


## Επιστήμη και Κοινωνία: Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής και Ηθικής Θεωρίας

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### Back to Black: Values, Ideology and the Black Box of Political Radicalization

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BACK TO BLACK:  
VALUES, IDEOLOGY AND THE BLACK BOX  
OF POLITICAL RADICALIZATION

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This article focuses on the psychological drivers of anomic and violent behaviors described as ‘new radicalisms’ in the context of the Eurozone economic crisis. The authors make a conceptual and empirical distinction between the desire for change forward against the old (defined as radicalism) and the desire for change backward against the new (defined as reactionism). Using 2015 data from Greece, multinomial logit models test the role of core values that map on the desire for change against the new and the desire for change against the old as predictors of dormant and actualized anomic and violent behaviors. The findings support that desire for conservation triggered reactionist political engagement in Greece that spans across the left/right ideology spectrum.

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## *Introduction*

In this article we examine the psychological drivers of anomic, extreme and violent political preferences and actions occurring in the context of the Eurozone economic crisis. Behaviors described as ‘subterranean politics’ (Kaldor & Selchow 2012) or the ‘new wave of political radicalism’ (Taheri 2015) are widespread across Europe. Opposition against political violence is not as explicit as once was, and ‘radical’ populist political parties have seen their fortunes rise in elections and polls.<sup>1</sup> Grassroots movements such as the ‘indignados’ in Spain and its equivalent, the ‘*aganaktismenoi*’, in Greece were agents of social resistance empowering individuals.<sup>2</sup> As these phenomena express individuals’ desire for political change, they are often labeled ‘radical’ but their psychological nature is rarely explored. Using core personal values as the underlying determinants of political preferences we make a conceptual and empirical distinction between orientations that are *radical*, defined by a clear desire to oppose the old and implement change, and orientations that are *reactionist*, defined by a clear desire to preserve tradition and return to the past.<sup>3</sup>

Our research was motivated by the observation that this combusive potential often called ‘new radicalisms’ is present among

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1. For example, see UKIP in the UK, Marine Le Pen’s National Front party in France, the Dutch Freedom party of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, the nationalist extreme right Golden Dawn and the left-wing radical SYRIZA in Greece, the nationalist Jobbik party in Hungary, the Austrian Freedom party.

2. Specifically in the case of Greece extreme right and extreme left ideological populist elements were present in the ‘*aganaktismenoi*’ movement, and their legacy sparked more violent expressions of political discontent (Simiti 2014).

3. *Reactionism* should not be confused with ‘*réactionnisme*’ or ‘*néo-réactionnisme*’, terms used in early 21st century in France to describe centre-right leaning journalists and intellectuals who expressed conservative ideas on policy, polity, and the culture without endorsing economic neoliberal precepts (Boltanski & Esquerre 2014).

those who occupy the political fringes of the extreme right or left as well as disinterested citizens and those engaging with mainstream politics. As such, it appears to break the moulds of left-right ideological attachments. In addition, it is expressed in various forms and through multiple channels: lawful demonstrations, strikes and protest; active disengagement from democratic processes; abstention from vote; hostility towards international and national institutions, political and socio-economic elites; support of or engagement with anomic, extreme and violent political actions. The above are seen as a direct result of disappointment with how the political system is practiced, combined with objective and perceived financial hardships, deprivation and social injustice, and the negative emotional energy generated by the economic crisis (Chaulia 2014; Schäfer & Streeck 2013).

Our thesis is that this recent wave of orientations and behaviors labeled ‘new radicalisms’ does not fit the traditional definition of right and left radicalisms. The *traditional radical left* follows the anti-liberal but not anti-democratic tradition and rejects the underlying socio-economic structure of modern-day capitalism.<sup>4</sup> The *traditional radical right* averts representative democracy and just like the radical left it does not present itself as anti-democratic, but as bearing true democracy for the natives (Rydgren 2007).<sup>5</sup> These typologies make a dual assumption: that the break with the status quo rests on two distinct ideologies (left vs. right) and different directions for change (forward vs. backward). The radicalisms of the *left* are driven by desire

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4. By identifying economic inequality as the base and source of liberal democracy and capitalist economy, radical left parties and ideologists reject capitalist values and practices with the ultimate purpose of establishing anew an economic and governing system based on collective economic and social rights and extreme redistribution from existing elites (March & Mudde 2005).

5. Radical right rejects pluralism and thus liberal democracy (Minkenberg 2000). Their ideological core is based on sociocultural authoritarianism and nativism (Rydgren 2005). This ideology also rejects division lines within ‘the people’ accepting only those between ‘the people’ and the elites behaving exactly as antiestablishment populism.

for *change against the old*, in this case the existing capitalist system, while radicalisms of the *right* are associated with a desire to *recover and reinstate the past* and move towards a more authoritarian or paternalistic state. A careful look into the ‘new radicalisms’ shows that they sit neither on the left, nor on the right, but rather span across both. In addition, the direction of their desire for change, forward for the left and backward for the right, is assumed and not examined by extant research.

