Greek Historiography and Slav-Macedonian National Identity

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In his celebrated novel Ἡ ζωή εν τάφῳ [Life in a tomb] (1954 edition), Greek author Stratis Myrivilis has the protagonist briefly stay in a village in the region of Macedonia during World War I. The peasants:

...spoke a language understood both by Serbs and Bulgarians. The first they hate because they torment them and treat them as if they were Bulgarians; and they [also] hate the Bulgarians because they took their children to the war. Us [Greeks] they accept with some sympathetic curiosity, only because we are the genuine moral subjects of the…Ecumenical Patriarch.1

It is fair to assume that this encounter was with people that today most Greeks would have identified as Slav-Macedonians. The existence, formation and mutations of their national identity have posed an interpretative challenge to Greek scholars and proved a consistently controversial topic. Since the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) declared independence in September 1991, the name dispute has added a further layer of often emotional complexity to bilateral arguments and understandings of identity.2

Over the past century, a mainstream narrative has emerged in Greek historiography concerning when and how Slav-Macedonian national

1 Stratis Myrivilis, Ἡ ζωή εν τάφῳ [Life in a tomb], Athens: Estia, n.d., p. 227; my translation. This passage is taken from the seventh and final 1954 edition. In the novel’s first edition, published in 1924, the above-cited passage is to be found in a version that is similar in essence but perhaps somewhat rougher in language. For a comparison, see Stratis Myrivilis, Ἡ ζωή εν τάφῳ, Athens: Estia, 1924 Mytiline Edition, p. 104.

2 The term FYROM will be used in this essay. It is the state’s international United Nations name according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 817 passed on 7 April 1993. For examples of Greek academics and politicians addressing the name dispute, see Evangelos Kofos, "The Unresolved 'Difference' over the Name: A Greek Perspective", in Evangelos Kofos and Vlassis Vlasidis (eds), Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis (1995-2002), Athens: ELIAMEP, 2005, pp. 125-223; id., "Greek Foreign Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition", in James Pettifer (ed.),

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identity evolved.\footnote{3} Despite the inevitable disagreements and different points of emphasis, a sophisticated, broad approach strives to provide an explanatory framework to this vexing, from a Greek perspective, issue. It will be the purpose of this essay to present the key characteristics of this framework and elucidate how, in particular, the work of the Greek academic Dimitris Livanios and especially his recent exemplary and well-researched monograph significantly enriches certain aspects of it.\footnote{4}

In its sophisticated manifestations, Greek historiography begins with a pre-national, pre-revolutionary era in Ottoman Macedonia applying to most of the Slavophone peasants. This state of affairs was based on the centrality of religious affiliation to Eastern Orthodoxy that permeated not only a common intellectual and theological landscape but also understandings of time and geography: “...time was defined by the ecclesiastical calendar...[while] the spatial horizon was defined by places of worship, great shrines of the faith and humble chapels”.\footnote{5}

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\footnote{3} For a superb example of sophisticated and mainstream modern Greek historiography, see John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, \textit{Greece: The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present}, London: Hurst and Company, 2002. It should also be kept in mind that mainstream Greek scholars consider the Slav-Macedonian national identity as only one of a multitude of identities that were present in the region that used to be Ottoman Macedonia. See, for example, Ioannis Stefanides, Vlassis Vlasidis and Evangelos Kofos (eds), \textit{Μακεδονικές ταυτότητες στο χρόνο. Διεπιστημονικές προσεγγίσεις} [Macedonian identities in time: interdisciplinary approaches], Athens: Institute of the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle and Patakis, 2008.


