similar problems of dealing with the past concern a number of authors in the present

volume. Klaus Ziemer addresses the question of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and stresses the importance of factors such as the establishment of constitutional order, the role of the old elites in the new situation and economic development for the success of political reforms. However, after a successful consolidation of democracy how do the society and the state deal with the authoritarian past? Carsten Humlebæk examines how the print media dealt with the Franco regime after his death to argue that most newspapers quickly relegated Franco to history in order to construct a discontinuity between the dictatorial past and the democratic present. Heidemarie Uhl investigates monument culture in post-war Austria. She underlines the difference between Vienna and the conservative Catholic provinces and analyses the ideas behind the successive phases of commemoration: the struggle for freedom in the immediate post-war years, which was followed by the rehabilitation of the soldiers who fought with Wehrmacht in the Second World War, which, in the 1980s, was replaced by a new culture of commemoration that focused on the victims of the resistance and the Holocaust. Martin Sabrow examines the collapse of historiography in the former GDR after 1989: research institutes were closed down, respected historians were forced to leave their jobs, and a 40-year production of historical knowledge was discredited. The former East German historians adopted at first an accusatory discourse, although later they were able to show in their autobiographies the ambivalence of academic practice in the GDR. In Slovakia after 1989, as Dušan Kováč shows in his chapter, historians tried to rewrite the history of Slovakia and Czechoslovakia without the communist ideological influence. The goal of “a history without ideology” was compromised by the turn of many historians to anti-communism and na-

tionalism. The revival of nationalism in many former socialist countries is a widespread phenomenon. Szymon Rudnicki's essay concerns right-wing radicalism in contemporary Poland, where a number of extreme rightist organisations, mainstream political parties and Catholic Church circles have put forward an agenda that combines nationalism, Catholicism, anti-communism, traditionalism and anti-Semitism. Perhaps the country with the most difficult past in present-day Europe is, after Germany, Russia. This is mirrored, for instance, in the contradictory ways that history schoolbooks have dealt with Stalin's rule, examined by Arkady Tsfasman. Even more controversial is the way that contemporary Russia deals with the legacy of the Soviet Union. As Alexei Miller writes in his chapter, those responsible for committing crimes under the communist regime in the Soviet Union were not punished: the communist past was silenced, while Russian governments have refused to take responsibility for the actions either against the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union or against other countries (Hungary, Poland and the former Czechoslovakia).

To return to the initial question, is it useful to use the term "totalitarianism" in order to analyse and compare a variety of political systems in twentieth-century Europe? Jens Petersen, in his contribution to the volume, argues that the anti-fascist ideology in post-war Italy prevented the spread of the concept of totalitarianism linked to an interpretation of communism. "Totalitarianism" was an ideological weapon, rather than a theoretical framework, in the various battles fought during the Cold War. If the history of the concept of totalitarianism is an essential part of the cultural history of the Cold War, then perhaps we should start our discussion based on that history, a history that should also in-

clude memory because the political uses of the past provide "frames" for the understanding of historical experience. While many essays of the volume point in that direction, a lot more work needs to be done.

NOTES

- 1 Such as Ian Kershaw and Moshe Levin (eds), *Stalinism and Nazism. Dictatorships in Comparison*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.

**Iakovos D. Michailidis, Elias
Nicolakopoulos, Hagen Fleischer
(eds)**

**«Εχθρός» εντός των τειχών.
Όψεις του Δωσιφλογισμού
στην Ελλάδα της Κατοχής
[“Enemy” within the Gates.
Aspects of Collaboration in
Greece during the German
Occupation]**

**Athens: Ellinika Grammata,
2006. 387 pp.**

Stratos N. Dordanas

**Έλληνες εναντίον Ελλήνων.
Ο κόσμος των Ταγμάτων
Ασφαλείας στην κατοχική
Θεσσαλονίκη 1941–1944
[Greeks against Greeks.
The Security Battalions in
Thessaloniki, 1941–1944]**

**Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2006.
529 pp.**

by Eleni Paschaloudi

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In comparison with the rest of Europe, collaboration has not been a favourite subject of Greek historians. For decades, the historical narrative about the Nazi occupation and the Civil War was politically biased. The victors of the Civil War sought to silence, on the one hand, the memory of the Resistance, because it was associated with the Left and, on the other, the fact that many right-wing groups and individuals collaborated with the Axis. In this narrative, which was dominant until 1974, the fact that different people for entirely different reasons ‘collaborated’ with the occupation authorities was repressed. When a reference was necessary, collaboration was analysed mainly as an outcome of the violent methods of EAM/ELAS, and the Security Battalions were presented as the forces that prevented the Greek communists from seizing power. A scientific historical approach of the phenomenon of collaboration in wartime Greece was postponed for many years. As the editors of the *“Enemy” within the Gates* point out in their introduction, the idea of a nationwide resistance, which was set forth in 1981, made matters even more complicated. Both narratives restricted systematic historical research and excluded one of the ‘darkest sides’ of modern Greek history.

Even in the recent past, the efficient and thorough research of collaboration was a project that very few historians decided to trail. John L. Hondros,¹ Hagen Fleischer,² and Mark Mazower³ were some of the historians who, in a way, initiated the discussion. A younger generation of historians and political scientists followed, trying to expand this in many ways repressed and thus unknown side of the 1940s. Both books examine certain aspects of ideological, political and military collaboration in Greece during the Axis occupation. The articles published in the volume *“Enemy” within the Gates* were first presented to a conference organised in June 2004 on Samoth-

raki, the fifth annual conference organised by the Civil War Study Group since 2000.

The volume is composed of four chapters and twenty articles selected from the more than 30 papers presented to the conference. The first chapter, entitled "European Experience and Methodological Considerations", serves as a starting point for the study of collaboration in Nazi-occupied Europe. First, it raises certain methodological issues. Stathis Kalyvas, in his contribution, suggests that the comparative approach is the most appropriate to examine collaboration at both the micro and macro social levels. Second, in this chapter collaboration in Greece is examined in comparison with the rest of Europe and the Balkans. Mark Mazower provides an interpretation of the collaborators' motives throughout Europe, showing that collaboration was very often enhanced by strong feelings of anti-communism and nationalism. While Vemund Aarbake focuses on Norway, the rest of the articles of this chapter refer to the Balkans. Konstantinos Katsanos analyses the case of Yugoslavia, arguing that political life after the Second World War was marked by the antagonism between former participants in the resistance groups and erstwhile collaborators. Georgia Kretsi, in a scrupulous analysis, reveals how collaboration was associated with class differences in post-war Albania in order to establish a new political system. In this case, collaboration was used to emphasise the moral superiority of the communist government as opposed to the corruption of the bourgeoisie. Finally, Kostas Gemenis focuses on the motives of the collaborators in Greece. The main point of his analysis is that collaboration of ethnic groups with the Occupation authorities was a way of gaining power over the Greek state.

The remaining three chapters of the volume concern aspects of the wartime govern-

ments, the local dimensions and collaboration in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, which was under Bulgarian rule. The second chapter consists of three contributions that shed light on the institutional and financial activities of the wartime Greek governments. Nikos Papanastasiou focuses on the way that the Tsolakoglou government tried to break away from the legacy of the Metaxas' regime. Nikos Zaikos examines the mechanisms used by the Axis powers to control wartime governments, while Christos Nikas focuses on the financial policy of the latter.

Among the volume's most intriguing papers are the ones attempting an interpretation of the motives that led separate people or groups to collaborate with the 'enemy'. Katerina Tsekou's study of the Armenian community of Kavala and Eleftheria Manta's of the Chams in Western Greece show that for ethnic minorities collaboration with the Axis was a way to protect their national identity (in the case of the former) or to pursue irredentist claims (in the case of the latter). Tassos Hadjianastasiou describes how certain communities of Slav Macedonians in Thrace saw the Bulgarian occupation as a liberating process. On the other hand, collaboration sometimes had more personal motives, such as represented by the case of the Greek communities in north Africa, which, according to Alexandros Dagkas, was motivated by financial considerations. Nevertheless, political motives also played a significant role. Vaios Kalogrias, in his contribution, discusses the case of Athanasios Chrysochoou, Inspector-General of the Region of Macedonia, who believed that establishing links with the Axis would be the best way of preventing the communists from seizing power after the war. In the same line of argumentation, Stratos Dordanas examines the case of Xenofon Yosmas from Thessaloniki, who devoted

himself to the anti-communist cause. In 1944, he followed the retreating German Army, taking refuge in Germany, where he remained until 1947 in order to avoid facing Greek justice. Even though he was convicted and sentenced to death, he was never executed. He continued his anti-communist activities, supporting right-wing paramilitary groups until the 1960s, and was involved in the assassination, in 1963, of Gregoris Lambrakis, a Greek Member of Parliament.