We bracket ideological qualifiers of ‘left’ and ‘right’ and understand the new ‘radicalisms’ on the basis of their desire for change. We employ the original conception of ‘radical’ which pointed to *innovation*. Wolfe (1923) defined radicalism as *the desire for, and the advocacy of, speedy, deep and thoroughgoing innovative reform or revolution*, either touching only certain aspects of social relations and processes, or involving the entire social order.<sup>6</sup> This original conception of radicalism as *desire and advocacy for change against the old, towards the new* is often labeled ‘left radicalism’, distinguishing it from ‘right radicalism’ which seeks change against the old and has right-leaning ideological preferences. What type of change are these ‘new radicalisms’ of the financial crisis advocating? Using core personal values as empirical instruments we examine whether recent ‘radical’ political engagement in the context of the financial crisis points to desire for change against the old, confirming its radical label, or shows desire for change backwards, against the new, which would be consistent with reactionism.

We test this theoretical framework in an environment with increased protest activities including the full spectrum of legal, anomic, extreme and violent political acts: Greece in the height of the financial crisis. Greece experienced intense and often vio-

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6. Craig Calhoun (1987) defines radicalism as a political orientation towards basic or extreme challenges to established order. As a relational term, ‘radicalism’ has been defined also as a view that existing arrangements should be transformed on the basis of foundations, roots, which are either to be rediscovered and re-asserted, or to be transplanted from the ideal to the actual (Barker 2001).

lent political behaviors due to the severe economic hardship and the migration challenges. These behaviors have been observed in both sides of the political spectrum, where individuals and political entities on the left and on the right engaged or silently supported such actions. Understanding their origins as radical or reactionist and their relation to left or right-wing ideology can shed light to how they can be best addressed.

Our key contribution is two-fold: we identify radicalism and reactionism on the basis of distinct sets of core personal values; and we empirically examine the role of values as predictors of support and active engagement in anomic, extreme and violent political acts. We start with a theoretical discussion and conceptual definition of radicalism, reactionism and related concepts, we highlight the role of core values in determining radical and reactionist politics, and lay out our hypotheses about the nature of passive and active political engagement. Our methodology section outlines the data procedures, variable operationalizations, and empirical models we employ to test our hypotheses, drawn from a dedicated survey of political radicalism in Greece during the financial crisis. Our analysis highlights significant differences in the ways radical and reactionist values explain legal, illegal and violent political behaviors and their passive support. We control for the effects of mitigating factors like emotionality, efficacy, institutional trust and basic demographics. In our conclusion we outline the significance of our findings in understanding and predicting political behavior in times of crisis, and the implications for understanding the psychology of engagement with reactionist or radical politics.

### *On radicalism, traditional definitions and a new typology*

To best explain ‘new radicalisms’ in the context of the financial crisis, we take a brief look at the conceptualization of radicalism. It is a recurring political orientation which does not occupy a

particular left or right ideological space. In fact, it could point to both directions; consider for example socialism, anarchism, or bolshevism. These radicalisms, as well as other kinds of radicalism such as anticlericalism (Schmid 2013), denote the desire for urgent change breaking with the old and uprooting towards the new using even violent or illegal means.<sup>7</sup> This stated desire for, and the advocacy of, change towards the new is speedy and deep and engages an individual's beliefs, feelings, and behaviors (Wolfe 1923). Radicalism as a political orientation is therefore tripartite: it requires desire for change against the *status quo*, the direction of change is towards the new against the old and it has complex psychological properties that may or may not lead to action. This definition can help us avoid a common pitfall among empirical studies which assume that left radicalism promotes change forward, against the old, and right radicalism promotes change backward, against the new, or definitions that solely rely on behavioral indicators to identify radicalism. To identify more clearly its conceptual borders it is useful to consider radicalism alongside related social phenomena that can share the desire for change and thoroughness and potentially generate legal, illegal and sometimes violent behaviors, like reactionism, activism, terrorism, extremism, conservatism and fundamentalism.

An orientation that sits conceptually very close to radicalism but has hardly received attention is *reactionism*. It engages in undistinguishable behaviors from radicalism, and it idealizes and advocates change, but it does it in the diametrically opposite direction: reactionism is change in reverse, opposing the new, in contrast with forward-looking radicalism that desires change opposing

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7. Radicalism advocates change which can, but does not have to involve violent actions: there are gradations of expressed violence of radicalism. Veldhuis & Staun (2009) make a distinction between violent radicalism, with emphasis on the active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal, and a broader sense of radicalism with emphasis on the active pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goals.

the old, cutting the roots. In a somewhat militant and nostalgic fashion, reactionists return to some previously existing—but now abandoned—model of social and political order. They strive to go back to the tried and the familiar, rather than seek the deep reforms and speedy changes advocated by the radicals. While the key word for radicalism is innovation, the key word for reactionism is *renovation*. Both radical and reactionist aims would upset the goals and visions of *conservatives* who would prefer things to stay-as-they-are and want no change.

*Activism*, like radicalism and reactionism, is also marked by the desire for change but its direction is not always specified. It signifies engagement with political action that is legal, in contrast to radicalism and reactionism that can involve engagement with illegal or violent political action. Moskalekno & McCauley (2009) argue that radicalism is an extreme form of activism that uses violent and illegal means for change. We argue that the essence of radical and reactionist political action lies in its *desire for swift change* while activism, which is a political style promoting action, does not necessarily desire swift change. The differentiation rests on the element of *change* or uprooting, rather than the nature (legal or illegal or violent) of the intended or actualized behavior.

