




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Notes Towards an Exilic Co-existence

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Notes Towards an Exilic Co-existence

R. Radhakrishnan

I would like to begin this essay with three riffs on three different scenarios. First, of late I have become the extended 'owner' and custodian of my son's dog. My son has always been an animal lover and till his advent into my life, I had led a life sequestered from animals. Between me and animals, it had always been a case of distant, unrelated, separate coexistence. I have learned a lot from my son and of late, I have had more than my share of taking care of the dog who by the way is just plain gorgeous and adorable. Now we coexist meaningfully under the same roof, very much mutually mediated. I have been thinking a lot, along the lines opened up by Jacques Derrida's essay on the animal that he is, about the meaning, both tacit and explicit, of our co-existence: mine and the dogs.¹ He loves human company perennially and lets you know quite volubly that he is unhappy when he is excluded from human togetherness. Recently, I was exasperated by his persistent barking and whining, and I shouted out to him, 'For God's sake Toofan, know your place,' and having said it, instantly I froze in horror. Had I just said what I had? Had I proven to myself that I was a species Nazi, a species racist? Who or what had spoken via me when I had thundered in putative omniscience, Know your place. Had I meant, separate but equal: had I intended apartheid with a separate canine Bantustan for him? Clearly, he could have barked back, or maybe he did and I did not understand, at me in contrapuntal reciprocity, 'You know your place.' On whose behalf had I produced the absolute and a priori demand that he better know his place as a precondition of his coexistence with me? Did I know my place, or as the human hegemon had I masterfully unmarked myself within this

relationship so as to regulate and normativise my relationship with Toofan, from my human all too human and anthropocentric perspective?²

What kind of knowledge is implied in the imperative 'know your place?' How does living space suddenly become a structured, hierarchical place? Why should the act of knowing turn into a performance of carceral limitation and segregation?³ Ok, he is a dog and I am a human being. So, what? What are the consequences of this stated difference? Should the act of knowing impose absolute limits and non-permeable boundaries between cats and dogs, dogs and humans, humans and other kinds of humans based on race, skin color, caste, gender, class, and so on? Doesn't the injunction carry with it the force of punishment: should you transgress your place, or understand it erroneously; beware, you will be punished. You will be pushed back and locked up within your canine space. There is a complicated connection between knowledge, identity, and placement. When Toofan had insisted on my company as though he were a fellow human being, my response had been: know your place as a dog. Once you know who you are, you will not transgress your proper place and you will not make demands that are incommensurable with your identity. It is on this basis of so-called 'place within a given structure' that a number of vicious questions arise. What does a single mother want? What does a black lesbian want? What does an immigrant want? What does a guest worker want? If your identity is upgraded, for example from transient worker to permanent resident or legitimate citizen, then, the relationship between knowledge and place is renegotiated. What I am pointing towards is the double-faced reality that though, existentially speaking, coexistence is a given, it needs to be validated through the production of a secondary discourse of rights and categories and ironically, it is the selective granting and withholding of rights to select target groups that renders equal co-existence unequal, un-egalitarian, and exclusionary. Categories create divides and perpetuate hierarchy which in turn perpetuates the logic of a given place within a sanctioned structure.

The problem is that the dog has to be addressed as a dog and not as a bear or as a plant or as a human being. Difference has to be acknowledged, named, and honoured but within a double gaze of recognition. The double-ness of the rhetoric of co-existence can be characterised thus: on the one hand, the ontology of coexistence dissolves and de-territorialises the logic, or what we could after Amitav Ghosh, term "the shadow lines" of sovereign or ontic subjectivity, but, in doing this, it also activates the very logic that it seeks to transcend by way of the co-

existential exhortation.⁴ It is a contradictory and double-conscious coexistence, a doubleness that is the singular burden of the human hegemon, whereby the nominal logic of the 'as' has to be instrumentalised and bracketed at the same time. The dog has to be a dog to be eventually realised as a canine point of entry into the indivisibility of cosmic/planetary Being. To know who one is and to know one's place can either harden into a casteist practice of untouchability; or such knowing can be performed porously and openendedly with a critical awareness that one's given location and subject positionality are not ends in themselves but are indeed narratological nodal points and conjunctures within a larger and nameless Becoming.⁵ To avail of Martin Heidegger and the work of William V. Spanos that builds with critical rigour on the legacy of Heidegger, the ontic is both a relational form of difference from the ontological and is at the same time an exemplar of the ontico-ontological continuum.⁶

The other two examples have to do with kings from South Indian mythology each of whom outdoes the other in ontological solicitude and generosity. In the first story, King Paari during his travels through his kingdom perceives a creeper languishing for lack of a supporting surface and ergo, he leaves his chariot behind as the prop for the creeper and walks back home. The other story has a king volunteer his own son as a sacrificial offer to satisfy a cow's demand for justice. The cow comes to the king's court to complain that the prince had recklessly run his chariot over the calf and killed it instantly. These stories have brought tears to my eyes; either that, or I have laughed at the sheer absurdity of the situation, and more specifically, at the wrong-headedness of the king who in his zeal to combat rampant anthropocentrism ends up a prisoner to a pathos that is no less anthropocentric in persuasion. Clearly, the creeper wasn't looking for his chariot; and as for the other case, to adopt an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth mode of justice and exchanging a human life for road-kill is just plain preposterous. A calf's life and a human life are both lives; but they are not automatically fungible within the rationale of life's indivisibility.7 Despite the compelling logic of life's indivisibility, taxonomy, rubrics, and modes of inter and intra-species differentiation do creep in and complicate the issue. Categories of differentiation are both warranted and are in the way of an inclusive and non-hierarchical realisation of the true meaning of coexistence. The problem I am pointing towards is simply this: how does one administer coexistence as normative policy? It is one thing to celebrate, on a phenomenological register, the one-ness of all life and the sacredness of co-existence

across borders and boundaries; but it is something quite different to achieve coexistence normatively, governmentally. In whose name, under what imprimatur, is this to be imagined and actualised? Or, is normativity along with the need for an imprimatur to be cast away as inimical to an undifferentiated solicitude for all of life?