Other papers bring forward the question of how post-war justice dealt with collaboration. Vassilis Ridjaleos and Kyriakos Lykourinos present the way collaborators were treated in the courts of Drama and Kavala respectively. Both cases allow us to draw the conclusion that most of the people who had collaborated with the Bulgarians were not put on trial because of the Civil War that followed the Occupation. Rather, the majority 'purified' themselves by gradually joining the National Army and assisting in the defeat of the communists in the Civil War.

Last but not least, some of the contributions focus on memory issues, especially in the way that collaboration and collaborators were 'engraved' in collective and individual memory. In their articles, Nikos Karagiannakidis presents his research on the collective memory of collaboration in Kavala while Maria Bontila shows how collaboration was represented in history and literature in post-war Greece. Very interesting is the contribution of Vangelis Tzoukas, who focuses on the hostility between ELAS and EDES. He claims that the hostility and distrust between the members of the two resistance groups continued after 1944 and was perpetuated for many decades. Actually, this hostility was a result of the civil strife during the Occupation. For many years, former EDES participants re-

fused to accept that ELAS had engaged in resistance activity, claiming rather that it did not aim at the liberation of Greece but the formation of a communist state.

The collective memory of collaboration and resistance in Greece was the direct result of the Civil War that followed the liberation of the country. It was not only due to the fact that the narrative of the victors prevailed after the end of the Civil War, but mainly because the divisions it produced were so intense that they led to the emergence of very strong political identities. These identities perpetuated, grew stronger and, thus, influenced any reconstruction of the past.

After 1949 the two sides that fought in the Civil War sought to return to some kind of normality, more so the victors. Accordingly, their narratives on the 1940s were based on the unifying rather than on the divisive elements of the otherwise controversial decade. Right-wing parties and politicians found in former collaborators a very strong ally against the Left. In order to accomplish this alliance, they provided shelter for many collaborators but refused to talk about collaboration in public. As Tassos Kostopoulos has shown, collaboration in the past was incompatible with "national mindedness".⁴ In the official discourse of the 1950s and 1960s, collaboration, even if it was triggered by anti-communism, was not something of which any political party could be proud. In the same way, the Left chose to commemorate resistance as its founding myth. Even though in public discourse the Left very often used collaboration with a view to undermining the "national mindedness" of the Right, resistance remained the main reference in the 1940s. Resistance in the discourse of the Left was the struggle of the whole nation, excepting a handful of domestic traitors who collaborated with the Axis, against foreign enemies.

The book *Greeks against Greeks* is a welcome contribution to the flourishing discussion on the 1940s which, during the last decade, has challenged the established narratives that for many years haunted Greek historians. “*Enemy*” within the *Gates* and other recently published books⁵ have focused mainly on rural Greece, leaving the issue of collaboration in urban centres almost untouched. Dordanas, in his study, shows that the situation was altogether different in the cities. His material derives from a very important but yet underestimated archive: that of the Special Court for Collaborators established in Thessaloniki in 1945 to try individuals accused of collaboration with the Occupation authorities. The various cases represent different aspects of collaboration, pointing to the multiplicity of the reasons and the motives that drove people to assist the Germans. In other words, *Greeks against Greeks* enriches our knowledge about the particular subject which, as mentioned above, was shrouded in silence for many years.

The book is divided into ten chapters that present the ideological, political and military activities of the Thessalonikian collaborators. The part dealing with the ideological background to collaboration shows that Greek Nazi sympathisers made a considerable effort to support the Nazi cause politically, as the cases of prominent collaborators Georgios Poulos, Georgios Spyridis and Grigorios Pazionis and the EEE (National Union of Greece) clearly demonstrate. Nationalist ideas were not new to Thessaloniki; they had already appeared in 1933 and the Axis Occupation gave them the opportunity to thrive. Hatred and fear of communism motivated the Nazi sympathisers into pursuing political links with the Germans. Their efforts, however, failed because they had very little support among the populace, a fact which

the Germans were aware. Under these circumstances, political association with the Germans became impossible. On the other hand, the Germans warmly welcomed offers of military collaboration. The product of this partnership was the establishment of the Security Battalions in Athens and Thessaloniki in 1943. Nevertheless, the northern Greek case, as Dordanas points out, contains a peculiarity. There, the Battalions were formed almost spontaneously, without an official decree and before those in Athens, by people who believed communism was more dangerous than the Axis Occupation. Moreover, these paramilitary units did not have any connection with the Greek authorities; they were directly controlled and armed by the German authorities in Thessaloniki.

The people who joined these military units were of different social, economic and educational backgrounds and comprised political groups located in the city as well as military groups coming from the rural areas. Others identified ideologically with the Germans or were anti-communists. Some were determined to prevent ELAS from taking over their villages while others took advantage of the situation in order to survive, become rich or take revenge on their personal enemies. Military collaboration mushroomed in Macedonia especially from 1943. The Security Battalions were supported mainly by refugees from Asia Minor, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Ex-officers with a liberal political background, university professors, old politicians and crooks came together in the Security Battalions. These individuals did not have the same origins and certainly not the same end. While different people in different places chose for a variety of reasons to establish political or military links with the occupation authorities in Greece, they were all certainly kept united under German orders. What is re-

ally astonishing about their military activities, described wonderfully in the book, is that they very soon managed to marginalise the Greek authorities in Thessaloniki. The chief of police seemed unable to curtail their activity and was quite intimidated by their violent methods. Reading the reports of their actions, one gets the impression that the Security Battalions reigned over the city in 1944.

It is very obvious in both of the books that no single analysis on collaboration is possible. Until very recently this controversial aspect of the 1940s had not been sufficiently studied. It was mainly in the last decade that the discussion about the 1940s became extremely vivid and fertile. As Henry Rousso points out, "when the time is right an era of the past may serve as a screen on which new generations can project their contradictions, controversies, and conflicts in objectified form".⁶ Occupation, the Resistance and the Civil War in Greece were not subjects of historical research for many decades. Because they were alive in the collective and individual memory, they served as a basis for the construction of political identities and thus, in a way, perpetuated the passions, divisions and animosity that they had initially caused. Collaboration was the most 'suppressed' aspect of the 1940s. These books, products of a new generation of historians who have not hesitated to broach such a controversial and fragile subject, prove that Greek society and its academic community are now able to face some of these issues. The intense discussion that followed the publication of the two books confirms Rousso's words: the time is right and the 1940s reflect the controversies, contradictions and conflicts of a new generation, be it inside or outside academia, in an objectified form. The next step will be to break that screen . . .

NOTES

- 1 John Louis Hondros, *Occupation and Resistance. The Greek Agony 1941–44*, New York: Pella, 1983.
- 2 Hagen Fleischer, *Στέμμα και Σβάστικα. Η Ελλάδα της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης. 1941–1944*, 2 vols, Athens: Papazisis, 1995.
- 3 Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece. The Experience of Occupation 1941–44*, New Haven: Yale UP, 1993.
- 4 Tassos Kostopoulos, *Η αυτολογοκριμένη μνήμη. Τα Τάγματα Ασφαλείας και η μεταπολεμική εθνοπροσύνη*, Athens: Filistor, 2005.
- 5 Nikos Marantzidis, *Yasasin Millet, Ζήτω το έθνος. Προσφυγιά, Κατοχή και Εμφύλιος: Εθνική ταυτότητα και πολιτική συμπεριφορά στους τουρκόφωνους ελληνορθόδοξους του δυτικού Πόντου*, Heraklio: Crete UP, 2001; Tassos Hadjianastasiou, *Αντάρτες και καπετάνιοι. Η Εθνική Αντίσταση κατά της βουλγαρικής κατοχής της Ανατολικής Μακεδονίας και της Θράκης 1942–1944*, Thessaloniki: Kuriakidis, 2003; Nikos Marantzidis (ed.), *Οι άλλοι καπετάνιοι. Αντικομμουνιστές ένοπλοι στα χρόνια της Κατοχής και του Εμφυλίου*, Athens: Hestia, 2005.
- 6 Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome. History and Memory in France since 1944*, transl. Arthur Goldhamer, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991.