*Extremism* is also conceptually close since radicalism and reactionism can contain attitudes and behaviors that favor extreme solutions to perceived problems. Kedem, Bilu, & Cohen (1987) borrow a definition of radical behavior from Stein and Urdang (1971) as ‘...one who follows extreme principles. One who advocates fundamental and drastic political reforms or changes by direct and uncompromising methods [...] It denotes that which goes beyond moderation or even to excess in opinion, belief, action, etc’. Schoenberger (1968: 871) conceptualizes extremism as willing to effectuate political changes through techniques of personal and group harassment, slanderous or libelous allegations and put forward or support wild and probably unattainable policy objectives. We place the distinction between these concepts not just on the extremity of behaviors, but also on the clear

desire for swift change (against the old or new). Often extremists do not favor change forward or backward, and radicalisms and reactionisms can involve other means than extreme political action. The borders of the concepts are fuzzy and might overlap particularly when the actions are extreme and the desire for swift change is the driver of behavior. Yet, they can be clearly demarcated to the extent that extremism is by definition anti-democratic as it prefers (a) force/violence over persuasion; (b) uniformity over diversity; (c) collective goals over individual freedoms and (d) giving orders over seeking dialogue (Schmid 2013: 54).

*Terrorism* and radicalism are often talked about as if they are the same phenomenon, since terrorism is a form of action which adopts the use of illegal force, threat, and unexpected and shocking violence to promote political motives by intimidating or coercing governments or civilians (Loza 2007). McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) looked at the mechanisms of political radicalization that are related to terrorism. They conceptualize terrorism as an extreme form of radicalization that emerges from the intergroup dynamics of conflict. While we agree with the above, we find it useful to separate conceptually the two. Radical is an act or *intention that looks forward for swift change*, and does not necessarily aim to intimidate by the use of force and violence.

*Fundamentalism*, often associated with religious movements, shares with radicalism the desire for change, and is similar to reactionism in terms of the direction of its desire to return back to a previous ideal. But fundamentalism holds particular characteristics that are not shared by radicalism or reactionism. It indicates attachment to irreducible ‘fundamental’ and pure beliefs, is marked by a literalist interpretation of its principles similar to *Dogmatism*, and adopts strong in-group out-group distinctions. In addition, fundamentalism is not associated with particular action preferences, and can remain an ideological exercise (Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992; Nagata 2001).

To recap, radicalism is *a complex system of sentiments, mental attitudes and behaviors that denote a swift and urgent desire for change against the old*. Its sister term, reactionism is more

appropriate for labeling desire for change backward, against the new. This definition of radicalism and reactionism free them from delineated ideological attachments, which compromise the understanding of recent expressions of radical political preferences and actions. Political radicalism, despite having been studied extensively, does not hold a uniform conceptualization, and reactionism has been largely neglected as a concept. In addition, although radicalism as an orientation involves change-promoting values, attitudes, emotions, preferences and organized political action, its empirical measurement is often restricted to behavioral indicators of illegal and violent, and sometimes legal political actions.

We argue that to understand the essence of radical and reactionist political engagement, we need to focus a) on the core values that drive the desire for urgent change against the old or against the new, and b) adopt a two-step approach that distinguishes intended from actualized behavior. Such empirical measures of radical political engagement will have construct validity and not rely merely on behavioral indicators. Our *two-step approach* distinguishes between *passive support* that remains dormant (i.e. accepting radical or reactionist behavior but not engaging in it) and *actualized behavior*. In this way, we acknowledge the breadth and spread of these phenomena, and avoid inaccurate empirical conclusions.

### *Desire for change: looking forward or looking back*

Values are instrumental for the understanding of the underlying causal structure of radicalism and reactionism. They are enduring beliefs, connected to desirable goals and modes of conduct, which serve as standards and guide behavior and action (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992; Glynn et al. 2004). Values exist in clusters, can be prioritized, and although they can change slowly over time, they provide the stable basis for behaviours, attitudes, political preferences and ideology, transcending particular situations

(Feldman 1988; Goren, Schoen, Reifler, Scotto & Chittick 2016; Kinder & Sanders 1996; Miller & Shanks 1996; Zaller 1992; Peffley & Hurwitz 1985; Schwartz 1992, 1996).

According to Schwartz (1994), a small number of *core personal values* (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security) span across the dimensions of openness versus conservatism and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement.<sup>8</sup> These categories are abstract and fundamental, and serve as guiding principles in individuals' lives, from decision-making to attitudinal responses (Goren et al. 2016; Chrona & Capelos 2016).<sup>9</sup> A number of studies focus also on *political values* reflecting normative beliefs or ideals about political matters that serve to consolidate attitudes and determine behaviour in the political sphere. Such overarching political values are related to freedom and civil liberties, egalitarianism and equality, ethnocentrism, limited government, economic security, law and order and moral traditionalism (Goren 2005; Hurwitz & Peffley 1987; McCann 1997; Schwartz et al. 2010; McClosky & Zaller 1984; Huddy, Feldman, Taber & Lahav 2005). Analyses of political values in political psychology, public opinion and electoral behavior provide sound explanations of citizen's individual preferences for particular policies like government spending (Jacoby 2006), abortion (Alvarez & Brehm 1995), campaign finance reform (Grant & Rudolf 2003), social welfare (Feldman & Zaller 1992) but also broader societal trends regarding political culture (Inglehart 1997; Abramson & Inglehart 1995), political attitudes towards liberty (Davis 2007), or the welfare state (McClosky & Zaller 1984).