To exist has no meaning except as a form of co-existence. To exist is to coexist. We already coexist before we exist. Individual existences transpire in the field called co-existence. Coexistence is neither the summing up nor the synthesis of existence. Co-existence by very definition cannot take on a proper or exemplary subject, i.e., I coexist, but always with: *Mitsein*, not just *Dasein*.⁸ Jean-Luc Nancy, for example, criticises Heidegger for privileging Dasein (Being there) over Mitsein (Being-with). Nancy's diagnostic recognition of the "monstrous presence of the One"9 leads him to an advocacy of a "being together without assemblage."10 Even as I agree with Nancy for the most part, I would maintain, despite Heidegger's 'error,' that in fact Dasein leads to an effective practice of Mitsein for the simple reason that Dasein is fundamentally and constitutively ek-static. Unlike the centered being of the human, the ek-static orientation of Dasein lends itself to Mitsein. It is precisely because Dasein is not self-contained and auto-telic that it finds in the indeterminacy of the 'there' genuine possibilities for coexistence. The putative opposition of the One and the Many is thus resolved both ontologically and epistemologically. The questions that follow immediately are: as human beings, who do we coexist as, and Whom do we co-exist with? It is immediately obvious that these two questions are intimately braided. If the *as* seems to focus on our autonomy to choose what roles we want to play in and by ourselves, the *with* immediately and normatively brings to our attention that our autonomy to choose is itself heteronomous. For, autonomy cannot mean pulling away from co-existence as the larger and inclusive horizon that accommodates our existence for ourselves. We cannot be rigidly and normatively who we are so as to rule out the potential for common ground with other normativities and socio-political tropisms and tendencies. "Other people should not be hell" to ensure that "we" are in "our" secluded heaven.¹¹ The challenge is this: in identifying ourselves as Hindu or secular or agnostic or feminist, how porous and negotiable are we and how capable are we of coexisting non-hegemonically with others of different persuasions? And, what if there are folks with whom we may not want to coexist: Nazis, Islamaphobes, misogynists, casteists, racists, and this list can be quite interminable?

The more relevant questions would be, will a Hindu co-exist, within the confines of the same community, with a non-Hindu? Will a Zionist Jew be prepared to co-exist in equality with a Palestinian Arab, and under what aegis? How in the first place do we get to be a Hindu or a Christian except by the pure fortuitous accident of birth? What umbrella or what neutral and egalitarian third term would be necessary to effect such a coexistence? Would that term, such as secularity, democracy, or the nation-state and the template of citizenship drop from heaven as an immaculate *a priori*; or would the parties concerned need to work toward the critical-immanent production of such a neutral and inclusive horizon? It would be disingenuous to claim with utter ontological innocence that we exist simply and purely as human beings. It is only by existing as Germans, as Hindus, as Muslims, as secularists, as agnostics, as African-Americans that each of us addresses and invokes the 'ontologically human' differentially and relationally. In other words, the only honourable and trustworthy way to demonstrate the indivisibility of humanity is not to just reiterate the indivisibility as a pious and ahistorical shibboleth; but rather, to acknowledge rigorously the underlying differences that constitute the indivisibility of humanity and achieve a critical transcendence of differences in the name of a differential but profoundly relational humanity. To put it differently, ontological solidarity has to be unpacked and lived coevally as historical difference, namely without any guarantee of a pre-given or primordial harmony. The terms and conditions of coexistence will have to be articulated as guiding principles and values in the realm of a shared but often conflictual and contested history.12

It is all about community and the founding rationale that makes community reasonable, intelligible, and worthy of co-existence. In other words, 'community' has to be produced as a concept, and not just intended as an *ad hoc* description of random and undirected co-habitation that can easily degenerate into the virulent doctrine, for example, of 'separate, but equal,' or be valorised vapidly and meaninglessly without differentiation. We are all aware of the double-edged nature of the word 'community,' whereby 'communitarian' denotes a collectivity rooted in humane/human reason, but 'communal' usually denotes exclusionary parochialism easily susceptible to racism, ethnocentrism, blood and guts nationalism, and xenophobia. Class, nationality, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, are conceptual categories that organise fellow feeling and solidarity. As a result, the broad and generic

identification, 'my fellow human being' gets substituted by the more specific, interested, and ideologically interpellated subjectivations such as 'my fellow proletarian,' 'my fellow American,' 'my fellow LGBT activist,' 'my fellow postmodern feminist,' 'my fellow subaltern insurgent,' 'my fellow transnational entrepreneur,' 'my fellow Hindu fundamentalist,' 'my fellow secular agnostic,' etc. These latter identifications are politically inflected, ideologically fraught and therefore, both enabling and limiting in their ontological and human reach. They are enabling to the extent that they make possible a certain kind of rational and interested solidarity; and limiting in the sense that in enabling one kind of solidarity they rule out a different or an opposing form of solidarity.¹³ These designations are ideological constructs and discursive functions that de-naturalise and de-familiarise the given-ness of the human with the intention of achieving 'the human' not as a *fait* accompli but as the function and end product of political self-reflexivity. They also operate as place-markers that in their seeming formal neutrality invite and precipitate a specific ideological content. A fellow American cannot be a Mexican even though the human in the Mexican definitely qualifies for the privilege of ontological fellowship: my fellow human being, but not fellow American. Where is fellowship most itself: when left blank and nameless, or when it is filled out by a named sovereign belonging? Are communities based on so called 'natural' human affinity more rational, more real, and more valuable than communities that are posited on the ideological coherence of constructed affiliations? When solidarities are in a state of conflict, each entrenched intransigently and non-porously in its own silo or fieldom, how indeed should an overarching ontological solidarity be enlivened so as to make sense of the conflict and at the same time resolve it in the name of a higher, a more worthwhile rationale of inclusion?¹⁴ Is the natural itself not constructed, and are not constructions naturalised by way of ideologies, axioms, and first principles? Are there other modes of envisioning community other than the political?15

