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Populism, Ethnic Nationalism and Xenophobia

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POPULISM, ETHNIC NATIONALISM
AND XENOPHOBIA
IN CONTEMPORARY GREECE

In this paper, we study a set of new indices, which are based on the answers of citizens to certain batteries of items included in a CSES module 5 pilot study conducted in Greece after the parliamentary election of September 2015. The first index is used to capture attitudes of citizens towards the political elites and is related to the increasing number of recent publications focusing on the study of populist attitudes. Likewise, the second index is based on items related to a demand for more power to the poor people. Another index developed here is built to measure attitudes towards out-groups. The use of this index is motivated by the increasing power of radical right-wing anti-immigrant parties, especially in Europe and due, to a certain extent, to the recent immigrant crisis. In addition to

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the aforementioned indices, we also identify the characteristics respondents think to be the most important for someone to be considered as a ‘Real Greek’, i.e. we present what are the most important lines that according to Greek citizens separate the in-group from the out-groups. After constructing the indices we use them both as dependent variables to identify the factors facilitating populist, nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes and as independent variables in a multinomial vote choice model to estimate the impact of these attitudes on voting behavior.

Introductory Remarks

On populism

THE STUDY of populist attitudes has contributed some revealing research of the populist phenomenon (Hawkins & Riding 2010, Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde 2012). In addition to populist attitudes, such research has also targeted elitist and pluralist attitudes (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove 2014). Indeed, the relationship between populism and elitism, or rather anti-elitism, seems to be crucial in understanding populism. If populism is defined as a worldview that ‘identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite’ (Hawkins & Riding 2010), then the antagonism between ‘the people’ and the ‘elite’, where the former is perceived as ‘good’, ‘pure’ and/or ‘homogeneous’ and the latter is regarded as ‘corrupt’ and ‘evil’ acquires primal importance (Mudde 2007, Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012).

Yet, a strong association between populism and anti-elitism is also present in conceptualizations of populism that bracket the aforementioned moralistic politico-theological framing of populist anti-elitism. For example, a discourse-oriented approach to populism is premised on establishing whether a given discursive practice under examination is, *first*, articulated around the nodal point ‘the people’ or other non-populist nodal points (nation, class, movement, race, etc.), and, *second*, to what extent the representation of society it offers is a predominantly antagonis-

tic one, dividing the social field between two antagonistic camps: ‘*the people*’ (the underdog, the non-privileged, the ‘many’, and so on), on the one side, and the ‘*elite*’ (the establishment, the power bloc, and so on), on the other. When these two conditions are in place at the same time, it is assumed that it is rather safe to identify a party or a movement as ‘populist’ (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014).

The discourse analysis of populism has highlighted the importance of interrogating in detail what is ‘the people’ and what is the hostile ‘elite’ invoked in a discourse categorised as populist. This is crucial because it can help us distinguish between left-wing and right-wing populism (Stavrakakis et al. 2017, De Cleen & Stavrakakis 2017). In the first case, it could be assumed that the ‘elite’ would include both professional politicians as well as the economically privileged, the establishment, the so-called 1%, who, according to the Occupy movement protesters, enjoy a disproportionate share of wealth. In fact, the emphasis would arguably be placed on the latter. As for the people, they would be, accordingly, framed in a rather ‘inclusionary’ manner that prioritizes economic and class positioning over national belonging. In stark opposition to left-wing populism, right-wing variants would probably target more the political and not the economic elites, unless the latter are identified as the alien and conspiratorial forces of globalization that undermine the national economy. Here, ‘the people’ are also bound to be framed in rather ‘exclusionary’ terms that place outside the body politic foreigners, immigrants, etc. (Gidron & Bonikowski 2014: 5, Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).

On nationhood

Founded in 1830, the Greek state developed from the 1821-7 revolution against the centuries-long Ottoman rule. This revolution was typical of separatist Eastern nationalist movements (Breuilly 1982: 107-111). As in other Balkan and Eastern European countries, the nation-state in Greece, as a post-traditional

mode of domination, is supported more by what has been called cultural nationalism, i.e. an ideological discourse according to which the nation is not so much a political association premised on modernity's civic liberties, but a particularistic, ethno-cultural community of language, religion, tradition, race, habits, with romanticized historical memories (Kohn 1961: 329-330, 457). Within this national-cultural *habitus* immigrants have often become 'otherized' by Greek nationalist discourse (Grigoriadis 2011), and 'foreigners' constitute an imaginary violation of the nation's 'intimate space' (Tzanelli 2006). The question, nevertheless, is the degree to which these processes occur.

