Andreas Papandreou’s Exile Politics: The First Phase (1968-1970)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/hr.332

To cite this article:

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Abstract: Andreas Papandreou’s exile politics, following his December 1967 release
from Averoff Prison, have stereotypically been seen as simply adopting the neo-Marxist
ideologies associated with the Third World national liberation movements of the era. In
narrating the initial evolution of his views on the “Greek Question” in exile, this study
attempts to surface the underlying dynamics responsible for radicalizing his politics in that
direction. Those dynamics reflect, on the one hand, the relentless will-to-action informing
Papandreou’s political persona and, on the other, the political upheavals, headlined by the
protest movement against the US war in Vietnam, in which his politics were enmeshed.

Released from prison by the Greek military dictatorship on Christmas Eve, 1967, Andreas Papandreou flew out of Athens to exile in Paris three weeks later, accompanied by his wife Margaret, their four children and his mother. Eight months of solitary confinement had taken their toll on the junta’s most renowned – and in some quarters, most notorious – political prisoner. His Paris exile, Margaret would write a few years later, was the beginning of a “long, slow road back to emotional and physical recovery”.¹

Judging by his behavior, that road consisted, first and foremost, in pursuing the consuming public passion that imprisonment had deprived Papandreou of most: collective action for a cause, with himself as leader. The day after his arrival in Paris, he announced plans to visit the United States, the country of paramount importance to the “Greek Question”. He then began a preliminary tour by visiting Western European capitals. Choosing potentially supportive NATO countries, he traveled to London, Bonn, Oslo and Copenhagen, where he met with government officials, political parties and members of the Greek diaspora to gauge attitudes towards the April 1967 coup and articulate his initial stance. In Bonn, he released a statement that urged Greek Gastarbeiter (nearly half a million at that point), as well as Greeks studying in Germany, “to put aside our platform differences and our personal vision of what kind of Greece we want” in order to focus on “liberating our

land and reestablishing genuine democracy. Unity in the struggle for our enslaved citizens is the command of the day.” Unity, however, would turn out to be the most divisive issue bedeviling Greece’s exile politicians.

Arriving in Stockholm, Papandreou appeared before a packed crowd of Greek immigrant workers and students on February 26 to announce the formation of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (known as PAK, the acronym for Πανελλήνιο Απελευθερωτικό Κίνημα), a coordinating committee for resistance activities, which, he declared, “has only one purpose: the country’s liberation”. As an early organizational statement would clarify, PAK “does not compete with parties. Its platform is restricted to one single objective: to establish in Greece [the] sovereignty of the Greek people – so the Greek people may choose freely among competing parties and party platforms in the context of a genuinely democratic process.” Meanwhile, Swedish prime minister Tage Erlander announced that PAK would receive financial support from his ruling Social Democratic party. Backed as well by strong statements of support from NATO members Denmark and Norway, Papandreou had driven his stake in the ground. For the next six and a half years, until the junta’s abrupt collapse in July 1974, PAK would be his vehicle for fighting Greece’s military dictatorship.

The Andreas Problem

The creation of PAK was not quite what US officials were hoping for when they engineered Papandreou’s release two months before. Still, they expected that, in exile, Andreas would be a more manageable problem than he had been as a political prisoner. From the very night of the April 1967 coup, the incarceration of Papandreou, a respected, popular figure among American academics and Western European social democrats, had been a thorn in the side of the US Johnson Administration. On April 26, five days after the coup, Hall Saunders, head of the State Department’s Intelligence and Research Bureau, sent a secret memo to Walt Rostow, the president’s National Security Adviser, recommending that the US urge “the coup government simply to

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2 Author archive.
3 Ibid.
4 Papandreou’s “name, his ambition and his industriousness will make him a force to be reckoned with in the future,” observed US Ambassador Phillips Talbot, reporting from Athens on Papandreou’s exile activities. He nonetheless concluded that, given virtually unanimous hostility towards him among his political colleagues, “Andreas would probably have been wiser to return to the university for the indefinite future.” Talbot to State Department, February 2, 1968. US National Archives, College Park, MD (henceforth NARA), Record group 59.
expel Andreas. No one believes that Greek politics can settle down until he is out of the picture,” he argued, “so expulsion would meet our domestic needs while at the same time being a gain for the [coup] government.”

The “domestic needs” Saunders cited were the product of the pressures on the White House from Papandreou’s wide array of politically well-connected friends within the American liberal intelligentsia and political world. Many of them – most prominently Papandreou’s Harvard mentor, John Kenneth Galbraith – belonged to the rising chorus of dissent within the Democratic Party over Johnson’s war in Vietnam. Learning he had been arrested on the night of the coup, Papandreou’s influential allies rallied to his cause.

Their lobbying was not the only factor driving the idea of getting Papandreou “out of the picture”. Pressures arising from the foreign policy bureaucracy also played into the equation. Already by early July, in the wake of the Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Pentagon, citing the now heightened “strategic importance of Greek land and air space” to the projection of US military power in the region, was pressing President Johnson to “normalize” relations with the junta, a position soon advanced as well by Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

While not the only obstacle to “normalization”, Papandreou’s continuing confinement was, among other things, complicating US relations with NATO allies, such as Denmark and Norway, where public feelings towards the dictatorship were overwhelmingly hostile and Papandreou, thanks to his October 1966 pre-coup tour of Scandinavian countries, had become a popular hero.

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5 Memorandum by Hal Saunders for Rostow, April 26, 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX (henceforth LBJ Library).

6 Likely of more immediate impact than Galbraith’s intervention with the Administration to protect Andreas from harm was a 3 am call the day of the coup by economist Paul Samuelson to Johnson’s national security adviser (and economics colleague). Author interview with Samuelson, October 16, 2002.

7 Already, in a July 6, 1967 meeting of the “Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia” (IRG), [representatives from the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the CIA and other agencies] noted that the recent Six-Day War in the Middle East had “dramatized” that the “availability of Greek bases [was]…virtually indispensable”. In light of the assessment that “the current government in Greece appears headed for a long stay in power”, the members of the IRG “Agreed that we should now move toward a normalization of our relations with Greece”. July 7, 1967 record of IRG/NEA meeting, classified “secret”. LBJ Library.

8 An August 1967 report to Washington by an American observer noted that, “the intensity of interests [sic] in Andreas Papandreou’s case in Scandinavia is difficult to imagine” [emphasis in the original]; Mogens Pelt, Tying Greece to the West: US–West German–Greek Relations, 1949-74, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, University of Copenhagen, 2006, p. 296.
Fig. 1. "No one believes that Greek politics can settle down until [Andreas] is out of the picture [...]". From an April 26, 1967 memo by Hal Saunders, head of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Walt Rostow, National Security Adviser to US President Lyndon Johnson.

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.
Retrieved via the Declassified Documents Reference System.

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Equally troublesome for US officials was Andreas’ American-born wife, the resourceful Margaret Papandreou, who, from Athens, was instrumental in keeping protest alive among Andreas’ supporters abroad. Shunned by the US Embassy9 and under heavy surveillance by the junta, she operated through a small network of trusted allies in the United States, including Stanley Sheinbaum, a peripatetic, well-heeled left-liberal activist prominent in the burgeoning New Left anti-war protest movement.10 In October 1967, Sheinbaum published a Ramparts cover story entitled “The Framing of Andreas Papandreou”. The article exposed how Greece’s Central Intelligence Agency (KYP) had fabricated key evidence used to indict Papandreou for acts of high treason – the junta’s justification for his continued incarceration (while most of his political colleagues, except for those on the severely persecuted left, were either conditionally free or under house arrest). With Margaret and her allies preparing to send highly reputed lawyers to Athens for Andreas’ impending trial, the junta was facing the likelihood of an international public relations disaster. The Johnson Administration had another good reason for wanting to get Papandreou “out of the picture”.

The opportunity to do so finally appeared in December 1967. It took the form of King Constantine’s long-awaited counter-coup – an attempt to seize power back from the cabal of junior officers, led by Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, which had preemptively implemented the coup plans of royalist generals – plans that, since November 1966, they had been developing at Constantine’s behest, with help of the same junior officers who were now their political masters. Launched on December 13, ten days before Papandreou’s release, the king’s poorly planned counter-coup quickly faltered, ending the next morning with the flight to Italy of the young monarch accompanied by the royal family and his puppet prime minister. Enabling Papadopoulos to isolate remaining pockets of opposition within the

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9 Robert Keeley, a political counselor recently arrived at the Embassy was an exception. Cf. his memoir, The Colonels’ Coup and the American Embassy: A Diplomat’s View of the Breakdown of Democracy in Cold War Greece, ADST-DACOR Diplomats and Diplomacy Series, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010, which provides an enlightening view of the atmosphere towards Papandreou at the Embassy.

10 The dramatic story of her struggle to obtain her husband’s release is recorded in her book, Nightmare in Athens; see note 1 above. Sheinbaum had helped kicked off a wave of revelations about illegal CIA activities at American universities in an article he wrote for Ramparts (April 1966) recording his experiences at Michigan State University. Cf. Angus Mackenzie and David Weir, Secrets: The CIA’s War at Home, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, for a documented account of the CIA’s illegal campaign against Sheinbaum.
officer corps, the botched counter-coup dispelled any lingering uncertainties about the junta’s long-term viability. Resigning his military status as an army colonel, Papadopoulos stepped into the foreground to add to his existing portfolio the posts of prime minister and minister of defense.