Core personal values and political values are related – the core personal values provide internal constraint and are expressed

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8. The Schwartz 'core' values are similar to the Rokeach 'terminal' vis-à-vis 'instrumental' values. Terminal values are non-reducible normative stipulations guiding personalities and the organizational principles of any given society. Instrumental values are means for the realization of the terminal ones.

9. This theory has been tested across 70 countries and using a variety of instruments, and results support this categorization (Bilsky et al. 2011).

via political values which in turn influence political choices (Feldman 1988). While political values are limited in the political sphere, core personal values operate in all domains of life, for example consumer decisions, sports, music and vocational interests, to name a few (Ciuk & Jacoby 2015). For the average citizens, for whom political values are not salient determinants of how they perceive and act on the political world, core personal values are relevant predictors of their political intentions and behaviors. Here, we are interested in conceptualizing the core value structure that promotes radical versus reactionist political orientations, and examine how they are manifested in specific political preferences and behaviors.

In western democracies radicalism has been presented as conceptually related to freedom and change, and as the ideological opposite of conservatism which supports the status quo and opposes change (Hirsh et al. 2010). Because radical politics show a desire for the new, we expect radicalism to draw on values that highlight preference for new experiences, independence and novelty. The Schwartz (1994) value dimensions of self-direction, adventurousness, and stimulation, identified by items that measure being interested in new ideas, taking risks and being adventurous are a close conceptual fit. Reactionism and its desire to return to the way things were, is best represented with value preferences that preserve tradition and conserve the old family and religious norms.

In the case of Greece, we expect specific value patterns to arise out of the context of the financial crisis. People in economic hardship attribute higher importance to the attainment of wealth (Inglehart 1991; Schwarz 1994). We therefore expect materialist values to be salient. In addition, extreme conditions of economic deprivation increase the force of 'deficit needs' (Maslow 1959). In times of crisis citizens find themselves under significant amounts of stress, experience high levels of insecurity, and show a 'need for rigid, predictable rules' in their search for stability (Inglehart 1990: 177). In situations where people lose a long-term feeling of security, they lose the psychological base

that allows them to accept deviation from familiar patterns. They return to feeling anxiety about their basic existential needs and activate their survival mode. Safety and danger avoidance, conformity, materialism, become significant considerations of individuals and societies in crisis. Along these lines, we expect that the recent wave of approval or active engagement in legal, illegal and violent behaviors will be accompanied by values that favor conversation and a preference for the familiar (reactionism) rather than values that promote new experiences (radicalism).

Two points are important here. First, we see values as key indicators of radical and reactionist orientations. Extreme or violent behaviors, often used as measures of radicalism, can surely be an expression of radical or reactionist politics, but they can also be an expression of neither. In the absence of value orientations, we are left with violence and extremism of the non-radical, non-reactionist kind.<sup>10</sup> Second, we do not preclude that radical politics cannot be inspired in the context of economic hardship. The inertia of traditional risk-averse politics is powerful but so can be the desire for change against the old. However, as we will show, during the Greek financial crisis, radical politics were not the dominant explanation of behaviors that were at first instance deemed to be perceived and labeled as radical. Instead, legal, illegal and violent behaviors were mostly driven by traditional preferences and return to conformist ideals, which point to reactionist orientations.

### *Methodology*

We test our hypothesis about the reactionist nature of political behaviors in Greece using data from a representative survey of Greek population conducted by the University of Macedonia,

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10. To be sure, political violence is not restricted to extremism or non-state and state terrorism; examples of non extremist and non terrorist political violence is tyrannicide, torture, partisan warfare, sabotage, ethnic cleansing, etc., some of which are justified by international law (Schmid 2013: 13-14).

designed to measure and understand radical political engagement and behavior. The Project ‘Designing & Operating an Infrastructure for the Empirical Inquiry of Political & Social Radicalism in Greece’ was funded by the EU Commission and the Greek Ministry of Education (Konstantinidis et al. 2015). Fieldwork took place in January 14-17, 2015. The survey had 758 respondents and a total of 69 questions. Among these, 10 items measured core personal values, and 19 assessed intention or active engagement in illegal or violent political action often associated with radical politics, and legal non-violent action associated with ordinary political participation. The items measuring engagement with illegal and violent behavior distinguish this specialized survey from other more general public opinion surveys (e.g. The European Social Survey) and provide us with the opportunity to get closer to the combusive character of radical and reactionist politics.

Core personal values were measured by ten short verbal portraits of people pointing to specific values and asking how similar these portraits were to each participant: importance of having new ideas and be creative in own way (creativity), being rich and having expensive possessions (materialism), being successful and recognized by others (achievement), respecting rules and avoiding to act in ways others consider wrong (conformity), respect tradition, family and religion (tradition), living in a safe environment and avoid danger (security), enjoying life and having a good time (hedonism), caring for others and looking out for their best interest (benevolence), being adventurous and taking risks (stimulation), and caring for nature and the environment (universalism).

Factor analysis identified three qualitatively different value clusters. The first pointed to *desire for conservation*, the second pointed to *desire for new experiences*, and the third pointed to *individual well-being considerations* (Table 1). Desire for conservation explains 22% of the variance and focuses on values such as respect for tradition, conformity and desire for security. Individual well-being explains 16% of the variance tapping on power,

achievement, and hedonism. About 13% of the variance is explained by the desire for new experiences which contains stimulation, self-direction, benevolence and universalism.