Much theoretical work and research grounded on historical sociology and social theory accounts was conducted in Greece during the 1990s stemming from the then revival of the Macedonian Question (Demertzis, Papathanassopoulos & Armenakis 1999) and the nationalist upheavals in the Balkans and elsewhere. What has been missing since then is systematic empirical research on national identity so that grand theoretical blue-sky endeavors are matched with bottom-up evidenced analysis of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments regarding the national *habitus* and national-cultural regulations of intimacy (Herzfeld 2005). For the most part, historical sociological and social psychological research has been focusing on official nationalist discourse where one can easily discern the difference between civic and ethnic nationalism traced in other cases of nationhood as well (Greenfeld 1992). Scrutinizing official narratives and media discourse, i.e. the forensic ideology of Greek nationalism (Φραγκουδάκη & Δραγώνα 1997, Frangoudaki & Dragonas 1997, Milas 1991, Özkirimli & Sofos 2008), scholars overlooked the everyday lived and performed nationhood. They missed, thereafter, the chance to control from below Anthony Smith's argument that every single national identity is not either civic or ethnic/cultural but a special mixture of both orientations (Smith 1991).

Apart from the typical *Eurobarometer* questions on the respondents' European and national identity (*In the near future do you see yourself as Greek only, Greek and European, Euro-*

pean and Greek, European only or Do you ever think of yourself as not only Greek but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?), and cognate ESS questions in rounds 1 (2002), 4 (2008), and 5 (2010), the admittedly few Greek published empirical studies of national identity, in its relation to other collective identities, rarely refer to the general population (e.g. Κασσιμάκη 2004); rather, they focus on special publics such as the youth, primary, and upper secondary school teachers, etc. (Δεμερτζής & Σταυρακάκης 2008, Δραγώνα 2007, Στρατουδάκη 2005, 2014). As far as the Greek youth is concerned research has shown that ethnocentric outlooks stand side by side with radical political-cultural practices and orientations. With regard to school teachers, in a rather ill-supported (as far as sample size is concerned) piece of research, Hara Stratoudaki (2014) purports to argue that Greek national identity is far from equivocal or bipolar; on the contrary, she claims that official discourse about the nation is consistently articulated with diverse political-cultural identities and below-the-line understandings of national history. Although her research results can hardly be generalized, the claim that top-down and bottom-up national identifications are made possible due to a subterranean cultural resemblance or intimacy without which ‘most nationalisms would have a hard time keeping popular support’ (Herzfeld 2005: 29) is certainly plausible. To stress the point further, the issue is not to draw a dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism but to demonstrate the multiple ways in which they become articulated in real time and terms. This is partly accomplished in our study, which includes a battery of items targeted to measure what are the things that are most important for Greek citizens in order to consider someone as being truly Greek.

It should be noted that in this paper we study attributes for someone to be regarded by the respondents as ‘real’ or ‘true’ Greek. It is critical also to note that it is not easy for empirical analysis to differentiate between the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’ image of Greekness. The likelihood is that occasionally they might diverge or coincide. This might be uncoupled by using alternative

or even complimentary scales with respect, among others, to national involvement and varieties of patriotism such as iconoclastic, symbolic, environmental, and capitalist patriotism (Hurwitz & Peffley 1999, Huddy, & Khatib 2007).

In the following sections of this paper, we aim to illuminate questions related to the distinction between right and left-wing populism and their relation to nationalism. Since the concepts of nation and national identity play an important role in right-wing populism, before we move to the indices of right-wing populism, we study the Greek national identity as perceived by Greek citizens. In particular, we study the characteristics that, according to the survey participants, separate Greeks from the outside groups and we build an index of ethnic nationalism. In addition to that, we create two indices related to populism: One index is used to capture negative attitudes towards the political elites. The second is based on items related to a demand for more power to the poor people. The last index is based on items built to measure attitudes towards out-groups.

Data and Methods

In the paper, we use data from the Hellenic (Greek) Voter Study that followed the elections of September 2015 (ELNES 2015b), which is part of the Hellenic National Election Studies (<http://elnes.gr>). It is a mixed-mode survey conducted by the Laboratory of Applied Political Research at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, using the CSES (<http://www.cses.org>) module 5 pilot questionnaire. Most of the items discussed in this paper are thus included in the final version of the CSES module 5 questionnaire.⁴ Based on the performance of the previous CSES modules, we expect that the CSES module 5 questionnaire will be included

4. Minor changes have been applied to the final questionnaire due to the analysis of the data collected by ELNES 2015b and other five pilot studies of Ireland, S. Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan.

in 30-40 national election studies conducted all over the world. We hope that the analysis presented in this paper, can be used as a guideline of how the new CSES items can be used by scholars who are interested in populism, ethnic nationalism, xenophobia and their relationship with voting behavior.

The recruitment of the respondents was done using Random Digit Dialing (RDD). The web was the main data collection mode of the survey and the telephone interview was used as an auxiliary method.² Respondents who lacked Internet access and/or an email account (the respondents were asked to provide their email address in order to participate in a web survey conducted by Aristotle University of Thessaloniki) were then asked to answer the questionnaire via a telephone interview. Their number amounted almost to twenty per cent of the sample. A similar approach had already been used for the Hellenic (Greek) Voter Study after the elections of January 2015 (ELNES 2015a) and has produced a top quality dataset (Andreadis 2015, Andreadis, Kartounidou, & Chatzimallis 2015). The 1068 completed cases were collected from 16 November 2015 to 29 February 2016. The Hellenic (Greek) Voter Study 2015 included a battery of eight items (Q04) targeted to measure the attitudes towards political elites. Some of these items are (either identical to or modified versions of) statements that have been used previously in order to measure populist attitudes of both voters (Akkerman et al. 2014) and elites (Andreadis & Stavrakakis 2017; Stavrakakis, Andreadis, & Katsambekis 2016). Three out-group attitudes items (Q05) have also been included in the questionnaire in order to estimate attitudes towards out-groups. Finally, there is a battery of seven items (Q06) where the respondents are asked to indicate how important is each of them for someone to be considered as ‘real’ Greek. These items are presented in the Appendix as Q04a-Q04h, Q04a-Q05c, and Q06a-Q06g. In the Appendix, there is al-