To begin to answer this question, I turn to two fictional texts: Tsitsi Dangarembga's *Nervous Conditions* and Amitav Ghosh's *The Shadow Lines*. Most students of postcolonial fiction are familiar with the explosive malevolence of the opening line of *Nervous Conditions*: "I wasn't sorry when my brother died."¹⁶ The female narrator is relieved, even delighted that her brother is no more. Is her profoundly visceral anti-filial, anti-familial feeling un-natural, even monstrous? Isn't

it evil to feel the way she does about one's own brother? But readers of Dangarembga's fiction know that though a brother, the brother was no brother at all, and did not act like a brother. Dangarembga's fiction raises the question, Who is a brother: the one who just happens to be a brother by virtue of the accident of birth, or the stranger, the unrelated one who acts *like* a brother? It is through the performance of similitude, the *like*, that relationships are truly recognised and valorised, and not on the basis of their tautological given-ness or brute facticity. One could be a brother factually and chronologically; and yet not be like a brother in actual performance and understanding. The titular given-ness of brotherhood is no guarantee of its semantic relevance or rectitude. The brother, in this story of African patriarchy, sexism, and misogyny in conjunction with the double-edged sword known as the legacy of Colonialism, is the enemy and oppressor, whose death paves the way for the narrator's education and future. Had the brother lived on, the sister would have had to wallow in the world of abject and uneducated domesticity. The brother and his natural consanguinity is a mere given, an accident of birth that holds no promise for the sister of a meaningful and valuable community. If anything, even if he hadn't actually died, she would have had to break relationship with him for her feminist bildungsroman to evolve. The brother would have to be disowned by way of an antagonistic recognition. He would have been in the way, and would have had to be removed as an obstacle. Family and familial structure are not guarantors of freedom or emancipation.¹⁷

Now, to *The Shadow Lines*, where at the very beginning of the novel, the narrator, by way of declaring his epistemological bias, has this to say about human relationality and possibilities of meaningful community. "The truth is that I did not *want* to think of her as a relative: to have done that would have diminished her and her family-I could not bring myself to believe that their worth in my eyes could be reduced to something as arbitrary and unimportant as a blood relation-ship."¹⁸ The narrator is talking about the importance of his extended family, but deeply apprehensive that he may fall prey to the mystique that a family *qua* family is naturally important and valuable. In many ways, this statement sets up the cosmopolitan, secular, anti-nationalist, anti-essentialist, anti-identitarian register of the novel. The novel refuses to valorise the family as the basic unit either of home or world. If anything, family is perceived as a duplicitous alibi, a form of esoteric reduction and mystification to be wary of. There is on the one hand the indivisibility of all human experience, and on the other there are "the shadow lines" that

divide, compartmentalise, entrench, and embattle experience and perpetuate Us-Them divides.¹⁹ There is, on the one hand, something called experience that seems native and/or natal, natural, and intimate; and on the other, there is knowledge that seems to come from somewhere else.20 "Places where we live" and "places where we think"²¹ refuse to get coordinated seamlessly in response to some mysterious umbilical pull or bind. Autochthony of existence is in dialectical tension with the mobile ubiquity of knowledge; home and world are in a relationship of reciprocal de-familiarisation, just as 'coming' and 'going' function in reversible directionality. To get back to the lines from *The Shadow Lines*: what is a family, what is a community, what is national belonging, what is diasporie or ek-static or exo-topic belonging?²² How does belonging eventuate into knowledge? Which belongings are rational, and which visceral? Is the basis for belonging synonymous or cognate with the basis for knowing and knowledge? Is 'basis' the same as 'need?' Is belonging in and by itself its own form of knowledge? Should knowledge reproduce belonging with fidelity; or is this a non-mimetic and perhaps a mutually alienating relationship based not on loyalty but critique? And crucially, what is a socalled blood relationship relative to other relationships that are not posited on socalled blood?23

To be a relative, is that a big deal: clearly not, to the narrator in Ghosh's fiction. And, why not? Because to be related by birth is just the accident of 'givenness.' No work has gone into this relationship. No one wanted it this way. We do not choose our relatives; they are part of a 'done deal.' The only way to do justice to filiation is to de-naturalise it and reclaim it as a relational affiliation whose value and importance is autonomous of the non-logic of mere birth. The narrator wants to open up a free and mobile space of representation between Ontology and Epistemology, between Being and Knowing so that relationships can have an imaginative and rational basis that is not blindly and filiatively complicit.²⁴ He wants to open up a genuine breathing space between the comfort of solidarity and the oppositional loneliness of critique. He would, as a mature adult, like to tell his relative, 'I find you important and valuable in spite of the fact that you are a relative by birth,' 'I would find you precious and valuable even if you were not related to me,' and also, 'At this point, I am going to break my relationship with you since I find you unacceptable, politically, ethically, ideologically.' What is at stake here is the freedom to choose even if that choice results in moving away, in horror,

disgust, revulsion, and utter antagonism from one's "stubborn attachments" (Butler 60).²⁵ The objective is the achievement of "like minds" and not "like bodies" (Guinier 149) to avail of Lani Guinier's formulation.²⁶ The narrator's emphasis is not on the relationship, but on the basis of community and not relationship, but relationality. The rationale of connectivity or relationality is neither endemic or intrinsic: nor is it already pre-scripted into an existing relationship. The basis or the rationale has to be forever open to negotiation, revision, recantation and reformulation. Relationality has the endless potentiality to refigure and prevent the ossification of community. Relationality can only be in the name of the Open, and not in the name of any enclosure that promises to accommodate the Open.

I want to pay a little extra critical attention to the phrase, "as arbitrary and unimportant as a blood relationship." What relationships are important and why, and what is the connection between importance and arbitrariness? And what precisely is a blood relationship, and what is the ritual significance of the term "blood?" What Ghosh is initiating is nothing short of a radical re-evaluation the value of value. In other words, value is neither intrinsic nor natural; on the contrary, it is only through an act of affiliative alienation that value is produced, and not just repeated. Though it has become customary to invoke Home and World together as though the two were always already in alignment with each other, it is really not clear what the alignment is all about and how it is to be or has been achieved. To put it somewhat provocatively, is it even desirable to think World on the basis of Home?²⁷ The general understanding is that Home is somehow natural, but the World even though natural has to be actualised through an act of production. It would seem that Home and World represent two forms of "givenness," and what is required is an act of mediation or translation between the two.²⁸ If home points towards filial pieties and loyalties, world insists that these pieties and loyalties should earn the right to be generalised beyond the provincial precincts and jurisdictions of home. Perhaps home may have to be re-named, modified radically before it can be made to articulate with the World Formulations that employ "blood," perpetrate a form of genetic essentialism based on the assumption that blood stands for an unchanging nature to be understood and honored as familial. Even though blood is just blood, it gets ideologically misconstrued as Hindu blood, Greek blood, Protestant blood.²⁹ What is after all just a point of entry, i.e., the given-ness of one's origins, is normativised as one's innate and irrefragable nature. Thus, revolts of sons and daughters against their parents are stigmatised as

blasphemy, as un-natural acts. Once a Hindu, always a Hindu. It is not for nothing that Swami Vivekananda famously declared, "I may have been born into a religion, but I don't have to die in it."³⁰