Stathis Kalyvas

The Logic of Violence in Civil War

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 508 pp.

by Neni Panourgia

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Stathis Kalyvas has plotted and undertaken a very ambitious project and *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* is the latest but not last word on it, as Kalyvas himself announces (290, n. 46). The book is divided into eleven chapters, with an introduction and a very impressive bibliography, which will be a valuable resource to anyone who engages with this subject matter. The bibliography is broken up into segments on primary and secondary sources; general theory; Greek-only sources; unpublished memoirs; and student research papers (some of them by students at the University of Athens, some at the University of Chicago, and some at New York University), although it is not clear in the book how these student papers have been utilised.

Kalyvas's project concerns itself with civil war as a form of war, globally and across time, and, as best as it can be summed up, argues against prevailing theories which explain violence in the context of civil war as the result of

madness, loss of emotional control, or simple-minded and short-sighted *tactical* decisions. Kalyvas, rather, puts forth the theory that civil war violence is a well thought-out, planned, calculated and *strategic* move that seeks to establish long-term military control over populations and areas. Moreover, Kalyvas claims that violence is not necessarily the result of ideological convictions, but rather an opportunistic act that seeks to maximise the putative results of the civil war. As he notes in the blurb, "Civil war offers irresistible opportunities to those who are not naturally bloodthirsty and abhor direct involvement in violence," therefore setting forth from the beginning the highly contentious and ultimately unconvincing argument, repeated throughout the book, that civil war and attendant violence are not the result of deep ideological cleavages between the warring parties, but rather opportunistic acts. This contention that there is no real ideological component in civil war is a running theme throughout Kalyvas's work on this subject matter.

The specific argument that insurgency is erroneously attributed to communist ideology was made primarily within military and policy circles in the 1970s, during the years of the Vietnam War, the African decolonisation movement, and the movements for democratisation in Latin America.¹ It was a counterintuitive argument and against the grain not only of the position taken by academics at the time, but also by the revolutionaries themselves, by professional analysts, policy makers, and the legacy of the Truman Doctrine. And it was an argument that sought to prove that the importance of communist ideology had been inflated by communists themselves without having any real or objective impact on the ground. Kalyvas's argument is not much different from this, namely that civil war is primarily carried out by individuals who

find opportunities (primarily for survival and personal advancement) in the context of the civil war, but who do not necessarily share the ideological positions of the leaders.

Furthermore, Kalyvas makes an argument for the specificity of violence in civil war, discussing at length the various theories about the particular barbarism of civil war but without making it clear in the end whether he actually agrees with the position that violence in civil war is exceptionally brutal or not. In order to bring out such specificities of violence in the context of civil war, Kalyvas has sought to separate civil war *qua* war from its attendant violence *qua* violence, attempting to show that there is indeed validity in the commonly made claim that the violence of civil wars is greater than the violence deployed in interstate wars, so much so that one of the main points of the book is that what sets “civil wars apart from interstate ones with respect to violence [is their] barbarism and intimacy” (11). Of course, the legitimate question here is how can the violence allegedly intrinsic to civil war, any civil war, be considered more barbaric than the violence unleashed upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for instance, or the bombardment of Dresden, or the Holocaust, or the violence deployed by the British Empire in India, South Africa or Kenya, or French violence in Algeria, or American violence in My Lai?

Through all this, Kalyvas attempts to construct a theory of violence in civil war based on macro- and micro-perspectives and approaches. His macro-perspectives include the employment of extremely convoluted and dense mathematical models and graphs accompanied by a language that is not very useful outside the restricted disciplinary boundaries of political science. Villages are categorised into five zones according to a number of parameters (elevation, level of violence,

political affiliation, etc.) and temporal dimensions are given code names (such as t1, t2, etc.): all in all, a language that quantifies (and thus perhaps disqualifies) an unquantifiable object of study.

Perhaps because this quantifying language and objectified method are indeed unyielding, Kalyvas feels compelled to turn to what he calls a “grass-roots” strategy (247), known in anthropology as ethnographic fieldwork, in order to be able to test the theory of violence and the importance of denunciation as a tool in the process. Kalyvas spent the latter part of January 1997 and the summers of 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 doing research in 136 villages in the Argolid plain in the Peloponnese, and in the region of Almopia, in the Prefecture of Pella in the northern Greek periphery of Central Macedonia. It is not entirely clear how much time Kalyvas was able to spend in each of the villages, since he never actually discloses this information, but if we assume that he spent the entirety of each summer doing fieldwork, it would mean that he has spent twelve months in the 136 villages, equalling roughly less than two days in each, figuring in time for travel and setting-up, making acquaintances, explaining the project, etc. This would hardly constitute enough time to engage in actual ethnographic fieldwork but enough to show that the similarities between the two areas are not great (despite his claim to the opposite [310]) and that the terms of comparison are seriously compromised from the beginning: despite their similarities in size and ecological range, the two areas are fundamentally different as sociological objects.

The Argolid is an area with a very high rate of right-wing politics (by Kalyvas’s own account, but also according to the ethnographic and demographic record), ethnically largely

homogeneous (the great majority of the inhabitants are Arvanites, Albanian-speaking Greeks who settled in the area in the late fourteenth century), and a place that played a major role during the Greek War of Independence of 1821–1829, serving as the seat of the first government after the end of that war. In this respect, the Argolid is at the heart of the statist project of modern Greece. On the other hand, Almopia, incorporated into the Greek state in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, was, during the period under consideration (1940–1949), largely inhabited by refugees from Asia Minor, as a result of the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne, and had a high degree of ethnic, linguistic and political differentiation (the old inhabitants spoke Slav-Macedonian, compared to the Greek, Turkish and Pontic of the refugees) with a population that was politically mixed with cleavages that did not run predictably along linguistic lines (again, according to Kalyvas). The Almopia example should probably be jettisoned from this study, especially since Kalyvas states that he was not able to “conduct a study of depth similar to that of the Argolid” (although he claims that even through this limited encounter he “was able to trace the main patterns of control and violence” [310]), and since the discussion on the Almopian example exhausts itself in a few paragraphs. Kalyvas has tried to mitigate this by using archival work in the process of trying to articulate what he refers to throughout as “the theory”, a gesture that further compromises his claim that his theory is sound and valid precisely because of his engagement with ethnographic fieldwork.

Let me speak as an anthropologist for a moment: ethnographic fieldwork is a method developed within anthropology; it is indeed the *sine qua non* of the discipline, and it is based

on one simple principle: by spending long and intimate time *in situ*, the anthropologist has the opportunity to come into very close contact with the people who will help to give texture to the concerns and questions s/he is researching, so that, over the course of time and in its depth, the inconsistencies and paradoxes of experience will become discernible. In other words, by spending a lot of uninterrupted time in the field, the anthropologist is able to observe the ways in which initial statements made by interlocutors develop and morph over time. This does not suggest that people lie to ethnographers (necessarily, although even that happens occasionally), but rather that when given the opportunity to think about their initial responses people will produce more nuanced and refined commentaries and accounts. And every anthropologist worth his or her Boas knows that material and information obtained *post factum*, especially 40 or 50 years later, constitute a present-day commentary on the fact (at best) or a rewriting of history (at worst) if it is not contextualised with material synchronic to the fact.

Therefore, what Kalyvas has managed to collect, almost 60 years later, are snippets of oral life histories, and he most certainly has not managed to “reconstruct the process of civil war in each village” as he claims, simply because such a reconstruction is impossible and, less simply, because claims to such reconstruction are suspect because they force interpretation. Refracted through time and the faltering of memory, invaluable though they are as testimonies of how their authors feel the impact of the past, these are by no means collected “nuanced accounts” produced when “researchers . . . conduct lengthy fieldwork in war zones – as opposed to interviewing victims and government officials” (104) which are the parameters that Kalyvas

himself has set as necessary for the production of “good theory” in his 2001 article “New and ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?” (118).² His fieldwork was neither lengthy nor in a war zone, and his interviews were most certainly conducted primarily with victims and old officials. Certainly the conceptualisation and definition of the victim is highly contentious in this context as it slips between ideological camps and is dependent on the final outcome of the war.