2. The analysis presented in this paper has been replicated in the two subgroups defined by the mode of data collection (web and telephone); there are no significant differences for the main findings of the paper.

so information about the other variables we use in the analysis presented in this paper.

In order to construct the indices, we apply a series of relevant methods such as Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA) and Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). We use EFA instead of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) because the batteries of items we use have not been tested before and we want to explore the factor structure of each battery. In addition, we use MSA, because our batteries consist of Likert type items and the methods of Factor Analysis (both exploratory and confirmatory) which have been invented for continuous variables, may give more factors when applied on Likert type data. MSA has been proposed as one of the alternatives to EFA in order to get the correct number of factors from Likert type data (Van der Eijk and Rose 2015). After finding the variables belonging to each factor/scale, we create the corresponding index by calculating the average of these variables and we transform so that the index gets values in the interval $[0,1]$.

To study which demographic characteristics affect the development of populist, nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes, we use linear regression models. In each of these models we have as dependent variable one of the four indices we have constructed and as independent variables, a series of demographic characteristics. Finally, to study the effect of these indicators on electoral behavior, we use a multinomial logit regression model.

Construction of Scales, Research Hypotheses and Results

Populist Attitudes Indices

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of variables measuring populist attitudes of voters. In order to check whether the eight variables can be considered as measuring the same feature, we have performed a series of related checks. First, we reversed Q04a

and Q04c and stored them as Q04ar and Q04cr respectively.³ We then calculated Cronbach's alpha coefficient (both the classic version and its version for Likert type data) and we found that the Q04ar and Q04e variables have a very low correlation coefficient with the rest of the variables. The same conclusion results from the application of Mokken Scale Analysis and Factor Analysis: Q04ar and Q04e (as well as Q04cr) do not appear to belong in any of the factors/scales.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for items

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Q04a	1045	3.86	0.90	1	5
Q04b	1055	4.01	0.96	1	5
Q04c	1052	2.08	0.97	1	5
Q04d	1050	3.57	1.18	1	5
Q04e	1039	3.06	1.20	1	5
Q04f	1055	3.32	1.12	1	5
Q04g	1050	3.77	1.02	1	5
Q04h	1047	3.61	1.03	1	5

In Table 2 we present the results of Factor Analysis and Mokken Scale Analysis. The first columns show the factorial loadings for the first two factors that emerged from the application of Factor Analysis. Three variables, Q04b (Most politicians do not care about the people), Q04d (Politicians is the main problem in Greece) and Q04g (Most politicians only care about the interests of the rich and powerful) appear with high factorial loadings on Factor 1. This is a factor of a negative attitude towards politicians. Q04f (People, not politicians, should take the most

3. The first (Q04a: 'In a democracy, it is important to seek a compromise between different views' and the third (Q04c: 'Most politicians are credible') statement have been formulated so as to be opposed to the other statements and indeed these two questions are negatively correlated with the answers to the remaining six questions.

important political decisions) and Q04h (Poor people should have a stronger voice on policy) appear with high factorial loadings in Factor 2. Respondents with high values in these variables believe that greater power must be given to the people.

For the Mokken Scale Analysis, the Automated Item Selection Procedure (AISP) was applied which separated the variables into two scales: The variables that were included in each scale from the Mokken analysis are identical to the variables included in each Factor from the Factor Analysis, that is, two different methods classified the variables in exactly the same way, increasing our confidence in the structure of the two factors/scales. The last two columns of Table 2 show the coefficients H_i of the variables belonging to each scale.

Table 2. Factor analysis and Mokken Scale Analysis

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>	<i>Scale 1</i>	<i>Scale 2</i>
Q04ar	0.029	0.261		
Q04b	0.640	0.127	0.475	
Q04cr	0.350	0.110		
Q04d	0.545	-0.085	0.362	
Q04e	0.251	-0.222		
Q04f	0.212	0.490		0.387
Q04g	0.592	0.354	0.413	
Q04h	0.242	0.426		0.387

For Factor analysis, the principal factor method with rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off) was used. For the Mokken scale analysis, the AISP algorithm was used.

Based on the results of the analyses presented in Table 2, we can create two indices: an index (anti-elite) calculating the average of the three variables belonging to Factor 1 (or Scale 1) and transforming the index to obtain values in the interval $[0,1]$. In a similar way, we can create an index (power to the people) corresponding to Factor 2 (or Scale 2) expressing preferences for

greater political influence of the people, using the two variables belonging to Factor/Scale 2.

Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics of the variables used to assess the attitudes of Greek voters towards out-groups such as minorities and immigrants. The variable Q05b (Migrants help the economy of the country) has been reversed (Q05br) to be in the same direction as the other two variables (i.e. higher values correspond to more negative attitudes).

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the attitudes towards out-groups

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Q05a	1049	3.42	1.07	1.00	5.00
Q05br	1051	3.02	1.06	1.00	5.00
Q05c	1052	2.55	1.16	1.00	5.00

Xenophobia index

In Table 4, we present the results of Factor Analysis and Mokken Scale Analysis for the variables that measure the attitudes towards other groups. All variables belong to the same factor. Thus, we can create an index using the average of the Q05a, Q05br and Q05c variables and transforming the index so that the range of its values is in the interval $[0, 1]$. Q05a. Respondents scoring high on this index are afraid that the Greek way of life and culture may be harmed by immigrants and minorities, and they do not think that immigrants are good for the Greek economy. It seems that these respondents face out-groups with a sense of fear and insecurity. Thus, we argue that this index can be used to measure xenophobia.

Ethnic Nationalism Index

Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics of the seven national identity items. Since value 1 is selected when something is very important and value 4 is selected when something is not impor-

Table 4. Factor analysis and Mokken Scale Analysis for out-group items

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Scale 1</i>
Q05a	0.498	0.381
Q05br	0.565	0.410
Q05c	0.688	0.512

For Factor analysis, the principal factor method was used. For the Mokken scale analysis, the AISP algorithm was used.

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of National Identity items

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Q06a	1050	2.52	1.02	1	4
Q06b	1053	2.06	0.89	1	4
Q06c	1056	1.72	0.82	1	4
Q06d	1050	2.97	1.10	1	4
Q06e	1053	1.39	0.68	1	4
Q06f	1052	1.38	0.69	1	4
Q06g	1052	2.49	1.04	1	4

tant at all, the items that are considered as more important by most of the respondents will have the smallest mean values. The smallest mean values are observed for the variables Q06e (to respect the Greek political institutions and laws) and Q06f (to feel Greek). Their mean values (1.39 and 1.38 respectively) indicate that most of the respondents believe that both of these attributes are very important in order for someone to be considered as truly Greek. Indeed, more than 9 out of 10 respondents think that both of these items are very or fairly important. This means that most of the Greek respondents follow a short of civic nationalism outlook considering the prerequisites for a non-Greek to become Greek. On the other hand, the items that are less im-

portant for most of the respondents are Q06a (to have been born in Greece), Q06d (to be Christian orthodox), and Q06g (to have Greek ancestry).

Table 6 displays the output of the factor analysis and Mokken Scale Analysis on the national identity items. The first columns show the factorial loadings for the first two factors that emerged from the application of Factor Analysis. Two elements, Q06e (Respecting the political institutions and laws of Greece) and Q06f (Feeling Greek) indicate civic nationalism. These are the two things that according to most of the respondents are considered the minimum criteria in order for someone to be truly Greek. Because of the low volatility of responses (since almost everyone considers them important) they do not show high factorial loadings on any of the first two factors. On the other hand, the variables Q06a (Being born in Greece), Q06d (To be Christian Orthodox) and Q06g (Greek origin) appear with high factorial loadings on Factor 1 (ethnic nationalism). Respondents with low values in variables belonging to Factor 1 are less tolerant to deviations from their standards and in order to accept someone else as Greek they are very demanding and they request common religion and common ancestry. Finally, Factor 2 includes the other variables Q06b (to have lived in Greece for most of their life), Q06c (to be able to speak Greek), but also Q06a. According to the Mokken Scale Analysis⁴ the variables in Scale 1 and Scale 2, are the same with the variables in Factors 1 and 2 respectively (except for Q06a, since in Mokken Scale Analysis each variable can belong to only one scale)

Thus, if we want to create an index of ethnic nationalism, we can do this as follows: a) calculate the average of the three variables with high loadings on factor 1, b) transform so that the index takes

4. Mokken Scale Analysis with the usual settings (lower bound = 0.3) proposes a single scale that includes all variables except Q06e and Q06f (probably because Q06a, which belongs to both factors, acts as a link between the other variables). In order to construct two stronger scales, we have set the lower bound = 0.4.

Table 6. Factor analysis of the national identity items

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>	<i>Scale 1</i>	<i>Scale 2</i>
Q06a	0.419	0.505	0.450	
Q06b	0.175	0.652		0.551
Q06c	0.279	0.541		0.551
Q06d	0.615	0.209	0.514	
Q06e	0.162	0.309		
Q06f	0.307	0.119		
Q06g	0.672	0.217	0.532	

For Factor analysis, the principal factor method was used with rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off) was used. For the Mokken scale analysis, the AISP algorithm with lower bound=0.4 was used.

values in the interval $[0, 1]$, and c) invert the index values so that higher values indicate stronger ethnic nationalism attitudes.