Table 1: Results of the Principal Component Analysis

	<i>Eigen values</i>	<i>Variance explained</i>
Desire for conservation	2.148	21.5%
Individual well-being	1.609	16.1%
Desire for new experiences	1.269	12.7%

Note: Data from Konstantinides et al. (2015)

The political behavior measures range from risky *illegal but physically non-violent actions*, like participating in illegal demonstrations, occupying buildings, obstructing public transportation or public works, objecting to pay ticket for public transport, demonstrating while concealing own identity, writing on walls, *aganaktismenoi* (indiganti), to *illegal violent actions* such as destroying private property, attacking a political actor, burning the national flag, destroying religious symbols, taking law and order into one's own hands, carrying dangerous items in demonstrations with intent to hurt others, and also *mainstream legal actions* (membership of political party or non-party organization, participating in demonstrations regarding workers' rights, social, national or religious issues). Each item is measured on a 5-point Likert with 0 'would never engage', to 5 for 'have engaged/would engage'. Figure 1 below provides a graphical presentation on the legal/illegal and violent/non-violent action indicators.

Figure 1: Political Action Items



We first test the assumption of traditional radicalism models that desire for conservation would be associated with right wing ideological preferences (right radicalism) and desire for new experiences would be associated with left wing ideological preferences (left radicalism). We then test our model of values as predictors of political action (illegal, violent and mainstream legal), making a distinction between passive support that signifies intention, and the actualized behavior indicators. We control for ideology emotions, internal and external political efficacy (Craig, Niemi & Silver 1990), trust towards institutions and citizens, political orientations, and demographics.

## *Analysis and findings*

The correlation of core values with left-right ideology scores shows that desire for conservation is significantly and negatively correlated with ideological self-placement ( $-.175, p < .05$ ) indicating that high scores of this factor map on the left of the ideological spectrum. Desire for new experiences is significantly positively correlated with ideology (.106) indicating that high scores of this factor are linked with right-wing ideology. Apparently, the traditional assessments of the left as forward looking and the right as traditionalist are not supported here. This gives credit to our argument that we ought to untangle ideology and radical politics if we want to understand both clearly. Keeping the financial crisis environment in mind, we also correlated ideology with considerations of individual well-being. We did not find a statistically significant correlation, meaning that well-being preferences span across the ideological spectrum.

Next, we compared the average scores on desire for conservation and desire for new experiences among three groups of participants: those who opposed specific political actions, (illegal, violent, or mainstream legal), those who supported but had not engaged in them, and those who have engaged in such actions in the past. We also accounted for individual well-being scores to capture the impact of the financial crisis on political developments. Table 2 summarizes the statistically significant differences in mean values scores.<sup>11</sup>

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11. Detailed results available in Table 2b, Appendix B.

Table 2: Summary of Mean Comparisons  
for Average Value Scores between Stages of Support of Action  
(Opposition, Passive support, Action)

ILLEGAL NON-VIOLENT ACTIONS	<i>Desire for conservation</i>	<i>Individual well-being</i>	<i>Desire for new experiences</i>
Illegal Demonstrations (Oppose, n=501)	Higher for Action (n=120) and Passive (n=111)	Higher for Action (n=120)	Lower for Action (n=120)
Occupation of building (Oppose, n=559)	Higher for Action (n=101) and Passive (n=72)	No significant differences	No significant differences
Obstruction of public transportation (Oppose, n=571)	Higher for Action (n=96) and Passive (n=64)	No significant differences	No significant differences
Obstruction of public works (Oppose, n=562)	Higher for Action (n=45) and Passive (n=124)	No significant differences	Lower for Action (n=45)
Refusing to pay ticket - bus, train (Oppose, n=620)	Higher for Action (n=50) and Passive (n=51)	Lower for Action (n=50)	No significant differences
Indignant (Oppose, n=129)	Higher for Action (n=128) and Passive (n=394)	Higher for Action (n=128) and Passive (n=394)	No significant differences
Demonstrate with concealing face (Oppose, n= 642)	Higher for Action (n=5) and Passive (n=25)	No significant differences	No significant differences
Graffiti (Oppose, n=557)	Higher for Action (n=13) and Passive (n=87)	No significant differences	No significant differences

VIOLENT ILLEGAL ACTIONS	<i>Desire for conservation</i>	<i>Individual well-being</i>	<i>Desire for new experiences</i>
Destroy public property (Oppose, n=715)	Higher for Passive (n=3)	Higher for Passive (n=3)	No significant differences
Attack political actor (Oppose, n= 574)	Higher for Passive (n=102)	No significant differences	No significant differences
Flag burning (Oppose, N=701)	Higher for Action (n=3) and Passive (10)	No significant differences	No significant differences
Destroy religious symbols (Oppose, n= 704)	Higher for Action (n=10) and Passive (n=34)	No significant differences	No significant differences
Carry objects to hurt others (Oppose, n= 711)	Higher for Action (n=5) and Passive (6)	No significant differences	No significant differences
LEGAL ACTIONS	<i>Desire for conservation</i>	<i>Individual well-being</i>	<i>Desire for new experiences</i>
Membership political party (Oppose, n= 442)	No significant differences	No significant differences	Lower for Action (n=234)
Political Membership -non-party (Oppose, n= 310)	Higher for Passive (n=190) and Action (n=233)	No significant differences	Lower for Action (n=233)
Demonstration workers' rights (Oppose, n=173)	Higher for Action (n=431)	Higher for Action (n=431)	Lower for Action (n=431)
Demonstration social issues (Oppose, n=212)	Higher for action (n=318)	Lower for Passive (n=203)	Lower for Action (n=318)

Demonstration national and religious issues (Oppose, n=325)	Lower for Action (n=202)	Lower for Passive (n=205)	Higher for Passive (n=205)
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Note: Analysis shows mean comparisons, reported are statistically significant means at  $p < .05$ . Number of respondents (n) per item in parenthesis. Opposition indicates the response ‘I oppose and would not do it’, passive indicates the response ‘I support but have not done it’, and action indicates ‘I have done it’. Data from Konstantinides et al. (2015). Detailed results available in Appendix b, Table 2b.

