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### Έρανίσματα

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## ΕΠΑΝΙΣΜΑΤΑ

### AKTUALISIERENDE PARALLELEN IN DARSTELLUNGEN ZUR GRIECHISCHEN GESCHICHTE

#### *Vorbemerkung*

Hinweise auf Erscheinungen der neueren, namentlich der nationalen Geschichte in allgemeinen Darstellungen, aber auch Einzeluntersuchungen zur griechisch-römischen Antike sind bekanntlich nicht selten, nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil die Analogie zur historischen Methode gehört und Begebenheiten aus der mehr oder weniger gut vertrauten jüngeren Vergangenheit zur Illustration ähnlicher oder ähnlich erscheinender Zusammenhänge aus der Antike beitragen können. Wie man sich gut vorstellen und bei einer einfachen Lektüre der betreffenden Werke feststellen kann, ist die Auswahl der Parallelen ebenso wie der Umgang mit ihnen und die Darstellungsweise verschieden, d.h. durch den geistigen Habitus der Verfasser, gegebenfalls auch die politische und geistige Atmosphäre ihrer Zeit bedingt, so daß sie für das Verständnis der jeweiligen Urteile aufschlußreich sein können. Hier einige Beispiele:

I. G.Grote, A History of Greece, London VI (1870)<sup>2</sup>, S. 381, Anm. 1: Athen gegen Melos (416 v.Chr.) und England gegen Dänemark (1807).

*“In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian envoy [“justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows, and the weak submitting to it”]; s.o. S.380] “I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen by the English Government in 1807, together with the language used by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject. We read as follows in M. Thiers' Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire: - “L'agent choisi étoit digne de sa mission. C' étoit M. Jackson qui avoit été autrefois chargé d'affaires en France, avant l'arrivée de Lord Whitworth à Paris, mais qu'on n'avoit pas pu y laisser, à cause du mauvais esprit qu'il manifestoit en toute occasion. Introduit auprès du régent, il alléguait de prétendues stipulations secrètes, en vertu*

*desquelles le Danemark devoit, (disoit-on) de gré ou de force, faire partie d' une coalition contre l' Angleterre: il donna comme raison d' agir la nécessité où se trouvoit le cabinet Britannique de prendre des précautions pour que les forces navales de Danemark et le passage du Sund ne tombassent pas au pouvoir des François: et en conséquence il demanda au nom de son gouvernement, qu' on livrât à l'armée Anglaise la forteresse de Kronenberg qui commande le Sund, le port de Copenhague, et enfin la flotte elle-même promettant de garder le tout en dépôt, pour le compte du Danemark, qui seroit remis en possession de ce qu' on alloit lui enlever, dès que le danger seroit passé: M.Jackson assura que le Danemark ne perdrait rien, qu' on le conduiroit chez lui en auxiliaires et en amis, - que les troupes Britanniques payeroient tout ce qu' elles consommeroient. Et avec quoi, répondit le prince indigné, payeriez-vous notre honneur perdu, si nous adhérons à cette infame proposition? Le prince continuant, et opposant à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Danemark, qui n' avait pris aucune précaution contre les Anglais, qui les avait toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusait pour le surprendre **M.Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par une insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre, qu' il falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus fort quand on étoit le plus faible.** Le prince congédia l' agent Anglais avec des paroles fort dures, et lui déclara qu' il allait se transporter à Copenhague, pour y remplir ses devoirs de prince et de citoyen Danois. (Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de l' Empire, tome viii, livre xxviii, p.190)”.*

II. J.P.Mahaffy, Social life in Greece from Homer to Menander, London 1879<sup>4</sup>.

1. Thukydidés, Periklēs-Kleon, “Old Whings and modern Radicals in England” (S.140/1).

*«Though I freely confess the transcendent genius of Pericles, I see no reason for following the modern German school in the extravagant estimate of his moral character, which they have borrowed from Thucydides' History. There are not wanting evidences, to anyone who will read the work, not in blind admiration, but with a critical sense, that it is to a great extent what the Germans call a Tendenzschrift, intended to magnify Pericles and his policy,*