For Greek scholars, the prevalence of Christianity was not automatically swept away by the ideology of nationalism but remained over an extended period of time. For example, British journalist Henry Noel Brailsford, visiting Ottoman Macedonia at the beginning of the twentieth century, presented the following anecdote:

I questioned some boys from a remote mountain village near Ochrida, which had neither teacher nor resident priest, and where not a single inhabitant was able to read, in order to discover what amount of traditional knowledge they possessed. I took them up to the ruins of the Bulgarian Tsar’s fortress... “Who built this place?” I asked them. The answer was significant – “The Free Men.” “And who were they?” “Our grandfathers.” “Yes, but were they Serbs or Bulgarians, or Greeks or Turks?” “They weren’t Turks, they were Christians.” And this seemed to be about the measure of their knowledge.6

Livanios is in complete agreement with this understanding: “It quickly became apparent to the apostles of nationalism in Macedonia that the peasants could simply not understand the word ‘nation’.”7 He offers the anecdote of a Greek patriot who asked some peasants in Macedonia if they were "Romaioi [Greeks] or Voulgaroi [Bulgarians]. They stared at me incomprehensibly… and answered “Well, we are Christians, what do you mean by Romaioi or Voulgaroi?”8

There are two aspects to this Greek emphasis on the prolonged and widespread pre-national status of peasants in Ottoman Macedonia that should be stressed. First, it is indeed probable that it represents an entirely accurate depiction of realities on the ground, supported by a multitude of

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7 Livanios, The Macedonian Question, p. 9. In a similar manner he has previously argued that “The Macedonian peasantry simply refused to identify themselves with the ‘national’ causes of either Bulgaria or Greece.” (Livanios, “The Quest for Hellenism”, p. 66).
8 Ibid. However, it should not necessarily be discounted that in some instances Macedonian peasants might have engaged in dissimulation as a survival strategy. Livanios offers the following suggestive anecdote: “An elderly Slav told an English liaison officer in 1944 that ‘we have had so many different masters that now, whoever comes along, we say (placing his hands together and smiling pleasantly and making a little bow) ‘kalos orisate’ [welcome].” (Livanios, The Macedonian Question, p. 25).
international and regional sources. Secondly, certain significant implications for the eventual emergence of a Slav-Macedonian national identity ensue from it: the identity comes to the forefront much later than the other Balkan ones and is therefore perceived as much weaker and more malleable.

The central event that possibly signifies the opening chapter of the modern Macedonian Question was the creation in 1870 of the Bulgarian Exarchate.\(^9\) It unleashed competing nationalisms and an often armed antagonism for securing or protecting the national affiliation of the Slavophone residents in Macedonia. For mainstream Greek scholars, Slav-Macedonian identity comes to the forefront as an intellectual and political force only within this context and at the very end of the nineteenth century and primarily in the beginning of the twentieth.

The connections with the Bulgarian national movement are of paramount importance:

\begin{itemize}
  \item It is inappropriate to speak of two separate rival national movements – the Bulgarian and the Macedonian – in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. It was a matter of two wings within the same movement. For the activists it was perfectly normal to change sides, and it is no coincidence that both Bulgarian and Macedonian historiography today lay claim to the same tradition in the national liberation struggle. Both venerate the same heroes and legends.\(^{10}\)
\end{itemize}

In this second stage of Slav-Macedonian identity development, it is the understanding of mainstream Greek scholars that towards the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of Bulgarians were convinced that the Slavophone peasants residing in Ottoman Macedonia were essentially co-nationals who should eventually be incorporated within a “Greater Bulgaria”. Gradually, some Bulgarians came to the realization that the interests of the era’s Great European Powers, as well as the regional powers of Greece and


Serbia, excluded such an outcome. From a Bulgarian perspective, and in order to ensure that Ottoman Macedonia would not be “carved up” by all the neighbouring Balkan states, a movement in favour of political separatism was advanced. The goal was the political autonomy of Ottoman Macedonia and not its incorporation into Bulgaria, although such a development was not necessarily precluded for a later date.