With Papadopoulos now solidly in command, the Johnson Administration turned its attention to eliminating a final obstacle to “normalization”: Papandreou’s continued confinement at Averoff Prison. On December 20, a week after the king’s ill-fated coup, a State Department official met with Papadopoulos’ back channel to Washington, the nefarious Greek-American businessman Tom Pappas. Informed by Pappas that the “regime needed to know exactly what the US wanted from them in order to attain respectability and US understanding”, the Johnson Administration official explained that the “release of political prisoners, and particularly Andreas Papandreou” would be “a constructive step” towards bringing Greece “back to normalcy”. Two days later, a delegation of European officials, accompanied by a diplomat from the Greek foreign ministry, visited Papandreou in his prison cell. Sent by the Council of Europe to investigate conditions under the dictatorship, the officials apparently also had Andreas’ impending release on their agenda. Asked what his intentions would be if he were released, Andreas declared that, should he “come to the conclusion that my further presence in the political arena might harm the smoothness of the national life of Greece, then I might just decide to leave politics and look after my family and my science”. The next day, on Christmas Eve, Andreas was released into the arms of his wife, four children and mother at their Athens home.

Greece remained under martial law, as it would for most of the next six and a half years. Moreover, roughly 3000 political prisoners were still incarcerated, without trial, on barren islands in the Aegean. Nonetheless, steps to “normalize” relations proceeded apace. In early January 1968, Tom Pappas was again in Washington to deliver, through informal channels, a personal letter he had brought from Papadopoulos for the US president. Aiming to clear up “certain misunderstandings” about the “nature of the change” in Greece, the letter explained how the April coup had saved the country from the “communist menace” that would have ultimately prevailed if the May 1967 elections had gone forward as scheduled. In any case, the regime, the

11 Memorandum of meeting between US Deputy Assistant of State Stuart Rockwell and Tom Pappas, December 20, 1967, Record group 59, NARA.
12 Lagoudakis archives, unprocessed, Howard Gottlieb Archive Center, Boston University Library.
13 Amnesty International report, cited in Pelt, Tying Greece to the West, p. 296.
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letter explained, would soon produce a new “updated” constitution and put the country on the course to free elections, “rid of all the ugliness and dangers of the past, if this were practically possible and psychologically advisable”.14 Four days later, the State Department sent Ambassador Phillips Talbot a telegram, classified secret, informing him that, “We have decided to move in the near future to a working relationship with the regime in Athens.” Then, following a “friendly, frank” meeting with Papadopoulos, Talbot delivered President Johnson’s reply to the dictator’s apparently reassuring missive. Capping the “normalization” process, Johnson’s letter thanked Papadopoulos for understanding the “dilemma” which the “sudden change of government” in April 1967 “has posed for democratic countries” and welcomed Papadopoulos’ pledge to “retain the basic structure of government which prevailed in Greece prior” to the April coup.

As events would prove, the Administration’s embrace of the junta’s planned “return to democracy” was more ploy than policy, answering, first and foremost, to the politically charged public relations problems the coup had created for the United States. Only a few days after the coup, Daniel Brewster, head of the State Department’s Greek Desk, made the salient point: the “important thing” was “to create the impression of progress” [my italics] of a return to constitutional rule.15 Over the next several years, US policy, in the words of a professor at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, was a matter of “dancing with dictators”.16 Graciously initiating the waltz, Johnson’s letter praised the recent measures “taken to restore a more normal condition to Greek political and social life” as “constructive”. Ending on a note of high principle, Johnson wished Papadopoulos success in his “endeavors to realize in Greece the values to which our peoples aspire”.17

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17 Department of State telegram, Deptel 108701, February 3, 1968, NARA.
The Johnson–Papadopoulos exchange was kept secret, both in Washington and Athens. Meanwhile, Ambassador Talbot welcomed Prime Minister Papadopoulos aboard the *USS Franklin D. Roosevelt* aircraft carrier for lunch and an “underwater operations demonstration”. Treated to photographs of the event in the Athens’ government-supervised press, the Greek public got the message.

**First Moves**

In exile, Andreas Papandreou thus faced a dictatorship firmly ensconced in power with the discreet public backing of the United States. Complicating the task of fighting the dictatorship, his pre-junta clashes with US officials had earned him the status of a pariah in American foreign policy circles. Initially regarded as an American ally within his father’s newly elected Center Union government, Andreas had taken unwelcome stands on a variety of sensitive issues: he had challenged aggressive American attempts to achieve a NATO-friendly division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey over the opposition of Cypriot President Makarios. He persisted in his demands that the monarchy, regarded by US policy-makers as a key “agent of influence” in Greece, stop intervening in the politics of Greece’s parliamentary democracy. Finally, he refused to treat EDA, the front party for the outlawed Communist Party defeated in the 1946-1949 Civil War, as an internal “enemy of the nation”, raising suspicions that he was willing to engage in a formal alliance with the left.

In all these ways, Papandreou, increasingly popular with the Greek public for his maverick politics, had transgressed the boundaries of permissible, Cold-War-sanctified political behavior. Papandreou was pressing for a Greece freer, in the context of an emerging superpower détente in Europe, to assert Greek national interests in NATO counsels, while domestically building a reform movement that challenged the right-wing hegemony of the country’s political, economic and military élites. By the time of the coup, he had become a magnet for American fears of losing control over a key Eastern Mediterranean asset in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. Thanks in part to unflattering articles by the influential *New York Times* columnist C. L. Sulzberger (a close confidante and advocate of the king), Andreas’ “public image” in the minds of many Americans was that of a demagogic, anti-American opportunist.

A visit to the United States was already at the top of Papandreou’s agenda on his arrival in Paris. While his release had helped consolidate the dictatorship, it had also stoked public interest abroad in hearing what the controversial Greek politician had to say. Three days after settling in Paris, he taped an interview,
broadcast in the United States on January 21, for the popular American public affairs TV program *Face the Nation*. The program gave Papandreou the opportunity to address a critical audience: the politically engaged US public and, more particularly, its opinion-makers in government and the news media.

Papandreou’s appearance on *Face the Nation* was the opening foray in his exile politics, inaugurating a stance towards the US that was at once non-confrontational and unapologetic. Asked as a “liberal democrat” about the American “posture” towards the dictatorship, Andreas based his answer on Washington’s continued silence over the regime’s *de jure* recognition, given that the country’s head of state, after his failed counter-coup, was now in exile. With Washington delaying its decision on the issue,\(^\text{18}\) Papandreou noted that the “official stand of the United States at this moment is one of non-recognition of this regime”. Declaring that “as long as this position is maintained I think the image of the United States in Greece will do well,” he added that, “Of course, one expects a little more than [non-recognition]. One expects that the United States will consider seriously the matter of aid, military aid especially, since the weapons that were turned over to the Greek junta are used not to protect the integrity of the nation but to enslave the Greeks.”\(^\text{19}\)

Predictably, interviewer Martin Agronsky challenged Papandreou’s appeal for American action by raising his past history as a critic of American intervention in Greece’s domestic affairs. “You yourself, when you were in the government of your father…were pretty anti-American,” Agronsky asserted. “You repeatedly denounced the United States’ involvement in Greece. Do

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\(^\text{18}\) On December 15, 1967, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared that the US would “wait a while” before making a decision on the question of the regime’s *de jure* recognition under international law, given that the country’s head of state was now in exile. On January 23, the State Department finally came up with a formula for dealing with the issue, announcing through its spokesman that, “the US Government continues to regard King Constantine as the Greek chief-of-state – relations between the King and the Government in Athens are an internal Greek matter, about which it is not for the US Government to comment.” Then, in March the junta issued an edict making General Georgios Zoitakis regent, thereby formally maintaining the institution of the monarchy. “Selected US Policy Statements on Greece”, Record group 59, NARA.

\(^\text{19}\) Transcript of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) speech in the James Pyrros archive, “The Pyrros Papers: A Collection on the Anti-junta Struggle”, University of Michigan Hatcher Graduate Library, Special Collections, Ann Arbor, MI. According to Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 152: “The arms embargo, which the administration imposed in haste in the days after the coup, was poorly designed. Arms needed for Allied defense against the Warsaw Pact were cut off, while the small arms need to repress the Greek population continued to flow to the junta.”
you feel now that there should be an American involvement?” Papandreou responded curtly to Agronksy’s reference to his alleged anti-Americanism. “Anybody who exercises critique, who speaks the truth, who advises correctly is not necessarily an enemy,” he declared. “And I have had indeed many arguments with the American Embassy in Greece and I have taken many stands concerning American policy in Greece where I believe mistakes were made. I believe this has weakened American influence in Greece and I believe it has lost many friends.”