So, what is the mandate of given-ness and what should be owed to givenness? Is given-ness a sort of umbilical nature not to be messed around with? To borrow from Judith Butler's powerful formulation, can "stubborn attachments" (Butler 60) be loathsome, hateful, even productive of shame and horror? Is it possible that home could both be a safe haven as well as a site of injustice that warrants escape? If every document of civilisation is also a document of barbarism,³¹ then by the same token, home too is subject to that same ambivalent logic. In what follows, I will be attempting, with the help of Martin Heidegger and Edward Said, to sketch notes towards an exilic notion of coexistence that calls into question the piety of the formulation of being at home in the world. My argument is that both home and world are cut of the same Manichean fabric, each term deeply complicit with the ideological burden of the other. My contention is that neither can home be de-provincialised and rendered worldly in the name of the all, nor can the abstract and non-denominational generality of the world be domesticated and rendered in the name of home. What is required is a radical deconstruction of both terms in the name of an exilic space that refuses the false solace of both home and world. Can this de- and re-territorialisation of existential space be actualised in the name of an other humanism; or, would this project have to be post-humanist both in form and content? Whereas Martin Heidegger would opt for a total disinvestment from the metaphysics of humanism, Edward Said is hopeful that whatever transformations are necessary can be valorised in the name of humanism.³² It is not coincidental that Said, despite being deeply aware of Heidegger's scathing ontico-ontological critique of humanism, chooses not to allow that theoretical diagnosis come in the way of praxis, of agential action. He prefers not to participate in a *tout court* theoretical break precisely because he wants to hold on to some notion of an onto-political agency, albeit flawed and complicit. It is to Said's everlasting credit that he opts to co-think critique and complicity, co-think praxis and theoretical vulnerability, rather than take easy refuge in the notion of a gestural theoretical break from humanism.³³ Rather than invest his critical energy in issues of essence and or ontico-ontological identity, Said 'chooses' to focus on the human as agency; and of course as readers of Said know, he was never in favor of debunking or debilitating agency in the name of a "post-al" theory that is always

too eager to point out the inescapable nature of complicity. Said's response to this has consistently been: complicity is absolute only when you reify structure as an ahistorical *a priori*.

So, what would exilic coexistence look and feel like? It would, as Mahmoud Darwish's poems demonstrate, look like 'nothing' on earth. It would be ineffable in its incalculability as well as unpredictability. Its answerability would indeed be to a radical "nothing" bereft of all cartography.³⁴ How would such exilic coexistence play itself between humans, between humans and non-humans, animals, between humans and Deep Ecology?³⁵ If sovereign names and loyalties are to be deconstructed or bracketed, in whose or what name should the 'exilic' be practiced and theorised? Isn't it unconscionable to be talking allegorically and concept-metaphorically about exile when in fact exile as a literal historical is in need of immediate redress? Let me turn to Edward Said's memorable essay, "Reflections on Exile" to get at the semantics of the term. "Exile is strangely compelling to think about but terrible to experience. It is the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted. And while it is true that literature and history contain heroic, romantic, glorious, even triumphant episodes in an exile's life, these are no more than efforts meant to overcome the crippling sorrow of estrangement. The achievements of exile are permanently undermined by the loss of something left behind forever."36

And yet, why is exile rich food for thought when in reality it is nothing but estrangement? How does estrangement become a semantically rich domain in thought? What indeed is home and what is location? What is a native place? What is the special charge behind the term 'native place' that differentiates it from the fortuity of any place? What is the difference between these two locutions? Is the place more mine, to anticipate the politics of immigration and naturalisation and of the diaspora because I was born there? Or, is it more mine than yours because I came here before you? And finally, does the place most authentically belong to those who are truly autochthonous, whose bodies are literally extensive with the physicality of the place? If there is the certitude of home to start *with, why do we need the intensifier, the authenticator term 'true' to differentiate* the true home from what, the non-true home, the false home, the factitious home? What here is mere description, and what prescriptive and normative? If, Palestine is home both

to Jews and Palestinians, can it be a true home to both? And is 'true' here a currency of politics, ontology, or theology? To be more specific, which Return, the return of the Palestinian or that of the Jew be more equal to the truth of home? How does the term 'true' function in duplicity: whose truth, the Zionist truth as profoundly theological and ahistorical, or the Palestinian truth anchored in the horrors of historical defeat, displacement, and negation? The term 'true' in Said's discourse resonates both politically and beyond the opportunistic-strategic rationale of politics. On the one hand truth can be commandeered and weaponised as Israeli or Palestinian with the result that one truth opposes the other. How then shall Truth, with a capital Truth, prevail (as in the profound Sanskrit maxim, Satyameva jayate, Truth alone will triumph), when the very emergence of Truth with a capital T can only be the function of conflict, war, violence, and a resultant winner-loser dyad? The problem that Said takes on without flinching is the reality that 'truth' is neither exclusively political nor ontological; just as worldliness is neither the dissolution of individual existence in the name of coexistence nor the betrayal of coexistence in the name of individual viability. What does Said mean by "essential sadness," i.e., an incorrigible sadness versus a "historical sadness" that is open to amelioration and remediation through dis-alienation and dis-estrangement? This is the critical tension between 'home' as it has been spoken for in the name of the 'nation' and that other 'home' which has to be violated and usurped in the name of the nation state. For there are no exiles in the context of that ontological home that is non-sovereign and therefore home to all: prior to the violent histories of enclosure and exclusion.³⁷ But when "the ontological open" is politicised as national home, it automatically produces the exile as its binary and excluded other.³⁸ Allegorically speaking, the 'other home' is possible only if we exile ourselves from the limiting and exclusionary 'home' of the nation state,' only if each national citizen occupies her sovereign space in an exilic mode. In other words, the exilic mode is a profoundly double-conscious mode of existence: double-consciousness and for that reason deconstructive and oppositional.³⁹ My understanding is that with the adjective "essential," Said is indeed pointing towards ontology, though he would not want to name it as such. His concern, very legitimate, is that ontology, as a philosophically determined realm, would seek to secede altogether from the domain of politics, and absolve itself of all historico-political contamination. To him, much like it is to Franz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, and Denise de Silva, ontology is an effect, an effect perpetrated by politics, and not a

realm in itself. The "essential," to Said, represents a different kind of freedom, i.e., 'freedom from the political' as the far-reaching goal to be envisioned from the perspective of 'freedom in and as political.' Mahmoud Darwish and Said find common cause and ground here. Said's theoretically unfashionable faith or belief that humanism can be redirected, rectified in the name of humanism is based on his deeply secular understanding of the world as nothing but historical.