*while it traduces Cleon and others who succeeded the great statesman. This sort of party-history has been written by Sallust, and detected by modern critics, who hold his two treatises to be political pamphlets, concealed under a garb of severe narrative. Perhaps Thucydides was to Sallust a more exact model than that historian suspected. Pericles (and Thucydides) stood to Cleon and his party in somewhat of the relation of the old Whigs in English politics to the modern Radicals. The former were great noblemen, who took up the cause of the people, and opposed the Tories, and so far the Radicals are their direct successors, just as Mr. Grote has shown that Cleon succeeded to the policy of Pericles. But nevertheless there are many old Whigs whose rank and traditions lead them to despise and dislike their modern allies, to claim a distinct name, and assert on many points a distinct policy. Thus Thucydides, a follower of Pericles, certainly intends us to believe, and even insinuates strongly, that Cleon's policy was not the continuation of that of Pericles. But it is really strange how the genius of the historian has carried with him all the moderns, though he is almost the only contemporary, or nearly contemporary, authority who estimates Pericles so highly. Thus, for example, the opinions of the two greatest Greek thinkers, Plato and Aristotle, which are fortunately preserved, are apparently against him. Though the former was a decided aristocrat, and the latter a Liberal Conservative, and so opposed in principle to Pericles' Radicalism, as they thought it, yet as they judged him long after his death, when all personal bias had long passed away, their opinions are too weighty to be summarily set aside.»*

2. Das Massaker in Aegospotamoi (405 v.Chr.) und Coomassie in Chana (1874) (S.234/5):

*“But this is a mere trifle, when we hear from Plutarch that Lysander, after the battle of Aegospotamoi, put to death 3000 prisoners!<sup>1</sup> Greek historians are too much in the habit of passing carelessly over such scenes as this. The appearance of Coomassie struck with horror all our troops who entered it, and afforded to the papers a subject which even the Daily Telegraph failed to exaggerate. What can Coomassie have been compared to Aegospotamoi,*

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1. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων τρισχιλίους ἐλὼν ζῶντας ἀπέσφαξεν ὁ Λύσανδρος, Alcib.c.37, cp. the details in his *Lysander* c. 13.



*where 3000 men, not savages, not negroes, but Athenians, men of education and of culture, were butchered with swords and spears<sup>2</sup>? What are we to think of the men who ordered this massacre, of those who executed it, of those who looked on? I do not believe that there is now a sovereign in the world, even the King of Dahomey or King Koffee, who would execute such a horrible and bloodthirsty deed. If our soldiers found the smell of blood and of decay horrible among the Ashantees, what would they have found it on the shore of Thrace, where Lysander celebrated his victory in rivers of human blood? And yet I believe this atrocity, seldom paralleled in human history, called forth no cry of horror in Greece. The unfortunate Athenian general, according to Theophrastus<sup>3</sup>, submits with dignified resignation to a fate which he confesses would have attended the Lacedaemonians had they been vanquished”.*

III. J.B.Bury, A History of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great, New York 1900.

1. Die sizilische Expedition der Athener und der Krieg der Engländer in Krim (S.468):

*“The Sicilian expedition was part of the general aggressive policy of Athens which made her unpopular in Greece. Unjust that policy was; but this enterprise was not more flagrantly unrighteous than some of her other undertakings, and it has the plausible enough pretext of protecting the weaker cities in the west against the stronger. More fruitful is the question whether the expedition was expedient from a purely political point of view. It is often said that it was a wild venture, an instance of a whole people going mad, like the English people in the matter of Crimean War. It is hard to see how this view*

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2. We are told, and this was a point which did strike the Greeks with horror, that on this occasion the bodies were left unburied, so that the resemblance to Coomassie is quite complete. When the habits of the Ashantee people became known, we were all filled with horror, and there were loud appeals made by the public to put down such depraved and abominable barbarism. Good people in Europa seem to think that a nation which is cruel and executes large numbers of people must be savage and degraded. Let me point out the striking example of Greece in its palmy days in disproof of such hasty generalisations.