Expanding on his argument, Papandreou attributed his disagreements to an ill-advised American stance towards Greece’s political scene in recent times. There “has been a tendency,” he asserted, “for the United States’ official policy to associate itself exclusively with the right, to consider the center, the democratic forces, as somewhat dangerous, let us say a bit pink; and in this fashion, it has encouraged reactionary developments in Greece instead of fostering progressive and democratic developments.” Repeating his appeal for cutting off military aid, he made a bid to discuss the matter more fully with concerned parties in private: “As long as the arms are used to subjugate the free people, to enslave the Greeks, obviously they should be withheld. This, I think, is very clear. And the other questions, one can discuss them privately but I believe not before the public.”

Papandreou thus assumed the posture not of a hostile opponent, but of a candid critic of American policies. Looked at in retrospect, the Face the Nation interview also provides a useful marker. It serves as a baseline for exploring the startling, and for many junta opponents counter-productive radicalization that Papandreou’s exile politics would undergo over the next six and a half years. By the time of the junta’s abrupt collapse in July 1974, Papandreou had mutated from an unrepentant, but restrained critic of US policies into the militant leader of a nascent national liberation movement, with PAK advocating armed struggle to free Greece from the “bonds of American imperialism”. The story of this transformation reveals much about the political persona of the leader who would dominate Greek politics in the last decades of the twentieth century.

The American Tour

From Athens, Ambassador Talbot tried to prepare the ground for Papandreou’s Washington reception. A week before that trip, Talbot alerted the State Department that the Embassy Country Team (which included the CIA station chief and the Pentagon’s defense attaché) was concerned lest the visit “harm” US efforts both to nudge the dictators towards democracy and “to protect important strategic factors at stake”. To be sure, Talbot noted,

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20 Embassy telegram to Secretary of State, Personal for Assistant Secretary Battle, February 27, 1968, Record Group 59, NARA.
Papandreou had scored only modest successes so far in Europe. In West Germany, popular Social Democrat Willy Brandt had met him in his role of party leader, rather than as foreign minister. In the UK, Papandreou had failed to “achieve any high-level meetings” with government officials. Talbot urged that Papandreou be given the same treatment in the United States by limiting Papandreou’s “official contacts” to the mid-level State Department bureaucrats. Adding weight to that recommendation was opinion among erstwhile Greek political élites. The junta’s “nationalist opponents (people such as [Evangelos] Averoff and other ERE leaders, as well as a good many Center Union personalities…) would be antagonized,” Talbot contended, if Papandreou were given “important official attention in Washington”. They are “anxious…lest opposition to the regime be divided and undermined by what they regard as Andreas’ psychotic, paranoid approach”.21

Still, Talbot feared that limiting Papandreou’s official contacts would not be enough to neutralize the political “harm” he might inflict on US policy efforts. While in the United States, Papandreou could be expected to take “advantage of various public, Capitol Hill and academic platforms offered him…to attack…the [US government] and this embassy”. As a counter-measure, Talbot recommended that the Department consider doing “deep backgrounding of certain congressmen and possibly [media] correspondents” using “select items” from CIA and Department files to demonstrate Papandreou’s “substantial record of political unreliability and opportunism”. Counseling “extreme circumspection” in using such sensitive material, he advised, nonetheless, that such a stratagem “should afford a salutary corrective to the oversimplified image [Papandreou] enjoys in certain American circles as a disinterested champion of democratic progress”.

In further preparation for Papandreou’s Washington visit, Ambassador Talbot had a three-hour meeting with the Greek dictator on March 6. He alerted Papadopoulos that “The ’noise level’ in [the] American press and on

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21 In reporting that Papandreou’s “approach” was seen as “psychotic” and “paranoid”, Talbot was likely quoting Andreas’ most acerbic Greek critics to validate his own longstanding hostile stance – a stance that, pre-junta, included proposing CIA “limited covert action” to undercut Papandreou’s rapidly expanding popular base in the parliamentary elections that the 1967 coup had prevented from happening. However, his broader point was not without a basis in reality. With the exception of erstwhile deputies belonging to the center-left caucus he had formed within the Center Union, Andreas was largely regarded with antipathy by the country’s now-displaced political class. Animosity towards him among politicians of the center and the right, as well as his difficult relations with the communist left would play a decisive role in shaping Papandreou’s exile politics; cf. Stan Draenos, Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick, London: I. B. Tauris, 2012, pp. 252 ff.
TV could rise pretty high, but explained that certain groups offering Andreas platforms also happened to be those who were most vocal in their criticisms of the Administration’s Vietnam policy.” Thus, while “advocacy” by such groups “could temporarily limit” American “maneuverability” on Greek affairs, it was “unlikely to result in any basic changes in policy toward Greece”. For his part, Papadopoulos appeared to Talbot to be “relaxed” about the visit’s “public relations aspects”. Yet, the junta leader did specify that the one thing “sure to cause real concern [was] if Andreas were to receive public high-level official attention” in the US. According to his report to Washington, Talbot assured Papadopoulos that he would not.  

Two days later, Papandreou arrived in Washington for his month-long tour of North America that would climax in Toronto (a major destination for the most recent wave of Greek economic emigrants), where he delivered a rousing anti-junta speech to thousands of pro-democracy Greeks. His first week, however, was spent at the command-center of the American superpower, Washington, DC. There, he pursued his immediate political priority: to push for a “reconsideration” of US policy towards the junta, with the termination of US military aid a first priority, in hopes of achieving a relatively painless “political solution” to the Greek problem. Papandreou was not alone, of course, in that quest. The search for a political solution preoccupied much of Greece’s now-displaced political class, both within and outside the country. Focusing their hopes on Constantinos Karamanlis, politicians across the spectrum persistently lobbied Karamanlis to lead such an effort, possibly in tandem with the exiled king. Papandreou also played on this field. However, on this issue, as on most others, he would find himself the odd man out.

A major speaking engagement was the first item on Papandreou’s Washington agenda. The day after his arrival, he was scheduled to deliver the keynote address at the 20th Annual Roosevelt Day Dinner held by the greater Washington chapter of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). A prestigious 50,000-member liberal Democratic Party political action group, the ADA included colleagues from the university world, friends from his days as a Democratic Party activist in the 1950s, and political allies from the Kennedy-era launch of his Greek political career. The ADA’s new national president was John Kenneth Galbraith, with whom he had recently spent an all-night gab session in Paris.  

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22 Telegram from Talbot to Secretary of State (secret), March 7, 1968, LBJ Library.
23 Author interview with Galbraith at his home in Cambridge, MA, October 18, 2002.
To all appearances, the ADA speaking engagement represented an ideal forum for mobilizing support among prominent Democratic Party activists, restive over Vietnam, for a “reconsideration” of American policy towards the junta. Nevertheless, Papandreou approached that opportunity with caution. Before traveling to the US, “I was careful not to attack the US government for its involvement in the coup,” he would write in Democracy at Gunpoint, the mid-term memoirs which he started writing a few months later. “I felt that there were possibilities both within the Administration and within the political world of the United States for a reappraisal of the situation.”24 In fact, however, he was not just cautious, but apprehensive about his ADA appearance. Margaret Papandreou recalled that he “would have preferred not to give a speech at all”.25

Andreas and Margaret were greeted at Washington’s Dulles Airport by a small welcoming party, including close confidantes Angelos and Julia Clones, and congressional aide Jim Pyrros, who described himself as “favorable to Andreas, but not completely sold on him”.26 Informed that Ambassador Talbot was seeking advance copies of his ADA speech, Papandreou remarked that he “must be careful to review the speech and see that every paragraph can stand on its own. Otherwise, they’ll take it out of context.” Handing them the draft for his talk, he and Margaret retired to their suite in the sedate Hay-Adams Hotel near the White House.

Poring through the draft’s 17 single-spaced pages, Pyrros “read it with astonishment at its inadequacies”. Mainly a “dull recitation” of economic and political theory “over the past four decades”, the “first 11 pages did not mention Greece once”. Pyrros’ negative opinion was shared by his wife, Betty, as well as by Angelos and Julia Clones (“boring, boring!” Julia exclaimed). “Andreas is a hot item here,” Pyrros noted, “People want to know why dictatorship came to Greece, why he was jailed, why he is out, what’s going to happen. They don’t want to hear a lecture on socio-economic theory.” An outsider to the Papandreou circle, Pyrros turned the situation over to Angelos Clones, “He’ll have to scrap it,” Clones remarked. After giving him a few hours to rest, Clones visited Papandreou in his room. Late that night, Pyrros received a call from Julia, who reported that “It was a fight.” “Apparently,” Pyrros wrote in his diary, “Angelo went in hammering, Andreas resisted and made some concessions at last.”27

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25 Email to author, October 14, 2014.
26 Pyrros journal, entry for March 8, 1968. Many thanks to James Pyrros for making entries to his journal available.
27 Pyrros journal, entry for March 8, 1968. The heated discussion between Clones and Papandreou was interrupted by the arrival of Steven Rousseas and Stanley Sheinbaum,
Andrew and Margaret Papandreou arrived in Washington today. Betty and I, taking the afternoon off, were among the small group which met them at Dulles Airport. Clovis had made a good move on transportation, hiring a limousine. He had also invited a few people. 