Here then is Said: "We come to nationalism and its essential association with exile. Nationalism is an assertion of belonging in and to a place, a people, a heritage. It affirms the home created by a community of language, culture, and custom; and, by so doing, it fends of exile, fights to prevent its ravages." Comparing the nationalism-exile nexus to the master-slave dialectic in Hegel, Said makes the general diagnosis that "all nationalisms in their early stages develop a condition of estrangement" (Said, *Reflections on Exile* 378).

The answer to estrangement is home, but what kind of home? Politics compels us to name estrangements and on that basis insist on a Jewish home as an answer to Jewish estrangement, a Palestinian home to officially accommodate the Palestinian, and so on, and finally and anthropologically, as a human home for human displacement. What about a nameless home where the name can be identified not as a remedy but as a problem?⁴⁰ It is in this Utopian spirit that Said quotes Auerbach who cites this passage from Hugo of St. Victor's *Didascalion*: "The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is a foreign land" (395). To Auerbach to whom our philological home is the Earth and not the nation, the point of entry into his Earth still has to be European culture, but from a rigorously cultivated exilic perspective. What this strategy avoids is the fallacy of con-centrism that assumes that we move automatically, and by fiat, from nation as Center to the Earth or World as Center. On the contrary, this option deploys the 'givenness' of native or natal culture against the grain and dissipates the propriety of a centrist vision. Is this an example of overturning nationalism in the name of nationalism, and humanism in the name of humanism? Is such critical self-reflexivity radical enough; or should we be expecting more from our oppositional consciousness?

Edward Said is quite clear about his strategy here. To him, the call for a *tout court* theoretical break from humanism is ill-advised, un-warranted, overblown, and just plain impracticable. The question I want to raise here is this: is it feasible

to problematise humanism simultaneously both ontologically and politically? Or, as Said, contra Heidegger, would have it: is an immanent political critique adequate in the hope that the effects of the political critique will have a bearing on ontology as well? Here then is Edward Said at his polemical best, both announcing with great clarity his intentions and at the same outlining what he is 'not' interested in. Said's hope, as a practicing 'non-humanist humanist' is that his oversight of ontology will not in any way compromise the integrity or the efficacy his political praxis. Strange and counter-intuitive as it may seem, it is precisely by insisting on the primacy of history and politics, and not that of theory or ontology, that Said, like Fanon, seeks a body that is nothing but questions. By way of understanding of the realm of historical politics as oppositional and contrapuntal, Said achieves the same effect of openness and non-arrival that is dear to ontologically oriented thinkers. The difference is that Said's strategy is unrelievedly immanent: he does not need a vestibule called the onto-political. To put it briefly, exile for Said, achieves immanently for Said what ek-stasis does for Heidegger. Here we need to remember that even Heidegger who scoffs at a recuperation of humanism does follow the strategy of sous rature, the strategy of crossing out rather than indulge in a ruptural neologism.⁴¹ Said establishes a clear instrumental break between Heidegger's

thoroughgoing examination of the relationship of humanism to a prior Being in his "Letter on Humanism," and his program of "humanism as a useable praxis for intellectuals and academics who want to know what they are doing, what they are committed to as scholars, and who want also to connect those principles to the world in which they live as citizens. (Said, *Humanism and Democratic Criticism* 6)

In other words, the deep theoretical and philosophical inherence of humanism in metaphysics does not bother Said one bit. He is aware of it in a casual, secondary, epiphenomenal kind of way, and he is happy to invest in humanism despite its metaphysical provenance.

Now, if metaphysics is but another name for anthropocentric hubris and human-hegemonic unilateralism and violence towards Being, then, metaphysics is as reprehensible as say Racism. If that is the case, isn't Said's critical-oppositional reliance on humanism no different from say, an anti-racist platform of action that is no more and no less than affirmative action without the benefit of critical race theory or the richness of Afro-pessimism?⁴² Why will Said not pay suffi-

cient attention to anthropocentrism, to the second order historiography of metaphysics that frames and enables what Said calls "secular worldliness?" (Said 49).⁴³ If Said were also, in addition to being a secular-worldly-oppositional thinker, interested in deep ecology, the philosophical critique of anthropocentrism, and animal rights, would he then have been compelled automatically to pay explicit attention to pre- trans- and non-human beings and temporalities? My larger question here has to do with the ways in which our declaration of our polemical interests, limits, frames, and scotomises our theoretical awareness: in other words, what is not within our valued world view does not, so to speak, exist. If Said had taken into account the fundamental insight that the violence of humanism has already been underwritten by the deeper violence of anthropocentrism, he may not have been in a position to claim

that it is possible to be critical of humanism in the name of humanism and that, schooled in its abuses by the experience of Eurocentrism and empire, one could fashion a different kind of humanism that was cosmopolitan and text-and-language-bound in ways that absorbed the great lessons from the past from, say, Erich Auerbach and Leo Spitzer and more recently from Richard Poirier, and still remain attuned to the emergent voices and contents of the present, many of them exilic, extraterritorial, and un-housed, as well as uniquely American. (Said 11)⁴⁴

Implicit in this passage too is, what Abdul JanMohamed identifies as Said's "specular" relationship to western humanism. Without a doubt, Said's epistemic location is 'occidental,' and his métier is to reflect the West critically back to itself with the intention of changing it, correcting it. His warm endorsement and reception of subaltern and postcolonial theorists such as Alatas, Guha, and CLR James is thoroughly metropolitan in scope and scale. He chooses to map their work as a 'voyage in' whereby the West becomes the locus classicus for an oppositional postcoloniality. The postcolonial project is no more and no less than admonishing western humanism for its erstwhile follies, and eventually opening it up to other, non-western, migrant, and diasporic voices and constituencies. We must also keep in mind that in Said's case oppositional thinking and contrapuntality go hand in hand. Just as Beethoven does sing for Du Bois, so too, for Said, a self-correcting West is very much part of his belonging and constituency. In other words, no change in the imprimatur, still human and all too human but with a different and enlarged and more inclusive space that lets in different and other contents. The same charge could be leveled at Said's refusal to problematise secularism in any way.45

Let me turn now to Heidegger's very different theorisation of coexistence under the aegis of humanism. Here is Heidegger's definition of a 'new humanism' that will return 'man' to his ontological essence, i.e., to what 'man' was intended to be, but was prevented and occluded from becoming because of anthropocentric politics and faulty propositional thinking that made the 'human' the illicit 'subject' of Being.