Discussion

In the following section, we use the constructed indices as dependent variables to identify demographic characteristics and other factors facilitating populist, nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes. The studies that have used populist attitudes as dependent variables are limited. Elchardus and Spruyt (2016) have found that lower levels of educational attainment and current economic situation (among others) are associated with populist attitudes. Tsatsanis, Teperoglou and Andreadis (2017) argue that ‘individual-level characteristics that tend to place someone in the less dynamic and competitive strata of the Greek society will tend to be associated with populist attitudes’ and they also find that low-levels of education and income are predictors of populist attitudes. As a result, our first task is to verify the association of education and income with our populist attitudes indices (H1). For our index on ethnic nationalism, since one of the three variables

of the scale is the requirement to be Christian Orthodox, we expect that frequent attendance of religious services will be positively related with ethnic nationalism (H2). This relationship would be compatible with other studies that find an association between religious services attendance and ethnic nationalism. (e.g. Inglehart, 2015: 237)

Finally, we use the constructed indices as independent variables in a multinomial vote choice model to estimate the impact of these attitudes on voting behavior. Previous studies have shown a relationship between populist attitudes and vote for populist parties (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove 2014; Elchardus & Spruyt 2016; Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser, & Andreadis 2016). There are two political parties in the Hellenic Parliament that are classified as populist by almost all scholars who have published on populism in Greece (Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli & Andreadis 2016): The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the right-wing Independent Greeks (ANEL). These two parties have formed a government coalition after the September 2015 parliamentary elections in Greece. There are two other parties that have also been occasionally classified as populist: The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the extreme right party Golden Dawn (GD), but their classification as populist is not accepted by everyone. The Hellenic Parliament also include MPs by the right-wing New Democracy (ND), the centre-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the social liberal River (POTAMI) and the Union of Centrists (EK).

For our multinomial logit model, we choose ND as the base category because it constitutes the largest non-populist party and it will be useful to compare the impact of populist attitudes on the probability of voting for a populist party (SYRIZA or ANEL) vs voting for a non-populist party (ND). From this comparison, we expect to find that populist attitudes increase the probability of voting for SYRIZA and ANEL (H3). At the same time, it will be useful to compare the impact of the other two indices (ethnic nationalism and xenophobic attitudes) on the probability of voting for the populist right-wing ANEL vs voting for the mainstream right-wing ND.

Demographic variables affecting the indices

In this section, we look at possible links of the indices we constructed with the personal characteristics of the respondents. In order to do this, we used the following variables as independent variables in predictive models of our indicators: Gender, Education, Union membership, Family Income, Frequency of Religious Services Attendance. A full description of these variables is presented in the Appendix.

In Table 7 five linear regression models are presented. In each of the four first models we have as dependent variable one of the four indices we have constructed and as independent variables a series of demographic features. The first column shows that the anti-elite index is higher for women and lower for trade union members. On the other hand, we find that gender is not an important predictor of the second indicator, which is associated with demands to increase the political influence of the people. It is noteworthy that the influence of trade union membership is in the opposite direction for the two indices linked to populism. Trade union membership is associated with lower anti-elite index values. On the other hand, it is associated with higher values in the popular power index. This finding is compatible with additional results not presented in this paper due to space limitations. As Andreadis, Stavrakakis and Demertzis (2016) show, the anti-elite index is associated with political interest and political efficacy. More specifically, it seems that there is a monotonous function linking higher anti-elite values with lower political interest and lower political efficacy, i.e. people who have been alienated and do not participate in politics should have higher anti-elite values. Thus, although union members have higher values in the ‘more power to the people’ index because this demand is central to their role as union members, considering that union members are very active in politics, they are expected to have lower anti-elite values than people who do not participate in politics. Despite these differences, both populist at-

titudes indices are lower among people with higher levels of education and income (verifying our H1 hypothesis.)

The third column of Table 7 shows that older respondents, with lower levels of education and household income, and respondents who attend religious services more frequently, are expected to have higher values in the ethnic nationalism index, i.e. these groups are more likely to consider common religion and common ancestry as prerequisites in order to accept someone else as a 'true' Greek. As a result, our H2 hypothesis is verified. The fourth column shows that respondents with higher levels of education and family income as well as trade union members are expected to have lower values in the xenophobia index. On the other hand, older respondents and those more frequently attending religious services are likely to have higher xenophobia index values.

Table 7. Linear regression models

	<i>Anti-elite</i>	<i>Power to the people</i>	<i>Ethnic nationalism</i>	<i>Xenophobia</i>	
Age	0.000	0.000	0.002 ***	0.002 ***	0.001 **
Gender(f)	0.040 ***	-0.003	-0.016	-0.016	-0.011
Education	-0.018 ***	-0.023 ***	-0.018 ***	-0.017 ***	-0.011 ***
Union membership	-0.048 **	0.072 ***	-0.006	-0.063 ***	-0.060 ***
Household income	-0.017 ***	-0.027 ***	-0.022 ***	-0.014**	-0.006
Religious Services Attendance	0.005	-0.005	0.071 ***	0.043 ***	0.016 ***
Ethnic Nationalism					0.368 ***
Constant	0.768 ***	0.845 ***	0.347 ***	0.473 ***	0.348***
N	926	926	926	928	925
R-squared	0.070	0.063	0.192	0.160	0.347

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

As expected, the index of xenophobia is positively correlated with the index of ethnic nationalism ($r = 0.569$) and we can use the index of ethnic nationalism along with demographic variables as independent variables in a model with xenophobia index as the dependent variable. This model is presented in the last column of Table 7. In this case, age, education and frequency of attending religious services (common predictors for both xenophobia and ethnic nationalism) have lower direct impact on xenophobia because a part of their effect is now mediated through ethnic nationalism. In this model, the direct impact of income becomes insignificant, due to the presence of ethnic nationalism as a predictor variable of xenophobia.