3. Plut. Lys. 13.

*can be maintained. If there were ever an enterprise of which the wisdom cannot be judged be the result, it is the enterprise against Syracuse. All the chances were in its favour."*

2. Kapital, Demokratie und Sozialismus im alten Griechenland und modernen Europa (S.572).

*"Thus, just as in modern Europe, so in ancient Greece, capital and democracy produced socialists, who pleaded for a levelling of classes by means of a distribution of property by the state. Aristophanes mocked these speculations in his Parliament of Women and his Wealth. The idea of communism which Plato develops on lines of his own in the Republic was not an original notion of the philosopher's brain, but was suggested by the current communistic theories of the day. It is well worthy of consideration that the Athenians did not take the step from the political to social democracy; and this discretion may have been partly due to the policy of those statesmen who, doubtless conscious of the danger, regarded the theoric fund as an indispensable institution."*

IV. K.J.Beloch, Griechische Geschichte.

1.Hesiods (vermeitliche) Niederlassung in Böotien und die Auswanderung nach Amerika (I, 1<sup>2</sup>, Strassburg 1912, S.312):

*"Hesiod ist so wenig eine historische Persönlichkeit wie Homer; die Verse im ersten Prooemion der Theogonie, in denen sein Name genannt wird (22-35), sind eine spätere Einlage, die den Zusammenhang unterbricht. Auch daß die verschiedenen Hesiod zugeschriebenen Dichtungen denselben Verfasser gehabt haben, ist durch nichts zu erweisen und an sich sehr unwahrscheinlich, nicht minder, daß der Dichter in Boeotien zu Hause war, denn die Erwähnung von Askra (Werke 639-640) ist ein störendes Einschlebsel, τῆδ' ἦλθε (635) genügt, wo das war, brauchte Hesiod dem Bruder nicht erst zu sagen, und es ist ja ganz absurd, daß ein Schiffer aus Kyme, der dort kein Fortkommen findet, ins boeotische Binnenland zieht und zum Bauern wird. Woher hatte er denn die ἔγκτησις? Und man wandert wohl aus Europa nach Amerika aus, aber doch nicht umgekehrt."*

2. Die Produktivität der Sklavenarbeit in Athen im 4. und die Emanzipation der Neger im 19. Jahrhundert [III, 1<sup>1</sup>, Leipzig 1922, S.321/322]:

*“Es waren durchweg unfreie Arbeiter, die in diesen Fabriken (d.h. des Vaters des Demosthenes) beschäftigt wurden. Man hat nun freilich behauptet, die freie Arbeit sei produktiver als die Sklavenarbeit, doch das ist abolitionistisches Geschwätz. Ich will hier nicht auf die Folgen der Sklavenemanzipation im englischen Westindien und in den amerikanischen Südstaaten hinweisen; da handelte es sich um bedürfnislose Neger. Aber wir alle wissen, wie nachlässig kleine Handwerker oft arbeiten, und doch arbeiten sie für einige Rechnung. Der freie Tagelöhner aber arbeitet, wie der Sklave, für seinen Herrn, und mit Hunger und Peitsche lässt sich eine grössere Arbeitsleistung erreichen, als mit dem Hunger allein.”*

3. Die Griechische Einheit bei Isokrates und die deutsche Einheit bei den Männern von 1848 [III, 1<sup>2</sup> 1922, S.525]:

*“Die Stimme eines solchen Mannes fand einen Widerhall, wie kaum die eines zweiten; und wenn Philipp es vermocht hat, Hellas zu einigen, wenn Alexander das weite Asien der griechischen Bildung und dem griechischen Unternehmungsgeiste erschliessen konnte, so ist es zum grossen Teil Isokrates, der ihnen den Weg geebnet hat, ganz so, wie die Männer von 1848 es gewesen sind, die der deutschen Einheit den Boden bereitet haben.”*

V. W.S.Ferguson, Greek imperialism, London 1913.

Die Einigung Griechenlands und Europas (S.34/35):