Walking in the Customs reception room were Anglos and Jills, Chineses, Mex, and Mrs. Philip Emmanuel (he told us he had married an American woman). Miss Warnecke (a rather large, solidly built woman, holding out her hand in such an affected manner, she looked like a caricature, her husband Dick is in Morocco), Mr. Arthur Row, and George Vountas, the old Washington attorney. Vountas was affable enough, but he’s something of an erratic one-man gang. He greeted us, then showed us some pamphlets, an anti-U.S. distrib, into our hands.

Angelo told us later that he had talked to Vountas about security. Vountas bubbled with assurances that he’d provide two guards.

“And then he showed up alone,” Angelo laughed. “Where’s the security?”

Aphrodis had asked him: “I am the security.” Vountas had replied.

At any rate, Betty and I had no cause to be nervous about a possible attempt on the lives of the Papandreous as we drove them in. (They had received threats in Paris about their U.S. trip.)

At about 2:30 p.m., the doors of the Customs room opened and out came Andreas and Margaret Papandreou, smiling widely. Both looked greatly pleased to be here. “They were both grinning from ear to ear.” Betty said later. “They shook hands with everyone. Since they’re near Betty and I together only once, I’m not sure they recognized us. The warmest greeting was saved, as it should have been, for Angelo.”

Her name the next day here. Andreas pulled Angelo’s left hand on Angelo’s right shoulder, smiled broadly, and said, “I’m proud...
Papandreou’s attempt to avoid controversy by escaping into academic abstraction suggests that more was at stake for him than just the danger of spoiling the atmosphere for talks with the Johnson Administration. In any case, it seems unlikely that he expected to make headway on that front. Washington concurred with Talbot’s (and implicitly Papadopoulos’) recommendation that Papandreou be denied “important official attention”, turning down his request to see the secretaries of state and defense – a refusal Papandreou (given the British cold shoulder) must have at least suspected before leaving Paris. Relegating him to meetings with assistant secretaries, the Johnson Administration signaled that it had little interest in hearing his arguments for an American policy shift.  

A confluence of factors explains Papandreou’s own desire to keep a low profile. In marshalling his inner resources for the fight, Papandreou had acted so far on political instinct. The creation of PAK reflected his sense that he needed to organize for the fight. Nonetheless, PAK was effectively still on the drawing board – an abstract concept yet to be materialized organizationally. Moreover, his eight months in prison had deprived him of any substantial contact with developments in the outside world. Asked to speak barely two months after his release, he had yet to sort out all the factors affecting the “Greek problem” and develop a larger strategy, one that answered the key questions of what the fight was about and how it should be conducted. Problems of a personal nature also complicated that task. The abrupt transition from prison to Paris confronted him with a crush of unanswered questions about where to live and how to support his seven-member family – issues by no means irrelevant to his ability to carry on the fight from exile.  

Likely the most decisive factor feeding Papandreou’s uncertainties was the ongoing upheaval in American politics. As he arrived in Washington, the Johnson government found itself beleaguered by an escalating crisis over the American war in Vietnam. With troop commitments approaching half a million, the bloody conflict had sparked a vociferous, anti-war protest movement centered in the country’s colleges and universities. Converging with the black civil rights struggle, the movement had given birth to a New Left politics, introducing unorthodox perspectives into the country’s Cold-War dominated foreign policy discourse, a development Papandreou had

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as well as Melina Mercouri and her husband, Jules Dassin, in from New York following a successful run of *Illya Darling*, a Broadway version of the film that had given Melina international renown, *Never on Sunday*. Nevertheless, Clones succeeded in persuading Papandreou to make major changes to his speech.  

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Stan Draenos

watched with sympathetic interest in the months leading up to the April coup. For the Johnson Administration, matters had taken a turn for the worse when, in late January 1968, North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces launched wide-ranging, coordinated attacks against US positions in what came to be known as the Tet Offensive. Still in progress as Papandreou landed in Washington, the offensive dealt the Johnson Administration a humiliating blow. With the credibility of government claims of imminent victory shattered, public support for the war collapsed.

Meanwhile, within the governing Democratic Party itself, the ADA had become a flashpoint in anti-war dissent. The organization had been founded in 1947 in support of President Truman’s landmark decision for American intervention in the Greek Civil War. It historical identification with the cause of Greek democracy was thus linked to the launch of America’s Cold-War crusade against alleged Soviet expansionism; but, two decades later, the Vietnam quagmire had shaken faith in the conduct and objectives of America’s Cold-War project, producing splits among ADA liberals. Already, John Kenneth Galbraith had incurred Johnson’s wrath by become a vocal critic of his war policies. Then, a month before Papandreou’s arrival in Washington, the ADA’s national board, in a vote that split the organization, endorsed the bid of peace candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy to challenge President Johnson for the Democratic Party nomination ahead of November’s presidential elections. McCarthy announced his candidacy at Galbraith’s Cambridge home. Meanwhile, US Vice President Hubert Humphrey, an ADA co-founder (and erstwhile Papandreou political friend) dutifully shouldered the burden of serving as the president’s loyal defender.

The Greek junta, of course, was not at the center of the political upheaval over Vietnam; neither was it irrelevant. The Papadopoulos coup, after all, had not taken place in a far-off Asian country like Vietnam, whose politics were at best obscure. A NATO country whose parliamentary democracy (however defective) had been rescued thanks to American military and economic aid, Greece was regarded to be a success story that validated the principle of American interventionism in the name of democracy. Yet, while much of the American public and many Congressional liberals were inherently sympathetic to the democratic cause in Greece, that sympathy was, in many cases, wed organically to anti-communism. Indicatively, Jim

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Pyrros, commenting on Papandreou’s original draft, complained that it made “no reference whatever” to the ADA’s “Truman Doctrine heritage, their great cause versus the Far Left. I don’t like that. It’s a sign that [Papandreou] erroneously seeks to cater to the far left in Greece.”

Held at the Sheraton Park Hotel, the ADA dinner was a gala event, complete with live bouzouki music and a moussaka main course. The more than 700 guests present included a substantial cohort of US-based Greeks and Greek-Americans, including the controversial investigative journalist Elias Demetracopoulos; a young international relations professor, Ted Couloumbis; and Andreas’ former teacher from Athens College, Harilaos Lagoudakis, a long-time Greek analyst at the State Department’s Office of Intelligence and Research. The majority of guests, however, were American liberals prominent in the worlds of politics, journalism, labor, and business. The crowd cheered heartily as Andreas and Margaret entered the ballroom hand in hand and took their seats at the head table. Melina Mercouri, who with other notables shared the dais, embraced Andreas as he prepared to deliver his address.

Papandreou’s hastily revised speech represented his first attempt, since release from prison, to develop a coherent narrative around the “Greek problem”, affording valuable insight into the logic, as well as the tensions, informing the initial phase of his exile politics. Those tensions quickly became apparent. His speech made the case for an American policy shift on Greece that resonated broadly with the sponsoring organization’s democratic credo. However, it articulated that case in the context of perspectives on US foreign policy that identified Papandreou with the views of the emergent New Left in the United States and Europe, reconnecting him with insights he already had arrived at in the months leading to April coup.

Papandreou began with the good news, telling his listeners that, “Your government did indeed intervene to protect the lives of political prisoners – for which we are grateful.” He soon delved into a sobering analysis of how the political processes as they operate in “modern societies” (and particularly the United States) put foreign policy decisions “beyond the reach of the average citizen”, with “decisive influence” residing instead “with the professionals of the State Department, with the Pentagon and with the CIA”. Growing by “leaps and bounds”, a “military-intelligence complex” [his emphases] was dominating American foreign policy formation. In the name of protecting “basic freedoms of the individual and democratic institutions in the West”, its exclusive concern was

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30 All quotes from the speech as published in ADA World Magazine 3/5 (May 1968).
fighting the Cold War. An outgrowth of that concern was NATO, which had been assigned “the mission to protect the world from the spread of totalitarianism”.

Yet, in the postwar period, Papandreou argued, a “gap” between America’s democratic ideals and its actions on the ground “has been widening in a frightening way”, with the US somehow finding it “advisable to associate itself, to ally itself with totally totalitarian regimes – such as the present junta regime in Greece – in order to further the cause of ‘freedom’ and ‘human dignity’ in the world”. He cited the “shock” of the recent official US recognition of the Greek regime, as well as of recent shows of “warmth and friendship” by the US and NATO, asking “What are the Greeks supposed to say to all this? How are they supposed to react?” Greece had joined NATO “in order to safeguard its freedom. And now we are faced with the bitter fact that the very organization we joined in order to protect this freedom is arming to the teeth the military mafia which usurped the government of our country and subjugated our people.”