Early on in the book, Kalyvas defines his terms, especially the term “civil war” that has set the whole project in motion. “Civil war is defined as *armed combat within the boundaries of a recognised sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities*. Within civil war, my focus is on violence committed intentionally against noncombatants” (5, emphasis in the original). This is exactly the point where the problems with this study begin, not only in regards to Kalyvas’ empirical sample, but also, and equally, with the conceptual parameters of this study. If civil war is defined as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognised sovereign entity” (presumably Greece, in this case) “between parties subject to a common authority”, we need a definition of this “common authority” to which the warring parties are subjected. Kalyvas, following the dominant, official, statist and largely right-wing historiography from the 1950s onwards on the temporal contours of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), places the beginnings of the civil war in 1943, a time when Greece was under occupation by the Axis powers. However, in southern Greece (to stay with his example), the warring parties in 1943 were very specific and clear: the Germans and their Greek collaborators, on one hand, and the Greek resistance on the other. Therefore, the “common authority” that Kalyvas invokes could not

have been any other than the Nazis. And this creates problems, not necessarily (or singularly) ideological or political but primarily conceptual and epistemological in character. Kalyvas terms the Germans/collaborators as “incumbents” and the resistance as “insurgents” (occasionally, also, rebels). This formulation, however, raises in unequivocal terms the question of the legitimacy of sovereignty and authority. Can an occupying force (the Nazis, in this case) be a legitimate authority? Or, maybe, Kalyvas means the Greek government of the time, a government that was collaborating with the Nazis. But could such a government be a legitimate sovereign authority, and are the concepts of authority and sovereignty not seriously compromised in such a case?

Kalyvas engages in the production of a theory of civil war by attempting to “decouple” civil war violence from the war itself, a process that is in turn based on a further breaking down of violence into selective and indiscriminate. Indiscriminate violence is easily understood both as a practice and as a tactic, and it is deployed primarily during interstate wars. Selective violence, Kalyvas argues, is not only central to the project of civil war (because Kalyvas sees civil war as a project which is “at its core . . . a process of integration and nation building” [14]) but, far more importantly, it defines civil war as such because it “presupposes the ability to collect fine-grained information” (173), something that can be achieved only through intimate knowledge which can be utilised by the warring parties for the establishment of territorial control. Of course, such intimate knowledge can only be imparted through the act of denunciation, an act that Kalyvas sees as “central to all civil wars” (173, 179). Curiously, while Kalyvas sees denunciation as a practice with a moral and ethical weight that has produced its own

lexicon across languages and cultures (“rats, snitches, touts, *soplones*, *chivitos*, *sapos*, *orejas*, ruffians, *mouchards*, and the like” (177)), the Greek terms (*hafiedes*, *prodotes*, *koukou-la*) do not appear in this litany of terms, raising a question about this absence, especially since Kalyvas’ empirical material all comes from the Greek example. Did he not encounter any of these terms in his interviews? Were the denouncers in the Argolid not attributed a term? Could it be that Kalyvas did not discern a moral and ethical weight attributed to the act of denunciation among his interviewees? The latter certainly cannot be true because Kalyvas mentions how he did not find anyone among his interviewees who would admit to having denounced anyone.

This problem may be related to a more general question raised in the book: the question of the ideological origins of civil war itself. (In contradistinction, see the exemplary manner in which such an approach has been taken into consideration by Mahmood Mamdani in 2001 in the case of the genocide in Rwanda,³ a book that Kalyvas curiously ignores.) Kalyvas knows full well that if the question of the ideology of the Greek civil war were to be brought up as a question, then a picture very different than the one that he has painted in his book would emerge. This picture would show that the civil war emerged from ideological cleavages and a history of political persecution that ran very deeply in Greece. The cleavages between the right and the left did not just appear overnight in 1946, neither were they based simply on the experience of the rupture between the resistance and collaboration of 1943–1944, or the tragic *Dekemvriana* of 1944. Rather, that rupture itself ought to be attributed to a history of Left-Centre/Right dichotomies produced in Greece with the advent of the socialist, agrarian and labour movement in the 1910s, solidified

through a series of legislation in 1929 that outlawed dissent into the future, and finally structured during the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936–1941 (a dictatorship that not only established denunciation as a patriotic act in 1937, but also deemed it fitting to hand over leftist political prisoners to the Nazis in 1941).

I point all this out knowing all too well that it is impossible to do justice either to the strengths or to the weaknesses of this book within the confines of a review. What I have tried to do here is to draw attention to some of the most troubling questions, primarily conceptual and methodological, present in this project. Maybe such troubles are inevitable in a project that seeks to create a theory that not only would be able to account for all civil wars across time and space, but, far more importantly and troublingly, to be also of predictive value. This book indeed provokes and deserves (in longer form) a systematic and methodical engagement with its ultimately deeply unconvincing argument and methodologies.

NOTES

- 1 See, for instance, Charles A. Russell and Robert E. Hildner, “The Role of Communist Ideology in Insurgency”, *Air University Review* 22:2 (1971), pp. 42–48.
- 2 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ And ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?”, *World Politics* 54:1 (2001), pp. 99–118.
- 3 Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 2001.

Vangelis Karamanolakis

***Η Συγκρότηση της
Ιστορικής Επιστήμης και
η Διδασκαλία της Ιστορίας
στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών
(1837–1932)***

***[The Formation of Historical
Science and History
Teaching at the University of
Athens, 1837–1932]***

**Athens: Historical Archive of
Greek Youth, 2006. 546 pp.**

by Effi Gazi

University of Thessaly

History writing and history teaching have been extensively researched and theorised in the last 20 years or so. The repertoire and themes of history, its character and features, its functions and uses have been included in current research agendas. These themes still attract scholarly attention, particularly in their relation to power, ideology and politics. This is a comprehensive study of history teaching and the development of the historical discipline in Greece from the foundation of the University of Athens, in 1837, up to the educational reforms of the 1930s. Vangelis Karamanolakis explores and succinctly illustrates

“the formation of a national-scientific history with an intense didactic character” (14). Scrutinising the fabric with which national history is woven, the author takes a critical look at the horizons of history writing and history teaching in nineteenth-century Greece and addresses the history-nationalism nexus.

The book is divided into five major parts. The first discusses the impact of the Enlightenment on history teaching in the period following the foundation of the first Greek state university, the University of Athens. Universal history was still dominant, along with the history of antiquity. In this context, the author studies the central cultural and political role of the University while revealing the interest in educating “proper citizens”. In the second part, the focus is on Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos and his major synthesis of the history of the Greek nation. The author thoroughly explores the various aspects of Paparrigopoulos’ work and teaching. It is important that Karamanolakis does not exhaust his analysis on this historian’s work but turns his attention to the variety of reactions his interpretation of national history provoked as well as to the process that lead to its dominance within the institutional framework of the University. This part of the book also examines the criticism of a group of liberal intellectuals, including Stephanos Koumanoudis, Nikolaos Sarripolos, and Pavlos Kalligas, highlighting an important aspect of the variety of processes surrounding the formation of the official Greek national historical narrative (124–136). The third part of the study discusses the formation of the historical discipline as it was expressed in curricular reforms, the introduction of new teaching material, a developing interest in archival sources and research, and the gradual establishment of historical seminars. Karamanolakis rightly relates disciplinisation to the professionalisation not only of history

but of university studies in general; in this vein, the author also explores changes in the student body and in the university curricula. He also places particular emphasis on the case of Spyridon Lambros, who contributed critically to the disciplinisation of historical studies. In the fourth part, the turn of history teaching at the University towards the intellectual and political “war” against communist ideas is discussed along with the turn to modern history and to the history of neighbouring peoples. The last part of the book constitutes a general overview of its main findings and arguments, where the author summarises crucial aspects of the topic. Moreover, history teaching is assessed on the basis of statistical data vis-à-vis the overall development of the curriculum.