*“However, it was not these institutional imperfections which prevented the unification of Hellas in a single federation. For this result could not now be achieved by any triumph of political science. Antigonus Doso (229-221 B.C.) whose name ought not to be unknown where Callicratidas, Agesilaus, Iphicrates and Phocion are household words, attempted with equal skill and generosity to combine the new federal idea with the old idea of representative national congress meeting at Corinth under the hegemony of the king of Macedon; but the best that can be said of the combination he made is that despite its great promise and possibilities it proved unacceptable to Hellas, and hence ineffective. The situation had now got beyond the control of Greek people. It may, perhaps, be realized best, if we imagine that the European*

*nations of to-day, weakened politically by continuous emigration and incessant conflicts, economically, by the withdrawal of industry and commerce to more favorably situated districts under European control, let us say in the East, were to pool their diplomatic and military interests, and entrust them, not to a European parliament, but to warring Latin and Teutonic parliaments, and were to take this step only to escape the Russian peril and when America was already thundering at their shores, if that be imaginable, coming with irresistible might, at once save and to destroy.”*

**VI.** G.Glotz, *La cité grecque*, Paris 1928.

Die kulturelle Leistung des besieigten Frankreich (nach 1815) für Europa und das besieigten Athen (nach 404 v. Chr.) für Hellas (S.335):

*“Enfin, de même que la France vaincue en 1815 a laissé à ses vainqueurs le code Napoléon, Athènes, avant d' être écrasée, avait répandu chez les confédérés qu'elle traînait devant ses tribunaux les principes de sa législation, si bien que beaucoup d'entre eux adoptèrent pour toujours, non pas seulement la technique de son droit, mais ses principes de liberté et de responsabilité personnelles. Ainsi, par la domination qu'elle exerça pendant trois quarts de siècle, Athènes fit beaucoup pour l'unification politique et économique intellectuelle et juridique de la race grecque.”*

**VII.** G.de Sanctis, *Storia dei Greci dalle origini alla fine del secolo V.*, Bd. I+II, Firenze 1939:

1. Die griechischen Kolonien, die Expansion der Angelsachsen und die Weltmachtstellung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (I, S.420):

*“In quasi tutte queste colonie i Greci rimasero aggrappati alle coste del mare. Nulla nella storia delle loro colonie che rassomigli alla ardimentosa e fortunata espansione degli Anglosassoni dall' oriente all' occidente dell' America del Nord alla quale gli Stati Uniti d' America debbono la loro posizione di Potenza mondiale. Infatti, pur inferiori per civiltà di fronte ai Greci, gli indigeni appartenevano spesso alla stessa stirpe ariana e non erano mai separati rispetto ai coloni da quell' abisso che separava gli Anglosassoni e i pellirosse dell' America settentrionale. Ond' essi non solo resistettero vittoriosamente ai Greci nei loro tentativi di avanzata verso l' interno, salvo*

*casi particolari come quello della Sicilia dove le stirpi indigene del centro si trovavano isolate e impotenti anche numericamente di fronte ai coloni; ma finirono, adottando in parte le istituzioni guerresche degli invasori, col respingerli a poco a poco là stesso dove questi avevano sulle prime proceduto, vincendo e soggiogando, come nell' estremo mezzogiorno d' Italia."*

2. Handel und Seeraub in der archaischen Zeit und die Geschichte der "pirateria britannica e olandese" in der modernen (I, S.432).

*"Quanto alle spedizioni maritime con cui movendo da Grecia Ulisse si sarebbe arricchito secondo uno de suoi falsi racconti, esse erano forse originariamente spedizioni piratesche, sebbene pirateria e commercio non siano del tutto inconciliabili tra loro come mostra la storia della pirateria britannica e olandese dell' età moderna; ma in ogni caso il racconto è espurgato da quelle immagini di violenza piratesca che forse in origine avrebbero potuto renderlo più gradevole agli uditori."*

3. Die Niederlage Athens (404 v.Chr.), der Zusammenbruch des Napoleonischen Reichs (1815), die Hegemonie Spartas in Hellas und die österreichische Herrschaft in Italien (II, S.459/460):