There are three noteworthy patterns. First, we see significant differences in the scores of desire for conservation more so than the other value clusters. Of the 19 action items, we noticed significant differences on desire for conservation in about 17 items compared to significant differences on individual well-being and desire for new experiences, with 7 items each. Second, differences on levels of desire for conservation are prevalent across the board, and particularly for illegal and violent actions, while differences in the scores on individual well-being and desire for new experiences are significantly different mainly for mainstream legal actions. Third, for illegal actions, the transitional tipping point between opposing them and supporting them is not between non-action and action but between opposition and holding a favorable perspective. Passive supporters and those who have engaged in the acts score similarly on desire for conservation. Also those who passively condone violent acts score higher on desire for conservation than those who have engaged in these actions. Had we not examined passive support indicators we would have missed this combustible potential.

The above confirm that behaviors hastily labeled as radical are associated with stronger desire for conservation, and therefore point to the reactionist nature of political engagement. This interesting twist drives home our main message: to do justice to the complex phenomenon of radicalism, we need to map empirically the direction of the desire for change. Measures of core

personal values, such as desire for conservation or new experiences provide good approximations of citizens' orientations and should be combined with measures of behaviors and intentions to capture the essence of radical or reactionist engagement.

The engagement with non-conventional political means appears to be reactionist. It is stimulated by the desire to restore practices of the past rather than adventurousness and desire for new ideas. We saw earlier that traditional left wing ideological preferences also map on the desire for conservation. Our next challenge is to investigate the drivers of this reactionist potential in a complex model that accounts for ideological attachments, emotionality, political engagement and demographic controls, and identify the important factors that affect the tipping points of engagement with politics of the reactionist kind.

We ran multinomial logit regressions to measure change from opposition (baseline category) to passive support (option-1) or action (option-2) for each of the 19 behavior items. We expect political engagement to be backward looking (reactionist), and desire for conservation to predict active and passive engagement in various types of action. The analyses include desire for conservation and desire for new experiences as explanatory variables, with 'individual well-being' scores as baseline to capture material constraints generated by the financial crisis environment.

In order to provide a parsimonious and valid model of empirical relationships, we add predictors such as ideological orientation on a left/right scale; ideological extremity (folded variable with high values for extreme left or extreme right preferences and low values for moderate preferences); internal and external efficacy; social trust/confidence to political institutions (parliament, police, parties and justice system); emotions (anger and hope, keeping fear as the baseline); and demographics like age, education, and residence status (living in the capital, Athens or living elsewhere). Table 3 provides a summary of the results presented in illegal, violent, and mainstream legal item sets.<sup>12</sup>

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12. Table 3b in Appendix B contains the full results.

Table 3: Summary of multinomial logit results

		<i>Values Type</i>	<i>Emotions</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Confidence</i>	<i>Efficacy</i>
Illegal Demonstrations	Action	Desire of conservation (+)		Left (+)	Police (-)	Internal (+)
	Passive support			Left (+)		Internal (+) External (-)
Occupy Buildings	Action			Left (+)	Parliament (+) Police (-)	
	Passive support				Parliament (+)	
Obstruct public works	Action	Desire of conservation (+)		Left (-)	Police (-)	
	Passive support	Desire of conservation (+)			Police (-)	External (-)
Refuse to pay transport ticket	Action	Desire of conservation (+)			Police (-) Justice (+)	
	Passive support			Left (-)	Police (-)	
Graffiti	Action	Desire of conservation (+)				
	Passive support	Desire of conservation (+)			Police (-)	
Indignadi	Action			Left (-)	Police (-)	External (-)
	Passive support					External (-)

		<i>Values Type</i>	<i>Emotions</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Confidence</i>	<i>Efficacy</i>
Obstruct Traffic for political reasons	Action	Desire of conservation (+)	Anger (+)	Left (-)	Police (-)	Internal (+) External (+)
	Passive support				Parliament (+)	
Attack Political Actor	Action				Police (-)	
	Passive support	Desire of conservation (+)			Justice (-)	
Destroy religious symbols	Action					
	Passive support					
Self-apply law order	Action	Desire of conservation (+)				
	Passive support	Desire of conservation (+)				
Carry objects to hurt others	Action	Desire of conservation (+)				
	Passive support				Police (-)	
Political party member	Action		Anger (+)	Left (+)	Parliament (+) Police (-)	External (+)
	Passive support		Hope (-)		Justice (-)	
Member of non-party organization	Action	Desire of conservation (+)	Hope (-)		Parliament (+) Police (-)	Internal (+)
	Passive support					

		<i>Values Type</i>	<i>Emotions</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Confidence</i>	<i>Efficacy</i>
Demonstration workers' rights	Action			Left (+)	Police (-)	
	Passive support				Political Parties (+)	
Demonstration social issues	Action	Desire of conservation (+) Desire for new experiences (-)		Left (-)	Police (-)	
	Passive support			Left (-)	Police (-) Justice (+)	
Demonstration national and religious issues	Action		Anger (+)	Right (+)		External (-)
	Passive support					

Note: Data from Konstantinides et al. (2015). Detailed results available in Appendix B, Table 3b.