Relations of indicators with electoral behavior

Table 8 shows the relationship between the four indices with voting behavior during the Greek parliamentary elections held in September 2015. The stronger anti-elite attitudes can be found in four groups of respondents: voters of GD, voters of ANEL, voters of smaller, other parties and non-voters. A medium anti-elite index can be found in the groups of SYRIZA, KKE and Union of Centrists voters. Finally, the voters of PASOK/DIMAR, ND and POTAMI have the lower mean values on the anti-elite index. The latter group also has the smallest popular power values, but if we focus on the largest values of the two indices for populism we will observe a lot of differences as far as voting behavior is concerned. For instance, KKE voters have one of the largest popular power scores while their anti-elite score is medium. On the other hand, people who have decided to abstain have one of the largest anti-elite scores, but a medium popular power score.

The third column of Table 8 shows the relationship between the ethnic nationalism index and September 2015 voting behavior. The stronger anti-out-group attitudes (mean value 0.68) can be found in the group of GD voters. The voters of SYRIZA, KKE, PASOK/DIMAR, and POTAMI have the lowest mean values

indicating they are much less negative towards out-groups and thus, arguably, more open and friendly or tolerant towards out-groups. The fourth column shows the relationship between the index of xenophobia and the September 2015 electoral behavior. The strongest (by far) xenophobic attitudes can be found in the group of GD voters. The voters of SYRIZA, KKE, PASOK/DIMAR and POTAMI have the lowest average values, indicating they are more open and friendly or tolerant to ‘Others’.

Table 8. Mean values of the indices by voting behavior

	<i>Anti-elite</i>		<i>Popular power</i>		<i>Ethnic Nationalism</i>		<i>Xenophobia</i>	
	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>
SYRIZA	0.70	0.20	0.65	0.19	0.39	0.28	0.44	0.20
ND	0.64	0.21	0.53	0.22	0.54	0.27	0.58	0.19
GD	0.75	0.17	0.72	0.18	0.68	0.28	0.79	0.11
PASOK/ DIMAR	0.61	0.22	0.56	0.21	0.40	0.27	0.44	0.21
KKE	0.71	0.17	0.72	0.17	0.37	0.25	0.42	0.19
POTAMI	0.64	0.20	0.46	0.21	0.35	0.24	0.45	0.18
ANEL	0.78	0.16	0.69	0.20	0.57	0.25	0.56	0.21
UN. OF CENTRISTS	0.73	0.18	0.60	0.21	0.53	0.25	0.54	0.13
Other	0.74	0.21	0.79	0.18	0.33	0.31	0.40	0.24
Abstention	0.76	0.18	0.62	0.22	0.47	0.27	0.53	0.22
Missing	0.71	0.19	0.65	0.23	0.46	0.28	0.52	0.21
Total	0.70	0.20	0.62	0.22	0.45	0.28	0.50	0.21

A comparison of the ethnic nationalism and xenophobia mean values between SYRIZA and ANEL voters highlights the large gap that separates these two groups. The mean values of ANEL voters for ethnic nationalism is 0.57 and for xenophobia is 0.56 while for SYRIZA voters the mean values are 0.39 and 0.44, respectively. However, although the voters of the right-wing populist ANEL score much higher than the voters of the left-wing

populist SYRIZA, their mean value is less than the mean of GD voters and, in fact, very similar to the mean values of the voters of the mainstream centre-right ND.

Finally, we present in Table 9 the impact of the indices on electoral behavior using a multiple logit regression model. In this model, apart from the indicators we have constructed, we use as independent variables the demographic characteristics of the voters. The reference category is ‘Vote for ND’ (i.e. the coefficients compare the probability of voting for another party with the probability of voting for ND). A coefficient with a positive sign indicates an increased probability of selecting the party displayed in the column header, while a negative sign indicates an increased probability of ND preference. In this way, we will be able to observe more easily the differences between ND and the other right-wing parties.

In the SYRIZA/ND comparison we observe that women are more likely to opt for SYRIZA than ND, while larger family incomes and more frequent religious services attendance seem to favor ND. All four indicators we have built seem to play an important role in the SYRIZA/ND dipole. Higher values in the two populism indices favor SYRIZA, while higher values in the ethnic nationalism and xenophobia indices increase the probability of ND choice.