*"Così Tucidide dopo aver coperto d' infamia la violenza che stava a base delle pretese imperiali d' Atene nel dialogo tra gli Ateniesi e i Meli, scritto sotto l' impressione della catastrophe, redigeva solo pochi anni dopo la propria palinodia in quella che può dirsi l' orazione funebre dell' impero ateniese, celebrandone con nostalgico rimpianto la grandezza e la gloria nell' epitafio di Pericle. Così, se vogliamo ricorrere a un' analogia moderna, gl' Italiani, dopo aver celebrato gioiosamente la caduta dell' impero napoleonico e salutato la restaurazione, si accorgevano, trascorsi pochi anni se non pochi mesi, che quella cosiddetta restaurazione d' un passato morto e non rinnovabile importava in realtà l' assoggettamento loro a un' egemonia assai più odiosa della napoleonica, e a governi senza idealità, la cui ragione di vita era soltanto l' appoggio interessato che ricevevano dal padrone straniero.*

*L' Italia, anelante a libertà, trovò in se stessa le forze per cacciare quel padrone e, annullando quella restaurazione fittizia, darsi un ordine nuovo. Erano i Greci atti a sostituire con un ordine nuovo l' intollerabile assetto che alla vita della nazione aveva dato, sotto la guida di Lisandro, Sparta?"*

4. Tyrannis und Demokratie in Hellas, Diktatur in Italien und eine verdeckte Kritik gegen den Faschismus (I, S.555):

*“Gli altri cercarono violentemente di conservarlo anche quando la dittatura non era più nell' interesse del popolo, si unicamente nell' interesse del dittatore. Con ciò non solo andarono incontro alla rovina, ma suscitavano quell' avversione profonda a ogni potere assoluto e arbitrario che è caratteristica delle democrazie greche. Quest' avversione conferì alla eroica tenacia con cui esse poi difesero le proprie libertà e alle mirabili energie che sprigionarono in tale difesa. Ma rese anche impossibile o estremamente difficile il ricorrere a quella libera delegazione temporanea di poteri dittatoriali, vale a dire alla dittatura limitata dalla legge e avvalorata dalla sicurezza che il dittatore non si sarebbe mai cambiato in usurpatore, la quale tanto giovò a Roma nella sua lotta per la esistenza che si chiuse con la unificazione d' Italia.”*

**VIII.** M.Hadas, Hellenistic Culture, Fusion and Diffusion. New York 1959. Hellenisierung und Amerikanisierung durch die Schule (S.59/60):

*“The most significant characteristic of the Greeks is that no group of them settled anywhere without at once establishing a school, and organized education was the most important single factor in the process of hellenization and also in the resistance to that process.*

*The American experience offers enlightening analogies. Generations of children of the foreign-born have been so rapidly Americanized by public schools that communication with their own parents became difficult. On the other hand, where loyalty to native traditions, usually reinforced by considerations of religion, is strong, the parents establish schools of their own to preserve their traditions. So in New York children who attend public schools may also attend schools where Hebrew or Yiddish or Greek or Chinese is taught. Where no marked physical traits or religious loyalties hamper the process and (an important point) where the native tradition is in no such danger of perishing that indifference amounts to defection, the process of assimilation is as rapid as it is easy. Statistics of the steady decline in circulation of the foreign-language press in proportion on the number of persons whose parentage might make them readers of foreign-language newspapers are sufficient demonstration.*

*An obvious objection to the analogy is that in the hellenistic world it was the Greeks who were the immigrants and the natives who were subjected to hellenization. The objection clearly applies to the first surge of immigration, but, as we have seen, there were special considerations which quickly gave hellenism the upper hand and made Greek the preferred language. To compare the relationship between the Greeks and the peoples of the Near East to that between the English immigrants and the Indians and Spanish, French, or Dutch they found in America, is manifestly unfair on the basis of the enormous differences in cultural levels and population density. But the important index to cultural dominance is language, and though native languages persisted in the Near East to an enormously greater degree than they have in America, in the metropolitan centers Greek was the language of government and of fashionable society.*