Karamanolakis argues that his analysis focuses on the University as a “laboratory for the production of ideology” (87). As mentioned above, the study is particularly successful at stressing the history–nationalism nexus. Through a variety of sources, including study guides, course syllabi, personal and institutional archives, academic proceedings, legal texts and an extended number of historical works, the study interestingly combines individual intellectual and academic trajectories with institutional developments. It examines the work of history professors in the lecture hall, archive and staffroom, looks at their interaction with colleagues, students and governors, as well as addressing their multiple roles as scholars, policy makers and public figures. It shows that they researched, wrote and taught history, shaping and reshaping the past in the process. They also communicated, discussed, agreed and disagreed with each other. They co-operated with or turned against each other, becoming involved in joint projects or in bitter controversies. Acutely aware of the public relevance of history throughout the period in question, the author discusses exten-

sively the public activities of the professors, including their involvement in cultural societies and relevant institutions.

Through these varied and challenging perspectives, the blossoming of history writing in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Greece unravels. Individual contributions and institutional developments are jointly studied in a study that reveals the various threads of its theme. The formative influence of history on the construction of the modern Greek nation and society becomes evident. In this sense, the work has definitely met its objectives. The emphasis it places on great personalities and individual contributions is perhaps one of its shortcomings. However, this tendency is successfully balanced by a clear interest in institutional developments as well as in the ideological and political conditions around which the body of historical knowledge was constructed. The author pays particular attention to the way the production and dissemination of historical knowledge became highly dependent on the function of the University of Athens as a central national institution, which undertook the mission of contributing to the formation and consolidation of national culture.

This is an elaborate and solid piece of work, which provides an overall detailed picture of history writing and history teaching in modern Greece. A useful appendix containing the themes of history lectures and seminars at the University of Athens for the entire period is also included in the volume.

Helen Papanikolas

***Μια ελληνική Οδύσσεια στην
Αμερικανική Δύση***
[*A Greek Odyssey in the
American West*]

Athens: Hestia, 2005. 391 pp.

by Margarita Dounia

University of Thessaly

The trajectory of her immigrant parents from Greece to America is the central narrative of Helen Papanikolas' *A Greek Odyssey in the American West*.¹ Her account is deployed through 23 chapters, transferring the 'scene of action' from the Greek periphery to the vastness of the American West.

Invoking the mechanisms of memory, Papanikolas initiates her reader to the multiethnic community of Utah of her childhood world. The protagonists are her parents, George and Emily, two people whose life-stories compel the author to investigate the "unpredictable events that brought them together, him being a smart, honest man from the stiff mountains of Greece and her, the only member of her family who dared to see further than her village". The different paths of Papanikolas' narrative interweave the lived-experiences of a vanishing world, that of first generation immigrants. The first chapters of the book

include the author's own memories of living close to the Greek community of Helper, Utah. The account then continues, from chapter five to chapter ten, in Greece. The harsh living conditions of Greek peasant families, retold through the eyes of George and Emily, serve as the basis for justifying people's wish to migrate. The reader follows the two young people on their journey to the United States, their wandering around the continent in search of labour, their marriage, family life and, finally, their elderly years.

Papanikolas' *Odyssey in the American West* is not simply a linear recording of events and memories. As Ioanna Laliotou states in the introduction to the Greek edition, Papanikolas' work should be placed in the context of the formation of migrant culture and memory, while its importance concentrates on the tone of disagreement over stereotypical presentations and concepts concerning both American history and the history of Greek migration. George and Emily personify the passage of millions of people from the Old to the New World. The reader encounters the common patterns of the migratory experience in the description of the long journey, the fear of rejection upon arrival, the thorough inspections at Ellis Island, the continuous roaming around the continent, the assistance provided by older immigrants in the context of chain migration and the fragmentary scenery of ethnic towns. But, at the same time, Papanikolas' manages to challenge stereotypical notions concerning the migrant experience. The concept of solidarity among Greeks is heavily wounded by the recurrent exploitation of new arrivals by older Greek immigrants, who played the role of intermediaries and work brokers. The popularised concept of fervent Greekness among migrants is questionable when the negotiation of identity at times requires the rejection of Greek ele-

ments, such as names, clothing, food or religious doctrine. The cultural dialectic between Greek communities in America and the metropolis is defied when preachers of Hellenism imperatively call for the maintenance of Greek identity without understanding the condition of Greek migrants abroad.

The story is recounted in multiple levels of time and space. One space is America, present through the Mormon communities of Utah, the liberal American women who smoke and talk to strangers, the railways that keep expanding to unite the country, the economic recession that leads to the Crash of 1929, the strikes and tumultuous political situation, the Ku Klux Klan who burn crosses in the forests across from the Papanikolas home. The other space is Greece, as a country tormented by poverty, political instability and nepotism that affects the lives of everyday people, infant mortality and other tragedies of death, murder and accidents that nourish the popular myth, innumerable wars, and the heavy pressure of dowry for daughters and sisters. The desperation of young people seems absolute when Emily visits her village for the last time and, following the Greek tradition, throws a rock behind her in order never to come back.

These two spaces mingle in a new transnational space with its continuities and ruptures. The widows of dead Utah miners wear black and mourn with tragic songs. The Asia Minor expedition brings even more picture brides to the male-congested Greek communities abroad. After the First World War, as Papanikolas mentions, "through letters more and more people claimed to be relatives from Greece and asked for help". Greek feta is produced in the mountains of America by Cretan shepherds. The pictures of Woodrow Wilson, Venizelos and the King decorate the walls of

Greek coffee stores where politicised brawls may even end in murder among clientele. Remittances from abroad secure enhanced dowries for girls, comfortable living for elderly parents and better education for young brothers in Greece. Finally, the effort to acquire land in America reflect the Greek ties to land and ownership, when Emily feels her mission fulfilled under the roof of her own home.

An appraisal of Papanikolas' contribution would not be complete without mentioning the emergence of engendered narrative throughout her account. Again, the author challenges the common concept of female migrants as appendices to male pioneers. Through the lives of Zafeiria, Emily and her grandmother, women are to an extent empowered in Greek society as well. This notion continues as Emily travels alone to the US, at her own expense provides assistance to her family in Greece, decides upon her marriage, brings her sister to America and convinces her husband to keep her in their house. Women at times transcend national barriers and seem more culturally adaptive to their new surroundings. Emily has a network of assistance involving members of different ethnic backgrounds. Mrs Reynolds convinces her to cut her hair and to cook American food while Mrs Bonnaci helps her with her children. Along with other women, she constitutes the Association of Wives of Railway Workers. Women, in Papanikolas' view, form their own world, differentiated and sometimes distant from that of men, yet not marginal. The notion that there is a lack of interaction between the male and female worlds is restored in the last chapters when her strict father refuses to live without his wife.

In conclusion, Papanikolas opens up new perspectives for the understanding of migrant experience and identity formation. In

Greek Odyssey to the American West, she manages to accentuate the centrality of life histories and the importance of recording such data before it is lost, as she had done throughout her life. Papanikolas redirects historical exploration of migrant stories away from stereotypes, engendered narrative and transnational practice. Her subjectivity, both engendered and transnational, is encapsulated in her introductory phrase: "It was always like that, I wanted to be somewhere and I didn't want to be there."

Efi Avdela

***Le genre entre class
et nation: essai
d'historiographie grecque***

Paris: Syllepse, 2006. 200 pp.

by Yannis Yannitsiotis

University of the Aegean

NOTE

- 1 Helen Papanikolas *A Greek Odyssey in the American West*, Athens, Ohio: Swallow Press, 2002.

This study by Efi Avdela, one of Greece's pioneers in the fields of women's history and gender history, is a synthesis of independent, reworked studies published from the mid-1990s to the early part of this decade.

The work's point of departure is the use of the analytical category of gender to understand labour relations and the importance invested in citizenship from the nineteenth century to the 1950s. At the focus of this analysis is the interaction of gender with class and nation in intersecting spheres such as family, work, citizenship and national identity. According to the author, this study has two objectives. One is the attempt to incorporate the Greek case into the broader historiographical dialogue, because it remains largely unknown and can only be incorporated into comparative syntheses with difficulty. The second objective is a systematic and programmatic dialogue with Greek historiography.