The Bulgarian political separatist movement was not solely based on a “reading” of the existing regional balance of power. It was also the result of the dissatisfaction of local Slavophones with the policy preferences of the official Bulgarian State on language, ecclesiastical and foreign policy issues. Separatism delinked the immediate political future of Ottoman Macedonia with that of Bulgaria, without, at first, accepting the existence of a different “Macedonian” national identity. In a sense, the movement appeared as an intra-Bulgarian differentiation on strategic goals. However, it was quickly followed by an ethnic separatist movement that proclaimed a “Macedonian” nation that was to be clearly and irrevocably distinguished from the Bulgarian and Serbian nations. In this process, Greeks acknowledge particularly the role of Krste Petkov Misirkov and a few like-minded intellectuals. Misirkov’s *Macedonian Affairs* (1903) is usually presented, and the author’s inconsistencies concerning his own self-declared national affiliation duly and unfailingly noted. Misirkov seems to have been acutely aware that his claims constituted a relatively new development, something with which most Greeks are in agreement. He explained: “Here is what one can answer to those who claim that a Macedonian nationality never existed: it might have not existed but today it exists and it will exist in the future.”

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11 For a comprehensive and near-definitive study of the creation of the Macedonian political and ethnic separatist movements, from a Greek perspective, see Anna Aggelopoulou, *Ο Κ. Π. Μισιρκόφ (1874-1926) και η κίνηση των “Μακεδονιστών”* [K. P. Misirkov (1874-1926) and the “Macedonianist” movement], Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2004.


Livanios both expands and qualifies the scope of those accepting the existence of such a national identity:

- Misirkov and the small circle of intellectuals who professed a Macedonian consciousness, however inconsistently, were not the only source of Macedonianism. Serbian politicians and scholars... also acknowledged at about the same time the existence of a separate Macedonian group, but they did so in an attempt to deny those Slavs to Bulgarian nationalism, thus safeguarding the "historic rights" of Serbia in the region.14

Within this context, Greek scholars invariably conclude that the August 1903 Ilinden events constituted an uprising and not a revolution, while they deny that it had a purely or even predominantly Slav-Macedonian character. In doing so, it becomes possible to dismiss its subsequent nationalist use by FYROM: "The 'Ilinden Revolt'...became one of the most potent foundation myths of Macedonian nationalism which considered the uprising, as it still does, as the most significant manifestation of Macedonian national consciousness."15

For mainstream Greek historiography, a Slav-Macedonian identity had nevertheless emerged by the beginning of the twentieth century. It was closely connected to and essentially derivative of the Bulgarian identity and endorsed by some Serbians for reasons pertaining to their country's perceived national interest. Early "Macedonianism" was the weak construct of a small intellectual élite lacking widespread popular acceptance.

In the decades leading up to World War II, Greeks stress the limited dissemination of the Slav-Macedonian identity. For example, it has been pointed out that in 1928, "There were only 81,984 Slavophones [in Greece]...a large number of [whom] continued to have a Bulgarian [e.g. non-"Macedonian"] consciousness."16 Taking full advantage of extensive research in British archives, Dimitris Livanios presents a 1925 Foreign Office memorandum, according to which, "The majority of the Slavs [in Macedonia]...do not care to what nationality they belong." Five years later, a subsequent memorandum noted that "a large part of the inhabitants of Macedonia do not have any

14 Livanios, The Macedonian Question, p. 15.
15 Ibid., p. 19; my emphasis. See also Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964, p. 33.
16 Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 48. Kofos follows the results of the 1928 Greek census.
particular national aspiration”.\textsuperscript{17} It is thus not surprising that “the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that Macedonia was a national ‘no man’s land’, ‘just like Alsace: one of those parts of Europe which has no real nationality’”; while “the Macedonian Question [is] a ‘sleeping dog’ which should be allowed to lie at all costs”.\textsuperscript{18}

This proved impossible due to the momentous regional events of the 1940s. In fact, as far as Greek historiography is concerned, that decade holds the key to understanding the shaping and acceptance of a Slav-Macedonian identity by many of the Slavophones residing in Yugoslavia and Greece. There are two reasons for this: first, the existence of an armed national “Macedonianist” liberation movement and, second, the creation of the People’s (subsequent Socialist) Republic of Macedonia (PRM). It is almost an article of faith that both were primarily, if not exclusively, connected to the regional geopolitical ambitions of Marshall Josip Broz (\textit{nom du guerre} Tito) to create a Balkan Communist Federation (controlled by him) that would include the Greek port city of Thessaloniki and hence access to the Aegean Sea.\textsuperscript{19}