In the GD/ND dipole, an important role is played by age and income with young people and lower incomes preferring GD. The anti-elite index does not seem to play a role in this dipole, while preference for more power to the people favors GD. It is remarkable that the index of ethnic nationalism is not important. This is probably because features such as common religion and common ancestry are considered important elements of ‘true’ Greeks by an important part of ND voters as well. On the other hand, the index of xenophobia has a significant impact on this dipole: an increase in its values causes a significant increase in the probability of selecting GD. This means that while ND and GD voters do not exhibit huge differences in the ethnic nationalism index, they differ significantly in how they treat the ‘others’, with

Table 9. Multinomial logit model
(voting behavior with reference category: Vote for ND)

	<i>SYRIZA</i>	<i>GD</i>	<i>PASOK/ DIMAR</i>	<i>KKE</i>	<i>POTAMI</i>
Age	-0.002	-0.102***	0.025**	-0.002	0.000
Gender(f)	0.536 **	-0.917	0.151	0.331	0.448
Education	-0.057	-0.162	-0.034	-0.053	0.205 *
Union membership	0.492	1.483	0.697	1.535 ***	0.419
Household income	-0.300 ***	-0.772**	-0.062	-0.421 **	-0.030
Religious Services	-0.268 ***	-0.112	-0.107	-0.454 ***	-0.342 ***
Anti-elite	1.535 **	-0.509	-0.306	2.123 **	1.634 **
Popular power	2.943 ***	4.899 ***	1.485 *	3.975 ***	-0.857
Ethnic nationalism	-1.042 **	0.356	-0.924	-1.359	-1.292 **
Xenophobia	-3.133 ***	7.375 ***	-2.855 ***	-3.159 ***	-1.654 *
Constant	0.707	-1.723	-0.833	-1.004	-1.037
N	920	920	920	920	920
	<i>ANEL</i>	<i>UN. OF CENTRISTS</i>	<i>OTHER</i>	<i>ABSTAIN</i>	<i>NA</i>
Age	-0.019	-0.014	-0.015	-0.035 ***	-0.018 *
Gender(f)	-0.598	-0.485	-0.308	0.397	0.446 *
Education	0.025	0.173	0.004	0.024	0.058
Union membership	0.897	0.766	0.616	-0.233	0.479
Household income	-0.192	-0.479 **	-0.391 ***	-0.407 ***	-0.212 **
Religious Services	0.039	0.245	-0.212	-0.354 ***	-0.146
Anti-elite	3.281 ***	2.539 **	3.144 ***	3.243 ***	0.977
Popular power	3.257 ***	1.600	5.841 ***	1.821 ***	3.573 ***
Ethnic nationalism	-0.108	-0.417	-1.998 **	-0.629	-1.401 **
Xenophobia	-1.477	-1.815	-3.789 ***	-0.914	-0.566
Constant	-3.314*	-2.715	-1.749	0.105	-1.265
N	920	920	920	920	920

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

ND voters being considerably more receptive and tolerant than GD voters who together with their leaders, have been engaged in violent activities against immigrants (Papathanassopoulos, Giannouli, & Andreadis 2017).

In the dipoles of ND with PASOK/DIMAR and POTAMI there are not many important coefficients. With PASOK/DIMAR the most important factor is the index of xenophobia that favors ND. In the dipole with POTAMI, ND is greatly favored by the frequency of religious services attendance. On the other hand, there is a large number of important coefficients in the ND/KKE dipole, a picture similar to that of the ND/SYRIZA dipole, with one significant difference: union membership, which significantly increases the probability of choosing KKE.

In the ND/ANEL dipole it is remarkable that the indices of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia do not play an important role. The same is true of all the demographic variables we have used in the model. So, the only driver that leads voters to prefer ANEL instead of ND is the higher values of the two populism indices (this finding along with the corresponding finding for the SYRIZA/ND dipole verify H3). Higher values of the two populism indices can also lead to other smaller parties or even to abstention.

Conclusion

Against the background of a slowly emerging consensus between ideational and discursive approaches to populism, this paper has registered the importance of identifying anti-elitist dichotomies of an Us/Them type that prioritize popular interests and demands as defining markers of a populist profile. Within this context, and in order to discriminate between different types of populism, it becomes equally important to interrogate in detail how ‘the people’ is conceptualized and how the hostile ‘elite’ invoked in a discourse categorised as populist is defined.

Our main hypothesis has been that it is possible to empirically distinguish between left-wing and right-wing populism. In

the first case, it could be assumed that the ‘elite’ would include both professional politicians as well as the economically privileged, the establishment. As for the people, they would be, accordingly, framed in a rather ‘inclusionary’ manner that prioritizes economic and class positioning over national belonging. In stark opposition to left-wing populism, right-wing variants would probably target more the political and not the economic elites, employing, at the same time, an exclusionary (ethnic nationalist) understanding of ‘the people’.

In this paper, we have created four indices based on data from the Hellenic National Election Study for the September 2015 Greek Parliamentary Elections (ELNES 2015b). Two of the indices are related to populism – anti-elitism and more power to the people –, one index was based on ethnic nationalism and it was used to measure tolerance towards out-groups and a final xenophobic index was based on items that measure negative attitudes towards out-groups. Initially we presented the demographic characteristics that appear to be related to these indicators. It is remarkable that the educational level plays a role in all four indicators. Raising the educational level may reduce attitudes related to populism and those related to ethnic nationalism and xenophobia.

