Blockchain, consensus, and cryptography in electronic voting

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.12681/homvir.20289
Keywords:
cryptographic voting blockchain electronic voting trust consensus
Panagiotis Grontas
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7584-0643
Aris Pagourtzis
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6220-3722
Abstract

Motivated by the recent trends to conduct electronic elections using blockchain technologies, we review the vast literature on cryptographic voting and assess the status of the field. We analyze the security requirements for voting systems and describe the major ideas behind the most influential cryptographic protocols for electronic voting. We focus on the great importance of consensus in the elimination of trusted third parties. Finally, we examine whether recent blockchain innovations can satisfy the strict requirements set for the security of electronic voting.

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