According to this interpretation of events, the Nazi occupation of the Balkans (and subsequent Greek Civil War) presented options and necessitated choices for the Slavophones in geographic Macedonia, even among those who had a weak (if any) national identity.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, some fought for their Greek or Bulgarian identities, while others collaborated with the Nazis or switched

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{18} Livanios, \textit{The Macedonian Question}, pp. 66 and 78. \\
\textsuperscript{19} See, for example, N. I. Mertzos, \textit{Εμείς οι Μακεδόνες} [We the Macedonians], Athens: I. Sideris, 1992, pp. 354-402. The Foreign Office was fully aware and very apprehensive of the potential territorial implications in the Balkans of the Greater Macedonia irredentism connected to Tito’s policies. See Livanios, \textit{The Macedonian Question}, pp. 165 and 173. \\
\textsuperscript{20} In this sense, the findings of the British officer P. H. Evans, which were included in a 1943 report following his mission to Greek Macedonia, are not necessarily troubling from a Greek perspective. That they contrast with the Foreign Office conclusions of 18 and 13 years previously could perhaps be the result of the choices that the local Slavophones were essentially forced to make by the 1940s. For example, Evans notes that, "It is...important to emphasize that the inhabitants, just as they are not Greeks, are also not Bulgarians, or Serbs or Croats. They are Macedonians...The Macedonians are actuated by strong but mixed feelings of patriotism...[Their] patriotism is not artificial." Cited in Andrew Rossos, \textit{Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History}, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008, p. 90; my emphasis.
sides. Many, though, were lured by Tito and his policies on Yugoslavia’s nationalities.

Tito and his top aide, Svetozar Vukmanović (nom du guerre Tempo), ultimately succeeded in significantly reducing any previous or lingering pro-Bulgarian sympathies.\(^{21}\) This was achieved through a number of policies, such as the creation of the Communist Party of Macedonia (CPM – its name being significant and indicative of intentions). The party’s armed units also contributed to the “‘Macedonianization’ of the Macedonians [since] it practised the politics of integration by including in its rank and file men of all inclinations”.\(^{22}\)

Furthermore, the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia issued a significant resolution on 29 November 1943, explaining that “Yugoslavia is being built up on a federal principle which will ensure full equality for the nations of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro [and] Bosnia-Herzegovina.”\(^{23}\) In addition, the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) was created in 1944. A proclamation issued on 4 August of that year is indicative of its irredentist goals and nationalist ideology:

People of Macedonia!
In the course of three years of combat you have achieved your unity, developed your army and laid the basis for the federal Macedonian state. With the participation of the entire Macedonian nation in the struggle against the Fascist occupiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece you will achieve unification of all parts of Macedonia, divided in 1915 and 1918 by Balkan imperialists.\(^{24}\)

At that point Tito was unable to unite all of geographic Macedonia under his aegis, a project that would remain unrealized. However, he did proceed to create in 1944 the PRM as part of the Yugoslav Federation.\(^{25}\) For most Greek scholars, the foundational cultural policies pursued by this republic explain

\(^{21}\) See Livanios, *The Macedonian Question*, p. 119.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 125.
\(^{23}\) Cited in Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism*, p. 117; my emphasis.
\(^{25}\) Irredentist claims were public and of central importance at the founding of the federal republic. See Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism*, p. 136.
the construction and particular content of the modern Slav-Macedonian identity and "newly found nationalism":

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The encouragement and evolution of Macedonian culture has had a far greater and more permanent impact on Macedonian nationalism than has any other aspect of Yugoslav policy...The greatest cultural effect has come from the creation of the Macedonian language and literature, the new Macedonian national interpretation of history, and the establishment of a Macedonian Orthodox Church.