Our data has revealed significant relationships between our two first indices (anti-elite and popular power) and voting behavior during the Greek Parliamentary elections of September 2015. As it was to be expected, voters of anti-populist parties like PASOK/DIMAR, ND and POTAMI have the lower mean values on the anti-elite index. At the antipodes, people who have decided to abstain have one of the largest anti-elite scores (and a medium popular power score). Strong anti-elite attitudes are also found in voters of the neo-nazi GD and voters of the right-wing populist party ANEL. Left-wing populist SYRIZA, communist KKE and Union of Centrists voters, get a slightly lower score on the anti-elite index.

And how is this people defined? According to a civic or an ethnic nationalism model? Our dataset reveals that, in fact, left-wing populist SYRIZA attracts voters more tolerant and open to

wards non-Greeks who want to enter the political community; similar is the situation with the voters of the communist party and anti-populist centre-left parties. At the other extreme one finds, once more, the neo-nazi Golden Dawn, whose voters espouse the most radical ethnic nationalist attitudes. The right-wing populist ANEL is, interestingly, positioned in-between GD and the first aforementioned group, close to the attitudes of voters of centre-right New Democracy, something that allows us to conclude that right-wing populism indeed seems to be significantly more exclusionary than left-wing populism, although not necessarily outright xenophobic. These results are corroborated by our last index, the xenophobic index.

Even after considering various demographic factors in a multinomial logit model we find our indices to function as they were expected. High values of populist indices lead to voting for populist parties and high values of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia indices lead to voting for conservative parties. Particularly noteworthy is that the indices of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia have no significant influence on the ND/ANEL dipole. As can be seen from the analysis of the data, the only thing that leads voters to prefer ANEL instead of ND is the increased values of the two populism indices. On the contrary, the xenophobia index is an important factor in choosing GD rather than choosing ND (or any of the other parties).

In short, both types of populism (left-wing and right-wing, inclusionary and exclusionary) are associated with demands for popular empowerment; and yet, the way ‘the people’ and its others are understood by voters are very different. Right-wing populism is more anti-elitist and less tolerant towards out-groups. It seems, then that the indices discussed in this paper can offer us crucial tools in discriminating between the two and in dispelling confusion.

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Appendix

The battery Q04 comprised 8 statements and respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement by selecting one of the five options: 1. strongly disagree, 2. disagree, 3. neither agree nor disagree, 4. agree, 5. strongly agree. The statements that have been tested are the following:

Q04a. In a democracy it is important to seek compromise among different viewpoints.

Q04b. Most politicians do not care about the people.

Q04c. Most politicians are trustworthy.

Q04d. Politicians are the main problem in Greece.

Q04e. Having a strong leader in government is good for Greece even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.

Q04f. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.

Q04g. Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.

Q04h. Poor people should have a greater voice in politics.

Q05 Attitudes towards out-groups

Q05a. Minorities should adapt to the Greek way of life,

Q05b. Immigrants are generally good for the Greek economy, and

Q05c. Greek culture is generally harmed by immigrants.

Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement by selecting one of the five options: 1. strongly disagree, 2. disagree, 3. neither agree nor disagree, 4. agree, 5. strongly agree.

Q06 Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Greek. Other says they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is very important, fairly important, not very important, or not important at all?

Q06a: to have been born in Greece

Q06b: to have lived in Greece for most of their life

Q06c: to be able to speak the Greek language

Q06d: to be Christian orthodox

Q06e: to respect the Greek political institutions and laws

Q06f: to feel Greek

Q06g: to have Greek ancestry

D2: Gender (1: male 2: female)

D3: Education: the highest level of education that has been completed by the respondent according to UNESCO's 2011 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 2011). The following codes have been used:

0 NO EDUCATION

1 ISCED LEVEL 0 - EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION

2 ISCED LEVEL 1 - PRIMARY

3 ISCED LEVEL 2 - LOWER SECONDARY

4 ISCED LEVEL 3 - UPPER SECONDARY

5 ISCED LEVEL 4 - POST-SECONDARY NON-TERTIARY

6 ISCED LEVEL 5 - SHORT-CYCLE TERTIARY

7 ISCED LEVEL 6 - BACHELOR OR EQUIVALENT

8 ISCED LEVEL 7 - MASTER OR EQUIVALENT

9 ISCED LEVEL 8 - DOCTORAL OR EQUIVALENT

D5r: Union membership (1. R IS MEMBER OF A UNION, 0. R IS NOT A MEMBER OF A UNION)

D9: HOUSEHOLD INCOME (the annual income for the respondent's household). The following codes have been used:

1 ≤ 10.000€

2 10.001-15.000ú

3 15.001-25.000ú

4 25.001-40.000ú

5 ≥ 40.001ú

D10: RELIGIOUS SERVICES reports the frequency with which the respondent attends religious services. The following codes have been used:

1. NEVER,

2. ONCE A YEAR,

3. TWO TO ELEVEN TIMES A YEAR,

4. ONCE A MONTH,

5. TWO OR MORE TIMES A MONTH,

6. ONCE A WEEK/MORE THAN ONCE A WEEK.