The essence of man lies in ek-sistence. That is what is essentially-that is, from Being itself-at issue here, in so far as Being appropriates man as eksisting for guardianship over the truth of Being into this truth itself. "Humanism" now means, in case we decide to retain the word, that the essence of man is essential for the truth of Being, specifically in such a way that the word does not pertain to man simply as such. So, we are thinking a curious kind of: humanism. (Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" 248)

And again,

Should we still keep the name of "humanism" for a "humanism" that contradicts all previous humanism-although it no way advocates the inhuman? And keep it just so that by sharing in the use of the name we might perhaps swim in the predominant currents, stifled in metaphysical subjectivism and submerged in oblivion of Being? Or should thinking, by means of open resistance to "humanism," risk a shock that should for the first time cause perplexity concerning the *humanitas of homo humanus* and its basis? In this way it could awaken a reflection—if the world-historical moment did not itself already compel such a reflection—that thinks not only about man but also about the "nature" of man, not only about his nature but even more primordially about the dimension in which the essence of man, determined by Being itself, is at home. (Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" 248)

Is this ek-static practice of humanism a humanism at all: a humanism that in being about "man" is not about man at all, a humanism that eviscerates man of his/her sovereign subjectivity? For, it must be noted that what Heidegger is calling for is not a sublation of humanism to a higher or more rarefied plane; and he is not asking for post-humanism or even for a polycentric poly-polar humanism. His demand is either for anti-humanism or a-humanism. He is demanding the erasure of humanism as such.⁴⁶ Essential man, to find his true home in Being has to unhome himself from his own ideological habitat, namely, humanism and its political corollary, nationalism and the nation state. Ek-static ontological practice requires an exilic humanist-nationalist orientation. To recuperate such an awareness coercively under the rubric of humanism-nationalism, constitutes for Heidegger, an egregious categorical error. And yet, disastrously, for a while,

Heidegger succumbs to the "authenticity" of National Socialism.⁴⁷ It is quite obvious how Heidegger establishes a direct causal relationship between humanism's obsession with just man and its oblivion of Being: the two are but flip sides of the same coin. I will just mention in passing that the outright rejection of humanism by Afro-Pessimism is based on a rationale that is both compatible and radically incommensurable with the Heideggerian measure or threshold of anti-humanism. Whereas to Heidegger, humanism and ontology are a given that are open to destruction, Afro-pessimism's thesis of anti-black humanism, humanism and ontology are not even relevant as interlocutors.

In the face of the essential homelessness of man, man's approaching destiny reveals itself to thought on the history of Being in this, that man find his way into the truth of Being and set out on this find. Every nationalism is metaphysically an anthropologism, and as such subjectivism. Nationalism is not overcome through mere internationalism: it is rather expanded and elevated thereby into a system. Nationalism is as little brought and raised to *humanitas* by internationalism as individualism is by an ahistorical collectivism. (Heidegger, 244)

This passage highlights some of the aporias that challenge Heideggerian thinking. To start with, Heidegger, despite his strong desire to get rid of humanism tout court, continues to hanker after a true and authentic humanitas, albeit in the nameless name of the *Dasein*. The measure of the ek-static human as *Dasein* is a custodial measure on behalf of the openness and the unconcealedness of the 'being of Being.' The human deterritorialised as *Dasein* is rid of the exceptionalist hubris both of humanism and anthropocentrism begins to function as a site or platform for the shining forth of Being. In that sense, then, Heidegger too, despite his downright disdain for any reworking of humanist-nationalism, is holding on strategically to the human re-identified as *Dasein* for the project of de-structing the entire tradition of the western, metaphysical, onto-theological, logocentric tradition. It is also quite evident how difficult it is for Heidegger to permit his exclusively ontological hermeneutic to lapse into the register of politics and history. When he did, he succumbed to the authenticity of National Socialism. The problem is that unlike the *Dasein* in all its pristine ontological-philosophical aloofness, *Mitsein* starkly raises the problem of historical co-existence: in other words, the Dasein-Mitsein continuum is neither entirely ontological nor political. It is a hybrid onto-political continuum that calls the philosophical/ontological bluff of a pure ek-stasis. Historically determinate configurations of the Mitsein, such as the

nationalism, Christendom, Judaism, Zionism, etc. are not automatically amenable to the *ek-static* call of the *Dasein*, unless the articulation of the register of the onto-political is given its due weight and consequence. All I am trying to say here is that Said, in declaring himself as a non-humanist humanist is in fact historically and politically actualising the Heideggerian project better, more convincingly and in better faith than Heidegger himself.

Here is another passage from the same Heidegger text that when read together with the passage on nationalism would seem to align the ontological with the political without mutual conflation or reduction.

Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground of one. Every determination of the essence of man that already presupposes an interpretation of being without asking about the truth of Being, whether knowingly or not, is metaphysical. The result is that what is peculiar to all metaphysics, specifically with respect to the way the essence of man is determined, is that it is "humanistic." Accordingly, every humanism remains metaphysical. (Heidegger, 225-6)

To a non-Heideggerian, the claim that every nationalism is inescapably metaphysical would sound like pure babble, i.e., until she is schooled in the process of Heideggerian ontopolitical mediation: from metaphysics to humanism, and from humanism to nationalism, a concatenated and co-symptomatic syndrome of the same pathology. Why is it enough and more than adequate for Said to oppose and transcend humanism in the name of humanism, whereas to Heidegger such a claim is self-defeating and counterproductive? Why does Said choose not to take the implication of politics in ontology seriously? In not factoring in the inherence of the political in the prior temporality of metaphysics and ontology, Said misses out on the opportunity to interrogate and deconstruct the *political as such* in the name of the exilic: a value that he cherishes deeply. Exile, in being the lack of home, points to an other and different possibility of home foreclosed by the regime of the nation state: that nameless and indivisible "dwelling" under the Open⁴⁸ that discerns in the desire for home the desire to dominate and exclude. The realm of the political in the name of the nation state functions duplicitously: creates a national home for 'refugees,' and offers them 'rights,' but only to perpetuate the divide between citizens and refugees. It is also unable to question, in the name of a higher and more inclusive emancipation, the hegemony of the discourse of rights. To put it in Foucauldian terms, any form of absolute and innocent reliance in the

discourse of rights is to forget that the very history of reason has been unreasonable and that 'rights' are the sedimented ideological continuation of an underlying logic of an Us and a Them.