The book contains six chapters. In the first

chapter, Avdela attempts to explain why the Greek historiography of the past 30 years has afforded such a marginal place to women's history and gender history. She argues that the 'New History' that supplanted traditional nationalistic historiography after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 replaced the catholic notion of 'nation' with that of 'class'. Focusing on the examination of structures, the economic and social history of the post-dictatorship years – the departure point of which was Marxist – sought to explain the 'flawed' character of Greek society and economy in terms of the absence of a class structure, at the same time underscoring that the dominant model was that of the family-based organisation of labour. Moreover, identifying the analytical category of gender with women, Greek historians downplayed and dismissed women's history as having no bearing on what was at stake for Greek historiography, which was the notion of class.

The author takes a critical stance on these formulations of Greek historiography and proposes approaching labour relations through the interaction of gender and class. The frame of reference she chooses is the discussion among historians of the conditions under which the working class formed in Greece. An attempt is made to understand the casual relationship of men and women with wage labour through the gender relations that had been shaped within the framework of the family.

The proposal is made more specific in the second chapter, where the author examines the historical development of the relationship between family and labour from the nineteenth century to the 1950s. She takes as her starting point the observations of Greek historiography regarding the predominance of small production units – in both the coun-

tryside and urban centres – in which labour was organised around the family, as well as the temporary relationship of men and women with wage labour; men were firmly oriented towards self-employment in the services and artisan sectors, while women pursued marriage into and employment in the family business. It is her assessment, however, that this particular Greek peculiarity was due less to successive state policies – such as the agrarian reforms of 1871 and 1927–1932 – and more to the influence of a cultural factor. It had to do with the family strategies and gender relations within the family-based productive units, both in the countryside and the cities, which were related to a cultural model of household autonomy. The conveyor of this model was the conjugal or nuclear family household that had been established among different social categories and regions and exerted a formative influence upon gender identities. Based on the hierarchical organisation of domestic kinship and on the sexual division of labour between its members, it led to the development of the small- or semi-productive unit. Household autonomy consisted, on the one hand, of securing for the male head of the family a livelihood independent from both waged work and state regulation and, on the other, of equating womanhood with domesticity and motherhood. In the context of a fragmented and occasional labour market, this model formed family strategies that organised the resettlement from country to city. The segregation of sexes for work in the agrarian economy was transformed into a new kind of segregation in the city.

In the third chapter, the author analyses the process of adopting women's protective labour legislation, stresses its gendered nature and attempts to explain its failed implementation. Her central working hypothesis rests on the following arguments:

Firstly, the legislation in question was part of a broader body of labour legislation that marked the state's intervention in the labour market from 1910 to 1920; this intervention aimed at winning over the labouring classes and averting social clashes within the framework of carrying out the modernisation of the economy and the irredentist plans of Greek nationalism. This particular policy was not the result of social demands given the absence of a labour movement as well as limited industrial development during the period in question.

Secondly, the legislation reinforced the dominant gendered perception of the social role of women. Thus, in addition to the physical disadvantage in relation to men, the legislation stressed women's sensitivity due to motherhood and the need for them to fulfil their role in managing the home and raising children. In this way, this particular legislation openly expressed its intention to function as a mechanism for controlling the labour market for the benefit of the male labouring population, in contrast to other cases in Europe where a similar philosophy was veiled with references to humanitarian ideals.

Thirdly, trade unions appeared to be in favour of the legislation and included it in their demands, but before the 1920s they exerted no serious pressure for its enactment and implementation. According to the author, this attitude stemmed from the fact that the organisation of labour in the country's industries was based exclusively on gender segregation. Women not only carried out different tasks on the production line but were also employed in other manufacturing sectors, with the exception of the tobacco industry. It was also due to the prevalence of the traditional hierarchy in the division of labour within the framework of the family in small work-

shops and the frequency with which labour was done in the home. Thus, male workers – in contrast to their European counterparts – did not feel insecure by the presence of women. In fact, it appears that their position was not even called into question in the decade of the wars (1912–1922).

Fourthly, the educated middle-class women of the nineteenth century underscored the need to protect women's labour, invoking their 'social destiny' of marriage and motherhood. In the 1920s, the clashes between the various feminist organisations over this issue corresponded to similar, concurrent clashes between women socialists and feminists in other European countries. The conservative organisations conceptualised the protection of women's labour in a manner similar to the prevailing liberal rhetoric, while the socialist organisations supported the legislation within the framework of the legislation for the labouring class. In contrast, radical feminists underscored the domination in gender relations that was established by this particular legislation.

In the fourth chapter, Avdela examines the reports of labour inspectors on the inadequate implementation of – or total failure to implement – the labour legislation for the protection of women's labour from 1913 to 1934. This is attempted from a double perspective. On the one hand, she looks at the ways in which the inspectors – men and women – perceived the historical and cultural context of their role and activities, while, on the other, she examines the extent to which their interpretations of the hygiene and safety conditions of women's and children's labour – as well as of the conduct of men and women workers in their daily lives and in the workplace – were in line with the requirements for the implementation of the legislation they were called upon to oversee during these 20 years. The latter concerns the

attempt to understand the extracontextual indicators of the many ways in which the collective subjects of the protection – women and men workers – perceived and silently resisted the dominant meanings of the legislation. The unjustified and inexplicable reaction of the men and women labourers themselves, according to the labour inspectors, to the adoption of the legislation's protective measures can be seen as a consequence of a different cultural frame of reference from that of the inspectors and the general philosophy behind the legislation. Moreover, this may be understood if viewed through the prism of resistance to the imposition of power in the workplace. Thus, the refusal of men to take the necessary protective measures is linked to the perception of the labour environment itself as an environment wherein their ability, as gendered individuals, to carry out difficult and complex tasks is confirmed. We can approach the issue of the refusal of women to wear the work uniform in a similar way. Resistance to the homogeneity of the uniform was linked to the fact that women workers saw the workplace as a public place in which they endeavoured to control time and their bodies. Finally, frequent changes of employment – which the inspectors put down to a lack of professional conscience – were part of the constantly shifting family strategies for survival.

The fifth chapter examines the relationships between class struggle, ethnic clashes and gender identity against the backdrop of the large, multiethnic tobacco workers' strike of 1914 in eastern Macedonia and the clash between striking Jewish women tobacco workers and Muslim women strikebreakers in multicultural Thessaloniki, which had been annexed by the Greek state two years before. Coordination of the movement in the city was undertaken by the Federation (the first socialist labour organisation in the Balkans – multi-

ethnic in principle, but essentially Jewish). In the early nineteenth century, the cultivation, processing and trading of tobacco was the dominant economic activity in eastern Macedonia. Before the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the growth of the tobacco market resulted in a significant increase in wages for labourers in this sector. But the negative consequences (of the wars) were immediately observable in the rapid increase in unemployment and the cost of living. The author recounts earlier interpretations of the strike, according to which the stoppage of some 20 days by the three major ethnocultural groups in the region – Jews, Muslims and Greeks – was the consequence of brewing class consciousness as opposed to ethnic feeling. The author, however, attempts to demonstrate that no form of consciousness is exclusive by introducing the gendered dimension of the strike movement. On the one hand, she stresses that the relationship between labour identity and gender identity is vital to understanding the issue: one of the three basic demands of the union – in which only men participated – was for the maintenance of the gender-based hierarchy in the division of labour. On the other hand, she points to the entwinement of gender identity with ethnic and class identity; the public clashing of the Jewish women strikers and the Muslim women strikebreakers and specialised women workers seemed paradoxical: the striking women had been mobilised by the union to defend the demands aimed at institutionalising their exclusion from specialised labour positions. In essence, however, the Jewish women – with their passion and tenacity during their clashes with the Muslim women and the police – defended the cultural structures upon which the various aspects of their identity were based. As women, workers and Jews, they felt threatened by the actions of the non-local, refugee Muslim women workers, who were in the city tempo-

rarily within the framework of the population exchange following the Balkan Wars. Finally, discourse analysis of Greek-language newspapers allows us to recognise the essence of the strike as a passage from the Ottoman past to the multicultural coexistence in the youthful present of a nation-state. Within this new framework, the once local Muslims and Jews were transformed into 'foreigners'. The Thessaloniki press welcomed the multiethnic nature of the protest but gradually established a new framework of signification according to which the 'socialism of the state' – that is, of the Greek liberal government – was patriotic, while that of the Federation was internationalist and thus anti-Greek.