*In areas where their numbers were fewer and where (as in the Middle East) they were confronted by a culture too advanced and too vigorous for them to dominate, the Greeks behaved as we should expect of a minority tenacious of its traditions in the face of danger of being submerged. Here too the American scene offers an analogy. A foreign group isolated in a remote area is especially concerned to safeguard its traditions. Individuals who might not participate in the cohesive activities of their group in a metropolis where its survival seems assured are now more likely to manifest their identity with the group not only by the communal worship and social activities, but by the subscribing to a newspaper in the old language and seeing that their children receive instruction in it. So in the remoter stretches of their diaspora the Greeks were more conscious of their Greekhood and made strenuous efforts to preserve it. And the central institution for this purpose was the gymnasium, which was to be found wherever Greeks were settled.”*

IX. Fritz Schachermeyr, *Griechische Geschichte. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der geistesgeschichtlichen und kulturmorphologischen Zusammenhänge*. Stuttgart 1960.

“Der Entwicklungsparallelismus von Antike und Abendland”.  
Übereinstimmungen (S.443):

“7. Beiden gemeinsam ist leider auch das Unheil der inneren Zwietracht, wie sie in Hellas zwischen den einzelnen Städten, in Europa aber zwischen



*Staaten und Nationen herrschte. Dieser hier wie dort allein durch Unvernunft herbeigeführten Zwietracht ist der Rückgang der machtpolitischen Geltung, zuzuschreiben, der in Hellas wie im Abendland weit vor einer Beendigung der Entwicklung bereits einsetzte.*

8. *In Parallele stehen auch der Hellenismus auf eigene Faust mit dem analogen Europäismus, den die modernen Überseevölker gegen Europa ins Treffen führen.*

9. *Der Undank, mit welchem sich Fremdvölker als Schüler gegen ihren Lehrer wenden, traf sowohl Griechenland wie auch Europa”.*

Unterschiede (S.444):

*“4.Im Gegensatz zum antiken Kulturablauf haben wir auch noch die neuen Schaffensmöglichkeiten der induktiven Forschung und der Naturwissenschaften erschlossen, Chemie und Biologie als neue Grunddisziplinen hinzugewonnen, auch die technische Auswertung von Erfindungen und wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen als hauptsächlichstes Betätigungsfeld eines rigorosen Arbeitsstrebens erwählt. In den Künsten schlug man gleichfalls neue Bahnen ein, die allerdings von der traditionellen Schönheit nun grundsätzlich wegführten. Mit den neuen Schaffensmöglichkeiten übernahmen wir neben der Sicherstellung unserer Fortschrittsdynamik allerdings auch manche Gefahren, ja ein gewisses Risiko für das Weiterbestehen der gesamten Menschheit. Die Griechen sind solchen Experimenten aus dem Wege gegangen, da sie das Sachliche nie über das Menschliche erhoben”.*

X. A.Andrews, The Greeks, London 1967.

1. Das fünfte vorchristliche Jahrhundert in Athen und seine sittengeschichtlichen Parallelen in Europa (S.217):

*“The affectations of fifth-century Athens have their nearest parallel in those of Elizabethan England, or in the Renaissance of Western Europe generally, and Alcibiades resembles some of the wilder figures of that Renaissance. He was an extreme case of the recklessness which set in towards the end of the fifth century, which contemporaries were apt to ascribe to the unsettling doctrines of certain of the sophists, and which was certainly intensified by the strains of a long war”.*

2. Die antimonarchische Einstellung der Griechen und der Amerikaner (S.247-8):

*“To revert for a moment to politics, the Greeks had every right to notice and emphasise the difference between their own various regimes and the kingdoms of the East, more particularly their overwhelmingly vast neighbour, the Persian Empire. No high degree of organisation seemed possible among these barbarians, unless it was held together by the authority of a king, reinforced with an amount of pomp and ceremony which the Greeks felt to be servile and ridiculous. In the same way, it was widely felt in Western Europe, till a very late date, that society could not be held together except by that hierarchy of hereditary kings and nobles which Americans came to resent as intolerable for free men. The overthrow of monarchy in Greece, lost though it is in the mists of her early history, was a revolution as significant as the American. The Greek alternative of free discussion and majority voting had its own dangers, and historians have been ready enough to point out their mistakes, including the occasions when discussion was not free and majority decisions were not accepted; but the Greek way allowed progress as well as mistakes.”*

J.T.