As we expected, desire for conservation is overwhelmingly relevant when predicting action and passive support, for six illegal, three violent, and two mainstream legal engagement items. Higher scores in this value system which promotes respect for tradition and security explain action in nine items and passive support in five items. Desire for new experiences has limited explanatory power (significant only for one item).

Looking first at illegal actions and moving from non-engagement to action, desire for conservation is significant for participation in illegal demonstrations, obstruction of traffic for political reasons, obstruction of public works, refusing to pay

transport tickets, drawing of graffiti. Similarly, moving from non-engagement to passive support, the desire for conservation is significant for occupying buildings, obstructing public works, and drawing graffiti. Again, desire for new experiences is not a significant factor in any of the analyses. These results provide empirical evidence that engaging in a number of political ‘radical’ actions in Greece during the financial crisis is reactionist. Ideology is a significant predictor for all illegal actions, and consistently in the negative, showing higher probability of action or dormant support, for left-leaning individuals. Ideology predicts transitions from opposition to action for illegal demonstrations, occupying buildings, obstructing traffic and public works, participating in the *indignandi* mobilizations; it also predicts transition from opposition to passive support of illegal demonstrations, refusing to pay transport tickets, and graffiti.

Ideological extremity, often associated with engagement in radical acts is only relevant for moving from opposing to obstructing traffic, painting graffiti, and passively supporting *the indignandi*. Social trust is relevant only for moving from opposing to obstructing public works, while lack of confidence in the police has a booster effect for all illegal actions, particularly moving from opposing to action. Internal political efficacy increases the likelihood of participating in illegal demonstrations and traffic obstruction and passive support of building occupations. The effect of external political efficacy is more varied. It positively influences the probability of participation in traffic obstruction but has a negative influence for the probability to participate in or show passive support for illegal demonstrations, obstructing traffic and public works, and participating in *the indignandi* movement. We also find interesting age differentiations. Younger individuals are more likely to participate in building occupations, actively or passively refuse to pay their transport tickets, do or support graffiti, take part or passively support *the indignandi*, while old age serves as a stimulant of participating in illegal demonstrations. Anger increases the probability of obstructing traffic for political reasons, being male is significant in doing graffiti,

and education does not have a significant independent effect on illegal non-violent actions.

Turning to violent activities, our findings again confirm our expectation of the reactionist nature of engagement. We start with the caution that positive responses here are few. This is not surprising given the violent character of the acts. When participants reported passive support or action, desire for conservation is a significant predictor. The probability of self-applying law and order, and carrying objects to hurt others increases with desire for conservation. We also find that passive support for attacking a political actor and self-applying law and order increase with desire for conservation. Ideology significantly increases the probability of carrying objects to hurt others, with a positive effect pointing to right-wing attachments. In addition, being ideologically extreme influences the passive willingness to destroy religious symbols. Lack of confidence in the police increases the probability of attacking a political actor and being willing to carry objects to hurt others, while lack of confidence in the justice system has a significant effect on being willing to attack political actors. Male and younger people are more likely to attack politicians, while younger people are more likely to carry or approve of carrying objects to hurt others. Neither desire for new experiences, nor emotions had a significant independent influence (beyond other variables in the models) in the probability of engaging in or passively supporting violent activities.

Finally we examine the determinants of legal political actions, not usually identified as radical. We check which values motivate mainstream engagement and behaviors, and find that desire for conservation is not as dominant. It explains membership in non-party organizations and engagement in demonstration on social issues (also explained by low scores in desire for new experiences). Ideology is significant but not in a consistent direction. Left-leaning individuals are more likely to be members of political parties and engage in demonstrations on workers' rights and social issues. Right-leaning ideology increases the likelihood of participating in demonstrations on national and religious

issues. Confidence in institutions also has variable effects. For membership in parties and non-party organizations, confidence in the parliament has a positive influence but confidence in the police has a negative influence. Negative police confidence also predicts demonstrating on workers' rights and social issues, as well as passive support of demonstrations regarding social issues. Confidence in political parties has a positive effect on participation and passive support of demonstrations on workers' rights, while confidence in justice negatively influences passive support for membership in political parties. Emotions play some limited role in predicting legal political action, with hope negatively affecting the probability to be member in non-party organizations, and anger increasing participation in demonstrations about national and religious issues. Internal political efficacy increases membership in non-party organizations, while external political efficacy increases party membership and decreases active participation in demonstrations about national and religious issues. Being ideologically extreme increases the probability of party membership, but decreases the probability of participating or wanting to participate in demonstrations on social and national or religious issues. Being a woman decreases the probability of being a member of a political party, while being older positively influences all legal engagement activities. Education has a positive influence for almost all types of legal actions.