Calling the junta a “provincial and primitive lot”, Papandreou debunked its disingenuous claim of saving Greece from a “communist takeover”. He asserted that the real “threat” the 1967 coup had saved Greece from was a “smashing victory of the Center Union party”, whose platform, he declared, sought to address “the economically, socially and politically backward state of the nation”. Donning his hat as spokesman for the Center Union abroad (a role assigned him by his father before leaving Athens), he cited the forces ranged against the Center Union’s “great quest for the democratization of public life”: the “hysterical attitude toward the left” that had “to all intents and purposes emasculated the basic freedoms formally guaranteed by the Greek constitution”; the involvement of the army in the country’s politics; the king, who had “become accustomed” to participating in the governing of the land; NATO, whose “dominant members” typically treated Greece “as a satellite rather than an ally”; and the United States, which persisted in playing “an active role in determining the outcome of the political process in Greece”. Finally, while not charging the US with direct, material involvement in the April coup, Papandreou criticized the US Embassy for giving “strong moral support to the king and the Greek establishment…thus paving the way for the military coup”.

Such statements made clear that Papandreou, while still uncertain of his exile strategy, had no intention of retreating on the core positions he had advocated in the aftermath of the July 1965 events, positions that had put him at odds with the monarchy, the anti-communist military officer corps, the US Embassy and even moderate Center Union members, such as Georgios
Mavros. To do so would have meant abandoning the identity that had earned him a substantial public following: that of a democratic reformer, the spokesman for a new, socially progressive nationalism that transcended the complexes and prohibitions of the Cold War.

Notably, Papandreou’s depiction of the Center Union as the political party representing this new narrative was a kind of Platonic “noble fiction” – a projection of the Center Union as the vehicle for the “great quest for the democratization of public life” that, in fact, defined his own reformist program for Greek politics. In fact, in the period leading up to the April coup, he had managed to mobilize both an ardent public following and a substantial cohort within the Center Union parliamentary group around this vision, thereby presaging PASOK, the “movement” he would found in 1974 and that in 1981 would bring him to power in sweeping electoral victory.

Yet here, Papandreou’s description of the political stakes in pre-dictatorship Greece confronted what he told his audience was the “truly amazing” feature of the junta phenomenon. For the junta was not an unambiguous manifestation of the conflict between the forces of “the people” and the forces of “the establishment” that had been the axis of Papandreou’s pre-coup politics. The April putschists, he correctly observed, “did not have the support of any political party, any class interest, or any region of the nation. They did not even have the support of the army, which they managed to surprise and subjugate by relying on the Greek intelligence services.” Moreover, since coming to power, the regime had not succeeded “in obtaining the support of any section of the Greek population. Right, center and left are passionately against it.”

Here, Papandreou touched on a feature of the junta phenomenon that was critical to the dynamics of the internal politics among Greece’s banished political class. The junta’s isolation from the country’s erstwhile popularly elected representatives meant that, de facto, Papandreou found himself on the same side of the barricades as the rest of the country’s political world. As he well knew, most of the leadership figures within that world were either

31 Although this assertion fineses rather than addresses the effective absence of active resistance against the junta, two events support Papandreou’s depiction of the dictatorship’s standing with the political world and the public at large. First, the massive crowds that came out for his father’s funeral eight months later would vividly exemplify the fact that, politically speaking, passive acquiescence for a regime is not the same as active support. Secondly, nearly every political figure, irrespective of political ideology, opposed the junta’s 1968 constitution, despite the prospect it offered of enabling them once again to participate, in some fashion, in the country’s politics.
rivals (like Mavros or Konstantinos Mitsotakis) or outright opponents (like Panayotis Kanellopoulos or Averoff). Yet, listeners at the ADA event were not the appropriate audience for addressing internal differences among Greek politicians. Instead, Papandreou drew a conclusion from the fact of the junta’s domestic isolation that was of immediate pragmatic relevance to Americans: “The only thing that keeps [the junta] in power is the support it is getting from the US and some of the NATO allies.” The message was clear. “If the junta were isolated morally, militarily and economically,” he declared, “it would collapse of its own weight.”

What were the chances, in the first place, that the US and “some NATO allies” might reverse course and turn against the junta? Papandreou remained silent on that issue, refraining from even posing the question. Still, the attentive listener would have had little difficulty in guessing what that answer would have been. In his opening remarks, Papandreou had argued that Cold-War conditions had fostered the rise of a “military-intelligence complex”, whose foreign policy decisions were beyond the reach of the average citizen and the country’s traditional democratic processes. Given that the junta was itself an “outgrowth” of this same power center, the odds were long on achieving a policy shift through the American political process.

Papandreou did not draw that pessimistic assessment for his audience. He turned instead to the current direction of US policy, explaining how that policy looked from the Greek side of the street. Since “a number of Western governments have chosen to follow the example of the US government in recognizing and supporting this brutal dictatorship,” he averred, “the Greek people have no alternative but to organize their own resistance against the junta.” Thus, speaking as the people’s tribune, Papandreou reaffirmed the right to resistance, introducing PAK, which, in minimalist language, he described as the coordinator of a “resistance effort” to “liberate our land from this internal occupation force”, a task to which all the Greeks, “independently of party association, will offer their time, their effort and possibly their lives”.

Papandreou then questioned the wisdom of current American policies on pragmatic grounds: “Is it in the long-term interests of the US government to be identified with the junta in Greece?” More pointedly, he asked, “For what reasons would [the US government] prefer to be identified with the brutal...

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32 Even King Constantine, the presumptive leader of the Greek establishment, had rebelled against the regime and now found himself in exile. Although the figures of the political right and moderate center generally escaped the regime’s brutality (torture of political figures being reserved largely for those on the left and Andreas’ followers), they too had been denied rudimentary political freedoms under threat of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.
forces of oppression rather than with the democratic forces in Greece?” There was “still time for a reconsideration of policy by your government toward Greece,” he argued, while warning that, if it were not forthcoming, “there is the likelihood [that] the Greek volcano will erupt.”

By Pyrros’ count, Papandreou was interrupted by applause 14 times, showing that Greece’s democratic cause had a purchase on the political consciences of American liberals. Yet public sympathy was one thing; effective action another. That would require a shift in Washington power relationships. Even though the current Administration had effectively closed its doors on making a policy shift, the heated election-year foreign policy debate did appear to offer some potential openings, ones that Papandreou was uniquely positioned to exploit.

_Eclipse of the American Option_

Opposition to the Vietnam War had been building within the Democratic Party for months, focused on peace-candidate Eugene McCarthy, a thoughtful, relatively unknown Democratic senator. Three days after Papandreou’s ADA appearance, McCarthy gave the incumbent Johnson a run for his money in the New Hampshire primary race. McCarthy’s impressive showing signaled a virtual revolt within the Party’s voting base, triggering Robert Kennedy, a more compelling and popular figure than the low-key McCarthy, to enter the fray.

The development was sheer serendipity for Papandreou, who enjoyed close ties in Kennedy circles, most prominently with Robert Kennedy’s key adviser, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. On March 16, the day Kennedy made his decision public, Papandreou met him at his office for an hour and then rode with him to the press conference, where, promising to “end the bloodshed” both in Vietnam and the country’s racially troubled cities, Kennedy would announce his candidacy. According to Papandreou’s account, he briefed

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33 For Papandreou’s connection with the covert Schlesinger network within the Kennedy Administration, cf. Draenos, _Andreas Papandreou_, pp. 59 ff. Papandreou had other ties to the Kennedy Administration. Ted Kennedy had visited Papandreou’s Center of Economic Research in the early 1960s. Also, while Papandreou was in prison, Jacqueline Kennedy and her friend Irene Papas each donated $500 to a committee to free Andreas from prison set up in New York by a close aide to Papandreou at the time, according to Stephen Rousseas’ listing of contributions from “The Andreas Papandreou Committee for Freedom in Greece”, March 15, 1968, Rousseas archives, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, New York.

34 Three weeks after the April coup, Kennedy had said in a TV debate with Ronald Reagan that, “I think the United States must make it clear that we – that our relationship
Kennedy on the “Greek Question”, arguing that cutting off military aid was “the one single US action that would bring the colonels to their knees”. Kennedy “agreed with me immediately,” according to Papandreou, declaring his readiness to declare publicly his intention, should he become president, for an immediate cessation of aid. “You think this will do it?” Kennedy asked. “It would be sufficient,” Papandreou replied. “We will do the rest.”

Papandreou professed feeling “quite elated” after the meeting. In reality, a number of hurdles would need to be cleared before Kennedy would be in a position to carry through on his pledge. He would first have to win his bid for the Democratic Party nomination, then beat his rival Republican candidate in the general elections, and finally, as president, overcome stiff resistance from within the Executive Branch itself to halting military aid.

Leaving Washington, Papandreou continued his whirlwind tour of North America. A stay in New York was highlighted by a fundraising dinner at the Biltmore Hotel, where Schlesinger, Melina Mercouri, and actress Irene Papas joined Papandreou at the head table. He then traveled with Margaret to Minneapolis, Chicago, and various cities in California to see political supporters, old university colleagues and relatives (their eldest son, George, had been sent to Margaret’s parents, who lived near Chicago, to attend school). In California, they spent time with Stanley and Betty Sheinbaum before moving on to Toronto for a mass rally on April 7, where some 7000 Greek immigrants responded exuberantly to his speech at the University of Toronto’s Varsity Arena. The Toronto event confirmed Papandreou’s continuing popularity with a core following. Toronto’s 60,000-strong Greek community included large numbers of youth from the most recent exodus of working people who had left Greece to seek employment abroad. By condition and outlook, this younger generation of Greeks was a natural audience for the modernizing agenda that had fueled Papandreou’s rise during his brief pre-coup tenure in Greek politics. Under the new conditions imposed by the dictatorship, they exemplified a potential asset that Papandreou would tap by creating local Friends of PAK organizations in centers of the Greek diaspora, particularly in Canada and West Germany.

