


# Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης

Τόμ. 43 (2015)



## Διόρθωση τ.42

Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης

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## Βιβλιογραφική αναφορά:

Πολιτικής Επιστήμης Ε. Ε. (2017). Διόρθωση τ.42. *Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης*, 43, 179–180. ανακτήθηκε από <https://ejournals.epublishing.ekt.gr/index.php/hpsa/article/view/14415>

## ΔΙΟΡΘΩΣΗ τ. 42

George Tsebelis, «The Greek Constitution From A Political Science Point of View», *Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης*, τχ. 42 Ιούλιος 2014, σ. 145-172.

The author apologizes for the previous Figure 4 in the article. It is replaced by the appropriate figure. The replacement does not affect the essence of the argument.

Replace :

“Statistical analysis enables us to “control for” additional variables, that is, if we consider other variables that may affect both “locking” and frequency of amendments, we can take their impact out of the relationship and reexamine the graph. The expectation would, as before, is a negative slope; countries that have locked their constitution (controlling for any variable) should have fewer amendments (controlling for the same variable).

Figure 4, presents the same relationship of locking and frequency of amendments, controlling for the length (logged) of the corresponding constitution<sup>1</sup>. The relationship is even more pronounced and in the wrong direction. This is the second and more important puzzle we will try to explain.”

By:

“If we introduce length as an additional variable, the correct way of thinking is to consider amendment frequency and constitutional rigidity together, because amendment procedures are engaged **despite** the fact that the constitution is “locked.” One might expect that the sum of amendment frequency and constitutional rigidity is more or less the same

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1. We log (use the logarithm instead of the natural number) because the effect of length is not constant over time: the first 1000 words of a constitution are more significant than the tenth.

for different constitutional lengths, since one compensates for the other. Yet, Figure 4 shows a different picture, one of a very strong and significant positive relationship between length and the combination of constitutional rigidity and amendment frequency. “

FIGURE 4.  
*Constitutional rigidity and. number of amendment events  
in OECD vs. log constitutional length*