The sixth and final chapter of the book examines the gendered representations of the nation and citizenship in Greek society from 1864, when universal male suffrage was established, to 1952, when women were enfranchised. A central theme of the political discussions, legislative reforms and feminist claims of these 90-odd years was the extent to which citizenship was a right or a duty. The author points to the erroneous uniformity of notions such as 'nation' and 'citizenship', stressing their gendered dimensions and women's exclusion from them. From the final decades of the nineteenth century to the inter-war period, biological determinism was a component part of the dominant discourse concerning the role and position of women in Greek society. Within the framework of the emerging middle strata and growing nationalism, even educated middle-class women – who considered that the time was not yet ripe for women to be given the vote – conceptualised citizenship as a duty and identified the lot of women with the homemaking ideal and 'patriotic motherhood'. At the same time, they limited themselves to demanding civil and social rights (the right to education, paid labour and

shifting of their legal position into the framework of the family). In the interwar period and within the framework of claiming social, economic and political equality between men and women, citizenship for women took on new content in the rhetoric of feminist demands: it was no longer seen as a national duty, but as a right devolving from the common human condition of the sexes.

Avdela perceives gender as an organisational principle of various hierarchical relations between the categories of 'men' and 'women', which are socially and culturally determined. She also sees gender as a symbol that – in historically determined ways – constitutes power relations. Moreover, gender emerges as a privileged field for comprehending the manner by which individual and collective identities are formulated in given historical contexts.

Based on the above, she restates the central questions of Greek historiography, replacing a sociocentric perspective with the cultural approach. One of these questions is the discussion of the terms and conditions relating to the formation of the working class. Faced with an approach that attempts to understand the class character of labour relations through the transformation of economic structures and the traditional nature of the Greek economy, statistics, union rhetoric and the number of strikes, Avdela proposes that gender be considered as an organising principle of labour relations at the level of family and kinship. The conceptualisation of gender as a relationship enables us to see the catalytic importance of perceptions concerning the organisation and division of labour within the framework of families in agrarian and urban environments. These perceptions lead to the crystallisation of the household autonomy model with the men of the family at the epicentre. At the same time, the conceptualisa-

tion of gender as a symbol enables us to comprehend the manner in which women are excluded from specialised jobs in industry. At the base of the author's endeavour is the systematic dialogue with social anthropology and its findings on the composition of the household. Her focus on the interdisciplinary approach, however, is not a random choice; it is the basic characteristic of her work as a whole.

The individual chapters on labour relations are structured around the perception of a history 'from below' as she attempts in these to bring forth the voices of collective subjects (women workers, men workers, feminists). Nevertheless, the author also hastens to stress the difficulty of this endeavour, given that narratives and testimonials of the workers themselves are absent in the Greek case due to the exceptionally high rate of illiteracy, which has forced Greek historians to limit their research to the official discourses on labour.

The manner in which the author is conversant with the European model indicates, on the one hand, her intention to acknowledge the policies shaping the European historiographical canon, which include exclusions, suppressions and hierarchies, and, on the other, her effort to shape, wherever possible, the conditions for familiarising specialists and laypersons with the Greek case, pointing out its unique aspects as well as its differences and similarities in comparison to other European countries. This specific narrative choice functions at two levels simultaneously. As concerns Greek historiography, she replaces the European perception of modernity through dichotomising and homogenising models such as 'centre-periphery', stressing the multi-level nature of an unequal relationship. Regarding European historiography, she stresses the various expressions of modernity depending on given

national and local contexts. Thus, the historical construction of citizenship as a Western, bourgeois and male model, coupled with the emergence of the 'social' as a space discrete from the 'political' in which women and the middle classes could unfold 'womanly qualities and virtues' is also evident in Greece. But in the Greek case, nationalism as a unifying factor in the two fields ('social' and 'political') allows educated women to attribute political significance to their public actions.

Let us now move to the sphere of labour. The pattern in other European countries where single women remained in the workforce indefinitely was not the case with Greek women up until the interwar years. The prevalence of the cultural model of the autonomous household left no other option. The exceptions prove the rule: public life essentially concerned a few eponymous teachers who devoted their lives to writing, philanthropy and running schools. In the interwar years, public activity was an alternative strategy to giving up professional activities due to marriage, particularly when there were no children. If marriage was an unavoidable condition, motherhood was yet another obstacle to public activity. Thus, marriage gave these women the right to negotiate their identity, which motherhood precluded. Moreover, the autonomous home model indicates the complexity and variety of gendered individual and familial strategies within the framework of the family; strategies that instead of answering to the evolutionary logic of a prevalent model – as in the countries of Western Europe and in the US – are historically and culturally predetermined. However, in spite of the double subordination of women – within the home and in the labour market – they maintained control of their dowry and the right to manage their incomes, in contrast with the case of English women: until the late nine-

teenth century, upon marriage, their assets and incomes passed into the possession of their husbands.

Despite the noteworthy studies that Greek historiography has produced over the past two decades concerning women's history and gender history, many gaps remain. One of these, as the author herself notes, concerns the examination of the construction of masculinities in their historical contexts. In this specific work, Efi Avdela reasserts, from the gender perspective, central issues of Greek historiography with class and nation as frames of reference. More generally, she provides food for thought thanks to her methodological and theoretical choices, and she succeeds in conversing with the various versions of the European model. Most of all, she convincingly proposes that the adoption of the analytical category of gender enables us to do better history.

Ioannis D. Stefanidis

***Stirring the Greek
Nation: Political Culture,
Irredentism and Anti-
Americanism in Post-War
Greece, 1945–1967***

Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. 300 pp.

by Alexis Heraclides

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One of the long-standing beliefs in Greece, shared by mainstream literature in the country, is that the irredentism of the *Megali Idea* ("Great Idea") experienced a sudden death in 1922, as a result of the Asia Minor Catastrophe. From then on irredentist tendencies were limited to a few nationalist fringe groups. Hence the shibboleth that Greece emerged as a status quo power not only in the interwar period (which is indeed the case) but also in the first three post-war decades. But what about the post-war striving to 'unite' Cyprus and southern Albania ('Northern Epirus' according to Greek nationalism) with Greece, why were not they seen for what they were, namely textbook cases of irredentism? One reason for this short sightedness may be a result of acute ethnocentrism. Thus the claims for faraway Cyprus or southern Albania were not regarded as far-fetched, but as 'ours anyway', Greek since time immemorial. I suspect that another reason for this flagrant

misperception is the need to counter the Turkish accusation that the *Megali Idea* was back on track. Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s most Greeks could not make sense of Turkey's fixation with Cyprus (as if no Turkish-Cypriots lived in Cyprus and as if the island was further from Turkey and nearer to Greece). Ankara's stance was attributed to sheer bad faith due to antagonism towards Athens, with British and American collusion to boot.

Recently the myth that the *Megali Idea* was safely dead and did not revive in the immediate post-war decades has been put to task.¹ Yet this view, however convincing, is not widely known and has made little inroads. At the level of scholarly discourse this was probably due to the lack of extended supporting evidence in the form of a monograph, showing conclusively that Greece and the Greeks as whole were in the throws of irredentism from 1945 to 1974, albeit the strategies differed between the 'here-and-now' approach and the gradualist line.²

The book under review, Ioannis D. Stefanidis' *Stirring the Greek Nation*, has come to fill this gap. The author has unearthed and synthesised a considerable amount of data, which proves, beyond reasonable doubt, that the *Megali Idea*, albeit a shortened version by comparison to the 1850–1922 one, was alive and kicking in the period from 1945 to 1967. This is a solid piece of scholarly work on irredentism. The author places irredentism within the realm of Greek political culture, with its penchant for the grandiose (and, I would add, with bouts of *follies de grandeur*) coupled with victimisation and the underdog syndrome. The author painstakingly builds the awesome edifice of shrill nationalism that seized the Greeks at all levels (politicians, diplomats, journalists, academics, churchmen, youth). Greece's irredentism was out of tune with the modern post-war world and, indeed, with sheer common sense, at least as it was

understood in the West. The author gleans one jingoist statement after another (with several verging on the ludicrous) made by major figures, portraying the air of unreality that pervaded Greece for three decades.