Wrapping up his North American tour, Papandreou returned to New York amidst a cascade of events in American politics. On March 31, President

with Greece is going to continue to be strained unless the country returns to democratic processes, and I, for one, would be opposed to giving any military aid or assistance to Greece until it’s made quite clear that the people themselves are going to determine their future, not a military junta.” CBS Town Hall meeting, May 15, 1967 (accessible online: http://reagan2020.us/speeches/reagan_kennedy_debate.asp).

Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, p. 338.
Johnson had stunned the nation by announcing his decision not to seek the Democratic Party’s nomination for president, thus boosting Robert Kennedy’s prospects, while leaving Vice President Humphrey – politically compromised by his identification with the president’s war policies – as the candidate of the Party establishment. Then, on April 4, civil rights leader Martin Luther King was assassinated in New Orleans, unleashing a wave of riots in black ghettos across the country. A week later, Papandreou gave a talk on the Greek dictatorship at Columbia University, just as militant New Left anti-war protests, eventually suppressed violently by the police, were beginning to get underway. Political turmoil followed Papandreou to Paris, where he was witness to the watershed May Events that reshaped French political culture, even as the majority of the voting public turned more conservative. 36

Then disaster struck. On June 5, Robert Kennedy was cut down by an assassin’s bullet after delivering a speech celebrating his victory in California’s critical Democratic primary. The assassination was a devastating blow to (possibly illusory) hopes, not just among anti-junta Greeks, but among progressives throughout the West that a second Kennedy Presidency could bring about a fundamental change in America’s conception of its global role, beginning with a negotiated withdrawal from Vietnam.

The NATO Front

News of Kennedy’s assassination arrived in Paris as the Papandreous were packing for a move to Sweden, where Andreas had accepted a one-year teaching position at the University of Stockholm. Papandreou had harbored doubts that a change at the White House would be enough to reverse America’s stance towards the junta. Kennedy’s assassination turned those doubts into certainties. 37 Hope was however still alive on another front. As the CIA observed in its secret April 1968 National Intelligence Estimate, “The coup has severely complicated Greece’s relationship with most of its NATO

36 In a comic aside, the Papandreous’ 12-year-old son, Nikos, somehow decided to go to a masquerade party he had been invited to dressed as a hippie. Taking to the street with a beard pasted to his chin to go the party, he was promptly arrested by the police. Once the police realized his age, two gendarmes accompanied him to his home, to ensure his safety.

37 Criticism of American backing for the junta would remain on the agenda of liberals in Congress, serving as a rallying point for efforts to bring the presidency’s autocratic exercise of foreign affairs – and wars – under congressional control, and also helping to keep the “Greek Question” alive through congressional debates and public hearings. Over the following few years, however, attempts to rein in America’s “imperial presidency” would meet with only limited success.
Papandreou’s exile diplomacy thus shifted its focus to turning the Greek dictatorship’s problems within NATO into a problem for the United States. Papandreou would repeatedly visit Denmark and Norway to lobby them, against American wishes, to act within NATO against the junta. With the junta facing a wall of domestic opposition from the leadership of Greece’s outlawed political parties, the focus was on isolating the junta internationally as well by cutting off military aid from Greece’s Western allies. Paced by the schedule of ministerial-level gatherings, the strategy required patience and persistence. For the next two years, Papandreou’s exile diplomacy would be devoted to “Operation NATO”, as he musingly called it.

Mobilizing diplomatic pressures on the USA through NATO was not Papandreou’s only priority. Of equal weight and urgency was resistance within Greece. Settling into Sweden in June 1968, Andreas and family spent the summer at a remote island-farm belonging to a young, rising figure in Sweden’s Social Democratic Party, Pierre Schori (later Swedish foreign minister and UN representative). Andreas regularly plunged into the island’s icy waters for “therapeutic and invigorating” swims, Schori remembered. Seclusion gave Andreas and Margaret the opportunity to begin writing their books on the tumult of their recent experiences in Greece.39

At the same time, resistance planning was also on the agenda. In July, the Papandreous had visitors. George Lianis, a young Purdue University aeronautics engineer, arrived with his wife Dora from the United States.40 During Lianis’ stay, three resistance groups sent representatives from Greece to see Andreas, including one consisting “almost exclusively of decommissioned army-air force officers who belonged to the liberal camp,” as Lianis reported after returning to Purdue.41 One thing was settled, Lianis wrote. "PAK under

38 NIE number 29.1-68, “Greece”, submitted by Richard Helms, CIA Director, LBJ Library.
40 A member of the EAM youth organization, EPON, during the Occupation, Lianis had left Greece in 1953, after the right became entrenched in power, to pursue an academic career abroad. The rise of the Center Union drew his attention back to Greece. Enthused by what he was reading of Andreas’ reformist politics, Lianis wrote him a letter. After a long delay, Papandreou responded in August 1964 with a letter inviting Lianis to participate in an international conference Andreas was organizing to help the Center Union government make plans for a new university in Patras. Taking his 1965-1966 sabbatical in “Greece, Lianis joined the “Fabian” Papanastasiou Society and soon became part of the Papandreou circle. A member of Margaret’s covert support network to free Andreas from prison, he had become a trusted lieutenant in Papandreou’s efforts to organize PAK in the United States.
41 Speedletter from Lianis to Sheinbaum, July 29, 1968, Stanley K. Sheinbaum Collection, Davidson Library, University of California at Santa Barbara.
the leadership of Andreas will include in its program resistance activities.”
[Lianis’ emphasis] With financial and technical aid from PAK, these resistance representatives from Greece agreed to mount “hit-and-run” operations. Such acts were not expected to overthrow the junta. Instead, they aimed at boosting Greek morale, “which has declined dangerous especially after the assassination of Robert Kennedy”, but also at destroying the impression abroad that the Greek people had accepted the junta. Not leaving resistance planning to mere talk, Papandreou and Lianis also used Schori’s farm to test “experimental gadgets” for detonating explosive devices by remote control.42

A number of considerations fed Andreas’ interest in active resistance, but prominent among them was its importance to “Operation NATO”. In order for Norway and Denmark actually to confront the United States in NATO over the Greek dictatorship, they needed “palpable proof”, as a PAK strategy paper would later put it, “that the Greek people are ready to engage in active resistance”.43 If the campaign to isolate the junta internationally were to succeed, resistance within Greece was also necessary, but the resistance planning in Sweden yielded only meager results. “Sporadic resistance has begun in Greece,” Margaret informed Sheinbaum in August, while cautioning that, “it has a long struggle ahead.”44 Writing to Lianis in early September, Andreas wrote cryptically that, “We are submerged in truly interesting work of the sort you were occupied with when you were here,” though he added, “there have been many arrests in Greece and, of necessity, we must wait.”45

Meanwhile, Papandreou’s relationship with Greece’s communist left got off on a positive footing as developments within the KKE mirrored the broader mood of reform that was gaining momentum within Europe’s communist parties. That new mood was manifested dramatically in Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring, a political and economic liberalization movement initiated in April by the new first secretary of the country’s communist party, Alexander Dubček. A revival of democratic aspirations in the Soviet camp, Dubček’s “socialism with a human face” was akin to the New Left’s quest for “participatory democracy” in the West. Moreover, the Prague Spring

42 Ibid. Independently, Schori told a similar story.
45 Letter of September 6, 1968, author archive.
Fig. 3. "The Pentagon will change its tactics only when the cost of maintaining its control on the political life of Greece becomes higher than the benefits that derive from it."

From the "Strategy Statement of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement",

Source: Author archive.
Andreas Papandreou’s Exile Politics

paralleled discontent with Moscow-line orthodoxy within several communist parties in Western Europe, including Greece’s KKE.

Following the February 1968 meeting of the KKE Central Committee in Bucharest, long-smoldering tensions erupted into a split between the party’s East European-based exile leadership, under Secretary-General Kostas Koliyannis, and its Greek-based leaders responsible for the ideological guidance of EDA, the legal front for the KKE. The dissenters formed a new communist party they dubbed the KKE (Interior Bureau). While more independent of direction from Moscow, the new party remained sentimentally attached to the Soviet Union as the fatherland of socialism. Tracking these developments from exile, Papandreou made contact with Antonis Brillakis in Italy. A former EDA deputy, Brillakis was a leading figure in the newly formed KKE (Interior) and, in exile, was the representative for the Patriotic Anti-Dictatorial Front (PAM), a resistance organization created by Mikis Theodorakis. Talks in Italy during July lead to their issuing a joint statement on August 1 announcing that PAM and PAK, putting aside their ideological differences, would collaborate to coordinate resistance activities, both within Greece and abroad. Greeted with disdain by Greece’s bourgeois politicians, the announcement confirmed the suspicions of Andreas’ anti-communist critics, who saw him as a “fellow-traveler” whose flirtations with the left, if successful, would end up leading Greece into the Soviet camp. His ailing father, a veteran anti-communist, also considered the agreement a “major mistake”, effectively continuing their disagreements after the 1965 July events over collaboration with the left. (Likewise, the reverse question – what stance the left should take towards the center – was among the internal KKE conflicts that produced the 1968 party split.)