As Said would have it:

And just beyond the frontier between "us" and the "outsiders" is the perilous territory of not-belonging: this is to where in a primitive time peoples were banished, and where in the modern era immense aggregates of humanity loiter as refugees and displaced persons. (Said, *Reflections on Exile* 17)

Said goes on to argue that precisely "because both terms (nationalism and exile) include everything from the most collective of sentiments to the most private of emotion, there is hardly a language adequate for both" (380). Once we accept this chronic complicity (I am reminded here of Fanon's explosive destruction of the binary logic of racism: "The Negro is not. Any more than a white man" (Fanon 180). Said asks: "What is there worth saving and holding on to between the extremes of exile on the one hand, and the often bloody-minded affirmations of nationalism on the other? Are they simply two conflicting varieties of paranoia?" (Said, "Reflections on Exile" 380). Said then offers us the specific example of Israel and Zionism and the ongoing Palestinian exile. Asks Said: "What could be more intransigent than the conflict between the Zionist Jews and Arab Palestinians? Palestinians feel that they have been turned into exiles by the proverbial people of exile, the Jews" (Said 382). Both groups are aware that their drive towards nationalism has been fuelled by exile: both groups feel the necessity for blood brothers and blood sisters and for fierce forms of loyalty and "where the slightest deviation from the accepted group line is an act of the rankest treachery and dislovalty" (383).

Homes as seductive spaces of the natural always unmark themselves. Even though deeply ideological as Hindu homes, Islamic homes, middle class homes, Protestant homes, patriarchal homes, homes like to see themselves as apolitical and at the same time as value laden in some mystical immaculate manner. Secondly, homes breed intellectual and critical torpor: homes are sites of complacency where critiques and self-reflexivity are disarmed in the name of filial piety and loyalty: my dad/mom/family right or wrong. It is on the basis of the point of entry called home that the world becomes imaginable. But the world alas is not home as when we discover simple things like, the culinary smells that are so natural and desirable to us are repugnant and nauseating to some other family. We

realise with some consternation that the way we do things in our home is no more and no less than what it is: the way we do things in our home. There is no built-in normativity or axiomatic rectitude scripted into our particular practices. Familiarity turns into legitimacy without the benefit of critique. So, if this is home, what is the world? In fact, there is no world for the simple reason that once we step out of our domestic ghettos, all we encounter are other such homes, other such domestic enclaves and enclosures each with its own built-in walls of intended inclusion and exclusion. What we have are specific human ideological homes each with its own particular pretense of utter worldliness.

Here is the tough double-bind. If the world, or worldliness, is to be realised in an egalitarian multi-lateral way, then, all homely aspirations will have to be abandoned, towards a higher and more inclusive belonging which, I must quickly add, should not be hastily renamed as the Home of all homes. A truly realised World will have to be un-homely from every conceivable perspective, and ergo, sovereign citizenship will be demanded of no one. So long as we continue to play the binary game of Home and World, we will only continue repeating the sorry and abject production of winners and losers, the homed and the un-homed, and an Us and a Them mode of subject production based on the twin principles of regulatory self-exceptionalism and the inclusion of the other by exclusion.⁴⁹ If the objective of coexistence is a-centric, non-identitarian, inclusive in the name of the Open (whether intended by way of Agamben or the Four Fold of Heidegger, or the radical concept of the vetta veli as sung by the Tamil Siddhar poet⁵⁰), then, the existential dynamic of the exilic will have to be built in differentially into the fabric of coexistence: exilic coexistence. I say built-in to avoid the fallacy of exilic essentialism. Also, the exilic condition as concept metaphor is not to be idealised in an irresponsible mode when there are actual, empirical, literal exiles languishing in utter abjection. Exilic consciousness and exilic self-fashioning need to be woven in integrally into all regnant modes of being and knowing. To refer briefly to a motif I have written about elsewhere, the imperative Admit All has to be understood and practiced in the name of no one.51 The Admit All has to be heard as an ashareeri, a disembodied command that privileges no particular body or embodiment, an imperative in the name of the Nothing, of radical absence. If the question is: who said, ADMIT ALL, then, the answer ought to be 'NO ONE.' The allimportant question of course, in the context of onto-political hyphenation is this:

If *All* are already there, naked and fully embodied, why then the official/governmental redundancy of the call/interpellation, *Admit All?* The answer would go somewhat like this: once the exilic mode is organically and generally integrated with the exigencies of 'political homes,' then every political residence will also have to actualise itself both as restrictive structure and the constitutive void that forms the very basis of structure. In other words, the *Open* as *the Void* will have been honored and valorised as a perennial 'reading against the grain' of each and every political formation: as that radical *hors texte* whose reliance on the text is merely procedural and not real, formal but not substantive, an exilic beat and interruption at the very heart of each and every political pulsation.

¹ Jacques Derrida and Marie-Louise Mallet. *The Animal that Therefore I Am*. Trans. David Willis, Fordham UP, NY, 2008. See, *Derrida and our Animal Others: Derrida's Final Seminar: "The Beast and the Sovereign. By David Farrell Krell*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2013. See also, my essay, "Postscript: The Philosopher that Therefore He Has to Be," in *Theory after Derrida: Essays in Critical Praxis*. Eds. Kailash K. Baral and R. Radha-krishnan. London: Routledge, 2018: 333-351.

² I am gesturing in the direction of Friedrich Nietzsche when I say, 'human, all too human.' ³ For more on the carceral nature of knowledge production, see Michel Foucault, in particular, *Discipline and Punish*.

⁴ To Martin Heidegger goes the credit of having formulated the principle of "ontico-ontological difference" in *Being and Time*. See also Jean-Luc Nancy and Aurélien Barrau, *What's These Worlds Coming To? (Forms of Living)*.

⁵ The classic elaboration of location is of course Adrienne Rich's essay "Notes towards a Politics of Location."

⁶ See William V. Spanos Reader: Humanist Criticism and the Secular Imperative, and Heidegger and Criticism, and the rest of his voluminous oeuvre.