The main manifestations of irredentism at foreign policy level were the claims submitted to the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, the main emphasis being on Greece's northern borders, with 'Northern Epirus' at the epicentre; the first Greek-Cypriot campaign for *enosis* in the 1950s; and the second *enosis* campaign from 1964 to 1967. Arguably, the period from 1967 to 1974 (the Colonels' dictatorship) represents a fourth, more opaque phase, but this is not covered by this book.³

As the Second World War ended, the minimum that the Greeks could accept and regard as rightfully 'theirs' (in view of the Greek sacrifices and 'epic struggle' during the Second World War and as having been Greek since 'time immemorial') were the Dodecanese islands, Cyprus, 'Northern Epirus' and a readjustment of the Greek–Bulgarian border (affecting parts of Eastern Rumelia). But many clamoured for more: for southern Yugoslavia (parts or the whole of Yugoslav Macedonia), for Turkey's Eastern Thrace or even Libya's Cyrenaica (!), on the grounds of 'impeccable historical rights' (predictably summoning up the legacy of Alexander the Great to boost their claim). In fact, Cyprus was not raised officially at the Paris Peace Conference so as not to antagonise Britain, but it was the claim *par excellence* in the background, to be left for a more expedient moment. By 1950, however, and in part because of the initial resistance of the Greek government to internationalise the Cyprus issue in the United Nations, an array of pro-*enosis* NGOs sprung up, with the Church of Greece and the youth at the forefront. Soon this became a torrent as the left also followed suit. As Stefanidis points out, the Cyprus campaign

brought the ostracised left back into Greek politics, at the same time providing it with a unique opportunity to shed the smear of having been 'traitors to the nation' on the Albanian ('Northern Epirus') and Macedonian issues. Verging on frenzy, the Cyprus campaign was such that, according to the author, only three individuals with influence dared question the wisdom of seeking *enosis* 'here and now' (though not of *enosis* as such): liberal intellectual Georgios Theotokas, former diplomat and monarchist politician Panayotis Pipinelis and, most of all, former diplomat Stephanos Dragoumis. In fact, premier Constantine Karamanlis himself as well as foreign minister Evangelos Averoff (and to some degree Panagiotis Kanellopoulos) were increasingly weary of the nationalist line of *enosis*, but refrained from voicing their concerns publicly.

In what is one of the most revealing (and amusing) chapters of the book ("The Rhetoric of the *Enosis* Campaign"), Stefanidis highlights the main tenets of the *enosis* rationale. As the author rightly points out, Cyprus's union with Greece was "firmly embedded in the continuum of Greek *history* – the keystone of national consciousness", on a glorious civilisation of 3,000 years, with Cyprus an integral part of this history and civilisation (110–11). From this tenet sprung the following arguments and claims (which, surprisingly, were deemed unassailable and convincing even internationally): first, the struggle for *enosis* was a holy struggle befitting Greece, a "*preordained mission* at the forefront of mankind's struggle for freedom, justice and democracy" (113, emphasis in the original); second, the 'unequalled' Greek contribution to world civilisation entitled Greece to "a *debt of gratitude* on the part of humanity", not least in the case of the Western powers (who "were still morally indebted" to Greece), thus "Greece was entitled to Cyprus at the least" (113–14, emphasis in the original);

third, Greece's strategic importance for millennia as 'the guardian of Europe' from successive waves of ferocious Eastern invaders and its vital role in the Cold War against 'the Soviets and Slavs', entitled it to Cyprus, and would strengthen it as a bastion of the West; fourth, the Greeks are racially isolated, alone in the world, 'orphans' as it were, hence their struggle for *enosis* had a heroic and "almost existential quality" (115); fifth, Greece was repeatedly victimised "by friend and foe alike", having paid "with rivers of blood and cascades of tears the bestial barbarity" of the Turks, "the slippery hypocrisy and selfishness" of the British and allied treachery (115); sixth, it was in the destiny of the Greek nation "to suffer for the sake of freedom", to face martyrdom and recurring severe trials in its age-long history only to survive and generate "new strength and new inspiration" (according to none other than Archbishop Makarios, the Greek nation ascended the hill of martyrdom only to "shine with the brilliant light of Resurrection")⁴ (116); seventh, divine providence – God (for many the 'God of Greece') fully endorsed the struggle for *enosis*, which was "a holy, honest, moral struggle" against "the anti-Christian designs of British diplomacy" (117–118); eighth, complete perseverance was necessary against all odds, that there were to be no limits to the struggle for *enosis*, no compromises, no concessions, until final victory or, otherwise, sacrifice, death, even "a holocaust" according to one proponent); and, ninth, the sheer 'self-evident justice' of *enosis* ought to be as clear as day to 'the entire civilised world', even though Britain and the US opposed it for reasons of petty self-interest (note the adage: Greece's interests are somehow international interests, presumably due to the world's 'debt to Greece'). After all, "justice was all that the Greek people asked for", as Karamanlis put it upon taking office in October 1955 (120), and by that token Cyprus was to be united with Greece.

On irredentism, in the main thrust of the book (1–158), one can detect few shortcomings, such as the sketchy coverage of the foremost ‘negative Other’, i.e., Turkey (barely two pages); the cursory coverage of the ‘Northern Epirus’ question; and the fact that the distinction between the public mood for *enosis* and actual foreign policy is sometimes blurred. A clearer distinction between the two could have produced a revealing separate chapter indicating instances of confluence (1945–1946, 1953–1958, 1964–1967) and instances of rift (1950–1952, 1959–1963). It would also have been very helpful if Stefanidis had made it abundantly clear who the writers (historians, political scientists, diplomats and others) are who have over the years peddled the conventional view that Greek irredentism was safely dead in 1922, never to resurface.

The author then devotes a third of his book (169–251) to anti-Americanism, a distinct topic probably worthy of a separate monograph. Apparently Stefanidis detects a common thread running through both topics, the political culture of Greece imbued as it is with a strong dose of nationalism. It is arguable whether anti-Americanism can be associated with – or is somehow related to – irredentism. Be this as it may, this part of the book is also tightly-knit. Worth stressing are the main grievances that, according to the author, gave rise and reinforced anti-Americanism not only among the left (whose staunch anti-Americanism was a given from 1945 onwards), but also in the centre and right of the political spectrum. They include the following: securing only the Dodecanese Islands in Paris (1946) due, in part, to American opposition; the high-handed interventions of the US Embassy in Greek politics in the 1950s; the issue of ‘extraterritoriality’ of US citizens on Greek soil (that gained considerable publicity from 1954 onwards); the lack of US support for *enosis* in the UN; the lukewarm reaction to the despicable September

1955 incidents in Istanbul against the Greek minority; the stance of Washington in the 1964 Cyprus crisis; and its role in the ouster of the Papandreou government (July 1965).

This is a revealing monograph and a much-needed contribution to the literature as far as irredentism and Greek behaviour regarding Cyprus are concerned. It also provides insight into Greek anti-Americanism, which, contrary to irredentism, remains very much alive in Greece.

NOTES

- 1 Perhaps the first such attempt appears in a paper by Theodore Couloumbis, in Dimitris K. Conostas and Panagiotis I. Tsakonas (eds), *Ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική. Εσωτερικές και διεθνείς παράμετροι*, Athens: Odisseas, 1994, p. 89. See also Ioannis D. Stefanidis, “Pressure Groups and Greek Foreign Policy, 1945–67”, *Discussion Paper*, No 6, The Hellenic Observatory, The European Institute, LSE (December 2001). For the birth of a “small *Megali Idea*”, see Alexis Heraclides, *Το κυπριακό πρόβλημα 1947–2004. Από την ένωση στη διχοτόμηση*, Athens: I. Sideris, 2006, pp. 167–172.
- 2 For two strategies, see Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Στρατηγικές του Κυπριακού. Η δεκαετία του 1950*, Athens: Patakis, 2005; also Heraclides, *Το κυπριακό πρόβλημα*, pp. 172–176.
- 3 Information for this period is sketchy, but it is certain that the Greek Junta pressed for *enosis* from April to November 1967 and in 1973–1974. From late 1967 until 1970, with Panayotes Pipinelis at the helm in the foreign ministry, *enosis* was not pursued.
- 4 This line is similar to that of Jewish fundamentalism. For Jewish fundamentalism, see, for example, Ian Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988.