A week later, Papandreou explained his rationale for the move in a confidential letter to Lianis. “In Italy,” he wrote from Sweden, “we concluded an agreement with the Patriotic Front (PAM).” While PAM had no interest in entering PAK, it had “become clear”, he averred, “that continuation of the lack of cooperation in the overall resistance effort would have adverse effects”.

46 “Συμφωνία Πατριωτικού Μετώπου–ΠΑΚ για τον συντονισμό της δράσης των αντι- στασιακών δυνάμεων” [Agreement between PAM and PAK for the coordination of resistance activities], August 1, 1968, Antonis Brillakis archive, Contemporary Social History Archives, ASKI, Athens.

Moreover, he added, "PAM is led by a democratically minded type of left and I thought it useful to give it a boost. Then again," he added, "unless the Greeks overcome their hysterical fear over communism, they will never be free."48

**Impact of the Warsaw Pact Invasion**

Two weeks after Papandreou wrote those words, anti-communist fears in the West revived when Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia to halt what Moscow regarded to be its threatening slide towards capitalism. Dubček called on his people not to resist, resulting in a relatively easy, but by no means bloodless, occupation. Over the next months, a “normalization” process, undoing the reforms of the Prague Spring, would proceed apace, bringing the country back in line. Meanwhile in the West, the invasion alarmed America’s European allies, heavily dependent on US military forces for their defense, rallying them around NATO.

Papandreou bemoaned the consequences of this abrupt revival of Cold-War tensions for the anti-junta struggle. "At the moment the situation in Greece looks pretty black," he wrote to Sheinbaum on September 20. “The invasion of Czechoslovakia has squeezed out any possibility of a political solution. Just a few days ago, the State Department announced it was resuming all military aid to Greece, and I think they have decided to back the junta all the way."49 In fact, Papandreou was mistaken in believing the US had officially announced the resumption of all military aid to Greece. Instead, the US had gotten its NATO partners to agree to a “one-time” resumption of heavy weapons deliveries to Greece frozen in the aftermath of the April coup.50 Official US resumption of military aid (and the unqualified American backing of the dictatorship it would signify) remained an open issue. Still, Papandreou was correct about the broader political impact of the Soviet move on East–West relations. Reanimating Cold-War fears, Communist Bloc intervention bolstered the argument that the Greek dictatorship was regrettable, but also necessary for the protection of American national security interests against the Soviets – and implicitly against politicians like Andreas Papandreou, whose politics before the April coup were seen as an emergent threat to those security interests.51

48 Letter to Lianis, August 8, 1968, author archive.
The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia drove Papandreou to a new perspective on the Cold War and in particular on the diplomatic movement towards détente (or, in Soviet parlance, “peaceful coexistence”) that had gotten seriously underway after the superpowers stepped back from the brink of nuclear war at the climax of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Prior to the April coup, Papandreou saw the relaxation of East–West tensions under détente as a positive development, affording Greece the opportunity to hew a foreign policy more independent of US dictates, particularly in relation to Cyprus. In fact, the thaw in the Cold War had helped create the conditions for liberalization movements to take life in both Greece and Czechoslovakia.

However, the American-backed Greek coup and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia – each taking place without serious reprisals from the opposing camp – cast a different light on the rules governing “peaceful coexistence”. Those events inserted a restrictive corollary into the formula for détente, allowing for bloc-specific police actions, with each superpower permitting its rival to halt undesirable developments in countries belonging to its bloc. The invasion of Czechoslovakia thus crystallized for Papandreou a perspective on the “Greek problem” that interpreted it as a function of superpower dynamics on the European front of the Cold War.

In December 1968, Papandreou had the opportunity to elaborate his new perspective at the level of policy analysis during a conference of American and European thinkers he attended at Princeton University in December. Papandreou’s participation was part of another month-long tour of North America, where he gave a number of lectures on Greece to university audiences in the American Midwest. The Canadian leg of the tour was organized by Nikos Skoulas, whom Papandreou had recently designated as the country’s PAK representative. A successful manager in the business world and a fiercely democratic Cretan, Skoulas had worked out a busy schedule for Papandreou in Montreal, Toronto, and Ottawa that connected him with both Canadian politicians and Greek diaspora communities.

Held a month after Republican Richard Nixon’s victory in the US presidential elections, the Princeton conference was entitled “The United States, its Problems, Impact and Image in the World.” With participants

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52 Sponsored by the International Association for Cultural Freedom, the successor organization to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which was embroiled in controversy over revelations that it had been receiving covert CIA funding. Cf. Frances Stonor Saunders’ excellent study Who Paid the Piper?: CIA and the Cultural Cold War, London: Granta, 1999. The revealing book also covers more broadly the issue of CIA support for liberal anti-communism during the Cold War.
from some twenty countries, the four-day event showcased the heated debates roiling Western intellectual circles over the American “arrogance of power” exemplified by the Vietnam War, as well as racial turmoil on the domestic front. The conference’s European co-chair was Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, a French liberal whose best-selling book, *The American Challenge*, advocated a reformed Europe united to compete economically with the United States. (In 1970, Servan-Schreiber would secure Mikis Theodorakis’ exile from imprisonment in Greece.)

The conference put Papandreou in the company of old friends and colleagues, many of whom were Kennedy-era intellectuals who had been part of his peer group when he departed to pursue his modernizing venture in Greece in 1963. At a panel discussion on US relations to Europe, Papandreou articulated his new perspective on the Cold War, a perspective congenial to the New Left critique that had put many American liberal intellectuals on the defensive. His views stood in sharp contrast to those of Stanley Hoffmann, a young Harvard international relations professor who proposed that the US adopt a policy of “selective disengagement” from Western Europe on the grounds that US over-commitment was fostering dependency. As if to confirm that concern, a West German political science professor rose to protest that a “continued strong presence of the United States in Europe” was essential to the continent’s security, irrespective of its political costs.

Papandreou spoke against both positions. Predictably, he criticized the German professor for advocating a policy of unquestioning German deference to American interests. More interesting was his criticism of Hoffman, who, after all, was proposing a relaxation of America’s postwar hegemony. Andreas’ problem was not with the substance of Hoffmann’s proposal, but with its realism. Was it historically possible, he wondered, for the US to disengage selectively from Europe? Behind his skepticism was the question of how US foreign policy is determined. “For me this is fundamental. Policy requires a power propellant. Who are the people who make foreign policy in the United States? Is it the American citizenry? Congress? The President? I doubt it.”

These colleagues included the conference’s American co-chair Carl Kaysen (at whose home Andreas stayed), the organization’s new president, Shepard Stone (the former Ford Foundation official who had shepherded funding for Papandreou’s Center of Economic Research), as well as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and John Kenneth Galbraith. Also dropping by to rub shoulders with the assembled luminaries was a Papandreou acquaintance from Harvard University circles, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s choice for National Security Adviser.

This quotation and the following ones from Papandreou’s speech at the Princeton conference are from François Duchene (ed.), *The Endless Crisis: America in the Seventies*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970, pp. 236-237 passim.
In this, Papandreou was not breaking new ground. In his talk at the ADA event nine months earlier, he had already expressed the view that foreign policy decision-making was controlled by a “military-intelligence complex”, insulated from popular control. He now deepened that analysis and took it in a more radical direction.

Papandreou cautioned,

We should look carefully at the new alliance between the military, the intelligence services and the large economic interests, which is particularly evident in United States policy toward Latin America. It constitutes the social base of a new type of imperialism. Soviet bureaucratic socialism is not much different within its sphere of influence. The progressive forces released during the postwar period constitute a threat, real or imagined, to the interests of both superpowers, which have trampled upon them. Neutralist tendencies on both side of the Iron Curtain have turned into bloc-oriented behavior.

He then turned to the case of Greece:

In 1947-48 the US stepped into Britain’s shoes in Greece by openly intervening there to “safeguard” Greek democracy, while the coalition regimes in Eastern Europe were converted into militant communist regimes with close ties to Moscow. The emergence of the NATO pact was countered by the emergence of the Warsaw Pact. In 1967, when Greece was on its way to becoming a democratic, progressive and sovereign country within NATO, the colonels associated with the CIA established a military dictatorship. A similar process of democratization and assertion of national sovereignty was underway in Czechoslovakia when the Warsaw Pact powers occupied the country.

Papandreou then introduced a distinction that signified his movement toward New Left neo-Marxism:

There are differences...in two respects between US and Soviet supremacy. One is that the Soviet Union lacks the techno-economic expansionism of the US military-industrial complex – the complex dynamic which, while propelling the world to new technological frontiers, is creating a new managerial élite beyond the reach of traditional levers of political authority over the bureaucracies. The other is that the Atlantic Alliance includes powerful advanced nations which are not dominated by the US in the same sense as the Latin-American republics. The pattern here is one of rapidly growing economic domination hand in hand with political infiltration and control.

