What Happens to Public Service Delivery under a Weak Civil Society? Evidence from India

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Published: Jul 29, 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.12681/npse.30880
Keywords:
civil society NREGA Uttar Pradesh corruption factionalism development transparency accountability villages India
Sujoy Dutta
Tata Institute of Social Sciences
Abstract

This paper argues the performance of public service delivery under weak civil society. Drawing on information from the world's largest workfare programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), it is argued that in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) benefits of NREGA hardly reach the poor. This is due to the presence of weak civil society organisations (CSOs), which is riddled with corruption and factionalism, and operates at the cost of social expense. The ruling elites who hold the key to these institutions have made it difficult for citizens to voice their concerns and negotiate their entitlements.

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Author Biography
Sujoy Dutta, Tata Institute of Social Sciences

Professor at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, India.

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