Livanios follows this framework and partakes in the general critical outlook of the republic's cultural policies. He presents, though, an additional and moderately revisionist argument, claiming that it helps explain the shaping of the latest manifestation of Slav-Macedonian national ideology. In doing so, he both deviates from the standard Greek historiographical approach and at the same time attempts to enrich it.

Livanios accepts that Tito created the overall political framework and set the general strategic goals of federal Yugoslavia but allowed the CPM considerable local autonomy in setting the cultural, linguistic, nationalist and identity-related policies of the PRM. These policies did not merely attempt to confront Bulgarian and Greek nationalism, but, even more significantly, were infused by an acute local anti-Serbianism. The Foreign Office had stressed such feelings since at least 1930, noting that the Serbs in the Yugoslav region of Macedonia were considered "invaders and unwelcome foreigners". During the period between the two World Wars, anti-Serbianism "took the form of Bulgarophilia. In the post-war [era] it was transformed into Macedonianism." The PRM's new educational system fully reflected these feelings, while Serbs were essentially unwelcome as civil servants. In fact,

26 Livanios, The Macedonian Question, p. 192; my emphasis.
29 See ibid., p. 203.
30 The 1930 Foreign Office report is cited in ibid., p. 66. In fact, Livanios stresses that "some thirty years of Serbian rule were enough to create an anti-Serbian sentiment of which many Bulgarian propagandists would be jealous" (Livanios, The Macedonian Question, p. 178).
31 Ibid., p. 205.
the CPM even refused to accept “Serb technical advisers in...reconstruction planning”.

Ultimately for Livanios, the cultural and political actions based on anti-Serbian animus reduce (but not negate) Tito’s role in the creation of “Macedonianism” in the 1940s:

It is not convincing to suggest that Tito communicates the Macedonian virus to the Macedonians in 1944, for shortly afterwards he was confronted with an epidemic. Moreover, Macedonian nationalism – as it was expressed in 1944-7 – had too strong an anti-Yugoslav dimension to be to his liking...Tito and the CPY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia] had been instrumental in the consolidation of [Macedonianism] but it quickly acquired its own dynamics, set its own dimension, and, at the local level, served local needs, not always compatible with those of Tito and Yugoslavia.

It should be kept in mind that Tito was not a liberal democratic leader subject to regular free elections. He was a communist autocrat holding supreme power over federal Yugoslavia until his death. The magnitude of Tito’s power proved sufficient to overcome even the split with Stalin and the Soviet Union. To suggest that Tito would have not attempted to reverse policies that he strongly disliked and disapproved of is not entirely credible. If such policies served his wider geopolitical goals and were perceived merely as a mild irritant to his power and domestic political arrangements, then it becomes comprehensible how and why he might have allowed them to be implemented. In other words, Tito’s role in the creation of the modern version of “Macedonianism” is perhaps somewhat less significant than the one ascribed to him by Greek historiography but still of great impact.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that a mainstream Greek narrative on the development of Slav-Macedonian identity has gradually emerged, striving to comprehend and explain all of its major stages of development. This account is, of course, far from uniform, but most scholars share a common “road map” by focusing on particular events, documents and turning points.

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33 See *ibid.*, p. 197.
The explanatory framework that results has often been challenged, as befits a controversial and often politicized academic topic. However, when high emotions and hidden agendas are excluded, it still remains possible to enrich and contribute towards the understanding and debate of various aspects of the Macedonian Question. Livanios’ analysis of the Slav-Macedonian anti-Serbian feelings in explaining Tito’s role in the cultural policies and identity formation taking place in the People’s Republic of Macedonia represents precisely such an example.

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37 The next stage for Greek historiography will be to understand the latest “mutation” of “Macedonianism” that is integrally related to FYROM’s recent, official and wide-ranging “Antiquization” campaign. See Anastas Vangeli, “Nation-building Ancient Macedonian Style: The Origins and the Effects of the So-called Antiquization in Macedonia”, Nationalities Papers XXXIX/1 (2011), pp. 13-32.