### *Conclusion*

In this article we make a conceptual distinction between radicalism and reactionism and an operational distinction between traditional behavioural indicators of these concepts and the more complex value/tendency/behaviour combination we employ for their measurement. We start from the premise that radicalism and reactionism are conceptual neighbours, but differ in the direction of desired change. Whereas radicalism looks forward and seeks change against the old towards the new, reactionism looks

backwards and seeks change against the new, towards the old. Our aim was to untangle radicalism from its left-right characterizations which actually conflate desire for change either forward or backward, with political ideological preferences. In our analysis, we examined anomic and violent behaviours in Greece, as well as legal actions, and used as predictors values that signify preferences for conservation or new experiences. We found that actions that fit under the umbrella of ‘new radicalisms’ were triggered by the desire for conservation while being predicted by left-wing ideology.

Our findings on the pivotal role of the desire for conservation in carving citizens’ reactions can be understood in the context of how modernity and tradition have been interrelated in Greek political culture. Historians, political sociologists and political analysts have noted Greece’s ‘in-betweenness’ among the West and the East. Greek culture is described as a transitory one, with a sort of ‘cultural dualism’ permeating the entire social fabric. Two distinct cultural forces are described as being at war since the foundation of the modern Greek state: an introverted ‘underdog culture’ adhering to the ‘tradition’ of the Byzantine and Ottoman past, and an extrovert culture that ‘draws its intellectual origins from the Enlightenment’ and expresses the secular demands for modernization (Diamandouros, 1994; Mouzelis 1986). Against the above, Demertzis (1997) argues that the ‘transition’ thesis is by definition obsolete and that the ‘cultural dualism’ claim is too schematic to grasp the multifaceted cultural reality of the country. To this end, he introduced the concept of ‘inverted syncretism’ designated to thematize the articulation rather than the separation of tradition and modernity in Greece. In comparative political analysis ‘syncretism’ is an acculturation process where the patterns of one culture are domesticated to the schemes of another without losing their original function.<sup>13</sup>

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13. There is family resemblance between inverted syncretism and Clifford Geertz’s idea of the interplay between ‘essentialism’ and ‘epochalism’ in the Third-World nation-building (Geertz 1973). The entrance to political

In the modernization process of countries like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea syncretism occurred because modernizing patterns were assimilated to the traditional ones retaining their original function. In Greece, Demertzis argues, an almost inverted process takes place: retaining a formal status, modernizing patterns lose their original function while traditional ones remain intact or even become rejuvenated.

As a long term political cultural trait, inverted syncretism makes for the linguistic substitution of radicalism with reactionism in current political discourse in Greece under crisis. Certainly, inverted syncretism does not explain everything in Greek politics but it is a strong *long-dureè* factor that molds much of institutional settings and political behavior of elites and mass public alike. Under crisis conditions, the values it underpins appear conducive to styles of political action that promote the restoration of or the sticking to the ‘politics as usual’ that maps directly onto reactionist political engagement. This hypothesis invites further exploration with qualitative methodologies and quantitative replication with additional and/or alternative datasets.

Our contribution extends beyond Greece to the broader study of radicalism. By adding core values to the conceptualization of radicalism and reactionism, we hope to untangle these phenomena

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modernity pushes the new nations into the imperatives of contemporary history and society, as they align with the spirit of the new epoch of development, cosmopolitanism and the like. This is what he calls ‘epochalism’. On the other hand, however, the new nations start their journey into modernization with nationalisms heavily based on indigenous ways of life and traditional norms and values. These offer an essential ground of collective and personal identity, a trend which he calls ‘essentialism’. Faced with socio-economic change the population is submerged ‘into a vast confusion of outlooks’ wherein ‘essentialist and epochalist sentiments are scrambled’ (ibid: 244). The two notions can be deemed functional equivalents of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ or ‘modernization’ and thus the interplay between ‘essentialism’ and ‘epochalism’ resembles the inverted syncretism argument. Yet, what this misses is the mechanics of the interplay; the ‘vast confusion of outlooks’ that spring from this interplay doesn’t say much about its specification, something accomplished principally with the concept of ‘inverted syncretism’.

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from each other as well as other – isms and promote empirical measurement that does justice to their conceptual complexity. By making a distinction between passive support and actualized behavior, we seek to unpack the processes that highlight different types of engagement with reactionism and radicalism, and identify systematic differences in the psychological mechanism of involvement with these politics of the other kind. We found consistent evidence of reactionism in behaviors and dormant political preferences. This means that the switch between supporting conventional and unconventional political actions often lies at the level of intentions. If we only study behaviors and ignore intentions, we will not be able to obtain a valid account of radicalism or reactionism. Passive support and legitimization through consent can be a valuable indicator of dormant radical and reactionary potential.

The lessons from our research have applications beyond the study of radicalism. Core values are an important tool for understanding political engagement and mobilization beyond traditional left-right ideological borders. Values related to desire for conservation can explain engagement with actions that fit the umbrella of ‘new radicalisms’ as well as legal behaviors which fit within the context of ordinary political participation. Unsettled attitudes, emotions, and actions that promote and endorse xenophobia, nationalism, anti-immigration, anti-expert accounts and anti-establishment sentiments are activated across the Western world and find political incorporations in populist radical leaders but also mainstream political parties. In this challenging times, core values will be useful tools for scholars who wish to shed light to the psychological process by which these tensions gain traction. We close with an invitation to use core values as tools to map what brings individuals together in collective expressions of engagement when traditional party or ideological divisions seem to set them apart.

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