⁷ For more on fungibility, in the context of Afro-Pessimism, refer to the ongoing projects of Frank Wilderson and Jared Sexton, see my essay, "The Epistemology of Pessimism" in the special issue of *The Comparatist* on Pessimism.

⁸ See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*. See Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Confronted Community," *Postcolonial Studies*, 6.1 (2003): 23-26 for a critique of Martin Heidegger's subjection of *Mitsein* to *Dasein*.

⁹ For more on the One and the many, see Stathis Gourgouris, *The Perils of the One*.

¹⁰ For more on assemblages, see work by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Aihwa Ong, Saskia Sassen, and Jasbir Puar.

¹¹ "Other people are hell" is a statement made by one of the characters in Jean-Paul Sartre's play *The Flies.* See also, Ernst Renan's "What is a Nation?" where Renan seeks to find a non-exclusionary principle to rationalize the notion of community. The cruel irony here is of course that Renan's lecture in the name of the Enlightenment is strictly contemporaneous with the infamous Berlin Conference and the systematic colonization of Africa. Settler colonialism is established as the exemplary rationale of coexistence.

¹² On the nature and the making of community, please refer to the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and Etienne Balibar in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*.

¹³ See the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe for more on the notion of articulation among locations and subject positions in the context of a radical democracy.

¹⁴ For more on the plight of refugees and exiles othered by every remnant political regime and narrative, see Mina Karavanta's ongoing work that brings together the "posts-" in post-structuralism and postcoloniality.

¹⁵ Rabindranath Tagore makes this point with biting eloquence in his book Nationalism.

¹⁶ Tsitsi Dangarembga, *Nervous Conditions*.

¹⁷ See Sara Ahmed's brilliant and phenomenologically inflected feminist reading of the politics of the table in *Queer Phenomenology*.

¹⁸ Amitav Ghosh, The Shadow Lines.

¹⁹ For a lucid and critical understanding of Us-Them divides, see Satya Mohanty, *Literary Theory and the Claims of History*.

²⁰ For more on filiation and affiliation, see Edward Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic.* See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* for more on the two modes of learning: *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, concepts from Max Weber. See also, Ernst Renan, "What is a Nation?"

²¹ Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking.

²² See Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*.

²³ See Gil Anidjar, Blood: A Critique of Christianity.

²⁴ See my book, *Diasporic Mediations: Between Home and Location*. See also, Maxine Hong Kingston's *The Woman Warrior*.

²⁵ For a statement and critique of primary attachments, refer to the work of Judith Butler in *The Psychic Life of Power*.

²⁶ See Lani Guinier, *Tyranny of the Majority*.

²⁷ For a devastatingly critical reading of home as phobic, see Gloria Anzaldua, *Borderlands*. The creative work of Rabindranath Tagore and the critical theoretical work of Partha Chatterjee are relevant here.

²⁸ For more on givenness, please refer to the work of the great phenomenological thinkers, Edmund Husserl, *General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology* and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*.

²⁹ I do not have the time or the scope here to look into the concept of martyrdom or those causes in whose name blood is shed: extreme situations that require redemption by the guarantee that "blood will not have been shed in vain," situations where blood achieves a level of specific fungibility in the context of a non-dialectical, it is either you or me antagonism. On the one hand there is the eponymy of blood, and on the other, there is a productive relational undecidability whereby any cause could be served by mixed or multiple bloods, as much via affiliation as via consanguinary filiation.

³⁰ See Gauri Viswanathan's *Outside the Fold* on the politics of conversion.

³¹ See Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History."

³² William V. Spanos's work on Edward Said and Hannah Arendt as *Exiles in the City* is particularly noteworthy for its post-colonially inflected "non-humanist humanism."

³³ See William V. Spanos, R. Radhakrishnan, and Mina Karavanta for more on humanism and post-humanism.

³⁴ See Mahmoud Darwish's poems, "If I were another," and "Who am I, Without Exile?" See also William V. Spanos, and R. Radhakrishnan.

³⁵ I have attempted to theorize "betweenness" in my *History, the Human, and the World Between.* See also Edward said, "Criticism Between Culture and System."

³⁶ Edward Said, "Reflections on Exile."

³⁷ The massive and brilliant work of William V. Spanos does more than justice to the theme of the onto-political. See also Robert Marzec's work on the ontopolitics of enclosure movements.

³⁸ The troubled and contradictory history of Zionism and its many versions and variations is exemplary of this predicament. See also Edward Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims," and Judith Butler's recent work on her relationship to Zionism, *Parting Ways*. ³⁹ I am working on this issue comprehensively in my forthcoming essay, "The Open Inc."

⁴⁰ For a profound enactment of the historical as well as allegorical theme of naming and un-naming, see Adrienne Rich's poem, "Diving into the Wreck," and my analysis of the poem in *History, the Human, and the World Between*.

⁴¹ For more on the Heidegger-Said-Spanos connection by way of exile and the "nothing," see both my essay and Karavanta's in the special issue of *boundary2* in honor of William V. Spanos.

⁴² See the work of Frank Wilderson, Jared Sexton, and Kimberle Crenshaw on *Critical Race Theory and Afro-pessimism*.

⁴³ See William V. Spanos, *The Legacy of Edward Said*, and my essay in *boundary2*, "In the Name of the Nothing."

⁴⁴ On the nature of Violence as both ontological and political, see Merleau-Ponty and Frantz Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth*.

⁴⁵ Unlike theorists such as Talal Asad, Sabah Mahmood, Wael Hallaq, Partha Chatterjee, Ashis Nandy, Gil Andjar, and William Connolly, to name a few, who have legitimate and substantive issues with secularism, Said is a happy citizen of the secular world.

⁴⁶ The strategy of *sous rature* is initiated by Heidegger and continued differentially by Jacques Derrida.

⁴⁷ For a withering critique of Heidegger and authenticity, see Theodor Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity*.

⁴⁸ See Giorgio Agamben, *The Open*.

⁴⁹ I refer here of course to Giorgio Agamben's profound notion of "inclusion by exclusion."
⁵⁰ I explicate the notion of the Open in the Diddhar poem in my forthcoming essay, "Open Inc."

⁵¹ I refer here to the book cover of Edward Said's posthumously published *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*, and my discussion of the Admit all motif in chapter 2 of my book, *History, the Human, and the World Between*.

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