Asserting that this pattern was “the reason for European concern over Greece”, Papandreou warned that “the US employed methods there that
it had so far not employed on the European continent. Greece, since the military takeover, has become a US satellite in the same sense that Bulgaria is a Russian satellite.” After dramatizing the threats to freedom and national sovereignty posed by the Cold War, he appealed for a European politics that would counter those threats:

While there is time, the democratic progressive forces on the European Continent should join hands to face the new gathering storm. They must work for a free, united and peaceful Europe in which each nation is respected as an equal partner and each citizen respected by the state as an inviolable individual. When a united Europe emerges and masters its technological, economic and political potential, it be will able to define its relationship with both the US and the Soviet Union in a way which may well contribute to peace, progress and democracy in the world.

Papandreou’s analysis of the Cold War’s threat to Europe laid the basis for his appeals to political allies in Norway, Denmark, and Italy to raise the Greek issue within NATO. Those appeals had resonance in Western Europe, despite the “new impulse toward united action in NATO” generated by the “Czechoslovak crisis”, as a CIA intelligence report would put it.55 The enormous readership gained by Servan-Schreiber’s book on The American Challenge (it would be translated into 15 languages) demonstrated that West European publics were growing increasingly concerned about American domination. Europe’s desire to transcend postwar divisions, along with alienation from US policies in South-East Asia, had produced growing disaffection over relations with the transatlantic superpower, providing Papandreou’s arguments with an

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55 Cf., for instance, the CIA Intelligence Memorandum entitled “Current Problems in NATO” in James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, Vol. XLI, Washington, DC, 2000, document 1, Washington, January 21, 1969. According to the CIA analysts, “the Czechoslovak crisis generated a new impulse toward united action in NATO – symbolized by expanded consultation and the postponement of troop reductions. It has not, however, altered the European NATO members’ basic view that the danger of an all-out Soviet assault remains low. The allies therefore find themselves in a state of heightened activity and momentum that will be difficult to sustain so long as no new long-range goal or purpose is found. The chances for a meaningful NATO role in the continuing search for détente have been blighted by Moscow’s determination to maintain its grip in Eastern Europe. Thus the coming months are likely to see a growing paradox, in which the alliance actually works better while dissatisfaction about it increases. Meanwhile, the growing rivalries among the European members – for influence in Europe and in Washington – make it difficult for them to organize effectively for the larger collective role they believe they should play in the alliance.”
audience. Indicatively, the year 1969 would officially inaugurate West German Ostpolitik, under the country’s new prime minister, Social Democrat Willy Brandt. Papandreou’s initial search for a “third road” beyond the rival Cold-War blocs had led him, in the first instance, not to the Third World, but to Europe itself.

**Nixon in Power**

Papandreou’s “Operation NATO” got underway in the context of a new administration in Washington. On January 20, 1969, Republican Richard Nixon was sworn in as the President of the United States. Opponents of the junta greeted the new administration with consternation, their dismay personified in the figure of Nixon crony Tom Pappas. Already under the Democrats, Pappas had played a nefarious role in bringing down the 1964-1965 Center Union government. In the spring of 1966, he managed to secure a meeting with President Johnson in the Oval Office to lobby in support of the “apostate” Stephanopoulos government. Following the April coup, Pappas had assumed the role of unofficial middleman between the junta and the Democratic Johnson Administration. His well-documented role in securing a $549,000 contribution from the junta for Nixon’s 1968 Republican presidential campaign (and later in providing “hush funds” for Nixon’s 1972 Watergate burglars) gave him clout in influencing Washington policies on behalf of the junta, as well as his own Greek investments.56

Yet while Pappas was an unalloyed friend of the junta, he by no means managed the new administration’s relations with the dictatorship. Thanks to humiliating policy failure in Vietnam, Nixon took office amidst widespread skepticism and uncertainty around America’s global role and direction. Greece was only one of a welter of politically divisive issues facing Nixon and his tough-minded national security adviser, Henry Kissinger.57 The Greek issue required adroit management on a number of fronts. In Congress, an articulate cohort of liberal lawmakers had adopted the termination of military

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56 His activities are widely documented. For an interesting report from the period, cf. “The Greek for Go-Between”, *Time* (14 February 1969).

57 In his first three months as president, Nixon, at the behest of Kissinger, ordered 56 NSSMs (National Security Study Memorandums), essentially policy reviews on major issues facing the US around the globe. These included NSSM 52 on “Military Aid Policy for Greece”, issued by Nixon on April 26, 1969. Sent to the secretaries of state and defense and the CIA Director, the NSSM asked the recipients to “include an assessment of the present political situation in Greece as it affects US interests”; Miller, Selvage and Van Hook (eds), *Foreign Relations*, Vol. XXIX, document 246, April 26, 1969.
aid to the junta as one of the issues in their campaign to rein in the “Imperial Presidency”. Overseas, the European Commission on Human Rights was investigating charges that the junta was using torture against political detainees, the beginnings of a process that would culminate in December 1969 with Greece’s withdrawal (once it realized that expulsion was certain) from the Council of Europe. Moreover, Norway and Denmark, soon to be joined by Italy, were coming under pressure from their own voters to take a stand against the junta within NATO.

As an intellectually sophisticated policy analyst, Papandreou was skeptical that these pockets of dissent could become powerful enough to overturn Pentagon support for the regime. Yet as a political man, Papandreou was under the pragmatic imperative to exhaust any still-open margins for action that circumstances afforded. Terminating military aid, while not enough to overthrow the regime, would have been no small matter. Sending a powerful message that the US was abandoning support for the regime, it would have been a severe psychological and political blow to the junta, likely triggering actions in Greece and in Europe to further isolate the regime.

Over the next two years, Papandreou carried on the fight within North America and Western Europe in a virtual marathon of public appearances and in camera meetings with politicians, while continuing, on a covert basis, to organize for resistance within Greece. To be sure, he was not alone in lobbying on this issue, although no other Greek émigré invested as much energy and resources in the effort; nor was any Greek politician better positioned or willing to exercise their influence with NATO countries (Karamanlis having chosen a different strategy for ousting the junta focused on appeals to the Greek officer corps). Propaganda and lobbying in exile met with some success. Indicatively, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs made the following observations on European attitudes toward “possible resumption” of military aid ahead of a critical May 1970 NATO ministerial meeting:

> Feeling concerning Greece in Western Europe runs deep and hot in most Western European countries except Spain and Portugal. Sentiments hostile to the present Greek Government spread over the entire spectrum of political opinion in the Western Europe democratic countries; it is particularly intense among Social Democrats, intellectuals and young people. None in high public positions in these countries

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58. To be sure, cutting off military aid was, from a military standpoint, of little significance. As the State Department informed Nixon on October 7, 1969, grant military aid had actually shown a “significant increase over the pre-coup levels”; Miller and Van Hook (eds), Foreign Relations, Vol. XLI, Draft Memorandum for the President, document 257, October 7, 1969.
can risk supporting the regime publicly, and many increasingly feel constrained by public pressures to openly oppose it.\textsuperscript{39}

“Operation NATO” fell short of its objectives. However, it did create enough political obstacles to force the Administration to postpone implementing President Nixon’s July 1969 decision to resume military aid to the junta until September 22, 1970, keeping that decision a secret, not only from the public, but from NATO defense and foreign ministers.

\textit{Epilogue}

Following the official resumption of military aid, the Nixon Administration pursued an increasingly cozy relationship with the junta, ultimately sending Papandreou in the direction of Third World revolutionary politics. In the words of James Edward Miller, an adjunct professor at the US Foreign Service Institute and one of Papandreou’s most virulent critics,

\begin{quote}
The Nixon Administration’s unwavering backing for the junta […] would provide a convincing validation of Andreas Papandreou’s version of history, reinforce his claim to power, and ultimately open the way for precisely the sort of political solution to Greece’s problems that Americans of all political persuasions had feared: a Greek government pursuing an anti-NATO agenda while cozying up to the Soviet bloc and radical regimes in the Third World.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

While Miller’s understanding of the actual content of Papandreou’s politics is questionable, it is notable that, in a backhanded way, Miller’s critique of Nixon’s policies validates Papandreou’s path towards political radicalism. Asked in March 1971 by \textit{The Harvard Crimson} what sort of government he envisioned for Greece, Papandreou acknowledged the distance he had traveled:

\begin{quote}
It was said long ago by the Sulzbergers and others that if allowed, I would take Greece out of NATO, and I would throw the king out, that I was a socialist. Well, at the time, I was not. I was a progressive gentleman, but not in that sense. At this point, I’m quite prepared to do all those nasty things.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

\textit{Political analyst and historian, Ph.D. in Political Science, York University, Canada}

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\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid.}, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies), document 276, April 22, 1970.

\textsuperscript{40} Miller, \textit{The United States and the Making of Modern Greece}, pp. 155-156.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{The Harvard Crimson} (29 March 1971).
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